ל

מדינת ישראל

משרדי הממשלה

משרד _____

סמ, מ"ת _____

אוסלו, ינואר - יוני 1993

_____

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_____

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שם תיק: אוסלו -ינואר - יוני1993

מזהה פיזי: פ-5513/4

מזהה פריט: 001nwge

כתובת: 99-999-99-999

תאריך הדפסה: 29/09/2021

מחלקה _____

מס' תיק מקורי _____

ד"ר דן בונה

19/03/93

טל: 03-635-5973 (ב)

הצעות למצע המדיני - חוג משוב

א. מבוא

א-1. למרות איטיותו של תהליך השלום, הנמצא כבר בשנתו השניה, ניכרים במהלכו ניצנים של פתרונות לקראת קידום התהליך להסדר שלום כולל במזרח התיכון. על מדינת ישראל להמשיך ולדבוק בתהליך השלום ולמצות כל דרך אפשרית על מנת להגיע להסדר של שלום קבע, מלא וכולל, עם שכנותיה ועם בני העם הפלסטיני.

א-2. האלימות הגוברת ותרדות הבטחון האישי השוררות כיום רק מדגישות את חשיבות ההתקדמות לקראת הסדר שלום מלא וכולל עם מדינות ערב והפלסטינאים. על הסדרי השלום לתת מענה הן לבעיות בטחון המדינה ברמה הצבאית והן לבעיות בטחון הפרט ברמה האישית. "שלום ובטחון" אינם סותרים אחד את משנהו מכיוון שלראות בהסדרי השלום, כאשר יושגו, את הפתרון האמיתי והכולל לבעיות הבטחון (הצבאי והאישי) של מדינת ישראל ותושביה.

א-3. מפלגת העבודה, במציאות הפוליטית הישראלית, הינה מפלגה החותרת באופן מתמיד להשגת שלום תוך הולכת מדיניות מתונה, ריאלית, היודעת לשלב חכמה מדינית ובטחונית.

ב. עקרונות להסדר

ב-1. הבטחת בטחונה של מדינת ישראל במישור המדיני, הצבאי ובתחום בטחון הפרט. כל הסדר מדיני יגזר מהיכולת להבטיח את הבטחון.

ב-2. הסרת השליטה על אוכלוסית השטחים מכרסמים בנו - מהבחינה המוסרית, הכלכלית והבטחונית. על מדינת ישראל לשאוף להעביר את שליטתה הנוכחית באוכלוסיה הפלסטינית למימשל פלסטיני עצמאי, מסודר ואחראי שיאפשר לפלסטינים הגדרה עצמית של "ישות לאומית" נפרדת. במסגרת הסדרי השלום העתידיים תקבענה הגדרות מדוייקות יותר של ישות זו, כ "מדינה", כ "פדרציה" או הגדרות אלטרנטיביות אחרות שיוסכמו על הצדדים לסכסוך.

ב-3. מדינת ישראל מכירה בזכות ההגדרה העצמית של הפלסטינים ומוכנה לשבת למו"מ עם נציגים פלסטינאים, שיקבעו על ידם, המכירים בזכות קיומה של מדינת ישראל ושוללים את הטרור. כל זאת על בסיס החלטות מועצת הבטחון 242 ו338.

ב-4. מדינת ישראל מוכנה לנקוט במדיניות של "שטחים תמורת שלום" כדרך לקידום התהליך לקראת הסדר שלום כולל עם כל הצדדים בכל מדיניות זו יש לישם באופן גמיש: "חלק מהשטחים תמורת שלום" ולא "כל השטחים תמורת שלום מלא וכולל".

ב-5. מדינת ישראל מגדירה "שלום מלא וכולל" כמצב בו כל הצדדים לסכסוך מוותרים לתלוטין על פתרונות כוחניים כדרך לפתרון בעיות. "שלום מלא" כולל בתוכו יחסי שוויון וצדק בין הצדדים, יחסים דיפלומטיים מלאים, מכירה בפתרונן של חילוקי דעות, גבולות פתוחים ותנועת אוכלוסיה ותיירות חופשית, שיתוף פעולה כלכלי, מדעי ותרבותי.

ב-6. ישראל שואפת להגיע למצב בו יחסי השלום עם שכנותיה ישענו על רצונם של בני אדם ולא רק על האינטרסים של המנהיגות הפוליטית באותה עת. לפיכך תשקיע ישראל דרכים לטיפוח יחסי שלום וקירבה בין תושבי ישראל לתושבי הארצות השכנות במטרה לבסס את השלום ולהקנות לעמי האיזור ערכים של שלום.

ג. הצעות

ג-1. מדינת ישראל מוכנה לפשרות טריטוריליות בהתאם לעקרון של "שטחים תמורת שלום" כמוסכר בסעיפים ב-4 וב-5 לעיל. מפאת נדבכי חוסר האימון בין סוריה לישראל, מציעה ישראל כי הגישה של "שטחים תמורת שלום" תבוצע במהלך תקופה של 5-10 שנים חצדדים על טיפוח השלום וביסוסו לקראת שלום מלא וכולל.

ג-2. מדינת ישראל מוכנה להכיר בעתיד בישות פלסטינית, המייצגת את הפלסטינים בשטחים בתנאי שהיא תכיר באופן רשמי בזכות קיומה של מדינת ישראל, תתנגד לאלימות וטרור ותכריז על שאיפתה להשגת שלום מלא וכולל עם מדינת ישראל. בתנאים אלו תהיה מוכנה ישראל להכיר באש"פ ולנהל מו"מ עם מנהיגיו ונציגיו.

ג-3. מדינת ישראל מוכנה לדון עם הפלסטינים על הסדרי ביניים כגון: אוטונומיה, שלטון עצמי והסדרים אחרים כדרכים לקראת השגת הסדר שלום כולל. עם התקדמות המו"מ ולאחר קבלת בטחונות וערבויות לבטחונה, תהיה ישראל מוכנה, בשלב ראשון, להעביר את רצועת עזה לשלטון פלסטיני מסודר ואחראי.

ג-4. לאחר מימוש ההסדר בעזה תתנור ישראל להגיע לפתרון דומה בגדה המערבית, תוך בחינת הקמתה של מסגרת מדינית פלסטינית המשותפת לגדה ולרצועה. המעבר לשלב זה יהיה מותנה בהמשך המו"מ האיזורי הכולל ויבטיח זיקה בין פתרון הבעיה הפלסטינית לבין קידום ותזלין והשלום באיזור כולו.

ג.5 - ישראל תהיה מוכנה להסכמים לפירוק נשק הדדי והסדרי בטחון שיחולו על כל מדינות האיזור במסגרת ביסוסו של הסדר שלום מלא וכולל. ישראל תהיה מוכנה לנוכחות של כוחות בינלאומיים עליהם יוסכם כאמצעי ביניים להבטחת הבטחון ולהסרת אימים פוטנציאלים - וזאת עד שישרור שלום מלא וכולל שלא יצריך נוכחות זו.

ג-6. לקידום תהליך השלום ובנוצע תוכניות כלכליות אשר ובטית פיתוח מקורות פרנסה ותשתית משקית לקהילה הפלסטינית ותקדם בו זמנית שיתוף פעולה כלכלי, ישראלי-ערבי. התוכנית תיעשה בשיתוף וסיוע של גורמים בינלאומיים.

ג-7. מדינת ישראל רואה בעיר ירושלים את עיר הקודש לעם היהודי ואת בירתה הנצחית. במסגרת הסדר שלום כולל מוכנה ישראל לראות בחלקה המזרחי של העיר מחוז מוניציפלי שינוהל ע"י רשויות עירוניות פלסטיניות. במתכונת כזו תמשיך העיר להיות מאוחדת מבחינה אדמיניסטרטיבית כאשר לתושביה היהודים שייכות פוליטית למדינת ישראל ולתושביה הערביים שייכות פוליטית לישות הפלסטינית שתקום.

ק.ח.ק

סמיכה של ועדה מדינית
של תום "עשרה".

← הפגישה תתקיים ביום ב- 15.4 בשעה 18:00.

← על הנוכחים לשוב ולהדגיש את העקרון הקובע, האומר, שלא הוקמה, בכל הקשר שהוא, ועדה ארצית.

← דר. ציון מוזכר/הדפוס מצין אחרת.

← הישיבה הקרובה של הסיס מצפה שד. ציון בעניין הסיורה ויבקש כתוצאה שלא תוקדם.

← ומבוקש שד. מיוחס תעמוד לרשותנו.

← בנוגע לסעיף ה: אחרונה ליסכה, עדיין הנחיות ובשלב:

1. בסעיף ב-2 היתה התייחסות לשימוש במילה "בימוש", ובשעתו ביקש הנציג לשנות "בשלבי התאמתו". יש, אפוא, לפנות בנושא לחבריו את מהות המושג "מימוש פסיכון צבאי", והאם כוונתו ל"מימוש פסיכון צבאי".

3. אין מקום בנושא לחבריו את המושג "אזכור" בכתב" ב"מפלגת הקבוצה". ניתן כן לשלבו. עליו הנציג לחבריו את השימוש ב"מכתבה" "מוקדה" וכן בכל הקשרים בהם נתקלים, ב"בחין לחבריו", "מעשה לחבריו" וכו'.

4. הנוסח לחוסיף לסעיף ב-3 משפט על כך שאזכור שמות אזרחים מכתבה בכתב אל בכל שלב במכתבה הוא אינו אירוני "נסת משפט בדוח כלשהו.

4. סעיף ב-4, להחליף "שלום תמורת שלום"
במשפט "שטחים תמורת שלום".

5. במשנה סעיף הנוגע להחלטת מל"ט הדגש:
"בהתאם להחלטות ועדי ה"שוריס והפלשתינאים".

6. במשנה סעיף הנוגע לנסיגה בשלבים
להוסיף שלום תמורת נסיגה

7. סעיף ב-5: הוחלף להחלטת הנסיגה "בגזע
ישראל" ב: "בגזע הדגדים לסכסוך" מאחר ומדובר
בהכרעת אלוהים על הדגדים.
שניהם, הנוגע להפסקת ~~הפסקת~~ הדגל, ~~ולהחלטה~~
נושאי סעיף על הינוף הדמוקרטי בשבוי.

8. בסעיף א-1: יש הרבה לדיון מאחר על משמעות
המילים ראש הגולן. בנוסף, הנושאים הסוכמים בישיבה
שלושה מתוכנים בסיכומים א. בניה אחד 2.
הגבלת החתימה ג. מתיחת פלסטינאית.
הנוסחה הסופי של א-1 שלא היה לשביעון מוסכמה
ודורשת כתובה אלטרנטיבית לסעיף.

9. סעיף א-2: להחליף ולא יבפל אחרון "בנוגע לפלסטינים"

10. סעיף א-3: שמיר בניגוד לדעה שלו אפשר לדון
בסוגיות-בסיס, בכדי להתקדם אל מטרת אותו דבר בלשון
הסעיף. הרפס רבה. שמיעון שאר הנלחמים בניגוד להשתיב
את הסעיף, אם כי אט' נשלם אל הנוסחה, והפכיר במפורש
על כך.

11. שמיר אל מתנגד לסעיף א-4.

12. סעיף א-5: היו מוצעים בשמעון 2 על הבעיה/
בעיה נלחמת בינלאומי על בעיה. ארה"ב ערעון ואף.
בניגוד לבכרי אל הסעיף. הוחלט להשתיב את הסעיף
להמשך דיון.

כז. סעיף ד-ו הוקרא לפניו.

28. סעיף ה-ז: פיצוי מוסכם בגין הפרת חוזה בינלאומי בין שותפים. בין היתר בוררות מוסכמת בסיטקום, בית משפט, בוררות, בכפוף לסמכות שיפוט מוכרת בכל (אם יש בעיקר הנדון) בנוגע שיפוטי יהודים.

הוקראו בפניו בקשר לכאן: אין לה יכולה מהם ניגוד עניינים?

אין הדבר שם ואם יתעורר ספק הסמכות לקבוע הוא בידי המועצה.

כתוב הבא

ב 9/4/15

שעה: 08:00

בלשכת בית הדין

ד"ר דן בונה
19/03/93
טל: 03-635-5973 (ב)

הצעות למצע המדיני - חוג משוב

א. מבוא

א-1. למרות איטיותו של תהליך השלום, הנמצא כבר בשנתו השניה, ניכרים במהלכו ניצנים של פתרונות לקראת קידום התהליך להסדר שלום כולל במזרח התיכון. על מדינת ישראל להמשיך ולדבוק בתהליך השלום ולמצות כל דרך אפשרית על מנת לחניע להסדר של שלום קבע, מלא וכולל, עם שכנותיה ועם בני העם הפלסטיני.

א-2. תאלימות הגוברת ותרדות הבטחון האישי השוררות כיום רק מדגישות את חשיבות ההתקדמות לקראת הסדר שלום מלא וכולל עם מדינות ערב והפלסטינאים. של הסדרי השלום לתת מענה הן לבעיות בטחון המדינה ברמה הצבאית והן לבעיות בט[illegible] הפרט ברמה האישית. "שלום ובטחון" אינם סותרים אחד את משנהו מכיוון לראות בהסדרי השלום, באשר יושגו, את הפתרון האמיתי והכולל לבעיות הבטחון (הצבאי והאישי) של מדינת ישראל ותושביה.

א-3. מפלגת העבודה, במציאות הפוליטית הישראלית, הינה מפלגה החותרת באופן מתמיד להשגת שלום תוך הולכת מדיניות מתונה, ריאלית, היודעת לשלב חכמה מדינית ובטחונית.

ב. עקרונות להסדר

ב-1. הבטחת בטחונה של מדינת ישראל במישור המדיני, הצבאי ובתחום בטחון הפרט. כל הסדר מדיני יגזר מהיכולת להבטיח את הבטחון.

ב-2. [illegible] השליטה על אוכלוסית השטחים מכרסמים בנו - מהבחינה המוסרית, הכלכלית והבטחונית. על מדינת ישראל לשאוף להעביר את שליטתה הנוכחית באוכלוסיה הפלסטינית למימשל פלסטיני עצמאי, מסודר ואחראי שיאפשר לפלסטינים הגדרה עצמית של "ישות לאומית" נפרדת. במסגרת הסדרי השלום העתידיים תקבענה הגדרות מדוייקות יותר של ישות זו, כ "מדינה", כ "פדרציה" או הגדרות אלטרנטיביות אחרות שיוסכמו על הצדדים לסכסוך.

ב-3. מדינת ישראל מכירה בזכות ההגדרה העצמית של הפלסטינים ומוכנה לשבת למו"מ עם נציגים פלסטינאים, שיקבעו על ידם, המכירים בזכות קיומה של מדינת ישראל ושוללים את הטרור. כל זאת על בסיס [illegible] מועצת הבטחון 242 ו338.

ב-4. מדינת ישראל מוכנה לנקוט כמדיניות של "שטח[illegible]ים" כדרך לקידום התהליך לקראת הסדר שלום כולל עם כל הצדדים[illegible]יניות זו יש לישם באופן ~~מדורג~~: ~~[illegible]~~ ~~תמורת~~ שלום מלא וכולל".

ב-5. מדינת ישראל מגדירה "שלום מלא וכולל" כמצב [illegible]כל הצדדים לסכסוך מוותרים להלוטין על פתרונות כוחניים כדרך לפתרון בעי[illegible] "שלום מלא" כולל בתוכו יחסי שוויון וצדק בין הצדדים, יחסים דיפלומטיים מלאים, ~~מסחריים~~ לפתרונן של חילוקי דעות, גבולות פתוחים ותנועת אוכלוסיה ותיירות חופשית, שיתוף פעולה כלכלי, מדעי ותרבותי.

ב-6. ישראל שואפת להגיע למצב בו יחסי השלום עם שכנותיה ישענו על רצונם של ~~כל~~ ~~אדם~~ דלא רק על האינטרסים של ~~המנהיגות~~ ~~הפלסטינית באחוזות עכב~~. לפיכך ~~תשיב~~ ישראל דורכים לטיפוח יחסי שלום וקירבה בין ~~תושבי~~ ישראל ל~~תושבי~~ ~~האזורים~~ השכנים במטרה לבסס את השלום ~~בכל~~ ולהקנות לעמי האיזור ~~כולם~~ ערכים של שלום.

ג. חצעות

ג-1. מדינת ישראל מוכנה לפשרות טריטוריליות בהתאם לעקרון ~~שטחים~~ של "שטחים תמורת שלום" כמוסכר בסעיפים ב-4 וב-5 לעיל. מפאת ~~המצב הבטחוני~~ נדבכי חוסר האימון בין סוריה לישראל, מציעה ישראל כי הגישה של "שטחים תמורת שלום" תבוצע במהלך תקופה ~~של 5-10 שנים~~ שבהם ישקדו ~~המעורבים~~ חצדדים על טיפוח השלום וביסוסו לקראת שלום מלא וכולל.

ג-2. מדינת ישראל מוכנה להכיר ~~בכל ארגון~~ פלסטיני המייצג את הפלסטינים בשטחים בתנאי ~~זה~~ ~~יכיר~~ כאופן רשמי בזכות קיומה של מדינת ישראל, ~~תתנגד~~ לאלימות וטרור ותכריז על שאיפתה להשגת שלום מלא וכולל עם מדינת ישראל. בתנאים אלו תחיה מוכנה ישראל להכיר כאש"פ ולנהל מו"מ עם מנחיגיו ונציגיו.

ג-3. מדינת ישראל מוכנה לדון עם הפלסטינים על הסדרי ביניים כגון: אוטונומיה, שלטון עצמי והסדרים אחרים כדרכים לקראת השגת הסדר שלום כולל. עם התקדמות המו"מ ולאחר קבלת כטחונות וערבויות לכטחונה, תהיה ישראל מוכנה, בשלב ראשון, להעביר את רצועת עזה לשלטון פלסטיני מסודר ואחראי.

ג-4. לאחר מימוש ההסדר בעזה תתחור ישראל להגיע לפתרון דומה בגדה המערבית, תוך בחינת הקמתה של מסגרת מדינית פלסטינית המשותפת לגדה ולרצועה. המעבר לשלב זה יהיה מותנה כהמשך המו"מ האיזורי הכולל ויבטיח זיקה בין פתרון הבעיה הפלסטינית לבין קידום ושלום באיזור כולו.

ג-5 - ישראל תהיה מוכנה להסכמים לפירוק נשק הדדי ~~ה~~הסדרי בטחון שיחולו על כל מדינות האיזור במסגרת ביסוסו של הסדר שלום מלא וכולל. ישראל תהיה מוכנה לנוכחות של כוחות בינלאומיים עליהם יוסכם כאמצעי ביניים להכטחת הכטחון ולהסרת איומים פוטנציאלים - וזאת עד שישרור שלום מלא וכולל שלא יצריך נוכחות זו.

ג-6. לקידום תחליך ושלום ובואע ותכניות כלכליות אשר ותכיה פיתוח מקורות פרנסה ותשתית משקית לקהילה הפלסטינית ותקדם בו זמנית שיתוף פעולה כלכלי, ישראלי-ערבי. התוכנית תיעשה בשיתוף וסיוע של גורמים בינלאומיים.

ג-7. מדינת ישראל רואה בעיר ירושלים את עיר הקודש לעם היהודי ואת בירתה הנצחית. במסגרת הסדר שלום כולל מוכנה ישראל לראות בחלקה המזרחי של העיר מחוז מוניציפלי שינוהל ע"י רשויות עירוניות פלסטיניות. במתכונת כזו תמשיך העיר להיות מאוחדת מבחינה אדמיניסטרטיבית כאשר לתושכיה היהודים שייכות פוליטית למדינת ישראל ולתושכיה הערכיים שייכות פוליטית לישות חפלסטינית שתקום.

ליום ה. 1.4.93

סיכום של ועדה מיוחדת
של תום "שלום".

← הפגישה תתקיים ביום ב- 15.4 בשעה 18:00.

← על הנוכחים לבוא מוכנים הפעילות את הנושא הקונקרטי, המוצע, של הועדה, בכל הקשור לתחומי האחריות שלהם.

← יו"ר: מר בנימין אלון מטעם אלטרנטיבה.

← הישיבה הראשונה תקיים בנושא שלום. יו"ר בנימין כהנא תזמין את הנוכחים.

← הנושאים של יו"ר בישיבה הראשונה:

בנוגע לסעיף ה: הוחלט לחסיר, לעת עתה, נושא הנשק הגרעיני.

1. בסעיף ב-2 ביקש הציבור לשנות במילה "בישוב", ובמקומה לכתוב את המלה "השלכה הישראלית". יו"ר אלון בקש להבהיר את מהות המושג "מישטר פלסטיני עצמאי", והאם כוונתו ל"מישטר פלסטיני עצמי".

2. אורית שטרן בקשה להחליף את המושג "אזרחי ישראל" ב"אוכלוסיה הקבועה". נקבע כן לשנות.

עוד הוצע להכניס את המושג "מדינה" בסעיף ג, ב"בנין הבית", ו"מישטר הבית".

4. הוחלט להוסיף לסעיף ב-3 משפט על כך שאזרחי ישראל יוזמנו להציע מכרזה בתכנון אך בכל זאת כמובן כי אורית שטרן נסמך משפט כזה.

4. סעיף ב-4, להחליף "שלום תמורת שטחים" במקום "שטחים תמורת שלום".

5. בשלהי סעיף הוצע להחליף את "כל הצדדים" באופן פרטני "ישראל, הסורים והפלשתינאים".

6. בשלהי סעיף ה' הוצע להכניס נוסח על הצורך להסדר שלום עם מצ' וכו'.

7. סעיף ב-ט: הוחלט להחליף את הניסוח "תדיע ישראל" ב: "יצעו הצדדים לסכסוך" מאחר ורוצה להטיל אחריות על כל הצדדים.
מאידך, הוצע ~~לבטל את הסעיף כולו, אך להחליפו~~ בנוסח סעיף על חינוך לדמוקרטיה באיזור.

8. בסעיף ט-1: התנהל ויכוח ממושך על ~~[illegible]~~ העצרת רמת הגולן. בסוף, הוצגה הסוגיה שישנם שלושה מחסומים פסיכולוגיים 1. המילה אש"ף 2. המילה להחזיר. 3. מדינה פלסטינאית.
הניסוח הסופי של ט-1 לא היה לחלוטין מוסכם ואריה יכתוב אלטרנטיבה לסעיף.

9. סעיף ט-2: להחליף את "כל ארגון" ב"קהילה פלסטינית".

10. סעיף ט-3: מאיר ביקש לומר שאי אפשר להפוך טיפין-טיפין, קרי להתחיל את העבודה, אלא רק באופן כולל להתקין, להוסיף וכו'. מאידך שאר הנוכחים ביקשו להשאיר את הסעיף, אם כי אפשר לשנות את הניסוח, ולהבהיר במפורש את כוונה.

11. מאיר אינו מתנגד לסעיף ט-4.

12. סעיף ט-5: היו חילוקי [illegible] בעניין של הבאת/נוכחות נוכחות בינלאומית באיזור. אריה, ירון ודר. ביילין הציעו לבטל את הסעיף. הוחלט להשאיר את הסעיף להמשך דיון.

כן. סעיף ד-ו הועבר כלשונו.

לא. סעיף ה-ז: שלטון מעמד מיוחד בירושלים ע"י שוודיה. כן הוצע ביחס לזה מחסום פסיכולוגי, וגם שוודיה, כמו פינלנד שהיא מכירה כמו (קים אל בעמק הנגב) בעיר שעליה יהודים.

הוצע בעיה בקשר לכאן: איך לדעת מהי יחסי הכוחות לכאן?

כן הדגיש שמה ומוסד מיוחד על המלחמה לכאן הוא הפתרון הטוב.

כבוד הרב

ב 9/4/15

שם: 008

בלשכת בר-ג

An agreement has been achieved in Sarpsborg regarding the concept of a mutually envisaged Israeli-Palestinian understanding. The Sarpsborg backchannel will be maintained in order to assist progress in negotiations.

THE SARPSBORG ~~DOCUMENT~~ March 20, 1993

~~Negotiating Concept~~ An agreement has been achieved

~~It is suggested that full agreement will be achieved in~~ Sarpsborg regarding the concept of a mutually envisaged Israeli-Palestinian understanding. ~~Having achieved this, the~~ Sarpsborg backchannel will be maintained in order to assist progress in negotiations.

The Principles of a First Israeli-Palestinian Understanding

Israeli-Palestinian negotiations will concentrate on achieving agreement in regard to three documents: A DoP (Declaration of Principles), a CWP (Cooperation and Working Programme) and Guidelines for a ~~REDP (Regional Economic Development Plan)~~. Marshall Plan

I. Draft for DoP (Declaration of Principles)

1. The aim of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations is to obtain agreement regarding arrangements for establishing a Palestinian Self-Governing Authority, the Palestinian Interim Council, for a period leading to a permanent settlement based on Resolutions 242 and 338.

It is understood that the interim arrangements are an integral part of the whole process leading to the implementation of 242 and 338.

2. In order that the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza may govern themselves according to democratic principles direct, free and general political elections would be held three months after the signing of this DoP. Agreement on the exact mode and conditions of elections, will be achieved, not later than one month before elections. ~~See ANNEX one~~ as clarified ANNEX one.

3. The elections for the establishment of the Palestinian Interim Council will constitute a significant interim preparatory step towads the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.

4. The jurisdiction of the Palestinian Interim Council ~~will cover control over land as mutually agreed upon~~. will

5. Immediately after the signing of the DoP a transfer of authority from the Israeli military government and the Israeli Civil Administration to the Palestinians and such committees that will be appointed by the Palestinian representatives, will start.

The transfer of authority to the Palestinian committees will be of temporary and preparatory nature and will include Palestinian control over taxation, tourism, education, health and social welfare, as well as other agreed upon spheres.

6. In order to guarantee optimal economic development and growth, immediately with the signing of this DoP, a Palestinian Land Committee and a Palestinian Water Administration Committee will be established.

The Palestinian Land Committee and the Palestinian Water Administration Committee will be given immediate powers as mutually agreed upon. A coordinated land and water resources development plan will be negotiated between the Palestinian Land Committee and the Palestinian Water Administration Committee on the one, and the Government of Israel on the other side.

7. In order to guarantee optimal security arrangements for the Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Palestinian Interim Council will establish a strong police force, responsible for internal security and public order.

Preparatory steps, necessary for the establishment of the Palestinian police force, will be taken immediately after the signing of the DoP, in liaison with the Palestinians, Israel, Egypt and Jordan.

8. In order to enable the Interim Self-Government Authority, the Palestinian Interim Council, to promote economic growth, several institutions will be established at the time of its inauguration, such as: a Palestinian Land Authority, a Palestinian Water Administration Authority, a Palestinian Electricity Authority, a Gaza Sea Port Authority, a Palestinian Development Bank, a Palestinian Export Promotion Board and an Environmental Authority.

The Palestinian committees will negotiate with the Government of Israel, the necessary relevant agreements for these institutions.

9. The Palestinian Interim Council will be empowered to legislate for all the authorities that are mutually agreed upon. Both parties will reassess jointly all laws and military orders presently in force.

10. An Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee will be established and will deal with all issues of dispute and

common interest. Agreements on cooperation and liaison will be negotiated and implemented on the professional levels in order to provide for security and mutual understanding between both parties.

11. Further liaison and cooperation arrangements will be negotiated and agreed upon between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority on one hand and the Governments of Jordan and Egypt on the other hand.

12. Immediately after signing the DoP the transitional period of five years will begin. As soon as possible, but not later than the beginning of the third year, negotiations will take place to determine the final status of the West Bank, including Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip ~~and its relationship with its neighbours~~ on the basis of Security Council resolution 242.

13. After the signing of the DoP, Israeli-Palestinian negotiations on the redeployment of Israeli military forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will start. A first redeployment of forces will be carried out on the eve of elections for the Palestinian Interim Council.

Further redeployments will be gradually implemented, ~~in line with the introduction of other security measures.~~

At the end of the second year of the interim-period, Israeli military forces will withdraw completely from Gaza, in the spirit of partial implementation of 242 and 338. The Israeli withdrawal will be fully coordinated with the Palestinian Interim Council.

After the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza a trusteeship will be established, as to be agreed upon between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority.

14. The Israeli and the Palestinian delegations will negotiate an Interim-Agreement that will specify the mechanisms and substance of the envisaged transfer of authority.

same as
+ notes

An agreement has been achieved in Sarpsborg regarding the concept of a mutually envisaged Israeli-Palestinian understanding. The Sarpsborg backchannel will be maintained in order to assist progress in negotiations.

THE SARPSBORG ~~DOCUMENT~~ March 20, 1993

~~Negotiating Concept~~ An agreement has been achieved

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It is understood that the interim arrangements are an integral part of the whole process leading to the implementation of 242 and 338.

2. In order that the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza may govern themselves according to democratic principles direct, free and general political elections would be held three months after the signing of this DoP. Agreement on the exact mode and conditions of elections, will be achieved, not later than one month before elections.

3. The elections for the establishment of the Palestinian Interim Council will constitute a significant interim preparatory step towads the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.

4. The jurisdiction of the Palestinian Interim Council will ~~cover control over land as mutually agreed upon~~.

5. Immediately after the signing of the DoP a transfer of authority from the Israeli military government and the Israeli Civil Administration to the Palestinians and such committees that will be appointed by the Palestinian representatives, will start.

The transfer of authority to the Palestinian committees will be of temporary and preparatory nature and will include Palestinian control over taxation, tourism, education, health and social welfare, as well as other agreed upon spheres.

6. In order to guarantee optimal economic development and growth, immediately with the signing of this DoP, a Palestinian Land Committee and a Palestinian Water Administration Committee will be established.

The Palestinian Land Committee and the Palestinian Water Administration Committee will be given immediate powers as mutually agreed upon. A coordinated land and water resources development plan will be negotiated between the Palestinian Land Committee and the Palestinian Water Administration Committee on the one, and the Government of Israel on the other side.

7. In order to guarantee optimal security arrangements for the Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Palestinian Interim Council will establish a strong police force, responsible for internal security and public order.

Preparatory steps, necessary for the establishment of the Palestinian police force, will be taken immediately after the signing of the DoP, in liaison with the Palestinians, Israel, Egypt and Jordan.

