מדינת ישראל

משרדי הממשלה

סוג

מס' תיק

מס' תיק מקורי

מחלקה

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Statement by

Mr. Yasser Arafat

President of The State of Palestine,
Chairman of The Executive Committee
Palestine Liberation Organization

Cairo 29/3/1993

Today, we stand at a historical crossroad we could either make use of the opportunity to achieve a just and balanced peace, or we would get into a bitter struggle which will reflect itself on the security of our area and the world and will multiply the pain, miseries and cycles of violence the parties in conflict have suffered from in this area for several decades.

The historical and national responsibility we assume as the leadership of the people of Palestine struggling for its freedom and independence, makes it necessary for me today - at this dangerous turning point threatening the peace process with the risk of a breakdown - to reiterate that the PLO is ready to take the real challenge, the challenge of peace. The PLO invites everybody, with no exception, - especially the Israeli leadership - to meet our position with a similar one, to protect the future of our peoples, our sons and our children, to provide a just solution, that can stand the test of time, and provide a shelter under which our coming generations can live.

The option of peace was - and will remain - our strategic choice, in spite of the tragedy our people is living today. In spite of the killing, dispersion, suppression and deportation, our insistence to seize the opportunity of peace never wavered nor weakened.

The boys and girls of Gaza, the men and women of Jerusalem and the West Bank, all the children of this struggling people in and out of our homeland, have stood with the Palestinian Initiative for Peace and with the decisions and policy of their sole legitimate leadership, the PLO, through its legislative and executive bodies, to give a chance for peace in the land of peace.

I reiterate that we have to face, with responsibility and historical perspective, all the challenges and obstacles that stand in the way of peace. Specifically from this angle and not out of any narrow and opportune reasons, we say to the Israeli leadership and to public opinion within Israel that the moment has come to let reason and human conscience reign, so that the relationships of equality built on the principles of justice, human rights and international legitimacy would prevail. We offer our Palestinian hand for peace with confidence, and unequivocal desire to build a just future, free from violence, aggression and oppression.

We reconfirm with absolute certainty, that the path of deportation, suppression, human rights violation and the continuation of occupation never lead to peace.

Negotiations - by their very nature - go through problems and obstacles , and reflect conflicting emotions . The Palestinian leadership , however, with a full sense of responsibility , realizing that the challange of peace is harder and more difficult than the challanges of war, assures the children of the Intifadah and its protectors , that our objective is to strive towards the achievement of the rights of our people , and the conclusion of a comprehensive , just , honorable and permanent peace , on the basis of Security Council Resolution 242 ,338 , land for peace , the rights of the Palestinian People , and holy Jerusalem . Such achievement must be realized in the context of negotiation , and the peace process inaugurated in Madrid in October 1991, in its two parts : the bilateral and the multilateral .

The Palestinian people participated in the political negotiations motivated by a serious desire to achieve peace, despite the unfair conditions that we had to accept . We made it absolutely clear from the very beginning that we have accepted to go through the peace process to reach a comprehensive solution of the problem . We agreed to begin with transitional arrangements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories , leading to a just , honorable and permanent settlement within a specified time frame .

The negotiating process has been stalled because the proposals received by our delegation from the other side lacked the minimum balance needed, and because of the policy of deportation and oppression which has reached an alarming level theratening the interests of our people and its basic rights,

the International Community stands witness today , to the continuous daily suffering of our steadfast people. It must support our striving for peace within the context of negotiations that witnessed eight rounds of hard work , and have reached an impasse that benefits nobody , particularly as we approach a new era of regional and international changes and

developments .

We have accepted the option of peace , when the Palestinian people expressed with full sincerity its conscious will to reach a just and permanent settlement realizing its rights through peace and cocxistence rather than war and confrontation . Our people has expressed its desire to put an end to violence and the spilling of blood, to generate hope for a secure future. A future that guarantees our peoples the historic opportunity to develop and prosper . A future that achieves welfare, under the protection of democracy that respects the rights of man , and hi security .

We are keen to maintain coordination with our brothers in Egypt, Jordan, Syria , Lebanon and the rest of the Arab Countries . We are confident that they are committed to a comprehensive settlement of all the problems of our Area , and their core issue , the Palestine problem . Without an honorable just and permanent solution of the Palestine problem, peace cannot be achieved, and security cannot be guaranteed in the Middle East . We are confident that any progress that can be realized within the context of the peace process is an achievement for all of us . That is why the Palestinian people represented by the Palestine Liberation Organization will not hesitate to bear the full responsibility for establishing that just and permanent peace.

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ד"ר רון פונדק
רחוב הרימון 9
ת ל - א ב י ב
6 4 9 2 5

28 מרץ 1993

ד"ר יוסי ביילין
ד"ר יאיר הירשפלד
בועז קרני

כזכור פנינו לפני מספר חודשים (בסיוע אבי, נחום פונדק) לממשלת דנמרק ובקשנו את תמיכתם הפיננסית בקידום פרויקטים של ECF ובקיום קונפרנס פלסטיני-ישראלי בנושא פיתוח כלכלי אזורי.
תוך כדי העיון בבקשה, נפלה הממשלה הדנית ושר החוץ שהיה האחראי לטיפול בנושא הוחלף גם הוא.
הפקידות הבכירה במשרד החוץ הדני נתנה לנו להבין שללא קשר לחילופי הממשל, הדנים תומכים ברעיון ויחפשו מימון.
בממשלה החדשה שהוקמה, מונו שבי שרים העוסקים במדיניות חוץ, ולפני מספר שבועות קיבל אבי, מכתב מהשרה האחראית במשרד החוץ על פיתוח וסיוע חוץ.
להלן תירגום עיקרי המכתב:
המכתב נכתב לאחר התיעצות עם שר החוץ.
הפניה של ECF אינה במבוי סתום. דנמרק מעוניינת לקבל על עצמה את אירגון הקונפרנס, ואין חילוקי דעות באשר להבנה שהכנס והעבודה הקשורה בו תומכים בתהליך השלום בערוץ המולטילטרלי. אך במצב הנוכחי יש לדנמרק אפשרויות כספיות מוגבלות לתמוך באירגון הכנס.
באשר לפניתך בנושא סיוע ל-ECF ופעולתיו, אנו במשרד החוץ הדני שוקלים את האפשרות ליצור סידור שיאפשר לנו לתמוך מהתקציב של סיוע טכני (שממנו אסור עתה להקצות כסף למזה"ת - ר.פ.ג, בפרויקטים שכוונתם לקדם ולסייע לתהליך השלום במזרח התיכון. אנו מתארים לעצמנו הקצאת סכום של לפחות 10 מיליון כתר (כ-1.5 מיליון דולר) שאפשר לשנות יעודם בהתאם לתהליך השלום. סידור זה תלוי בתמיכה של הפרלמנט. אנו כבר דיברנו עם האחראים על סיוע טכני במפלגות השונות.
אני מקווה לנהל במהרה שיחות רציניות על הקמת ההקצבה המיוחדת מתקציב הסיוע הטכני, ועל העקרונות שיכוונו את ניהול ההסדר.
אשמור על קשר איתך ועם הנהלת ECF ונעדכנכם לגבי ההתפתחויות.

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24 מרץ 1993

דוח פגישה עם משלחת אש"ף בסרפסבורג נורבגיה

ב- 20-21 מרץ 1993, התקיימה פגישה עם משלחת אש"ף בכירה בנורבגיה. בראש המשלחת עמד אבו עלא, "שר הכלכלה והאוצר" של אש"ף ובציגו האישי של ערפאת למפגש.

מטרת הפגישה וכללי המשחק

1. מטרת הפגישה היתה לבדוק את עמדות אש"ף למשא ומתן ואת מידת הויתורים שיהיו מוכנים לעשות, כשהמסגרת העקרונית לשיחות היתה עקרון "עזה תחילה", תוכנית לשיתוף פעולה כלכלי, ו"תוכנית מרשל" אזורית.

2. המשלחת הפלסטינית הגיעה עם מלוא הסמכויות מערפאת ו"המטבח המצומצם" שלו שכולל את אבו-מאזן, פארוק קדומי, ואבו-עלא. הפלסטינים הדגישו שהפעילות בערוץ זה ממודרת מאד והמשלחת הפלסטינית לשיחות אינה מיודעת בינתיים.

3. אנו מצידנו הבהרנו שאנו מגיעים למפגש כאנשים פרטיים ללא שום סמכות, אשר קיבלו עידוד לקיים את המפגש ולבדוק את עמדת הצד השני.

4. בסוף הפגישה הוכן מסמך המביע את העמדות המוצגות בהמשך ועשוי לשמש כטיוטא לקונצפיה של הבנה ישראלית-פלסטינית.

המסר של אש"ף

5. המסר הבסיסי היה שמנהיגות אש"ף מעוניינת להגיע מהר ככל האפשר, ובאמצעות המשלחת בוושינגטון, להסדר מרחיק לכת עם ישראל, ושבמסגרת זאת היא מוכנה לויתורים משמעותיים.

6. העמדות שהוצגו על ידיהם בתום הדיונים, היו שונות לחלוטין מאילו שהוצגו על ידי המשלחת הפלסטינית בוושינגטון, ולהלן עיקריהם:

א. הרעיון של עזה תחילה הוצע על ידם. הוצע גם שישראל תכין GAZA STABILIZING PLAN לטווח ארוך. התוכנית המוסכמת תחייב את הממשל העצמי לפני ואחרי הנסיגה הישראלית שתתבצע עד שנתיים לאחר חתימת הסכם הביניים.

הוצע על ידם שלאחר נסיגה מעזה תהיה הרצועה בחסות TRUSTEESHIP, עד גמר המשא ומתן להסדר הקבע.

ב. הוצע להכין במשותף תוכנית כלכלית לפיתוח השטחים עם דגש מיוחד לרצועת עזה. כמו כן הוצע לחתום על תוכנית לשיתוף פעולה ישראלי-פלסטיני המורכבת מתשעה נושאים: ניצול מים, הפקת חשמל, תעשיית נפט ואנרגיה, המערכת הפיננסית, תחבורה ותקשורת, תעשייה, יחסי עבודה ורווחה, משאבי אנוש, ואיכות סביבה.

ג. הוצעה הכנת תוכנית בתחום הבטחון שתבטיח מאבק משותף נגד הטרור.

ד. בנוגע ל-JURISDICTION על אדמה, הם מוכנים לקבל נוסחה רחבה מספיק שתאפשר יישום של ההצעה הישראלית. היקף האדמות בשליטתם יותנה במידת הפיתוח הכלכלי שתיושם על ידם בעזרת "תוכנית מרשל".

ה. בנוגע לזכויות החקיקה, הביעו נכונות לקבל רק את אלה עליהן יוחלט במשותף.

ו. הביעו ענין לקבל סמכויות חלקיות מיד אחרי חתימת הצהרת עקרונות ישראלית-פלסטינית, בתחום של מיסוי, תיירות, חינוך, בריאות, ורווחה.

ז. הסכימו שבמסגרת ההסדר תוקם מערכת LIAISON פלסטינית-ישראלית על שלוש רמות: האחת HIGH LIAISON COMITTEE, השניה LIAISON על בסיס מקצועי רחב, והשלישית ועדה מרובעת ישראלית-פלסטינית-ירדנית-מצרית.

7. הוצע על ידם לקיים שיתוף פעולה רחב וחשאי לקידום המשא ומתן המולטילטרלי. המשלחת הפלסטינית תתמוך בקידום כל הנושאים האזורים שהועלו במסמך וביניהם: הקמת קרן לפיתוח המזה"ת, הקמת בנק מזרח תיכוני, הקמת תעלת הימים, פיתוח משותף של אזור ים המלח, מפעל התפלת מים ברצועה, קשירת רשתות החשמל באזור, בניית צינורות גז ונפט מהמפרץ הפרסי עד הים התיכון (עזה ואשדוד), הקמת אזור סחר חופשי בין רצועת עזה לאשדוד, ופיתוח אזורי לתיירות ותחבורה.

8. הוצע על ידם לתאם PEACE PROPAGANDA PLAN, קרי תוכנית ליצירת אוירה חיובית לקידום המו"מ בקרב הציבור הפלסטיני והישראלי.

דרישות אש"ף

9. אש"ף דורש השתתפות תושבי ירושלים המזרחית בבחירות למועצה הפלסטינית. מתוך הבנה לבעייתיות של הדרישה הציעו שתושבי העיר יצביעו במסגד אל-אקצה ובכנסיית הקבר.

10. אשף עומד על כך שבהגדרת פנקס הבוחרים, תנתן לכאורה זכות בחירה גם לאילו שהיו רשומים בשטחים ביוני 1967. בפועל הם הבהירו שרק מספר מזערי של אנשי פזורה יוכלו לחזור וישראל תוכל לממש את סמכותה למנוע הגעה של אחרים.

11. אש"ף דורש שעם תחילת הסדר הביניים, יוקמו מוסדות פלסטינים לקידום הפיתוח הכלכלי, וביניהן: רשות לנושאי קרקע, רשות לניהול מים, רשות לניהול חשמל, רשות נמל עזה, בנק פלסטיני לפיתוח, מועצה לקידום היצוא, ורשות לאיכות הסביבה.

12. אש"ף דורש שהבחירות בשטחים יתנהלו בפיקוח בינלאומי. הוסבר לנו שהחשש העיקרי שלהם איננו מישראל אלא שהמחנה הפונדמנטליסטי עלול להאשים אותם בזיופים.

13. אש"ף דורש שהסכם הביניים יכלול סעיף המאפשר מכניזם של בוררות.

סיכום

14. במפגש בנורבגיה נוצרה הבנה שהסכם ישראלי-פלסטיני חייב להיות בנוי על המשוואות הבאות: במקום תלות כלכלית שיתוף כלכלי; במקום חרם ערבי יהפכו הפלסטינים לכוח מניע עיקרי לשיתוף פעולה אזורי; במקום בעיות בביטחון שותף מאבק משותף בטרור; ובמקום שליטה ישראלית ישירה על השטחים שליטה באמצעות של שיתוף פעולה.

15. המפגש מצביע על כך שהנהגת אש"ף מעוניינת להתקדם לקראת הסדר בשני שלבים ללא שינוי נוסחת מדריד.

16. מובן גם להם שההישגים הישראלים המשמעותיים ימומשו מיד, ואילו הויתורים הישראלים באופן הדרגתי בעתיד.

ד"ר יאיר הירשפלד

תו"ק: 22/03/93 19:41
מקור: ר.-מונטה-קרלו
מ"ד: 23/03/93/836/6980

מל"מ: יאסר-ערפאת מ-דיווח ראיון ישראל פלסטינים תהליכ-השלום ארה"ב מגעים
הנדון: פלסטינים/ראיון טלפוני של ערפאת לרדיו מונטה קרלו:
טלטלטל
-התשובה להסלמה של צעדי ישראל בשטחים הינה הסלמת האנתפאצ'ה. האדמה תבער תחת רגלי הפולשים.
-בתשובה לשאלה האם הוא תומב בשימוש בנשק ובסכינים אמר ערפאת: האנתפאצ'ה של האבנים היא הבסיס, אולם רבין צריב להאשים רק את עצמו. אני הזהרתי אותו ואמרתי בי אלימות מולידה אלימות. האלימות האבזרית הינה חרב פיפיות.
-הגנרל רבין פועל על פי ההגיון של הסלמת המלחמה ולא על פי הגיון השלום.
-השתתפותנו או אי השתתפותנו בסיבוב הבא של שיחות השלום ייקבע ע"י ההנהגה הפלסטינית שתתכנס לאחר בינוס דמשק.
-מבראב והמלב חסן עושים מאמצים מבורבים אצל הממשל האמריקאי בעניין המגעים בינינו לבין האמריקאים.
-אגרת מההנהגה הפלסטינית נמסרה ב-24 השעות האחרונות לפיצל חסיני והוא העבירה לשגריר ארה'ב בתוניס.
-אם השלום לא יהיה פלסטיני אזי לא יהיה שלום.
-אני אומר למימשל קלינטון: האמינות שלכם עומדת עתה למבחן. מה שמתרחש באדמה הכבושה מאיים על תהליב השלום כולו.
-המגעים עם הממשל האמריקאי אינם נפסקים הם בדרב ישירה והם בדרב בלתי ישירה.
-ערפאת קורא לפלסטינים באדמות הכבושות לחזק את אחדותם ולגלות התנגדות.
==========

ש.קיימת הסלמה ישראלית ברורה באדמות הערביות הכבושות. עד עתה נהרגו עשרות ומאות

נפצעו. מהן הסיבות המניעות את ממשלת רבין לנקוט צעדים כאלה בשעה שהיא מתכוננת

להיכנס לסיבוב חדש של שיחות?

ת.ראשית אנו צריכים לזכור בצורה ברורה כי ההתרברבות הזאת של רבין היא דבר ידוע.

רבין הוא בעל המדיניות של אגרוף הברזל.

אזכיר לכם כי כאשר פרצה האנתפאצ'ה היה רבין בוושינגטון. שאלו אותו על האנתפאצ'ה

והוא השיב:איזה אנתפאצ'ה? מיד עם שובי אני אמגר אותה תוך יומיים.

באותו יום קראתי עליו תגר ואמרתי לו: לפניך יומיים, שבועיים, חדשיים ושנתיים של

אנתפאצ'ה.

רבין הוא גם בעל הרעיון של שבירת עצמות. עתה הוא גם בעל הרעיון של השבת הכיבוש

לגדה, לרצועה ולירושלים . על רבין לדעת כי התשובה ל-42000 החיילים במשוריינים

שלהם, למסוקים הנושאים רקטות ולכל כלי הטרור האלה הינה הסלמת האנתפאצ'ה.

האדמה תתלקח תחת רגלי הפולשים.

ש.כיצד תהיה ההתמודדות הפלסטינית עם ההסלמה הזאת. האם אתם תומכים בשימוש בנשק

ובדקירות הסכין הנעשה עתה?

ת.האנתפאצ'ה של האבן היא הבסיס, אולם רבין צריך להאשים רק את עצמו. אני הזהרתי

אותו ואמרתי כי אלימות מולידה אלימות. בקרבנו, חי אללה, ישנה עדת אמיצי לב.

האלימות האכזרית הינה חרב פיפיות.

תחילתו של קצ מעגל האלימות הזה הינה סיום הכיבוש אשר הוכח שהוא הסיבה העקרית לכל

הטרגדיות האלה. אני אמרתי דברים אלה בעבר ביחס לאנתפאצ'ה.

ש.האם האנתפאצ'ה נכנסה עתה לשלב חדש?

ת.על רבין לדעת שאין הוא יכול להציג עצמו בפנינו כגיבור מלחמה וכגנרל של המלחמה.

הפצצות הגרעיניות, מטוסיו, טיליו והטנקים שלו לא יובלו לנחול נצחון על ילדי

האבנים. ילדי האבנים הם הגנרלים החדשים.

הגנראל רבין עדיין פועל על פי המנטליות של הסלמת המלחמה ולא על פי הגיון השלום.

הפלסטיני,

נגד ילדינו, נשינו ומקומותינו הקדושים.

רבינ שב מוושינגטונ לאחר שנועד עמ קלינטונ ואני אומר לקלינטונ כי עליו לבדוק את

המסר שאש''פ מסוגל להתמודד עמ ההתגרות באמצעות התגרות.

ש.האמ אתה מקווה שישראל תיישמ את החלטות מועבי''ט הקובעות שעל ישראל לסגת מכל

האדמות הערביות הכבושות כולל הגדמ''ע ורצועת עזה הכבושות?

ת.אנו הלכנו למדריד על בסיס יוזמת בוש האומרת אדמה תמורת שלום באמצעות ביצוע

החלטות 242 ו-338, ומשמעות הדבר נסיגה מכל האדמות הערביות הפלסטיניות הכבושות

ובראשנ ירושלים והגשמת הזכויות המדיניות של העמ הפלסטיני וכי השלום הוא לכולמ.

אמ כנ רבינ יודע כפי ששמיר ידע שהמ הלכו על בסיס זה. אמ המ ינסו להתחמק מכך אנו

נחשוף זאת בפני דעת הקהל שתיווכח לדעת שהוא אינו רוצה בשלום אלא בכניעה שלנו.

אמ הוא מחפש אחר כניעה אזי הוא לא ימצא באומתנו הערבית ולא בעמ הפלסטיני מי שיחשוב

על כניעה. עליו לדעת שאינ בתוכנו אדמ ששוכח את ירושלים או מפקיר גרגר אדמה של

ירושלים או של האדמה הפלסטינית.

ש.אתמ סרבתמ להיענות להזמנה של ארה''ב ורוסיה לשיחות הדו-צדדיות האמורות להיערכ

ב-20 אפר'. האמ אפשר שיתחולל מיפנה עד למועד זה שעשוי לדחוף אתכמ בכיוונ של

השתתפות בסיבוב זה?

ת.חייבים להתחולל מיפנים רבים. אשר להשתתפותנו או לאי השתתפותנו, דבר זה ייקבע

ע''י ההנהגה הפלסטינית אשר תתכנס ברצונ אללה לאחר הכינוס בדמשק של 5 שה''ח ב-28

וב-29 מרצ.

בו בזמנ עושים מבארכ והמלכ חסנ מאמצים מבורכים, שאינמ תיווכ, בכיוונ זה, בינינו

לבינ המימשל האמריקאי ואנו מודים להמ על ככ.

כפי שאתה יודע אנו מסרנו במהלכ 24 השעות האחרונות אגרת לאחי פיצל אלחסיני בהיותו

ראש המשלחת הפלסטינית לשיחות השלום והוא העביר היום (22 מרצ) את האגרת אל השגריר

האמריקאי בתוניס. אנו, כמובנ, נמשיכ בקרוב במגעינו עמ הממשל האמריקאי.

ש.מה אתם מבקשים באגרת זאת?

ת.אותם הדברים עליהם הסכמנו עם הממשל האמריקאי באמצעות כתב הערבויות ו-6 הנקודות

עליהן הסכמנו עם כריסטופר בסיורו האחרון. 4 נקודות מהן הועלו ע"י ישראל והיא

נסוגה מ-2 מהן. 2 נקודות הועלו ע"י ארה"ב ביניהן הנקודה הנוגעת לשיחות אשר מקור

הסמכות שלהן צריכה להיות יוזמת בוש.

4 נקודות קשורות בבעית המגורשים הפלסטינים לדרום לבנון. אחת מהנקודות היא שהגירוש

אינו חוקי וארה"ב מודיעה על אי החוקיות שבגירוש. בו בזמן מתחייב רבין שלא ישוב

לגרש. אסור שהגירוש יהיה כחרב שלופה מול העם הפלסטיני, משום שכפי שאתה יודע

הגירוש לגבי העם הפלסטיני הוא פעולת טרנספר בשעה שאלפי מהגרים חדשים מתיישבים

באדמתנו.

אנו איננו הצד החלש במישוואה. אם השלום לא יהיה שלום פלסטיני המבוסס על הגשמת

הזכויות הלאומיות והמדיניות של העם הפלסטיני אזי לא יהיה שלום. השלום הוא השלום

הפלסטיני. 18 חודשים חלפו מאז מדריד ולא קרה מאומה.

ברצוני לשאול את מימשל קלינטון היכן ההגנה על זכויות האדם. האמינות שלכם עומדת

עתה למבחן. מה שמתרחש באדמה הכבושה מאיים על תהליך השלום כולו.

ברצוני לראות האם עמדת המימשל האמריקאי הינה אמת מידה אחת או מידה של איפה ואיפה.

האם הלגיטימיות הבינ"ל הינה אמת מידה אחת או מידה של איפה ואיפה. האם קיימת אמת

מידה נגד פלסטין ונגד האומה הערבית ואמת מידה אחרת לטובת ישראל?

ש.למה אתם מקווים ממימשל קלינטון?

ת.אנו נמתין ונראה. המגעים עם המימשל האמריקאי אינם נפסקים הם בדרך ישירה והם בדרך

בלתי ישירה.

האחים מבארב והמלך חסן עושים מאמצים מבורכים ואנו מודים להם על כך. אם ירצה אללה

אפשר שנגיע לדבר טוב בעניין זה.

ש.האם אתה מקווה שהכינוס בדמשק יביא לנקיטת עמדה ערבית ברורה ומפורשת ביחס

להשתתפות הערבית הקיבוצית בסיבוב השיחות?

קבוע

בבהירות כי על מנת להבטיח את המשכיות תהליך השלום יש לסיים את פרשת המגורשים ויש

לדבוק במקור הסמכות של תהליך השלום.

ש.לאור המתרחש עתה באדמות הפלסטיניות הכבושות, מה אתה רוצה לאמר להמוני העמ

הפלסטיני העומדים איתנ?

ת.קודם כל אני קורא לחזק את האחדות. אני אומר לעמנו בתוב האדמות הכבושות: גלו

התנגדות, פעלו נגד טרור הדמים הזה. תתלקח האדמה תחת רגלי הפולשים.

באדמות הכבושות ישנה עדת גיבורים. אנו נהפוך אותם לאמאמים וליורשי האדמה.

הנצחון קרב. הנצחון קרב.

אני אומר זאת לאהובי באדמתנו הכבושה ואני אומר זאת לדרום לבנון, לג'נין, לשכם,

לירושלים, לעזה, לח'אן יונס ולרפיח.

ש.האם אתה מצפה שאירופה ובמיוחד צרפת ורוסיה תמלא תפקיד אפקטיבי יותר בהבאת ישראל

לכך שתדבק בעקרון האדמה תמורת שלום?

ת.כן. רוסיה היא אחת השותפות העיקריות יחד עם ארה"ב. עמדתה עתה ברורה.

היא ניצבת לצד העם הפלסטיני, לצד מדינת פלסטין ולצד הזכויות הלאומיות הפלסטיניות

אשר הלגיטימיות הבינ"ל הכירה בהן. כפי שאתה יודע קיימת ועדה משותפת

פלסטינית-רוסית והיא מתכנסת מפעם לפעם ומקבלת החלטות רבות.

אשר לאירופה, אנו נמנים על אלה הקוראים להגברת תפקידה בתהליך השלום.

אנו נמצאים בקשר מתמיד הן עם הטרויקה והן עם השוק האירופי המשותף.

זאת בנוסף לקשר שלנו עם סין, יפן, מדינות הבלמ"ז, הקבוצה האסלאמית, קבוצת המדינות

האפריקאיות ומדינות אמל"ט ואפילו קנדה.

כל אלה בנוסף למגעים שאנו מקיימים ברציפות באופן ישיר או בלתי ישיר עם הצד

האמריקאי.

*** דוד/ורד/שרית+דליה ***

ggggg

להוסיף את

המאמצים שעושות מדינות הטבעת אשר דחו אתמול את קבלת ההחלטה עד שייבחנו כל ההבטים

של התיווכים והמאמצים המבורכים הערביים והבינ"ל.

ש. האם ניתן לקוות כי ממשל קלינטון ילחץ על ישראל להסיר את המכשולים העומדים בפני

חידוש המו"מ?

ת. אני רוצה לאמר לנשיא קלינטון: היכן הן זכויות האדם אשר הוא דוגל בהן? הוא מדבר

על זכויות האדם בעולם פרט לזכויות האדם הפלס'? איפה הדמוקרטיה אשר הוא דוגל בה?

אללה לא שלל את זכותנו שנתלכד למען זכות ההגדרה העצמית. כמובן זכות ההגדרה העצמית

של העם הפלס'. האם אין זכותנו לדון בעניין זה כשאר העמים בעולם? האם יש נורמות

כפולות ביחס לזכויות האדם ולדמוקרטיה? זכותי לשאול את הממשל האמר' החדש שאלה זו.

כמו כן זכותי לשאול אותם- היתה בידינו הבטחה מבייקר כי הוא יחדש את הדיאלוג עם

אש"פ. האם הממשל עושה עצמו ומתכחש לדבר זה? אם הם לא יחדשו את הדיאלוג עם אש"פ אזי

עם מי הם נושאים ונותנים? האם לא המשלחת הפלס' בעצמה הודיעה כי היא חלק בלתי נפרד

מאש"פ?! כלומר הם מנסים להסתיר את השמש בידיהם. האם הדבר מתקבל על הדעת?

אנו ממשיכים באנתפאצ'ה ובהתנגדות שלנו לכיבוש. זוהי זכותנו בהסתמך על אמנות האו"ם

והחלטותיו, הצדק האלוהי וכל הנהגים הבינ"ל והמקומיים. כמו כן בהתבסס על תפיסותינו

הלאומיות הערביות ודתנו. זכותנו להגן על מולדתנו ואדמתנו, על כבודנו, על ילדינו,

נשותינו ועל מקומותינו הקדושים למוסלמים ולנוצרים.

ש. אתה תשב בראש ישיבה של ההנהגה הפלס' כדי להעריך את תוצאות המגעים הערביים

והבינ"ל הקשורים בתהליך השלום ועל מנת לבדוק את האפשרויות ביחס להשתתפות הפלסטינית

בסיבוב ה-9 של המו"מ, כפי שאמרת בעבר. האם אפשר להגדיר את מאפייני המגמות שאתם

רוצים לאשר בישיבה זאת?

ת. אינני יכול לומר לכם כל דבר. אתה יודע שאנו מחוייבים לדמוקרטיה הפלסטינית הזאת

בכל דבר שאנו מציגים בפני אחינו הן בועד הפועל והן בהנהגה הפלסטינית.

