מדינת ישראל

משרדי הממשלה

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March 23, 1994

From: yair hirschfeld
to: Yossi Beilin and Uri Savir

Planning an Israeli Policy towards the Palestinians of the West Bank, Jericho and the Gaza Strip

I. General Remarks:

I.1. An analytical understanding of the power structure within the West Bank, Jericho and the Gaza Strip is not possible, if the outside-inside relationship is not taken into account. Hence, an Israeli policy towards the "inside" has to be designed, as an integral part, of the entire Israeli-Palestinian relationship.

I.2. Israel's interest is to design a policy, which will assist in promoting the peace process and create a long lasting working relationship between Israel and the upper, the medium and the lower echelons of the entire pyramid of Palestinian decision-makers.

I.3. This paper will at first analyze the pecularities of the Palestinian decision-making mechanism (i.e. the functioning and the effects of Arafat's political control system); secondly, it will describe its impact on the Palestinian "inside" power structure; thirdly, Israeli policy dilemmas and the pitfalls of Israel's present strategy will be discussed, enabling us finally to suggest a new strategic approach.

II. The Palestinian Decision-Making Mechanism: Arafat's Political Control System

II.1. Arafat's political control system of the internal Palestinian decision-making process is built on the application of four power techniques: first, the creation and maintenance of a rotating double-check system (see II.2.); second, the creation of an anti-hierarchical work system (see II.3); third, an ongoing effort of internal Palestinian, and external Arab (and non-Arab) coalition building (see II.4) and finally fourth, maintaining the capability to support or oppose the ongoing negotiating process, (see II.5.)

II.2. Arafat's rotating double check system is built on the creation of rivalling power structures within decision-making institutions and between them; e.g.:
on the economic decision-making level:
PECDAR is led by Abu Ala, whereas its local directors are all former members of the technical committees and still loyal and largely controlled by Faisal Husseini; moreover in competition to PECDAR, Arafat has created an Economic Development Committee, in charge of sponsoring economic development projects. Thus, Arafat's support may be given and taken from "outside" players to "insiders" and vice versa;

on the constitutional decision-making level Arafat is planning a similar set up: the PEC (Palestinian Elected Council) will counter-balance and will be counterbalanced by the PNC (Palestinian National Council) whose members are nominated; this pattern will again enable Arafat to play the "inside" and "outside" and other groups, one against the other.

II.3. Arafat's anti-hierarchical worksystem is built on a very simple (and rather devastating) device: Arafat will give orders to subordinates contradicting the guidelines they receive from their superiors: e.g. Muhammad Abu Kosh, while working in Abu Ala's office, or Hassan Abu Libdeh, working for Faisal Husseini, will obtain direct orders from Arafat, in contradiction to the policies laid down by Abu Ala or Faisal Husseini. The immediate result hereof is threefold: increased dependency of everybody upon Arafat, the creation of an ineffective and insecure decision-making process both in Tunis and in the territories, and lastly, the creation of ongoing infights also against Arafat.

II.4. Coalition-building within Fatah and the other organisations of the PL0 is by and large a separate undertaking in Tunis and in the territories. In the territories Faisal Husseini has so far been permitted to build a coalition of forces between el-Fatah, the Communists, the Independents, the Democratic Front (Peda) and the Sha'abi; whereas in opposition to Faisal Husseini, direct support is given to the "street leadership".

Arafat's capability to build a Palestinian power coalition is strongly supplemented by his capability to obtain outside Arab, and non-Arab support. Here the United States and Egypt play of course a key role. Within the PL0, Abu Ala, Nabil Shaath and Faisal Husseini have strong enough personal connections that may weaken or strengthen Arafat's outside relations.

II.5. The effectivity of Arafat's coalition building strategies has so far been based on his ability to support or obstruct the negotiating process. The Oslo Agreement has created a certain change of the old pattern. Before September 13, 1993, the "inside" tended to pressure Tunis, to move ahead in the peace process. Yet, the fact that the "inside" was excluded from Oslo, and the understanding that Arafat's coming to Jericho, will have a strong impact on existing power patterns in the territories, has created reservation and fear among the "inside" against the process.