8. In order to enable the Interim Self-Government Authority, the Palestinian Interim Council, to promote economic growth, several institutions will be established at the time of its inauguration, such as: a Palestinian Land Authority, a Palestinian Water Administration Authority, a Palestinian Electricity Authority, a Gaza Sea Port Authority, a Palestinian Development Bank, a Palestinian Export Promotion Board and an Environmental Authority.

The Palestinian committees will negotiate with the Government of Israel, the necessary relevant agreements for these institutions.

9. The Palestinian Interim Council will be empowered to legislate for all the authorities that are mutually agreed upon. Both parties will reassess jointly all laws and military orders presently in force.

10. An Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee will be established and will deal with all issues of dispute and

common interest. Agreements on cooperation and liaison will be negotiated and implemented on the professional levels in order to provide for security and mutual understanding between both parties.

11. Further liaison and cooperation arrangements will be negotiated and agreed upon between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority on one hand and the Governments of Jordan and Egypt on the other hand.

12. Immediately after signing the DoP the transitional period of five years will begin. As soon as possible, but not later than the beginning of the third year, negotiations will take place to determine the final status of the West Bank, including Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip ~~and its relationship with its neighbours~~ as specified in Article 4.

13. After the signing of the DoP, Israeli-Palestinian negotiations on the redeployment of Israeli military forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will start. A first redeployment of forces will be carried out on the eve of elections for the Palestinian Interim Council.

Further redeployments will be gradually implemented. ~~in line with the introduction of other security measures.~~

At the end of the second year of the interim-period, Israeli military forces will withdraw completely from Gaza, in the spirit of partial implementation of 242 and 338. The Israeli withdrawal will be fully coordinated with the Palestinian Interim Council.

After the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza a trusteeship will be established, as to be agreed upon between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority.

14. The Israeli and the Palestinian delegations will negotiate an Interim-Agreement that will specify the mechanisms and substance of the envisaged transfer of authority.

THE SARPSBORG DOCUMENT March 18, 1993

Negotiating Concept

It is suggested that full agreement will be achieved in Sarpsborg regarding the concept of a mutually envisaged Israeli-Palestinian understanding. Having achieved this, the Sarpsborg backchannel will be maintained in order to assist progress in negotiations.

The Principles of a First Israeli-Palestinian Understanding

Israeli-Palestinian negotiations will concentrate on achieving agreement in regard to three documents: A DoP (Declaration of Principles), a CWP (Cooperation and Working Programme) and Guidelines for a REDP (Regional Economic Development Plan).

I. Draft for DoP (Declaration of Principles)

1. The aim of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations is to obtain agreement regarding arrangements for establishing a Palestinian Self-Governing Authority, the Palestinian Interim Council, for a period leading to a permanent settlement based on Resolutions 242 and 338.

It is understood that the interim arrangements are an integral part of the whole process leading to the implementation of 242 and 338.

2. In order that the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza may govern themselves according to democratic principles direct, free and general political elections would be held three months after the signing of this DoP. Agreement on the exact mode and conditions of elections, will be achieved, not later than one month before elections.

3. The elections for the establishment of the Palestinian Interim Council will constitute a significant interim preparatory step towads the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.

4. The jurisdiction of the Palestinian Interim Council will cover control over land, as mutually agreed upon.

5. Immediately after the signing of the DoP a transfer of authority from the Israeli military government and the Israeli Civil Administration to the Palestinians and such committees that will be appointed by the Palestinian representatives, will start.

The transfer of authority to the Palestinian committees will be of temporary and preparatory nature and will include Palestinian control over taxation, tourism, education, health and social welfare, as well as other agreed upon spheres.

6. In order to guarantee optimal economic development and growth, immediately with the signing of this DoP, a Palestinian Land Committee and a Palestinian Water Administration Committee will be established.

The Palestinian Land Committee and the Palestinian Water Administration Committee will be given immediate powers as mutually agreed upon. A coordinated land and water resources development plan will be negotiated between the Palestinian Land Committee and the Palestinian Water Administration Committee on the one, and the Government of Israel on the other side.

7. In order to guarantee optimal security arrangements for the Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Palestinian Interim Council will establish a strong police force, responsible for internal security and public order.

Preparatory steps, necessary for the establishment of the Palestinian police force, will be taken immediately (after the signing of the DoP), in liaison with the Palestinians, Israel, Egypt and Jordan.

8. In order to enable the Interim Self-Government Authority, the Palestinian Interim Council, to promote economic growth, several institutions will be established at the time of its inauguration, such as: a Palestinian Land Authority, a Palestinian Water Administration Authority, a Palestinian Electricity Authority, a Gaza Sea Port Authority, a Palestinian Development Bank, a Palestinian Export Promotion Board and an Environmental Authority.

The Palestinian committees will negotiate with the Government of Israel, the necessary relevant agreements for these institutions.

9. The Palestinian Interim Council will be empowered to legislate for all the authorities that are mutually agreed upon. Both parties will reassess jointly all laws and military orders presently in force.

10. An Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee will be established and will deal with all issues of dispute and

common interest. Agreements on cooperation and liaison will be negotiated and implemented on the professional levels in order to provide for security and mutual understanding between both parties.

11. Further liaison and cooperation arrangements will be negotiated and agreed upon between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority on one hand and the Governments of Jordan and Egypt on the other hand.

12. Immediately after signing the DoP the transitional period of five years will begin. As soon as possible, but not later than the beginning of the third year, negotiations will take place to determine the final status of the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip and its relationship with its neighbours.

13. After the signing of the DoP, Israeli-Palestinian negotiations on the redeployment of Israeli military forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will start. A first redeployment of forces will be carried out on the eve of elections for the Palestinian Interim Council.

Further redeployments will be gradually implemented in line with the introduction of other security measures.

At the end of the second year of the interim-period, Israeli military forces will withdraw completely from Gaza, in the spirit of partial implementation of 242 and 338. The Israeli withdrawal will be fully coordinated with the Palestinian Interim Council.

After the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza a trusteeship will be established, as to be agreed upon between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority.

(14. After Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, joint Israeli-Palestinian development projects will be established and promoted in the locations of present Israeli settlements.)

15. The Israeli and the Palestinian delegations will negotiate an Interim-Agreement that will specify the mechanisms and substance of the envisaged transfer of authority.

During the transitional period, representatives of Israel and the Palestinian Interim Council may decide by agreement to seek arbitration. The conditions for arbitration will then have to be fully and mutually agreed upon.

אוניברסיטת חיפה
UNIVERSITY OF HAIFA

אגף מינהל תלמידים
מדור אישורים

41224 776430
15/3/93 Jerrold Welt

Amerca Inchaken

(1) First Plan
15/3 (?) end of
Rush to Chat -
the issue is raised
- ~~possibility~~ to check
check possibility
of Summit Shuttle Diplomacy
(before repatriation, Hol!!))

(2) Fromt Stage of Shuttle Diplomacy
proposed date: 28/March 1993
(a) obtain agreement in principle
for the concept →
get all sides to work:

Israel: ~~Rabin~~ in Palestine:
Proposal for Immediate Withdrawal
of Authority
Proposal for Establishment of Police Force
Proposal for Elections
Proposal for ~~CBM~~ — linked
mutually

אוניברסיטת חיפה
UNIVERSITY OF HAIFA

אגף מינהל תלמידים
מדור אישורים

18/5
24/4

67= Jewish to a Request for a Dem. Sta

(a)

(b) Negotiate two Projects
in Uzbek

19 April 1993

(3) Second Study for Shuttle Diplomacy
proper date:
2 May 1993 -

(a) also agreement about draft of
Protocol D.P. CWC w
when Jordan & Mubarak is

→

Next rules to work:

Israeli & Palestinian prepare projects for

(i) Land and Water Resources
Development Plan

(ii) Proposal for establishment of institutional & Juridical
Relations between
Relations with Arab Authority

Palestine Electricity Authority
Jerusalem Port Authority
Palest. Development Bank
Palest. Export Promotion Board
Palestine Industrial Authority

(III) Proposal for Repeal of Legislation & Enactment of Regulations for Legal Rights of Arabs

(IV) Proposal for Creation of Mechanism

(V) Proposal for Employment of Hebrew Press in Stages (Start: ;) Full Employment.

(VI) (6) Negotiate with Multilateral

24/Sept Write

Agent - Report Progress & Write Protocol

DR Tzfat

אוניברסיטת חיפה
UNIVERSITY OF HAIFA

אגף מינהל תלמידים
מדור ישורים

Reference 2/5
Israel Rehabilitation Program

Economic Development
Authority MW - May -
to PEDP
REDP

(1) Bi-lateral Negotiations.
~~Recognition May~~ May 31 -

(4) Third Step of Shuttle Diplomacy 20 June
Families repatriated
to
Dor, Ofer, Ahuzat Ela

Next

3c i, ii
W. a xv

(a) principle of Israeli-related
negotiations will be:

i) agreement on unanimous transfer
of authority in the sphere of
taxation, tourism, education,
health & social welfare

ii) agreement - elections
Knesset to be off D.P. law to be applied

iv) agreement on an Israeli-related
(WB & Gaza) police force
~~United~~ Regional Council to the

~~v) Agreement that rights~~

v) Israeli military - principle to
withdraw from the Gaza Strip
at the end of the 2nd year of
the interim-period

(b) Agreement on a ~~partnership~~ mutually open up
(with Jordan) withdrawal

15 Even if one of the necessary approvals will not be granted in time, the elections to the Student Council of a new institution, shall be held as agreed upon date.

In this case, the elected Student Council will continue negotiations with the S.U.I.

Accordingly, the delegation of powers and the transfer of authority, regarding those specific ones, that will not have been agreed upon before the date of elections, will be postponed until mutual agreement will have been achieved.

Palestine Electricity Authority
Jerusalem Port Authority
Palest. Development Bank
Palest. Export Promotion Board
Israel Environmental Authority

(III) Request ~~to open~~ for Review of
Application & Issue Rules of
Respect. to
Legal Right of 1961

(IV) Request for ~~Issue to~~ Issue
Machine

(V) Request for Postponement of
Matriculation Exam in Subject
(date:)
for Med. Applicant

(VI) (B) Negotiate ~~in Subject~~ Multilateral

24/Sept Agent - Request
Date Copy
& Visa Refund

Reference 2/5

Israel Scholarship Programs

Economic Development

funding PEDS

by REDP

May -

(1) Bi-Lokrat Nyatuk.

~~Recipient May~~ May 31 -

(4) The Step of Hatfla Nyki 20 June

Families reunion

by

D.P., Chil, Marshall Is.

Hart

אוניברסיטת חיפה
UNIVERSITY OF HAIFA

אגף מינהל תלמידים
מדור אישורים

41224 776430

1-13/93 Jerrold Wilk

American Embassy

(1) Front Page
K/3 (") seal of
Rule to Chet -
Us issue in more;
- you today to check
check pm. Thursday
at Embassy Shuttle Diplomacy
(before repatriation!!!)

(2) Front Stage of Shuttle Diplomacy
proper date: 28./March 1993
(a) Start agreement on principle
for the concept →
get all sides to work?

Israel: ~~Start~~ on Palestine
Proposal for Immediate i.r. of
of Authority
Proposal to Establishment of Joint Force
Proposal for Elections
Proposal for CMP — bilateral
multilateral

Refuge 2/5

Israel Kehalchut Program

Economic Department

Jewish REDS

Arab REDP

Mw - May -

(1) Bikkurei Nyatuh.

~~Kroepheut May~~ May 31 -

(4) Third Step of Hostile Infiltration 20 June

Families repatriated

to

Qal, Chl, Ahuzat Bl.

Hart

אוניברסיטת חיפה
UNIVERSITY OF HAIFA

אגף מינהל תלמידים
מדור אישורים

The people of Israel Police
negotiations will be -

i) agreement on immediate transfer
of authority in the spheres of
taxation, education, welfare,
health, and social welfare

ii) agreement - Civil
Administration will be dismantled.

iii) agreement on an Israeli-Police
Civil [illegible] function in
United Regional Security [illegible]

~~iv) Agreement that [illegible]~~

v) Israel obligated [illegible] to
withdraw [illegible] to [illegible] lines
at the end of the [illegible] period.
The withdrawal-period

(vi) Agreement on [illegible] to
(after Israeli withdrawal)

15 Even in case the necessary approvals will not be finalized in time, the elections to the Polefrucia Council in Argentina, shall be held as agreed upon date.

In this case, the elected Polefrucia Council will continue exercising its functions until the finalization of approvals, namely that specific case, Haifa will not have the agreed upon before its exit of elected, but the postponed until approvals will have been achieved.

1013/93

Invitation to Bilaterals

The United States and Russia, as co-sponsors of the Middle East peace negotiations, invite the parties to the bilateral negotiations to reconvene in Washington on April 20 and continue without interruption until May 6. Administrative arrangements and other procedures will be unchanged from previous rounds of negotiations. Each party is requested to inform the co-sponsors of any religious or national holidays on which it would prefer not to conduct negotiations during this round.

The co-sponsors want to reemphasize their commitment and determination to achieve substantive progress toward the shared objective of a comprehensive peace settlement based on United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The co-sponsors trust that all of the parties to the negotiations will approach the next round of talks with equal commitment to overcome differences and achieve real progress. In this respect, the co-sponsors are prepared to promote actively forward movement in the negotiations.

10/3/93

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10/3/93

Text of U.S./Russian Announcement

The United States and Russia, as co-sponsors of the Middle East peace process, have extended invitations to Israel, Jordan, Syria, Palestinians and Lebanon to resume bilateral negotiations in Washington on Tuesday, April 20. This ninth round of negotiations will continue in uninterrupted fashion until Thursday, May 6.

In conveying this invitation to the parties, the co-sponsors have reemphasized their commitment and determination to achieve substantive progress toward the common objective of a comprehensive peace settlement based on U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The co-sponsors have conveyed to the parties their intention to work with the parties actively to promote substantive progress in the negotiations.

The co-sponsors have also notified host countries for the next round of multilateral working groups that the working groups have been rescheduled. The co-sponsors have proposed that the Water Working Group convene in Geneva April 27-29; that the Economic Development Working Group convene in Rome May 4-5; that the Refugee Working Group convene in Oslo May 11-13; that the Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group convene in Washington May 17-20; and that the Environment Working Group convene in Tokyo in late May.

With the resumption of both bilateral and multilateral negotiations, the co-sponsors join the parties in expressing their conviction that 1993 should be a year of substantive progress toward peace and reconciliation.

03

February 28, 1993

From: Yair Hirschfeld

to: Shimon Peres

via: Yossi Beilin

1. On Friday, February 26, I got a phone-call from Hanan Ashrawi asking me urgently to come to see her and Faisal. Accordingly, two meetings with them took place, yesterday; one in Ramallah with Faisal and Hanan, and a second one in Jerusalem, only with Faisal. (see the enclosed report on these two meetings).

2. The Palestinian requests and concessions for the proposed four-point package deal are a very clear response to the last meeting Faisal and Ziyyad had with you on Sunday, February 21, 1993.

3. Faisal still has to reconfirm the Palestinian acceptance of the idea that the Four-Point Package Deal will be negotiated confidentially, without a public Israeli announcement pledging not to enact further deportations.

In case Faisal will - against his own judgement - insist on a public Israeli statement, I would recommend to suspend talks with them and announce unilaterally the date for the renewal of bilateral negotiations.

4. Faisal and Hanan expect, to hear from me, or from the Americans, that the principles for the suggested Four-Point Package Deal, are acceptable. Hereby, the official channels would gain about two weeks time, to work out the details of the package deal. Thereafter, it would be extremly useful, if the package deal could be finally put together in another meeting between yourself and Faisal. At such a meeting acceptable conditions for having elections, as soon as possible should also be discussed.

5. Agreement on principle on the package deal, will enable us also, to arrange meetings for preparing a coordinated Israeli-Palestinian approach for promoting various multilateral issues.

6. If I would be permitted to go to Washington at the later part of the next bilateral round of negotiations, we would create an effective back-channel.

(2 enclosures)

Summary Report on Meeting with Faisal and Hanan (February 27, 8.oo - 10.oo a.m. and with Faisal, 12.30 - 12.50).

1. It is proposed that no further declarations will be made: the Government of Israel will not be asked to make a statement, regarding its determination to refrain from further deportations. The Palestinians will not make a statement that they will attend negotiations in Washington on April 19, 1993. Yet, the Palestinians will understand that the GoI does not intend to carry out further deportations; whereas Israel (the United States, Syria, Jordan and Egypt) will understand that the Palestinians will attend negotiations in April, in Washington.

2. Instead of a declaration, the GoI and the Palestinians will prepare a package deal. The following components of this package deal shall be agreed upon:

a. In return for a confidential Israeli pledge not to carry out further deportations, the Palestinians will enter confidential talks with the GoI, as of how, to stop the use of violence against Israeli and Palestinian targets. Faisal and Hanan referred specifically to their intention to work out a stage by stage deal with the Black Panthers that will at first bring about an obligation for a prolonged "ceasefire", and will be followed by movement towards dissolving the Black Panther organisation both in rural and urban areas.

b. In line with the implementation of UN SC Resolution 799 a re-scheduling of the return of the Hamas deportees should be agreed upon. Specifically, Faisal and Hanan suggested that the Israeli "Re-examining the Cases Committee" (waadat habdika) shall announce on radio and tv the names of those, who are allowed to return at once, referring every day - again in the mass media - to the names of two or three. This way, the pressure upon the families of the deportees would be increased. Faisal and Hanan hope that all deportees will be permitted to return by the end of the summer. They have also suggested (half jokingly, half seriously) that the returned deportees should be arrested and isolated.

c. To counter-balance the Hamas, a list of PLO deportees, deported since 1967 permitted to return will be announced. Also here they ask that the people permitted to return shall come back in stages. At first twenty, then again twenty, and then smaller numbers. Care shall be taken to guarantee that those permitted to return will cover all areas: cities, villages and refugee camps. Specifically the request was made, to permit former heads of Student Councils to return. I shall get a list of proposed names in the coming days. For the Ramallah area they mentioned already some names: Akram Haniye, Taysir Aruri, Azmi Shuabi, Marvan Barghuti,

Samir Sbehat, Hana Nasr, Alfred Tubassi and Abdel Jawad Saleh.

d. Finally, they asked for various CBM's. (see: enclosed ten point list, written by Hanan).

3. When negotiations start in mid-April efforts should be directed at reaching a quick understanding on elections. And the elections should be held as soon as possible thereafter. (Evidently, the four-point package deal should be built in such a way, as to prepare the public atmosphere for elections).

4. In Washington it would be important to create a backchannel mechanism, that could assist in overcoming difficulties.

5. Hanan complained bitterly about Martin Indyk, who leaked a conversation with her to the press and had claimed that Secretary of State Christopher had called the PLO a "terrorist organisation".

Feb. 27, '93

Human Rights:

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   Over 50 yrs. old, below 17 yrs. old, women, health reasons, length of sentence (20 yrs.), Administrative detainees
   - Closure of Ketziot

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   Reducing taxes, cancelling fines + fees, investments opportunities, encouragements

3. Family reunification - in categories: esp. returnees from Kuwait + Gulf, 1st. degree relatives, el

4. Immediate halt to house demolition

5. "Undercover/special units" - disbanding. Halt to summary executions

6. End use of live ammunition agnst unarmed civilians

7. Removal of fences, barrels, + other barriers from refugee camps - Opening blocked roads

8. Unsealing sealed homes

9. Ending collective punishments - curfews, etc.

10. Ending tree-uprooting

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Feb. 27, '93

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FEB. 27, 1993

P. Binding commitment that Israel will not resort to deportation in the future

I. Although deportation is permissible by law in Israel, the govt has no (we have no) intention of ~~applying it~~ of carrying out any further deportations

P. In compliance with UNSCR 799, Israel undertakes to:
steps - accelarated, to be agreed upon

I. To implement UNSCR 799 as soon as possible, Israel will accelarate the return of the deportees
(~ 100 before April)
1 review board - daily announcing names to return
All return by summer - Aug.

P. + I. Agreed-upon list of deportees since 1967 to be returned in sizable #s
(in each group, significant names - geogr. + pol. cross-section

P. Concrete, broad, effective human rights measures - to be agreed upon
(Economic + social + individ., etc.)

Public

1, 6 ✓. 3, 4, 5 (2)

PL - re. The fence(.) has no right
of carrying out any public departure

First Paragraph: Israel - legal + security

2nd Paragr. - Israel v. Feb. 1, 1993 -
consent with Resolut 799 -

3rd Paragr - what: Resolut, to resum-
Israel will not carry out departure;
pravda Isr. security is not jeopardized

4th Peace Process -
(Israeli unilateral statement - A shall
consult.) Israel shall not agree + begin
to meet Pal. req.

~~Bo~~ They got 1 e 6 for US just
They get 3, 4 or 5;
let 2 to be agreed upon privately
— Rabin needs no public statement -
they come to negotiate - !!

Feb. 27, '93

P. Negotiations –

- 242, 338 basis of whole process, applicable to both phases – interlock in time + substance, non-prejudicial aspect
- Geographic / territorial jurisdiction (all Pal. territory occupied in 1967)
- Recognition that land is "occupied"
- One legal system
- Legislation rights (to rescind Military Orders as needed, new legislation) within terms of the agreement
- Separate economic unit
- No non-negotiable areas

Feb. 27, '93

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3. Family reunification - in categories: esp. returnees from Kuwait + Gulf, 1st. degree relatives, etc

4. Immediate halt to house demolition

5. "Undercover/special units" - disbanding. Halt to summary executions

6. End use of live ammunition agnst unarmed civilians

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(Economic + social + individ., etc.)

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1, 6 ✓. 3, 4, 5

(2)

D.K.

A I - ny. The fm of J. has no intn of carrying out mass public demonstrations

---

First Paragraph: Israel- legal + security

2nd Paragr - Israel v Feb. 1, 1993- consent until Resolut 799 -

3rd Paragr - what : Kyatsat, to resume- Israel will not carry out deportn.; provided its security is not jeopardized

4th Peace Process -
(Israeli unilateral statement - it shall consider.) Israel shall not agreement design to meet Pal. needs,

---

~~B~~ They get 1 & 6 for US just
they get 3, 4 or 5;
let 2 to be ~~do~~ agreed upon privately
- Rabin needs no public statement -
they come to negotiations - !!

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3. Family reunification - in categories: esp. returnees from Kuwait + Gulf, 1st. degree relatives, el

4. Immediate halt to house demolition

5. "Undercover/special units" - disbanding. Halt to summary executions

6. End use of live ammunition agnst unarmed civilians

7. Removal of fences, barrels, + other barriers from refugee camps - Opening blocked roads

8. Unsealing sealed homes

9. Ending collective punishments - curfews, etc.

10. Ending tree-uprooting

Feb. 27, '91

P. Negotiations –

- 242, 338 basis of whole process, applicable to both phases – interlock in time + substance, non-prejudicial aspect
- Geographic / territorial jurisdiction (all Pal. territory occupied in 1967)
- Recognition that land is "occupied"
- One legal system
- Legislation rights (to rescind Military Orders as needed, new legislation) within terms of the agreement
- Separate economic unit
- No non-negotiable areas

Y.H.
February 26, 1993

PLAN AND TIMETABLE FOR (US-PROPOSED)(?) ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN NEGOTIATIONS

I. Agreeing on the Negotiating Concept

At the forthcoming visit of PM Rabin to Washington and his meeting with President Clinton, the concept, the aims and the timetable of a negotiating plan should be discussed and agreed upon:

1. The Concept

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The US-Government will suggest to Israel and the Palestinians to concentrate negotiations on achieving the following aims:

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3. A Timetable for Negotiations

a. The First Stage of the US Shuttle Diplomacy Effort:

proposed date: 28 March 1993

goal: obtain agreement on the aims of the proposed negotiating concept;

get all sides to work:

Israeli and Palestinian delegations will be asked to prepare:

i. Proposal for Immediate Transfer of Authority (in spheres specified above);
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iv. Proposal for Israeli-Palestinian CWP (both on the bi- and the multilateral levels).

US-AID, the World Bank, the Commission of the European Communities will be asked to prepare:

i. Guidelines for a Regional Economic Development Programme.

b) Renewing Bilateral Negotiations in Washington

proposed date: April 19, until May 7, 1993 (the 9th round)

proposals described under 3) a) i, ii, iii and iv shall be negotiated.

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proposed date: May 10, 1993

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proposed date: May 31 - June 18, 1993

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proposed date: June 20, 1993

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Keep the earlier document

Y.H.
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Summary Report on Meeting with Faisal and Hanan (February 27, 8.00 - 10.00 a.m. and with Faisal, 12.30 - 12.50).

1. It is proposed that no further declarations will be made: the Government of Israel will not be asked to make a statement, regarding its determination to refrain from further deportations. The Palestinians will not make a statement that they will attend negotiations in Washington on April 19, 1993. Yet, the Palestinians will understand that the GoI does not intend to carry out further deportations: whereas Israel (the United States, Syria, Jordan and Egypt) will understand that the Palestinians will attend negotiations in April, in Washington.

2. Instead of a declaration, the GoI and the Palestinians will prepare a package deal. The following components of this package deal shall be agreed upon:

a. In return for a confidential Israeli pledge not to carry out further deportations, the Palestinians will enter confidential talks with the GoI, as of now, to stop the use of violence against Israeli and Palestinian targets. Faisal and Hanan referred specifically to their intention to work out a stage by stage deal with the Black Panthers that will at first bring about an obligation for a prolonged "ceasefire", and will be followed by movement towards dissolving the Black Panther organisation both in rural and urban areas.

b. In line with the implementation of UN SC Resolution 799 a re-scheduling of the return of the Hamas deportees should be agreed upon. Specifically, Faisal and Hanan suggested that the Israeli "Re-examining the Cases Committee" (waadat habdika) shall announce on radio and tv the names of those, who are allowed to return at once, referring every day - again in the mass media - to the names of two or three. This way, the pressure upon the families of the deportees would be increased. Faisal and Hanan hope that all deportees will be permitted to return by the end of the summer. They have also suggested (half jokingly, half seriously) that the returned deportees should be arrested and isolated.

c. To counter-balance the Hamas, a list of PLO deportees, deported since 1967 permitted to return will be announced. Also here they ask that the people permitted to return shall come back in stages. At first twenty, then again twenty, and then smaller numbers. Care shall be taken to guarantee that those permitted to return will cover all areas: cities, villages and refugee camps. Specifically the request was made, to permit former heads of Student Councils to return. I shall get a list of proposed names in the coming days. For the Ramallah area they mentioned already some names: Akram Haniye, Tayeir Arouri, Hani Shuabi, Marvan Barghuti,

Samir Sbenaa, Hana Naar, Alfred Tubassi and Abdel Jawad Salen.

d. Finally, they asked for various CBM s. (See) enclosed ten point list, written by Hanan).

3. When negotiations start in mid-April efforts should be directed at reaching a quick understanding on elections. And the elections should be held as soon as possible thereafter. (Evidently, the four-point package deal should be built in such a way, as to prepare the public atmosphere for elections).

4. In Washington it would be important to create a backchannel mechanism, that could assist in overcoming difficulties.

5. Hanan complained bitterly about Martin Indyk, who leaked a conversation with her to the press and had claimed that Secretary of State Christopher had called the PLO a "terrorist organisation".

Minutes for the meeting

with

SP

Date: 21/2/1993

Time: 2:20pm

Present: Yosi Beilin, Yair Herchfeld, SP' staff.

Palestinians: Faisal Husseini, Ziad Abu Zayyad

Minutes: Oreint House Staffer

FH: When is your meeting with Christopher, 22 or 23?

SP: I will take him from the airport, talk briefly, but main talks the next day. I met him for an hour in Washington. On his team he has many people that are knowledgeable, like Sam Lewis. Wisner with Les Aspin. You have the old hands, Dennis is a consultant. They told in Washington that have 4 basic priorities in their policies:

1- Keep regions of the World away from flaming up.
2- Stop the proliferation of non-conventional arms.
3- In the former Soviet Republics nobody feels settled.
4- Economy and strength of the US.

Clinton devoted himself to economic issues. He will eventually get down to International issues. It is an administration with old hands. Some appointments include people from the previous generation. They have agreements with the Europeans on the Bosnia plan. In return the Us asked the Europeans to be helped in the UNSC with the deportation issue. They told me that previously they had enemies, but now they have problems. Everything should be done to return you to the negotiating table. Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, they ready to return, and the issue of deportation is no longer an issue in the UNSC. To bring them back this is the issue.

FH: First, I would like to convey a message from President Arafat. I put the question to him, if another meeting will help, he said yes to go ahead to continue, but they should be secret.

SP: We understand that, I do not how it was leaked. I only told the press that we met before and I will be ready to meet in the future.

FH: The Message:

" We are concerned about the peace process, our commitment is so strong. It is important for us, for the region, it is not only the shape of the new world that can help us, we also can help the new world order. As far as we are enemies, but in this peace process there is a partnership, so do not make more problems for both of us. (Your credibility and our credibility are linked, if our credibility is hurt, this hurts the peace process, and in turn your credibility among your people. Things can come to concrete steps. Both of us are not completely free to do steps exclusively without consideration of the other side)".

Situation created in the last event of the deportation, it put us in a difficult situation. Finding a way out is important. Before coming and reaching a conclusion we were in Washington DC, we were thinking that such a thing was supposed to be discussed at least.

FH: When this problem will be solved, things like this should discussed.

Concerning the situation now, we would like to see a move which can take all of us out of this situation, if we need more than one meeting with you, I have instructions to meet more, especially for the visit of Mr. Christopher, even for more meetings in the future if it may help.

Whole reaction concerning the PLO, in the same time we were looking positively about repeal of the PLO law. We could not understand why you were sharp and strong in your criticism of Yael Dayan. This is one of the questions that I was asked to put to you in Tunis. Is the PLO a taboo, what, such relations can hurt. In the end what can push whole negotiations and kill suspicions can come through direct meetings.

About the situation:

Security: We believe until now, the solution suggested by you and the Americans cannot bring us to the negotiations table. The main problem with us is not the numbers, it is the principle. In you letter to the UNSC, you said: You are going to let go of 101 deportees, but those who are still under order of deportation, their time will be reduced. The principle of deportation is still there and existing.

Rabin is continuing to say that deportation is a right that can be used in the future.

Every people have their own disaster, each people believe this his own disaster or holocaust is the maximum. Deportation is

the most sensitive issue to us. It is our holocaust, imagine if something from your holocaust is being used against you now.