בסיבוב זה של דיוני ההנהגה הפלסטינית יועלה לדיון כל מה שהתרחש עד עתה, דהיינו

מאז הסתיים סיבוב השיחות הקודם ועד עתה. כל מה שאירע בתוך אדמתנו הכבושה, הן במה

שנוגע לפעולות הדיכוי, האלימות והעקירה והן במה שנוגע לעמידה האיתנה ולהסלמת

האנתפאצ'ה המבורכת שלנו. האנתפאצ'ה הזאת תימשך גל אחרי גל עד אשר יתנוסס הדגל

הפלסטיני מעל חומות ירושלים, מעל צריחי המסגדים בירושלים ומעל הכנסיות בירושלים.

כ"כ נדון במצב הפנימי שלנו ובדרך הפעולה של המוסדות הפלסטיניים, הן המוסדות

המבצעים והן המוסדות המחוקקים.

כל הדברים האלה ישמשו נושאים בסיסיים לדיון בכינוס הבא, אם ירצה אללה, של ההנהגה

הפלסטינית.

ש. מהו השדר של הנשיא ערפאת ושל ההנהגה הפלסטינית לעם הפלסטיני ולאומה הערבית

לרגל יום האדמה?

ת. אדמה זאת היא אדמתנו. אדמה זאת היא אדמת אבותינו. בה נמצאות עצמות אבותינו ובה

יישארו עצמות ילדי ילדינו. אנו עימהם. הזמן הוא ארוך. הוי הר, הרוח לא תזעזע אותך.

*** דוד/שרית ***

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לבנון נובעת ממנה. לב הסכסוב במזה"ת הוא הבעיה הפלסטינית והמקומות הקדושים

האסלאמיים והנוצריים בפלסטינ.

ש. כולנו יודעים שהדיכוי הישראלי לא הצליח עד עתה לשכך את הדעם העממי ואת הרגשות

העוינים לכיבוש.

ת. אנחנו עם חזק.

ש. מדי פעם בפעם יש הסלמה איכותית באנתפאצ'ה.

ת. אני אמרתי לאנשים: הבה ותבער האדמה תחת רגלי הפולשים. דברים אלה צריכים להבין

הרחוק והקרוב.

ש. לאן מועדות פניה של האנתפאצ'ה במה שנוגע לנשק העימות וליכולת לעמוד איתנ ובמה

שנוגע למטרות המוגדרות?

ת. עד עתה האנתפאצ'ה נמצאת בשלב השישי. עד עתה לא הגענו לשלב השביעי על כל

הבטיו. מה שהם רואים עכשיו הוא אכ ורק אלימות שהיא תולדת האלימות שהם מפעילים.

ש. מהם מאפייני השלב השביעי?

ת. הבה נשאיר זאת כהפתעה. אנו כפי שאמרתי עדת גיבורים. שליחו של אללה צדק כאשר

אמר- "תכנסו אל המסגד במכה בעזרת אללה כשאתם שלווים, הבה וייכנסו אל המסגד כפי

שנכנסו אליו בפעם הראשונה".

אם המ חושבים שהם יכולים לרקוד ריקוד מלחמה ליד החלל ח'אלד ביאפטה שגילו 17 או 18

שנה כשהוא כבול בידיו ולרקוד ריקוד מלחמה בטרם יהרגו אותו כשהוא כבול בידיו. אמ

זוהי התרבות שהם מדברים עליה אזי המ טועים טעות גסה. אנו לא נסכים לכך ודברים אלה

הייבים להיות ברורים.

ש. ביקרת בקהיר ונועדת עם מבארכ ועם בכירים מצריים. האם יש מהלכ פלסטיני-מצרי

משותף בכיוון של סילוק המכשולים העומדים עתה בפני חידוש תהליכ השלום?

ת. אתה יודע שיש מאמצ מצרי בעניין זה. מבארכ שלח שליחים כולל שה"ח כדי להיוועד עם

פרס ורמון וכן שלח את אסאמה אלבאז. גם המלכ חסן עושה מאמצים דומים.

כ"כ האחים בתוניס עושים מאמצים דומים. זאת בנוסף למאמצים שעושות מצרים וסוריה

באמצעות היוזמה המצרית-סורית שהן הציגו לסילוק מכשולים אלה. לכך יש

ש. ישראל חותרת לייהוד כל האדמות המקודשות של פלסטינ באמצעות עקירת הזהות הערבית

ממנה. היא עורכת חפירות ארכאולוגיות וגיאולוגיות במטרה להשיג הוכחות ולומר לעולמ

שהיהודימ המ תושביה הראשונימ של אדמת פלסטינ.

ת. התורה עצמה- לאנ היא אומרת שמשה יצא ממצרימ? לפלסטינ אותה השארנו לעולמימ אדמת

אבות אבותינו הכנענימ. משה ראה אותה אבל לא נכנס אליה, כפי שאומרת התורה, למרות

שמספר מסורות אומרות שהוא ראה אותה וגמ נכנס אליה כאשר בא למדינ והתחתנ עמ אחת

מבנותיה. לכנ אני אומר שהמ באו אליה משמ לאדמת כנענ ולחופימ המ לא הגיעו אפילו

בשיא תפארתמ. לכנ אתה שומע אותמ אומרימ שהמ אינמ רוצימ בעזה. מדוע המ אומרימ

שהמ אינמ רוצימ בעזה? משום שהיא חופ. בצפונ נמצאו אבות אבותינו הפיניקימ ואבות

אבותינו הפיניקימ גמ המ ממקור כנעני והמ נמצאו באזור הצפונ. אבות אבותינו נמצאו

ש. ישראל חותרת לייהוד כל האדמות המקודשות של פלסטינ באמצעות עקירת הזהות הערבית

ממנה. היא עורכת חפירות ארכאולוגיות וגיאולוגיות במטרה להשיג הוכחות ולומר לעולמ

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שהמ אינמ רוצימ בעזה? משום שהיא חופ. בצפונ נמצאו אבות אבותינו הפיניקימ ואבות

אבותינו הפיניקימ גמ המ ממקור כנענ והמ נמצאו באזור הצפונ. אבות אבותינו נמצאו

Summarized Report of the 3rd Sarpsborg-Meeting

1. This time (March 20-22, 1993) a joint document was agreed upon. (see enclosure no. 1).

a. The Palestinians agreed that PIC (Palestinian Interim Council) jurisdiction will cover "West Bank and Gaza Strip land", and not the entire territory of the Westbank and the Gaza Strip.

b. On the issue of elections, we agreed to a suggestion made by them that elections should be held in the el-Aqsa Mosque and the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, enabling hereby Palestinian Jerusalemite active and passive participation in the elections; permitting Israel to claim that any concession in regard to Jerusalem would be completely restricted towards enabling them to gain certain rights only in regard to the Holy Islamic and Christian Places.

Moreover, a formula was suggested that would permit a certain number of outside Palestinians to participate in the elections. (see enclosed text; Annex no. one in enclosure no. 1).

c. On the issue of arbitration the Palestinians agreed that a more detailed concept had to be worked out for the entire arbitration process. Knowing this, and being determined to maintain the concession offered in regard to jurisdiction over land, we agreed to a possibly unrealistic clause on arbitration.

d. In a series of other issues small alterations were made, as a rule in our favour. (see detailed report: enclosure no. 2).

2. A series of oral agreements, understandings and suggestions were obtained:

a. The DoP, the CWP and the Guidelines should be renegotiated in Washington, within the existing channels, however, permitting the Americans to submit "their" proposals to both sides.

At the same time the Sarpsborg bachchannel shall be maintained, in order to maintain the capability of "crisis management". Another meeting shall be held in Sarpsborg before April 20.

b. Work on preparing detailed proposals on each item to be negotiated in more detail, should start immediately, particularly on the issue of:

i. immediate provisional transfer of authority;

ii. elections.

c. We should prepare a "peace propanda plan", defining proposed Palestinian P.R. measures, aimed at creating confidence in the peace process among the Palestinian public and they will implement it.

d. We should prepare a long-term "Gaza-Strip Stabilizing Plan" to be negotiated with them, providing Israel with a Palestinian obligation for the implementation of stabilizing measures.

e. The full demilitarization of the Gaza Strip has been agreed upon.

f. The Palestinians have proposed to establish an American-Russian-Egyptian-Jordanian trusteeship that should function under the auspices of the United Nations General Secretariat.

g. For promoting negotiations on the multilateral level full secret coordination has been offered.

h. Coordination for obtaining financing for coordinated and/or joint studies and projects has been offered.

i. Coordination of efforts to guarantee the success of a planned Palestinian Investors' Conference in Jerusalem has been asked for.
Moreover, preparation of a planned Israeli-Palestinian Business Men Conference to be held in Ireland (in cooperation with the Harvard University Group) has been suggested.

j. The Palestinians have informed Mubarak, Osama el-Bas and Amr Mussa of the Sarpsborg channel. The "Sarpsborg No. 2 - Document" has been given to them. Reportedly, Mubarak has responded enthusiastically. The Palestinians suggest that we should also coordinate further moves with the Egyptians.

k. The Palestinians have asked us to consider even a quicker withdrawal from Gaza; this request has neither been granted, nor rejected.

l. We have told the Palestinians that the extent of land to be put under their jurisdiction, will depend upon the financing and possible implementation of agreed upon Regional Development Plans: e.g. only the financing and implementation of a Trilateral Development Plan for the Dead Sea area will permit them to obtain jurisdiction over lands adjacent to the Dead Sea. The same principle will be applied in regard to other geographical areas, too.

m. The Palestinians have informed us that they the Sarpsborg-Channel as the decisive channel for maintaining and monitoring the entire relationship with Israel and with Jewish communities. For the time being they have freezed other channels. In case we shall proceed, all activities shall be coordinated on this level.

3. Other Issues:

The Palestinians have informed us that the delegation will not attend peace talks on April 20, in case no agreed upon solution of the deportee question will have been achieved.

We told the Palestinians we would not interfere in these matters. Hence, all their efforts in this regard should be coordinated only with the Americans.

4. Suggested Further Steps

a. Obtain authorisation. It will be necessary to inform the Norwegians, whether further steps are possible.

b. Develop a coordinated negotiating strategy and proposed principles for Sarpsborg 4 to be held in mid-April.

c.

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The principles of an Israeli-Palestinian understanding include the following three documents: A DoP (Declaration of Principles), a CWP (Cooperation and Working Programme) and Guidelines for a "Marshall-Plan."

I. Draft for DoP (Declaration of Principles):

1. The aim of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations is to obtain agreement regarding arrangements for establishing a Palestinian Interim Self-Governing Authority, the elected Palestinian Interim Council, for a transitional period leading to a permanent settlement based on Resolutions 242 and 338.

It is understood that the interim arrangements are an integral part of the whole process leading to the implementation of 242 and 338.

2. In order that the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip may govern themselves according to democratic principles, direct, free and general political elections would be held under international supervision to be agreed upon, three month after the signing of this DoP. Agreement on the exact mode and conditions of elections, according to the attached annex one, will be achieved, not later than one month before elections.

3. The elections for the establishment of the Palestinian Interim Council will constitute a significant interim preparatory step towards the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.

4. Jurisdiction of the Palestinian Interim Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip land.

Final status negotiations will take place as soon as possible, but not later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period, between the Israeli government and the Palestinian representatives, to cover all remaining issues including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, sovereignty, borders and any other issues of common interest.

5. Immediately after the signing of this DoP a transfer of authority from the Israeli military government and the Israeli Civil Administration to the Palestinians and such committees that will be appointed by the Palestinian representatives, will start.

The transfer of authority to the Palestinian committees will be of temporary and preparatory nature and will include Palestinian control over taxation, tourism, education, health and social welfare, as well as other agreed upon spheres.

6. In order to guarantee optimal economic development and growth, immediately with the signing of this DoP, a Palestinian Land Committee and a Palestinian Water Administration Committee will be established.

The Palestinian Land Committee and the Palestinian Water Administration Committee will be given immediate powers as mutually agreed upon. A coordinated land and water resources development plan will be negotiated between the Palestinian Land Committee and the Palestinian Water Administration Committee on the one, and the Government of Israel on the other side.

7. In order to guarantee optimal security arrangements for the Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Palestinian Interim Council will establish a strong police force, responsible for internal security and public order.

Preparatory steps, necessary for the establishment of the Palestinian police force, will be taken immediately after the signing of this DoP, in liaison with the Palestinians, Israel, Egypt and Jordan.

8. In order to enable the Interim Self-Government Authority, the Palestinian Interim Council, to promote economic growth, several institutions will be established at the time of its inauguration, such as: a Palestinian Land Authority, a Palestinian Water Administration Authority, a Palestinian Electricity Authority, a Gaza Sea Port Authority, a Palestinian Development Bank, a Palestinian Export Promotion Board and an Environmental Authority.

The Palestinian committees will negotiate with the Government of Israel, the necessary relevant agreements for these institutions.

9. The Palestinian Interim Council will be empowered to legislate for all the authorities that are mutually agreed upon. Both parties will reassess jointly all laws and military orders presently in force.

10. An Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee will be established and will deal with all issues of dispute and common interest.

Agreements on cooperation and liaison will be negotiated and implemented on the professional levels in order to provide for security and mutual understanding between both parties.

11. Further liaison and cooperation arrangements will be negotiated and agreed upon between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority on one hand and the Governments of Jordan and Egypt on the other hand.

12. Immediately after signing the DoP the transitional period of five years will begin. As soon as possible, but not later than the beginning of the third year, negotiations will take place to determine the final status of the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip and its relationship with its neighbours, as specified in article four.

13. After the signing of the DoP, Israeli-Palestinian negotiations on the redeployment of Israeli military forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will start. A first redeployment of forces will be carried out on the eve of elections for the Palestinian Interim Council.

Further redeployments agreed upon will be gradually implemented in line with the introduction of other security measures.

Not later than the end of the second year of the interim-period, Israeli military forces will withdraw completely from Gaza, in the spirit of partial implementation of 242 and 338. The Israeli withdrawal will be fully coordinated with the Palestinian Interim Council.

After the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza a trusteeship will be established, as agreed upon between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority.

14. The Israeli and the Palestinian delegations will negotiate an Interim-Agreement that will specify the mechanisms and substance of the envisaged transfer of authority.

15. An arbitration committee will be created to whom all issues of dispute will be submitted. This committee will be formed later in coordination between both parties and the co-sponsors of the Madrid Conference.

Issues will be submitted to this committee only when both parties will be unable to reach agreement amicably.

Both parties accept the necessity to work out a mechanism of reconciliation and compromise before going to arbitration.

Annex No. ONE:

Mode and Conditions of Elections

1. Palestinians of Jerusalem have the right to participate in the elections as voters and candidates. Jerusalem voters will vote in the el-Aqsa Mosque and in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre.

2. All displaced Palestinians who were registered before 4th June 1967 have the right to participate in the election process. Their right will not be prejudiced even if they will not be able to participate for practical reasons.

3. Agreements between both parties should be arranged to cover the following issues;

a. the system of elections;
b. the number of members to be elected to the Palestinian Interim Council.
c. the mode of international supervision and the personal composition of the supervising body;
d. rules and regulations regarding election campaign including agreement on the organising of mass media, and the possibility of licensing a broadcasting and TV station;
e. any other issues.

II. Draft for an Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation and Working Programme [CWP]

The Israeli-Palestinian DoP will be accompanied by an agreed upon Israeli-Palestinian CWP, which shall include:

1. A joint Water Development Programme prepared by Israeli and Palestinian water engineers, which will also specify the mode of cooperation necessary for the management of water resources, in Gaza Strip and West Bank, including the Jordan Valley, and prepare studies and plans on water rights of each party and equitable utilization of joint water resources for implementation in the final status.

2. An Electricity Development Programme, which will also specify the mode of cooperation necessary for the production, maintenance, purchase and sale of electricity resources.

3. An Israeli-Palestinian agreed upon Energy Development Programme, which will provide for the construction of oil- and gas pipelines, the establishment of a petrochemical industrial complex in the Gaza Strip, and for the coordinated or joint exploitation of gas, oil and other energy resources, (such as solar energy, oil shale, etc.).

4. A Financial Development Programme, and the establishment of a Palestinian Development Bank.

5. A Transport and Communications Development Programme, which will define guidelines for the establishment of a Greater Gaza Port Area, and the creation of a Free-Trade Zone between Gaza and Ashdod. Moreover, communication lines to and from Gaza via Israel to other countries will be determined and steps taken to carry out necessary construction of roads, railways, etc.

6. An Industrial Development Programme, which will provide for the establishment of a joint Palestinian-Israeli car industry in Gaza, promote other Palestinian-Israeli joint ventures and provide guidelines for cooperation in the textile, food, pharmaceutical, electronics, computer, and other science-based industries.

7. A programme for regulating labour relations and creating cooperation in social welfare issues.

8. A Human Resources Development Plan, providing for joint Israeli-Palestinian workshops and seminars; the establishment of joint vocational training centers, research institutes and data banks.

9. An Environmental Protection Plan, providing for joint and/or coordinated measures in this sphere.

10. An agreed upon Security Programme and Plan.

III. A Draft for Preparing a "Marshall-Plan" for the West Bank, Gaza Strip and the Region

The Israeli-Palestinian DoP [Declaration of Principles] and CWP [Cooperation and Working Programme] will be accompanied by a "Marshall-Plan" Initiative of the G 7 and other OECD member states. The G 7 and other OECD member states participating in the multilateral negotiations, will commit themselves to prepare a Marshall Plan Initiative for the West Bank, Gaza Strip and the Region, which will be implemented after the election and inauguration of the Interim Self-Government Authority, the Palestinian Interim Council. Substantial additional aid will be raised by the Palestinians from Arab states, as well as from existing all-Arab institutions.

The "Marshall-Plan" Initiative will be composed of two parts: First, a PEDP [Palestinian Economic Development Programme] as a priority, and second a REDP [Regional Economic Development Programme].

A. The PEDP [Palestinian Economic Development Programme]

Israel will support in the multilateral negotiations a PEDP (Palestinian Economic Development Programme), which will be composed of three parts:

1) A Social Rehabilitation Programme;
2) A Small and Medium Business Development Plan, and
3) An Infrastructure Development Programme (water, electricity, transportation and communication, human resources, financial institutions, etc.)

B. The REDP [Regional Economic Development Programme]

Both parties will support a REDP proposing the implementation of several pivotal developmental projects:

1) The establishment of a Middle East Development Fund (MEDF) and of a Middle East Bank for Reconstruction and Development (MEBRD).

2) The Mediterranean Sea - Dead Sea Canal, and development of a joint Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian Plan for coordinated exploitation of the Dead Sea area.

3) Regional Desalination and Power Generating Plant.

4) Interconnection of electricity grids.

5) Regional cooperation for the transfer, distribution and industrial exploitation, of gas, oil and other energy resources.

6) A Regional Tourism and Transport Development Plan.

7) Regional Cooperation in other spheres as mutually agreed upon.

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3. The elections for the establishment of the Palestinian Interim Council will constitute a significant interim preparatory step towards the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.

4. Jurisdiction of the Palestinian Interim Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip land.

Final status negotiations will take place as soon as possible, but not later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period, between the Israeli government and the Palestinian representatives, to cover all remaining issues including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, sovereignty, borders and any other issues of common interest.

5. Immediately after the signing of this DoP a transfer of authority from the Israeli military government and the Israeli Civil Administration to the Palestinians and such committees that will be appointed by the Palestinian representatives, will start.

The transfer of authority to the Palestinian committees will be of temporary and preparatory nature and will include Palestinian control over taxation, tourism, education, health and social welfare, as well as other agreed upon spheres.

6. In order to guarantee optimal economic development and growth, immediately with the signing of this DoP, a Palestinian Land Committee and a Palestinian Water Administration Committee will be established.

The Palestinian Land Committee and the Palestinian Water Administration Committee will be given immediate powers as mutually agreed upon. A coordinated land and water resources development plan will be negotiated between the Palestinian Land Committee and the Palestinian Water Administration Committee on the one, and the Government of Israel on the other side.

7. In order to guarantee optimal security arrangements for the Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Palestinian Interim Council will establish a strong police force, responsible for internal security and public order.

Preparatory steps, necessary for the establishment of the Palestinian police force, will be taken immediately after the signing of this DoP, in liaison with the Palestinians, Israel, Egypt and Jordan.

8. In order to enable the Interim Self-Government Authority, the Palestinian Interim Council, to promote economic growth, several institutions will be established at the time of its inauguration, such as: a Palestinian Land Authority, a Palestinian Water Administration Authority, a Palestinian Electricity Authority, a Gaza Sea Port Authority, a Palestinian Development Bank, a Palestinian Export Promotion Board and an Environmental Authority.

The Palestinian committees will negotiate with the Government of Israel, the necessary relevant agreements for these institutions.

9. The Palestinian Interim Council will be empowered to legislate for all the authorities that are mutually agreed upon. Both parties will reassess jointly all laws and military orders presently in force.

10. An Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee will be established and will deal with all issues of dispute and common interest.

Agreements on cooperation and liaison will be negotiated and implemented on the professional levels in order to provide for security and mutual understanding between both parties.

11. Further liaison and cooperation arrangements will be negotiated and agreed upon between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority on one hand and the Governments of Jordan and Egypt on the other hand.

12. Immediately after signing the DoP the transitional period of five years will begin. As soon as possible, but not later than the beginning of the third year, negotiations will take place to determine the final status of the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip and its relationship with its neighbours, as specified in article four.

13. After the signing of the DoP, Israeli-Palestinian negotiations on the redeployment of Israeli military forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will start. A first redeployment of forces will be carried out on the eve of elections for the Palestinian Interim Council.

Further redeployments agreed upon will be gradually implemented in line with the introduction of other security measures.

Not later than the end of the second year of the interim-period, Israeli military forces will withdraw completely from Gaza, in the spirit of partial implementation of 242 and 338. The Israeli withdrawal will be fully coordinated with the Palestinian Interim Council.

After the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza a trusteeship will be established, as agreed upon between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority.

14. The Israeli and the Palestinian delegations will negotiate an Interim-Agreement that will specify the mechanisms and substance of the envisaged transfer of authority.

15. An arbitration committee will be created to whom all issues of dispute will be submitted. This committee will be formed later in coordination between both parties and the co-sponsors of the Madrid Conference.

Issues will be submitted to this committee only when both parties will be unable to reach agreement amicably.

Both parties accept the necessity to work out a mechanism of reconciliation and compromise before going to arbitration.

Annex No. ONE:

Mode and Conditions of Elections

1. Palestinians of Jerusalem have the right to participate in the elections as voters and candidates. Jerusalem voters will vote in the el-Aqsa Mosque and in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre.

2. All displaced Palestinians who were registered before 4th June 1967 have the right to participate in the election process. Their right will not be prejudiced even if they will not be able to participate for practical reasons.

3. Agreements between both parties should be arranged to cover the following issues;

a. the system of elections;
b. the number of members to be elected to the Palestinian Interim Council.
c. the mode of international supervision and the personal composition of the supervising body;
d. rules and regulations regarding election campaign including agreement on the organising of mass media, and the possibility of licensing a broadcasting and TV station;
e. any other issues.

II. Draft for an Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation and Working Programme [CWP]

The Israeli-Palestinian DoP will be accompanied by an agreed upon Israeli-Palestinian CWP, which shall include:

1. A joint Water Development Programme prepared by Israeli and Palestinian water engineers, which will also specify the mode of cooperation necessary for the management of water resources, in Gaza Strip and West Bank, including the Jordan Valley, and prepare studies and plans on water rights of each party and equitable utilization of joint water resources for implementation in the final status.

2. An Electricity Development Programme, which will also specify the mode of cooperation necessary for the production, maintenance, purchase and sale of electricity resources.

3. An Israeli-Palestinian agreed upon Energy Development Programme, which will provide for the construction of oil- and gas pipelines, the establishment of a petrochemical industrial complex in the Gaza Strip, and for the coordinated or joint exploitation of gas, oil and other energy resources, (such as solar energy, oil shale, etc.).

4. A Financial Development Programme, and the establishment of a Palestinian Development Bank.

5. A Transport and Communications Development Programme, which will define guidelines for the establishment of a Greater Gaza Port Area, and the creation of a Free-Trade Zone between Gaza and Ashdod. Moreover, communication lines to and from Gaza via Israel to other countries will be determined and steps taken to carry out necessary construction of roads, railways, etc.

6. An Industrial Development Programme, which will provide for the establishment of a joint Palestinian-Israeli car industry in Gaza, promote other Palestinian-Israeli joint ventures and provide guidelines for cooperation in the textile, food, pharmaceutical, electronics, computer, and other science-based industries.

7. A programme for regulating labour relations and creating cooperation in social welfare issues.

8. A Human Resources Development Plan, providing for joint Israeli-Palestinian workshops and seminars; the establishment of joint vocational training centers, research institutes and data banks.

9. An Environmental Protection Plan, providing for joint and/or coordinated measures in this sphere.

10. An agreed upon Security Programme and Plan.

III. A Draft for Preparing a "Marshall-Plan" for the West Bank, Gaza Strip and the Region

The Israeli-Palestinian DoP [Declaration of Principles] and CWP [Cooperation and Working Programme] will be accompanied by a "Marshall-Plan" Initiative of the G 7 and other OECD member states. The G 7 and other OECD member states participating in the multilateral negotiations, will commit themselves to prepare a Marshall Plan Initiative for the West Bank, Gaza Strip and the Region, which will be implemented after the election and inauguration of the Interim Self-Government Authority, the Palestinian Interim Council. Substantial additional aid will be raised by the Palestinians from Arab states, as well as from existing all-Arab institutions.

The "Marshall-Plan" Initiative will be composed of two parts: First, a PEDP [Palestinian Economic Development Programme] as a priority, and second a REDP [Regional Economic Development Programme].

A. The PEDP [Palestinian Economic Development Programme]

Israel will support in the multilateral negotiations a PEDP (Palestinian Economic Development Programme), which will be composed of three parts:

1) A Social Rehabilitation Programme;
2) A Small and Medium Business Development Plan, and
3) An Infrastructure Development Programme (water, electricity, transportation and communication, human resources, financial institutions, etc.)

B. The REDP [Regional Economic Development Programme]

Both parties will support a REDP proposing the implementation of several pivotal developmental projects:

1) The establishment of a Middle East Development Fund (MEDF) and of a Middle East Bank for Reconstruction and Development (MEBRD).

2) The Mediterranean Sea - Dead Sea Canal, and development of a joint Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian Plan for coordinated exploitation of the Dead Sea area.

3) Regional Desalination and Power Generating Plant.

4) Interconnection of electricity grids.

5) Regional cooperation for the transfer, distribution and industrial exploitation, of gas, oil and other energy resources.

6) A Regional Tourism and Transport Development Plan.

7) Regional Cooperation in other spheres as mutually agreed upon.

21 MARCH 1993 - SARPSBORG III

VERSION 3

An agreement has been achieved in Sarpsborg regarding the concept of a mutually envisaged Israeli-Palestinian understanding. Having achieved this the Sarpsborg backchannel will be maintained in order to assist progress in negotiations.

The Principles of an Israeli-Palestinian Understanding

The principles of an Israeli-Palestinian understanding include the following three documents: A DoP (Declaration of Principles), a CWP (Cooperation and Working Programme) and Guidelines for a "Marshall-Plan."

I. Draft for DoP (Declaration of Principles):

1. The aim of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations is to obtain agreement regarding arrangements for establishing a Palestinian Interim Self-Governing Authority, the elected Palestinian Interim Council, for a transitional period leading to a permanent settlement based on Resolutions 242 and 338.

It is understood that the interim arrangements are an integral part of the whole process leading to the implementation of 242 and 338.

2. In order that the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip may govern themselves according to democratic principles, direct, free and general political elections would be held under international supervision to be agreed upon, three month after the signing of this DoP. Agreement on the exact mode and conditions of elections, according to the attached annex one, will be achieved, not later than one month before elections.

3. The elections for the establishment of the Palestinian Interim Council will constitute a significant interim preparatory step towards the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.

4. Jurisdiction of the Palestinian Interim Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip land.

Final status negotiations will take place as soon as possible, but not later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period, between the Israeli government and the Palestinian representatives, to cover all remaining issues, including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, sovereignty, borders and any other issues of common interest.

Immediately after signing the DOP ~~agreement~~ to transitional period of two years will begin.

5. Immediately after the signing of this DoP a transfer of authority from the Israeli military government and the Israeli Civil Administration to the Palestinians and such committees that will be appointed by the Palestinian representatives, will start.

The transfer of authority to the Palestinian committees will be of temporary and preparatory nature and will include Palestinian control over taxation, tourism, education, health and social welfare, as well as other agreed upon spheres.

6. In order to guarantee optimal economic development and growth, immediately with the signing of this DoP, a Palestinian Land Committee and a Palestinian Water Administration Committee will be established.

The Palestinian Land Committee and the Palestinian Water Administration Committee will be given immediate powers as mutually agreed upon. A coordinated land and water resources development plan will be negotiated between the Palestinian Land Committee and the Palestinian Water Administration Committee on the one, and the Government of Israel on the other side.

7. In order to guarantee optimal security arrangements for the Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Palestinian Interim Council will establish a strong police force, responsible for internal security and public order.

Preparatory steps, necessary for the establishment of the Palestinian police force, will be taken immediately after the signing of this DoP, in liaison with the Palestinians, Israel, Egypt and Jordan.

8. In order to enable the Interim Self-Government Authority, the Palestinian Interim Council, to promote economic growth, several institutions will be established at the time of its inauguration, such as: a Palestinian Land Authority, a Palestinian Water Administration Authority, a Palestinian Electricity Authority, a Gaza Sea Port Authority, a Palestinian Development Bank, a Palestinian Export Promotion Board and an Environmental Authority.

The Palestinian committees will negotiate with the Government of Israel, the necessary relevant agreements for these institutions.