III. The Changing "Inside" Power Structure:

III.1. In the past, before September 13, 1993, the power base of the "inside" leadership, headed by Faisal Husseini, was based on the following power components:

- legitimacy for negotiations obtained from Tunis, Washington, Brussels and Jerusalem;
- the power of inside coalition-building, - combining the forces of right and left-wing Fatah, the Communists, the Independents, the forces of Peda and Sha'abi;
- the administrative set-up of the Orient House and the technical committees;

however, missing a grass-root structure, after in autumn 1988, the IDF had destroyed the structure of the local committees.

III.2. After September 13, the "inside" leadership headed by Faisal Husseini, lost in importance:
- Arafat and the PL0 obtained legitimacy for negotiations;
- the "inside" coalition, that had created the Washington negotiating team, lost prestige, while a new process of "outside-inside coalition building" was taking place; and
- the administrative set-up of the Orient-House was weakened by the creation of an "outside" dominated new administrative set-up.

III.3. In order to regain influence Faisal Husseini attempted to obtain the following:
- continuous financial and political support from the EC, the US and European governments; this was obtained;
- direct support from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states; this was also obtained;
- direct support from the Palestinian and Palestinian-Jordanian business community; this was partially obtained;
- from Israel, Faisal Husseini and his political partners requested:
  - to coordinate various CBM,s, such as e.g. the release of prisoners, - this was rejected;
  - to prepare quietly for early empowerment in the spheres of education, health, social welfare, tourism and direct taxation, - this was rejected;
  - to obtain a concession for opening a tv and radio program, - this was rejected.

III.4. The weakening of the power structure of the Orient-House has tended to strengthen the more diffuse power-structure of regional power-brokers, such as the local Fatah leadership and the old regional families. Both of these groups tend to be hardliners. The local Fatah-leadership has no knowledge and experience of cooperation with Israel (outside the prison walls); the old traditional families, whose power base is regional, have experienced the undermining of their power position, by Israel, since the introduction of the "village-league policy" of Ariel Sharon.

IV. Israeli Dilemmas and Pitfalls:

IV.1. Endeavouring to promote the peace process, the Government of Israel has to overcome several policy dilemmas, such as:

- strengthen chairman Arafat, on one hand, while on the other, develop a close working relationship with an optimal number of "inside" power brokers;
- widen the general Palestinian support for a peace policy, without increasing Palestinian demands against Israel;
- maintain important concessions for future negotiations, while implementing immediately change on the ground;
- centralize coordination for promoting economic cooperation, while creating a wide range of Israeli-Palestinian relations on the ground;
- take internal Palestinian power struggles into consideration, without replicating their internal division on the Israeli side.

IV. 2. So far, little success has been obtained regarding the policy aims outlined under IV.1.:

- chairman Arafat's position has been weakened, while the former working relationship with "inside" power brokers has almost completely faltered;
- Palestinian support for a peace policy has dwindled;
- no immediate change has been implemented on the ground;
- efforts for promoting economic cooperation have been diffuse and have created serious Palestinian fears of anticipated Israeli business practices;
- Palestinian internal power struggles have been largely replicated on the Israeli side.

V. An Alternative Israeli Strategy:

V. 1. In order to succeed in the peace negotiations, Israel should adopt a "Three-Level Strategy". In essence, this would mean:

first, to strengthen Arafat's need and capability to follow a peace policy, by implementing in a dialogue with him, practical change on the ground (not only in the Gaza Strip and Jericho, but also in the West Bank);
second, preserve Faisal Husseini and the Orient-House set-up as a factor of moderation and pragmatism, by renewing and intensifying the political dialogue with Faisal Husseini and the Orient House set-up;
third, to re-create a working relationship with local Palestinian power brokers of both the local Fatah-organisations and the local families.