Without touching the principle of deportation, it will not be used in the future. We will be in a very difficult situation to continue negotiations.

If Israel is not applying the UNSC 799, we believe the whole peace process is built on the UNSC resolutions, if these resolutions are not being respected at the highest level or degree, then it will strip us of any basis in these negotiations.

It is we who are under occupation, rules of this particular game is different from the rules of another game. I hope I am not wrong. We will feel unable to go on. The negotiations in vietnam were done while both sides were still fighting each other. We are not in a position to tell our forces in Jenin to so something. But in the negotiations, we and the Israelis are equals, and such the basis, the rules for this process are the letter of invitation and the UNSC resolutions.

SP: This deportation was a very large one, it was different from any other deportation. Originally it was just for two years. It was a limited deportation. Each one of them has the right to appeal. According to decision of the supreme court we have to reach to a period of appeals. Even if they do not appeal, I believe the government is going to do it anyhow.

You what created the problems is the Lebanese government, their refusal to let them in. **Any way we have said that we shall declare that deportation is not our policy and what has happened is an exception to the policy. <u>That is a far reaching statement, we are close to make it a formal declaration</u>.**

I do not believe that this (Deportation) will happen in the future. The government will not say it. It will make it appear as if the deportation act was illegal.

YB: It does not mean that it will use it.

SP: The government went on with a compromise on our decision, by letting 101 come back and the reducing the duration for the rest by half.

We cannot, and you should not make Hamas as the winning party from the whole thing. Hamas wants to become a master of all policies. It is our policy or consideration not to make Hamas more strong.

If we have tp put a condition before the Palestinians: No

negotiations unless all acts of terror are stopped. We cannot declare no more acts of counter-terror on our part, unilaterally.

An agreement: You will declare no more acts of terror, then we shall declare no more acts of counter terrorism. As long as you do not declare that you will stop terror what can we do. Can you make condemnation of any act even physical terror (throwing stones even), then I will make declaration.

I went a long way formalizing that deportation is not policy. You should be satisfied. We can make it formal, I only said it across the media.

FH: I am only asking you to stop doing something which I am ready to do. If some of your people do something without your control, we will not take it as intentional, we have the same thing.

SP: You can say that you condemn any act of terror, of violence and throwing stones.

FH: The stones are different.

SP: Be the real Ghandi, no more violence, nobody likes stones or knives.

ZAZ: We are not in a position of making conditions to go back to the negotiations. We can say this (end violence) but some people will not accept it. People who believe that they have a right to resist, acts on individual basis, we cannot have a 100% od obedience.

SP: Your movement can say that.

ZAZ: We signed many statements here in Jerusalem condemning violence.

SP: Including stones.

ZAZ: Details get you nowhere.

Before deportation happened Hamas was exaggerating their force or presence on the ground. After deportation those who led the campaign against the deportation were the nationalist stream. Most people in Hamas recognize that it was the nationalist that led the campaign against deportation.

Now they realize presence of umbrella, nationalist umbrella and the recognize that they are under umbrella.

The general feeling in jails, is that the PLO is real

leadership, without the PLO the deportees would have been neglected.

Any positive development on deportation, I believe the credit will be for the nationalists. If they are brought back because of nationalist interventions, the credit will go to the nationalists. If they remain outside, they will be heros and the martyrs.

SP: If this happens, they will claim the credit.

Hamas killed last week some our people, their is a genuine feeling of anger.

If Arafat is the president of all palestinians, surely he can put an end to terror. We know that the delegation is in contact with whoever, we are not moving much ahead.

ZAZ: We want not to legitimize the principle of deportation.

Mr. Rabin on TV mentioned one achievement: how important is the fact that Palestinians are now aware that there will be a compromise on 242. (similar to 799)

YB: He said that?

ZAZ: He said: look how panicked are the Palestinians, this is an example for the future.

SP: This can be clarified.

YB: After years of Likud, Palestinians think and suspect that we will compromise on 242.

SP: This can be clarified.

FH: Can you say you are accepting 799 and you will reschedule return of people without relating it to the two years order. Maybe you can work something as far as negotiations are going, that you are not going to use deportation matter.

SP: We can say compromise is in consistent with 799. Scheduling of return will be prompted up due to individual cases. We ourselves are going to review the cases.

FH: Say: that due to security and logistical needs "we shall reschedule their return".

SP: We will review their schedule.

FH: Because of security needs you will review, but for others you will reschedule.

SP: Americans and us, we reached an agreement, that is binding. Deportation will not and is not our policy, but it is the exception. As long as you have exceptions (violence).

You know what is the problem with the PLO. In some cases, some acts of terror are ordered and executed by the PLO. We have more than the evidence of it.

What is overshadowing you and us is the terror.

Hamas did something terrible, public opinion is telling us: whom are you talking to now. You have told that Hamas activists are resorting back to your wings.

ZAZ: You have small hard core supporters of Hamas, and a wide circle of supporters, it is this wide circle that are feeling grateful for the nationalists.

FH: We are gaining them back. They are like students, they are good students, but they are waiting for the exam.

SP: You should be the professor.

YB: We owe you an answer about Yael Dayan.

FH: before that, in this peace process, we are tied to each other, by a robe, we were standing under a tree, deportation act brought me and you on top of the tree. The Americans put a ladder for you to come down.

SP: And you!

FH: No-I need a ladder, I can not jump, I am sitting refusing to come down. If you want to come you will have to bring me down with you or cut the robe. The rope here is the Peace Process.

We are in need of a such a ladder, in certain period through negotiations you should be rescheduling return of people, this order allows me to tell my people: look we are in a peace negotiations, it has certain rules, we have to respect its rules, even the Israelis are respecting rules, then I can tell my people to stop 1,2,3.

YB: We do not have to say that we stop the deportation through the peace process??. It is our policy to freeze such actions for a while, some action was done because of a wave of terrorism, we acted. In the future we do not have to do it.

On Yael: what was our argument, they said that you are now talking to the PLO. To convince others to support this, we needed some time, she should waited a little bit, she was

rushing there as if she was having political negotiations without authorization. We supported here outdoors, but she did this pre-maturely.

SP: The party which is actually doing the negotiations cannot have people negotiating our negotiations.

***

Now if we reach a situation where there is no linkage between the negotiations and the deportations we can look into issuing or clarifying the following points:

1- Israel does not intend to violate UN resolutions. Except some idiotic resolutions by the UN.

interruption:

FH: Not UN, you mean no violations of UNSC resolutions.

SP: Time table will be reviewed anyway, you will say: Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, that there is no linkage. In return those 3 points will be clarified.

Syria and Lebanon will not link, that will not be good for you.

Let me mention again the 3 points:

1- Deportation is not a policy (I can also try to add: Whoever does not support violence will not face deportation).

2- No violations of 242 (UNSC resolutions)

3- Review of the schedule will continue.

The minute you make a linkage, an ultimatum, no government will accept it. When the government feels that the SC is no longer insisting.

ZAZ: Linkage is not an ultimatum, make it easier for us to go in negotiations. We need more relaxation on your positions to make easier for us to go on.

SP: Review of all deportees-old and fresh.

Permit some old deportees to come back (previous ones)

FH: Practical things, I believe it is a good idea. There should something real about returning the deportees.

SP: Suppose, make out this:

- No linkage
- Deportation not policy, the exception.
- Review of old and new.
- "Israel will not respect UNSC resolutions" is not correct.

Some UN resolutions, they are absurd: every year the UN decides to pay compensation for nuclear reactor bombardment in Iraq. Distinguish between basic resolutions that we have accepted and funny resolutions that we rejected.

ZAZ: It was very difficult for us to make you apply 242 on the West Bank.

SP: You must let your people see that you are winning. We stopped the settlements, the subsidies, your d

February 18, 1993

From: Yair Hirschfeld

to: Yossi Beilin

(in continuation of report of February 13, 1993)

I. Evaluation of the Sarpsborg Proposals

1. The proposals made at Sarpsborg indicate that the Palestinian leadership is today determined (and desperate) to reach a breakthrough agreement with Israel. On February 15, the Norwegians were informed that the PLO leadership had approved the document (DoP, CWP and Guidelines); reiterated that they were prepared to show further flexibility, asking for flexibility on the Israeli side, too; indicating that an understanding should be achieved before the official renewal of negotiations.

2. The proposed agreement offers Israel immediately important tactical gains:
   a. substance has been given for an American shuttle diplomacy effort, enabling the G.o.I and the American mediators not to be solely dependent upon Syrian good will;
   b. Progress on both the Syrian and Palestinian front, at the same time, may enforce Assad to accept a geographical compromise on the Golan, which otherwise would be completely unattainable;
   c. the Sarpsborg proposal permits movement towards an immediate (provisional) transfer of authority, and towards the organisation of elections in the West Bank and Gaza;
   d. a strong and forceful impetus will be given to the multilateral negotiations.

3. The proposed agreement offers Israel important long-term strategic gains:

   a. The present pattern of Israeli control by military means will be replaced by an agreed upon pattern of Israeli-Palestinian cooperation in all spheres of life (security, administration, economic affairs, social welfare, education);
   b. Israel will be granted a leading role in promoting the reconstruction of the Palestinian economy;
   c. immediate steps will be taken to promote regional cooperation;
   d. Israel's obligation to withdraw from Gaza, with no similar obligation regarding the West Bank, will strengthen Israel's position at the final status negotiations.

II. Proposed Next Steps

1. Informing the PM

a. The PM should be asked to support an American shuttle-diplomacy effort, between Israel and Syria on one hand, between Israel and the Palestinian leadership (Faisal and Hanan) on the other hand.

b. The principles for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations will be:

i. agreement on immediate transfer of authority in the spheres of: taxation, tourism, education, health and social welfare.

ii. agreement on elections.

iii. full Israeli (and international) support for a PEDP (Palestinian Economic Development Programme), which will be closely interconnected with a REDP (Regional Economic Development Programme)

iv. agreement on an Israeli-Palestinian CWP (see Draft of CWP) and guidelines for a Marshall-Plan.

v. Agreement that rights and responsbilities of the PIC (Palestinian Interim Council) and other self-government institutions, will be adapted to the needs prescribed by the Israeli-Palestinian CWP.

vi. Israeli obligation in principle to withdraw from the Gaza Strip at the end of the second year, of the interim-period.

2. Agree on a Division of Work with the PM:

a. The PM's Office will prepare:
a plan for an immediate transfer of authority in taxation, tourism, education, health and social welfare;
a plan for elections;
a plan for the establishment of a Palestinian police force;
a concept defining Palestinian secondary legislative powers and Israeli-Palestinian cooperation in matters related to legislation;
a concept for Israeli-Palestinian liaison;
a concept for proposed arbitrational procedures.

b. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (and/or ECF) will prepare:

a regional water development plan;
a regional electricity and energy development plan;
a concept for the establishment of a MEDF and a Palestinian Development Bank;
a regional transport and trade development plan;
an industrial cooperation programme;
a regional human resources programme;
all to be seen as basis for negotiating the Israeli-Palestinian CWP.

c. The Histadruth will prepare:

a CWP for improving labour relations;
a human resources development programme
and a concept for the improvement of social welfare benefits.

3. Inform the Americans

a. on the top political level.

b. on the working level.

c. the Norwegian Government is interested to raise the results of the Sarpsborg meeting in their contacts with the US Government. The proposal is that the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs will informally address Warren Christopher on the issue, on February 25, in a forthcoming meeting in Brussels. (the Palestinians have specifically asked the Norwegians to do so).

The Norwegians have pledged to act only in a manner that will be mutually agreed upon by both sides. Hence, we may prepare very clear and detailed instructions, or ask them to refrain from one or the other move.

17 פברואר 1993

<u>ד"ר יוסי ביילין</u> (אישי)

1. הבוקר נפגשנו (ד"ר הירשפלד ודי"ר פונדק) עם פיצל חוסייני בביתו שבירושלים. חוסייני אמור היה לצאת לעמאן מייד לאחר הפגישה, שם ישתתף בשיחות בין צמרת אש"ף בראשות ערפאת לבין הצמרת הירדנית בראשות חוסיין.
2. חוסייני אמר שהפלסטינים מעוניינים לחדש את המו"מ אך הם זקוקים לנוסחה ברורה שתוריד אותם מהעץ. לדעתו הדרך לצאת מהסבך היא שישראל תודיע שהיא מקבלת את החלטת מועצת הביטחון 799, ושמסיבות בטחוניות ומנהלתיות תחזיר את המגורשים באופן הדרגתי.
3. חוסייני מעריך שעם שובם של מגורשי החמאס, הם יתקבלו בחגיגות גדולות על ידי התושבים בגדה וברצועה, דבר שיחזק אותם. (ברור שגם המחבה המתון יאלץ להשתתף ב"חגיגות" הללו). לדעת חוסייני ניתן למנוע את הפיכת החזרה לנצחון מוחלט של החמאס, על ידי החזרתם במקביל של חלק ממגורשי אש"ף. זה יהפוך לחגיגה פלסטינית ולא חגיגה חמאסית, ויהווה גם ניצחון למחבה המתון מה עוד שיסייע לבניית אמון הדדי בין ממשלת ישראל לתושבי השטחים.
אם ישראל תעשה צעד כזה, חוסייני גם יוכל לשכנע את החמאס שמגורשיו ימתינו בשקט עד אשר יסתיימו ההכנות להחזרתם של מגורשי אש"ף "ששהו הרבה יותר זמן מחוץ לשטחים".
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הוא מציע שתי אפשרויות; האחת שהם יכינו רשימה שתועבר לנו, והשניה שהם יקבלו מבעוד מועד רשימה ישראלית מוצעת ויגיבו עליה.

יאיר + רון

17 פברואר 1993

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יאיר + רון

2 עמודים

15 פברואר 1993

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1. כזכור בפגישתנו (ד"ר הירשפלד וד"ר פונדק) עם פייצל חוסייני בשבוע שעבר, הבטיח חוסייני להעביר לנו רשימה מוצעת של צעדים שישומן, טרם כינוס סדרת המפגשים המולטילטרלית והבילטרלית הבאה, יסייע לקידום המו"מ.
2. הרשימה מצורפת בזה.
3. חלק מהצעדים המוצגים במסמך כבר מיושמים בפועל. לדוגמא בנושא הכלכלי (סעיף 4 אצלם) עושה המנהל האזרחי בעצם ימים אלה פעילות מהותית. אחד הצעדים שדורשים הפלסטינים וכבר נקטו הוא ביטול המס על מעבר בגשרים, אך לצערנו שוב פעל המנהל במנותק וללא תאום או הודעה מראש למשלחת הפלסטינית שיכולה היתה למכור זאת ל"רחוב הפלסטיני" כהישג שלהם.
בעבר ביקשו חוסייני ועשראווי שצעדים מהסוג הזה יתואמו עמם לטובת שני הצדדים.
4. לדעתנו, מימוש חלק מהמחוות אכן יכול לסייע להשגת אוירה טובה יותר בין הצדדים, אך צריך לגבש זאת במסגרת תפיסה אסטרטגית כוללת. מימוש חד-צדדי של כל הצעדים ללא התקדמות משמעותית במו"מ, יהווה בזבוז מחוות שבהם עדיף לעשות שימוש במועד מתאים.
5. מעניין להשוות את המסרים השונים כל כך העולים מנוסח ההצעה של חוסייני מחד, ומהדברים שהושמעו לנו בחו"ל מאידך.

בברכה

יאיר + רון

Conditions for creating an atmosphere conducive for peace in the OPTs

1- **Implementation of 799, which means the return of the 415 deportees and subsequent return of previous deportees.**

2- Prison categories:
- End to whole category of administrative detentions.
- Release of older people, women, children.
- Improvement of prison health conditions and prison general conditions.

3- Facilitation of all family reunification categories.

4- Removal of economic restrictions (fees at bridge, taxes, fines and freedom of movement and merchandise) and the facilitation of economic activity in general and investments in particular.

5- End of collective punishment which includes; work of undercover units, fugitive killings, house demolitions (rocket demolition), killing of children, and the whole spectrum of collective punishment (fences around camps, sealing of homes).

6- Removal of barriers and restrictions of entry to Jerusalem.

7- Categorical cessation of confiscation of all lands, in addition to land in Jerusalem.

2 עמודים

15 פברואר 1993

<u>ד"ר יוסי ביילין</u> (אישי)

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Procedure and Timetable

6. The proposed procedure and timetable is:
   a. negotiate an understanding in Jerusalem (and possibly also in Washington);
   b. sign the three proposed documents (DoP, CWP and Guidelines);
   c. start a provisional transfer of authority to Palestinian Committees immediately with the signing of the DoP; and intensify further preparatory work, cooperation and negotiations;
   d. start immediately work for the implementation of the CWP and the "Guidelines";
   e. three to six months after the signing of the DoP there shall be elections for a Palestinian Interim Council (PIC), its inauguration; and the signing of an Interim-Agreement;
   f. At the end of the second year of the interim-period, Israel will withdraw from Gaza; Israeli rule will be replaced by a trusteeship (preferably Egyptian);
   g. Final status negotiations will start at the beginning of the third year of the interim-period.

7. Joint support for a variety of economic cooperation projects has been agreed upon. (see CWP and Guidelines)

Evaluation

7. The Initiative has undoubtedly full Palestinian support, indicating the need of the Palestinian leadership in Tunis to reach as quick as possible a signed agreement.

8. To proceed direct and visible PLO-Tunis participation is not (we repeat: is not) necessary. Interestingly, the demand, to renew the US-PLO Dialogue, made at the first Sarcobarg-Meeting (21 January), was not repeated at the second one (12 February).

Moreover, at the first meeting, we were specifically asked to keep the content of our meeting secret from Faisal el-Husseini and Hanan Ashrawi; at the second meeting, Abu Ala stated that he would ask Faisal el-Husseini to come to Tunis, in the coming days, in order to inform him fully.

9. We were left in no doubt that further Palestinian concessions will be made. The Palestinians were even quite specific about it: they will be prepared to accept the Israeli concept in regard to jurisdiction over land; on Jerusalem the issue would be only related to elections, and

there they would ask for American proposals; also on arbitration they would be prepared to accept compromise formulas. They were less forthcoming in regard to agreeing to a formula that would permit Israel to postpone the transfer of authority.

Other concessions were suggested on two important issues: First, after Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, Israeli settlements could be turned into centers for joint Israeli-Palestinian cooperation projects; (Abu Ala'); second, the establishment of a unitary price for water in Israel on one hand, in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip on the other hand, could be viewed as an "equitable" distribution of water resources. (Mamer el-Hurdi).

10. The proposal represents in our view a very serious attempt to achieve a breakthrough in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and to move towards Israeli demands in four central aspects:

a. Enable Israel to deal with Gaza, separately from the West Bank;
b. enable Israel and the Palestinians to implement immediately regional economic cooperation;
c. promote the political process without referring immediately to all aspects of the permanent settlement; and
d. refrain from demanding (ultimatively) a change of the Madrid formula.

In our opinion the presentation of this proposal signifies an important turning point and indicates preparedness on behalf of the Palestinian leadership in Tunis to recognize the basic political needs of the G.o.I.

11. Certain difficulties still prevail. In case, as expected, an agreement on the proposed DoP, the CWP and the Guidelines, will be achieved, the gap on issues of substance will still remain great and may impede upon the conclusion of an "Interim Agreement".

Necessary Moves ¶12. Peres

12. Full support of the Government of the United States of America is needed mainly for two reasons:

a. take an active role in mediation to bridge the still remaining gap;
b. establish a regional and an international coalition to back the proposed CWP and the Marshall Plan and provide necessary political, financial and technical assistance.

13. Full support of Rabin is needed, [illegible] it may be very useful for negotiations with the Palestinians, to demonstrate his goodness.

We assume that in order to convince Rabin to offer his support it will be necessary, first, to show him that American political and practical support has been achieved; second, to permit him, to take full credit.

In the Norwegians are also fully informed, they may play an important role, in excluding the PLO (Tunis) from negotiations, while keeping them on the sidelines happy.

Moreover, the Norwegians have offered to fund the necessary seed money, to prepare immediately activities for necessary feasibility studies. Other, additional assistance could also be discussed.

[illegible]

to be discussed.

Ramat Yishai, February 13, 1993

From: Yair Hirschfeld and Ron Pundik
to: Yossi Beilin

Report on two Meetings with a PLO Delegation

Introduction

1. At a seminar on "Human Resources" held at Sarpsborg, Norway, between January 20 and 22, and a second seminar, held on February 11 and 12, 1993 we met a PLO delegation that had arrived from Tunis. The delegation was headed by Abu Ala, (head of Economic Affairs at the PLO and in charge of the multilateral negotiations), who was accompanied by Dr. Maher el-Kurd (Economic Adviser to Chairman Yassir Arafat) and Hassan Asfour (Political Adviser to Abu Mazen).

2. At the second seminar (February 11, 12) the Palestinians stated that they had come with the full authorisation of chairman Arafat, of Abu Mazen and of Faruk Kadumi.

The Proposed Agreement

3. At the first meeting (January 21) we were asked to pass on, the following secret political message:

It was proposed to adopt a "Gaza First" Approach, comprising three components:

a. Israel will agree ahead of time to withdraw from Gaza in "two to three years".
b. A "Mini-Marshall Plan" will immediately be prepared and implemented, in order to alleviate socio-economic problems in Gaza and the West Bank.
c. There will be immediate movement towards the creation of an intense Israeli-Palestinian economic cooperation.

4. At the second meeting (February 11 and 12) a joint paper was produced, including a proposed

a. DoP (Declaration of Principles);
b. an Israeli-Palestinian CWP (Cooperation and Working Programme) and
c. Guidelines for a Marshall-Plan (see enclosure).

5. Agreement was not achieved on four issues: jurisdiction over territory, Jerusalemite participation in elections, arbitration and necessary securities for Israel, in case the necessary detailed agreements will not be achieved. The Palestinians said clearly that they knew they had to make further concessions in these spheres too, but needed herefore legitimisation that could be given to them by American mediation. (between the GoI on one hand, Faisal el-Husseini and Hanan, on the other.)

Procedure and Timetable

6. The proposed procedure and timetable is:
   a. negotiate an understanding in Jerusalem (and possibly also in Washington)
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In our opinion the presentation of this proposal signifies an important turning point and indicates preparedness on behalf of the Palestinian leadership in Tunis to recognize the basic political needs of the G.o.I.

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We assume that in order to convince Rabin to offer his support it will be necessary, first, to show him, that American political and practical support has been achieved; second, to permit him, to take full credit.

14. The Norwegians are this time fully informed. They may play an important role, in excluding the PLO (Tunis) from negotiations, while keeping them at the same time happy.

Moreover, the Norwegians have offered to finance necessary seed money, to prepare immediately outlines for necessary feasibility studies. Other, additional assistance could also be discussed.

Proposed Further Steps

to be discussed.

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VERSION 4

Feb. 12, 1993

It is suggested that the US Secretary of State will go to Jerusalem and will submit to the Government of Israel on one hand, and to the Palestinian leadership, (Faisal el-Husseini and Hanan Ashrawi) on the other hand, an American draft for a DoP (Declaration of Principles); an outline of a proposed Israeli-Palestinian CWP (Cooperation and Working Programme), and an outline of a proposed "Marshall-Plan" for the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the Region.

The Principles of an Israeli-Palestinian Negotiating Plan

Israeli-Palestinian negotiations will concentrate on achieving agreement in regard to three documents: A DoP [Declaration of Principles], a CWP [Cooperation and Working Programme] and Guidelines for a Marshall-Plan.

I. Draft for DoP (Declaration of Principles):

1. The aim of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations is to obtain agreement regarding arrangements for establishing a Palestinian Interim Self-Governing Authority, the elected Palestinian Interim Council, for a period leading to a permanent settlement based on Resolutions 242 and 338.

PAL. (It is understood that the interim arrangements are an integral part of the whole process leading to the implementation of 242 and 338.)

2. In order that the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza may govern themselves according to democratic principles, direct, free and general political elections, (under international supervision) ¤(in which all Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza, as registered in the population register on the fourth of June 1967, would participate)¤ would be held three to six months after the signing of this DoP.

PAL

PAL

3. The elections for the establishment of the Palestinian Interim Council will constitute a significant interim preparatory step towards the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.

PAL. ¤ (4.The jurisdiction of the Palestinian Interim Council will cover the Palestinian territories occupied in 1967. Any administrative exception hereto should be discussed during negotiations, stipulated these exceptions should not prejudice UN Resolutions 242 and 338 and the principles of international law.)¤
(this paragraph has not been accepted by the Israeli side).

(4. The jurisdiction of the Palestinian Interim Council will cover control over land, as mutually agreed upon.)
(this paragraph has not been accepted by the Palestinian side).

5. Immediately after the signing of this DoP a transfer of authority from the Israeli military government and the Israeli Civil Administration to the Palestinians and such committees that will be appointed by the Palestinian representatives, will start.

The transfer of authority to the Palestinian committees will be of temporary and preparatory nature and will include Palestinian control over taxation, tourism, education, health and social welfare, as well as other agreed upon spheres.

6. In order to guarantee optimal economic development and growth, immediately with the signing of this DoP, a Palestinian Land Committee and a Palestinian Water Administration Committee will be established.

The Palestinian Land Committee and the Palestinian Water Administration Committee will be given immediate powers as mutually agreed upon. A coordinated land and water resources development plan will be negotiated between the Palestinian Land Committee and the Palestinian Water Administration Committee on the one, and the Government of Israel on the other side.

7. In order to guarantee optimal security arrangements for the Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Palestinian Interim Council will establish a strong police force, responsible for internal security and public order.

Preparatory steps, necessary for the establishment of the Palestinian police force, will be taken immediately [after the signing of this DoP], in liaison with the Palestinians, Israel, Egypt and Jordan. ~~regarding Gaza~~.

8. In order to enable the Interim Self-Government Authority, the Palestinian Interim Council, to promote economic growth, several institutions will be established at the time of its inauguration, such as: a Palestinian Land Authority, a Palestinian Water Administration Authority, a Palestinian Electricity Authority, a Gaza Port Authority, a Palestinian Development Bank, a Palestinian Export Promotion Board and an Environmental Authority.

The Palestinian committees will negotiate with the Government of Israel, the necessary relevant agreements for these institutions.

9. The Palestinian Interim Council will be empowered to legislate for all the authorities that are mutually agreed upon. Both parties will reassess jointly all laws and military orders presently in force.

10. An Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee will be established and will deal with all issues of dispute and common interest.

Agreements on cooperation and liaison will be negotiated and implemented on the professional levels in order to provide for security and mutual understanding between both parties.

11. Further liaison and cooperation arrangements will be negotiated and agreed upon between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority on one hand and the Governments of Jordan and Egypt on the other hand.

12. Immediately after signing the DoP the transitional period of five years will begin. As soon as possible, but not later than the beginning of the third year, negotiations will take place to determine the final status of the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip and its relationship with its neighbours.

13. After the signing of the DoP, Israeli-Palestinian negotiations on the redeployment of Israeli military forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will start. A first redeployment of forces will be carried out on the eve of elections for the Palestinian Interim Council.
Further redeployments will be gradually implemented in line with the introduction of other ¤(agreed upon)¤ security measures.

PAL.

At the end of the second year of the interim-period, Israeli military forces will withdraw completely from Gaza, in the spirit of partial implementation of 242 and 338. The Israeli withdrawal will be fully coordinated with the Palestinian Interim Council.

After the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza a trusteeship will be established, as agreed upon between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority.

14. The Israeli and the Palestinian delegations will negotiate an Interim-Agreement that will specify the mechanisms and substance of the envisaged transfer of authority.

(During the transitional period, representatives of Israel and the Palestinian Interim Council may decide by agreement to seek arbitration. The conditions for arbiration will then have to be fully and mutually agreed upon.) (Israeli proposed version)

(An arbitration committee will be created to whom all issues of disputes will be submitted, in case no Israeli-Palestinian agreement will have been achieved, otherwise. The committee will include representatives of the co-sponsors of the Madrid

Conference, of Egypt, Jordan and the UN Secretariat, and furthermore a representative from Israel and from the Palestinian Interim Council.) (Palestinian proposed version).

II. Draft for an Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation and Working Programme [CWP]

The Israeli-Palestinian DoP will be accompanied by an agreed upon Israeli-Palestinian CWP. Preparation hereof shall start immediately.

1. Preparation of Israeli-Palestinian CWP

a. Meeting of water engineers and experts, to prepare a joint water development plan and studies and plans on water rights of each party and equitable utilization of joint water resources to be prepared for implementation in the final status.

b. Meeting of electricity and energy experts to prepare a CWP regarding the exploitation of energy resources, to include the construction of oil- and gas pipelines and the establishment of a petrochemical complex in the Gaza Strip.

c. Meeting of financial experts to prepare a blueprint for establishing a Palestinian Development Bank.

d. Meeting of transport and trade experts to prepare a CWP for establishing a greater Gaza Sea Port Area; prepare communication lines to and from Gaza and work out a proposal for organising a free-trade zone in the Gaza-Ashdod area.

e. Meeting of industrialists to prepare a CWP for establishing a joint Israeli-Palestinian car industry in the Gaza Strip and may propose other ideas for joint venture enterprises.

f. Meeting of members of the Israeli and Palestinian trade union movements, to prepare a CWP for improving labour relations and enhancing the provision of social welfare benefits.

g. Meeting of experts on human resources development issues, to prepare a CWP, providing for joint Israeli Palestinian workshops and seminars; the establishment of joint vocational training centers, research institutes and data banks.

h. Meeting of security experts, to prepare studies on regional security issues in all its strategic, comprehensive and future aspects.

2.Preparation of Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian-Egyptian CWP

a. Meeting of electricity experts, to prepare a CWP for interconnecting the Egyptian, Palestinian, Israeli and Jordanian electricity grids;

06 987 309

b. Meeting of financial experts, to prepare a CWP for establishing a Middle East Bank for Reconstruction and Development and/or a Middle Eastern Development Fund;

c. Meeting of transport experts, to prepare a CWP for improving land, air and sea communications in the area.