97 9. The Palestinian Interim Council will be empowered to legislate for all the authorities ~~that are~~ mutually agreed upon. Both parties will reassess jointly all laws and military orders presently in force.

10. An Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee will be established and will deal with all issues of dispute and common interest.

Agreements on cooperation and liaison will be negotiated and implemented on the professional levels in order to provide for security and mutual understanding between both parties.

11. Further liaison and cooperation arrangements will be negotiated and agreed upon between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority on one hand and the Governments of Jordan and Egypt on the other hand.

12. Immediately after signing the DoP the transitional period of five years will begin. As soon as possible, but not later than the beginning of the third year, negotiations will take place to determine the final status, ~~of the West Bank, Jerusalem~~ and the Gaza Strip and its relationship with its neighbours, as specified in article four.

13. After the signing of the DoP, Israeli-Palestinian negotiations on the redeployment of Israeli military forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will start. A first redeployment of forces will be carried out on the eve of elections for the Palestinian Interim Council.

Further redeployments agreed upon will be gradually implemented in line with the introduction of other security measures.

Not later than the end of the second year of the interim-period, Israeli military forces will withdraw completely from Gaza, in the spirit of partial implementation of 242 and 338. The Israeli withdrawal will be fully coordinated with the Palestinian Interim Council.

After the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza a trusteeship will be established, as agreed upon between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority.

14. The Israeli and the Palestinian delegations will negotiate an Interim-Agreement that will specify the mechanisms and substance of the envisaged transfer of authority.

15. An arbitration committee will be created to whom all issues of dispute will be submitted. This committee will be formed later ~~in coordination~~ between both parties and the co-sponsors of the Madrid Conference.

Issues will be submitted to this committee only when both parties will be unable to reach agreement amicably.

Both parties accept the necessity to work out a mechanism of reconciliation and compromise before going to arbitration.

This agreement does not in any way undermine the implementation of the agreed principles in the DoP pertaining to the West Bank.

Annex No. ONE:

Mode and Conditions of Elections

1. Palestinians of Jerusalem have the right to participate in the elections as voters and candidates. Jerusalem voters will vote in the el-Aqsa Mosque and in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre.

2. All displaced Palestinians who were registered before 4th June 1967 have the right to participate in the election process. Their right will not be prejudiced even if they will not be able to participate for practical reasons.

3. Agreements between both parties should be arranged to cover the following issues;

a. the system of elections;
b. the number of members to be elected to the Palestinian Interim Council.
c. the mode of international supervision and the personal composition of the supervising body;
d. rules and regulations regarding election campaign including agreement on the organising of mass media, and the possibility of licensing a broadcasting and TV station;
e. any other issues.

II. Draft for an Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation and Working Programme [CWP]

The Israeli-Palestinian DoP will be accompanied by an agreed upon Israeli-Palestinian CWP, which shall include:

1. A joint Water Development Programme prepared by Israeli and Palestinian water engineers, which will also specify the mode of cooperation necessary for the management of water resources, in Gaza Strip and West Bank, including the Jordan Valley, and prepare studies and plans on water rights of each party and equitable utilization of joint water resources for implementation in the final status.

2. An Electricity Development Programme, which will also specify the mode of cooperation necessary for the production, maintenance, purchase and sale of electricity resources.

3. An Israeli-Palestinian agreed upon Energy Development Programme, which will provide for the construction of oil- and gas pipelines, the establishment of a petrochemical industrial complex in the Gaza Strip, and for the coordinated or joint exploitation of gas, oil and other energy resources, (such as solar energy, oil shale, etc.).

4. A Financial Development Programme, and the establishment of a Palestinian Development Bank.

5. A Transport and Communications Development Programme, which will define guidelines for the establishment of a Greater Gaza Port Area, and the creation of a Free-Trade Zone between Gaza and Ashdod. Moreover, communication lines to and from Gaza via Israel to other countries will be determined and steps taken to carry out necessary construction of roads, railways, etc.

6. An Industrial Development Programme, which will provide for the establishment of a joint Palestinian-Israeli car industry in Gaza, promote other Palestinian-Israeli joint ventures and provide guidelines for cooperation in the textile, food, pharmaceutical, electronics, computer, and other science-based industries.

7. A programme for regulating labour relations and creating cooperation in social welfare issues.

8. A Human Resources Development Plan, providing for joint Israeli-Palestinian workshops and seminars; the establishment of joint vocational training centers, research institutes and data banks.

9. An Environmental Protection Plan, providing for joint and/or coordinated measures in this sphere.

10. An agreed upon Security Programme and Plan.

DoB. 21/22/3/93

2. All cases related to the part of security are known as jurisdiction based on the ~~first~~ application - the ~~ite~~ first step application. In the meeting which was held on 6th PIC, ~~where~~ ~~was~~ put ~~before~~ ~~him~~ forth how many the will be determined based on specific areas along the boundary. In the other part ~~the~~ ~~control~~ ~~control~~ ~~was~~ ~~but~~ ~~not~~ the PIC ~~will have to provide~~ ~~was~~ ~~but~~ will not accept unless the first is ~~not~~ ~~a~~

~~The jurisdiction of the PIC~~ will obtain jurisdiction over land in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The exact details will be worked out in an annex to the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement.

The jurisdiction of the PIC will cover ~~the~~ criminal offences in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Immediate
Transfer of Authority (Draw

Elections - comprehensive preparation

Jurisdiction - Fatah the Fatah Page

Practical Work

(1) Immediate Transfer of Authority
(2) Elections
(3) Jurisdiction
(4) Civil Work Committee
(5) Civil, Water, Electric
power Post, Develop. Bank,
export Promot. Bank
& Environment Authority
(6) Security & Police
(7) Legislation
(8) Palest. Israeli Liaison
(9) Palest. Israeli - Egypt - Jord.
Liaison
(10) IDF - Redeployment
(11) Withdrawal from Gaza
(12) Infrastructure

10 Point Programme

: Marshall Plan Projects

Ryan Corp: Projects

Plans & Schemes for
Multilateral.

Ordinary Students
for all Nations

אוניברסיטת חיפה
UNIVERSITY OF HAIFA

אגף מינהל תלמידים
מדור בחינות

Protocol of UNDERSTANDING

~~(1) BOTH SIDES WILL OBTAIN KEMCC~~

(1) Parties' demand:
Stop American boycotting
of all money resources to the PLO

(2) No understanding on solving the separate
question → no return to negotiations.

(3) No understanding on DOP -
no progress on working groups in
CWP w Marshall-Plan.

---

(4) Cooperation of Palestinian
with Israel

(Brazil Trip.

Charity

comprehensive program

Fact the Fact Page

Need

date Temple of Dendur

Water Committee

Water Electr.

Power Part Develop. Bank

expert Present. Bank

Government Authorities

Security Police

7) Legislation

8) Palest. Israeli Liaison

9) Palest. Israeli - Egypt Gaza Liaison

10) IDF - Redeployment

11) Withdrawal from Gaza Settlements

Sun -

Paper by ...

10 Pent. Programme

Thurs: Marshall Pln Project

Fantl Rynd Coop: Project

Fri: Plans & Pensions for Multichoteish.

Sprach: Problem of Students in all. ...

Then the Proposal

11. Bell park will ~~support~~ ~~program~~
the ~~modified~~ ~~updated~~, ~~the~~

11 Both.

11 ~~The HC will provide support~~

- U PEDP

11. ~~17 PEDP~~
to the cost of the pool

a.
b
c.

12. 17 ~~cost~~ PEDP
prepare the updated of second
parking development proposal.

13.

13 Bond will support the rehabilitated
aquatic - PEDP (
b the removal of three pools:

C. ~~Bell Hq Trend~~

Bell parks will support a REDP, ~~what that~~.

Progress Hs implementation of Hunt's proposed development projects:

~~a. [illegible] Dr~~

~~b. Ky~~

a. A MEDF w a Multi Cult Bus for Dennis & Dennett.

(6) 28 Aegypt 7 May.

~~Electric~~ re Immediate Trans. of Authority re Electn.

(5) Conduct of Israeli
re Palestine moves
for Multilateral Peace,
(in connection with U.K. & DoP)

(6) Int. Support - to encourage
US - not to cut off
money resources for Lebanon.
(Sen. Stevens, etc.)

(7) Unlikely to turn to
America by Deported Arabs

(8) Unlikely to Negotiate
open up DoP (WB)
through Washington channels

(9) Alternatively to give Washington Channels
- only partial instruments →
Vacant Programmes Yes

Ole Arth

① Security

② Social Safety (Long Wk)

③ Sustainable Develop
Environment, Work

④ Solidarity

Fu 1993- $600 000,- for

Democracy Budget

Emergency Aid Budget

(a) Establishment of Government Bank.
in DG Cat Bank of pres - m

plus coordination of
necessary Israeli entrants →
establishment of Israeli mercy groups

(b) Obtain EC - Financing.
for Electricity Works groups

(c) obtain Western Finance for Water Dev.
of Israel Works groups

(d) obtain Italian Financing for Works groups & Israel

(e) obtain Japanese Fin in Works for
Tourist Organ

(f) obtain Dutch Financ

(g) " Norway. Fin

(h) obtain Danish Financing

The Principles of a Just Isr-Pal. Solution

Israel-Pal

(1) Further contacts:

Understandings:

(1) coordinate propaganda
in case of pleas made
- Israel not to use of steps taken

(2) coordinate movement of ships
of Jew. of Egypt → ships
Cairo?
→ point 6

(3) coordinate Isr. military
Israeli actions
to be taken when "ripe". → Malaya in Ireland

(4) coordinate measures to
of the more likely Europ
Jewish

Israeli - Palestinian arbitration will be implemented if necessary, in a calling ~~for~~ ~~arbitration~~ where agreed upon

Hopefully ~~At first arbitration will be~~ happy.

At first the High Court will not conduct. In cases this effect fail, a compromise solution will be worked at.

Only as the last step arbitration

(1) A Joint Water Development Program.

~~Studies, plans~~ prepared by Israel and Jordan, with the cooperation, when and where necessary, of the United States, for the management of water resources in the Lower Jordan Valley, ~~Israel~~ in the Lower Jordan Valley, ~~to~~ prepare studies, plans or make right, of each party to equitable utilization of joint water resources to be prepared in, in pursuance with the Israel States.

Agreement on

(a) ~~Participation of ~~outside~~ in elections ~~unable~~ for the candidates in election.~~

(4) ~~Agreement to allow the electoral reporters~~

(1) eg other ~~[illegible]~~ relevant issues

Annex No. I

3. The Israeli-Palestinian Agreement shall include:

a) Agreement on the right of elections;

b) Agreement on the number of members to be elected to the PLC;

c) Agreement on the mode of the conduct of the elections;

d) Agreement on the political parties ?

e) Agreement on the rules for election campaign;

f) Agreement on the establishment of an election committee;

g) Agreement on the responsibility of the election committee;

h) Agreement on ways of implementing the election process;

i) Agreement on ways of implementing the election process in Jerusalem participating in elections in the Holy Sepulchre

Annex No. I

Election

~~1st: Jerusalem inhabitiar~~

The ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN AGREEMENT ON ELECTIONS WILL INCLUDE:

FIRST, AN UNDERSTANDING THAT WILL ENABLE PALESTINIAN RESIDENTS ~~FROM~~ Jerusalem to participate as voters and candidates in elections.

Jurisdiction of the PIC until
later Vet Bird or pen stays the
1 bird returns to the pen
of the Vet Bird, the pen stays in
Jeopardy until be repeated.

Jurisdiction of the PIC will
Cover the Land of west
Bank and the Gaza Strip.

In the begining of the third
year of the interim period
negotiation will start about
all of P.S. including Jerusalem.
the final status.
Head
Urgent
Address of contact in
secretary of Palestinian Council
written.

ANNEX

Jurisdiction of the PIC will
cover West Bank & Gaza Strip.
In final status negotiation the question
on the law of the future use of the
West Bank & the Gaza Strip will be negotiated

Annex No. 1
Election Process

1) A) Palestinians of Jerusalem have the right to participate in the elections as voters and Candidates inside Jerusalem (in the Alaqsa mosque or the church)

B) ALL Displaced Palestinians who were registered before 4th June 1967 have the right to participate in the election process.

~~They don't~~ These right will not be prejudiced even if they will not be able to participate for practical reasons.

2) Agreements between both parties should be arranged to cover the following issues:

A)

An Arbitration Committee will be created to whom all issues of dispute will be submitted. This Committee will be formed later in Coordination between both parties and the Co-Sponsors of Madrid Conference.

Issues will be submitted to this Committee only when both parties will be unable to reach agreement amicably.

Article 4: 2213

Jerusdiction of the PIC will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip Land.

In the final status negotiation which will take place ~~in not~~ as soon as possible but not later than the beginning of the third Year, ~~negotiation will take place between~~ between the Israeli government and the Palestinians, to cover all remaining issues including - Jerusalem - Refugees - settlement, security arrangements, soveleignty and boarders and any other issue of common interest.

(Israeli Prop.

Charity

comprehensive proposal

Text the Fact Page

Next

date Temple of Gold

Water Committee

Water Electr.

Power Part. Develop. Bal;

export Promot. Bur

Government Authorities

Security & Police

7) Legislation

8) Palest. Israeli Liaison

9) Palest. Israeli - Egypt Jord.

Liaison

10) IDF - Redeployment

11) Withdrawal for Sale

Arbitration

Tues -

Paper due, Chap

10 Pers. Programme

Thurs: Marshall Pln Project

Fantl Rynd. Comp: Project

Sat: Pln, & Personnel in Multicultural.

Mon: Problem or Study
In ell. Unit

Then the Proposal

11. Bell park will support the ~~modified~~ ~~proposal~~, the

11. Bell.

11 ~~The PE and~~ PEDP

11. ~~PEDP~~ PEDP

to be approved of these part

a.

b

c.

12. ~~PEDP~~ PEDP

proposing the replacement of second

parallel development project.

13.

13 Broad will support a the modified

report - PEDP (C

to be approved of three parts:

C. ~~Bell Hall Trust~~

Bell parks will support a RCDP, ~~which will~~. Progress & Implementation of Tuscola parks development projects:

a. ~~[illegible]~~ Dr

b. ~~Ky~~

c. & MEDF w/ a Mobile Unit Bus for Remote & Direct

(6) 28 Regret 7 May.

~~Electric~~ re Immediate Transfer of Authority re Electn.

(5) Conduct of Israeli
re-Palestinian moves
for Multilateral Peace,
(in view of safe aft O.K. re DoP)

(6) Int. Support - to encourage
US - not to cut off
money resources for Centrum.
(Sen. Dodd, etc.)

(7) Unlikely to turn to
America by Deported Pal.

(8) Unlikely to Negotiate
openly with PLO (WI
through Watergate channel

(8) Alternatively to give Watergate channel
- only granted in strictly →
Valuable Programmes lies

Ole Arth

① Security

② Social Safety (Long Wk)

③ Sustainable Develop
Environment, Work

④ Solidarity

Fu 1993- $600 000,- for

Democracy Budget

Emergency Aid Budget

(a) Establishment of Government Staff in [illegible] at pre-war

plus coordination of necessary Israeli entrants → establishment of Israeli working groups

(b) Obtain EC-Finance for Electricity working groups

(c) obtain Austrian Finance for Water Dev. & Irrig. working groups

(d) obtain Italian Finance for Working groups & Tech. Assist. Organs

(e) obtain Yugoslav Finance for working groups & Tech. Assist. Organs

(f) obtain Dutch Finance

(g) " Norway. Finance

(h) obtain Danish Finance

The principles of a Pol. Mr- Pol. Understanding

Israeli-Pal

(1) Further contacts:

Understanding:

(1) · coordinate propaganda
in case of pol. crisis
- Israel will be free of responsibility

(2) coordinate movement ? newly created ?
of pers. of Egypt → see point 6

(3) coordinate · pro-newspaper
Israeli actions
to the Hebrew Union
who « succeed ». → Newly in Ireland

(4) coordinate measures to
alter more binding the European ?

Israeli - Palestinian arbitration will be implemented if necessary, in a calling ~~for~~ ~~arbitration~~ ~~to~~ ~~be~~ ~~binding~~ ~~and~~ ~~enforceable~~ where agreed upon ~~by~~ ~~both~~ ~~parties~~.

~~At first~~ ~~in which~~ ~~will~~ ~~be~~ ~~step~~.

At first the High Court will not conduct. In cases this effect fail, a compromise solution will be reached at.

Only as the last step arbitration

(1) A Joint Water Development Program.

~~Studies, plans~~ prepared by Israel and Jordan, which will also specify the amount of cooperation necessary for the management of water resources in the Jordan River Valley, ~~Headwaters~~ the West Bank and the Jordan Valley, ~~to~~ prepare studies, plans or make right, of each party or equitable utilization of joint water resources to be prepared for implementation in the final status.

Agreement

(I) Interpret of ~~out~~ on clause
~~must~~ by the court
in clear.

(R) Agreement for the
electronic repository

(I) by all relevant users

Annex No. I

3. The Israeli-Palestinian Agreement shall include:

(a) Agreement on the right of election;

(b) Agreement on the number of such elections to the PLC;

(c) Agreement on the modalities of a list system for the proportional representation of the respective lists;

(d) Agreement on the [illegible] ?

(e) Agreement on the rules for election campaign;

(f) Agreement on the establishment of [illegible] of voters;

(g) Agreement on the possibility of [illegible] of voters.

(h) Agreement on ways of [illegible] to enable Jerusalem Palestinians participate in elections in Holy Sepulchre

Agreement on [illegible] Jerusalem Palestinians [illegible]

Annex No. I

Election

~~1st: Jerusalem inhabitat~~

The ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN AGREEMENT ON ELECTIONS WILL INCLUDE:

FIRST, AN UNDERSTANDING THAT WILL ENABLE PALESTINIAN RESIDENTS ~~FROM~~ Jerusalem to participate as voters and candidates in elections.

Jurisdiction of the PIC would
cover Val Verde as per Stipulation
1 and 2 of the Settlement Agreement. The portion
of the Val Verde, the pipeline
trench would be regulated.

Jurisdiction of the PIC will
Cover the Land of west
Bank and the Gaza Strip.

In the begining of the third
year of the interim period
negotiation will ~~start about~~
~~all OPT including Jerusalem.~~
~~the final status.~~ about
withdrawal of control
sovereignty and ~~law~~ control
~~of~~ territories.

ANNEX

Jurisdiction of the PIC will
cover West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
In final status negotiations the question
on the law of the future use of the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip will be negotiated

Annex No. 1
Election Process

1) A) Palestinians of Jerusalem have the right to participate in the elections as voters and candidates inside Jerusalem (in the Al Aqsa mosque or the church) of the Holy Republic.

B) ALL Displaced Palestinians who were registered before 4th June 1967 have the right to participate in the election process.

~~They don't~~ These right will not be prejudiced even if they will not be able to participate for practical reasons.

2) Agreements between both parties should be arranged to cover the following issues:

A)

An Arbitration Commitee will be created to whom all issues of dispute will be submitted. This Commitee will be formed later in Coordination between both parties and the Co-Sponsors of Madrid Conference.

Issues will be submitted to this Commitee only when both parties will be unable to reach agreement amicably.

Article 4:

2213

Jurisdiction of the PLC will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip Land.

In the final status negotiation ~~which~~ will take place ~~in not~~ as soon as possible but not later than the beginning of the third year, ~~negotiation will take place between~~ between the Israeli government and the Palestinians, to cover all remaining issues including - Jerusalem - Refugees - settlement, security arrangements, sovereignty and boarders and any other issue of common interest.

21 MARCH 1993 - SARPSBORG III

VERSION 3

An agreement has been achieved in Sarpsborg regarding the concept of a mutually envisaged Israeli-Palestinian understanding. Having achieved this the Sarpsborg backchannel will be maintained in order to assist progress in negotiations.

The Principles of an Israeli-Palestinian Understanding

The principles of an Israeli-Palestinian understanding include the following three documents: A DoP (Declaration of Principles), a CWP (Cooperation and Working Programme) and Guidelines for a "Marshall-Plan."

I. Draft for DoP (Declaration of Principles):

1. The aim of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations is to obtain agreement regarding arrangements for establishing a Palestinian Interim Self-Governing Authority, the elected Palestinian Interim Council, for a transitional period leading to a permanent settlement based on Resolutions 242 and 338.

It is understood that the interim arrangements are an integral part of the whole process leading to the implementation of 242 and 338.

2. In order that the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip may govern themselves according to democratic principles, direct, free and general political elections would be held under international supervision to be agreed upon, three month after the signing of this DoP. Agreement on the exact mode and conditions of elections, according to the attached annex one, will be achieved, not later than one month before elections.

3. The elections for the establishment of the Palestinian Interim Council will constitute a significant interim preparatory step towards the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.

4. Jurisdiction of the Palestinian Interim Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip land.

Final status negotiations will take place as soon as possible, but not later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period, between the Israeli government and the Palestinian representatives, to cover all remaining issues including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, sovereignty, borders and any other issues of common interest.

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Annex No. ONE:

Mode and Conditions of Elections

1. Palestinians of Jerusalem have the right to participate in the elections as voters and candidates. Jerusalem voters will vote in the el-Aqsa Mosque and in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre.

2. All displaced Palestinians who were registered before 4th June 1967 have the right to participate in the election process. Their right will not be prejudiced even if they will not be able to participate for practical reasons.

3. Agreements between both parties should be arranged to cover the following issues;

a. the system of elections;
b. the number of members to be elected to the Palestinian Interim Council.
c. the mode of international supervision and the personal composition of the supervising body;
d. rules and regulations regarding election campaign including agreement on the organising of mass media, and the possibility of licensing a broadcasting and TV station;
e. any other issues.

II. Draft for an Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation and Working Programme [CWP]

The Israeli-Palestinian DoP will be accompanied by an agreed upon Israeli-Palestinian CWP, which shall include:

1. A joint Water Development Programme prepared by Israeli and Palestinian water engineers, which will also specify the mode of cooperation necessary for the management of water resources, in Gaza Strip and West Bank, including the Jordan Valley, and prepare studies and plans on water rights of each party and equitable utilization of joint water resources for implementation in the final status.

2. An Electricity Development Programme, which will also specify the mode of cooperation necessary for the production, maintenance, purchase and sale of electricity resources.

3. An Israeli-Palestinian agreed upon Energy Development Programme, which will provide for the construction of oil- and gas pipelines, the establishment of a petrochemical industrial complex in the Gaza Strip, and for the coordinated or joint exploitation of gas, oil and other energy resources, (such as solar energy, oil shale, etc.).

4. A Financial Development Programme, and the establishment of a Palestinian Development Bank.

5. A Transport and Communications Development Programme, which will define guidelines for the establishment of a Greater Gaza Port Area, and the creation of a Free-Trade Zone between Gaza and Ashdod. Moreover, communication lines to and from Gaza via Israel to other countries will be determined and steps taken to carry out necessary construction of roads, railways, etc.

6. An Industrial Development Programme, which will provide for the establishment of a joint Palestinian-Israeli car industry in Gaza, promote other Palestinian-Israeli joint ventures and provide guidelines for cooperation in the textile, food, pharmaceutical, electronics, computer, and other science-based industries.

7. A programme for regulating labour relations and creating cooperation in social welfare issues.

8. A Human Resources Development Plan, providing for joint Israeli-Palestinian workshops and seminars; the establishment of joint vocational training centers, research institutes and data banks.

9. An Environmental Protection Plan, providing for joint and/or coordinated measures in this sphere.

10. An agreed upon Security Programme and Plan.

III. A Draft for Preparing a "Marshall-Plan" for the West Bank, Gaza Strip and the Region

The Israeli-Palestinian DoP [Declaration of Principles] and CWP [Cooperation and Working Programme] will be accompanied by a "Marshall-Plan" Initiative of the G 7 and other OECD member states. The G 7 and other OECD member states participating in the multilateral negotiations, will commit themselves to prepare a Marshall Plan Initiative for the West Bank, Gaza Strip and the Region, which will be implemented after the election and inauguration of the Interim Self-Government Authority, the Palestinian Interim Council. Substantial additional aid will be raised by the Palestinians from Arab states, as well as from existing all-Arab institutions.

The "Marshall-Plan" Initiative will be composed of two parts: First, a PEDP [Palestinian Economic Development Programme] as a priority, and second a REDP [Regional Economic Development Programme].

A. The PEDP [Palestinian Economic Development Programme]

Israel will support in the multilateral negotiations a PEDP (Palestinian Economic Development Programme), which will be composed of three parts:

1) A Social Rehabilitation Programme;
2) A Small and Medium Business Development Plan, and
3) An Infrastructure Development Programme (water, electricity, transportation and communication, human resources, financial institutions, etc.)

B. The REDP [Regional Economic Development Programme]

Both parties will support a REDP proposing the implementation of several pivotal developmental projects:

1) The establishment of a Middle East Development Fund (MEDF) and of a Middle East Bank for Reconstruction and Development (MEBRD).

2) The Mediterranean Sea - Dead Sea Canal, and development of a joint Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian Plan for coordinated exploitation of the Dead Sea area.

3) Regional Desalination and Power Generating Plant.

4) Interconnection of electricity grids.

5) Regional cooperation for the transfer, distribution and industrial exploitation, of gas, oil and other energy resources.

6) A Regional Tourism and Transport Development Plan.

7) Regional Cooperation in other spheres as mutually agreed upon.

DoB. 21/22/3/93

2. All cases related to the part of security are handled by specialist branch which is ~~the~~ separate from the main control room but will be linked to the PIC ~~where control~~ & a part related ~~to the~~ branch. The main control will be able to determine how many officers & other personnel. For the other personnel ~~the control~~ ~~control~~ ~~but not~~ the PIC ~~will have no~~ ~~but~~ will not exist in the ~~but~~ but not exist in the ~~but~~ but not exist in the

~~The~~ ~~jurisdiction~~ of the PIC will ~~cover~~ pur-
~~suant~~ ~~under~~ ~~the~~ West Bank ~~and~~ the Gaza Strip.
The exact details will be worked out
in an annex to the Interim-Agreement.

The PIC will obtain
jurisdiction over land in the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
The exact details will be
worked out in an annex to the
Interim-Agreement.

The pursuit of the PIC will cover
~~over~~ criminal ~~matters~~ in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Immediate
Transfer of Authority (Brea

Elections - comprehensive preparation

Jurisdiction - Fact the Fact Page

Practical Work

(1) Immediate Transfer of Authority
(2) Elections
(3) Jurisdiction
(4) Civil Work Committee
(5) Civil, Work, Elections
Area Part, Development Bank,
expert Practical Base
& Government Authority
(6) Security & Police
(7) Legislation
(8) Palest. Israeli Liaison
(9) Palest. Israeli - Egypt - Jord.
Liaison
(10) IDF - Redeployment
(11) Withdrawal from Gaza
(12) Authority

10 - Point - Programme

- Marshall Plan Project

- Rural Coop - Project

Plans & Scenarios for
Multicultural.

- Problem or Study
to all - men

אוניברסיטת חיפה
UNIVERSITY OF HAIFA

אגף מינהל תלמידים
מדור בחינות

~~PROTOCOL~~ of UNDERSTANDING

~~(1) BOTH SIDES WILL OBTAIN REPLY~~

(1) Bar-Tzvi demand:
Stop American boycotting
of all money resources to the PLO

(2) No understanding on solving the Egyptian
question → no return to negotiations.

(3) No understanding on PLO-
no progress on working groups in
CWP on Marshall-Plan.

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(4) Coordination of Achdut
with Israel

ד"ר דן בונה
19/03/93
טל: 03-635-5973 (ב)

הצעות למצע המדיני - חוג משוב

א. מבוא

א-1. למרות איטיותו של תהליך השלום, הנמצא כבר בשנתו השניה, ניכרים במהלכו ניצנים של פתרונות לקראת קידום ההליך להסדר שלום כולל במזרח התיכון. על מדינת ישראל להמשיך ולדבוק בתהליך השלום ולמצות כל דרך אפשרית על מנת להגיע להסדר של שלום קבע, מלא וכולל, עם שכנותיה ועם בני העם הפלסטיני.

א-2. האלימות הגוברת ותרדות הבטחון האישי השוררות כיום רק מדגישות את חשיבות ההתקדמות לקראת הסדר שלום מלא וכולל עם מדינות ערב והפלסטינאים. על הסדרי השלום לתת מענה הן לבעיות בטחון המדינה ברמה הצבאית והן לבעיות בטחון הפרט ברמה האישית. "שלום ובטחון" אינם סותרים אחד את משנהו מכיוון לראות בהסדרי השלום, כאשר יושגו, את הפתרון האמיתי והכולל לבעיות הבטחון (הצבאי והאישי) של מדינת ישראל ותושביה.

א-3. מפלגת העבודה, במציאות הפוליטית הישראלית, הינה מפלגה החותרת באופן מתמיד להשגת שלום תוך הולכת מדיניות מתונה, ריאלית, חיודעת לשלב חכמה מדינית ובטחונית.

ב. עקרונות להסדר

ב-1. הבטחת בטחונה של מדינת ישראל במישור המדיני, הצבאי ובתחום בטחון הפרט. כל הסדר מדיני יגזר מהיכולת להבטיח את הבטחון.

ב-2. ~~הסרבנות~~ השליטה על אוכלוסית השטחים מכרסמים בנו - מהבחינה המוסרית, הכלכלית והבטחונית. על מדינת ישראל לשאוף להעביר את שליטתה הנוכחית באוכלוסיה הפלסטינית למימשל פלסטיני עצמאי, מסודר ואחראי שיאפשר לפלסטינים הגדרה עצמית של "ישות לאומית" נפרדת. במסגרת הסדרי השלום העתידיים תקבענה הגדרות מדוייקות יותר של ישות זו, כ "מדינה", כ "פדרציה" או הגדרות אלטרנטיביות אחרות שיוסכמו על הצדדים לסכסוך.