More in detail, the following policy measures are proposed:

V.2. Strengthening Arafat by the following policy measures:

- Even before the final signature of the Gaza-Jericho Implementation Agreement, several practical steps of implementation should be carried out; practical implementation will increase Arafat's dependence on further implementation measures;
- in order to improve the economic situation immediately, a one-time import of large quantitities of cement from Jordan (at the Jordanian price of $ 43,- instead the Nesher prices of $ 73,-) should be granted and measures taken to encourage immediate private and public construction;
- practical steps should be taken to enable Arafat to to start work on the implementation of several economic key projects, to include: the establishment of a PDB (Palestinian Development Bank); the construction of a port in Gaza; the establishment of a car industry in Gaza; the construction of a 120 Megawatt power station in Gaza to be combined with the desalination of sea water (to be guaranteed at a m3 price of US $ 0,70); the promotion of public housing projects and the implementation of tourism development projects.

  Practical support may be offered behind the scenes, by assisting in permitting the Palestinians to obtain financial and technical aid from various governments and be instrumental in obtaining the necessary permissions etc. Moreover, related cooperation agreements may be prepared and agreed upon confidentially and concluded in such a way, as to permit the creation of an ongoing effective working relationship between Israeli and local Palestinian partners.

  Undoubtedly, practical and visible movement in the implementation of these projects, set into motion by Arafat and his office for economic affairs, will provide the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza with the necessary confidence in the success of the peace process.

- Agree to start final status negotiations, as soon as possible, still before elections in the territories.

V.3. Renew the political dialogue with Faisal Husseini and the Orient House set-up, by promoting the following policies:

- renew an ongoing dialogue between Faisal Husseini and the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, as well as sometimes also with the MFA;
- involve Faisal in an ongoing brainstorming dialogue regarding final status issues;
- within the framework of multilateral negotiations start to take preparations for early empowerment;
- provide practical assistance, enabling the Orient House to intensify its relations with Palestinian outside investors; (e.g. encourage with them the Hasib Sabbagh and the Shuman connection and support several of the projects that have obtained their funding);
- encourage support to Faisal Husseini's coalition partners (the Communists, the Peda-Party, the Sha'abi) with the assistance of proxies (European Govts., various Israeli groups) in coordination with him.

V.4. Recreate a working relationship with local power groups:

- to create a working relationship with local Fatah groups, create practical cooperation in security and police affairs on the ground;
- to create an effective relationship with the local Palestinian political leadership, businessmen, other professional groups and associations, the geographical proximity to close-by Israeli areas, the forces of the labour market and the natural search for new business opportunities, mainly of small enterprises, may be effectively exploited. For the promotion of this kind of daily regional (local) cooperation, three different tactics should be adopted:
First, small grants should be provided for promoting a variety of local business cooperation schemes; second, local institutes should act as centers for promoting a close relationship with neighbouring Palestinian areas (e.g. Givat Haviva with the area of Tulqarem and Qalqiliya; IPCRI with the Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Ramallah area; etc.); third, a variety of municipality to municipality programmes should be developed; assuming that presently Palestinian municipalities will be hesitant, a variety of tri- or multilateral programs with the assistanc of the European Community and the IULA (International Union of Local Authorities) should be sponsored.

VI. Proposed Practical Steps:

VI.1. Most of the policy proposals described may be discussed and their implementation agreed upon, in the unobliging set-up of an informal backchannel. Moreover, for certain policy steps, the involvement of various non-governmental agents may be most useful.

VI. 2. The following organisational set up is suggested:
An ad hoc committee composed of Yossi Beilin, Uri Savir, Shlomo Gur, Yair Hirschfeld and Ron Pundik will devise guidelines for informal backchannel activities.

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סודי

17 מרץ 1994

947536

הנדון: דוח פגישה

1. נפגשנו ד"ר הירשפלד וד"ר פונדק היום עם פייצל חוסייני במשרדו.

2. חוסייני הציג בפנינו את המצב הקשה בו מצויה ההנהגה הפלסטינית ואת הדילמה הפליסטינית: מחד צורך להמשיך במו"מ ולממש את ההסכמים במהירות, ומאידך את המצוקה של הפלסטינים בעקבות הטבח.