III. Preparing a Marshall-Plan for the West Bank, Gaza Strip and the Region

The Israeli-Palestinian DoP [Declaration of Principles] and CWP [Cooperation and Working Programme] will be accompanied by a Marshall-Plan Initiative of the G 7 and other OECD member states. The G 7 and other OECD member states participating in the multilateral negotiations, will commit themselves to prepare a Marshall Plan Initiative for the West Bank, Gaza Strip and the Region, which will be implemented after the election and inauguration of the Interim Self-Government Authority, the Palestinian Interim Council. Substantial additional aid will be raised by the Palestinians from Arab states, as well as from existing all-Arab institutions.

The Marshall-Plan Initiative will be composed of two parts: First, a PEDP [Palestinian Economic Development Programme] as a priority, and second a REDP [Regional Economic Development Programme].

1. The PEDP [Palestinian Economic Development Programme]

will be composed of three parts:

a. a Social Rehabilitation Programme;
b. a Small and Medium Business Development Plan, and
c. an Infrastructurue Development Programme [water, electricity, transportation and communication, human resources, financial institutions, etc.]

2. The REDP [Regional Economic Development Programme]

a. Construction of a Mediterranean Sea - Dead Sea Canal, and development of a joint Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian Plan for the coordinated exploitation of the Dead Sea area.

b. Regional Desalination and Power Generating Plant, as well as the interconnection of electricity grids, and the development of regional cooperation for the transfer, distribution and industrial exploitation of gas, oil and other energy resources.

c. Regional Tourism and Transport Development Plan.
d. Regional Cooperation in other spheres as mutually agreed upon.

ד"ר יאיר הירשפלד
ד"ר רון פונדק

4 פברואר 1993

<u>לשכת שר-החוץ - אבי גיל</u> (אישי)
סגן שר החוץ - ד"ר יוסי ביילין (אישי)

ב-3 פברואר 1993 נפגשנו עם פייצל חוסייני, ששב לאחרונה מביקור בעמאן ותוניס, לשיחה בנושאים שונים.
חוסייני, שעמו לא שוחחנו מאז פגישתו השביה עם שר החוץ פרס, פתח את הפגישה בשאלה: מי הדליף לעיתון הארץ את הידיעה אודות פגישתו הראשונה עם שמעון פרס. לדברי חוסייני העובדה שעצם הפגישה הודלפה לתקשורת היתה מאד לא נעימה עבורו, והוא נאלץ לשקר לכתבים ערבים ששאלוהו ישירות בנושא. חוסייני הסכים עמנו שהסערה נמנעה רק מאחר ובאותו יום התפרסם פסק הדין של בג"ץ בעניין המגורשים.
לדברי חוסייני אין ספק שההדלפה לא יצאה מחוגים פלסטינים.
אנו סבורים שצריך לבדוק את הנושא לעומק בכדי לסתום את הערוץ ממנו יצאה ההדלפה. אין ספק שהדלפה נוספת עלולה לפגוע באופן משמעותי באמינות הצד הישראלי ובהמשך המגעים החשאים עם הצמרת הפלסטינית.
נבקשך לטפל בנושא.

בברכה

יאיר הירשפלד ורון פונדק

Principles of I-P negotiating plan - US initiative

aim: Pal interim self. gov. body elections

agreements on certain areas to be negotiated after DoP

temporary transport of authority to Pals

Pal land & water committees to be formed etc.

Dev. Pal. police force

Gaza-Ashdod free-trade

Trans. period w/ neg. for final status



3/2/93

DRAFT

Action Plan:
==========

The Principles of an ~~A Gaza-First~~ Israeli-Palestinian Negotiating Plan:
==========

The Proposed US Diplomatic Initiative
==========

The US Secretary of State will go to Jerusalem and will submit to the G.o.I. on one hand, and to the Palestinian leadership (Faisal and Hanan) on the other hand, an American draft for a DoP, (Declaration of Principles); an outline of a proposed Israeli-Palestinian CWP (Cooperation and Working Programme), and an outline of a proposed "Marshall-Plan" for Gaza and the region.

I. Draft for DoP (Declaration of Principles):

1. The aim of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations is to obtain agreement regarding arrangements for establishing a Palestinian Interim Self-Governing Body, the Palestinian Council, for a period leading to a permanent settlement based on Resolutions 242 and 338.

   Interim arrangements must not presage or prejudge the permanent status itself.

2. In order that the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza may govern themselves according to democratic principle ~~free~~ elected and general political elections will be held nine months after the signing of this DoP.

3. The elections for the establishment of the Interim ~~Self-Government Body, the Palestinian Council~~, will constitute a significant step towards the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.

4. Interim arrangements must take into account the current situation and complexities, which have been created during the last 25 years. Therefore specific agreements, concerning agreed upon areas, will be negotiated, immediately after the signing of this DoP.

5. Immediately after the signing of this DoP a transfer of authority from the Israeli military government and the Israeli Civil Administration to Palestinian technical committees will start.

The transfer of authority to the Palestinian ~~technical committees~~ will be of temporary and preparatory nature and will include Palestinian control over taxation, tourism, education, health and social welfare.

6. In order to guarantee optimal economic development and growth, immediately with the signing of this DoP, a Palestinian Land Committee and a Palestinian Water Administration Committee will be established.

   The Palestinian Land Committee and the Palestinian Water Administration Committee will be given immediate powers as mutually agreed upon. A coordinated land and water resources development plan will be negotiated between the Palestinian Land Committee and the Palestinian Water Administration Committee on one, and the Government of Israel on the other side.

7. In order to guarantee optimal security arrangements to the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, the Palestinian Council will establish a strong police force responsible for internal security and public order.
   Preparatory steps, necessary for the establishment of the Palestinian police force, will be taken immediately (after signing of this DoP), in liaison with the Israeli and Jordanian police forces regarding the West Bank, and in liaison with the Israeli and Egyptian police forces, regarding Gaza.

8. In order to enable the Interim Self-Government ~~Body~~, the Palestinian Council, to promote economic growth, several institutions will be established at the time of its inauguration: a Palestinian Land Authority, a Palestinian Water Administration Authority, a Palestinian Electricity Authority, a Gaza Port Authority, a Palestinian Development Bank and a Palestinian Export Promotion Board.

   In order to determine the powers, rights and obligations of these institutions, the Palestinian ~~technical~~ committees will negotiate with the Government of Israel, the necessary relevant agreeements.

9. The Israeli and Palestinian delegations express their interest and determination to establish a free-trade zone between Gaza and Ashdod.

10. The Palestinian Council will be empowered to legislate for all the authorities that are mutually agreed upon, ~~and will be delegated to~~ it.
    Both parties will respect all laws & military orders in force.

11. In order to allow the Interim Self-Governing Authority, ~~the Palestinian Council~~, to operate in harmony with the G.o.I. agreements on cooperation and liaison will be negotiated in order to provide for security and mutual understanding between the concerned parties.

An Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee will be established and will deal with all issues of common interest.

12. Further liaison and cooperation arrangements will be negotiated and agreed upon ~~with~~ the Governments of Jordan and Egypt.

13. Even in case the necessary agreements will not be finalized in time, the elections to the Palestinian Council and its inauguration, shall be held on the agreed upon date. In this case, the elected Palestinian Council will continue negotiations with the G.o.I. Accordingly, the delegation of powers and the transfer of authority, regarding those specific issues that will not have been agreed upon before the date of elections, will be postponed until mutual agreement will have been achieved.

14. ~~When, immediately after elections, the interim self-governing authority (the Palestinian Council) in the West Bank and Gaza is established and inaugurated~~, the transitional period of five years will begin. As soon as possible, but not later than the ~~third year after the beginning of the transitional period~~, negotiations will take place to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and its relationship with its neighbours.

15. Three years after the inauguration of the elected Palestinian Council, (the interim self-government body) all Israeli forces will withdraw from Gaza. The Gaza Strip will be put under an Egyptian trusteeship, which will last until negotiations for a final status settlement will be successfully concluded. Before Israeli withdrawal necessary security arrangements will be implemented as agreed upon.

February 28, 1993

From: Yair Hirschfeld

to: Shimon Peres

via: Yossi Beilin

1. On Friday, February 26, I got a phone-call from Hanan Ashrawi asking me urgently to come to see her and Faisal. Accordingly, two meetings with them took place, yesterday: one in Ramallah with Faisal and Hanan, and a second one in Jerusalem, only with Faisal. (see the enclosed report on these two meetings).

2. The Palestinian requests and concessions for the proposed four-point package deal are a very clear response to the last meeting Faisal and Ziyyad had with you on Sunday, February 21, 1993.

3. Faisal still has to reconfirm the Palestinian acceptance of the idea that the Four-Point Package Deal will be negotiated confidentially, without a public Israeli announcement pledging not to enact further deportations.

In case Faisal will - against his own judgement - insist on a public Israeli statement, I would recommend to suspend talks with them and announce unilaterally the date for the renewal of bilateral negotiations.

4. Faisal and Hanan expect, to hear from me, or from the Americans, that the principles for the suggested Four-Point Package Deal, are acceptable. Hereby, the official channels would gain about two weeks time, to work out the details of the package deal. Thereafter, it would be extremly useful, if the package deal could be finally put together in another meeting between yourself and Faisal. At such a meeting acceptable conditions for having elections, as soon as possible should also be discussed.

5. Agreement on principle on the package deal, will enable us also, to arrange meetings for preparing a coordinated Israeli-Palestinian approach for promoting various multilateral issues.

6. If I would be permitted to go to Washington at the later part of the next bilateral round of negotiations, we would create an effective back-channel.

(2 enclosures)

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(2 enclosures)

Order to be made !
a US Initiative

Yair Hirschfeld
Ramat Yishai 30095
P.O.Box 596
Tel.: 04-833 221

Ramat Yishai, January 26, 1993

Dear Dan,

It was good to speak to you on the phone. I enclose for your information two documents: First, a "Report on a Meeting with a PLO Delegation"; second, an "Action Plan (Tochnit Awoda): The Principles of a A Gaza-First Negotiating Plan". (The Proposed US Diplomatic Initiative, comprising a draft for a DoP [Declaration of Principles]; an outline of an Israeli-Palestinian CWP [Cooperation and Working Programme] and a G 7 and OECD-member states sponsores Marshall Initiative for Gaza and the Region).

I hope it will be interesting reading. Yossi saw the first document; I finished the second document only just now; the first paper has documentary value; the second is, so far only a think piece, as how, a possible implementation of the Gaza First Idea could be planned.

Undoubtedly the whole concept would have much "political sex appeal" in Israel and I believe also some similar appeal among the Palestinians.

We have been asked to attend a second meeting with Abu Ala, Maher el-Kurd and Hassan Azfour; to be hosted again by the Norwegians, who are unaware of what we are speaking.

For Ron Pundik and myself it would be immensely valuable to obtain your detailed comments on the programme. Vice versa, it might be quite useful for you and the people in your government to get, ahead of time, reliable Israeli and Palestinian reactions to the outlined plan.

In order to be able to have a detailed discussion, Ron and myself would even come for one or two days to Washington, if you think it would be useful. We would, of course, be very grateful, if funding herefore, could be made available; although we might be able to secure funding from another source.

Best wishes

Yours,

Ramat Yishai, January 25, 1993

From: Yair Hirschfeld and Ron Pundik
to: Dan Kurtzer

Report on a Meeting with a PLO Delegation

Introduction

1. At a seminar on "Human Resources" held at Sarpsborg, Norway, between January 20 and 22, 1993, we met a PLO delegation that had arrived from Tunis. The delegation was headed by Abu Ala, (head of Economic Affairs at the PLO and in charge of the multilateral negotiations), who was accompanied by Dr. Maher el-Kurd (Economic Adviser to Chairman Yassir Arafat) and Hassan Azfour (Political Adviser to Abu Mazen).
2. At the seminar several meetings were held with the Palestinian delegation regarding multilateral issues that are reported elsewhere.
3. In a meeting held without the Norwegians present, we were asked to pass on, the following secret political message, which had been authorized - so we were told - by Arafat and Abu Mazen.

The Palestinian Proposal

4. It was proposed to adopt a "Gaza First" Approach, comprising three components:
   a. Israel will agree ahead of time to withdraw from Gaza in "two to three years".
   b. A "Mini-Marshall Plan" will immediately be prepared and implemented, in order to alleviate socio-economic problems in Gaza, but also in the West Bank.
   c. There will be immediate movement towards the creation of an intense Israeli-Palestinian economic cooperation.

5. The Palestinians understand that a "hypothetical Israeli withdrawal" from Gaza will not automatically be linked to a similar withdrawal from the West Bank. The Palestinians think of giving the "key" to Gaza, for an interim-period to a third party.

6. A series of ideas for economic cooperation were raised. They proposed to check the following project ideas:
   a. The construction of an Israeli-Palestinian-Egyptian desalination and electricity production plan on the border between the Negev, Sinai and Gaza.
   b. The establishment of a free-trade zone between Gaza and Ashdod and agreed upon coordination of both

ports.

c. The establishment of the Red-Dead Sea Canal or preferably, from the Palestinian point of view, the Med-Dead Sea Canal, under the condition that the Palestinians will be accepted as equal partners for the exploitation of the Canal and the Dead Sea resources.

d. Cooperation in the joint exploitation of the Dead Sea area (chemicals production, tourism, etc.).

e. The establishment of an Israeli-Palestinian joint venture for car manufacturing in the Gaza Strip, permitting export of the cars to the Arab world.

f. The construction of a 30 inch oil pipeline leading from Mafraq (Tapline) in Jordan to Gaza; as follow up projects construction of a refinery and petrochemical industries.

g. The construction of a gas pipe-line from Egypt to Gaza and Israel.

h. The foundation of a Palestinian Development Bank and in connection herewith of a Middle East Development Bank.

i. Other economic development projects regarding mainly investment in light and other labour intensive industries.

Preparation and Implementation of the Initiative

7. The Gaza First-Initiative has to remain secret until the finalisation of the mutually agreed upon details of the programme. Abu Ala specifically asked us, not to inform Faisal and Hanan.

8. The preparation of the Initiative should be carried out in three stages:
   a. Achieving an Israeli-Palestinian understanding;
   b. involvement of the USA and agreement on her contribution;
   c. involvement of the Government of Egypt and agreement on her contribution.

9. The programme will be presented to the public as an "American Initiative".

Evaluation

10. The "Gaza First" proposal presented by Abu Ala. was undoubtedly authorized by Yassir Arafat.

11. The proposal represents in our view a very serious attempt to achieve a breakthrough in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and to move towards Israeli demands in four central aspects:

a. Enable Israel to deal with Gaza, separately from the West Bank;
b. enable Israel and the Palestinians to implement immediately regional economic cooperation;
c. promote the political process without referring immediately to all aspects of the permanent settlement; and
d. refrain from demanding (ultimatively) a change of the Madrid formula.

12. In return the Palestinians expect to make the three following gains:

a. Obtain already now an Israeli pledge to withdraw from Gaza;
b. create a more intense involvement of the PLO in the establishment of Palestinian interim self-governing institutions and
c. bring about a renewal of the US-PLO dialogue

13. In our opinion the presentation of this proposal indicates an important turning point and indicates preparedness on behalf of the Palestinian leadership in Tunis to recognize the basic political needs of the G.o.I.

14. Moreover, it appears to us, that - if the proposal is effectively "packaged and sold", Prime Minister Rabin will be able to gain strong public support, enabling him to win the next elections by a great majority.

15. If the project proposal is rejected, the Palestinians, in our view, will not end the negotiating effort immediately, but will attempt to permit the PLO to obtain a controlling position over institution building for the Interim Self-Government Body. However, in this case, Palestinian demands for control over land, legislation and jurisdiction will tend to be far more extensive. A rejection of these demands, too, will in our opinion, bring about a failure of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiating effort.

==========

24 ינואר 1993

אל: ד"ר יוסי ביילין
מאת: ד"ר יאיר הירשפלד וד"ר רון פונדק

פגישה עם משלחת אש"ף

מבוא

1. בסמינר בנושא "משאבי אנוש" שהתקיים ב-SARBSBORG שבנורבגיה, בין ה-20-22 ינואר 1993, נפגשנו עם משלחת אש"ף שהגיעה מתונים. בראש המשלחת עמד אבו-עלא (ראש המחלקה הכלכלית והאחראי לנושא המו"מ המולטילטרלי) ואליו התלוו ד"ר מאהר אל-קורד (יועץ כלכלי במשרדו של יאסר ערפאת), וחסן עספור (יועץ מדיני לאבו-מאזן).
2. במהלך הסמינר קיימנו עם המשלחת הפלסטינית שיחות בנושאים מולטילטרלים שידווחו בנפרד.
3. תוך כדי הפגישות התבקשנו להעביר את המסר המדיני הסודי הבא, שתוכנו - כך הובהר לנו - אושר על ידי יאסר ערפאת ואבו-מאזן.

ההצעה הפלסטינית

4. הוצע לממש מהלך של "עזה תחילה" ובו שלושה מרכיבים:
   א. ישראל תסכים מראש לנסיגה מרצועת עזה בעוד "שבתיים או שלוש".
   ב. תתוכנן ותמומש מייד תוכנית מרשל קטנה לאזור הרצועה.
   ג. תיבנה מייד מערכת הדוקה של שיתוף פעולה כלכלי ישראלי פלסטיני.

5. הפלסטינים מבינים שכל נסיגה "היפוטטית" מהרצועה לא תחשב כעיסקה לנסיגה מהגדה המערבית. לתקופת הביניים ניתן להפקיד את "המפתח" לרצועה בידי גורם שלישי.

6. הועלו מספר רעיונות לשיתוף פעולה כלכלי. הוצע לבדוק:
   א. הקמת מפעל התפלה ויצור חשמל ישראלי-פלסטיני-מצרי על גבול הרצועה-סיני.
   ב. הקמה של אזור מסחר חופשי בין עזה לאשדוד וחיבור פעילות שני הנמלים.
   ג. הקמת תעלת הימים תוך העדפה פלסטינית לתעלה שתחבר בין הים התיכון לים המלח, בתנאי שהפלסטינים יהיו שותף שווה בניצול משאבי התעלה.

Echo is all in response
to Peres-Faisal Meeting of
January 9, 1993

ד. שיתוף פעולה בפיתוח משאבי ים המלח (תיירות פוספטים וכו).
ה. הקמת מפעל ישראלי פלסטיני ליצור מכוניות שישווקו בעולם הערבי.
ו. בניית צינור נפט ממפרק לעזה כחלק ממערכת הטפליין, ובמסגרת זאת הקמת בתי זיקוק ותעשיה פטרו-כימית.
ז. בנית צינור גז ממצרים לרצועה ולישראל.
ח. פרויקטים כלכלים משותפים נוספים שיוסכמו בין הצדדים כגון תעשיות קלות וכבדות.

<u>גיבוש ומימוש התוכנית</u>

7. התוכנית חייבת להשאר סודית עד לגיבושה הסופי. אבו-עלא ביקש באופן מיוחד שלא לשתף בשלב זה את ההנהגה הפלסטינית בשטחים.

8. גיבוש התוכנית יעשה בשלושה מהלכים מהירים:
א. השגת הבנה ישראלית פלסטינית.
ב. צירוף של ארה"ב וקביעת תרומתה.
ג. צירוף של מצרים וקביעת תרומתה.

9. התוכנית תוצג כ"יוזמה אמריקאית".

<u>הערכה</u>

10. התוכנית המוצגת מתואמת ומסוכמת ללא ספק עם ערפאת ועם אבו-מאזן.

11. ההצעה מבטאת נסיון רציני ביותר להשיג פריצת דרך במו"מ עם ישראל, וללכת לקראת ממשלת ישראל במספר תחומים מרכזיים:
א. לאפשר מהלך של התנתקות ישראל מרצועת עזה.
ב. לקדם מיד שיתוף פעולה אזורי.
ג. לקדם התהליך המדיני ללא השלכה רישמית על פתרון הקבע.
ד. לא נדרש באופן מוצהר לקשור בין המהלך לבין שינוי נוסחת מדריד.

12. בתמורה מצפים הפלסטינים לזכות במספר השגים כלהלן:
א. הבטחת נסיגה ישראלית מעזה.
ב. מעורבות עמוקה יותר של אש"ף בהקמת המוסדות של הישות הפלסטינית ותכנון המהלכים הכלכליים ושיתוף הפעולה עם ישראל.
ג. חידוש הדו-שיח בין אש"ף לארה"ב.

13. הגשת ההצעה מהווה נקודת מפנה. יש בה מענה לצרכים פוליטים של ממשלת ישראל. שלילת ההצעה ושלילת מעורבות עקיפה של אש"ף תביא לדעתנו לכשלון המו"מ בערוץ הישראלי פלסטיני.

<u>צעדים מוצעים</u>

14. אנו מציעים את הצעדים הבאים לתקופה הקרובה:

א. גיבוש תוכנית עבודה מוסכמת וגיבוש מסלול פעולה מוסכם.

ב. נסיעת תאום שלנו לארה"ב לפגישה עם גורמים רלבנטים בממשל.

ג. מפגש שני בנורבגיה (הנורבגים - שאינם בסוד ההצעה הפלסטינית - הביעו עניין בארוח מפגש נוסף והפלסטינים ביקשו לשמור על מסגרת הפורום שכבר התכנס).

Minutes for the meeting

Mr. Shimon Peres

-1-

Date: 23/1/1993

Time: 9:30 am

Present: Dr. Yair Herchefeld

Palestinians: Faisal Husseini, Hanan Ashrawi

Minutes: Orient House Staffers

(Some pleasantries are exchanged)

FH: Where did we reach in the matter of the deportees.

SP: We have two tracks. One is legal: the supreme court can take one of 3-4 decisions, it can declare that the action is illegal or incompetent with the law in Israel, in that case the government will submit, then they are brought home. There is a way in between. Categories to recognize legality of banishment. or enable each one of them to appeal to the court.

The government feels restrained in her actions, not to affect the deliberations of the ccurt.

This confidential: There is some suggestion from France, 3 categories:

The idea is as such: part of them will come back more immediately. The other part, their expulsion will be reduced considerably maybe by half, in that case they can be transferred to another country, like France and Algeria. There they can be free, they do not have to be detained.

HA: Did Algeria accept that.

SP: At the beginning the baby was born when Dumas visited Algeria. It depends a little bit on Palestinians' reaction, if there will be a Palestinian refusal, France will not fight for it. You know Hamas is quite active in Paris and Sous went out, they are threatening his life. We would like to combine the 3 considerations:

- Renew the peace process.
- Not embark on collision course with the UN.
- Hamas not to appear as a winner.If Hamas is triumphant, it will bad for the peace process. Acts of Hams reached such a height against the Jewish community that the government had to do something. I did not know if they (the government) did the right thing. We have to look forward and see how to come out of it.

HA: A sort of a staggered approach, installments.

SP: That is French proposal. If the French come with a proposal, we will react. The French are checking.

FH: The Algerians have their own problems with the moslem movement.

SP: All north Africa there is an ongoing war. It is true of Egypt, Algeria and Morocco. They are for the continuation of the Peace Process (North African Countries). Tunis has offered to host one working group of the Multilaterals. Therefore, we are tracks: we would like very much to open talks on time, if we start before Ramdan, then it can go into Ramdan. It is difficult to start it when Ramadan has started.

FH: Yesterday, on the TV, talks of 10 ministers, talk of compromise, is it preparing of public opinion.

SP: This is an initiative of TV, you suggested that if transferred to security zone. There are problems with that: Israel does not have formal status in the security Zone, we cannot determine. Lahad will not have it. This may be become an immediate target for Hizballah, they might attack Lahad.

FH: Why anybody who does this will free them to Lebanon.

SP: Hizballah does not care. Hariri is wrong about thinking that we are trying to pressure him, to challenge him. I think we have no problem with Hariri. This week there were two confidence building measures. The Government cut all subsidies in the West Bank and Gaza, it is a major step. It will stop the flow of people into the West Bank and Gaza. Parliament changed the law regarding the meetings with the PLO. Those are important CBMs. That is how we see them. Permit me to be specific. A new zoning of Israel includes 3 elements:

- It crosses out the territories completely.
- It includes Arab villages in Israel.
- It follow an objective criteria geographically.

Those are two important steps that we are taking.

HA: We noted subsidies. But Baker said that this was a promise.

SP: That was concerning buildings, now it concerns many things: tax breaks, teachers, and social institutions, many new things, it is creating a new map. One University that was going to build across the green line, it was stopped.

HA: Do you see a negative sort of move of people moving out of houses?

SP: But the lines and queues to buy houses in the West Bank will

subside. The new zoning it was done because of political things. It was already started it is not a secret.
HA: How do you see a solution to the deportees problem. The idea that maybe that the high court will solve it, because in this case it will not embarrass your government. If the Security zone idea goes, we will not endorse it, we will attack it.

SP: Would you support the French solution.

HA: 3 solutions: We will like first the high court solution, it is very convenient, the Americans asked us to buy time for Rabin. Our position was for the UN security council to take action. We yesterday agreed to postpone the request for a meeting tomorrow. It was a gesture of good will. We will give a chance for Israeli legal system, there is a political solution which can come from your government itself. We know you do not want a triumphant return of heros. However, it is done, the requirement that is needed initially; the people who are allowed to return have to be sizeable.

SP: 50-60 people?

HA: 80 were already in the jail system, it begins to resolve, to unravel, whether they will accept a third country, that is difficult. Maybe a schedule can be announced for their return it will help. It would remove that dramatic impact.

SP: Privately, suppose 80 are back and others whoever was expelled for 9 months, his expulsion will be halved, others for 2 year will be halved, would you support this.

FH: What about the numbers of people in two categories?

SP: The majority are for two years. Then, they have to leave Lebanon. They will be free to move.

HA: We have to be able to sell it, that deportation itself has to be nullified. If you have period of deportations it will not give us the chance to proceed with the peace process.

SP: Lets say if we have 80 people coming back immediately.

HA: And then after that 50 that were deported by mistake will come back.

SP: Deportation is the exception to the rule, we left two legal doors open. If they go abroad, they can act easier to appeal legally. An important number will be brought home. It is not prejudice to their right to appeal individually.

HA: Individual appeal might not work, since those people, they move collectively.

SP: They too must decide where their actions lead to. I know that the Egyptians will accept, Syrians are not too keen on this.

1993 should be the year of decisions.

HA: If the French come out of it as their own proposal, seen as twisting the arms of both sides.

SP: You should not freighted them. This can come out as forcing two sides.

FH: If in certain things we can make two thirds, let us talk about those who are above 60 years of age.

HA: Maybe over 50. There are a few older.

SP: If someone declares that he is against terror, he will be pardoned.

HA: It is a non starter.

FH: Better not to ask them.

HA: Many proposals, not for public information.

SP: That is why we are talking quickly. Those are parameters, I expect tonight to hear from the french. They will talk to your people, I hope that your people will not freighted them.

FH: Did you think about returning former deportees.

SP: Would it help. On our side it may appear as appeasement, we should not lose and waste gestures. As well as deportees who were deported in the past they can appeal.

HA: It is a very good approach.

SP: We should keep for later.

FH: How do you analyze such a step.

SP: We also have our public opinion. Do not forget, it will be kept for later. Everything the court will decide will be completely respected by us. We hope that they make their decisions on Monday.

HA: Is the government considering a move if the court does not.

SP: If the french tonight inform us, we may take some immediate steps, or we may wait until monday. We would like to put on rail the peace process as soon as possible.

FH: About scale of punishment, you mean people in prison.

SP: If they are judged today, their sentence will be easier.

HA: We can point out cases to you that have symbolic influence.

between you and the administration to talk about things not on the table and that you think it is important. Small stones, small gestures.

FH: Let us think about this scenario: if we accept education system, or tax system, some will say, this is the implementation of Israeli autonomy, if they go against me (opposition), either, I will get the Israeli army to fight against the rejectionists, especially if we have no security system, but that is not acceptable.

SP: Build your own police force. There was a local police in Jewish settlements in the early days. You should not be too worried, you will gain authority. We will be supportive and invisible. You have to appear as an independent group.

HA: This is not reflected in your official delegation position.

SP: Like what?

HA: During negotiations we tried to see how to get negotiations going. We went to the Israelis and said, while we discuss land, we would like to discuss modalities for elections, your side refused, they said that.....

Preliminary steps, CBMs, every time, we brought them ideas, they said bring us names for individual cases. These things, should come out as a result of negotiations. This would give negotiations a boost. If declarations on CBMs happens during negotiations. Bring in individual cases to authorities that is what they told us. That is what infuriated our people, as if we are acting as village leagues.

SP: Put some cased before the delegation. Then two delegation announce of agreement.

HA: How about across the board categories.

SP: Categories are difficult.

HA: Categories like bridge fees, age of prisoners, category of demolishing houses. If you keep the undercover units working in cold blood, it will look bad.

SP: If I understood you correctly, you will go in talking about elections while not agreeing about whole thing.

HA: We presented this, we said to have it parallel.

SP: Not independent.

HA: We have to have conditions that is parallel; like supervision and guarantees, freedom of movement and censorship.

SP: In 1976 I was defense minister, there was not a single complaint against these municipal elections.

HA: Now we are talking about different elections.

SP: If they (Palestinians) have elections, we should close our ears, I told my party yesterday. On international supervision, if the international press is there, Barbara Walters is more significant than Jimmy Carter. We cannot be the policeman of Hamas. If we will stop it we force you then to come and stand in the same boat as Hamas. We want you to stop it. If we hit Hamas, we hit Palestinians.

HA: We have to defend them.

SP: Only way is to take over authority, to try elections. Have two rounds of elections; one for the delegation and one for the representatives. This will save the Arab dilemma, be their beacon.

HA: Then support our call for Human Rights Working Group.

FH: If we work for individual cases, it seems to me that people will come to me with a case, if I solve it , the fine, if not, then I seem to accept that.

SP: I think you are mistaken in not acting more actively in multilaterals in water, and land is not alike water. Moves from side to another on the multilateral, you can get support, and good will for your economy. You are fighting the ceremonial side, make authority that you are part of it. In the multilaterals you have 30 countries that can give you support. I think that you should be more objective.

HA: We needed a lot of human resources from outside.

SP: You have a lot among you.

FH: We have a lot in Jerusalem.

SP: Both of you, you have double addresses. Let us have a good look about elections. The sooner we release ourselves from the task of fighting Hamas the better the negotiations will be.

HA: If elections is the way, then elections for what before we agree. Negotiators need to have certain skills, they cannot be elected, but appointed.