ב-3. מדינת ישראל מכירה בזכות ההגדרה העצמית של הפלסטינים ומוכנה לשבת למו"מ עם נציגים פלסטינאים, שיקבעו על ידם, המכירים בזכות קיומה של מדינת ישראל ושוללים את הטרור. כל זאת על בסיס החלטות מועצת הבטחון 242 ו338.

ב-4. מדינת ישראל מוכנה לנקוט במדיניות של "שטחים תמורת שלום" כדרך לקידום התהליך לקראת חסדר שלום כולל עם כל הצדדים בסכסוך. מדיניות זו יש לישם באופן ~~מודולרי~~: "חלק מהשטחים תמורת חלק מהשלום" ~~תמורת~~ שלום מלא וכולל".

ב-5. מדינת ישראל מגדירה "שלום מלא וכולל" כמצב בו כל הצדדים לסכסוך מוותרים לחלוטין על פתרונות כוחניים כדרך לפתרון בעיות. "שלום מלא" כולל בתוכו יחסי שוויון וצדק בין הצדדים, יחסים דיפלומטיים מלאים, ~~מסחריים~~ לפתרונן של חילוקי דעות, גבולות פתוחים ותנועת אוכלוסיה ותיירות חופשית, שיתוף פעולה כלכלי, מדעי ותרבותי.

ב-6. ישראל שואפת להגיע למצב בו יחסי השלום עם שכנותיה ישענו על רצונם של בני ~~אדם~~ ולא רק על האינטרסים של ~~המנהיגות הפוליטית באחיזות עבה~~. לפיכך ~~תשתדל~~ ישראל דרכים לטיפוח יחסי שלום וקירבה בין ~~תושבי~~ ישראל ~~לתושבי~~ הארצות השכנות במטרה לבסס את השלום ~~לשמור~~ ולהקנות לעמי האיזור ~~כולם~~ ערכים של שלום.

ג. הצעות

ג-1. מדינת ישראל מוכנה לפשרות טריטוריליות בדמות הגזלן בהתאם לעקרון של "שטחים תמורת שלום" כמוסכר בסעיפים ב-4 וב-5 לעיל. מפאת נדנבכי חוסר האימון בין סוריה לישראל, מציעה ישראל כי הגישה של "שטחים תמורת שלום" תבוצע במהלך תקופה של 5-10 שנים חצדדים על טיפוח השלום וביסוסו לקראת שלום מלא וכולל.

ג-2. מדינת ישראל מוכנה להכיר בעם פלסטיני, המיצג את הפלסטינים בשטחים בתנאי מדינת ישראל, תתנגד לאלימות וטרור ותכריז על שאיפתה להשגת שלום מלא וכולל עם מדינת ישראל. בתנאים אלו תהיה מוכנה ישראל להכיר בא"פ ולנהל מו"מ עם מנהיגיו ונציגיו.

ג-3. מדינת ישראל מוכנה לדון עם הפלסטינים על הסדרי ביניים כגון: אוטונומיה, שלטון עצמי והסדרים אחרים כדרכים לקראת השגת הסדר שלום כולל. עם התקדמות המו"מ ולאחר קבלת בטחונות וערבויות לבטחונה, תהיה ישראל מוכנה, בשלב ראשון, להעביר את רצועת עזה לשלטון פלסטיני מסודר ואחראי.

ג-4. לאחר מימוש ההסדר בעזה תתחור ישראל להגיע לפתרון דומה בגדה המערבית, תוך בחינת הקמתה של מסגרת מדינית פלסטינית המשותפת לגדה ולרצועה. המעבר לשלב זה יהיה מותנה בהמשך המו"מ האיזורי הכולל ויבטיח זיקה בין פתרון הבעיה הפלסטינית לבין קידום ונחלין ושלוו באיזור כולו.

ג.5 - ישראל תהיה מוכנה להסכמים לפירוק נשק הדדי בשטח שיחולו על כל מדינות האיזור במסגרת ביסוסו של הסדר שלום מלא וכולל. ישראל תהיה מוכנה לנוכחות של כוחות בינלאומיים עליהם יוסכם כאמצעי ביניים להבטחת בטחון ולהסרת אימים פוטנציאלים - וזאת עד שישרור שלום מלא וכולל שלא יצריך נוכחות זו.

ג-6. לקידום תחליך השלוו ובואע תוכניות כלכליות אשר ותבטיח פיתוח מקורות פרנסה ותשתית משקית לקוזילה הפלסטינית ותקדם בו זמנית שיתוף פעולה כלכלי, ישראלי-ערבי. התוכנית תיעשה בשיתוף וסיוע של גורמים בינלאומיים.

ג-7. מדינת ישראל רואה בעיר ירושלים את עיר הקודש לעם היהודי ואת בירתה הנצחית. במסגרת הסדר שלום כולל מוכנה ישראל לראות בחלקה המזרחי של העיר מחוז מוניציפלי שינוהל ע"י רשויות עירוניות פלסטיניות. במתכונת כזו תמשיך העיר להיות מאוחדת מבחינה אדמינסטרטיבית כאשר לתושביה היהודים שייכות פוליטית למדינת ישראל ולתושביה הערביים שייכות פוליטית לישות הפלסטינית שתקום.

ק.ח.ב.

סמיכה של ועדה מדינית
של תום "עשרה".

← הפגישה תתחיל עכשיו ב- 15.4 בשעה 18:00.

← על הנוכחים לשוחח מראש הפגישה את המדען הקנדי, ד"ר משיח, על הנושאים, בכל הנוגע לאמריקן בשלום.

← ד"ר ען מונה ע"י הדפוס מדען אמריקני.

← הישיבה הקרובה על בסיס מצעו של ד"ר ען בעניין כיווצה רפואי כדרך של ועדה.

← המבוי של ד"ר מיוחס הוועדה בשעון.

← בנוגע לסעיף ב: אדוארד ירסקי, עמנו הנאמן ובשלום:

1. בסעיף ב-2 היתה התקדמות לשיאים בנושא "בימוש", ובשלום ראה הוועדה לחלק "פשיטה המתמשכת". ש. גד אסף בינתים להביא את מהות המושג "מימשל פרסיון עצמאי", והוועדה מייחס מעמד יומרני מ"מימשל פרסיון עצמי".

2. אריה אלון בינתים להחליף את המושג "אדמה שבורה" ב"מפלגת הקבוצה". ניקח כל נשלחה. עליה הוועדה להחליף את בשלום ב"מכירה" "מלקה" ובכל בכל פקשנה שמעון ה, ב"בין לחבר", "מלשכה לחבר" ובין

4. הוועדה יהושיע לסעיף ב-3 עשוי עלי קף שמדינת ישראל אינה מכירה בהכרה או בכל יחס כאדמה בה אריה אלון נסה משפט ברוח כלשהי.

4. סעיף ב-4, להחליף "שלום תמורת פשרות" במשפט "שטחים תמורת שלום".

5. במהלך סעיף הדיון להחליף את "פ' הדגדים" בביטוי "תושבי פרזיון יתר בי"שומרון ובפלשתינאים".

6. במהלך סעיף הדיון להקיים ניסוח על בעלות היהודי שלום את שטחי רכישה

7. סעיף ב-ס: הוחלף להחליף את הניסוח "צבא ישראל" ב: "כוחות הדגדים לסילוק" מאחר כוונה להביא ולהשאיר על פ הדגדים.

שלישית, הדיון להמשיך את הסעיף כולו, אל להחליפו בניסוח סעיף על הינוך לדמוקרטיה בלבד.

8. בסעיף ק-1: הוסרו הילות מאחר על מנת מתירה רמה הגולן. בהמשך, הוצעו הסוגיות שיוגשו שלושה מתווים פסיפולמיים 1. בניה אחד 2. המשך המשא ומתן. 3. מסגרת פלסטינאית. הניסוח הסופי של ק-1 שלו היה להלן מאוחר יותר יבואו הערות אלטרנטיביות לסעיף.

9. סעיף ק-2: להחליף את "בפני ארצות" בקבלת פלסטינית"

10. סעיף ק-3: שאיר בינתיים לומר שאי אפשר להגיע לסיום-סיכום, בכך שהמשא ומתן יתחדש. להוסיף כמו: שאין הנהרות בינתיים להשאיר את הסעיף. אם כי אנו נשקול את הניסוח, ונביאו מאוחר יותר.

11. שאיר את מתנאי סעיף ק-4.

12. סעיף ק-5: היו מחלוקת מסוימת בעלת הבעת/ בעיה נהדרת בינתיים בבלי. ארוכה ארונין ועוד. בישראל בצו רבים את הסעיף. הוחלט להשאיר את הסעיף כמו שהוא.

כז. סעיף ד-ו הוקרא כלשונו.

כח. סעיף ד-ה: שלמען מפעל הפיס בירושלים ע"ר שותפים. מן הדין בי"ד לדון מחסום פסיכולוגי, וכיצד שנפרט, הם בעיקר שהוא מכיר הם (קים 14 בעמוד הבא) בעיר שעליהם הרוקדים.

הוקראו בעיני בקשר הכתב: אין לה יותר מהניתן לבוא לבית?

אין הדבר שכן ומוסף ומשלב על הסעיף לקיחת הנושים הפיזה.

כעילה הבא

ב 4/4/15

שמו: 008

בלשכת בית"ד

An agreement has been achieved in Sarpsborg regarding the concept of a mutually envisaged Israeli-Palestinian understanding. The Sarpsborg backchannel will be maintained in order to assist progress in negotiations.

THE SARPSBORG ~~DOCUMENT~~ March 20, 1993

~~Negotiating Concept~~ An agreement has been achieved

~~It is suggested that~~ full agreement will be achieved in Sarpsborg regarding the concept of a mutually envisaged Israeli-Palestinian understanding. ~~Having achieved this,~~ the Sarpsborg backchannel will be maintained in order to assist progress in negotiations.

The Principles of a First Israeli-Palestinian Understanding

Israeli-Palestinian negotiations will concentrate on achieving agreement in regard to three documents: A DoP (Declaration of Principles), a CWP (Cooperation and Working Programme) and Guidelines for a ~~REDP (Regional Economic Development Plan)~~. Marshall Plan

I. Draft for DoP (Declaration of Principles)

1. The aim of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations is to obtain agreement regarding arrangements for establishing a Palestinian Self-Governing Authority, the Palestinian Interim Council, for a period leading to a permanent settlement based on Resolutions 242 and 338.

It is understood that the interim arrangements are an integral part of the whole process leading to the implementation of 242 and 338.

2. In order that the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza may govern themselves according to democratic principles direct, free and general political elections would be held three months after the signing of this DoP. Agreement on the exact mode and conditions of elections, will be achieved, not later than one month before elections. ~~Free Annex~~ acknowledged Annex one.

3. The elections for the establishment of the Palestinian Interim Council will constitute a significant interim preparatory step towads the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.

4. The jurisdiction of the Palestinian Interim Council will ~~cover control over lands as mutually agreed upon~~. will

5. Immediately after the signing of the DoP a transfer of authority from the Israeli military government and the Israeli Civil Administration to the Palestinians and such committees that will be appointed by the Palestinian representatives, will start.

The transfer of authority to the Palestinian committees will be of temporary and preparatory nature and will include Palestinian control over taxation, tourism, education, health and social welfare, as well as other agreed upon spheres.

6. In order to guarantee optimal economic development and growth, immediately with the signing of this DoP, a Palestinian Land Committee and a Palestinian Water Administration Committee will be established.

The Palestinian Land Committee and the Palestinian Water Administration Committee will be given immediate powers as mutually agreed upon. A coordinated land and water resources development plan will be negotiated between the Palestinian Land Committee and the Palestinian Water Administration Committee on the one, and the Government of Israel on the other side.

7. In order to guarantee optimal security arrangements for the Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Palestinian Interim Council will establish a strong police force, responsible for internal security and public order.

Preparatory steps, necessary for the establishment of the Palestinian police force, will be taken immediately after the signing of the DoP, in liaison with the Palestinians, Israel, Egypt and Jordan.

8. In order to enable the Interim Self-Government Authority, the Palestinian Interim Council, to promote economic growth, several institutions will be established at the time of its inauguration, such as: a Palestinian Land Authority, a Palestinian Water Administration Authority, a Palestinian Electricity Authority, a Gaza Sea Port Authority, a Palestinian Development Bank, a Palestinian Export Promotion Board and an Environmental Authority.

The Palestinian committees will negotiate with the Government of Israel, the necessary relevant agreements for these institutions.

9. The Palestinian Interim Council will be empowered to legislate for all the authorities that are mutually agreed upon. Both parties will reassess jointly all laws and military orders presently in force.

10. An Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee will be established and will deal with all issues of dispute and

common interest. Agreements on cooperation and liaison will be negotiated and implemented on the professional levels in order to provide for security and mutual understanding between both parties.

11. Further liaison and cooperation arrangements will be negotiated and agreed upon between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority on one hand and the Governments of Jordan and Egypt on the other hand.

12. Immediately after signing the DoP the transitional period of five years will begin. As soon as possible, but not later than the beginning of the third year, negotiations will take place to determine the final status of the West Bank, including Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip ~~and its relationship with its neighbours~~ on the basis of Security Council resolution 242.

13. After the signing of the DoP, Israeli-Palestinian negotiations on the redeployment of Israeli military forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will start. A first redeployment of forces will be carried out on the eve of elections for the Palestinian Interim Council.

Further redeployments will be gradually implemented, ~~in line with the introduction of other security measures.~~

At the end of the second year of the interim-period, Israeli military forces will withdraw completely from Gaza, in the spirit of partial implementation of 242 and 338. The Israeli withdrawal will be fully coordinated with the Palestinian Interim Council.

After the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza a trusteeship will be established, as to be agreed upon between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority.

14. The Israeli and the Palestinian delegations will negotiate an Interim-Agreement that will specify the mechanisms and substance of the envisaged transfer of authority.

ד"ר דן בונה

19/03/93

טל: 03-635-5973 (ב)

הצעות למצע המדיני - חוג משוב

א. מבוא

א-1. למרות איטיותו של תהליך השלום, הנמצא כבר בשנתו השניה, ניכרים במהלכו ניצנים של פתרונות לקראת קידום התהליך להסדר שלום כולל במזרח התיכון. על מדינת ישראל להמשיך ולדבוק בתהליך השלום ולמצות כל דרך אפשרית על מנת להגיע להסדר של שלום קבע, מלא וכולל, עם שכנותיה ועם בני העם הפלסטיני.

א-2. תאלימות הגוברת ותרדות הבטחון האישי השוררות כיום רק מדגישות את חשיבות ההתקדמות לקראת הסדר שלום מלא וכולל עם מדינות ערב והפלסטינאים. על הסדרי השלום לתת מענה הן לבעיות בטחון המדינה ברמה הצבאית והן לבעיות בטחון הפרט ברמה האישית. "שלום ובטחון" אינם סותרים אחד את משנהו מכיוון שניהם לראות בהסדרי השלום, כאשר יושגו, את הפתרון האמיתי והכולל לבעיות הבטחון (הצבאי והאישי) של מדינת ישראל ותושביה.

א-3. מפלגת העבודה, במציאות הפוליטית הישראלית, הינה מפלגה החותרת באופן מתמיד להשגת שלום תוך הולכת מדיניות מתונה, ריאלית, היודעת לשלב חכמה מדינית ובטחונית.

ב. עקרונות להסדר

ב-1. הבטחת בטחונה של מדינת ישראל במישור המדיני, הצבאי ובתחום בטחון הפרט. כל הסדר מדיני יגזר מהיכולת להבטיח את הבטחון.

ב-2. הסרת השליטה על אוכלוסית השטחים מכרסמים בנו - מהבחינה המוסרית, הכלכלית והבטחונית. על מדינת ישראל לשאוף להעביר את שליטתה הנוכחית באוכלוסיה הפלסטינית למימשל פלסטיני עצמאי, מסודר ואחראי שיאפשר לפלסטינים הגדרה עצמית של "ישות לאומית" נפרדת. במסגרת הסדרי השלום העתידיים תקבענה הגדרות מדוייקות יותר של ישות זו, כ "מדינה", כ "פדרציה" או הגדרות אלטרנטיביות אחרות שיוסכמו על הצדדים לסכסוך.

ב-3. מדינת ישראל מכירה בזכות ההגדרה העצמית של הפלסטינים ומוכנה לשבת למו"מ עם נציגים פלסטינאים, שיקבעו על ידם, המכירים בזכות קיומה של מדינת ישראל ושוללים את הטרור. כל זאת על בסיס החלטות מועצת הבטחון 242 ו338.

ב-4. מדינת ישראל מוכנה לנקוט כמדיניות של "שטחים תמורת שלום" כדרך לקידום התהליך לקראת הסדר שלום כולל עם כל הצדדים בכפוף לקבלת מדיניות זו יש לישם באופן מדורג: ~~"חלק מהשטחים תמורת שלום חלקי"~~ ~~"כל השטחים תמורת~~ שלום מלא וכולל".

ב-5. מדינת ישראל מגדירה "שלום מלא וכולל" כמצב בו כל הצדדים לסכסוך מוותרים להלוטין על פתרונות כוחניים כדרך לפתרון בעיות. "שלום מלא" כולל בתוכו יחסי שוויון וצדק בין הצדדים, יחסים דיפלומטיים מלאים, ~~מבוי זמנים~~ לפתרונן של חילוקי דעות, גבולות פתוחים ותנועת אוכלוסיה ותיירות חופשית, שיתוף פעולה כלכלי, מדעי ותרבותי.

ב-6. ישראל שואפת להגיע למצב בו יחסי השלום עם שכנותיה ישענו על רצונם של ~~בני~~ ~~אדם דלא דק על האינטרסים של המנהיגות הפולטנית בהנהגת עבה~~. לפיכך ~~תעשה~~ ישראל ~~להנשיג~~ ~~הדשה~~ ישראל ~~להנשיג~~ ~~הארצות השכנות~~ במטרה לבסס את השלום ~~להשפר~~ ולהקנות לעמי האיזור ~~כולם~~ ערכים של שלום.

ג. הצעות

ג-1. מדינת ישראל מוכנה לפשרות טריטוריליות בהתאם לעקרון "שטחים תמורת שלום" כמוסכר בסעיפים ב-4 וב-5 לעיל. מפאת חשש הדדי של "שטחים תמורת שלום" תבוצע במהלך תקופה של 5-10 שנים שבהם ישקדו הצדדים על טיפוח השלום וביסוסו לקראת שלום מלא וכולל.

ג-2. מדינת ישראל מוכנה להכיר בנציגות פלסטינית, המייצגת את האוכלוסיה הפלסטינים בשטחים בתנאי שהיא תכיר באופן רשמי בזכות קיומה של מדינת ישראל, תתנגד לאלימות וטרור ותכריז על שאיפתה להשגת שלום מלא וכולל עם מדינת ישראל. בתנאים אלו תהיה מוכנה ישראל לחכיר באש"פ ולנהל מו"מ עם מנחיגיו ונציגיו.

ג-3. מדינת ישראל מוכנה לדון עם הפלסטינים על הסדרי ביניים כגון: אוטונומיה, שלטון עצמי והסדרים אחרים כדרכים לקראת השגת הסדר שלום כולל. עם התקדמות המו"מ ולאחר קבלת כטחונות וערבויות לכטחונה, תהיה ישראל מוכנה, בשלב ראשון, להעביר את רצועת עזה לשלטון פלסטיני מסודר ואחראי.

ג-4. לאחר מימוש ההסדר בעזה תתחור ישראל להגיע לפתרון דומה בגדה המערבית, תוך בחינת הקמתה של מסגרת מדינית פלסטינית המשותפת לגדה ולרצועה. המעבר לשלב זה יהיה מותנה בהמשך המו"מ האיזורי הכולל ויבטיח זיקה בין פתרון הבעיה הפלסטינית לבין קידום ושלום באיזור כולו.

ג-5 - ישראל תהיה מוכנה להסכמים לפירוק נשק הדדי והסדרי בטחון שיחולו על כל מדינות האיזור במסגרת ביסוסו של הסדר שלום מלא וכולל. ישראל תהיה מוכנה לנוכחות של כוחות בינלאומיים עליהם יוסכם כאמצעי ביניים להבטחת הבטחון ולהסרת אימים פוטנציאלים - וזאת עד שישרור שלום מלא וכולל שלא יצריך נוכחות זו.

ג-6. לקידום תהליך ושלום ובנוסף לפיתוח כלכלית אזורי והטיית פיתוח מקורות פרנסה ותשתית משקית לקהילה הפלסטינית ותקדם בו זמנית שיתוף פעולה כלכלי, ישראלי-ערבי. התוכנית תיעשה בשיתוף וסיוע של גורמים בינלאומיים.

ג-7. מדינת ישראל רואה בעיר ירושלים את עיר הקודש לעם היהודי ואת בירתה הנצחית. במסגרת הסדר שלום כולל מוכנה ישראל לראות בחלקה המזרחי של העיר מחוז מוניציפלי שינוהל ע"י רשויות עירוניות פלסטיניות. במתכונת כזו תמשיך העיר להיות מאוחדת מבחינה אדמינסטרטיבית כאשר לתושביה היהודים שייכות פוליטית למדינת ישראל ולתושביה הערביים שייכות פוליטית לישות הפלסטינית שתקום.

ק.ע.ב

סמיכה של ועדה מדינית
על תום "שלום".

← הפגישה תתקיים ביום ב- 15.4 בשעה 18:00.

← על הנוכחים לשוב ולהדגיש את העמדה הקיצונית, המוטעית, של הנשיאה, בכל הקשר ראיון שיתקיים באלו.

← דר. ען בונה/והדפיס מיד אחרי כך.

← הוגשה הטיוטה על בסיס מעמו של דר. ען בעניין הסוכנות ויש לקוות שזו תועבר.

← המבוי של דר. בניה היתה כבר בשוק.

← בנוגע לסעיף ב: אחרונה ברשימה, עדנו הנאמר ברשימה:

1. בסעיף ב-2 בשורה האחרונה לשאול במילה "בישוב", ובשלום ראוי להחליף ב"שלטה המתאימה". יש גם אופן בינלי להבהיר את מהות המושג "מיושב פלסטיני אבל שלו", והחלפה כי יש מקום לומר כי "מישב פלסטיני אבל"

2. אריה מבונק בינלי להחליף את המושג "אזור שבשלט" ב"מפלגת הקבוצה". ובלבד כי נשלה. עולם החלפה ראוי לשקול את הביטוי ב"מכירה" "מוקה" וגם בקשר במשפט הזה, ב"בתי להבהיר", "מעשה להביר" וכו'.

4. ההחלפה לאופן לסעיף ב-3 נשמע לי שאין שאין אזכרה מכירה בשכונה אלא בכל יום כאזכרה בה אריה מבונק "נסח משפט ברוח כזאת.

4. סעיף ב-4, להחליף "שלום תמורת שלום"
במלים "שטחים תמורת שלום".

5. במלים סעיף הנדון להחליף את "ל-ה-ג-ה"
במלים פרטניות יותר כ"יישובים ובשטחים".

6. במלים סעיף הנדון להיכנס לניסוח ה~~ב~~קבוע
להסדר שלום את שניהם וכולל

7. סעיף ב-ס: הוחלט להחליף את הניסוח "צבא
ישראל" ב: "כוחות ה-ג-ה ישראליים" מאחר כוונה
לכוחות אחרים על פי ה-ג-ה.
~~שלישית, הנדון להפיל את הסעיף כולו, אך להחליפו~~
~~בנוסח סעיף על הענין כדאמריקה בקובץ.~~

8. בסעיף ג-1: היתה הצעה לנסח מחדש את ~~ה~~
הצרה רחב הנדון. בהמשך, הנציגים הסכימו שיש
שלוש מטרות מרכזיות בסיכלוק"ם 1. בניה אחד 2.
הגיבה הדדית. 3. מניעת פלישות ישראליות.
הניסוח הסופי של ג-1 שזה היה לדעתו מוסכם
ורצוי כבסיס לעבודה.

9. סעיף ג-2: להחליף את "בכל אזורי" בקובץ ל"
פלסטינים".

10. סעיף ג-3: שאיר בינתיים לראות שאי אפשר להגיע
לפשרה-סיפוק, אזי יהיה אחד מצדדים, אולי רק אחד
מהצדדים, להודיע רשמית. שאזי הנושאים בינתיים יהיו
את הסעיף, אם כי אולי לשקול את הניסוח, ולפצל במפורש
לשני חלקים.

11. שאיר את מנגנון סעיף ג-4.

12. סעיף ג-5: היו מוכנים להסתפק בעיקרון של הבטחת/
קבלת הודעות בינלאומיות בכתב. ארה"ב ואולי גם
בריטניה רצו את הסעיף. הוחלט להשאיר את הסעיף
כמו שהוא כרגע.

כז. סעיף ד-ט הינם כשגיאה.

כח. סעיף ד-ה: שגיאה מאחר שאלה בירושלים ע"י שלומציון. כן כלה בירושלים אך מחסום פסיכולוג, וגיס שלומציון, כפי שמוזכר שהוא מכיר כבר (אף אז בעיקר הדגיש בניו שעליהם להודיע.

הוקשה - מניה מקשר ראשון: איך לדעת מהי נידון לכאן?

זן. הדין שם ואם יחשב על המעיד לקבל הגישה המהירה.

כג'ילי הבן

ב' 15/4/4

ציון: 100

בהצלחה בבחינה

THE SARPSBORG DOCUMENT March 18, 1993

Negotiating Concept

It is suggested that full agreement will be achieved in Sarpsborg regarding the concept of a mutually envisaged Israeli-Palestinian understanding. Having achieved this, the Sarpsborg backchannel will be maintained in order to assist progress in negotiations.

The Principles of a First Israeli-Palestinian Understanding

Israeli-Palestinian negotiations will concentrate on achieving agreement in regard to three documents: A DoP (Declaration of Principles), a CWP (Cooperation and Working Programme) and Guidelines for a REDP (Regional Economic Development Plan).

I. Draft for DoP (Declaration of Principles)

1. The aim of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations is to obtain agreement regarding arrangements for establishing a Palestinian Self-Governing Authority, the Palestinian Interim Council, for a period leading to a permanent settlement based on Resolutions 242 and 338.

It is understood that the interim arrangements are an integral part of the whole process leading to the implementation of 242 and 338.

2. In order that the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza may govern themselves according to democratic principles direct, free and general political elections would be held three months after the signing of this DoP. Agreement on the exact mode and conditions of elections, will be achieved, not later than one month before elections.

3. The elections for the establishment of the Palestinian Interim Council will constitute a significant interim preparatory step towads the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.

4. The jurisdiction of the Palestinian Interim Council will cover control over land, as mutually agreed upon.

5. Immediately after the signing of the DoP a transfer of authority from the Israeli military government and the Israeli Civil Administration to the Palestinians and such committees that will be appointed by the Palestinian representatives, will start.

The transfer of authority to the Palestinian committees will be of temporary and preparatory nature and will include Palestinian control over taxation, tourism, education, health and social welfare, as well as other agreed upon spheres.

6. In order to guarantee optimal economic development and growth, immediately with the signing of this DoP, a Palestinian Land Committee and a Palestinian Water Administration Committee will be established.

The Palestinian Land Committee and the Palestinian Water Administration Committee will be given immediate powers as mutually agreed upon. A coordinated land and water resources development plan will be negotiated between the Palestinian Land Committee and the Palestinian Water Administration Committee on the one, and the Government of Israel on the other side.

7. In order to guarantee optimal security arrangements for the Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Palestinian Interim Council will establish a strong police force, responsible for internal security and public order.

Preparatory steps, necessary for the establishment of the Palestinian police force, will be taken immediately (after the signing of the DoP), in liaison with the Palestinians, Israel, Egypt and Jordan.

8. In order to enable the Interim Self-Government Authority, the Palestinian Interim Council, to promote economic growth, several institutions will be established at the time of its inauguration, such as: a Palestinian Land Authority, a Palestinian Water Administration Authority, a Palestinian Electricity Authority, a Gaza Sea Port Authority, a Palestinian Development Bank, a Palestinian Export Promotion Board and an Environmental Authority.

The Palestinian committees will negotiate with the Government of Israel, the necessary relevant agreements for these institutions.

9. The Palestinian Interim Council will be empowered to legislate for all the authorities that are mutually agreed upon. Both parties will reassess jointly all laws and military orders presently in force.

10. An Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee will be established and will deal with all issues of dispute and

common interest. Agreements on cooperation and liaison will be negotiated and implemented on the professional levels in order to provide for security and mutual understanding between both parties.

11. Further liaison and cooperation arrangements will be negotiated and agreed upon between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority on one hand and the Governments of Jordan and Egypt on the other hand.

12. Immediately after signing the DoP the transitional period of five years will begin. As soon as possible, but not later than the beginning of the third year, negotiations will take place to determine the final status of the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip and its relationship with its neighbours.

13. After the signing of the DoP, Israeli-Palestinian negotiations on the redeployment of Israeli military forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will start. A first redeployment of forces will be carried out on the eve of elections for the Palestinian Interim Council.

Further redeployments will be gradually implemented in line with the introduction of other security measures.

At the end of the second year of the interim-period, Israeli military forces will withdraw completely from Gaza, in the spirit of partial implementation of 242 and 338. The Israeli withdrawal will be fully coordinated with the Palestinian Interim Council.

After the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza a trusteeship will be established, as to be agreed upon between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority.