3. חוסייני הביע רצונו למצוא דרך לחידוש המו"מ. במהלך השיחה התגבשה הצעה על פיה שני הצדדים יבדקו אפשרות קיום פגישה בין שר החוץ לבין חוסייני כדי להכין פגישה רחבה יותר בין שר החוץ לבין שורה של מנהיגים פלסטינים כולל נציגים מהשטח, אשר יקראו לערפאת לחזור לשולחן המו"מ.

4. בשלב ראשון של השיחה העמיד חוסייני באופן אולטימטיבי את הדרישה לפינוי המתנחלים מלב חברון. בהמשך, ולאחר שהבהרנו לו את הבעיות הניצבות בפני ממשלת ישראל בנושא זה, הביע נכונות לבדוק אפשרויות חדשות אחרות אשר יאפשרו לפלסטינים להחזיר את החיים בחברון למסלולם ולהציג הישג שיאפשר חזרה למשא ומתן. עם זאת הבהיר שאם קיים צעד בודד שיביא לחידוש המו"מ הרי הוא הוצאת ההתנחלויות מלב העיר.

5. בנוסף סבור חוסייני שעל ישראל להבין שבכדי שהסכם עזה ויריחו יהווה "מקרה מבחן" מוצלח, על שני הצדדים למנוע ככל האפשר חיכוך מיותר בין האוכלוסיות ולצורך כך צריך לפעול להורדת שתי ההתנחלויות ברצועה התקועות בלב האזור הפלסטיני ולצרף את האוכלוסיה לגוש קטיף. לדעת חוסייני הכרזה כזאת כבר עתה תסייע לפלסטינים לחזור לשולחן המו"מ.

6. באשר לנוכחות כוח בינלאומי בשטחים הבהיר חוסייני שלפלסטינים לא משנה איזה ציוד ישאו המשקיפים - האם יהיה זה רובה או מקל - אלא מה יהיה הסטטוס החוקי של המשקיפים, תוך דגש ליחס ביניהם לבין חיילי צה"ל.

7. חוסייני איננו מקבל לחלוטין את ההצעה להחזיר את השוטרים הערבים ששרתו במשטרת ישראל לשרות בחברון. חוסייני מעונין לבדוק את הרעיון שיוקם כוח שיטור משותף ישראלי-פלסטיני שיאבטח את העיר, כאשר השוטרים הפלסטינים נמצאים תחת פיקוד מפקדת המשטרה הפלסטינית של עזה-יריחו.

8. חוסייני התלונן בפנינו שאף נציג ישראלי לא הקדים לעדכן את הפלסטינים אודות שחרור 950 האסירים בסיבוב האחרון ולא פרט בפניו מי ומי ברשימת המשוחררים. אם היה יודע למשל שבין המשוחררים ישנם גם כאלה שאמורים היו לשבת עוד מספר שנים, היה מציג זאת כמחווה ישראלית משמעותית דבר שהיה מסייע להורדת המתח. יתרה מזאת לא ברור לו מדוע ישראל לא שיחררה אנשים המופיעים ברשימה שהגישו הפלסטינים וכוללת זקנים חולים וכו. ראוי לציין שעמדת צה"ל שלא לתאם צעדים של רצון טוב עם הפלסטינים - דבר שבא לידי ביטוי גם בעבר - מונעת יצירת אמון הדדי ושימוש פוליטי יעיל על ידי שני הצדדים.

9. חוסייני הדגיש שיש חשיבות מירבית לסיים המו"מ מהר ככל הניתן בכדי לממש יישום ההסכם עד תאריך היעד שנקבע בהסכם אוסלו (13 אפריל).

10. חוסייני מעונין להגיע להסכמה להקדמת תחילת המו"מ על הסדר הקבע ופתיחתו בדיון על נושאי ההתנחלויות.