SP: Elected body can nominate negotiators. You can speak on behalf of the majority. You can either exercise your authority by being a government or you can establish your authority by being a majority. We are deeply interested in your success. We regret some of the "omelets" we have done in world politics, we do not want to make an omelet (like Yugoslavia) in the West Bank because it is

SP: We are ready to hand over to the delegation cases and power. We are interested that the delegation will win prestige, if no Hamas, then who. We know that you need public opinion. The basic problem is how to establish your authority on people. If you will have whole of majority, you will face whole of country. Go for elections.

HA: There is a certain amount of reciprocal responsibility. If we have elections, the delegation has been undermined. If we have elections in this situation, disequilibrium will affect us, when Hamas has economic support, we do not have similar support. Whereas, we do not have enough room to move. We need to prepare grounds before we achieve elections. Right now are absolutely helpless.

SP: Why do not you take over part of the authority now: treasury, home tax, education, tourism. Why do you have to have it all at once. Begin gradually. In our nation we have always cherished the gradual approach, we think that maybe you are wrong.

HA: Two schools: There are people who want this, others are afraid of fragmented approach and are afraid to be stuck in administrative tasks.

The conspiracy theory is every where, the politicization of our public is big. It all comes from the fact that you have a delegation that is not a government.

SP: You have to take risks. People will criticize you but you will be able to show fruits. Why do not use authority and present a group of people who can become authority in Gaza. Build a municipality of your own. Arafat authorized Fayez Abu Rahmeh. We want to help the economic situation in the West Bank, we are telling everybody to help you (the EC, Sweden). I am going to Brussels, we want to have a happy and not a poor neighbor. We believe in a world that will have basic clash. Economies became globalized, nationalism became particularized. Poverty will be used politically, it is photogenic nowadays. An economic group for all of us and an identity card for all of us. Occasionally, I am asking myself for whom I am working, we are satisfying our rulers, we are ignoring our people. The greatest danger is the decertification of the land. Every child that will be born will have less land that can be developed. We want to fight deserts. We I am organizing money and funds it will be open for all we want to build a school to fight decertification. This common denominator, we want to be a facilitator not a dominator, Standard of living creates the standard of politics. It goes to the depth of the story. We are not playing games with you. We do not want to dominate Palestinian life. We want to see the Palestinian life in the highest shape.

HA: When talk about economic life in the West Bank we see taxation, fines, and outrageous regulations.

SP: We looked into that. Maybe we can organize a small meeting

against the historical wisdom. We are interested to move ahead as soon as we can. You insisted on 242, nobody in 4 years will remember. 242 means that the return of the whole land to you. You can say it, we will not say, we will say our version.

HA: We have to have common terms of reference, we have a long history among us. We need terms of references. We need to establish proper linkage, there is also an interlock in substance.

Nothing in interim period will be prejudicial to final stage in 242.

HA: We have said it. If we can get that this interlock in substance.

SP: We have said, It should not prejudice solution in 242 and 338.

HA: You stayed away from relation in substance. Then you came with another agenda.

SP: Jerusalem is a touchy issue.

HA: We are not dealing with it frontly, we are dealing with practical issues like economic life, education and elections.

SP: On elections, our party said we do picture that Palestinians in east Jerusalem will have the right of a proxy vote. Every nationality can vote for whatever he wants, wherever he is: the law of the land.

HA: Vote or run.

SP: Vote.

FH: Can you go back to the question of double addresses.

SP: I would like to equip myself with more information. Let me have a look at it, if we can find ways to include Jerusalem.

FH: About the other matter, the deportees from before, from your side your prove two things: these steps were not meant to get rid of Palestinians, so you start to allow them to come back.

SP: The Mere fact that they are being deported for 2 years shows our intentions.

SP: If you tell us that is sufficient for your to come to the Peace table, we would consider it. We do not want empty gestures.

HA: Let us deal with the 400 deportees first.

SP: You made this the only item.

FH: To make a damage control of getting back these people, we are

in need of returning back all deported people.

HA: Can we achieve a time frame for negotiations.

SP: The sooner the better.

HA: We have a problem with the surpassing of the timetable.

SP: Start counting after the new government. Every time you are coming out of negotiations you have a weeping face especially Dr. Abdul Shafi, you are depressing your own people.

HA: People measure things on the ground.

SP: I can tell you the list of your achievements.

FH: We need some achievements on the field.

SP: We are not building settlements any more, better to be attacked in success. In order not to be attacked by your people you create a failure.

Public relations is based on repetition, there is a competition among you, who will be the more pessimistic. 10 ministers out of 17 against deportations. This week you had two unique decisions by government.

HA: We need things that are tangible.

SP: We told FM of Sweden to invest in territories, why do not you ask them to really support you. 1% of Sweden's GNP is in Foreign Aid. We are today open. In the EC I will talk greatly about you. How about for a fund for small loans for small business.

HA: We do not even have running costs for existing institutions.

FH: Infrastructure projects: cement factory, power generator in Gaza, you will not oppose these projects..

SP: WE told you begin your building of projects, Gaza is on the verge of catastrophe, get funding from wherever you want, even from Libya. In Gaza we will buy water from you for 10 years. Expensive water is more important than no water.

HA: We are not a country, countries are hesitant to assist us.

SP: We were also a non country. Leave the world of rhetoric and go to the world of practice.

SP: Deportees: we are willing to do enough to bring you to the negotiations, but not to give Hamas the victory.

Meeting between Shimon Peres, Faisal el-Husseini and Hanan Ashrawi; January 23, 1993
present: Kamal Husseini, Avi Gil, Yair Hirschfeld

Faisal: What is now the situation regarding the deportees?

Shimon: We have two tracks. One is the legal one and it depends on the High Court of Justice. The judges can take three different decisions: First, they can recognized the legality od the departation; second they can declare the illegality of the deportation - in this case the government will respect their decision; and third, they may look for a way inbetween; define several categories od those deported and ask for a differentiated approach to the issue.

The Government has been fully restrained and will not effect the deliberations of the High Court.

On the other hand, there is the political and diplomatic track. There are all kind of suggestions from various parties. Lets for instance say, from France. The idea is that part of the deportees will come back immediately; the time of expulsion of another part of the deportees will be strongly reduced and a third part will be transferred to other countries; to Algeria or France. There, of course, they will be free. This "baby" was born, when Dumas visited Algeria. I don't know what the real position of the Algerian government is. In a way, the succes of the scheme may depend on the Palestinian reaction to the French proposal.

At the beginning there were some favourable reactions of some of the Arab countries; but the problem is that Hamas is strong. In Paris, for instance, they are very strong. They are threatening the life of Ibrahim Sus; he had to run away.

In seeking a solution to the deportee question Israel bears three considerations in mind:
a) the continuation of the peace process;
b) our desire not to bring about a collusion with the United Nations; and
c) our determination to show that Hamas will be the loser.
We are afraid that they will be triumphant. This will be very bad for peace.

At the outset of the crisis we were left with no option. They killed many Jews and they threatened to kill the peace process. Therefore strong action had to be taken against them.

Hanan: But the Hamas was strengthened and our people were put in a very bad situation.

Shimon: May be. But you know, Ben Gurion once asked the

question: What can God not do? and the answer is: He cannot change the past.

Hanan: Thus, you expect that a staggered approach will be adopted, and they will come back in different stages?

Shimon: This is the French proposal. If the French will come with a clear cut proposal, we may react to it. We know this tonight or at latest tomorrow.

Faisal: The Algerians have their own problems; they won't create problems for themselves; getting the deportees there would cause all kind of domestic problems (in Algeria).

Shimon: In all the Arab countries there is an Islamic threat; but most of the Arab states want a continuation of the peace process. Tunisia has even offered to host a session of the multilateral working group on refugees.

Also for us it is important that the negotiations start on schedule. I was told that if we start on time, we can continue negotiations into Ramadan; but if we postpone the renewal of negotiations we can not start in Ramadan. We want to keep the momentum.

Faisal: We too, but as long as they are all time in the limelight. (?)

Hanan: Is there any chance that the Yossi Sarid compromise will be implemented?

Shimon: He suggested that the deportees should be returned to the security zone. This proposal was rejected for several reasons: First, we have no legal status there; we cannot detain them; we cannot change decisions there or the like. Second, Lahat is opposed to it. They may become an immediate target. The Hisbollah may attack.

Faisal: Why? Nobody would want them back into Lebanon.

Shimon: Harari, the Lebanese Prime Minister thinks wrongly that we want to undermine him. Rather on the contrary; we are happy with Harari. He puts economic considerations above everything and he has established Lebanese authority throughout. We are in favour of this.
The French talked to Lahat. He would not listen.

The last time we met, we spoke about CBM's. This weak two important CBM's were taken. The Government cut all the subsidies given to settlers on the West Bank and Gaza. This

decision will have an impact on the flow of people. People will not go there anymore as before.

The second move was done by the Knesseth, changing the law regarding meetings with the PLO. That is important too.

In deciding on a new system for subsidies three categories were established: First, the territories (the West Bank and Gaza) were crossed our for subsidies; second, subsidies will now be given also to Arab villages; many Arab villages are within the districts that will be able to obtain substantial government support; third, geographic criteria have been determined.

Hanan: We noticed the issue of the subsidies. Secretary of State James Baker had told us, (a year ago), if there would be no (complete) stop of settlements, the US would not provide financing for Israel. So for us, this measures don't seem to be anything new.

Shimon: At the time Baker spoke about stopping subsidies for buildings. But we have now decided to stop subsidies in the form of taxbreaks, payment for teachers, kindergardens and many other ways of providing assistance.

Hanan: There is continued building going on.

Shimon: If they already possessed all the permissions, the government cannot legally interfer.

Hanan: Do you see that people will actually leave the settlements?

Shimon: The indication is that the lining up, the long queu of people wanting to go there has come to an end.

Hanan: Can we get details?

Shimon: We shall give the material to Yair. It is not a secret. How do you see the solution of the deportees?

Hanan: We are speaking confidentially.

Shimon: Nothing leaks from here. Also the last time everything remained secret.

Faisal: We want the problem removed.

Shimon: Will you support the French proposal?

Hanan: There are three possible solutions. First, if the High Court orders your government to take the deportees back, this is an Israeli solution.

Shimon: We have no influence...

Hanan: Our (official) position is that we have asked for a Security Council meeting and decision. Nevertheless, we have agreed to postpone our request. It is a gesture of good will, intended to give the Israeli legal system a chance.

We feel that there is also a political solution: The staggered approach; The Hamas would then not be triumphant. The question is what does "staggering" mean in practical terms? Have it the way of the Israeli Government; the Security Council, or of third parties.

If the deportees return within different groups; the question is, how big will be the size of each group? If the first group to return counted 80 it would be o.k. Some of them were already sentenced. You can say that nobody may be sentenced twice for the same act; for another group (of deportees) your people could discover that they have been deported by mistake. A third group could go to a third country, in case it is a temporary solution, and the time of expulsion is being also reduced, i.e. if it is less than the whole period; we could probably sell it. It could remove the sting.

Shimon: suppose 80 come back and the others expulsion sentence will be halfed.

Faisal: It is a question of numbers.

Shimon: The majority of them have been sentenced for two years.

Hanan: It is not a good idea to say the detention has been fixed for a shorter period. We have to be able to say that the act of expulsion has been nullified.

Shimon: We have said the expulsion is not
a) a rule, but the expception of the rule;
b) there is a legal situation.
One could say if they go abroad, they can act easier to appeal.

Hanan: The problem with individual appeal is, is that they move collectively.

Shimon: When the action (to solve the problem) is taken

it may look differently. The Egyptians would be satisfied. The Syrians, so far did not push, altogether. 1993 should be the year of decision.

Hanan: If the French can act as arbitrators and submit their proposal to each side, they may be seen to twist the arm of both sides. We can live with that.

Faisal: Over 50 will have to come back immediately.

Shimon: If they would be asked to declare that they are against terror and violence, would they do it?

Hanan: No.

Shimon: I am afraid that they would say "no". They might calculate that they will gain more from saying "no" than from saying "yest".

Faisal: They would say "no".

Hanan: Is is an act of balance, having them come back gradually, and not having the sentence of expulsion being legitimized.

Shimon: I expect to hear from the French even this evening. Your people should not frighten.

Faisal: Will you take some other deportees back?

Shimon: We don't want to waste gestures. They can appeal. But we may review the scale of punishment and we may set up a time limit for expulsion. You know some years ago, the sentences were far more severe.

Faisal: to Fatah people.

Shimon: Actually, the first to be expelled were pro-Jordanians. This is quite an indication that there is real change.

Hanan: It is a very good approach (to permit others to return, or to reevaluate the sentences). But the timing has to be right.

Shimon: It should be kept for a later date. If we get the French proposal tonight, we may take some immediate steps, or we may wait until Monday; we want to put the peace process back on rail, as soon as possible.

Faisal: About the scale of punishment, you mean the deportees

or those imprisoned?

Hanan: Could it be coordinated with (us)(?)

Shimon: I would do it without asking. We are willing to review all our former punishments, that will have an impact on certain personal matters. We want to strengthen you The basis problem is how to establish authority over your people. I don't want to repeat myself; but it is either majority rule, or the rule of the gun. Elections can be important.

Hanan: There are basic problems. There is the standing of the delegation. We did not bring concrete results. If we have elections in this situation of equilibrium, when the Hamas have strong economic support and we have not. We have also no political achievements. Before we think of elections we need ammunition; e,g. alleviate the economic hardships; the human rights issue.

Shimon: Why won't you take part of the authority immediately? Start with taxes, education, tourism. If you begin gradually, you can provide your people with achievements. We have always cherished the gradual approach. Another dunam, another cow...

Hanan: The present situation is that some people among us think that way, some are afraid that the gradual approach would imprison us and limit our activities to administrative tasks. We have to be aware of public opinion. You have to secure the support of your people.

Shimon: You have to take risks. They, (the Palestinian people), will appreciate the fruits of your authority. We are talking about Gaza, e.g. why don't you have a municipality led by one of your own people. Arafat has authorized Faiz Abu Rahme, but he is uncapable of taking over. We want economic development; and investement. For instance, I saw the Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs and told her, she should support investment in the territories.

You must understand we don't simply act upon considerations of efficacy. We want you to be a good neighbour and a happy neighbour. We have to think about the future, too.

There is a basic clash between two developments. The economies become global, politics become national. This creates a dangerous clash. There was always (in the past as today) poverty; but today it is more "photogenic". We want you to develop your economy. We have to develop an economic roof for all of us and a national identity card for each of us. Everybody will have his flag, and there will be coopera-

tion to make the people happy.

We are drawing too much attention to satisfy the rulers and not the people.

There is the problem of desertification of the area. Now, every child will have less land. It is a catastrophe. We want to develop the desert. We are taking already important practical steps.

Hanan: It has to be done collectively.

Shimon: Yes, but we cannot wait. I am raising money; we will build a school, a research center. You have to provide services and opportunities for your people and for the economy. A high standard of living creates a (high) standard of politics. The Palestinian society is most developed ..

Hanan: I agree with you; yet, we cannot afford to wait. We can start, but we have to face increased taxation, fines, regulations limiting all our activities.

Shimon: We can deal with it. May be in an informal meeting between your people and the people of our Civil Administration. Then, all these issues can be raised. Small guestures in regard to taxation etc.

Faisal: You think of "Gaza First"

Shimon: "Gaza Equal".

Faisal: Assume we accept a scenario, when we take over control for education and finances; our men responsible herefore may be all too easily under attack from both sides. ~~We must find a way...~~

Shimon: Build your own police force. You probably don't remember. Under the British we had the Gaffir, a local jewish police force. Arms and training were provided by the British. You should not be worried. You have to face criticism. You will gain authority. We shall be supporting you, but we will stay unvisible. We understand that have to take certain public positions.

Hanan: What you have been saying is not reflected in the negotiation papers.

Shimon: Give an example.

Hanan: For instance regarding the elections for an interim self-governing body. During negotiations we talked about

the concept and the modalities (of elections). Your side refused to talk about the election modalities, argueing the concept included everything.
Another example, in negotiations our delegation demanded practical steps, such as: reducing the fees at the bridge; tax reductions, family reunion in order to create a better atmosphere. Instead of granting these demands, our delegation was asked to bring individual cases; had the delegation obliged, its members would have been transformed into a kind of new "village league". We need across the board changes.

Shimon: Give me some examples of categories you are referring to.

Hanan: Travel fees reduction; release from prison persons over a certain age, persons under a certain age. You can also but certain activities into one category: as e.g. the demolishing of houses.

Shimon: Would you agree to negotiate elections before determining other issues?

Hanan: We are willing to discuss election modalities parallel, not independent of the other issues. There are several issues related: a. international supervision and monitoring; b. freedom of movement, speech, censorship.

Shimon: I was Minister of Defence in 1976; we had elections; there was not the slightest complaint. Elections will be same thing this time. We mean it.

Hanan: The people will have to voice their ideas...

Shimon: We will have to close our ears.

Hanan: Supervision

Shimon: The international press; Barbara Walters is far more effective than Jimmy Carter. We cannot be the police man of Hamas. We want to escape this dilemma.If we hit Hamas, we hit the Palestinians and you have to defend the Hamas. The only way out of this dilemma, is you have to take over. The Palestinian people are prone to democracy.

Hanan: There is the issue of human rights.

Shimon: We agreed to create a human right working group in the bilaterals.

Hanan: It backfired. There was again the individual approach.

Shimon: We can't have the Human Right issue dealt with in the multilaterals. It would become a forum to attack us internationally. Things should be done informally.

We have to deal also with the issue of water and land. They are not the same. Land is immobile and can be divided. Water moves and belongs to all of us. In the multilaterals you can mobilise great support for your economy. Instead you always fight the ceremonial side. The multilaterals are the greatest opportunity. Thirty countries participate there and want to help you; there are also twelve Arab countries there and you are not depedent on one or the other party.

Hanan: Also here we are limited. We cannot have our best professionals participate; and not people from Jerusalem.

Shimon: You can have double adresses and you can mobilise assistance from abroad....

I don't see any other way to move ahead, thanm elections.

Hanan: If election is the only way before the transition period...

Shimon: You will elect the group which will nominate the negotiators for four to five years. Even if Arafat would come here, Hamas would threaten his life. You impose your authority by being elected.

You have on our side much good will. We are deeply interested in your success. You know, we think also beyond the immediate developments. In life one can easy make an omelette out of eggs, but you cannot make eggs out of an omeletteWe don't want the West Bank to become an omelette. We are not thinking merely in terms of expedience. We want to move ahead. You insisted on 242. We agreed on an interlock. Who will remember all this in a year? You can claim 242 is return of all territories; we shall speak the English version; but you can't expect us to endorse your positions.

Hanan: We need common terms of reference. We need to establish the proper linkage.

Shimon: There is an interlock in time.

Hanan: We need also an interlock in substance. It will be nothing if activities in the interim-period will be prejudicial to the outcome in final status negotiations.

Shimon: It is there.

Hanan: Jerusalem

Shimon: Our party said a proxy vote on Jerusalem would be possible. This was some time ago; but today that question is still open ended.

Hanan: There is the problem, if Jerusalem is not included in practical matters.

Shimon: I will equip myself with my information. Let me have a look at it.

Faisal: Regarding the deportee question. An Israeli declaration, regarding the non applicability of deportation...

Shimon: Do you prefer delcarations to facts? This was a temporary move. We said it is not a policy.

Hanan: Can we have a time frame for negotiations. We have a problem, as our people expected negotiations to last one year, and the year is over.

Shimon: You have to start counting from the moment the new government took over.

Hanan: Our people have no hope.

Shimon: Tell your people you are gaining in negotiations. You are depressing your people. You are weeping. You are becoming a victim of your own propaganda.

Hanan: People are judging by what is happening.

Shimon: You are describing the negotiations. You are mobilising your own people against you.

Hanan: I did not. I was attacked. Prisoners are still in prison.

Shimon: There is an end of settlements, although the settlement stop was not complete. It is better to be attacked because you are successful, than you are attacked because you have failed.

Rabin and myself spoke to the Swedes. They are the third largest goregin donor of aid after the US and Japan and have a budget of $ 1 bn. I asked them why don't you invest. Ask

them to support your economy and the public institutions.

Faisal: We are doing this.

Shimon: Bethlehem, for instance, got money for the sewage system...

Hanan: They can give technical assistance.

Shimon: Make a fund for Small Business Enterprises; a Fund for Hospitals.

Hanan: There is the problem of maintenance payments. In Bir Zeiyth for instance we have beautiful buildings but we have no money to pay the running costs.

Shimon: From the fund for small business enterprises; you can use repayment for maintaining institutions.

Faisal: We are also concerned of creating the necessary economic infrastructure.

Shimon: We suggested to give you control over electricity, desalination, etc.

Faisal: Can we tell the Japanese about the electricity?

Shimon: Gaza is on the way to a catastrophe; under your land, your management, built your own companies. We are ready to facilitate.

Hanan: Money is not be pouring down on us. The Gulf countries may assist.

Shimon: We are ready to help you to get the money. We are ready to guarantee and purchase goos; e.g. buy gas from Egypt.
Do it. The cost of the water depends on the cost of electricity; and the cost of electricity depends on the cost of the capital. Today you have much good will. France e.g. has funds for 2 %. This is cheap money.

Hanan: We have limitations because we are not a country.

Shimon: We have also been a non-country. We had the Jewish Agency. We got ourselves organised..

Faisal: I am travelling tomorrow.

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Meeting with Abu Ala, Maher al-Kurd and Hassan Azfour with Yair Hirschfeld and Ron Pundik; Sarpsborg, January 21, 1993.

Abu Ala's Statements:

Present Difficulties

We believe that we are passing in these days and weeks a very important and critical phase, requiring from both of us, Israelis and Palestinians, courage and fruitful thinking. To be very frank, we feel that if we together will not make (successful) use of the present stage, we will both lose and our people will suffer. The only alternative (to an Israeli-Palestinian understanding) is more conflict. We very strongly and seriously seek an understanding; we want to make peace.

You may have observed that the present state of frustration has enforced growing opposition. For instance the activities of the ten organisations working from Damascus and their channels have become very active inside the West Bank and Gaza. Their supports in various Arab and Islamic countries, mainly Iran, have gained from this state of affairs. Iran, of course, has serious pretensions in the region. Under present conditions Iran manipulates the Palestinian course and the problem of Jerusalem in order to achieve its selfish aims.

We are convinced that if we find a just solution, a country like Iran will lose its main weapon.

Going back to the phenomenon of frustration, you have to be aware, that this frustration is reflected in three aspects:
First, it relates to the nature of Israeli policies and practices in the area. We believe that the time has now arrived to create a sense of relaxation in the area (the West Bank and Gaza);
Second, negotiations have not reached tangible achievements;
Third, the ongoing drastic deterioration of social and economic conditions of the population of the West Bank and Gaza is creating great grievances, hardship and radicalisation.

In case our intentions are genuine, we can coordinate measures to relax and resolve these three aspects (of frustration).

The Impact of the Gulf War

After the Gulf War we have passed through difficult times. Our position has often been misinterpreted. May be, we "exaggerated" our position. However, our relations (with the former anti-Iraq coalition countries) have drastically improved. I refer particularly to the last visit of Abu Mazen

and his delegation to Qatar, Oman and Saudi Arabia. Of course, the positions expressed by Abu Mazen and his delegation had been totally supported and endorsed by Arafat and the highest Revolutionary Council. Yassir Arafat openly supported a policy of improving relations with these countries.

Our international relations with Europe are good. These relations have recovered and the pre-Gulf crisis state of affairs has been reestablished in our dealings with the European Community, with Canada, with North and East European states.

Unfortunately the relationship with the USA has not seen any progress. We expected that the dialogue between the US government and the PLO would be resumed. May be you share our view that such a dialogue with the USA can be conducive to peace.

The PLO Contribution to the Peace Process

We have proven our good intentions and our constructive attitude in the participation in the peace process, although unjust conditions have been imposed on us. We will remain committed to the peace process, as long as it has a chance of success. (emphasis added) We will strife to improve the terms of Palestinian participation.

In our opinion we are presently facing a crisis and a deadlock in negotations. The main weakness of the process is that no change has occurred. Moreover, our people understood that negotiations have been limited in time to one year. One year of negotiations is over and we have not obtained an agreement.

We have submitted many proposals. No adequate response has been received from the Government of Israel. This makes our position shaky within the Palestinian public and leadership.

We need to examine carefully the details of the gap. I will give some suggestions:

We have submitted detailed proposals to Mr. Gargirian. regarding principles of agreement. Another proposal was submitted in adifferent way to the Israeli delegation.
An agreement on these principles with some cosmetic alterations will help progress in the negotiations.
It is deemed crucial to reach a clearly defined frame of reference for the interim-period..

Jurisdiction

Regarding jurisdiction. We feel we can avoid conflict. Our understanding was that jurisdiction (of the interim self-government) will cover the territories occupied in 1967; and negotiations should concentrate on exceptions, provided that such exceptions are not contrary to the context of resolution 242. It is also our understanding that 338 calls for the implementation of 242.

Security

Regarding the security issue. We put that issue high up on our agenda. Your requirements and ours have to be well taken care of and an understanding on strategic issues obtained. The implementation of security entails the personification of peaceful coexistence in the area and the search for mutual interests. This way, the security issue, (which has a negative aspect in the experience of our people), will obtain a positive content that will make all of us interested in preserving it.

Elections

We understand that the Interim Palestinian Council will be formed by general, free and direct elections of all of the population on the West Bank and Gaza, that are registered in the statistics of June 4, 1967. Naturally, the elections shall take place under the supervision of agreed upon international bodies.

Legislation

The Interim Palestinian Council will be empowered to legislate for all the authorities that are mutually agreed upon to be delegated to it. Taking into consideration a review of all laws and regulations.

Confidence Building Measures

We believe that the Israeli Government can take the initiative and create confidence building measures that will serve both sides and will not cause any harm to the Israeli side:

a. We believe the first step in this direction is an immediate solution of the deportee question.

In order for the Israeli Government to regain its good reputation inther internationsl arena, it should permit other deportees to return, especially pesonalities, whose presence in the West Bank and Gaza would be conducive to the peace process. I refer to people like Hana Nasr (from Bir Zeith University) or

like Muhammad Milhem (former mayor of Halhul). (responding to our question: not to Akram Haniye).

b. The second issue is to reinstal the role of the PLO; permit the PLO role in the peace process to be a direct one. This will be conducive to the peace process.

c. The third issues; we believe that a way copuld be devised that the G.o.I will do some convincing steps to end the settlenments.

d. Another issue relates to human rights. A list of points has been offered by our delegation.

e. We need measures to alleviate restrictions on economic development. There is a long list of issues which have been mentioned by the delegation in Washington.

Gaza First

Mr. Rabin, Mr. Peres as well as Mr. Arens have spoken in the past about a possible withdrawal from Gaza. This is a welcome step. We can start immediately with several activities and economic cooperation in the Gaza Strip. Gaza needs a Mini-Marshall Plan. There can be a free-zone area and it can be extended to Ashdod. There can be joint operations, serving the entire area with two seaports, (Ashdod and Gaza); this will enable you and us to enhance trade, tourism and other areas of development.

This is one of the several cooperation schemes we have in mind. We can start by commissioning studies very discretly. These studies can be done by us, by you, or by a third side. Many of these studies can be done by you, as you are better than we are in these things.

These are ideas that come to our mind and can be translated into action; however it cannot be openly discussed.

The implementation of such a proposal could enable us to solve the social problems in Gaza and take care of related hardship elsewhere. Such an idea is worth considering.

(Israeli-Palestinian) cooperation in Gaza could be a model for future cooperation. We can imagine many other forms of cooperation and know that such projects can be interwoven in the economic structure of the region as a whole:
Several industries and refineries can be established; light industries can be developed and projects for re-export planned. We can consider a joint Israeli-Palestinian car manufacture enterprise to serve the entire region.

We understand that any hypothetical withdrawal from Gaza will create a constructive mechanism that will lead to progress also on the West Bank. It is an important step in the right direction and it can create a magical effect on the enhancement of the entire peace process.

The Multilateral Negotiations

The Government of Israel can give a very effective push to the multilaterals. I understand that in the multilaterals you (Israel) are compensated for concessions in the bilaterals. For us this is good, as we gain twice: we will improve our situation in both the bilaterals and the multilaterals.

If you make it easier for us in the multilaterals we will make it easier for you in your contact with other Arab states. For instance let us consider a list of misunderstandings that could be prevented and a list of CBM's.

CBM's

We suggest to obtain from Israel a license
a. to start the cement factory in Hebron;
b. to start to work on a sea port in Gaza;
c. to establish a Palestinian Development Bank; and
d. to permit the implementation of the Teddy Kollek Plan: enabling the construction of 7 500 housing units for Palestinians preferably on public owned land.

Such positions and attitudes would be very helpful in the multilaterals and would remove obstacles for progress. All these are hypothetical suggestions.

Water Resources

It is difficult for us to understand the logic behind the Israeli refusal, to recognize our water rights. This particular issue is blocking progress.

(The Israeli position was explained)

Another thought would be in this context - as a token of good will - if Israel would double the quantity of water in the territories for the Palestinians; that would create high political returns for us.

Although in the context of water resources, reference should be made to the Johnston Plan. Would it be possible to consider the construction of the Western Gor Canal?

We should obtain at first agreement with you (Israel) and then we can deal with the Jordanians.

It is necessary to enable the establishment of a Palestinian Water Authority; there could be an understanding between the delegations and it would serve mutual interests.

Refugees

For various reasons - humanitarian, social and political - it is necessary to deal more seriously with the issue of Family Reunification and the return of deportees. There are so many ways that we can deal with it. It will enable us to move to all other issues. (We explained the need to deal with the issue of Family Reunification in the context of bilateral talks).

Environment

We have suggested to establish a Palestinian Institute for the Protection of Environment. I don't see the ratio of opposing this.

Security and Arms Control

We will be careful to follow the formula of representation; the Palestinian delegation will be led by Dr. Zayigh and Ziyyad Abu Zayyad will be a member.

Steering Committee

We suggested to form a sub-committee on Jerusalem. (It was explained to them, why this was impossible).
The participation of Syria and lebanon should be encouraged.
In the committee on security and arms control Lybia and Iraq should be encouraged to participate in order to have them as partners for security arrangements in the area.

Trilateral Activities

Steps to promote the implementation of the Red - Dead Sea Canal, or preferably the Med-Dead Sea Canal should be encouraged.