(14. After Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, joint Israeli-Palestinian development projects will be established and promoted in the locations of present Israeli settlements.)

15. The Israeli and the Palestinian delegations will negotiate an Interim-Agreement that will specify the mechanisms and substance of the envisaged transfer of authority.

During the transitional period, representatives of Israel and the Palestinian Interim Council may decide by agreement to seek arbitration. The conditions for arbitration will then have to be fully and mutually agreed upon.

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February 28, 1993

From: Yair Hirschfeld

to: Shimon Peres

via: Yossi Beilin

1. On Friday, February 26, I got a phone-call from Hanan Ashrawi asking me urgently to come to see her and Faisal. Accordingly, two meetings with them took place, yesterday; one in Ramallah with Faisal and Hanan, and a second one in Jerusalem, only with Faisal. (see the enclosed report on these two meetings).

2. The Palestinian requests and concessions for the proposed four-point package deal are a very clear response to the last meeting Faisal and Ziyyad had with you on Sunday, February 21, 1993.

3. Faisal still has to reconfirm the Palestinian acceptance of the idea that the Four-Point Package Deal will be negotiated confidentially, without a public Israeli announcement pledging not to enact further deportations.

In case Faisal will - against his own judgement - insist on a public Israeli statement, I would recommend to suspend talks with them and announce unilaterally the date for the renewal of bilateral negotiations.

4. Faisal and Hanan expect, to hear from me, or from the Americans, that the principles for the suggested Four-Point Package Deal, are acceptable. Hereby, the official channels would gain about two weeks time, to work out the details of the package deal. Thereafter, it would be extremly useful, if the package deal could be finally put together in another meeting between yourself and Faisal. At such a meeting acceptable conditions for having elections, as soon as possible should also be discussed.

5. Agreement on principle on the package deal, will enable us also, to arrange meetings for preparing a coordinated Israeli-Palestinian approach for promoting various multilateral issues.

6. If I would be permitted to go to Washington at the later part of the next bilateral round of negotiations, we would create an effective back-channel.

(2 enclosures)

Summary Report on Meeting with Faisal and Hanan (February 27, 8.oo - 10.oo a.m. and with Faisal, 12.30 - 12.50).

1. It is proposed that no further declarations will be made: the Government of Israel will not be asked to make a statement, regarding its determination to refrain from further deportations. The Palestinians will not make a statement that they will attend negotiations in Washington on April 19, 1993. Yet, the Palestinians will understand that the GoI does not intend to carry out further deportations; whereas Israel (the United States, Syria, Jordan and Egypt) will understand that the Palestinians will attend negotiations in April, in Washington.

2. Instead of a declaration, the GoI and the Palestinians will prepare a package deal. The following components of this package deal shall be agreed upon:

a. In return for a confidential Israeli pledge not to carry out further deportations, the Palestinians will enter confidential talks with the GoI, as of how, to stop the use of violence against Israeli and Palestinian targets. Faisal and Hanan referred specifically to their intention to work out a stage by stage deal with the Black Panthers that will at first bring about an obligation for a prolonged "ceasefire", and will be followed by movement towards dissolving the Black Panther organisation both in rural and urban areas.

b. In line with the implementation of UN SC Resolution 799 a re-scheduling of the return of the Hamas deportees should be agreed upon. Specifically, Faisal and Hanan suggested that the Israeli "Re-examining the Cases Committee" (waadat habdika) shall announce on radio and tv the names of those, who are allowed to return at once, referring every day - again in the mass media - to the names of two or three. This way, the pressure upon the families of the deportees would be increased. Faisal and Hanan hope that all deportees will be permitted to return by the end of the summer. They have also suggested (half jokingly, half seriously) that the returned deportees should be arrested and isolated.

c. To counter-balance the Hamas, a list of PLO deportees, deported since 1967 permitted to return will be announced. Also here they ask that the people permitted to return shall come back in stages. At first twenty, then again twenty, and then smaller numbers. Care shall be taken to guarantee that those permitted to return will cover all areas: cities, villages and refugee camps. Specifically the request was made, to permit former heads of Student Councils to return. I shall get a list of proposed names in the coming days. For the Ramallah area they mentioned already some names: Akram Haniye, Taysir Aruri, Azmi Shuabi, Marvan Barghuti,

Samir Sbehat, Hana Nasr, Alfred Tubassi and Abdel Jawad Saleh.

d. Finally, they asked for various CBM's. (see: enclosed ten point list, written by Hanan).

3. When negotiations start in mid-April efforts should be directed at reaching a quick understanding on elections. And the elections should be held as soon as possible thereafter. (Evidently, the four-point package deal should be built in such a way, as to prepare the public atmosphere for elections).

4. In Washington it would be important to create a backchannel mechanism, that could assist in overcoming difficulties.

5. Hanan complained bitterly about Martin Indyk, who leaked a conversation with her to the press and had claimed that Secretary of State Christopher had called the PLO a "terrorist organisation".

Feb. 27, '93

Human Rights:

1. Prisoner release:
   Over 50 yrs. old, below 17 yrs. old, women, health reasons, length of sentence (20 yrs.), Administrative detainees
   - Closure of Ketziot

2. Lifting economic restrictions - reducing taxes, cancelling fines + fees, investments (opportunities, encouragements

3. Family reunification - in categories: esp. returnees from Kuwait + Gulf, 1st. degree relatives, el

4. Immediate halt to house demolition

5. "Undercover/special units" - disbanding. Halt to summary executions

6. End use of live ammunition agnst unarmed civilians

7. Removal of fences, barrels, + other barriers from refugee camps - Opening blocked roads

8. Unsealing sealed homes

9. Ending collective punishments - curfews, etc.

10. Ending tree-uprooting

Y.H.
February 26, 1993

PLAN AND TIMETABLE FOR (US-PROPOSED)(?) ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN NEGOTIATIONS

I. Agreeing on the Negotiating Concept

At the forthcoming visit of PM Rabin to Washington and his meeting with President Clinton, the concept, the aims and the timetable of a negotiating plan should be discussed and agreed upon:

1. The Concept

An enhanced American involvement in the negotiating process should be achieved by combining ongoing bilateral and multilateral negotiations with an American shuttle diplomacy effort, to be carried out in stages. (see below: timetable).

2. The Aims of Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations

The US-Government will suggest to Israel and the Palestinians to concentrate negotiations on achieving the following aims:

a. agreement on a DoP (Declaration of Principles); a CWP (a Cooperation and Working Programme); and Guidelines for an internationally supported REDP (Regional Economic Development Programme);

b. agreement on immediate transfer of authority (after signing the DoP, CWP and Guidelines) in the spheres of: taxation, tourism, education, health and social welfare;

c. agreement on elections to a PIC (Palestinian Interim Council), to be held three months after signing the DoP;

d. full Israeli, Palestinian and international support for a PEDP (Palestinian Economic Development Programme) which will be closely interconnected with a REDP (Regional Economic Development Programme);

e. Israeli obligation in principle to withdraw from the Gaza Strip at the end of the second year of the interim-period;

f. Agreement on a mutually agreed upon trusteeship for the Gaza Strip (after Israeli withdrawal), for the time, final status negotiations will last.

3. A Timetable for Negotiations

a. The First Stage of the US Shuttle Diplomacy Effort:

proposed date: 28 March 1993

goal: obtain agreement on the aims of the proposed negotiating concept;

get all sides to work:

Israeli and Palestinian delegations will be asked to prepare:

i. Proposal for Immediate Transfer of Authority (in spheres specified above);
ii. Proposal for Elections;
iii. Proposal for establishment of police force;
iv. Proposal for Israeli-Palestinian CWP (both on the bi- and the multilateral levels).

US-AID, the World Bank, the Commission of the European Communities will be asked to prepare:

i. Guidelines for a Regional Economic Development Programme.

b) Renewing Bilateral Negotiations in Washington

proposed date: April 19, until May 7, 1993 (the 9th round)

proposals described under 3) a) i, ii, iii and iv shall be negotiated.

c. The Second Stage of the US Shuttle Diplomacy Effort

proposed date: May 10, 1993

goal: obtain a first agreement on most of the details of the proposed DoP, CWP and Guidelines for REDP;

get all sides to work:

Israeli and Palestinians to prepare proposals for

i. a Land and Water Resources Development Plan;
ii. rights and obligations of Palestinian

institutions: a Palestinian Land Authority,
a Palestinian Water Administration Authority,
a Palestinian Electricity Authority,
a Palestinian Development Bank,
a Palestinian Export Promotion Board and
an Environmental Authority;

iii. proposal resulting from review of existing rules and regulations, defining the legal rights of the PIC;

iv. proposal for liaison mechanisms;

v. proposal for redeployment of military forces for elections.

d. Multilateral Negotiations
should be intensified;

Water: April 24, and possibly again May 31,
prepare international support for water and land development projects;

Refugees: May 12;
prepare a Social Rehabilitation Programme;

(Security) and Economic Development: May 18;
prepare international support for the PEDP and the REDP;

Environment: May 31.
prepare international support for agreed upon projects;

e. Returning to Bilateral Negotiations (Washington)
the 10 th Round

proposed date: May 31 - June 18, 1993

aim: negotiate proposals submitted under 3) c) i. ii. iii. iv and v.

f. The Third Stage of the US Shuttle Diplomacy Effort

proposed date: June 20, 1993

goal: finalise negotiations on DoP, CWP and Guidelines for REDP;
(agreement should optimally be achieved on June 23, 1993).

only
Message for
Herchfeld 1 PM

Minutes for the meeting

with

SP

Date: 21/2/1993

Time: 2:20pm

Present: Yosi Beilin, Yair Herchfeld, SP' staff.

Palestinians: Faisal Husseini, Ziad Abu Zayyad

Minutes: Oreint House Staffer

FH: When is your meeting with Christopher, 22 or 23?

SP: I will take him from the airport, talk briefly, but main talks the next day. I met him for an hour in Washington. On his team he has many people that are knowledgeable, like Sam Lewis. Wisner with Les Aspin. You have the old hands, Dennis is a consultant. They told in Washington that have 4 basic priorities in their policies:

1- Keep regions of the World away from flaming up.
2- Stop the proliferation of non-conventional arms.
3- In the former Soviet Republics nobody feels settled.
4- Economy and strength of the US.

Clinton devoted himself to economic issues. He will eventually get down to International issues. It is an administration with old hands. Some appointments include people from the previous generation. They have agreements with the Europeans on the Bosnia plan. In return the Us asked the Europeans to be helped in the UNSC with the deportation issue. They told me that previously they had enemies, but now they have problems. Everything should be done to return you to the negotiating table. Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, they ready to return, and the issue of deportation is no longer an issue in the UNSC. To bring them back this is the issue.

FH: First, I would like to convey a message from President Arafat. I put the question to him, if another meeting will help, he said yes to go ahead to continue, but they should be secret.

SP: We understand that, I do not how it was leaked. I only told the press that we met before and I will be ready to meet in the future.

FH: The Message:

" We are concerned about the peace process, our commitment is so strong. It is important for us, for the region, it is not only the shape of the new world that can help us, we also can help the new world order. As far as we are enemies, but in this peace process there is a partnership, so do not make more problems for both of us. (Your credibility and our credibility are linked, if our credibility is hurt, this hurts the peace process, and in turn your credibility among your people. Things can come to concrete steps. Both of us are not completely free to do steps exclusively without consideration of the other side)".

Situation created in the last event of the deportation, it put us in a difficult situation. Finding a way out is important. Before coming and reaching a conclusion we were in Washington DC, we were thinking that such a thing was supposed to be discussed at least.

FH: When this problem will be solved, things like this should discussed.

Concerning the situation now, we would like to see a move which can take all of us out of this situation, if we need more than one meeting with you, I have instructions to meet more, especially for the visit of Mr. Christopher, even for more meetings in the future if it may help.

Whole reaction concerning the PLO, in the same time we were looking positively about repeal of the PLO law. We could not understand why you were sharp and strong in your criticism of Yael Dayan. This is one of the questions that I was asked to put to you in Tunis. Is the PLO a taboo, what, such relations can hurt. In the end what can push whole negotiations and kill suspicions can come through direct meetings.

About the situation:

Security: We believe until now, the solution suggested by you and the Americans cannot bring us to the negotiations table. The main problem with us is not the numbers, it is the principle. In you letter to the UNSC, you said: You are going to let go of 101 deportees, but those who are still under order of deportation, their time will be reduced. The principle of deportation is still there and existing.

Rabin is continuing to say that deportation is a right that can be used in the future.

Every people have their own disaster, each people believe this his own disaster or holocaust is the maximum. Deportation is

the most sensitive issue to us. It is our holocaust, imagine if something from your holocaust is being used against you now.

Without touching the principle of deportation, it will not be used in the future. We will be in a very difficult situation to continue negotiations.

If Israel is not applying the UNSC 799, we believe the whole peace process is built on the UNSC resolutions, if these resolutions are not being respected at the highest level or degree, then it will strip us of any basis in these negotiations.

It is we who are under occupation, rules of this particular game is different from the rules of another game. I hope I am not wrong. We will feel unable to go on. The negotiations in vietnam were done while both sides were still fighting each other. We are not in a position to tell our forces in Jenin to so something. But in the negotiations, we and the Israelis are equals, and such the basis, the rules for this process are the letter of invitation and the UNSC resolutions.

SP: This deportation was a very large one, it was different from any other deportation. Originally it was just for two years. It was a limited deportation. Each one of them has the right to appeal. According to decision of the supreme court we have to reach to a period of appeals. Even if they do not appeal, I believe the government is going to do it anyhow.

You what created the problems is the Lebanese government, their refusal to let them in. **Any way we have said that we shall declare that deportation is not our policy and what has happened is an exception to the policy. <u>That is a far reaching statement, we are close to make it a formal declaration</u>.**

I do not believe that this (Deportation) will happen in the future. The government will not say it. It will make it appear as if the deportation act was illegal.

YB: It does not mean that it will use it.

SP: The government went on with a compromise on our decision, by letting 101 come back and the reducing the duration for the rest by half.

We cannot, and you should not make Hamas as the winning party from the whole thing. Hamas wants to become a master of all policies. It is our policy or consideration not to make Hamas more strong.

If we have tp put a condition before the Palestinians: No

negotiations unless all acts of terror are stopped. We cannot declare no more acts of counter-terror on our part, unilaterally.

An agreement: You will declare no more acts of terror, then we shall declare no more acts of counter terrorism. As long as you do not declare that you will stop terror what can we do. Can you make condemnation of any act even physical terror (throwing stones even), then I will make declaration.

I went a long way formalizing that deportation is not policy. You should be satisfied. We can make it formal, I only said it across the media.

FH: I am only asking you to stop doing something which I am ready to do. If some of your people do something without your control, we will not take it as intentional, we have the same thing.

SP: You can say that you condemn any act of terror, of violence and throwing stones.

FH: The stones are different.

SP: Be the real Ghandi, no more violence, nobody likes stones or knives.

ZAZ: We are not in a position of making conditions to go back to the negotiations. We can say this (end violence) but some people will not accept it. People who believe that they have a right to resist, acts on individual basis, we cannot have a 100% od obedience.

SP: Your movement can say that.

ZAZ: We signed many statements here in Jerusalem condemning violence.

SP: Including stones.

ZAZ: Details get you nowhere.

Before deportation happened Hamas was exaggerating their force or presence on the ground. After deportation those who led the campaign against the deportation were the nationalist stream. Most people in Hamas recognize that it was the nationalist that led the campaign against deportation.

Now they realize presence of umbrella, nationalist umbrella and the recognize that they are under umbrella.

The general feeling in jails, is that the PLO is real

leadership, without the PLO the deportees would have been neglected.

Any positive development on deportation, I believe the credit will be for the nationalists. If they are brought back because of nationalist interventions, the credit will go to the nationalists. If they remain outside, they will be heros and the martyrs.

SP: If this happens, they will claim the credit.

Hamas killed last week some our people, their is a genuine feeling of anger.

If Arafat is the president of all palestinians, surely he can put an end to terror. We know that the delegation is in contact with whoever, we are not moving much ahead.

ZAZ: We want not to legitimize the principle of deportation.

Mr. Rabin on TV mentioned one achievement: how important is the fact that Palestinians are now aware that there will be a compromise on 242. (similar to 799)

YB: He said that?

ZAZ: He said: look how panicked are the Palestinians, this is an example for the future.

SP: This can be clarified.

YB: After years of Likud, Palestinians think and suspect that we will compromise on 242.

SP: This can be clarified.

FH: Can you say you are accepting 799 and you will reschedule return of people without relating it to the two years order. Maybe you can work something as far as negotiations are going, that you are not going to use deportation matter.

SP: We can say compromise is in consistent with 799. Scheduling of return will be prompted up due to individual cases. We ourselves are going to review the cases.

FH: Say: that due to security and logistical needs "we shall reschedule their return".

SP: We will review their schedule.

FH: Because of security needs you will review, but for others you will reschedule.

SP: Americans and us, we reached an agreement, that is binding. Deportation will not and is not our policy, but it is the exception. As long as you have exceptions (violence).

You know what is the problem with the PLO. In some cases, some acts of terror are ordered and executed by the PLO. We have more than the evidence of it.

What is overshadowing you and us is the terror.

Hamas did something terrible, public opinion is telling us: whom are you talking to now. You have told that Hamas activists are resorting back to your wings.

ZAZ: You have small hard core supporters of Hamas, and a wide circle of supporters, it is this wide circle that are feeling grateful for the nationalists.

FH: We are gaining them back. They are like students, they are good students, but they are waiting for the exam.

SP: You should be the professor.

YB: We owe you an answer about Yael Dayan.

FH: before that, in this peace process, we are tied to each other, by a robe, we were standing under a tree, deportation act brought me and you on top of the tree. The Americans put a ladder for you to come down.

SP: And you!

FH: No-I need a ladder, I can not jump, I am sitting refusing to come down. If you want to come you will have to bring me down with you or cut the robe. The rope here is the Peace Process.

We are in need of a such a ladder, in certain period through negotiations you should be rescheduling return of people, this order allows me to tell my people: look we are in a peace negotiations, it has certain rules, we have to respect its rules, even the Israelis are respecting rules, then I can tell my people to stop 1,2,3.

YB: We do not have to say that we stop the deportation through the peace process??. It is our policy to freeze such actions for a while, some action was done because of a wave of terrorism, we acted. In the future we do not have to do it.

On Yael: what was our argument, they said that you are now talking to the PLO. To convince others to support this, we needed some time, she should waited a little bit, she was

rushing there as if she was having political negotiations without authorization. We supported here outdoors, but she did this pre-maturely.

SP: The party which is actually doing the negotiations cannot have people negotiating our negotiations.

***

Now if we reach a situation where there is no linkage between the negotiations and the deportations we can look into issuing or clarifying the following points:

1- Israel does not intend to violate UN resolutions. Except some idiotic resolutions by the UN.

interruption:

FH: Not UN, you mean no violations of UNSC resolutions.

SP: Time table will be reviewed anyway, you will say: Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, that there is no linkage. In return those 3 points will be clarified.

Syria and Lebanon will not link, that will not be good for you.

Let me mention again the 3 points:

1- Deportation is not a policy (I can also try to add: Whoever does not support violence will not face deportation).

2- No violations of 242 (UNSC resolutions)

3- Review of the schedule will continue.

The minute you make a linkage, an ultimatum, no government will accept it. When the government feels that the SC is no longer insisting.

ZAZ: Linkage is not an ultimatum, make it easier for us to go in negotiations. We need more relaxation on your positions to make easier for us to go on.

SP: Review of all deportees-old and fresh.

Permit some old deportees to come back (previous ones)

FH: Practical things, I believe it is a good idea. There should something real about returning the deportees.

SP: Suppose, make out this:

- **No linkage**
- **Deportation not policy, the exception.**
- **Review of old and new.**
- **"Israel will not respect UNSC resolutions" is not correct.**

Some UN resolutions, they are absurd: every year the UN decides to pay compensation for nuclear reactor bombardment in Iraq. Distinguish between basic resolutions that we have accepted and funny resolutions that we rejected.

ZAZ: It was very difficult for us to make you apply 242 on the West Bank.

SP: You must let your people see that you are winning. We stopped the settlements, the subsidies, your d

February 18, 1993

From: Yair Hirschfeld

to: Yossi Beilin

Yair - suggestion shown to Peres p.2

(in continuation of report of February 13, 1993)

1. Evaluation of the Sarpsborg Proposals

1. The proposals made at Sarpsborg indicate that the Palestinian leadership is today determined (and desperate) to reach a breakthrough agreement with Israel. On February 15, the Norwegians were informed that the PLO leadership had approved the document (DoP, CWP and Guidelines); reiterated that they were prepared to show further flexibility, asking for flexibility on the Israeli side, too; indicating that an understanding should be achieved before the official renewal of negotiations.

2. The proposed agreement offers Israel immediately important tactical gains:

a. substance has been given for an American shuttle diplomacy effort, enabling the G.o.I and the American mediators not to be solely dependent upon Syrian good will;
b. Progress on both the Syrian and Palestinian front, at the same time, may enforce Assad to accept a geographical compromise on the Golan, which otherwise would be completely unattainable;
c. the Sarpsborg proposal permits movement towards an immediate (provisional) transfer of authority, and towards the organisation of elections in the West Bank and Gaza;
d. a strong and forceful impetus will be given to the multilateral negotiations.

3. The proposed agreement offers Israel important long-term strategic gains:

a. The present pattern of Israeli control by military means will be replaced by an agreed upon pattern of Israeli-Palestinian cooperation in all spheres of life (security, administration, economic affairs, social welfare, education);
b. Israel will be granted a leading role in promoting the reconstruction of the Palestinian economy;
c. immediate steps will be taken to promote regional cooperation;
d. Israel's obligation to withdraw from Gaza, with no similar obligation regarding the West Bank, will strengthen Israel's position at the final status negotiations.

II. Proposed Next Steps

1. Informing the PM

a. The PM should be asked tosupport an American shuttle-diplomacy effort, between Israel and Syria on one hand, between Israel and the Palestinian leadership (Faisal and Hanan) on the other hand.

b. The principles for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations will be:

i. agreement on immediate transfer of authority in the spheres of: taxation, tourism, education, health and social welfare.

ii. agreement on elections.

iii. full Israeli (and international) support for a PEDP (Palestinian Economic Development Programme), which will be closely interconnected with a REDP (Regional Economic Development Programme)

iv. agreement on an Israeli-Palestinian CWP (see Draft of CWP) and guidelines for a Marshall-Plan.

v. Agreement that rights and responsbilities of the PIC (Palestinian Interim Council) and other self-government institutions, will be adapted to the needs prescribed by the Israeli-Palestinian CWP.

vi. Israeli obligation in principle to withdraw from the Gaza Strip at the end of the second year, of the interim-period.

2. Agree on a Division of Work with the PM:

a. The PM's Office will prepare:
a plan for an immediate transfer of authority in taxation, tourism, education, health and social welfare;
a plan for elections;
a plan for the establishment of a Palestinian police force;
a concept defining Palestinian secondary legislative powers and Israeli-Palestinian cooperation in matters related to legislation;
a concept for Israeli-Palestinian liaison;
a concept for proposed abitrational procedures.

b. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (and/or ECF) will prepare:

a regional water development plan;
a regional electricity and energy development plan;
a concept for the establishment of a MEDF and a Palestinian Development Bank;
a regional transport and trade development plan;
an industrial cooperation programme;
a regional human resources programme;
all to be seen as basis for negotiating the Israeli-Palestinian CWP.

c. The Histadruth will prepare:

a CWP for improving labour relations;
a human resources development programme
and a concept for the improvement of social welfare benefits.

3. Inform the Americans

a. on the top political level.

b. on the working level.

c. the Norwegian Government is interested to raise the results of the Sarpsborg meeting in their contacts with the US Government. The proposal is that the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs will informally address Warren Christopher on the issue, on February 25, in a forthcoming meeting in Brussels. (the Palestinians have specifically asked the Norwegians to do so).

The Norwegians have pledged to act only in a manner that will be mutually agreed upon by both sides. Hence, we may prepare very clear and detailed instructions, or ask them to refrain from one or the other move.

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VERSION 4

Feb. 12, 1993

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The Principles of an Israeli-Palestinian Negotiating Plan

Israeli-Palestinian negotiations will concentrate on achieving agreement in regard to three documents: A DoP [Declaration of Principles], a CWP [Cooperation and Working Programme] and Guidelines for a Marshall-Plan.

I. Draft for DoP (Declaration of Principles):

1. The aim of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations is to obtain agreement regarding arrangements for establishing a Palestinian Interim Self-Governing Authority, the elected Palestinian Interim Council, for a period leading to a permanent settlement based on Resolutions 242 and 338.

PAL. (It is understood that the interim arrangements are an integral part of the whole process leading to the implementation of 242 and 338.)

2. In order that the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza may govern themselves according to democratic principles, direct, free and general political elections, (under international supervision) ¤(in which all Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza, as registered in the population register on the fourth of June 1967, would participate)¤ would be held three to six months after the signing of this DoP.

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3. The elections for the establishment of the Palestinian Interim Council will constitute a significant interim preparatory step towards the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.

¤ (4.The jurisdiction of the Palestinian Interim Council will cover the Palestinian territories occupied in 1967. Any administrative exception hereto should be discussed during negotiations, stipulated these exceptions should not prejudice UN Resolutions 242 and 338 and the principles of international law.)¤
(this paragraph has not been accepted by the Israeli side).

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(4. The jurisdiction of the Palestinian Interim Council will cover control over land, as mutually agreed upon.)
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5. Immediately after the signing of this DoP a transfer of authority from the Israeli military government and the Israeli Civil Administration to the Palestinians and such committees that will be appointed by the Palestinian representatives, will start.

The transfer of authority to the Palestinian committees will be of temporary and preparatory nature and will include Palestinian control over taxation, tourism, education, health and social welfare, as well as other agreed upon spheres.

6. In order to guarantee optimal economic development and growth, immediately with the signing of this DoP, a Palestinian Land Committee and a Palestinian Water Administration Committee will be established.

The Palestinian Land Committee and the Palestinian Water Administration Committee will be given immediate powers as mutually agreed upon. A coordinated land and water resources development plan will be negotiated between the Palestinian Land Committee and the Palestinian Water Administration Committee on the one, and the Government of Israel on the other side.

7. In order to guarantee optimal security arrangements for the Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Palestinian Interim Council will establish a strong police force, responsible for internal security and public order.

Preparatory steps necessary for the establishment of the Palestinian police force, will be taken immediately [after the signing of this DoP], in liaison with the Palestinians, Israel, Egypt and Jordan. ~~regarding Gaza~~.

8. In order to enable the Interim Self-Government Authority, the Palestinian Interim Council, to promote economic growth, several institutions will be established at the time of its inauguration, such as: a Palestinian Land Authority, a Palestinian Water Administration Authority, a Palestinian Electricity Authority, a Gaza Port Authority, a Palestinian Development Bank, a Palestinian Export Promotion Board and an Environmental Authority.

The Palestinian committees will negotiate with the Government of Israel, the necessary relevant agreements for these institutions.

9. The Palestinian Interim Council will be empowered to legislate for all the authorities that are mutually agreed upon. Both parties will reassess jointly all laws and military orders presently in force.

10. An Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee will be established and will deal with all issues of dispute and common interest.

Agreements on cooperation and liaison will be negotiated and implemented on the professional levels in order to provide for security and mutual understanding between both parties.

11. Further liaison and cooperation arrangements will be negotiated and agreed upon between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority on one hand and the Governments of Jordan and Egypt on the other hand.

12. Immediately after signing the DoP the transitional period of five years will begin. As soon as possible, but not later than the beginning of the third year, negotiations will take place to determine the final status of the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip and its relationship with its neighbours.

13. After the signing of the DoP, Israeli-Palestinian negotiations on the redeployment of Israeli military forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will start. A first redeployment of forces will be carried out on the eve of elections for the Palestinian Interim Council.
Further redeployments will be gradually implemented in line with the introduction of other ¤(agreed upon)¤ security measures.

At the end of the second year of the interim-period, Israeli military forces will withdraw completely from Gaza, in the spirit of partial implementation of 242 and 338. The Israeli withdrawal will be fully coordinated with the Palestinian Interim Council.

After the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza a trusteeship will be established, as agreed upon between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority.

14. The Israeli and the Palestinian delegations will negotiate an Interim-Agreement that will specify the mechanisms and substance of the envisaged transfer of authority.

(During the transitional period, representatives of Israel and the Palestinian Interim Council may decide by agreement to seek arbitration. The conditions for arbiration will then have to be fully and mutually agreed upon.) (Israeli proposed version)

(An arbitration committee will be created to whom all issues of disputes will be submitted, in case no Israeli-Palestinian agreement will have been achieved, otherwise. The committee will include representatives of the co-sponsors of the Madrid

Conference, of Egypt, Jordan and the UN Secretariat, and furthermore a representative from Israel and from the Palestinian Interim Council.) (Palestinian proposed version).

II. Draft for an Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation and Working Programme [CWP]

The Israeli-Palestinian DoP will be accompanied by an agreed upon Israeli-Palestinian CWP. Preparation hereof shall start immediately.

1. Preparation of Israeli-Palestinian CWP

a. Meeting of water engineers and experts, to prepare a joint water development plan and studies and plans on water rights of each party and equitable utilization of joint water resources to be prepared for implementation in the final status.

b. Meeting of electricity and energy experts to prepare a CWP regarding the exploitation of energy resources, to include the construction of oil- and gas pipelines and the establishment of a petrochemical complex in the Gaza Strip.

c. Meeting of financial experts to prepare a blueprint for establishing a Palestinian Development Bank.

d. Meeting of transport and trade experts to prepare a CWP for establishing a greater Gaza Sea Port Area; prepare communication lines to and from Gaza and work out a proposal for organising a free-trade zone in the Gaza-Ashdod area.

e. Meeting of industrialists to prepare a CWP for establishing a joint Israeli-Palestinian car industry in the Gaza Strip and may propose other ideas for joint venture enterprises.

f. Meeting of members of the Israeli and Palestinian trade union movements, to prepare a CWP for improving labour relations and enhancing the provision of social welfare benefits.

g. Meeting of experts on human resources development issues, to prepare a CWP, providing for joint Israeli Palestinian workshops and seminars; the establishment of joint vocational training centers, research institutes and data banks.

h. Meeting of security experts, to prepare studies on regional security issues in all its strategic, comprehensive and future aspects.

2.Preparation of Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian-Egyptian CWP

a. Meeting of electricity experts, to prepare a CWP for interconnecting the Egyptian, Palestinian, Israeli and Jordanian electricity grids;

06 987 309

b. Meeting of financial experts, to prepare a CWP for establishing a Middle East Bank for Reconstruction and Development and/or a Middle Eastern Development Fund;

c. Meeting of transport experts, to prepare a CWP for improving land, air and sea communications in the area.

III. Preparing a Marshall-Plan for the West Bank, Gaza Strip and the Region

The Israeli-Palestinian DoP [Declaration of Principles] and CWP [Cooperation and Working Programme] will be accompanied by a Marshall-Plan Initiative of the G 7 and other OECD member states. The G 7 and other OECD member states participating in the multilateral negotiations, will commit themselves to prepare a Marshall Plan Initiative for the West Bank, Gaza Strip and the Region, which will be implemented after the election and inauguration of the Interim Self-Government Authority, the Palestinian Interim Council. Substantial additional aid will be raised by the Palestinians from Arab states, as well as from existing all-Arab institutions.

The Marshall-Plan Initiative will be composed of two parts: First, a PEDP [Palestinian Economic Development Programme] as a priority, and second a REDP [Regional Economic Development Programme].

1. The PEDP [Palestinian Economic Development Programme]

will be composed of three parts:

a. a Social Rehabilitation Programme;
b. a Small and Medium Business Development Plan, and
c. an Infrastructurue Development Programme [water, electricity, transportation and communication, human resources, financial institutions, etc.]

2. The REDP [Regional Economic Development Programme]

a. Construction of a Mediterranean Sea - Dead Sea Canal, and development of a joint Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian Plan for the coordinated exploitation of the Dead Sea area.

b. Regional Desalination and Power Generating Plant, as well as the interconnection of electricity grids, and the development of regional cooperation for the transfer, distribution and industrial exploitation of gas, oil and other energy resources.

c. Regional Tourism and Transport Development Plan.
d. Regional Cooperation in other spheres as mutually agreed upon.

* VERSION 4

Feb. 12, 1993

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Ramat Yisnai, February 13, 1993

From: Yair Hirschfeld and Ron Pundik
to: Yossi Beilin

Report on two Meetings with a PLO Delegation

Introduction

1. At a seminar on "Human Resources" held at Sarpsborg, Norway, between January 20 and 22, and a second seminar, held on February 11 and 12, 1993 we met a PLO delegation that had arrived from Tunis. The delegation was headed by Abu Ala, (head of Economic Affairs at the PLO and in charge of the multilateral negotiations), who was accompanied by Dr. Maher el-Kurd (Economic Adviser to Chairman Yassir Arafat) and Hassan Azfour (Political Adviser to Abu Mazen).

2. At the second seminar (February 11, 12) the Palestinians stated that they had come with the full authorisation of chairman Arafat, of Abu Mazen and of Faruk Kadumi.

The Proposed Agreement

3. At the first meeting (January 21) we were asked to pass on, the following secret political message:

It was proposed to adopt a "Gaza First" Approach, comprising three components:

a. Israel will agree ahead of time to withdraw from Gaza in "two to three years".
b. A "Mini-Marshall Plan" will immediately be prepared and implemented, in order to alleviate socio-economic problems in Gaza and the West Bank.
c. There will be immediate movement towards the creation of an intense Israeli-Palestinian economic cooperation.

4. At the second meeting (February 11 and 12) a joint paper was produced, including a proposed

a. DoP (Declaration of Principles);
b. an Israeli-Palestinian CWP (Cooperation and Working Programme) and
c. Guidelines for a Marshall-Plan (see enclosure).

5. Agreement was not achieved on four issues: jurisdiction over territory, Jerusalemite participation in elections, arbitration and necessary securities for Israel, in case the necessary detailed agreements will not be achieved. The Palestinians said clearly that they knew they had to make further concessions in these spheres too, but needed herefore legitimisation that could be given to them by American mediation. (between the GoI on one hand, Faisal el-Husseini and Hanan, on the other.)

Procedure and Timetable

6. The proposed procedure and timetable is:
   a. negotiate an understanding in Jerusalem (and possibly also in Washington)
   b. sign the three proposed documents (DoP, CWP and Guidelines);
   c. start a provisional transfer of authority to Palestinian Committees immediately with the signing of the DoP; and intensify further preparatory work, cooperation and negotiations;
   d. start immediately work for the implementation of the CWP and the "Guidelines";
   e. Three to six months after the signing of the DoP there shall be elections for a Palestinian Interim Council (PIC), its inauguration; and the signing of an Interim-Agreement;
   f. At the end of the second year of the interim-period, Israel will withdraw from Gaza; Israeli rule will be replaced by a trusteeship (preferably Egyptian);
   g. Final status negotiations will start at the beginning of the third year of the interim-period.

7. Joint support for a variety of economic cooperation projects has been agreed upon. (see CWP and Guidelines)

Evaluation

7. The Initiative has undoubtedly full Palestinian support, indicating the need of the Palestinian leadership in Tunis to reach as quick as possible a signed agreement.

8. To proceed direct and visible PLO-Tunis participation is not (we repeat: is not) necessary. Interestingly, the demand, to renew the US-PLO Dialogue, made at the first Sarpsborg-Meeting (21 January), was not repeated at the second one (12 February).

Moreover, at the first meeting, we were specifically asked to keep the content of our meeting secret from Faisal el-Husseini and Hanan Ashrawi; at the second meeting, Abu Ala stated that he would ask Faisal el-Husseini to come to Tunis, in the coming days, in order to inform him fully.

9. We were left in no doubt that further Palestinian concessions will be made. The Palestinians were even quite specific about it: they will be prepared to accept the Israeli concept in regard to jurisdiction over land; on Jerusalem the issue would be only related to elections, and

there they would ask for American proposals; also on arbitration they would be prepared to accept compromise formulas. They were less forthcoming in regard to agreeing to a formula that would permit Israel to postpone the transfer of authority.

Other concessions were suggested on two important issues: First, after Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, Israeli settlements could be turned into centers for joint Israeli-Palestinian cooperation projects; (Abu Ala); second, the establishment of a unitary price for water in Israel on one hand, in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip on the other hand, could be viewed as an "equitable" distribution of water resources. (Maher el-Kurd).

10. The proposal represents in our view a very serious attempt to achieve a breakthrough in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and to move towards Israeli demands in four central aspects:

a. Enable Israel to deal with Gaza, separately from the West Bank;
b. enable Israel and the Palestinians to implement immediately regional economic cooperation;
c. promote the political process without referring immediately to all aspects of the permanent settlement; and
d. refrain from demanding (ultimatively) a change of the Madrid formula.

In our opinion the presentation of this proposal signifies an important turning point and indicates preparedness on behalf of the Palestinian leadership in Tunis to recognize the basic political needs of the G.o.I.

11. Certain difficulties still prevail. In case, as expected, an agreement on the proposed DoP, the CWP and the Guidelines, will be achieved, the gap on issues of substance will still remain great and may impede upon the conclusion of an "Interim Agreement".

Necessary Moves ¶12. Seen

12. Full support of the Government of the United States of America is needed mainly for two reasons:

a. take an active role in mediation to bridge the still remaining gap;
b. establish a regional and an international coalition to back the proposed CWP and the Marshall Plan and provide necessary political, financial and technical assistance.

13. Full support of Rabin is needed, although it may be very useful for negotiations with the Palestinians, to demonstrate his aloofness.

We assume that in order to convince Rabin to offer his support it will be necessary, first, to show him, that American political and practical support has been achieved; second, to permit him, to take full credit.

14. The Norwegians are this time fully informed. They may play an important role, in excluding the PLO (Tunis) from negotiations, while keeping them at the same time happy.

Moreover, the Norwegians have offered to finance necessary seed money, to prepare immediately outlines for necessary feasibility studies. Other, additional assistance could also be discussed.

Proposed Further Steps

to be discussed.

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11/2/93

The Principles of an Israeli-Palestinian Negotiating Plan
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Israeli-Palestinian negotiations will concentrate on achieving agreement in regard to three documents: A DoP (Declaration of Principles), a CWP (Cooperation and Working Programme) and Guidelines for a Marshall-Plan.

I. Draft for DoP (Declaration of Principles):

1. The aim of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations is to obtain agreement regarding arrangements for establishing a Palestinian Interim Self-Governing Authority (Body), the elected Palestinian Interim Council, for a period leading to a permanent settlement based on Resolutions 242 and 338.

(It is understood that the interim arrangements are an integral part of the whole process leading to the implementation of 242 and 338.)

2. In order that the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza may govern themselves according to democratic principles, direct, free and general political elections, (under international supervision) (in which all Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza, as on the fourth of June 1967, would participate) would be held six months after the signing of this DoP.

3. The elections for the establishment of the Palestinian Interim Council will constitute a significant interim step towards the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.

4. Immediately after the signing of this DoP a transfer of authority from the Israeli military government and the Israeli Civil Administration to the Palestinians and such committees that will be appointed by the Palestinian delegation, will start.
The transfer of authority to the Palestinian committees will be of temporary and preparatory nature and will include Palestinian control over taxation, tourism, education, health and social welfare, as well as other agreed upon spheres.

5. In order to guarantee optimal economic development and growth, immediately with the signing of this DoP, a Palestinian Land Committee and a Palestinian Water Administration Committee will be established.

The Palestinian Land Committee and the Palestinian Water Administration Committee will be given immediate powers as mutually agreed upon. A coordinated land and water resources development plan will be negotiated between the Palestinian Land Committee, the Palestinian Water Administration Committee on the one, and

6 In order to guarantee optimal security arrangements for the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, the Palestinian Interim Council will establish a strong police force, responsible for internal security and public order.

Preparatory steps, necessary for the establishment of the Palestinian police force, will be taken immediately (after the signing of this DoP), in liaison with the Israeli and Jordanian police forces regarding the West Bank, and in liaison with the Israeli and Egyptian police forces, regarding Gaza.

7. In order to enable the Interim Self-Government Authority, the Palestinian Interim Council, to promote economic growth, several institutions will be established at the time of its inauguration: a Palestinian Land Authority, a Palestinian Water Administration Authority, a Palestinian Electricity Authority, a Gaza Port Authority, a Palestinian Development Bank and a Palestinian Export Promotion Board.

In order to determine the powers, rights and obligations of these institutions, the Palestinian committees will negotiate with the Government of Israel, the necessary relevant agreements.

8. The Palestinian Interim Council will be empowered to legislate for all the authorities that are mutually agreed upon. Both parties will reassess jointly all laws and military orders presently in force.

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An Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee will be established and will deal with all issues of dispute and common interest.

10. Further liaison and cooperation arrangements will be negotiated and agreed upon between the Government of Israel and the Palestinians on one hand and the Governments of Jordan and Egypt on other hand.

(11. Even in case the necessary agreements will not be finalized in time, the elections to the Palestinian Interim Council and its inauguration, shall be held on the agreed upon date. (i.e. six months after the signing of this DoP). In this case, the elected Palestinian Interim Council will continue negotiations with the Government of Israel. Accordingly, the delegation of powers and the transfer of authority, regarding those specific issues that will not have been agreed upon before the date of elections, will be postponed until mutual agreement will have been achieved.)

12. Immediately after signing the DoP the transitional period of five years will begin. As soon as possible, but not later than the

beginning of the third year, negotiations will take place to determine the final status of the West Bank, Jerusalem and Gaza, and its relationship with its neighbours.

13. After the signing of the DoP, Israeli-Palestinian negotiations on the redeployment of Israeli military forces in the West Bank and Gaza will start. A first redployment of forces will be carried out on the eve of elections for the Palestinian Interim Council. Further redeployments will be gradually implemented in line with the introduction of other agreed upon security measures. At the end of the second year of the interim-period, Israeli military forces will withdraw completely from Gaza, in the spirit of partial implementation of 242 and 338

14. After the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza an trusteeship will be established, as agreed upon between the Government of Israel and the Palestinians.

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Agreements on cooperation and liaison will be negotiated and implemented on the professional levels in order to provide for security and mutual understanding between both parties.

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Further redeployments will be gradually implemented in line with the introduction of other ¤(agreed upon)¤ security measures.

At the end of the second year of the interim-period, Israeli military forces will withdraw completely from Gaza, in the spirit of partial implementation of 242 and 338. The Israeli withdrawal will be fully coordinated with the Palestinian Interim Council.

After the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza a trusteeship will be established, as agreed upon between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority.

14. The Israeli and the Palestinian delegations will negotiate an Interim-Agreement that will specify the mechanisms and substance of the envisaged transfer of authority.

(During the transitional period, representatives of Israel and the Palestinian Interim Council may decide by agreement to seek arbitration. The conditions for arbiration will then have to be fully and mutually agreed upon.) (Israeli proposed version)

(An arbitration committee will be created to whom all issues of disputes will be submitted, in case no Israeli-Palestinian agreement will have been achieved, otherwise. The committee will include representatives of the co-sponsors of the Madrid

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II. Draft for an Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation and Working Programme [CWP]

The Israeli-Palestinian DoP will be accompanied by an agreed upon Israeli-Palestinian CWP. Preparation hereof shall start immediately.

1. Preparation of Israeli-Palestinian CWP

a. Meeting of water engineers and experts, to prepare a joint water development plan and studies and plans on water rights of each party and equitable utilization of joint water resources to be prepared for implementation in the final status.

b. Meeting of electricity and energy experts to prepare a CWP regarding the exploitation of energy resources, to include the construction of oil- and gas pipelines and the establishment of a petrochemical complex in the Gaza Strip.

c. Meeting of financial experts to prepare a blueprint for establishing a Palestinian Development Bank.

d. Meeting of transport and trade experts to prepare a CWP for establishing a greater Gaza Sea Port Area; prepare communication lines to and from Gaza and work out a proposal for organising a free-trade zone in the Gaza-Ashdod area.

e. Meeting of industrialists to prepare a CWP for establishing a joint Israeli-Palestinian car industry in the Gaza Strip and may propose other ideas for joint venture enterprises.

f. Meeting of members of the Israeli and Palestinian trade union movements, to prepare a CWP for improving labour relations and enhancing the provision of social welfare benefits.

g. Meeting of experts on human resources development issues, to prepare a CWP, providing for joint Israeli Palestinian workshops and seminars; the establishment of joint vocational training centers, research institutes and data banks.

h. Meeting of security experts, to prepare studies on regional security issues in all its strategic, comprehensive and future aspects.

2.Preparation of Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian-Egyptian CWP

a. Meeting of electricity experts, to prepare a CWP for interconnecting the Egyptian, Palestinian, Israeli and Jordanian electricity grids;

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b. Meeting of financial experts, to prepare a CWP for establishing a Middle East Bank for Reconstruction and Development and/or a Middle Eastern Development Fund;

c. Meeting of transport experts, to prepare a CWP for improving land, air and sea communications in the area.

III. Preparing a Marshall-Plan for the West Bank, Gaza Strip and the Region

The Israeli-Palestinian DoP [Declaration of Principles] and CWP [Cooperation and Working Programme] will be accompanied by a Marshall-Plan Initiative of the G 7 and other OECD member states. The G 7 and other OECD member states participating in the multilateral negotiations, will commit themselves to prepare a Marshall Plan Initiative for the West Bank, Gaza Strip and the Region, which will be implemented after the election and inauguration of the Interim Self-Government Authority, the Palestinian Interim Council. Substantial additional aid will be raised by the Palestinians from Arab states, as well as from existing all-Arab institutions.

The Marshall-Plan Initiative will be composed of two parts: First, a PEDP [Palestinian Economic Development Programme] as a priority, and second a REDP [Regional Economic Development Programme].

1. The PEDP [Palestinian Economic Development Programme]

will be composed of three parts:

a. a Social Rehabilitation Programme;
b. a Small and Medium Business Development Plan, and
c. an Infrastructurue Development Programme [water, electricity, transportation and communication, human resources, financial institutions, etc.]

2. The REDP [Regional Economic Development Programme]

a. Construction of a Mediterranean Sea - Dead Sea Canal, and development of a joint Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian Plan for the coordinated exploitation of the Dead Sea area.

b. Regional Desalination and Power Generating Plant, as well as the interconnection of electricity grids, and the development of regional cooperation for the transfer, distribution and industrial exploitation of gas, oil and other energy resources.

c. Regional Tourism and Transport Development Plan.
d. Regional Cooperation in other spheres as mutually agreed upon.

ד"ר יאיר הירשפלד
ד"ר רון פונדק

4 פברואר 1993

לשכת שר-החוץ - אבי גיל (אישי)
סגן שר החוץ - ד"ר יוסי ביילין (אישי)

ב-3 פברואר 1993 נפגשנו עם פייצל חוסייני, ששב לאחרונה מביקור בעמאן ותוניס, לשיחה בנושאים שונים.
חוסייני, שעמו לא שוחחנו מאז פגישתו השביה עם שר החוץ פרס, פתח את הפגישה בשאלה: מי הדליף לעיתון הארץ את הידיעה אודות פגישתו הראשונה עם שמעון פרס. לדברי חוסייני העובדה שעצם הפגישה הודלפה לתקשורת היתה מאד לא נעימה עבורו, והוא נאלץ לשקר לכתבים ערביים ששאלוהו ישירות בנושא. חוסייני הסכים עמנו שהסערה נמנעה רק מאחר ובאותו יום התפרסם פסק הדין של בג"ץ בענין המגורשים.
לדברי חוסייני אין ספק שההדלפה לא יצאה מחוגים פלסטינים.
אנו סבורים שצריך לבדוק את הנושא לעומק בכדי לסתום את הערוץ ממנו יצאה ההדלפה. אין ספק שהדלפה נוספת עלולה לפגוע באופן משמעותי באמינות הצד הישראלי ובהמשך המגעים החשאים עם הצמרת הפלסטינית.
נבקשך לטפל בנושא.

בברכה

יאיר הירשפלד ורון פונדק

3/2/93

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Action Plan:
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The Principles of a ~~A Gaza-First~~ Israeli-Palestinian Negotiating Plan:
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The Proposed US Diplomatic Initiative
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The US Secretary of State will go to Jerusalem and will submit to the G.o.I. on one hand, and to the Palestinian leadership (Faisal and Hanan) on the other hand, an American draft for a DoP, (Declaration of Principles); an outline of a proposed Israeli-Palestinian CWP (Cooperation and Working Programme), and an outline of a proposed "Marshall-Plan" for Gaza and the region.

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   Interim arrangements must not presage or prejudge the permanent status itself.

2. In order that the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza may govern themselves according to democratic principle free and general political elections will be held nine months after the signing of this DoP.

3. The elections for the establishment of the Interim ~~Self-Government Body, the Palestinian Council~~, will constitute a significant step towards the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.

4. Interim arrangements must take into account the current situation and complexities, which have been created during the last 25 years. Therefore specific agreements, concerning agreed upon areas, will be negotiated, immediately after the signing of this DoP.

5. Immediately after the signing of this DoP a transfer of authority from the Israeli military government and the Israeli Civil Administration to Palestinian technical committees will start.

The transfer of authority to the Palestinian ~~technical committees~~ will be of temporary and preparatory nature and will include Palestinian control over taxation, tourism, education, health and social welfare.

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9. The Israeli and Palestinian delegations express their interest and determination to establish a free-trade zone between Gaza and Ashdod.

10. The Palestinian Council will be empowered to legislate for all the authorities that are mutually agreed upon, ~~and will be delegated to~~ it.
    Self government will remain all laws & military orders in force.

11. In order to allow the Interim Self-Governing Authority, ~~the Palestinian Council~~, to operate in harmony with the G.o.I. agreements on cooperation and liaison will be negotiated in order to provide for security and mutual understanding between the concerned parties.

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12. Further liaison and cooperation arrangements will be negotiated and agreed upon ~~with~~ the Governments of Jordan and Egypt.

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14. ~~When, immediately after elections, the interim self-governing authority (the Palestinian Council) in the West Bank and Gaza is established and inaugurated, the~~ transitional period of five years will begin. As soon as possible, but not later than the ~~third~~ year after ~~the beginning of the transitional period~~, negotiations will take place to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and its relationship with its neighbours.

15. Three years after the inauguration of the elected Palestinian Council, (the interim self-government body) all Israeli forces will withdraw from Gaza. The Gaza Strip will be put under (an Egyptian) trusteeship, which will last until negotiations for a final status settlement will be successfully concluded. Before Israeli withdrawal necessary security arrangements will be implemented as agreed upon.

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Meeting between Shimon Peres, Faisal el-Husseini and Hanan Ashrawi; January 23, 1993
present: Kamal Husseini, Avi Gil, Yair Hirschfeld

Faisal: What is now the situation regarding the deportees?

Shimon: We have two tracks. One is the legal one and it depends on the High Court of Justice. The judges can take three different decisions: First, they can recognized the legality od the departation; second they can declare the illegality of the deportation - in this case the government will respect their decision; and third, they may look for a way inbetween; define several categories od those deported and ask for a differentiated approach to the issue.

The Government has been fully restrained and will not effect the deliberations of the High Court.

On the other hand, there is the political and diplomatic track. There are all kind of suggestions from various parties. Lets for instance say, from France. The idea is that part of the deportees will come back immediately; the time of expulsion of another part of the deportees will be strongly reduced and a third part will be transferred to other countries; to Algeria or France. There, of course, they will be free. This "baby" was born, when Dumas visited Algeria. I don't know what the real position of the Algerian government is. In a way, the succes of the scheme may depend on the Palestinian reaction to the French proposal.

At the beginning there were some favourable reactions of some of the Arab countries; but the problem is that Hamas is strong. In Paris, for instance, they are very strong. They are threatening the life of Ibrahim Sus; he had to run away.

In seeking a solution to the deportee question Israel bears three considerations in mind:
a) the continuation of the peace process;
b) our desire not to bring about a collusion with the United Nations; and
c) our determination to show that Hamas will be the loser. We are afraid that they will be triumphant. This will be very bad for peace.

At the outset of the crisis we were left with no option. They killed many Jews and they threatened to kill the peace process. Therefore strong action had to be taken against them.

Hanan: But the Hamas was strengthened and our people were put in a very bad situation.

Shimon: May be. But you know, Ben Gurion once asked the

question: What can God not do? and the answer is: He cannot change the past.

Hanan: Thus, you expect that a staggered approach will be adopted, and they will come back in different stages?

Shimon: This is the French proposal. If the French will come with a clear cut proposal, we may react to it. We know this tonight or at latest tomorrow.

Faisal: The Algerians have their own problems; they won't create problems for themselves; getting the deportees there would cause all kind of domestic problems (in Algeria).

Shimon: In all the Arab countries there is an Islamic threat; but most of the Arab states want a continuation of the peace process. Tunisia has even offered to host a session of the multilateral working group on refugees.

Also for us it is important that the negotiations start on schedule. I was told that if we start on time, we can continue negotiations into Ramadan; but if we postpone the renewal of negotiations we can not start in Ramadan. We want to keep the momentum.

Faisal: We too, but as long as they are all time in the limelight. (?)

Hanan: Is there any chance that the Yossi Sarid compromise will be implemented?

Shimon: He suggested that the deportees should be returned to the security zone. This proposal was rejected for several reasons: First, we have no legal status there; we cannot detain them; we cannot change decisions there or the like.
Second, Lahat is opposed to it. They may become an immediate target. The Hisbollah may attack.

Faisal: Why? Nobody would want them back into Lebanon.

Shimon: Harari, the Lebanese Prime Minister thinks wrongly that we want to undermine him. Rather on the contrary; we are happy with Harari. He puts economic considerations above everything and he has established Lebanese authority throughout. We are in favour of this.
The French talked to Lahat. He would not listen.

The last time we met, we spoke about CBM's. This weak two important CBM's were taken. The Government cut all the subsidies given to settlers on the West Bank and Gaza. This

decision will have an impact on the flow of people. People will not go there anymore as before.

The second move was done by the Knesseth, changing the law regarding meetings with the PLO. That is important too.

In deciding on a new system for subsidies three categories were established: First, the territories (the West Bank and Gaza) were crossed our for subsidies; second, subsidies will now be given also to Arab villages; many Arab villages are within the districts that will be able to obtain substantial government support; third, geographic criteria have been determined.

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Faisal: You think of "Gaza First"

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Faisal: Assume we accept a scenario, when we take over control for education and finances; our men responsible herefore may be all too easily under attack from both sides. ~~We must find a way...~~

Shimon: Build your own police force. You probably don't remember. Under the British we had the Gaffir, a local jewish police force. Arms and training were provided by the British. You should not be worried. You have to face criticism. You will gain authority. We shall be supporting you, but we will stay unvisible. We understand that have to take certain public positions.

Hanan: What you have been saying is not reflected in the negotiation papers.

Shimon: Give an example.

Hanan: For instance regarding the elections for an interim self-governing body. During negotiations we talked about

the concept and the modalities (of elections). Your side refused to talk about the election modalities, argueing the concept included everything.
Another example, in negotiations our delegation demanded practical steps, such as: reducing the fees at the bridge; tax reductions, family reunion in order to create a better atmosphere. Instead of granting these demands, our delegation was asked to bring individual cases; had the delegation obliged, its members would have been transformed into a kind of new "village league". We need across the board changes.

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Shimon: I was Minister of Defence in 1976; we had elections; there was not the slightest complaint. Elections will be same thing this time. We mean it.

Hanan: The people will have to voice their ideas...

Shimon: We will have to close our ears.

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Shimon: The international press; Barbara Walters is far more effective than Jimmy Carter. We cannot be the police man of Hamas. We want to escape this dilemma.If we hit Hamas, we hit the Palestinians and you have to defend the Hamas. The only way out of this dilemma, is you have to take over. The Palestinian people are prone to democracy.

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Shimon: We agreed to create a human right working group in the bilaterals.

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You have on our side much good will. We are deeply interested in your success. You know, we think also beyond the immediate developments. In life one can easy make an omelette out of eggs, but you cannot make eggs out of an omeletteWe don't want the West Bank to become an omelette. We are not thinking merely in terms of expedience. We want to move ahead. You insisted on 242. We agreed on an interlock. Who will remember all this in a year? You can claim 242 is return of all territories; we shall speak the English version; but you can't expect us to endorse your positions.

Hanan: We need common terms of reference. We need to establish the proper linkage.

Shimon: There is an interlock in time.

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Shimon: It is there.

Hanan: Jerusalem

Shimon: Our party said a proxy vote on Jerusalem would be possible. This was some time ago; but today that question is still open ended.

Hanan: There is the problem, if Jerusalem is not included in practical matters.

Shimon: I will equip myself with my information. Let me have a look at it.

Faisal: Regarding the deportee question. An Israeli declaration, regarding the non applicability of deportation...

Shimon: Do you prefer delcarations to facts? This was a temporary move. We said it is not a policy.

Hanan: Can we have a time frame for negotiations. We have a problem, as our people expected negotiations to last one year, and the year is over.

Shimon: You have to start counting from the moment the new government took over.

Hanan: Our people have no hope.

Shimon: Tell your people you are gaining in negotiations. You are depressing your people. You are weeping. You are becoming a victim of your own propaganda.

Hanan: People are judging by what is happening.

Shimon: You are describing the negotiations. You are mobilising your own people against you.

Hanan: I did not. I was attacked. Prisoners are still in prison.

Shimon: There is an end of settlements, although the settlement stop was not complete. It is better to be attacked because you are successful, than you are attacked because you have failed.

Rabin and myself spoke to the Swedes. They are the third largest goregin donor of aid after the US and Japan and have a budget of $ 1 bn. I asked them why don't you invest. Ask

them to support your economy and the public institutions.

Faisal: We are doing this.

Shimon: Bethlehem, for instance, got money for the sewage system...

Hanan: They can give technical assistance.

Shimon: Make a fund for Small Business Enterprises; a Fund for Hospitals.

Hanan: There is the problem of maintenance payments. In Bir Zeiyth for instance we have beautiful buildings but we have no money to pay the running costs.

Shimon: From the fund for small business enterprises; you can use repayment for maintaining institutions.

Faisal: We are also concerned of creating the necessary economic infrastructure.

Shimon: We suggested to give you control over electricity, desalination, etc.

Faisal: Can we tell the Japanese about the electricity?

Shimon: Gaza is on the way to a catastrophe; under your land, your management, built your own companies. We are ready to facilitate.

Hanan: Money is not be pouring down on us. The Gulf countries may assist.

Shimon: We are ready to help you to get the money. We are ready to guarantee and purchase goos; e.g. buy gas from Egypt.
Do it. The cost of the water depends on the cost of electricity; and the cost of electricity depends on the cost of the capital. Today you have much good will. France e.g. has funds for 2 %. This is cheap money.

Hanan: We have limitations because we are not a country.

Shimon: We have also been a non-country. We had the Jewish Agency. We got ourselves organised..