For the future trilateral Israeli-Palestinian-third country activities should be planned. Several trilateral projects could be planned in the Dead Sea area, in regard to Chemical Industries, Tourism etc.

Also in the Jordan Valley - a free trade zone should be arranged; enabling the development of major trade activities to and from the Arab world.

All other projects mentioned in the paper "Dividends of Peace" (written by Abu Ala; see appendix) should be considered.

Maher el-Kurd: Many of the projects, such as described by the Armand Hammer Institute of the University of Tel Aviv, or by Palestinian Institutes should also be considered.

In interesting suggestion is the construction of a desalination and electricity generating plant on the border between Gaza, the Negev and Egypt.

Abu Ala: It would be useful to revive the old Tap-line, which originally transferred oil to Haifa. We want to construct a 30 inch pipeline from Mafraq (Jordan) to Gaza - Ashdod; the costs involved amount to US $ 50 000 000,- . This and other ideas can be gradually studied together.

Postponement of the Multilaterals

In case the deportee question should not be solved on time; the Palestinians would prefer to postpone the multilateral meetings, in order not to be forced to remain outside.

2nd Meeting with Abu Ala; (Oslo)

The way to proceed in promoting the Gaza-First Plan would be as follows:

First, organise another meeting, or several meetings - with Norwegian assistance - in order to sum up the details of a coordinated Israeli-Palestinian strategy;
second, involve the US-government: coordinate a scenario with them and permit the US government to lead the way (publicly). American Government support is also important in order to obtain enough financial support from the international community and the Arab world);
third, involve the Government of Egypt, discuss with them the details of implementation;
fourth: go public (until then keep the operation completely secret).

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The implementation of such a proposal could enable us to solve the social problems in Gaza and take care of related hardship elsewhere. Such an idea is worth considering.

(Israeli-Palestinian) cooperation in Gaza could be a model for future cooperation. We can imagine many other forms of cooperation and know that such projects can be interwoven in the economic structure of the region as a whole:
Several industries and refineries can be established; light industries can be developed and projects for re-export planned. We can consider a joint Israeli-Palestinian car manufacture enterprise to serve the entire region.

We understand that any hypothetical withdrawal from Gaza will create a constructive mechanism that will lead to progress also on the West Bank. It is an important step in the right direction and it can create a magical effect on the enhancement of the entire peace process.

The Multilateral Negotiations

The Government of Israel can give a very effective push to the multilaterals. I understand that in the multilaterals you (Israel) are compensated for concessions in the bilaterals. For us this is good, as we gain twice: we will improve our situation in both the bilaterals and the multilaterals.

If you make it easier for us in the multilaterals we will make it easier for you in your contact with other Arab states. For instance let us consider a list of misunderstandings that could be prevented and a list of CBM's.

CBM's

We suggest to obtain from Israel a license
a. to start the cement factory in Hebron;
b. to start to work on a sea port in Gaza;
c. to establish a Palestinian Development Bank; and
d. to permit the implementation of the Teddy Kollek Plan: enabling the construction of 7 500 housing units for Palestinians preferably on public owned land.

Such positions and attitudes would be very helpful in the multilaterals and would remove obstacles for progress. All these are hypothetical suggestions.

Water Resources

It is difficult for us to understand the logic behind the Israeli refusal, to recognize our water rights. This particular issue is blocking progress.

(The Israeli position was explained)

Another thought would be in this context - as a token of good will - if Israel would double the quantity of water in the territories for the Palestinians; that would create high political returns for us.

Although in the context of water resources, reference should be made to the Johnston Plan. Would it be possible to consider the construction of the Western Gor Canal?

We should obtain at first agreement with you (Israel) and then we can deal with the Jordanians.

It is necessary to enable the establishment of a Palestinian Water Authority; there could be an understanding between the delegations and it would serve mutual interests.

Refugees

For various reasons - humanitarian, social and political - it is necessary to deal more seriously with the issue of Family Reunification and the return of deportees. There are so many ways that we can deal with it. It will enable us to move to all other issues. (We explained the need to deal with the issue of Family Reunification in the context of bilateral talks).

Environment

We have suggested to establish a Palestinian Institute for the Protection of Environment. I don't see the ratio of opposing this.

Security and Arms Control

We will be careful to follow the formula of representation; the Palestinian delegation will be led by Dr. Zayigh and Ziyyad Abu Zayyad will be a member.

Steering Committee

We suggested to form a sub-committee on Jerusalem. (It was explained to them, why this was impossible).
The participation of Syria and lebanon should be encouraged. In the committee on security and arms control Lybia and Iraq should be encouraged to participate in order to have them as partners for security arrangements in the area.

Trilateral Activities

Steps to promote the implementation of the Red - Dead Sea Canal, or preferably the Med-Dead Sea Canal should be encouraged.

For the future trilateral Israeli-Palestinian-third country activities should be planned. Several trilateral projects could be planned in the Dead Sea area, in regard to Chemical Industries, Tourism etc.

Also in the Jordan Valley - a free trade zone should be arranged; enabling the development of major trade activities to and from the Arab world.

All other projects mentioned in the paper "Dividends of Peace" (written by Abu Ala; see appendix) should be considered.

Maher el-Kurd: Many of the projects, such as described by the Armand Hammer Institute of the University of Tel Aviv, or by Palestinian Institutes should also be considered.

In interesting suggestion is the construction of a desalination and electricity generating plant on the border between Gaza, the Negev and Egypt.

Abu Ala: It would be useful to revive the old Tap-line, which originally transferred oil to Haifa. We want to construct a 30 inch pipeline from Mafraq (Jordan) to Gaza - Ashdod; the costs involved amount to US $ 50 000 000,- . This and other ideas can be gradually studied together.

Postponement of the Multilaterals

In case the deportee question should not be solved on time; the Palestinians would prefer to postpone the multilateral meetings, in order not to be forced to remain outside.

2nd Meeting with Abu Ala; (Oslo)

The way to proceed in promoting the Gaza-First Plan would be as follows:

First, organise another meeting, or several meetings - with Norwegian assistance - in order to sum up the details of a coordinated Israeli-Palestinian strategy;
second, involve the US-government: coordinate a scenario with them and permit the US government to lead the way (publicly). American Government support is also important in order to obtain enough financial support from the international community and the Arab world);
third, involve the Government of Egypt, discuss with them the details of implementation;
fourth: go public (until then keep the operation completely secret).

ECF 13

13 ינואר 2016

בנושא: אם כיתת אלפ"ות

1. היום 13 ינואר 2016 בבוקר (בין שעה 10:00 ל-11:00 בערך) אם כיתת אלפ"ות נכנסה לחדר המורים.

2. מטרת הביקור הייתה לבדוק את הנושאים הבאים (בהתאם לנושאים שנלמדו בכיתה):

א. האם המורים מכינים לקחים? מבדק את הדרך שבה המורים מכינים את השיעור.

ב. הנושאים הבאים נבדקו בביקור הנ"ל:

1) בהירות בהצגת המטרות.
2) ITEM 2 בשאלה שנשאה הוסיפו בשאלון בקשר:
(אלו: מכינים לשיעור בעזרת הסלולרים
או בעזרת אוכלוסיה)
3) הסבים על עקרונות, בעזרת מסמך עקרונות אשר ניתן למורים לפני כן.
4) בעזרי מיצים לנושא אחרון הבנה. כמו מבחן מתווה.

ג. אשכולות תגובה על ביצועה שכל עוד לא תיבדק ביה"ס המורים הם על שלמו למשך ומתן.

3. באזור לבן נשמר הגיבעה אשר אליו מספר מקומות
לפתרון בעיית המעברים:
א) כל פתרון חייב להתאים לאילוץ ראשון
ב) תצורה הגרפית - תוך הבנת לוח צמנים קרוב - על
קבוצות שונות של מעברים (נוסחאת קבוצה של
מעברים שיתחרו לתת פתרון, קבוצה שאחרי לאחר מכן,
וכו')
ג) הם לכל יכולה הבאה שתכלוסת על הארבע
המעברים לאחרונה סדרית על אחרי שלישית.
ד) הפתרון החשוב ביותר ושל לכל לעיין באחרונה
בדרכים לבנות.

ה. הצעה של שיטה להפעלת הלוגיקה תאורית המצבית
המעברים שלה. קבלה דעתו אשף ובלוח לה
דעתו באמצעות.

1. אשר אלו סוגים שונות ביקורת הקשורה שאר
שם הבקבוצה כאשר נראים אחרונה. הייתה סיווגים
לבחינת על תיבות המקומות וקבוצות
נתחתונים, בפרט לדעתו תשובות אחרונות ואחרונות הקשורה
בתמונה. הדיונים הנוגעים הקשורים.
לביקורת הקבוצות ~~את~~ ביקור של אלו מצלמן, על
הוצג - ואחרים את שלהם - ובקשר הקרובות יחסית.
אלו מצלמן ביקר שם בארץ בסדר. הסוגים מצוינים
ש. שם על יש כל נוכח בישראל. הסוגים מצוינים
אשר אלו ותוסיף ביצוע לביקור.

בכבוד רב,

MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

שר החוץ

Jerusalem, 10th January 1993

Dear Mr. Husseini,

Further to our conversation, I have the pleasure to send you an article I wrote entitled "The Middle East in a New Era".

I was always convinced that it is within our power - as Jews and Arabs - to march together towards a new and safer Middle East.

After our meeting, I am even more firmly convinced of this.

Yours sincerely

Shimon Peres

THE MIDDLE EAST IN A NEW ERA

SHIMON PERES

The Middle East in a New Era

Shimon Peres

The Middle East has not changed, but the world has. The central question facing this region is the following: What is its place in the changing world—facing winds of glory and ghosts of the past, or facing winds of change bearing hope for a new era?

Today every person belongs to two entities. There is the national entity, based on the land and the homeland, rooted in the memories we hold, the language we speak, the political identification we carry, the physical and spiritual collective heritage passed on by our parents and forebears, and the identity fed by our collective memory flowing from the past. The Middle East is abundantly endowed with such collective memory.

Yet, almost without notice another story has been added to our national home, a second story, a universal space based on science, technology, and information, all unfettered by the boundaries of politics and nationalism. Science and technology, in fact, recognize no borders, for nature has no artificial, man-made boundaries or dimensions. There always exists something more minute than the most microscopic matter, and for the largest object there is something even greater in size. The only limit is our ability to penetrate a universe infinite in dimension.

This second story faces the future. The Middle East, like the rest of the human family, must place its national rivalries, including the Arab-Israeli conflict, in proper perspective. This story is founded not on the existent but on the potential. To a large extent our future depends on it. We study a country by learning about its geographic dimensions, climate, population, natural resources, and history, and with this information we determine

whether a country is large or small, rich or poor, yet what we should be looking at is that nation's level of education, its scientific and technological capacity, and its capability to meet the challenges of change in the future.

The Challenges of Universal Change

In what ways has the world changed, and how might these ways affect the future of the Middle East and the settlement of conflicts in this region?

To begin with, there is economic change. The production of bread today depends more on production efficiency than on the quality of the soil. Today we require less work, less land, and less water in order to produce more and more crops.

The United States, which employs 1.5 percent of its work force in agriculture, produces 25 percent of the total world food supply, while the Soviet Union, employing 33 percent of its work force in agriculture, cannot supply its own food needs. The Soviet Union, for example, bought cows from Israel. Why? Because the Israeli cow gives three times more milk than the Russian. The cows are the same ones with the same horns; the difference is in the method that can increase production threefold. In other words, if in the past successful agriculture depended on land, water, sun, and the farmer, today it is increasingly dependent on science.

And that is not the last word. Science will eventually adapt and harness the two great reservoirs of future food production, the salty seas and arid deserts. With a threefold worldwide population growth in the twentieth century, efforts will concentrate on tapping these two reluctant factors for the world food supply. People will harvest directly from the sea or create potable water by desalination, and they will make the desert bloom by cultivating rocky terrain that until now has mocked man's plow.

With fewer materials we produce increasingly greater amounts at higher quality and greater usefulness. Robots produce cars, as well as the robots and computers which design them. And those very computers are becoming ever more minuscule: they require less material as they become more sophisticated and their uses are diversified.

Even raw materials are no longer derived solely from the earth. Syn-

thetic materials are increasingly replacing organic materials, and a synthetic diamond can sparkle just like a natural one. Almost anything can be used as raw material—air, sun, sea, and, in the future, who knows, perhaps even outer space.

Services are no longer dependent on servants. Machines are replacing and improving the functioning of legs and hands, ears and eyes. Telephone, fax, tape recorder, compact disc, and television are portable, accompanying human beings everywhere—we no longer have to seek them out. The day will surely come when school instruction will be based on diskettes, and hospitals will be able to report directly to their patients on their condition, thanks to minuscule personal monitors attached to their bodies.

Military strategy, long based on narrow national concepts of space and time, also has undergone a thorough revolution. Prior to armies meeting on the battlefield to wage war, technological clashes will take place where technological supremacy will crown the victor, precluding battles on land, in the air, or on the sea. This scenario is very nearly what happened in the Gulf war, when the American army and the coalition forces hardly suffered the cost of war in physical terms, while the Iraqi army incurred heavy blows without knowing the position of the front line or even the basic battle strategy. A missile does not require a pilot, nor are mountains, rivers, and fortifications obstacles to its flight. Nuclear warheads are not measured by quantity, as their potential for destruction mocks any mathematical computation, and smart bombs, even in the hands of rather average-minded people, make military know-how a negotiable coin.

We must keep in mind that we are not dealing in futurism but rather in the present situation. Before we could fully grasp what was happening, a new era began to evolve. A new era has dawned, not in the realm of the familiar past but in the unknown future, and has issued each of us a new passport—a universal one.

The Preconditions for Scientific Progress

There is no scientific economy, as the Marxists claim, but the modern economy derives its independence from scientific development, and the

real question facing every country today is not how to expand in territory but how to advance in science.

Scientific progress depends on two preconditions: political freedom that allows uncensored research and, secondly, a rational, as opposed to automatic, thinking process in which freedom of research is not hampered by political or clerical dictatorship. Science can develop only in a regime that allows humans to question, to doubt, to discover, to amass information and to discredit information, to be unprejudiced, and to be, at times, anti-establishment.

Dictatorship despises freedom, novelty, nonconformity, and the unknown. Dictatorship is methodical repression, and any form of repression thwarts originality and renewal. In the end, all the dictatorships of the twentieth century have been toppled: Hitler, Stalin, Mussolini, and Ceausescu, among others. They had hoped to censor by force those who were wiser in spirit.

Scientific progress demands democratization of all levels of government, for only democratic rule is open and unrestricted enough to allow the full development of science in every sphere of a country's life. People, not regimes, create scientific progress. Regimes can assist or prevent but they cannot create thoughts or new awareness, and therefore decentralized democracy is the best framework within which modern science can flourish.

When it becomes apparent that the sources of wealth and power are dependent not on the physical side of life but rather on the intellectual side, the question arises as to the strategic position of armies. Are they defending existing national interests or future values? Here, too, it is clear that all thought, education, and science cannot be conquered by an army, whereas everything an army can attain—coercive power, land, seas, markets—is no longer so decisive in defining power for both the first and second stories of the future national home as in the past. Moreover, the cost of progressing from bow and arrow to missiles and nuclear warheads is far greater than the cost of progressing from horse to tractor. Since the military effort has always taken precedence over the civilian effort, its costs are always higher, too.

We have reached a stage where maintaining a modern army can threaten the state's economy in no less measure than the danger of an enemy army attack. It is more economically sound to develop and maintain good rela-

tionships between nations than to build expensive armies required to ensure deadlock.

The Dangers of the New Era

The modern age excels, therefore, in three positive phenomena: scientific development of the economy, democratization of regimes, and demilitarization of foreign relations. Yet the new era has introduced some dangers, the greatest among them being a population explosion of unprecedented rate, disruption of the ecological balance and endangerment of world health, and proliferation of nuclear arms.

Population growth is largely due to medical advancement in the new era. Infant mortality has declined; life expectancy has grown. Cures and inoculations against many, though not all, fatal diseases have been discovered. World population has increased threefold, but in the Middle East the population growth has been nine- or tenfold.

More and more people live in our world, a world of depleted fresh water and pure air. The great battle that will demand drafting armies and supplies will be waged not between countries in the future but between humans and their environment, which they have commercialized and nearly devastated. We will have to confront the environment and replenish it by new means and through tremendous investment.

As if this contradiction between population growth and ecological damage threatening world stability and human security were not enough, the proliferation of nuclear weapons never provided man with the ability to create a world, but the nuclear era granted him the ability to destroy the earth. Moreover, there is no correspondence between the capability to acquire nuclear weapons and the degree of responsibility among those who have control of them. Irresponsible nations as well as blood-thirsty tyrants desire and may even acquire nuclear arms. What Hitler lacked in his arsenal could be in the hands of Saddam Hussein, and just the thought is horrendous—that a madman like him could control nuclear weapons.

The new dangers, like the new prospects, are not limited to a certain country. They are worldwide and touch everyone, every country, every

region—the entire planet. Ecology knows no borders, nor do nuclear warheads respect them. In other words, global developments play a far more central role in man's life and the state's existence, a greater role than the national or political framework.

The Countries of the Middle East in the New Era

The countries of the Middle East must ask themselves six major questions arising out of the new era and touching on their very existence:

—What kind of economy do they want? A new economy based on science and technology and regional cooperation or an outdated economy based on land, oil, and nationalism?

—What form of government do they prefer? An authoritarian, monarchical, militaristic regime frozen in the past or a democratic, presidential, or parliamentary regime that would allow an atmosphere of freedom to develop the economy, society, science, and regional cooperation?

—How do they want to distribute their resources, those allocated to war and those allocated to development, education, and society?

—Do they want to ignore environmental devastation, air pollution, waste of water resources, destruction of beaches, and erosion of fertile soil, or do they welcome regional cooperation in order to ensure air to breathe, seas to sail, land to cultivate, and water to drink for the children of future generations?

—How do they want to deal with the population explosion? By family planning and projecting food production and supply to new families, or by letting poverty make havoc and allowing fundamentalists (those who promise free meals and heaven knows what) to destroy every realistic and promising initiative?

—Will they allow their future to be determined by the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, or will they take charge of determining future policies for disarmament by clearing zones of unconventional weapons? Will they remain part of a passing world or sail ahead with sails full-blown by the winds of a new era?

I know many will say that these questions cannot be answered until a clear and explicit solution is found to the problem of the great conflicts of the region, the Arab-Israeli conflict above all. Indeed, in my opinion, the Arab-Israeli conflict as a whole should be given first priority, particularly a solution to the Palestinian problem.

Nevertheless, peace in the Middle East is not a matter of clinical surgery; we are not dealing in amputation or transplantation of parts of the body. Peace falls, above all, within the realm of fine architecture, historic architecture, and the reconstruction of a Middle East free of past conflicts, set to take its place in the new era—an era which will not tolerate backwardness or ignorance.

Before I discuss this new structure for the Middle East, I would like to preface my comments with a few points about the Arab-Israeli conflict and how to solve it.

Solving the Arab-Israeli Conflict

The main dispute, in fact the source of the conflict between Israel and the Arab world, is rooted in the Palestinian problem and is centered territorially in two areas: Judea and Samaria, and the Gaza Strip. These are not very large territories. The area of Judea and Samaria covers 5,000 square kilometers of western Israel (Israel's total area is 24,000 square kilometers), and the Gaza Strip is only 350 square kilometers. These two territories have no oil or other natural resources and not much cultivable land. Both suffer a severe shortage of water and employment opportunities. Yet there is a great difference between them. The Gaza Strip is a compact area with few Israeli settlements, while Judea and Samaria present at least three serious issues from Israel's perspective: a united Jerusalem, the problem of strategic depth for an Israel that lacks geographic width, and the Israeli settlements that are, in essence, an enduring fact.

I do not believe that this dispute can be solved without territorial and bilateral compromise. In other words, Israel must give up some territory, and the Palestinians must relinquish some of their claims to territory.

The subject of Jerusalem, it is virtually agreed, should be left until the

end of any negotiations or should be a subject that both sides agree not to set precise dates for, allowing the course of everyday life to evolve its own resolution. Alternately, the subject can be divided into two aspects: political and religious. Politically, Jerusalem would be the capital of Israel. As for religion, the city would allow free access to all religions practicing there.

The issue of strategic depth for Israel can be solved by demilitarization of the territories to be returned and by designation of the Jordan River as a line not to be crossed by alien armies.

I also believe that there is no need to create confrontation on the issue of settlements. Just as the Arabs would live under an Israeli administration in parts of the West Bank, so the Jews may live under a non-Jewish administration.

At any rate, just as in war there is no substitute for victory, so in peace there is no substitute for compromise. While victory is unilateral, compromise must be bilateral or multilateral. Under existing conditions, it seems to me that the proper solution would be the establishment of a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation composed of the kingdom of Jordan, including its army and government, the Gaza Strip as a demilitarized canton, and a canton of Judea and Samaria as a third flank. Although there are divisions among the residents of Gaza, Judea and Samaria, and Jordan, these divisions are no deeper than those between Catholics and Protestants in Christendom or between Sunnis and Shiites in Islam. In fact, many of the residents of Judea and Samaria have familial, not just political, ties to residents of Jordan. Any distinction drawn between these populations is completely artificial; as David Fromkin writes in his recent book, *A Peace to End All Peace*, "The European powers at that time . . . introduced an artificial state system in the Middle East that has made it into a region of countries that have not become nations even today."[1]

Even if the Palestinians acquired all the territory of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, it is doubtful that it could serve as a territorial basis for an independent state, and it is even more doubtful that Israel could depend on the

1. David Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East* (New York: Avon Books, 1989), 17.

commitment to a demilitarization of this state, to a large extent a nation of poverty and bitterness. The establishment of two separate entities, Jordan and a Palestinian one, would also serve as a new source of endless future disputes, for it is better to solve a problem with *one* solution. Two solutions to the same problem create the potential for constant rivalry and covert appetite.

I believe that after a solution to the Palestinian problem is reached, it will be easier to attain a solution to the conflict between Israel and Syria. This conflict should not cast a shadow over the attempt to find a resolution to the Palestinian dispute, whereas a solution to the Palestinian problem would facilitate resolving the dispute with Syria.

In order for a majority of Israelis to support a territorial compromise, the Israeli public must be convinced that terrorism will pass, that the thirst for war will disappear, and that on the foundation of compromise a new, historic coexistence between the Arab and Jewish worlds can be erected. Nothing strengthens reluctant groups in Israel more than Molotov cocktails thrown at public buses, indiscriminately striking mothers and children. The greatest pillar supporting extremists in Israel is Palestinian terrorism. Had the Palestinians established a political movement in place of violent organizations, Israeli-Palestinian negotiations would have begun long ago, and perhaps a solution would have already been reached.

From the Israeli perspective, the picture is very clear. There are no such entities as "territories." If the territories were empty, it would be possible to discuss them as territories, but they are populated, and so we must talk about the population living there. Furthermore, since in both moral and political terms we have no desire to dominate the Palestinian people, Israel must withdraw from this domination without sacrificing security. The term *territories* must stand a double test from the two aspects of a people and a security threat. Israel must give back the territories populated by Palestinians on condition that the Palestinians understand that real guarantees must be created so that these territories cannot be used as a springboard for attacking Israel. Gaza is not a territory but a population; it can be allowed self-rule on condition that no threat arises from within or because of its proximity to Israeli settlements.

Is such a peace settlement possible? The answer is yes, because

there is a precedent. The distance between Gaza and Ashkelon is greater than the distance between Aqaba and Eilat. Nonetheless, terrorists have crossed from Gaza to Israel, while not a shot has been fired from Aqaba to Eilat or vice versa. This is also one of the reasons why many in Israel have more faith in King Hussein than in Yassir Arafat.

It is my greatest hope that a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation will adopt democratic rule, even if it be a democratic monarchy. Jordan has already taken steps toward democratization. Aside from linking Jordan to Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, there is no doubt that a democratic system is the best guarantee for peace. Elections cannot be stipulated as a condition for negotiation, because I fear that negotiations about the nature of the elections would in themselves postpone indefinitely the opening of negotiations for peace. Nevertheless, a Palestinian-Jordanian declaration of intent to hold free elections would serve as a considerable contribution to peace in the region, for never has any democratic country launched an attack on another democratic country.

Regional Reconstruction and the Peace Settlement

Concurrently with the opening of negotiations for peace between Jordanians and Palestinians on one side and Israel on the other, plans for the reconstruction of the region should be started. The Gulf war proved beyond doubt that without a regional approach it is impossible to guarantee either the security of states or their economic development in the Middle East. Missiles do not stop at borders and, with their high speeds, do not respect distances, thus requiring all of us to realize that the range of solutions cannot fall short of the range of dangers. It is senseless that a missile should cover a distance of 1,000 kilometers and we, at the same time, should be occupied with marking borders 30 kilometers from our population centers. Today we require not only defensible borders but defensible distances. In other words, we must build a network of region-wide political relations that will have the power to overcome the dangers inherent in purely military relations.

The same need for a regional emphasis holds true for the economy. Of course it is important for every state in the region and for the entire region

to have a close network of relations with the European Community, but not to the exclusion of developing a comparable network in the Middle East itself. Europe is experiencing monumental changes. While in the past the EC lived in fear of a military threat from the Communist bloc, today it lives with anxiety as to the fate of the same bloc of countries threatened now with hunger. Lech Walesa, the president of Poland, has told me that he is no longer afraid of a Soviet army invasion but rather of an invasion of unemployed Russians. Due to the serious economic situation in Eastern Europe, the wages in Eastern European countries are very low; it will be difficult for nations in the Middle East to compete in the European Community against such levels of pay.

The Future of the Middle East

The future of Middle Eastern countries lies in the Middle East. In spite of all the improvements in transportation and communication, the geographic factor still serves as an important one in economics. It is odd, for example, that the Middle East imports annually $32 billion in foodstuffs, paying high transportation costs. It also spends about the same on importing weapons. If we could only reach a political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, then we could surely save part of the expenditure on food transportation costs and on arms purchases. Instead of importing arms and foodstuffs, the Middle East could establish peace and produce food for itself.

In order for our region to cope with the great possibilities inherent in the new era, it must formulate policy in three major areas: (1) the greening of the region, (2) the computerization of its industries and services, and (3) the just distribution of its wealth.

As for the greening of the Middle East, it is already obvious that the region suffers more from a shortage of water than from land deficiency. If the outbreak of war is to be averted over this scarce resource, then the production of water must be confronted by everyone in the region. It can be produced by desalination, by recycling used water, by reservoirs, by producing rainfall, by more effective distribution of existing water, by purchase, and by introducing new and efficient irrigation. Each of these systems requires regional coordination. For example, the most viable method

for producing water by desalination may be by nuclear energy, yet it is possible to harness this power only if there is a regional agreement to establish international islands on which the stations can be constructed under full supervision.

One might also note the idea raised by President Turgut Ozal of Turkey that a pipeline be laid from his country, which enjoys a water surplus, to the Saudi Arabian peninsula, selling water to every country along the way. Such a plan is possible, of course, only if peace reigns in the places the pipeline crosses.

Water and peace flow together; otherwise nothing will come of either. Logic dictates that we establish a council of agricultural ministers of the whole region that will set to work immediately on planning a solution to the water problem, in order to supply food to the entire population of the Middle East without relying on foreign currency and without fear of either nature or man. Such a program would receive the finest European, American, Japanese, and Soviet assistance. It would serve as a tremendous effort to unite the Middle East through water, rather than divide it by force and fire.

The same approach used for water can be applied to computers, services, and industries in the Middle East. Let us imagine that we agreed to educational computers in every school in the region. Computers of this sort operated by batteries are relatively inexpensive to produce and would create a new language common to all children. Here too we can expect considerable assistance from the industrialized nations and the great electronics companies. This would immediately move the Middle East one phase ahead toward modernization in the new era I discussed at the beginning of this article.

A great fund could be established for regional development. Oil-producing and oil-purchasing countries might agree that for every barrel produced, one dollar be set aside for developing the Middle East, amounting to $8 billion annually. The imposition of this dollar surcharge on the price would have no effect whatsoever on the economies of either producing or consuming states, but it could be a kind of self-devised Marshall Plan for the future survival of the Middle East. Israel would see its role in this case not as a recipient but as a contributor to the aid program through both money and know-how.

Leadership for Peace and Development in the Middle East

A program like the one proposed above would require vast coordination both within the region and beyond it. In my view, Egypt should take the lead in the Middle East as the most populous Arab nation and the first to cross the barrier of war, demonstrating ever since its peace treaty with Israel a praiseworthy political maturity. The fact that Egypt's foreign minister, Esmet Abdel Meguid, was selected this year to be secretary general of the Arab League and the fact that the league returned its headquarters to Cairo shows that the greater part of the Arab world continues to think of present-day Egypt as its leading country. Egypt also has free access to Israel, the Palestinians, Europe, and the United States. The problems facing Egypt are economic and political and can be solved only within the kind of general regional framework I have outlined. I am convinced that if Egypt took this initiative, it would have the widest support both within the Middle East and beyond it. Egypt would also have the consent of Jordan, the Palestinians, and, later, Syria to open wider peace negotiations between the Arabs and Israel.

Beyond our region, it is fitting that the United States maintain its involvement and initiative. The Americans have taken the lead for peace and military aid in the Middle East and have, in essence, proved throughout their history that even when the U.S. goes to war it does not develop a territorial appetite. The United States has withdrawn from Iraq as it withdrew from Japan, in both cases having become involved only to stop aggression and not to profit in any sense. The U.S. must be a leader for peace in the Middle East, a peace to be observed by countries that until now have either fought with each other or been in a state of war.

It is also most desirable that there be full coordination between the United States and the Soviet Union on peace in the Middle East, although the USSR no longer plays the role it did in the past. Nonetheless, it is important that the Soviet Union work for peace in the Middle East, rather than supply arms to one of the sides in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Second place on the list of international parties having influence in the region must be given to Europe, which is undergoing historic geographi-

cal, economic, and political unification. The Middle East is close to Europe and Europe close to it. If great industries are to be set up in the region, then Europe's industrial power, and not just the governments of the EC, can play a role as chief planner for the new era in the Middle East. In the present political situation, there need not be a contradiction among the roles of the United States, the Soviet Union, and the European Community, as Italy's foreign minister, Gianni De Michelis, makes clear in the Summer 1991 issue of this journal.[2]

A rare opportunity to create a new Golden Age in the Middle East has arisen after the Gulf war. We are all in need of it, and any other alternative would be a collective punishment for all peoples in our region. We can begin today with skeletal plans, an archway through which we might begin a long journey. The way is open. We need brave travelers.

2. See Gianni De Michelis, "The Mediterranean after the Gulf War," *Mediterranean Quarterly* 2 (Summer 1991): 1–8.

10.1.93

Hans Koschnick
Mitglied des Deutschen Bundestages

5300 Bonn 1
Bundeshaus
Tel. (0228) 16 38 58
Telefax (0228) 168 68 58

2800 Bremen 1, den 11. Januar 1993
Findorffstr. 106
Tel. (0421) 35 01 829
Telefax (0421) 35 72 83

An den Stellvertretenden Außenminister
Herrn Yossi Beilin
Auswärtiges Amt

Jerusalem/Israel

Lieber Yossi,

habe Dank für Deine Zeilen vom 20.Dezember 1992. Doch habe bitte Verständnis dafür, daß ich wenig Sinn sehe, im Augenblick in Deutschland für eine neue Politik Israels zugunsten der Palästinenser im Gaza-Streifen und in der Westbank zu werben oder um Mittel dafür nachzusuchen, solange das Verständnis der Öffentlichkeit oder auch die Sympathie der Freunde Israel's sich wegen der Situation der im Niemandsland deportierten Hamash-Anhänger - ohne Zugang für das Rote Kreuz, ohne Hilfen für menschenwürdiges Verbleiben - so reduziert wie es jetzt der Fall ist.

Hartes, entschiedenes Durchgreifen gegen Terroristen und friedensstörende Gewalttäter hat nicht nur unser Verständnis, wir halten es für geboten und klagen unsere öffentliche Gewalt an, nicht entschieden gegen die "Ewiggestrigen" in unserem Land vorzugehen. Ja, ich schäme mich für die Vorgänge in unserem Land, für die Übergriffe gegen Fremde, für die Schändung von Gedenkstätten und Friedhöfen und ich fordere von der Bundesregierung und den Landesregierungen, von den Gerichten und der Polizei ein hartes Durchgreifen gegen die Gewalttäter. Dafür setze ich mich in öffentlicher Auseinandersetzung ein. Doch das hindert mich nicht, israelischen Freunden auch meine Besorgnisse über die augenblickliche Situation in Ihrem Lande mitzuteilen, wobei für mich erschwerend hinzukommt, daß neben der humanitären Frage auch nicht übersehen werden darf, daß das Verbleiben der Deportierten im Niemandsland nur den Todfeinden Israels zu Nutze kommt und die PLO an die Seite von Hamash bringt. Wie kann so Frieden gedeihen?

Sicher, wir Deutschen sollten bei unserer blutbeladenen Geschichte besser schweigen, wenn es um israelische innenpolitische Vorgänge geht. Und ich habe bisher geschwiegen - bei uns zu Hause. Aber wer selbst einer Familie entstammt, die bereits 1933 den langen Weg durch Gefängnisse, Zuchthäuser und KZ antreten mußte, wer dafür eintritt, daß bei uns Auschwitz nie vergessen wird, und sich für eine sichere Existenz Israels und seiner Bevölkerung ausspricht, der muß Freunden gegenüber imstande sein, offen zu

DIG Deutsch-Israelische Gesellschaft

An die
Deutsch-Israelische Gesellschaft
Arbeitsgemeinschaft Münster
Herrn Karl-Heinz Volkert
Kerkheideweg 3 d

4400 Münster

Bremen, den 11.01.1993

Lieber Karl-Heinz,

ich erwidere dankend die guten Wünsche für das Jahr 1993. Zudem gebe ich Dir Kenntnis von meinem Brief an Yossi Beilin.

Für ein Treffen in diesem Monat würde nur noch der Sonnabendnachmittag (30.01.1993) bei mir zu Hause in Frage kommen. Für die anderen Zeit bis zum 8.02. bin ich voll ausgebucht.

Teile mir bitte mit, ob das bei Dir geht.

Freundliche Grüße
Dein

Hans Koschnick

Deutsch-Israelische Gesellschaft e.V., Königstraße 60, 5300 Bonn 1, Telefon (02 28) 22 30 01, Telefax (02 28) 26 13 50
Bank für Gemeinwirtschaft Bonn, Kto.-Nr. 1010 4182 (BLZ 380 101 11)
Postgirokonto Köln Nr. 36 46 – 502 (BLZ 370 100 50)

DIG

Deutsch-Israelische Gesellschaft
- Arbeitsgemeinschaft Münster -

Kerkheideweg 3d · 4400 Münster
Telefon 0251/7180992
Büro 0251/591-3775/8
Telefax 0251/591-5806

13.1.93

Liebe Jair,

nachfolgend die Briefe, die in der gemeinsamen Sache entstanden sind.

Es ist notwendig, daß Du schnell antwortest und mindest erläuterst. Die Gefahr besteht, daß sich sonst eine nicht hilfreiche Meinung festsetzt.

Ich habe Hans den Termin 30.1. zur Besprechung bestätigt.

Grüße an die Freunde, Shalom

Dein Karl-Heinz

DIG
Deutsch-Israelische Gesellschaft
- Arbeitsgemeinschaft Münster -

Herrn
Hans Koschnick MdB
Rudolstädter Weg 9

2800 Bremen 41

Kerxheideweg 3c · 4400 Münster
Telefon 0251/718092
Büro 0251/591-3775/8
Telefax 0251/591-5806

08.01.1993

Lieber Hans,

für das begonnene Jahr 1993 wünsche ich Dir und Deiner Familie viel Glück, Gesundheit, Erfolg und Zufriedenheit.

Für 1993 wünsche ich mir weiterhin eine gute und vertrauensvolle Zusammenarbeit. Daß die eklatante Intoleranz und die neue braune Sud schnell verschwindet, ist Ziel unser gemeinsamen Arbeit.

Jossi Beilin hat Dir unter dem 20.12.1992 zu den Grundzügen der Annäherungspolitik der israelischen Regierung und der evtl. möglichen wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung in den Gebieten ein persönliches Schreiben zugeleitet. Davon habe ich eine Kopie erhalten; sicherlich um als Vorsitzender der AG Münster die Verbindung nach Düsseldorf zu pflegen.

Wir sehen uns zwar am 08.02.1993 in der Konferenz in Bonn. Ich würde aber gerne vorher mit Dir dieses Anliegen und vielleicht andere Fragen besprechen und das gemeinsame Vorgehen verabreden.
Neben der Möglichkeit, daß wir uns in Münster anläßlich Deiner Durchreise treffen, wäre ich auch bereit, kurzfristig (auch am Samstag oder Sonntag) nach Bonn oder Bremen zu kommen. Ich käme jeweils mit dem Zug und hätte somit keine Verkehrsprobleme.
Laß' mich durch Dein Büro wissen, welcher Vorschlag und Termin Dir auskommt.

Alles Gute, herzliche Grüße

Dein

K. H. V.

Karl-Heinz Volkert

10.1.83



Meeting between Shimon Peres and Faisal el-Husseini;
Jerusalem, January 9, 1993, 9.30 to 12.00 a.m.
(present: Avi Gil, Dr. Ron Pundak, Dr. Yair Hirschfeld)

after first introductory remarks:

Shimon:

The Question of Deportation

We understand that the deportation of the 415 Hamas members has become a great obstacle and a heavy burden for the Palestinians. Yet, you have to understand, if our decision had been reversed, the burden would have been even greater - for everybody. Scepticism in Israel in regard to the development of the negotiations was already great before and our fear was to lose control of events. The chain of killings initiated and carried out by the Hamas, information we obtained of plans to kidnap and kill little children and of plans to make an attack on your life - all these made a shock treatment necessary. Now we have to minimize the damage.

We are trying to ease the present situation. For the first stage we have permitted the Red Cross to get there. We received information from the deportees. They asked us to permit two persons from the Red Cross to enter and told us that they have enough food. We received the special envoy from the United Nations.
We are looking for various solutions. Yet, if Israel will lose, the Hamas will gain.

We do not oppose the principle of them returning home. It is rather a problem of time. We suggested 9 months to two years each of them has the right to appeal. And nobody can know in advance the decision the supreme court will take.

Our main challenge in this affair is to prevent the Hamas from gaining strength and permit u=you to regain a position of leadership.

I have suggested several arrangements. This has been done in full concert with Rabin.

Peace Negotiations with Syria

Let us turn to the peace process:
It is our impression that we can do business with Syria, although progress is slow. President Assad has started a process of education of his people. He is calculated. His moves are well thought out; he is not impulsive. He is capable of making strategic decisions. He is progressing slowly for two reasons:

First, he took the decision to make business with Clinton;

second, he wants to educate his public.

The negotiations will not be easy. We believe that we can reach an agreement with Syria. Yet, the Syrians will not wait for you. I can tell you also why. Israeli-Palestinian negotiations are based on a two-stage agreement, whereas the first stage will take five years. The Syrians will not wait for five years and the Syrians will assumingly not go for a two-stage solution.

If the Syrians will go for two stages - we would not oppose it - but it would surprise us. Assad will not be able to go for something that is less than full agreement.

We - on our part - are also educating the public. We are publicly speaking of withdrawal.

So far the Syrians say rather provincial things about peace. They say for instance, they need no diplomatic relations with Israel, and compare the situation to their relations with Kasakhstan. Yet, they do understand that the situation is different. Syria did not fight wars with Kasakhstan.

Peace Negotiations with Jordan

Jordan will not be the first to sign a treaty with us, although they want to go ahead. In spite of what the king said, they have not lost their interest in the Palestinian destiny. The problems to be solved with Jordan relate to water, refugees (they speak about "displaced persons") and territory. In regard to territory we have achieved understanding in principle. We have told them that we will respect the Mandatory borderline - in the Arava.

Peace Negotiations with the Palestinians

On top of all what I have said, I want to stress that it is our vital interest to obtain agreement with you. We do not want to connect negotiations one with the other and want to reach independent agreements with each of our negotiating partners. Yet, in our view, peace remains indivisible. We believe that the time and the opportunity for peace has come and we want to build today a new and more stable future.

Our problems in negotiating with you are the following:

1. The greatest problem is the decision-making problem on your side. You have no democratic process. A minority like Hamas can easily kill the process. In politics the choice is to have either majority rule or the rule of the gun. It is a tragedy for you and for us.

Palestinians, among all the other Arab peoples - are the most open to democracy. I don't know any stable system, and no
successful economic system that functions without democracy.
We are suggesting elections. The elected will not report to us, but to their people.
If this will be the case, we shall try to look for ways and means that will enable everybody who wants peace to participate in elections.

We know the situation: you speak to Tunisia. We don't prevent you from doing this. However, we cannot negotiate with Arafat, as there are a few problems:
First, he wants to negotiate for the Palestinian diaspora. - We have also our diaspora, but we never negotiated on behalf of our diaspora. Second, the PLO and Fatah are still engaging in acts of terror. It causes great bitterness - even if sometimes exaggerated - among our people.

I know that the dividing line among the Palestinian people is not geographic but political. There are of course moderate people both in- and outside the territories and there are extremists in- and outside the territories.

In case your leadership in Tunisia would stop terror for the entire duration of negotiations and support clearly the proposed solution in two stages, and be very clear on it, the situation could change. We are now speaking on issues related to the West Bank and Gaza. Only 1/5 of the jewish people are living in Israel. We have never negotiated in Israel, negotiations of the diaspora.

Today there is a delegation recognized by you and us. If you want to change the delegation. The best way to go about it, is to go for elections. The people to be elected can serve in a double capacity; they can be negotiators and being elected, they can act as the heads of the new self-governing body.

2. The other problem in negotiations is the concept: Why can't we go straight ahead: as we would break all the glass. The situation is so complicated both on the map and in the relationship of our two peoples. We need time to create a different atmosphere. Under the present climate there will be clashes, if we shall move immediately to a one-stage solution.

We are told that you are afraid that the interim-stage will turn into a permanent arrangement. We have offered several answers to permit you to overcome this fear:

First: although we shall draw no clear map, we shall agree on a clear calendar;
Second, we create a clear interlock. We have agreed that the solution will be based on 242 and 338 and that there will be a clear interlock in time between the provisional and the permanent solution.

Third; in regard to land and water we have made important suggestions. Land, where there is Palestinian life, will be under Palestinian control; land where there is Israeli life, will be under Israeli control; and other areas will be jointly controlled.

We stopped settlements without your request.

Fourth; regarding legislation; we are ready to map the laws and give you the capacity to make your own laws in areas under your control; while we will keep the capacity to make laws in other areas.

If you agree on the concept, we can find solutions for other issues.

3. Jerusalem is an open-ended question. We suggested in the past that people in Jerusalem may vote by proximity. Today, if any Israeli government will make a move on Jerusalem, it will loose its majority. Therefore we have to keep it for later.

4. Confederation. The general development in the world is that the economies are becoming global, whereas political frameworks are becoming more and more national. It is too early to talk about this issue, as any talk will cause at this stage only problems; but we can prepare for an economic union.

5. Security: WE cannot have a solution without referring to security. Security will encounter also measures against unconventional and missile attacks. I am going this week to Paris to sign the Chemical Weapons Treaty and I shall make a statement, that if we reach peace, we will want the Middle East to be free of non-conventional weapons and we will agree to full inspections, also to unannounced

inspections.
For national security we need regional security and we shall seek progress in this area too.

6. Economic Development: The present economic situation causes us much concern. In most Arab countries the standard of living is US $ 800,- per capita, at a time, when annual income has reached US $ 30 000,- in highly developed industrial countries and about US $ 12 000,- in Israel. Poor income causes poor education, which again leads to extremism and to Fundamentalism. Militant fundamentalism is a protest and not a religion. We have to raise the standard of living.

The Arab countries possess 13 000 000 km2; 89 % of which is desert and is of no use. The remaining 11 %, about 1 000 000 km2 is presently under danger, as then drought and the desert tend to eat up the land (while Aids eats up the people).

I am afraid of the fact that we don't have an agreement on water. It is true, we use more water than you. While water consumption is 190 litres per person in Arab countries; it is 500 litres per person in Israel. We have to organise the water distribution and produce more water resources.

Economically speaking, the problem of the Middle East, is not to receive more money, but to generate income. On your side, there is fear of Israeli colonialism and domination; but the time hereof is gone; we live today in a time of competition and we will have to compete one with the other.

We on our behalf will take measures to fight the desert. We will build the greatest Institute in the world - that will specialize on research questions in this area.

The biggest treasure we, you, and the Jordanians have is the Dead Sea. It has enormous potential for exploitation: pottash, brom(ide), magnesium and salts. If we shall overcome the problem of transportation everybody may gain from it. You can be partners to the

project. We shall build a train from the North to the South, in full agreement with all parties. We shall built a Canal (from the Red Sea to the Dead Sea) that will have many purposes: it will create energy; there will be a desalination of water; we plan to transfer the harbours of Eilath and Aqaba further to the north, mainly to prevent pollution and the destruction of nature resources in the Red Sea, but also in order to open up the Dead Sea to all parties.

I know that you want to deal with many of these projects at the final status negotiations; however, to study various projects and ideas takes three to four years, and it would be a pity to lose this time. Let us safe this time and start these studies now. The construction of a new Middle East calls for a lot of studies and research work!

The same is true for Gaza. I visited Gaza. Gaza needs immediately 50 million cubic meters of water (Immediately means within three to four years). In the beginning we planned to have a desalination plant for water outside of Gaza. I changed our attitude and said: let us build a water desalination plant in Gaza. The Palestinians will build it and will run it. Financial arrangements will have to be made.

I was told by Palestinians from Gaza, that - in order to go ahead - they needed an institution: a municipality of Gaza. It was suggested that Faiz Abu Rahme should be appointed Mayor of Gaza. But he is old.

In the past Israel took 4 million cubic metres water from Gaza. We stopped it. You should go ahead and build the desalination plant. It costs US $ 250 000 000,-. We may help to get the financing plan. We are ready to guarantee to buy water which will not be needed. You can get the money from Saudi Arabia, or from any political source you like; even from Lybia. In case, you shall not built the plant, we shall do it by ourselves.

The plant will include also a power station for electricity.

We have to build bridges, rather than peers. (You know peers are frustrated bridges)

I am not looking for profits, I am looking for peace, which means that we will have to solve some of your problems, and you will have to solve some of our problems. 1993 is the year for peace. We are sincere, we are ready to take the risk and pay the price. It is possible to reach an agreement. Problems you will raise, we shall try to solve, provided it will be the same vice versa. Don't lose the opportunity.

7. The Role of the United States: There are some people who have the tendency to assume that the United States will solve the problem. Clinton will not impose any solution.

8. Concluding, I am happy that we have this opportunity to meet and discuss the outstanding questions openly and frankly.

Faisal: Thank you very much for your clear description of issues. I would like to start with the question of deportation.

It is a big obstacle for us. We have to find a way out. I will explain to you, how we look at it. The most important thing for us is the principle of deportation. It is not the time and not the numbers. Next time, if there is another terror attack, you may expell 1 000 or 2 000 and it will create more and more problems. We are concerned. You will have to put this weapon aside, as long as there are negotiations. All other issues can be discussed.

We can deal with negotiations like in Vietnam, or in Diem Bien Phu, or in Algeria. As long as negotiations are free.

Shimon: Do you relate to secret negotiations?

Faisal: No. I mean negotiations with Palestinians from outside.
We want to know, what weapons can be used and what weapons can't be

used during negotiations. For instance when you launched the attack on Hamas. Hamas grew for a certain period. After Madrid the majority of our people was for negotiations. However, under Shamir and also under Rabin, no visible change has occurred. The majority of the people still support us, but they are not willing to fight for us; whereas the minority, who support the Hamas are willing to fight. The moment Hamas took Toledano as hostage to free Ahmad Yassin everybody applauded Hamas. We gained the public support again when the Hammas attacked us in Gaza. The moment the Hamas killed Toledano their popularity strongly declined. You saved them and prevented the Palestinian public to turn against them. I believe you did this to save the government and not in order to save the peace process.

Shimon: That is the same thing. Without our government there is no peace.

Faisal: We are enemies, but we are partners. We came with a paper, demanding the implementation and the respect of human rights, you did not solve, the issues we raised.

We would like to establish a mechanism for damage control. We want to move ahead in the peace process. We know it is most important for us. We will not permit anyone to kill the peace process; yet, at the same time, we will not permit the peace process to kill us.

For me, the basic formula is simple: the greater my credibility among my people is, the more flexible I can be. Since Madrid I am losing credibility. Today I am losing credibility and hence I am losing flexibility. I need a move from your side. The decision to let the Red Cross provide aid was a good decision.

[Yet, if the Hamas come back, they will become a problem for us]

Shimon: Deportation is not a policy, it is an exception to the policy. We want to facilitate your position, but we don't want to bring victory to Hammas.

[Faisal: Have a meeting with part of the Palestinian Delegation and at that opportunity announce an agreed upon solution of the problem.]

Faisal: Regarding negotiations with Syria. We were asured that it was Israel rather than Syria that wanted to postpone negotiations in order to deal with Clinton, rather than with Bush.

Shimon: If we could have reached an agreement under Bush we would have done it.

Faisal: Do you trust Assad?

Shimon: I don't trust people, neither you, nor us. I trust the situation. You, or Assad have no other choice. Once, during the Cold War, all basic questions were related to the strategic problem; now the main world problem will be the problem of political democratization.

Earlier nations fought wars. Egypt achieve in negotiations far more, than any Arab nation in war. Assad is a good chess player. He is capable of making a decision and imposing it on his people. He has adopted a change of strategy; although he is not under great (time) pressure. But he is getting older; and there are the problems of Iraq and Iran.

The Arab world needs an economic union not a political. A confederation between you, the Jordanians, and Israel could be a revolutionary step. You could be the first and leading Arab democracy. Take the destiny in your hands and implement democracy. We will not get involved, and not impose limitations even if the most extreme body will be elected. (Shimon gave an example from the elections for municipalities in 1976 when he served as Minister of Defence). why wait ? implement election. Those who will be elected would be allowed to nominate delegates to the negotiations.

Faisal: I agree to that.
We have a serious need to obtain CBM's, to allow ourselves to go ahead in negotiations:

a. End collective punishment such as demolition of housing;
b. in prisons: release some people over 65,
release some who are seriously ill (5 to 6) and
others; deal with it carefully;
b. Settlements - there are 11 000 houses being built under the present government, this is 33 000 settlers, this is almost one third of the whole settlement activity;
I have a house in Ain Sinia and from there you can see the ongoing building activity

Shimon: Tomorrow the government will take the decision to cross out all subsidies for the settlers. It is a revolution. We have changed the national priorities. We have stopped 7 000 units; legally we are powerless to stop the 11 000. Don't underestimate the decision to cross out the subsudies.

Faisal: I need the CBM's to go ahead. every step by you is an investment in moderating our steps. You have to understand that our relationship is not symmetric. I am not a government; I cannot give orders; I have to convince. I was speaking about the Intifada and said that the stones had neutralized the Israeli tank and therefore - so I argued - we Palestinians had to refrain from the use of fire weapons.
I am not in this position today. Then, we were joining negotiations and hoped to obtain a change of the situation. Now, the common sense is that nothing changes.

Regarding the multilaterals: it is very positive for us that the outside can participate in these negotiations. By this I succeeded in preventing extremism among the oposition to the peace process.

Regarding the two-phased solution: We are in favour of moving ahead in two stages: first an interim settlement and then a permanent settlement.

Regarding negotiations on land: For us, the Palestinian land occupied in 1967 is an indivisible unit. In the negotiations we will discuss about the whole area whether it will be Jordanian, Israeli, or Palestinian. If we can say this land is one unit, and that we deal with its future, we may be saying that there is a temporary solution and a permanent one.

Shimon: It is unattainable, leave it. Because it means to create a map just now. But, you can say - once you have 242 , you can tell your people 242 is for all the land. If you want us to say the same, it will not happen. You cannot expect us to say, what the Arab position is. It is against the logic of negotiations. I also told one of the Syrians: you think 242 is a complete withdrawal and we do not; For a period of time the disagreement is part of the agreement. The art of negotiations is to distinguish between mobile and immobile issues. I will not ask you to do something you cannot do, and I ask you the same.

Faisal: Regarding settlements: you speak about cities and villages under Israeli control; does it mean that it will be final?

Shimon: We refer in the issue of land to three categories: sovereignty, ownership and management. We say sovereignty is open: we are not annexing any territory; Ownership will remain as it is; Managementz; can be largely under your control, or joint, or certain areas under direct Israeli control.
We have the longer perspective in mind. Also during and after the final settlement, even if there will be a Palestinian state, we want to maintain the right for jewish ownership of land; on your side, there is the right of Arab ownership of land in Israel. At least today we cannot declare that it is impossible. we must look at it as a settlement of problem and not the problem of settlements.

Faisal: What is the difference between political and security settlements?

Shimon: Would we add new settlements, you would oppose them.

Faisal: Regarding democracy - we are in need of it. I believe it is a main problem of the Arab world. It needs a protector.

Shimon: The Zionist Movement had no protector. You can elect, whomever you want. We are not talking about municipal elections. Those who will be elected will report to their voters. We shall respect that. We will not censor yor views

Faisal: The position on Jerusalem appears to be vague?

Shimon: There is no decision. In the past we were for voting in absence. In the negotiations, put the issue under the title of elections, and not under Jerusalem. it is an open question.

Faisal: Regarding Terrorism; families of people who had been involved in terrorist activities have gone to the army, indicating that their relatives would go to prison. The IDF, said: we want to kill them. So they fought stronger than ever before. Moreover, in our view, clashes between armed people is not terrorism, while attacks on civilians is.

Shimon: Even in regard to the deportee question, Rabin said: stop the intifada for the time of negotiations and the deportees can go home. Why don't you take it up.
I understand perfectly well, that it is difficult for you to accept suggestions that are made by us. Instead of permitting us to make public suggestions, you can make demands and we can agree to accept them. We can agree on a scenario before it will be made public.

Faisal: Was the proposal to include a moratorium on violence, or a ceasefire? If we speak about violence, we have to define it more carefully. Are demonstrations violence? The village of Salfit for instance, started off with non-violent demonstrations, but it ended otherwise; will the army refrain from shooting? The Palestinians perceived the Rabin proposal as an attempt to take 415 hostages in order to obtain an announced end of the intifada.

Even if we reach an agreement; you can implement it immediately; I need time;

Shimon: We know in most cases of terror, who has instigated and controlled the terror act on your side. If there are acts of violence that are not at all under your control, we will not blame you.

Faisal: Regarding the relationship between Israel and the diaspora. There is one big difference. Your diaspora had the right to come back; even under the Mandate. We have no such right. The diaspora is forbidden to take a role in any matter.

Shimon: The Right of Return was decided by Israel, not by the diaspora. You can say: We can negotiate about the diaspora; we cannot negotiate with the diaspora. There is another difference: We are one jewish state and you have 22 Arab states, including Jordan with a Palestinian majority.

Faisal: I would like the diaspora to negotiate with our team.

Shimon: I have made such a distinction in the multilaterals. The bilateral negotiations are about the past; but the multilaterals are about the future and organised according to various subjects. Thus, everybody who is willing and qualified can participate, as long as certain difficulties on our side are respected by you.

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Shimon: Let us move ahead, as much as we can, (in direct contacts and negotiations). In case we shall make important headway we may check various ways as of how to reach (public) understanding. The logic of negotiations obliges us to understand the needs and limitations of the other side.

Faisal: We are now speaking openly and frankly, however, I am not negotiating.

Shimon: Sure; we are checking here various ideas, which, however, do not oblige either side.

Faisal: It may be useful to check the possibility of having a follow-up meeting.

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P.S. Faisal to Y.H. in the car:

1. It is of great importance to coordinate plans quietly and carefully. For this reason this meeting and further meetings, which should lead to public action, are of great importance.

2. Showing the organisational chart of the HAMAS on Israeli TV tends to further improve the image and standing of HAMAS among the Palestinians. The Palestinian people don't lack a target to work for, but the organisational means to achieve it. Hence, the demonstration of organisational capabilities is of such major political importance.

3. The Palestinian technological committees have worked our a plan for the establishment of a national electricity grid; the plan refers also to the necessity to interconnect the electricity grid of Gaza with Egypt, Israel, the West Bank and Jordan. The exact locations for the interconnection have already been identified.

for you



Meeting between Shimon Peres and Faisal el-Husseini;
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(present: Avi Gil, Dr. Ron Pundak, Dr. Yair Hirschfeld)

after first introductory remarks:

Shimon:

The Question of Deportation

We understand that the deportation of the 415 Hamas members has become a great obstacle and a heavy burden for the Palestinians. Yet, you have to understand, if our decision had been reversed, the burden would have been even greater - for everybody. Scepticism in Israel in regard to the development of the negotiations was already great before and our fear was to lose control of events. The chain of killings initiated and carried out by the Hamas, information we obtained of plans to kidnap and kill little children and of plans to make an attack on your life - all these made a shock treatment necessary. Now we have to minimize the damage.

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We are looking for various solutions. Yet, if Israel will lose, the Hamas will gain.

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I have suggested several arrangements. This has been done in full concert with Rabin.

Peace Negotiations with Syria

Let us turn to the peace process:
It is our impression that we can do business with Syria, although progress is slow. President Assad has started a process of education of his people. He is calculated. His moves are well thought out; he is not impulsive. He is capable of making strategic decisions. He is progressing slowly for two reasons:

First, he took the decision to make business with Clinton;
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The negotiations will not be easy. We believe that we can reach an agreement with Syria. Yet, the Syrians will not wait for you. I can tell you also why. Israeli-Palestinian negotiations are based on a two-stage agreement, whereas the first stage will take five years. The Syrians will not wait for five years and the Syrians will assumingly not go for a two-stage solution.

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We - on our part - are also educating the public. We are publicly speaking of withdrawal.

So far the Syrians say rather provincial things about peace. They say for instance, they need no diplomatic relations with Israel, and compare the situation to their relations with Kasakhstan. Yet, they do understand that the situation is different. Syria did not fight wars with Kasakhstan.

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Jordan will not be the first to sign a treaty with us, although they want to go ahead. In spite of what the king said, they have not lost their interest in the Palestinian destiny. The problems to be solved with Jordan relate to water, refugees (they speak about "displaced persons") and territory. In regard to territory we have achieved understanding in principle. We have told them that we will respect the Mandatory borderline - in the Arava.

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On top of all what I have said, I want to stress that it is our vital interest to obtain agreement with you. We do not want to connect negotiations one with the other and want to reach independent agreements with each of our negotiating partners. Yet, in our view, peace remains indivisible. We believe that the time and the opportunity for peace has come and we want to build today a new and more stable future.

Our problems in negotiating with you are the following:

1. The greatest problem is the decision-making problem on your side. You have no democratic process. A minority like Hamas can easily kill the process. In politics the choice is to have either majority rule or the rule of the gun. It is a tragedy for you and for us.

Palestinians, among all the other Arab peoples - are the most open to democracy. I don't know any stable system, and no
successful economic system that functions without democracy.
We are suggesting elections. The elected will not report to us, but to their people.
If this will be the case, we shall try to look for ways and means that will enable everybody who wants peace to participate in elections.

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We are told that you are afraid that the interim-stage will turn into a permanent arrangement. We have offered several answers to permit you to overcome this fear:

First: although we shall draw no clear map, we shall agree on a clear calendar;
Second, we create a clear interlock. We have agreed that the solution will be based on 242 and 338 and that there will be a clear interlock in time between the provisional and the permanent solution.

Third; in regard to land and water we have made important suggestions. Land, where there is Palestinian life, will be under Palestinian control; land where there is Israeli life, will be under Israeli control; and other areas will be jointly controlled.

We stopped settlements without your request.

Fourth; regarding legislation; we are ready to map the laws and give you the capacity to make your own laws in areas under your control; while we will keep the capacity to make laws in other areas.

If you agree on the concept, we can find solutions for other issues.

3. Jerusalem is an open-ended question. We suggested in the past that people in Jerusalem may vote by proximity. Today, if any Israeli government will make a move on Jerusalem, it will loose its majority. Therefore we have to keep it for later.