Faisal: I am travelling tomorrow.

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Meeting between Shimon Peres, Faisal el-Husseini and Hanan Ashrawi; January 23, 1993
present: Kamal Husseini, Avi Gil, Yair Hirschfeld

Faisal: What is now the situation regarding the deportees?

Shimon: We have two tracks. One is the legal one and it depends on the High Court of Justice. The judges can take three different decisions: First, they can recognized the legality od the departation; second they can declare the illegality of the deportation - in this case the government will respect their decision; and third, they may look for a way inbetween; define several categories od those deported and ask for a differentiated approach to the issue.

The Government has been fully restrained and will not effect the deliberations of the High Court.

On the other hand, there is the political and diplomatic track. There are all kind of suggestions from various parties. Lets for instance say, from France. The idea is that part of the deportees will come back immediately; the time of expulsion of another part of the deportees will be strongly reduced and a third part will be transferred to other countries; to Algeria or France. There, of course, they will be free. This "baby" was born, when Dumas visited Algeria. I don't know what the real position of the Algerian government is. In a way, the succes of the scheme may depend on the Palestinian reaction to the French proposal.

At the beginning there were some favourable reactions of some of the Arab countries; but the problem is that Hamas is strong. In Paris, for instance, they are very strong. They are threatening the life of Ibrahim Sus; he had to run away.

In seeking a solution to the deportee question Israel bears three considerations in mind:
a) the continuation of the peace process;
b) our desire not to bring about a collusion with the United Nations; and
c) our determination to show that Hamas will be the loser. We are afraid that they will be triumphant. This will be very bad for peace.

At the outset of the crisis we were left with no option. They killed many Jews and they threatened to kill the peace process. Therefore strong action had to be taken against them.

Hanan: But the Hamas was strengthened and our people were put in a very bad situation.

Shimon: May be. But you know, Ben Gurion once asked the

question: What can God not do? and the answer is: He cannot change the past.

Hanan: Thus, you expect that a staggered approach will be adopted, and they will come back in different stages?

Shimon: This is the French proposal. If the French will come with a clear cut proposal, we may react to it. We know this tonight or at latest tomorrow.

Faisal: The Algerians have their own problems; they won't create problems for themselves; getting the deportees there would cause all kind of domestic problems (in Algeria).

Shimon: In all the Arab countries there is an Islamic threat; but most of the Arab states want a continuation of the peace process. Tunisia has even offered to host a session of the multilateral working group on refugees.

Also for us it is important that the negotiations start on schedule. I was told that if we start on time, we can continue negotiations into Ramadan; but if we postpone the renewal of negotiations we can not start in Ramadan. We want to keep the momentum.

Faisal: We too, but as long as they are all time in the limelight. (?)

Hanan: Is there any chance that the Yossi Sarid compromise will be implemented?

Shimon: He suggested that the deportees should be returned to the security zone. This proposal was rejected for several reasons: First, we have no legal status there; we cannot detain them; we cannot change decisions there or the like.
Second, Lahat is opposed to it. They may become an immediate target. The Hisbollah may attack.

Faisal: Why? Nobody would want them back into Lebanon.

Shimon: Harari, the Lebanese Prime Minister thinks wrongly that we want to undermine him. Rather on the contrary; we are happy with Harari. He puts economic considerations above everything and he has established Lebanese authority throughout. We are in favour of this.
The French talked to Lahat. He would not listen.

The last time we met, we spoke about CBM's. This weak two important CBM's were taken. The Government cut all the subsidies given to settlers on the West Bank and Gaza. This

decision will have an impact on the flow of people. People will not go there anymore as before.

The second move was done by the Knesseth, changing the law regarding meetings with the PLO. That is important too.

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Faisal: Regarding the deportee question. An Israeli declaration, regarding the non applicability of deportation...

Shimon: Do you prefer delcarations to facts? This was a temporary move. We said it is not a policy.

Hanan: Can we have a time frame for negotiations. We have a problem, as our people expected negotiations to last one year, and the year is over.

Shimon: You have to start counting from the moment the new government took over.

Hanan: Our people have no hope.

Shimon: Tell your people you are gaining in negotiations. You are depressing your people. You are weeping. You are becoming a victim of your own propaganda.

Hanan: People are judging by what is happening.

Shimon: You are describing the negotiations. You are mobilising your own people against you.

Hanan: I did not. I was attacked. Prisoners are still in prison.

Shimon: There is an end of settlements, although the settlement stop was not complete. It is better to be attacked because you are successful, than you are attacked because you have failed.

Rabin and myself spoke to the Swedes. They are the third largest goregin donor of aid after the US and Japan and have a budget of $ 1 bn. I asked them why don't you invest. Ask

them to support your economy and the public institutions.

Faisal: We are doing this.

Shimon: Bethlehem, for instance, got money for the sewage system...

Hanan: They can give technical assistance.

Shimon: Make a fund for Small Business Enterprises; a Fund for Hospitals.

Hanan: There is the problem of maintenance payments. In Bir Zeiyth for instance we have beautiful buildings but we have no money to pay the running costs.

Shimon: From the fund for small business enterprises; you can use repayment for maintaining institutions.

Faisal: We are also concerned of creating the necessary economic infrastructure.

Shimon: We suggested to give you control over electricity, desalination, etc.

Faisal: Can we tell the Japanese about the electricity?

Shimon: Gaza is on the way to a catastrophe; under your land, your management, built your own companies. We are ready to facilitate.

Hanan: Money is not be pouring down on us. The Gulf countries may assist.

Shimon: We are ready to help you to get the money. We are ready to guarantee and purchase goos; e.g. buy gas from Egypt.
Do it. The cost of the water depends on the cost of electricity; and the cost of electricity depends on the cost of the capital. Today you have much good will. France e.g. has funds for 2 %. This is cheap money.

Hanan: We have limitations because we are not a country.

Shimon: We have also been a non-country. We had the Jewish Agency. We got ourselves organised..

Faisal: I am travelling tomorrow.

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Meeting with Abu Ala, Maher al-Kurd and Hassan Azfour with Yair Hirschfeld and Ron Pundik; Sarpsborg, January 21, 1993.

Abu Ala's Statements:

Present Difficulties

We believe that we are passing in these days and weeks a very important and critical phase, requiring from both of us, Israelis and Palestinians, courage and fruitful thinking. To be very frank, we feel that if we together will not make (successful) use of the present stage, we will both lose and our people will suffer. The only alternative (to an Israeli-Palestinian understanding) is more conflict. We very strongly and seriously seek an understanding; we want to make peace.

You may have observed that the present state of frustration has enforced growing opposition. For instance the activities of the ten organisations working from Damascus and their channels have become very active inside the West Bank and Gaza. Their supports in various Arab and Islamic countries, mainly Iran, have gained from this state of affairs. Iran, of course, has serious pretensions in the region. Under present conditions Iran manipulates the Palestinian course and the problem of Jerusalem in order to achieve its selfish aims.

We are convinced that if we find a just solution, a country like Iran will lose its main weapon.

Going back to the phenomenon of frustration, you have to be aware, that this frustration is reflected in three aspects:
First, it relates to the nature of Israeli policies and practices in the area. We believe that the time has now arrived to create a sense of relaxation in the area (the West Bank and Gaza);
Second, negotiations have not reached tangible achievements;
Third, the ongoing drastic deterioration of social and economic conditions of the population of the West Bank and Gaza is creating great grievances, hardship and radicalisation.

In case our intentions are genuine, we can coordinate measures to relax and resolve these three aspects (of frustration).

The Impact of the Gulf War

After the Gulf War we have passed through difficult times. Our position has often been misinterpreted. May be, we "exaggerated" our position. However, our relations (with the former anti-Iraq coalition countries) have drastically improved. I refer particularly to the last visit of Abu Mazen

and his delegation to Qatar, Oman and Saudi Arabia. Of course, the positions expressed by Abu Mazen and his delegation had been totally supported and endorsed by Arafat and the highest Revolutionary Council. Yassir Arafat openly supported a policy of improving relations with these countries.

Our international relations with Europe are good. These relations have recovered and the pre-Gulf crisis state of affairs has been reestablished in our dealings with the European Community, with Canada, with North and East European states.

Unfortunately the relationship with the USA has not seen any progress. We expected that the dialogue between the US government and the PLO would be resumed. May be you share our view that such a dialogue with the USA can be conducive to peace.

The PLO Contribution to the Peace Process

We have proven our good intentions and our constructive attitude in the participation in the peace process, although unjust conditions have been imposed on us. We will remain committed to the peace process, as long as it has a chance of success. (emphasis added) We will strife to improve the terms of Palestinian participation.

In our opinion we are presently facing a crisis and a deadlock in negotations. The main weakness of the process is that no change has occurred. Moreover, our people understood that negotiations have been limited in time to one year. One year of negotiations is over and we have not obtained an agreement.

We have submitted many proposals. No adequate response has been received from the Government of Israel. This makes our position shaky within the Palestinian public and leadership.

We need to examine carefully the details of the gap. I will give some suggestions:

We have submitted detailed proposals to Mr. Gargirian. regarding principles of agreement. Another proposal was submitted in adifferent way to the Israeli delegation.
An agreement on these principles with some cosmetic alterations will help progress in the negotiations.
It is deemed crucial to reach a clearly defined frame of reference for the interim-period..

Jurisdiction

Regarding jurisdiction. We feel we can avoid conflict. Our understanding was that jurisdiction (of the interim self-government) will cover the territories occupied in 1967; and negotiations should concentrate on exceptions, provided that such exceptions are not contrary to the context of resolution 242. It is also our understanding that 338 calls for the implementation of 242.

Security

Regarding the security issue. We put that issue high up on our agenda. Your requirements and ours have to be well taken care of and an understanding on strategic issues obtained. The implementation of security entails the personification of peaceful coexistence in the area and the search for mutual interests. This way, the security issue, (which has a negative aspect in the experience of our people), will obtain a positive content that will make all of us interested in preserving it.

Elections

We understand that the Interim Palestinian Council will be formed by general, free and direct elections of all of the population on the West Bank and Gaza, that are registered in the statistics of June 4, 1967. Naturally, the elections shall take place under the supervision of agreed upon international bodies.

Legislation

The Interim Palestinian Council will be empowered to legislate for all the authorities that are mutually agreed upon to be delegated to it. Taking into consideration a review of all laws and regulations.

Confidence Building Measures

We believe that the Israeli Government can take the initiative and create confidence building measures that will serve both sides and will not cause any harm to the Israeli side:
a. We believe the first step in this direction is an immediate solution of the deportee question.
In order for the Israeli Government to regain its good reputation inther internationsl arena, it should permit other deportees to return, especially pesonalities, whose presence in the West Bank and Gaza would be conducive to the peace process. I refer to people like Hana Nasr (from Bir Zeith University) or

like Muhammad Milhem (former mayor of Halhul). (responding to our question: not to Akram Haniye).

b. The second issue is to reinstal the role of the PLO; permit the PLO role in the peace process to be a direct one. This will be conducive to the peace process.

c. The third issues; we believe that a way copuld be devised that the G.o.I will do some convincing steps to end the settlenments.

d. Another issue relates to human rights. A list of points has been offered by our delegation.

e. We need measures to alleviate restrictions on economic development. There is a long list of issues which have been mentioned by the delegation in Washington.

Gaza First

Mr. Rabin, Mr. Peres as well as Mr. Arens have spoken in the past about a possible withdrawal from Gaza. This is a welcome step. We can start immediately with several activities and economic cooperation in the Gaza Strip. Gaza needs a Mini-Marshall Plan. There can be a free-zone area and it can be extended to Ashdod. There can be joint operations, serving the entire area with two seaports, (Ashdod and Gaza); this will enable you and us to enhance trade, tourism and other areas of development.

This is one of the several cooperation schemes we have in mind. We can start by commissioning studies very discretly. These studies can be done by us, by you, or by a third side. Many of these studies can be done by you, as you are better than we are in these things.

These are ideas that come to our mind and can be translated into action; however it cannot be openly discussed.

The implementation of such a proposal could enable us to solve the social problems in Gaza and take care of related hardship elsewhere. Such an idea is worth considering.

(Israeli-Palestinian) cooperation in Gaza could be a model for future cooperation. We can imagine many other forms of cooperation and know that such projects can be interwoven in the economic structure of the region as a whole:
Several industries and refineries can be established; light industries can be developed and projects for re-export planned. We can consider a joint Israeli-Palestinian car manufacture enterprise to serve the entire region.

We understand that any hypothetical withdrawal from Gaza will create a constructive mechanism that will lead to progress also on the West Bank. It is an important step in the right direction and it can create a magical effect on the enhancement of the entire peace process.

The Multilateral Negotiations

The Government of Israel can give a very effective push to the multilaterals. I understand that in the multilaterals you (Israel) are compensated for concessions in the bilaterals. For us this is good, as we gain twice: we will improve our situation in both the bilaterals and the multilaterals.

If you make it easier for us in the multilaterals we will make it easier for you in your contact with other Arab states. For instance let us consider a list of misunderstandings that could be prevented and a list of CBM's.

CBM's

We suggest to obtain from Israel a license
a. to start the cement factory in Hebron;
b. to start to work on a sea port in Gaza;
c. to establish a Palestinian Development Bank; and
d. to permit the implementation of the Teddy Kollek Plan: enabling the construction of 7 500 housing units for Palestinians preferably on public owned land.

Such positions and attitudes would be very helpful in the multilaterals and would remove obstacles for progress. All these are hypothetical suggestions.

Water Resources

It is difficult for us to understand the logic behind the Israeli refusal, to recognize our water rights. This particular issue is blocking progress.

(The Israeli position was explained)

Another thought would be in this context - as a token of good will - if Israel would double the quantity of water in the territories for the Palestinians; that would create high political returns for us.

Although in the context of water resources, reference should be made to the Johnston Plan. Would it be possible to consider the construction of the Western Gor Canal?

We should obtain at first agreement with you (Israel) and then we can deal with the Jordanians.

It is necessary to enable the establishment of a Palestinian Water Authority; there could be an understanding between the delegations and it would serve mutual interests.

Refugees

For various reasons - humanitarian, social and political - it is necessary to deal more seriously with the issue of Family Reunification and the return of deportees. There are so many ways that we can deal with it. It will enable us to move to all other issues. (We explained the need to deal with the issue of Family Reunification in the context of bilateral talks).

Environment

We have suggested to establish a Palestinian Institute for the Protection of Environment. I don't see the ratio of opposing this.

Security and Arms Control

We will be careful to follow the formula of representation; the Palestinian delegation will be led by Dr. Zayigh and Ziyyad Abu Zayyad will be a member.

Steering Committee

We suggested to form a sub-committee on Jerusalem. (It was explained to them, why this was impossible).
The participation of Syria and lebanon should be encouraged. In the committee on security and arms control Lybia and Iraq should be encouraged to participate in order to have them as partners for security arrangements in the area.

Trilateral Activities

Steps to promote the implementation of the Red - Dead Sea Canal, or preferably the Med-Dead Sea Canal should be encouraged.

For the future trilateral Israeli-Palestinian-third country activities should be planned. Several trilateral projects could be planned in the Dead Sea area, in regard to Chemical Industries, Tourism etc.

Also in the Jordan Valley - a free trade zone should be arranged; enabling the development of major trade activities to and from the Arab world.

All other projects mentioned in the paper "Dividends of Peace" (written by Abu Ala; see appendix) should be considered.

Maher el-Kurd: Many of the projects, such as described by the Armand Hammer Institute of the University of Tel Aviv, or by Palestinian Institutes should also be considered.

In interesting suggestion is the construction of a desalination and electricity generating plant on the border between Gaza, the Negev and Egypt.

Abu Ala: It would be useful to revive the old Tap-line, which originally transferred oil to Haifa. We want to construct a 30 inch pipeline from Mafraq (Jordan) to Gaza - Ashdod; the costs involved amount to US $ 50 000 000,- . This and other ideas can be gradually studied together.

Postponement of the Multilaterals

In case the deportee question should not be solved on time; the Palestinians would prefer to postpone the multilateral meetings, in order not to be forced to remain outside.

2nd Meeting with Abu Ala; (Oslo)

The way to proceed in promoting the Gaza-First Plan would be as follows:

First, organise another meeting, or several meetings - with Norwegian assistance - in order to sum up the details of a coordinated Israeli-Palestinian strategy;
second, involve the US-government: coordinate a scenario with them and permit the US government to lead the way (publicly). American Government support is also important in order to obtain enough financial support from the international community and the Arab world);
third, involve the Government of Egypt, discuss with them the details of implementation;
fourth: go public (until then keep the operation completely secret).

ECF

בז' באייר תשפ"ג

בג"ת: עם כ"ג אלף וחמש מאות

1. היום בז' באייר בפרשת בחוקותי (בדר' ג' לספירת העומר) עם תום"נ ואשה"ל.
2. סדר הנושאים בעיקריו שלו: קריאת (בעזרת הנשים ע"י אשה"ל):-
א. הנשים מציעים לקיים מנהג עם ערס. מציעים את שאת בדיקה.
ב. הנושאים והמרכזים בדיון כרגיל יהיו:-
1) בעיות לוגיסטיות המשורים.
2) 1 שבוע בשבוע שלפתח חוסם בשלון בכלל:-
(אנו מציעים לשקול הצעת הפלגים
מ 12- אוכוסט 29)
3) הסכם על עקרונות, בנוגע מספר לקבוצת שבו ניתן לבצע לפרטים פלגים.
4) בעיני מציעים לנושא אחרון הצב. שלום מתוך.

3. אשה"ל תצבה על הבמה שכל עוד לא יבוא ומתן בע"ת המשורים הם לכל שלום למשך ומתן.

3. באזור לא נשמר הגיעה אשראלוי מסגר עקרונות לפתרון בעיית המאזרחים:
א) לא כפתרון חיוב לתושבי [illegible] אזרחים
ב) אבנה הבנייתית - תנאי הבניית לוח זמנים קרוב - על קבוצות עבודות על מאזרחים להזדרז קרובה על מאזרחים שיתמידו לקח מרוב, קבוצה שאחרי מאזרח מרוב, וכו'.
ג) הם לגל יכולו הבניה שתכוסה על האדמה המאזרחים לאחיהם מרוחקת אלו אחיהם שלישית.
ד) הפחד החשוב ביותר ועל לכבוד לעזרן במאזרח בכדורים לקרוון.

ה. הבעיה של שכנים להפסקת בלתי דורה תמורת האבנית המאזרחים ליהן קבלה דעתי אשף ולבלח לה דעתי האמצעי.

ו. אשראלוי סיבה עיונית בקורה בקלאו השקוע שאבו שם הקבלה כאשר בראש אחיה. הייתה סיבות לבנות על מרכזית הבתים המקוריים ובכירים בתחתונים, כדי לקדם תשלום אחיו ואחרונות בקלאו בתחתונים. התיים הבונים בשלבים.
לבקורה הבקבוק בקורה על אלו מאזרח, על הלה - ואחד את עשרה בקלאו בקרוונות יחסית. אלו מאזרח בקר שם בארץ עסוקים לא הקרה יחסית מאזרחים ושלושים / חמישים ובקורה.

בכבוד רב,

ECF

בז' אלול תשפ

בס"ד אם כיוצ"ב אלמלי

ל"ת: ואתחנן

1. היום בז' אלול שבת לפרשתנו [בבר' ג'] ד' רגלים
נבר ירון בונים) שם ת"ת ואתחנן.

2. שלוח הנשלחים בציקרוים שלוי. בכיתה (בעזרת
הנשים ביה"ב אשה"ל):-

א. השנים מצ'עים לקרוי מנרים עם פרס.
מצ'עים ולא שאת בדוקה.

ב. הנשלחים ו. מרכזים לשון דבריהם יה"ל:-
1) בתרוגת לרבנית המצורפים.
2) 2 משלוחים בשבוע שלפתח חוזק שלוחי
בדוקים:
(אלו מצ'עים לשעון הצעת הסלולרים
מ 18- אוקטובר 19)
3) הסכם על עקרונות, בעזה. מספר לקצרת
אשר ניתן לבצעם לפרטים פלוני.
4) בעבר מצ'עים לרוני אחרון הצב. שלוח
מתוקן.

ג. אשה"ל תבנה על הצעה שכל עוד לא יכתב
בע"י המצורפים הם על שלוח למשל ומתן.

3. באופן כללי נשמח הבהרה אשר תאפשר מקבלת
החלטה בנוגע למאזנים:
א) כל פתרון חייב להתאים לתקנות אלו:
ב) תצורה הנדסית - תנאי הבטיחות לעומסים קרוב - על
הקונים לעמוד על מאזנים המאושרים לשימוש בקונה על
מאזנים שיאפשרו לנו מהיר, קונה שאתה לאחר מקום,
וכו'.
ג) הם לכל יכולת הבדיקה שתתקיים על המדרכה
המאזנים לאחריה מדויקת ולא אחיד שקיים.
ד) הפיזי התנאים ביותר ומה לביצוע לעמוד במאזנה
בפרוץ לקונה.

ה. הבטחה על שמירה לחסימה הכלכלי תאורה המדרכה
המאזנים ליד. קבלה דרכי אשף ולבלה לכל
כלי. האמצעי.

1. אשראי סיבה אלינות ביקורת הקלאי השקוע שאר
שם הקבלה במעט בראש אחיזה. ה"מ סיבוי
לבדוק את מהימנות השירים המקומיים ולכירים
לחתרים, בכדי לקדם תשלום אחיזן והאורכות הקלאי
בתחום. התיים השונים הקלאים.
לביקורת בקנים ~~את~~ ביקור על אלו מאזנן, על
הכל - ומצב את אשף - ומקל הקרוות יתמיד.
אלו מאזנן ביקר עם בארץ עסקנית לכל הם הכל
ש. שם על כי כל אדם בישם. הסיבות מאזנים
אשראי ותוסיף ביאור לביקור.

בכבוד רב,

ECONOMIC COOPERATION FOUNDATION
הקרן לשיתוף פעולה כלכלי

ד"ר רון פונדק
רחוב הרימון 9
ת ל - א ב י ב
6 4 9 2 5

11 ינואר 1993

שיחה עם נציגים פלסטינים הקשורים לועדות המולטילטרליות

ב-10 ינואר 1993, בבית הוריו של סרי נוסייבה במזרח ירושלים, קוימה פגישה עם קבוצת פלסטינים שכללה את סרי נוסייבה (האחראי לועדות הטכניות המיעצות למשלחות הפלסטיניות), ג'אד יסחק (העומד בראש הצוות הפלסטיני בועדה לאיכות הסביבה), וחסן אבו-לבדה (החבר במשלחת הפלסטינית למו"מ הבילטרלי, וחבר גם בצוות המולטילטרלי). מהצד הישראלי נכחו אברהם כץ-עוז (יו"ר הצוות הישראלי לועדה המולטילטרלית בנושאי מים), עמוס גבור (סמנכ"ל במשרד החוץ לתהליך השלום), ונציגי E.C.F. (ד"ר יאיר הירשפלד וד"ר רון פונדק) אשר יזמו ואירגנו את המפגש.

שני הצדדים הבהירו שמדובר בפגישה לא פורמאלית שאינה תחליף לערוץ השיחות הרישמי, ושמטרת הפגישה היא להכיר טוב יותר את עמדות הצדדים, להבין את הפרשנויות שנותן כל צד, לקרב בין העמדות, ולאתר נקודות מהם ובאמצעותן יהיה ניתן לקדם את המשא ומתן. כן הוסכם שהבסיס לדיון הוא שלשני הצדדים אינטרס שהתהליך יצליח, אך ברור שקיימות בעיות.

בפתיחה הבהרנו שברור לכולנו שאנו חיים בתקופה קשה, ושגרוש אנשי החמאס גרם לקשיים בצד הפלסטיני התומך במשא ומתן עם ישראל. עם זאת, לטווח הארוך, יש לנו ולהם הרבה מן המשותף, כגון מניעת עליית הרדיקאליזם, התגברות הטרור, והתחזקות הכוחות העלולים לתפוס את התהליך כבן-ערובה.

הדובר המרכזי, המוביל, והסמכותי מן הצד הפלסטיני היה סרי נוסיבה, שניסה לכל אורך הדרך למצוא נקודות הבנה, ולהבין את נקודות המחלוקת. נוסיבה ציין שהם מקבלים בברכה את היוזמה להפגש במסגרת זאת ומפרשים זאת כגישה חיובית מצידה של ישראל. הדגיש שאל אף שהמצב הנוכחי חייב דחיית פגישה כזאת, ועל אף שהם לא ידעו באילו נושאים תעסוק הפגישה, החליטו שעדיף

להניח הצידה את הארועים ולהפגש עמנו. סיפר שהיה ויכוח בתוך ההנהגה שלהם האם להענות לפגישה או לא. המתנגדים טענו שאי אפשר לדבר על התקדמות כל עוד בעיית המגורשים לא נפתרה.

נוסייבה הדגיש שאם בעיית המגורשים לא תיפתר, הפלסטינים אינם בעמדה המאפשרת להם להשתתף במפגשים הבילטרלים והמולטילטרלים המתוכננים. הוסיף שהיום הם תקועים; מחד הם מרגישים מחויבים למו"מ ורוצים לראות התקדמות, ומאידך הם חשים שישראל מקשה על המצב ואולי אפילו הופכת אותו לבלתי אפשרי.

על פי נוסיבה הגרוש היה הקש ששבר את גב הגמל. גם לפני הגרוש היו הנציגים למו"מ בעמדת התגוננות קבועה כלפי האוכלוסיה בשטחים וכלפי מתנגדי התהליך. עתה המצב החמיר, ואפילו בקרב חלק מהנציגים עצמם גוברים הרגשות האופוזיציונריים. הגרוש יצר אוירה שלילית בציבור, ואפילו אם האינטרס של המשלחת הפלסטינית הוא לשכוח את הארוע ולהמשיך, הרי האוירה אינה מאפשרת זאת.

התחושה הנוכחית של הפלסטינים (ולעמדה זאת הצטרפו ג'ד יסחק ואבו-לבדה) היא שהממשלה החדשה בישראל שינתה את הרטוריקה אך אינה פועלת ליישם את הבטחותיה. האנשים בשטחים בודקים האם ממשלת ישראל באמת מעוניינת בשינוי ומגלים שבאופן כללי אין שינוי בנושא זכויות האדם בשטחים, בנושא החלטת 242, ובנושא השתתפות אש"ף, ולפתע כל ההתנגדות שהיתה ברקע ודוכאה על רקע הציפיות מהמצע המבטיח של העבודה ומר"צ, יוצאת מעל פני השטח.

חסן אבו-לבדה, שהיה במידה מסוימת הקיצוני מבין השלושה, תיאר בפנינו כיצד לדעתם טירפדה המשלחת הישראלית למשא ומתן הדו-צדדי השגת אג'נדה מוסכמת כבר בסיבוב השישי (ספטמבר 1992). לדבריו הבעיה היתה נעוצה בניסוח מספר מילים הקשורים ללינקג' בין 242 לבין שני השלבים. הסיבה להתעקשות הפלסטינית נובעת מחוסר אמונם בממשלה הישראלית ולכן רצו נוסח כתוב. על פי תאורו נתנו הישראלים להבין שנוסח הניר מוסכם על ידם, אך כשהוגש במליאה נדחה.

לדעת אבו-לבדה אין שינוי מהותי בין עמדות ממשלת שמיר לממשלת רבין. הממשלה הנוכחית, כמו הקודמת, מכירה את הרקע לאוטונומיה אינסופית או לסיפוח ישראלי. היו להם ציפיות גבוהות מהממשלה החדשה והם מאוכזבים. הם קיוו שהממשלה תביא שורה של צעדים שיקלו על האוכלוסיה וישמשו כ-CBM, אך עתה הם חשים שלא רק שזה לא קרה אלא שישראל מחזיקה את האוכלוסיה כבת ערובה. עם זאת ישראל צריכה לדבריו להבין שהפלסטינים לא הלכו לשיחות בכדי לשפר את תנאי המחיה בשטחים. לאחר שהסברנו לפלסטינים עד כמה לדעתנו שונה מדיניות הממשלה הנוכחית מקודמתה, הגיב אבו-לבדה שבינתיים ההבדל העיקרי הוא שהם באמת מאמינים שהממשלה הנוכחית מחויבת לתהליך, אך השאלה היא באילו תנאים.

לדעת נוסיבה ישראל לא עושה כלפי אוכלוסיית השטחים מספיק צעדים שיחזקו את האמון במדיניות המוצהרת של ממשלת ישראל. הם רואים נתק בין הכוונות לבין היישום, וזה יוצר בעיית אמון בכוונות. לדעתו CBM (צעדים לבניית אמון) במהלך תהליך המו"מ, יסייעו לתהליך עצמו ולתוצאותיו. בינתיים מה שקורה בשטח זה צעדים לשבירת אמון (CONFIDENCE SHATTERING MEASURES). ניתן לעשות צעדים מידיים שישומן לא יפגע באופן משמעותי בשליטה הישראלית. לישראל יש יכולת ושליטה ליזום ולהביא להתקדמות.

הבהיר מספר פעמים שאנו צריכים לקחת בחשבון שלעיתים עמדות בהן אנו נוקטים, או צעדים שאנו עושים, אינם מובנים לפלסטינים ומתפרשים שלא בדרך בה היינו רוצים, ונקלטים לא בדרך בה אנו סבורים שנקלטו. במיקרים רבים הבעיה היא בחוסר ההבנה בין הצדדים. מסר נוסף עליו חזרו הפלסטינים מספר פעמים היה שעל הצד הישראלי לנסות להיות יותר יצירתי ביחסו לפלסטינים ובפעילות סביב המו"מ, ויותר קשוב לבעיות של הפלסטינים בשטחים.

ג'ד יסחק שהיה אחרון הדוברים מהצד הפלסטיני ציין שהוא חש מאד נוח בפגישה הנוכחית, והוא מאמין שבמו"מ צריך לחתום על מסמך שנובע מדברים שמסוכמים בפגישות מסוג זה. ביקש להבהיר שלדעתו כל צעד חיובי ישראלי יגביר את עוצמת תומכי המו"מ בציבור הפלסטיני ובעיקר את אילו השותפים בו. הדגיש שכמו שהממשלה בישראל אינה נהנית מרוב מוחלט, כך גם הם אינם רוב במחנה הפלסטיני ולכן זקוקים ל-CBM. לדעתו תומכי המו"מ ישארו בבעיה כל עוד אין לפלסטינים שליטה על נושאים שקשורים לקרקע, לכן צריך לחבר בין נושא הקרקע ללוח הזמנים.

בתום הפגישה הבהירו שני הצדדים שהם יצאו חכמים יותר ומודעים יותר לבעיות ולחוסר ההבנה השוררים בין הצדדים ושהשלב הבא יהיה לנסות ולקדם נושאים נקודתיים הקשורים למו"מ המולטילטרלי, בצורה שתספק את שני הצדדים.

ECONOMIC COOPERATION FOUNDATION
הקרן לשיתוף פעולה כלכלי

ד"ר רון פונדק
רחוב הרימון 9
ת ל - א ב י ב
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11 ינואר 1993

שיחה בנושא מים עם נציגים פלסטינים הקשורים לועדות המולטילטרליות

ב-10 ינואר 1993, בבית הוריו של סרי נוסייבה, קוימה פגישה עם קבוצת פלסטינים שכללה את סרי נוסייבה (האחראי לועדות הטכניות המיעצות למשלחות הפלסטיניות), ג'אד יסחק (העומד בראש הצוות הפלסטיני בועדה לאיכות הסביבה), וחסן אבו-לבדה (החבר במשלחת הפלסטינית למו"מ הבילטרלי, וחבר גם בצוות המולטילטרלי). מהצד הישראלי נכחו אברהם כץ-עוז (יו"ר הצוות הישראלי לועדה המולטילטרלית בנושאי מים), עמוס גבור (סמנכ"ל משרד החוץ לתהליך השלום), ונציגי E.C.F. (ד"ר יאיר הירשפלד וד"ר רון פונדק) אשר יזמו ואירגנו את המפגש.

שני הצדדים הבהירו שמדובר בפגישה לא פורמאלית שאינה תחליף לערוץ השיחות הרישמי, ושמטרת הפגישה היא להכיר טוב יותר את עמדות הצדדים, להבין את הפרשנויות שנותן כל צד, לקרב בין העמדות, ולאתר נקודות מהם ובאמצעותן יהיה ניתן לקדם את המשא ומתן המולטילטרלי.

להלן הנושאים העיקריים בתחום המים שעלו במהלך הפגישה:

1. ג'אד יסחק העלה את השאלה מדוע התנגדה המשלחת הישראלית בשיחות המולטילטרליות לדון בנושא זכויות המים של הפלסטינים. נענה על ידי גבור שהנושא שייך למשא ומתן הבילטרלי, ולא למולטי המתעסק בנושאים אזוריים.

גבור חזר על הצעתו של סגן שר החוץ יוסי ביילין, בועדת ההיגוי האחרונה בלונדון, על פיה צריך לנצל את הערוץ המולטילטרלי להתקדמות בתכנון פרויקטים שישומן יתרחש לאחר שיושגו הסכמים בערוץ הבילטרלי. הדגיש את מימד הזמן שיאבד אם וכאשר נדחה את כל הפעילות עד אשר נגיע להסכמים בילטרלים. גבור הדגיש את היתרון המצוי ברעיון ה- NON-COMMITAL PLANNING, והכנת תוכניות מגירה.

2. כץ-עוז העלה את השאלה מדוע הם גורמים לעיכובים בתוכניות כגון מתקן התפלה בעזה, שנועד לשרת את האוכלוסיה שם. נענה על ידי יסחק שמבחינתם אין הגיון להקים מתקן בעזה שעלות המים בו תהיה 1 דולר למ"ק, כאשר ניתן להזרים מים בעלות של 10 סנט בצינור מהגדה המערבית לרצועה.

3. הנושא לעיל הביא לדיון קצר בנושא שאלת חלוקת המים באקויפר המשותף בגדה המערבית. על פי יסחק ישראל נוטלת גם חלק מהמים השייכים להם. ביקש לבדוק עמנו מה תהיה עמדת ישראל אם יוצע לה שארה"ב תשלם לפלסטינים כאקט סימלי, 125 מיליון דולר עבור המים שישראל נוטלת מהם.
לדברי אבו-לבדה החלוקה צריכה להיות על פי מפתח אוכלוסיה. גנור הדגיש שעל אף שאיננו טוענים שלפלסטיני מגיע פחות מים, צריך להכניס לשיקולים גם את נתוני של רמת חיים, תצרוכת ממוצעת וכו. הוסיף שאנו באותו אזור מים לטוב או לרע ונצטרך לפתור את הבעיה. גם לדעת כץ-עוז ההבנה קיימת והשאלה היא איך פותרים את הבעיה.
יסחק חזר לנושא זכויות המים ואמר שאם נסכים בנושא נוכל לעבוד יחדיו לפתור את בעיות המים שלנו ושלהם. הובהר ליסחק שעל פי העמדה הישראלית בתקופת הביניים אין סוברניות פלסטינית ולכן אין זכויות מים.
על פי נוסיבה ניתן להבדיל בין זכויות מים לצורך במים עבור שני הצדדים, וכך ניתן גם להבדיל בין צורך מיידי לצורך בטווח ארוך. לדעתו ישנם דברים בתחום המים שניתן ליישם באופן מיידי וישמשו גם כ-CBM. אבו-לבדה ציין שחלוקה מחדש של מקורות המים עשויה להיות צעד CBM חשוב, וזה אינו מופיע בהצעות הישראליות. על פי גנור נושא זה צריך לעלות במסגרת הערוץ הבילטרלי, אם כי ניצול וניהול טוב יותר של המים הקיימים הוא חלק מהמולטי.

4. נוסיבה הביע את דאגתו שכשישראל מדברת על בעית המים היא מתייחסת בעיקר להגדלת העוגה, ולא לפתרון הבעיות המיידיות של הפלסטינים. לדבריו מהפרספקטיבה הפלסטינית נראה שהישראלים מדברים על פתרון לטווח ארוך אשר יסייע קודם כל להם. הישראלים צריכים להבין שהם מביטים על העתיד מעמדת נוחות ולא לוקחים בחשבון את המצב הקבוע של חוסר נוחות בסיסית של אוכלוסיה בשטחים.

5. יסחק העלה הצעה על פיה אם השנה תהיה ברוכה במים כמו השנה שעברה, תפנה ישראל, באופן חד-פעמי, את עודפי המים מהמוביל הארצי למילוי באמצעות שקיעה/חילחול של אקויפר עזה הסובל ממליחות יתר. כץ-עוז הגיב שהוא מוכן לקיים פגישת מומחים בנושא אם כי לדעתו הדבר אינו אפשרי מבחינת העלות.

באותה פגישה ניתן יהיה גם לדון בהיתכנות הרעיון שלהם להקים צינור מים מהגדה לרצועה.

5. אבו-לבדה העלה את נושא הנתונים אודות משק המים. מסתבר שקיימת אי הבנה מוחלטת בין הצדדים בנושא. מזה מספר חודשים שהישראלים סבורים שכוונת הבקשה הפלסטינית שהועלתה בשיחות המולטי היא לגבי נתונים סטטיסטים המופיעים בפירסומים הרשמיים הישראלים, ושמטרת הבקשה היא פורמליסטית ולא מהותית. עתה הסתבר לראשונה שהפלסטינים מעוניינים בגישה לנתונים, קרי לקבל אישור ישראלי לאסוף נתונים מהשטח ולקבל נתונים גולמיים. על פי נוסיבה ואבו-לבדה, קיימת הוראה של המינהל האזרחי לפלסטינים המתפעלים את משק המים בשטחים, האוסרת העברת נתונים ליועצי המשלחת הפלסטינית למו"מ. כך-עוז וגבור הודו שזה חדש עבורם, והביעו פליאתם מהפער בין ראייתם את הנושא לבין ראיית הפלסטינים את הנושא. הובטח לפלסטינים שהנושא יטופל. פרשה זאת מאפיינת במידה רבה את הנתק הקיים בנושאים רבים בין שני הצדדים שמקורו באי הבנה של מסרים פשוטים.

6. את הפגישה סיכם סרי נוסיבה באומרו שברור לכולם שחילופי דעות כאלה מאד מסייעים. הדגיש שלעיתים קיים מצב של חוסר הבנה של עובדות ועמדות. לעיתים הישראלים סבורים שמסר שלהם הועבר והובן, כשלמעשה הצד השני לא הבין את המסר או לא קיבל אותו.

for you



Meeting between Shimon Peres and Faisal el-Husseini;
Jerusalem, January 9, 1993, 9.30 to 12.00 a.m.
(present: Avi Gil, Dr. Ron Pundak, Dr. Yair Hirschfeld)

after first introductory remarks:

Shimon:

The Question of Deportation

We understand that the deportation of the 415 Hamas members has become a great obstacle and a heavy burden for the Palestinians. Yet, you have to understand, if our decision had been reversed, the burden would have been even greater - for everybody. Scepticism in Israel in regard to the development of the negotiations was already great before and our fear was to lose control of events. The chain of killings initiated and carried out by the Hamas, information we obtained of plans to kidnap and kill little children and of plans to make an attack on your life - all these made a shock treatment necessary. Now we have to minimize the damage.

We are trying to ease the present situation. For the first stage we have permitted the Red Cross to get there. We received information from the deportees. They asked us to permit two persons from the Red Cross to enter and told us that they have enough food. We received the special envoy from the United Nations.
We are looking for various solutions. Yet, if Israel will lose, the Hamas will gain.

We do not oppose the principle of them returning home. It is rather a problem of time. We suggested 9 months to two years each of them has the right to appeal. And nobody can know in advance the decision the supreme court will take.

Our main challenge in this affair is to prevent the Hamas from gaining strength and permit u=you to regain a position of leadership.

I have suggested several arrangements. This has been done in full concert with Rabin.

Peace Negotiations with Syria

Let us turn to the peace process:
It is our impression that we can do business with Syria, although progress is slow. President Assad has started a process of education of his people. He is calculated. His moves are well thought out; he is not impulsive. He is capable of making strategic decisions. He is progressing slowly for two reasons:

First, he took the decision to make business with Clinton;
second, he wants to educate his public.

The negotiations will not be easy. We believe that we can reach an agreement with Syria. Yet, the Syrians will not wait for you. I can tell you also why. Israeli-Palestinian negotiations are based on a two-stage agreement, whereas the first stage will take five years. The Syrians will not wait for five years and the Syrians will assumingly not go for a two-stage solution.

If the Syrians will go for two stages - we would not oppose it - but it would surprise us. Assad will not be able to go for something that is less than full agreement.

We - on our part - are also educating the public. We are publicly speaking of withdrawal.

So far the Syrians say rather provincial things about peace. They say for instance, they need no diplomatic relations with Israel, and compare the situation to their relations with Kasakhstan. Yet, they do understand that the situation is different. Syria did not fight wars with Kasakhstan.

Peace Negotiations with Jordan

Jordan will not be the first to sign a treaty with us, although they want to go ahead. In spite of what the king said, they have not lost their interest in the Palestinian destiny. The problems to be solved with Jordan relate to water, refugees (they speak about "displaced persons") and territory. In regard to territory we have achieved understanding in principle. We have told them that we will respect the Mandatory borderline - in the Arava.

Peace Negotiations with the Palestinians

On top of all what I have said, I want to stress that it is our vital interest to obtain agreement with you. We do not want to connect negotiations one with the other and want to reach independent agreements with each of our negotiating partners. Yet, in our view, peace remains indivisible. We believe that the time and the opportunity for peace has come and we want to build today a new and more stable future.

Our problems in negotiating with you are the following:

1. The greatest problem is the decision-making problem on your side. You have no democratic process. A minority like Hamas can easily kill the process. In politics the choice is to have either majority rule or the rule of the gun. It is a tragedy for you and for us.

Palestinians, among all the other Arab peoples - are the most open to democracy. I don't know any stable system, and no
successful economic system that functions without democracy.
We are suggesting elections. The elected will not report to us, but to their people.
If this will be the case, we shall try to look for ways and means that will enable everybody who wants peace to participate in elections.

We know the situation: you speak to Tunisia. We don't prevent you from doing this. However, we cannot negotiate with Arafat, as there are a few problems:
First, he wants to negotiate for the Palestinian diaspora. - We have also our diaspora, but we never negotiated on behalf of our diaspora. Second, the PLO and Fatah are still engaging in acts of terror. It causes great bitterness - even if sometimes exaggerated - among our people.

I know that the dividing line among the Palestinian people is not geographic but political. There are of course moderate people both in- and outside the territories and there are extremists in- and outside the territories.

In case your leadership in Tunisia would stop terror for the entire duration of negotiations and support clearly the proposed solution in two stages, and be very clear on it, the situation could change. We are now speaking on issues related to the West Bank and Gaza. Only 1/5 of the jewish people are living in Israel. We have never negotiated in Israel, negotiations of the diaspora.

Today there is a delegation recognized by you and us. If you want to change the delegation. The best way to go about it, is to go for elections. The people to be elected can serve in a double capacity; they can be negotiators and being elected, they can act as the heads of the new self-governing body.

2. The other problem in negotiations is the concept: Why can't we go straight ahead: as we would break all the glass. The situation is so complicated both on the map and in the relationship of our two peoples. We need time to create a different atmosphere. Under the present climate there will be clashes, if we shall move immediately to a one-stage solution.

We are told that you are afraid that the interim-stage will turn into a permanent arrangement. We have offered several answers to permit you to overcome this fear:

First: although we shall draw no clear map, we shall agree on a clear calendar;
Second, we create a clear interlock. We have agreed that the solution will be based on 242 and 338 and that there will be a clear interlock in time between the provisional and the permanent solution.

Third; in regard to land and water we have made important suggestions. Land, where there is Palestinian life, will be under Palestinian control; land where there is Israeli life, will be under Israeli control; and other areas will be jointly controlled.

We stopped settlements without your request.

Fourth; regarding legislation; we are ready to map the laws and give you the capacity to make your own laws in areas under your control; while we will keep the capacity to make laws in other areas.

If you agree on the concept, we can find solutions for other issues.

3. Jerusalem is an open-ended question. We suggested in the past that people in Jerusalem may vote by proximity. Today, if any Israeli government will make a move on Jerusalem, it will loose its majority. Therefore we have to keep it for later.

4. Confederation. The general development in the world is that the economies are becoming global, whereas political frameworks are becoming more and more national. It is too early to talk about this issue, as any talk will cause at this stage only problems; but we can prepare for an economic union.

5. Security: WE cannot have a solution without referring to security. Security will encounter also measures against unconventional and missile attacks. I am going this week to Paris to sign the Chemical Weapons Treaty and I shall make a statement, that if we reach peace, we will want the Middle East to be free of non-conventional weapons and we will agree to full inspections, also to unannounced

inspections.
For national security we need regional security and we shall seek progress in this area too.

6. Economic Development: The present economic situation causes us much concern. In most Arab countries the standard of living is US $ 800,- per capita, at a time, when annual income has reached US $ 30 000,- in highly developed industrial countries and about US $ 12 000,- in Israel. Poor income causes poor education, which again leads to extremism and to Fundamentalism. Militant fundamentalism is a protest and not a religion. We have to raise the standard of living.

The Arab countries possess 13 000 000 km2; 89 % of which is desert and is of no use. The remaining 11 %, about 1 000 000 km2 is presently under danger, as then drought and the desert tend to eat up the land (while Aids eats up the people).

I am afraid of the fact that we don't have an agreement on water. It is true, we use more water than you. While water consumption is 190 litres per person in Arab countries; it is 500 litres per person in Israel. We have to organise the water distribution and produce more water resources.

Economically speaking, the problem of the Middle East, is not to receive more money, but to generate income. On your side, there is fear of Israeli colonialism and domination; but the time hereof is gone; we live today in a time of competition and we will have to compete one with the other.

We on our behalf will take measures to fight the desert. We will build the greatest Institute in the world - that will specialize on research questions in this area.

The biggest treasure we, you, and the Jordanians have is the Dead Sea. It has enormous potential for exploitation: pottash, brom(ide), magnesium and salts. If we shall overcome the problem of transportation everybody may gain from it. You can be partners to the

project. We shall build a train from the North to the South, in full agreement with all parties. We shall built a Canal (from the Red Sea to the Dead Sea) that will have many purposes: it will create energy; there will be a desalination of water; we plan to transfer the harbours of Eilath and Aqaba further to the north, mainly to prevent pollution and the destruction of nature resources in the Red Sea, but also in order to open up the Dead Sea to all parties.

I know that you want to deal with many of these projects at the final status negotiations; however, to study various projects and ideas takes three to four years, and it would be a pity to lose this time. Let us safe this time and start these studies now. The construction of a new Middle East calls for a lot of studies and research work!

The same is true for Gaza. I visited Gaza. Gaza needs immediately 50 million cubic meters of water (Immediately means within three to four years). In the beginning we planned to have a desalination plant for water outside of Gaza. I changed our attitude and said: let us build a water desalination plant in Gaza. The Palestinians will build it and will run it. Financial arrangements will have to be made.

I was told by Palestinians from Gaza, that - in order to go ahead - they needed an institution: a municipality of Gaza. It was suggested that Faiz Abu Rahme should be appointed Mayor of Gaza. But he is old.

In the past Israel took 4 million cubic metres water from Gaza. We stopped it. You should go ahead and build the desalination plant. It costs US $ 250 000 000,-. We may help to get the financing plan. We are ready to guarantee to buy water which will not be needed. You can get the money from Saudi Arabia, or from any political source you like; even from Lybia. In case, you shall not built the plant, we shall do it by ourselves.

The plant will include also a power station for electricity.

We have to build bridges, rather than peers. (You know peers are frustrated bridges)

I am not looking for profits, I am looking for peace, which means that we will have to solve some of your problems, and you will have to solve some of our problems. 1993 is the year for peace. We are sincere, we are ready to take the risk and pay the price. It is possible to reach an agreement. Problems you will raise, we shall try to solve, provided it will be the same vice versa. Don't lose the opportunity.

7. The Role of the United States: There are some people who have the tendency to assume that the United States will solve the problem. Clinton will not impose any solution.

8. Concluding, I am happy that we have this opportunity to meet and discuss the outstanding questions openly and frankly.

Faisal: Thank you very much for your clear description of issues. I would like to start with the question of deportation.

It is a big obstacle for us. We have to find a way out. I will explain to you, how we look at it. The most important thing for us is the principle of deportation. It is not the time and not the numbers. Next time, if there is another terror attack, you may expell 1 000 or 2 000 and it will create more and more problems. We are concerned. You will have to put this weapon aside, as long as there are negotiations. All other issues can be discussed.

We can deal with negotiations like in Vietnam, or in Diem Bien Phu, or in Algeria. As long as negotiations are free.

Shimon: Do you relate to secret negotiations?

Faisal: No. I mean negotiations with Palestinians from outside.
We want to know, what weapons can be used and what weapons can't be

used during negotiations. For instance when you launched the attack on Hamas. Hamas grew for a certain period. After Madrid the majority of our people was for negotiations. However, under Shamir and also under Rabin, no visible change has occurred. The majority of the people still support us, but they are not willing to fight for us; whereas the minority, who support the Hamas are willing to fight. The moment Hamas took Toledano as hostage to free Ahmad Yassin everybody applauded Hamas. We gained the public support again when the Hammas attacked us in Gaza. The moment the Hamas killed Toledano their popularity strongly declined. You saved them and prevented the Palestinian public to turn against them. I believe you did this to save the government and not in order to save the peace process.

Shimon: That is the same thing. Without our government there is no peace.

Faisal: We are enemies, but we are partners. We came with a paper, demanding the implementation and the respect of human rights, you did not solve, the issues we raised.

We would like to establish a mechanism for damage control. We want to move ahead in the peace process. We know it is most important for us. We will not permit anyone to kill the peace process; yet, at the same time, we will not permit the peace process to kill us.

For me, the basic formula is simple: the greater my credibility among my people is, the more flexible I can be. Since Madrid I am losing credibility. Today I am losing credibility and hence I am losing flexibility. I need a move from your side. The decision to let the Red Cross provide aid was a good decision.

[Yet, if the Hamas come back, they will become a problem for us]

Shimon: Deportation is not a policy, it is an exception to the policy. We want to facilitate your position, but we don't want to bring victory to Hammas.

[Faisal: Have a meeting with part of the Palestinian Delegation and at that opportunity announce an agreed upon solution of the problem.]

Faisal: Regarding negotiations with Syria. We were asured that it was Israel rather than Syria that wanted to postpone negotiations in order to deal with Clinton, rather than with Bush.

Shimon: If we could have reached an agreement under Bush we would have done it.

Faisal: Do you trust Assad?

Shimon: I don't trust people, neither you, nor us. I trust the situation. You, or Assad have no other choice. Once, during the Cold War, all basic questions were related to the strategic problem; now the main world problem will be the problem of political democratization.

Earlier nations fought wars. Egypt achieve in negotiations far more, than any Arab nation in war. Assad is a good chess player. He is capable of making a decision and imposing it on his people. He has adopted a change of strategy; although he is not under great (time) pressure. But he is getting older; and there are the problems of Iraq and Iran.

The Arab world needs an economic union not a political. A confederation between you, the Jordanians, and Israel could be a revolutionary step. You could be the first and leading Arab democracy. Take the destiny in your hands and implement democracy. We will not get involved, and not impose limitations even if the most extreme body will be elected. (Shimon gave an example from the elections for municipalities in 1976 when he served as Minister of Defence). why wait ? implement election. Those who will be elected would be allowed to nominate delegates to the negotiations.

Faisal: I agree to that.
We have a serious need to obtain CBM's, to allow ourselves to go ahead in negotiations:

a. End collective punishment such as demolition of housing;
b. in prisons: release some people over 65,
release some who are seriously ill (5 to 6) and
others; deal with it carefully;
b. Settlements - there are 11 000 houses being built under the present government, this is 33 000 settlers, this is almost one third of the whole settlement activity;
I have a house in Ain Sinia and from there you can see the ongoing building activity

Shimon: Tomorrow the government will take the decision to cross out all subsidies for the settlers. It is a revolution. We have changed the national priorities. We have stopped 7 000 units; legally we are powerless to stop the 11 000. Don't underestimate the decision to cross out the subsudies.

Faisal: I need the CBM's to go ahead. every step by you is an investment in moderating our steps. You have to understand that our relationship is not symmetric. I am not a government; I cannot give orders; I have to convince. I was speaking about the Intifada and said that the stones had neutralized the Israeli tank and therefore - so I argued - we Palestinians had to refrain from the use of fire weapons.
I am not in this position today. Then, we were joining negotiations and hoped to obtain a change of the situation. Now, the common sense is that nothing changes.

Regarding the multilaterals: it is very positive for us that the outside can participate in these negotiations. By this I succeeded in preventing extremism among the oposition to the peace process.

Regarding the two-phased solution: We are in favour of moving ahead in two stages: first an interim settlement and then a permanent settlement.

Regarding negotiations on land: For us, the Palestinian land occupied in 1967 is an indivisible unit. In the negotiations we will discuss about the whole area whether it will be Jordanian, Israeli, or Palestinian. If we can say this land is one unit, and that we deal with its future, we may be saying that there is a temporary solution and a permanent one.

Shimon: It is unattainable, leave it. Because it means to create a map just now. But, you can say - once you have 242 , you can tell your people 242 is for all the land. If you want us to say the same, it will not happen. You cannot expect us to say, what the Arab position is. It is against the logic of negotiations. I also told one of the Syrians: you think 242 is a complete withdrawal and we do not; For a period of time the disagreement is part of the agreement. The art of negotiations is to distinguish between mobile and immobile issues. I will not ask you to do something you cannot do, and I ask you the same.

Faisal: Regarding settlements: you speak about cities and villages under Israeli control; does it mean that it will be final?

Shimon: We refer in the issue of land to three categories: sovereignty, ownership and management. We say sovereignty is open: we are not annexing any territory; Ownership will remain as it is; Managementz; can be largely under your control, or joint, or certain areas under direct Israeli control.
We have the longer perspective in mind. Also during and after the final settlement, even if there will be a Palestinian state, we want to maintain the right for jewish ownership of land; on your side, there is the right of Arab ownership of land in Israel. At least today we cannot declare that it is impossible. we must look at it as a settlement of problem and not the problem of settlements.

Faisal: What is the difference between political and security settlements?

Shimon: Would we add new settlements, you would oppose them.

Faisal: Regarding democracy - we are in need of it. I believe it is a main problem of the Arab world. It needs a protector.

Shimon: The Zionist Movement had no protector. You can elect, whomever you want. We are not talking about municipal elections. Those who will be elected will report to their voters. We shall respect that. We will not censor yor views

Faisal: The position on Jerusalem appears to be vague?

Shimon: There is no decision. In the past we were for voting in absence. In the negotiations, put the issue under the title of elections, and not under Jerusalem. it is an open question.

Faisal: Regarding Terrorism; families of people who had been involved in terrorist activities have gone to the army, indicating that their relatives would go to prison. The IDF, said: we want to kill them. So they fought stronger than ever before. Moreover, in our view, clashes between armed people is not terrorism, while attacks on civilians is.

Shimon: Even in regard to the deportee question, Rabin said: stop the intifada for the time of negotiations and the deportees can go home. Why don't you take it up.
I understand perfectly well, that it is difficult for you to accept suggestions that are made by us. Instead of permitting us to make public suggestions, you can make demands and we can agree to accept them. We can agree on a scenario before it will be made public.

Faisal: Was the proposal to include a moratorium on violence, or a ceasefire? If we speak about violence, we have to define it more carefully. Are demonstrations violence? The village of Salfit for instance, started off with non-violent demonstrations, but it ended otherwise; will the army refrain from shooting? The Palestinians perceived the Rabin proposal as an attempt to take 415 hostages in order to obtain an announced end of the intifada.

Even if we reach an agreement; you can implement it immediately; I need time;

Shimon: We know in most cases of terror, who has instigated and controlled the terror act on your side. If there are acts of violence that are not at all under your control, we will not blame you.

Faisal: Regarding the relationship between Israel and the diaspora. There is one big difference. Your diaspora had the right to come back; even under the Mandate. We have no such right. The diaspora is forbidden to take a role in any matter.

Shimon: The Right of Return was decided by Israel, not by the diaspora. You can say: We can negotiate about the diaspora; we cannot negotiate with the diaspora. There is another difference: We are one jewish state and you have 22 Arab states, including Jordan with a Palestinian majority.

Faisal: I would like the diaspora to negotiate with our team.

Shimon: I have made such a distinction in the multilaterals. The bilateral negotiations are about the past; but the multilaterals are about the future and organised according to various subjects. Thus, everybody who is willing and qualified can participate, as long as certain difficulties on our side are respected by you.

Faisal: We want members of the PNC to participate in the negotiations. Palestinians who have distinguished professional qualifications are all members of one or the other Palestinian institution.

Shimon: May be; but if they want to negotiate they cannot be "card-holders". You, remember the negotiations in Canada; when your chairman (Muhammad Hallaj) said that he was not a "card-holder" we accepted his participation in the negotiations.

Faisal: Why is the PNC identical to the PLO according to you.

Shimon: The PNC is the parliament of the PLO.

Faisal: but one must distinguish between a government and a parliament. In the past I talked with you when I did not talk with [the Likud] government.

Regarding Gaza. We checked the idea of desalination. We do not oppose the idea, but the costs were too high. We can do something.

Shimon: But don't wait. take the initiative. We are ready to buy water for ten years and thereby offer ease the financing of the project.

Faisal: We feared in the past that the pricet will be too high, but if you are ready to by it is a change. Was this suggested to our negotiating team?

Shimon: Not yet, but I talke about it with businessmen in gaza. The cost of water depends on the cost of electricity and the cost of electricity depends on the cost of capital. You shall have also a power station.

Faisal: Regarding the role of the United States. We understand and know that the United States will not impose a solution. However, we need the Americans as a facilitator.

Shimon: Let us move ahead, as much as we can, (in direct contacts and negotiations). In case we shall make important headway we may check various ways as of how to reach (public) understanding. The logic of negotiations obliges us to understand the needs and limitations of the other side.

Faisal: We are now speaking openly and frankly, however, I am not negotiating.

Shimon: Sure; we are checking here various ideas, which, however, do not oblige either side.

Faisal: It may be useful to check the possibility of having a follow-up meeting.

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P.S. Faisal to Y.H. in the car:

1. It is of great importance to coordinate plans quietly and carefully. For this reason this meeting and further meetings, which should lead to public action, are of great importance.

2. Showing the organisational chart of the HAMAS on Israeli TV tends to further improve the image and standing of HAMAS among the Palestinians. The Palestinian people don't lack a target to work for, but the organisational means to achieve it. Hence, the demonstration of organisational capabilities is of such major political importance.

3. The Palestinian technological committees have worked our a plan for the establishment of a national electricity grid; the plan refers also to the necessity to interconnect the electricity grid of Gaza with Egypt, Israel, the West Bank and Jordan. The exact locations for the interconnection have already been identified.