4. Confederation. The general development in the world is that the economies are becoming global, whereas political frameworks are becoming more and more national. It is too early to talk about this issue, as any talk will cause at this stage only problems; but we can prepare for an economic union.

5. Security: WE cannot have a solution without referring to security. Security will encounter also measures against unconventional and missile attacks. I am going this week to Paris to sign the Chemical Weapons Treaty and I shall make a statement, that if we reach peace, we will want the Middle East to be free of non-conventional weapons and we will agree to full inspections, also to unannounced

inspections.
For national security we need regional security and we shall seek progress in this area too.

6. Economic Development: The present economic situation causes us much concern. In most Arab countries the standard of living is US $ 800,- per capita, at a time, when annual income has reached US $ 30 000,- in highly developed industrial countries and about US $ 12 000,- in Israel. Poor income causes poor education, which again leads to extremism and to Fundamentalism. Militant fundamentalism is a protest and not a religion. We have to raise the standard of living.

The Arab countries possess 13 000 000 km2; 89 % of which is desert and is of no use. The remaining 11 %, about 1 000 000 km2 is presently under danger, as then drought and the desert tend to eat up the land (while Aids eats up the people).

I am afraid of the fact that we don't have an agreement on water. It is true, we use more water than you. While water consumption is 190 litres per person in Arab countries; it is 500 litres per person in Israel. We have to organise the water distribution and produce more water resources.

Economically speaking, the problem of the Middle East, is not to receive more money, but to generate income. On your side, there is fear of Israeli colonialism and domination; but the time hereof is gone; we live today in a time of competition and we will have to compete one with the other.

We on our behalf will take measures to fight the desert. We will build the greatest Institute in the world - that will specialize on research questions in this area.

The biggest treasure we, you, and the Jordanians have is the Dead Sea. It has enormous potential for exploitation: pottash, brom(ide), magnesium and salts. If we shall overcome the problem of transportation everybody may gain from it. You can be partners to the

project. We shall build a train from the North to the South, in full agreement with all parties. We shall built a Canal (from the Red Sea to the Dead Sea) that will have many purposes: it will create energy; there will be a desalination of water; we plan to transfer the harbours of Eilath and Aqaba further to the north, mainly to prevent pollution and the destruction of nature resources in the Red Sea, but also in order to open up the Dead Sea to all parties.

I know that you want to deal with many of these projects at the final status negotiations; however, to study various projects and ideas takes three to four years, and it would be a pity to lose this time. Let us safe this time and start these studies now. The construction of a new Middle East calls for a lot of studies and research work!

The same is true for Gaza. I visited Gaza. Gaza needs immediately 50 million cubic meters of water (Immediately means within three to four years). In the beginning we planned to have a desalination plant for water outside of Gaza. I changed our attitude and said: let us build a water desalination plant in Gaza. The Palestinians will build it and will run it. Financial arrangements will have to be made.

I was told by Palestinians from Gaza, that - in order to go ahead - they needed an institution: a municipality of Gaza. It was suggested that Faiz Abu Rahme should be appointed Mayor of Gaza. But he is old.

In the past Israel took 4 million cubic metres water from Gaza. We stopped it. You should go ahead and build the desalination plant. It costs US $ 250 000 000,-. We may help to get the financing plan. We are ready to guarantee to buy water which will not be needed. You can get the money from Saudi Arabia, or from any political source you like; even from Lybia. In case, you shall not built the plant, we shall do it by ourselves.

The plant will include also a power station for electricity.

We have to build bridges, rather than peers. (You know peers are frustrated bridges)

I am not looking for profits, I am looking for peace, which means that we will have to solve some of your problems, and you will have to solve some of our problems. 1993 is the year for peace. We are sincere, we are ready to take the risk and pay the price. It is possible to reach an agreement. Problems you will raise, we shall try to solve, provided it will be the same vice versa. Don't lose the opportunity.

7. The Role of the United States: There are some people who have the tendency to assume that the United States will solve the problem. Clinton will not impose any solution.

8. Concluding, I am happy that we have this opportunity to meet and discuss the outstanding questions openly and frankly.

Faisal: Thank you very much for your clear description of issues. I would like to start with the question of deportation.

It is a big obstacle for us. We have to find a way out. I will explain to you, how we look at it. The most important thing for us is the principle of deportation. It is not the time and not the numbers. Next time, if there is another terror attack, you may expell 1 000 or 2 000 and it will create more and more problems. We are concerned. You will have to put this weapon aside, as long as there are negotiations. All other issues can be discussed.

We can deal with negotiations like in Vietnam, or in Diem Bien Phu, or in Algeria. As long as negotiations are free.

Shimon: Do you relate to secret negotiations?

Faisal: No. I mean negotiations with Palestinians from outside.
We want to know, what weapons can be used and what weapons can't be

used during negotiations. For instance when you launched the attack on Hamas. Hamas grew for a certain period. After Madrid the majority of our people was for negotiations. However, under Shamir and also under Rabin, no visible change has occurred. The majority of the people still support us, but they are not willing to fight for us; whereas the minority, who support the Hamas are willing to fight. The moment Hamas took Toledano as hostage to free Ahmad Yassin everybody applauded Hamas. We gained the public support again when the Hammas attacked us in Gaza. The moment the Hamas killed Toledano their popularity strongly declined. You saved them and prevented the Palestinian public to turn against them. I believe you did this to save the government and not in order to save the peace process.

Shimon: That is the same thing. Without our government there is no peace.

Faisal: We are enemies, but we are partners. We came with a paper, demanding the implementation and the respect of human rights, you did not solve, the issues we raised.

We would like to establish a mechanism for damage control. We want to move ahead in the peace process. We know it is most important for us. We will not permit anyone to kill the peace process; yet, at the same time, we will not permit the peace process to kill us.

For me, the basic formula is simple: the greater my credibility among my people is, the more flexible I can be. Since Madrid I am losing credibility. Today I am losing credibility and hence I am losing flexibility. I need a move from your side. The decision to let the Red Cross provide aid was a good decision.

[Yet, if the Hamas come back, they will become a problem for us]

Shimon: Deportation is not a policy, it is an exception to the policy. We want to facilitate your position, but we don't want to bring victory to Hammas.

[Faisal: Have a meeting with part of the Palestinian Delegation and at that opportunity announce an agreed upon solution of the problem.]

Faisal: Regarding negotiations with Syria. We were asured that it was Israel rather than Syria that wanted to postpone negotiations in order to deal with Clinton, rather than with Bush.

Shimon: If we could have reached an agreement under Bush we would have done it.

Faisal: Do you trust Assad?

Shimon: I don't trust people, neither you, nor us. I trust the situation. You, or Assad have no other choice. Once, during the Cold War, all basic questions were related to the strategic problem; now the main world problem will be the problem of political democratization.

Earlier nations fought wars. Egypt achieve in negotiations far more, than any Arab nation in war. Assad is a good chess player. He is capable of making a decision and imposing it on his people. He has adopted a change of strategy; although he is not under great (time) pressure. But he is getting older; and there are the problems of Iraq and Iran.

The Arab world needs an economic union not a political. A confederation between you, the Jordanians, and Israel could be a revolutionary step. You could be the first and leading Arab democracy. Take the destiny in your hands and implement democracy. We will not get involved, and not impose limitations even if the most extreme body will be elected. (Shimon gave an example from the elections for municipalities in 1976 when he served as Minister of Defence). why wait ? implement election. Those who will be elected would be allowed to nominate delegates to the negotiations.

Faisal: I agree to that.
We have a serious need to obtain CBM's, to allow ourselves to go ahead in negotiations:

a. End collective punishment such as demolition of housing;
b. in prisons: release some people over 65,
   release some who are seriously ill (5 to 6) and
   others; deal with it carefully;
b. Settlements - there are 11 000 houses being built under the present government, this is 33 000 settlers, this is almost one third of the whole settlement activity; I have a house in Ain Sinia and from there you can see the ongoing building activity

Shimon: Tomorrow the government will take the decision to cross out all subsidies for the settlers. It is a revolution. We have changed the national priorities. We have stopped 7 000 units; legally we are powerless to stop the 11 000. Don't underestimate the decision to cross out the subsudies.

Faisal: I need the CBM's to go ahead. every step by you is an investment in moderating our steps. You have to understand that our relationship is not symmetric. I am not a government; I cannot give orders; I have to convince. I was speaking about the Intifada and said that the stones had neutralized the Israeli tank and therefore - so I argued - we Palestinians had to refrain from the use of fire weapons.
I am not in this position today. Then, we were joining negotiations and hoped to obtain a change of the situation. Now, the common sense is that nothing changes.

Regarding the multilaterals: it is very positive for us that the outside can participate in these negotiations. By this I succeeded in preventing extremism among the oposition to the peace process.

Regarding the two-phased solution: We are in favour of moving ahead in two stages: first an interim settlement and then a permanent settlement.

Regarding negotiations on land: For us, the Palestinian land occupied in 1967 is an indivisible unit. In the negotiations we will discuss about the whole area whether it will be Jordanian, Israeli, or Palestinian. If we can say this land is one unit, and that we deal with its future, we may be saying that there is a temporary solution and a permanent one.

Shimon: It is unattainable, leave it. Because it means to create a map just now. But, you can say - once you have 242 , you can tell your people 242 is for all the land. If you want us to say the same, it will not happen. You cannot expect us to say, what the Arab position is. It is against the logic of negotiations. I also told one of the Syrians: you think 242 is a complete withdrawal and we do not; For a period of time the disagreement is part of the agreement. The art of negotiations is to distinguish between mobile and immobile issues. I will not ask you to do something you cannot do, and I ask you the same.

Faisal: Regarding settlements: you speak about cities and villages under Israeli control; does it mean that it will be final?

Shimon: We refer in the issue of land to three categories: sovereignty, ownership and management. We say sovereignty is open: we are not annexing any territory; Ownership will remain as it is; Managementz; can be largely under your control, or joint, or certain areas under direct Israeli control.
We have the longer perspective in mind. Also during and after the final settlement, even if there will be a Palestinian state, we want to maintain the right for jewish ownership of land; on your side, there is the right of Arab ownership of land in Israel. At least today we cannot declare that it is impossible. we must look at it as a settlement of problem and not the problem of settlements.

Faisal: What is the difference between political and security settlements?

Shimon: Would we add new settlements, you would oppose them.

Faisal: Regarding democracy - we are in need of it. I believe it is a main problem of the Arab world. It needs a protector.

Shimon: The Zionist Movement had no protector. You can elect, whomever you want. We are not talking about municipal elections. Those who will be elected will report to their voters. We shall respect that. We will not censor yor views

Faisal: The position on Jerusalem appears to be vague?

Shimon: There is no decision. In the past we were for voting in absence. In the negotiations, put the issue under the title of elections, and not under Jerusalem. it is an open question.

Faisal: Regarding Terrorism; families of people who had been involved in terrorist activities have gone to the army, indicating that their relatives would go to prison. The IDF, said: we want to kill them. So they fought stronger than ever before. Moreover, in our view, clashes between armed people is not terrorism, while attacks on civilians is.

Shimon: Even in regard to the deportee question, Rabin said: stop the intifada for the time of negotiations and the deportees can go home. Why don't you take it up.
I understand perfectly well, that it is difficult for you to accept suggestions that are made by us. Instead of permitting us to make public suggestions, you can make demands and we can agree to accept them. We can agree on a scenario before it will be made public.

Faisal: Was the proposal to include a moratorium on violence, or a ceasefire? If we speak about violence, we have to define it more carefully. Are demonstrations violence? The village of Salfit for instance, started off with non-violent demonstrations, but it ended otherwise; will the army refrain from shooting? The Palestinians perceived the Rabin proposal as an attempt to take 415 hostages in order to obtain an announced end of the intifada.

Even if we reach an agreement; you can implement it immediately; I need time;

Shimon: We know in most cases of terror, who has instigated and controlled the terror act on your side. If there are acts of violence that are not at all under your control, we will not blame you.

Faisal: Regarding the relationship between Israel and the diaspora. There is one big difference. Your diaspora had the right to come back; even under the Mandate. We have no such right. The diaspora is forbidden to take a role in any matter.

Shimon: The Right of Return was decided by Israel, not by the diaspora. You can say: We can negotiate about the diaspora; we cannot negotiate with the diaspora. There is another difference: We are one jewish state and you have 22 Arab states, including Jordan with a Palestinian majority.

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We are told that you are afraid that the interim-stage will turn into a permanent arrangement. We have offered several answers to permit you to overcome this fear:

First: although we shall draw no clear map, we shall agree on a clear calendar;
Second, we create a clear interlock. We have agreed that the solution will be based on 242 and 338 and that there will be a clear interlock in time between the provisional and the permanent solution.

Third; in regard to land and water we have made important suggestions. Land, where there is Palestinian life, will be under Palestinian control; land where there is Israeli life, will be under Israeli control; and other areas will be jointly controlled.

We stopped settlements without your request.

Fourth; regarding legislation; we are ready to map the laws and give you the capacity to make your own laws in areas under your control; while we will keep the capacity to make laws in other areas.

If you agree on the concept, we can find solutions for other issues.

3. Jerusalem is an open-ended question. We suggested in the past that people in Jerusalem may vote by proximity. Today, if any Israeli government will make a move on Jerusalem, it will loose its majority. Therefore we have to keep it for later.

4. Confederation. The general development in the world is that the economies are becoming global, whereas political frameworks are becoming more and more national. It is too early to talk about this issue, as any talk will cause at this stage only problems; but we can prepare for an economic union.

5. Security: WE cannot have a solution without referring to security. Security will encounter also measures against unconventional and missile attacks. I am going this week to Paris to sign the Chemical Weapons Treaty and I shall make a statement, that if we reach peace, we will want the Middle East to be free of non-conventional weapons and we will agree to full inspections, also to unannounced

inspections.
For national security we need regional security and we shall seek progress in this area too.

6. Economic Development: The present economic situation causes us much concern. In most Arab countries the standard of living is US $ 800,- per capita, at a time, when annual income has reached US $ 30 000,- in highly developed industrial countries and about US $ 12 000,- in Israel. Poor income causes poor education, which again leads to extremism and to Fundamentalism. Militant fundamentalism is a protest and not a religion. We have to raise the standard of living.

The Arab countries possess 13 000 000 km2; 89 % of which is desert and is of no use. The remaining 11 %, about 1 000 000 km2 is presently under danger, as then drought and the desert tend to eat up the land (while Aids eats up the people).

I am afraid of the fact that we don't have an agreement on water. It is true, we use more water than you. While water consumption is 190 litres per person in Arab countries; it is 500 litres per person in Israel. We have to organise the water distribution and produce more water resources.

Economically speaking, the problem of the Middle East, is not to receive more money, but to generate income. On your side, there is fear of Israeli colonialism and domination; but the time hereof is gone; we live today in a time of competition and we will have to compete one with the other.

We on our behalf will take measures to fight the desert. We will build the greatest Institute in the world - that will specialize on research questions in this area.

The biggest treasure we, you, and the Jordanians have is the Dead Sea. It has enormous potential for exploitation: pottash, brom(ide), magnesium and salts. If we shall overcome the problem of transportation everybody may gain from it. You can be partners to the

project. We shall build a train from the North to the South, in full agreement with all parties. We shall built a Canal (from the Red Sea to the Dead Sea) that will have many purposes: it will create energy; there will be a desalination of water; we plan to transfer the harbours of Eilath and Aqaba further to the north, mainly to prevent pollution and the destruction of nature resources in the Red Sea, but also in order to open up the Dead Sea to all parties.

I know that you want to deal with many of these projects at the final status negotiations; however, to study various projects and ideas takes three to four years, and it would be a pity to lose this time. Let us safe this time and start these studies now. The construction of a new Middle East calls for a lot of studies and research work!

The same is true for Gaza. I visited Gaza. Gaza needs immediately 50 million cubic meters of water (Immediately means within three to four years). In the beginning we planned to have a desalination plant for water outside of Gaza. I changed our attitude and said: let us build a water desalination plant in Gaza. The Palestinians will build it and will run it. Financial arrangements will have to be made.

I was told by Palestinians from Gaza, that - in order to go ahead - they needed an institution: a municipality of Gaza. It was suggested that Faiz Abu Rahme should be appointed Mayor of Gaza. But he is old.

In the past Israel took 4 million cubic metres water from Gaza. We stopped it. You should go ahead and build the desalination plant. It costs US $ 250 000 000,-. We may help to get the financing plan. We are ready to guarantee to buy water which will not be needed. You can get the money from Saudi Arabia, or from any political source you like; even from Lybia. In case, you shall not built the plant, we shall do it by ourselves.

The plant will include also a power station for electricity.

We have to build bridges, rather than peers. (You know peers are frustrated bridges)

I am not looking for profits, I am looking for peace, which means that we will have to solve some of your problems, and you will have to solve some of our problems. 1993 is the year for peace. We are sincere, we are ready to take the risk and pay the price. It is possible to reach an agreement. Problems you will raise, we shall try to solve, provided it will be the same vice versa. Don't lose the opportunity.

7. The Role of the United States: There are some people who have the tendency to assume that the United States will solve the problem. Clinton will not impose any solution.

8. Concluding, I am happy that we have this opportunity to meet and discuss the outstanding questions openly and frankly.

Faisal: Thank you very much for your clear description of issues. I would like to start with the question of deportation.

It is a big obstacle for us. We have to find a way out. I will explain to you, how we look at it. The most important thing for us is the principle of deportation. It is not the time and not the numbers. Next time, if there is another terror attack, you may expell 1 000 or 2 000 and it will create more and more problems. We are concerned. You will have to put this weapon aside, as long as there are negotiations. All other issues can be discussed.

We can deal with negotiations like in Vietnam, or in Diem Bien Phu, or in Algeria. As long as negotiations are free.

Shimon: Do you relate to secret negotiations?

Faisal: No. I mean negotiations with Palestinians from outside.
We want to know, what weapons can be used and what weapons can't be

used during negotiations. For instance when you launched the attack on Hamas. Hamas grew for a certain period. After Madrid the majority of our people was for negotiations. However, under Shamir and also under Rabin, no visible change has occurred. The majority of the people still support us, but they are not willing to fight for us; whereas the minority, who support the Hamas are willing to fight. The moment Hamas took Toledano as hostage to free Ahmad Yassin everybody applauded Hamas. We gained the public support again when the Hammas attacked us in Gaza. The moment the Hamas killed Toledano their popularity strongly declined. You saved them and prevented the Palestinian public to turn against them. I believe you did this to save the government and not in order to save the peace process.

Shimon: That is the same thing. Without our government there is no peace.

Faisal: We are enemies, but we are partners. We came with a paper, demanding the implementation and the respect of human rights, you did not solve, the issues we raised.

We would like to establish a mechanism for damage control. We want to move ahead in the peace process. We know it is most important for us. We will not permit anyone to kill the peace process; yet, at the same time, we will not permit the peace process to kill us.

For me, the basic formula is simple: the greater my credibility among my people is, the more flexible I can be. Since Madrid I am losing credibility. Today I am losing credibility and hence I am losing flexibility. I need a move from your side. The decision to let the Red Cross provide aid was a good decision.

Shimon: Deportation is not a policy, it is an exception to the policy. We want to facilitate your position, but we don't want to bring victory to Hammas.

Faisal: Regarding negotiations with Syria. We were asured that it was Israel rather than Syria that wanted to postpone negotiations in

order to deal with Clinton, rather than with Bush.

Shimon: If we could have reached an agreement under Bush we would have done it.

Faisal: Do you trust Assad?

Shimon: I don't trust people, neither you, nor us. I trust the situation. You, or Assad have no other choice. Once, during the Cold War, all basic questions were related to the strategic problem; now the main world problem will be the problem of political democratization.

Earlier nations fought wars. Egypt achieve in negotiations far more, than any Arab nation in war. Assad is a good chess player. He is capable of making a decision and imposing it on his people. He has adopted a change of strategy; although he is not under great (time) pressure. But he is getting older; and there are the problems of Iraq and Iran.

The Arab world needs an economic union not a political. A confederation between you, the Jordanians, and Israel could be a revolutionary step. You could be the first and leading Arab democracy. Take the destiny in your hands and implement democracy. We will not get involved, and not impose limitations even if the most extreme body will be elected. (Shimon gave an example from the elections for municipalities in 1976 when he served as Minister of Defence). why wait ? implement election. Those who will be elected would be allowed to nominate delegates to the negotiations.

Faisal: I agree to that.
We have a serious need to obtain CBM's, to allow ourselves to go ahead in negotiations:

a. End collective punishment such as demolition of housing;
b. in prisons: release some people over 65,

release some who are seriously ill (5 to 6) and others; deal with it carefully;

b. Settlements - there are 11 000 houses being built under the present government, this is 33 000 settlers, this is almost one third of the whole settlement activity; I have a house in Ain Sinia and from there you can see the ongoing building activity

Shimon: Tomorrow the government will take the decision to cross out all subsidies for the settlers. It is a revolution. We have changed the national priorities. We have stopped 7 000 units; legally we are powerless to stop the 11 000. Don't underestimate the decision to cross out the subsudies.

Faisal: I need the CBM's to go ahead. every step by you is an investment in moderating our steps. You have to understand that our relationship is not symmetric. I am not a government; I cannot give orders; I have to convince. I was speaking about the Intifada and said that the stones had neutralized the Israeli tank and therefore - so I argued - we Palestinians had to refrain from the use of fire weapons.
I am not in this position today. Then, we were joining negotiations and hoped to obtain a change of the situation. Now, the common sense is that nothing changes.

Regarding the multilaterals: it is very positive for us that the outside can participate in these negotiations. By this I succeeded in preventing extremism among the oposition to the peace process.

Regarding the two-phased solution: We are in favour of moving ahead in two stages: first an interim settlement and then a permanent settlement.

Regarding negotiations on land: For us, the Palestinian land occupied in 1967 is an indivisible unit. In the negotiations we will discuss about the whole area whether it will be Jordanian, Israeli, or Palestinian. If we can say this land is one unit, and that we deal

with its future, we may be saying that there is a temporary solution and a permanent one.

Shimon: It is unattainable, leave it. Because it means to create a map just now. But, you can say - once you have 242 , you can tell your people 242 is for all the land. If you want us to say the same, it will not happen. You cannot expect us to say, what the Arab position is. It is against the logic of negotiations. I also told one of the Syrians: you think 242 is a complete withdrawal and we do not; For a period of time the disagreement is part of the agreement. The art of negotiations is to distinguish between mobile and immobile issues. I will not ask you to do something you cannot do, and I ask you the same.

Faisal: Regarding settlements: you speak about cities and villages under Israeli control; does it mean that it will be final?

Shimon: We refer in the issue of land to three categories: sovereignty, ownership and management. We say sovereignty is open: we are not annexing any territory; Ownership will remain as it is; Managementz; can be largely under your control, or joint, or certain areas under direct Israeli control.
We have the longer perspective in mind. Also during and after the final settlement, even if there will be a Palestinian state, we want to maintain the right for jewish ownership of land; on your side, there is the right of Arab ownership of land in Israel. At least today we cannot declare that it is impossible. we must look at it as a settlement of problem and not the problem of settlements.

Faisal: What is the difference between political and security settlements?

Shimon: Would we add new settlements, you would oppose them.

Faisal: Regarding democracy - we are in need of it. I believe it is a main problem of the Arab world. It needs a protector.

Shimon: The Zionist Movement had no protector. You can elect, whomever you want. We are not talking about municipal elections. Those who will be elected will report to their voters. We shall respect that. We will not censor yor views

Faisal: The position on Jerusalem appears to be vague?

Shimon: There is no decision. In the past we were for voting in absence. In the negotiations, put the issue under the title of elections, and not under Jerusalem. it is an open question.

Faisal: Regarding Terrorism; families of people who had been involved in terrorist activities have gone to the army, indicating that their relatives would go to prison. The IDF, said: we want to kill them. So they fought stronger than ever before. Moreover, in our view, clashes between armed people is not terrorism, while attacks on civilians is.

Shimon: Even in regard to the deportee question, Rabin said: stop the intifada for the time of negotiations and the deportees can go home. Why don't you take it up.
I understand perfectly well, that it is difficult for you to accept suggestions that are made by us. Instead of permitting us to make public suggestions, you can make demands and we can agree to accept them. We can agree on a scenario before it will be made public.

Faisal: Was the proposal to include a moratorium on violence, or a ceasefire? If we speak about violence, we have to define it more carefully. Are demonstrations violence? The village of Salfit for instance, started off with non-violent demonstrations, but it ended otherwise; will the army refrain from shooting? The Palestinians perceived the Rabin proposal as an attempt to take 415 hostages in order to obtain an announced end of the intifada.

Even if we reach an agreement; you can implement it immediately; I need time;

Shimon: We know in most cases of terror, who has instigated and

controlled the terror act on your side. If there are acts of violence that are not at all under your control, we will not blame you.

Faisal: Regarding the relationship between Israel and the diaspora. There is one big difference. Your diaspora had the right to come back; even under the Mandate. We have no such right. The diaspora is forbidden to take a role in any matter.

Shimon: The Right of Return was decided by Israel, not by the diaspora. You can say: We can negotiate about the diaspora; we cannot negotiate with the diaspora. There is another difference: We are one jewish state and you have 22 Arab states, including Jordan with a Palestinian majority.

Faisal: I would like the diaspora to negotiate with our team.

Shimon: I have made such a distinction in the multilaterals. The bilateral negotiations are about the past; but the multilaterals are about the future and organised according to various subjects. Thus, everybody who is willing and qualified can participate, as long as certain difficulties on our side are respected by you.

Faisal: We want members of the PNC to participate in the negotiations. Palestinians who have distinguished professional qualifications are all members of one or the other Palestinian institution.

Shimon: May be; but if they want to negotiate they cannot be "card-holders". You, remember the negotiations in Canada; when your chairman (Muhammad Hallaj) said that he was not a "card-holder" we accepted his participation in the negotiations.

Faisal: Why is the PNC identical to the PLO according to you.

Shimon: The PNC is the parliament of the PLO.

Faisal: but one must distinguish between a government and a

parliament. In the past I talked with you when I did not talk with [the Likud] government.

Regarding Gaza. We checked the idea of desalination. We do not oppose the idea, but the costs were too high. We can do something.

Shimon: But don't wait. take the initiative. We are ready to buy water for ten years and thereby offer ease the financing of the project.

Faisal: We feared in the past that the pricet will be too high, but if you are ready to by it is a change. Was this suggested to our negotiating team?

Shimon: Not yet, but I talke about it with businessmen in gaza. The cost of water depends on the cost of electricity and the cost of electricity depends on the cost of capital. You shall have also a power station.

Faisal: Regarding the role of the United States. We understand and know that the United States will not impose a solution. However, we need the Americans as a facilitator.

Shimon: Let us move ahead, as much as we can, (in direct contacts and negotiations). In case we shall make important headway we may check various ways as of how to reach (public) understanding. The logic of negotiations obliges us to understand the needs and limitations of the other side.

Faisal: We are now speaking openly and frankly, however, I am not negotiating.

Shimon: Sure; we are checking here various ideas, which, however, do not oblige either side.

Faisal: It may be useful to check the possibility of having a follow-up meeting.

Shimon: Sure; we are checking here various ideas, which, however, do not oblige either side.

Faisal: It may be useful to check the possibility of having a follow-up meeting.

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P.S. Faisal to Y.H. in the car:

1. It is of great importance to coordinate plans quietly and carefully. For this reason this meeting and further meetings, which should lead to public action, are of great importance.

2. Showing the organisational chart of the HAMAS on Israeli TV tends to further improve the image and standing of HAMAS among the Palestinians. The Palestinian people don't lack a target to work for, but the organisational means to achieve it. Hence, the demonstration of organisational capabilities is of such major political importance.

3. The Palestinian technological committees have worked our a plan for the establishment of a national electricity grid; the plan refers also to the necessity to interconnect the electricity grid of Gaza with Egypt, Israel, the West Bank and Jordan. The exact locations for the interconnection have already been identified.

9 נספח ג'

פגישה עם פיליפ תומסין

1. ב-9 בנובמבר נתקבל במשרדנו בדואר הרשמי מכתב מפיליפ תומסין.

2. תומסין הביע את רצונו להיפגש עם שמעון פרס בהקדם האפשרי.

3. מבקשתו של תומסין תכנה שטרם הפגישה לשמוע מפרס את הערכתו הכללית בנוגע ליחסי ישראל-פלסטין ומשמעות הפלסטינית בעיניו.
תומסין מציין כי הוא מעוניין להשמיע את עמדתו בנושא לפני כינוס הפלסטינים.

4. גם מנשה הנקלמור ~~[illegible]~~ בפגישה המוצעת, מעוניין תומסין להיפגש גם עם עצמון וכן בנוסף שלפני פגישה נוספת תהיה הנקלמור מאשרת עמדתו נגד להציג בפני הפלסטינים.

5. תומסין ביקש להעניק את קדם הפגישה דגש שתהיה תמציתי, ולכן הוסיף שאם אי אפשר יצא אלונית הפגישה, ישמח בכך מאוד.

6. הובהר שפגישה תתקיים בירושלים.

יואב הרשקוביץ, רכז מדיניות

פרשת עין גדי תורכין

1. ב-6 לאוגוסט נפתחה (בדרך כלל ביום ראשון) עין גדי תורכין.
2. תורכין רבים באים לבית שאן ברכבת ומשם ברכבים הקבועים לשירות.
3. מבקרים על תורכין חייבים מגורים בשטחים בגדר ישראל ומחוץ לשטחים הפלסטיניים - ירוחם, ומבקרי לצרכים בשטחי הפלסטינים בהתאם לכללים הנהוגים.
תורכין מלבד יהיה מאורגן לשמוע את עמדתו בנושא להבעיות הפלסטינים עומדים בפני הפלסטינים.
4. אם תגישו בקשות ~~בקשות~~ בפרשה המוצעת, מאורגן תורכין לשרות אם עדיין ניתן בקשתי, שלפני פרשה נוספת חייבים בקשות מחשבת אולם יכול להגיע מהפלסטינים.
5. תורכין בכך להתנות את קיום הפרשה רק שאין תסגרת, ואלך ויסל שאם מי מהנכנסים יצאו אוניות הפרשה, יגמר כבר קיומה.
6. בנוגע לפרשה תשקיע מדינה פרטית בישראל.

יהיו הישגים, בין מוצלח