STANLEY K. SHEINBAUM

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FAX COVER SHEET

To: Yair Hirschfeld
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FROM: Stanley Sheinbaum
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PAGES (INCLUDING COVER) DATE 21 march

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Stanley K. Sheinbaum

March 16, 1994

VIA FAX

President Bill Clinton
The White House
1600 Pensylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Bill:

I particularly appreciated your very deft handling of the Jerusalem/UN resolution question just a few minutes ago in your press conference with Prime Minister Rabin. There has been conflicting stories about whether or not members of your peace team--as you have referred to them re--were pressing to have Jerusalem excluded from the definition of the Occupied Territories in the about to be raised UN resolution. Further that "instruction" to Israel would then exclude the protection of Palestinians in Jerusalem. Nevertheless this confusion surrounding the Jerusalem/UN resolution affords me the opportunity to address what I think is a broader--and deeper problem.

It is clear that in the post-Hebron moment the entire peace process could come to naught. Interestingly, I have the sense that Rabin now functions from a stronger position than before. The question arises, however, as to what good it does to have Rabin strengthened if at the same time Arafat is becoming so weak among the Palestinians that there may not be anyone of consequence to be at the table trying to bring the process to a conclusion. Certainly among those who broke away from Arafat in the months before Oslo was announced nobody looms now as a successor. Further, and as I wrote in my description of my meeting with Prime Minister Rabin about a month ago, even his sees the future Palestinian leadership coming from a different direction, that is, the rising generation of the young ones whose political training was primarily in the *intifada*.

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What I am saying is that at least for the present Washington's policy should be to strengthen Arafat's hand as much as possible if only to get on with the *negotiations*. Except for your press conference response, we seem to be doing exactly the opposite. I have mentioned this tendency in the past, but with a resolution of the peace process within reach despite Hebron this is a most critical moment.

At a time when Hebron is causing the Palestinians to expect and even to demand more of Arafat in obtaining a better position for the Palestinians the difficult question of Jerusalem has been thrown on the table. In the first place, in Oslo they, the Palestinians and the Israelis, were smart enough to recognize that Jerusalem could be a dead breaker and decided to keep it out of consideration for the upcoming interim period especially at first when the Declaration of Principles (DOP) were being hammered out and also when the complexities of their implementation had to be negotiated. (Self-servingly, I will tell you that 18 months ago I recommended similarly that Jerusalem be kept off the agenda until the end. That fell on deaf ears in your system.)

All that notwithstanding here we are suddenly facing the Jerusalem question in the context of revising that 16-year old UN resolution. The inclusion of Jerusalem in the definition of the Territories at that time has stuck in the craw of the Israelis. That is not difficult to understand given the ancient and profound meaning of Jerusalem to them. It is not surprising that even some outstanding Labor dovish types share this view. But why try to rectify that 15 year old error now when the peace process itself is at stake?! And keep in mind that the agreements concluded in Cairo were about to be announced in just a few days if not hours when Goldstein struck in Hebron. Despite all their desire to get Jerusalem out of the UN resolution the Israelis to their credit seem to have signaled Washington to let it remain. They at least have gotten their priorities in order. Peace is at the top of their list. Why not the same for the US regardless of when Israel sees the light?

To repeat, the operative question after Hebron is the effect the raising of the Jerusalem question is having on Arafat's standing among his own constituency and therefore the effect of his declining credibility on the peace

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process. What was done in Hebron was done to the Palestinians and despite that we see the Jerusalem matter being whipped up against them with endorsement by the US. Who is doing it? To repeat, the worst of it is that exactly when the Palestinians are increasingly disenchanted with Arafat we are helping to undermine him--as if Hebron didn't do enough in that respect. Goldstein is getting what he wanted.

I think you would do well to take a look at this one very narrow matter as a specific manifestation of what I see as the overall problem. You should ask why the US is taking so perverse a position. That the Israelis are of one mind about it--despite their sudden flexibility--is their business. But why the US should be so tilted is a very serious question especially at this time when at least the stated US position is to get the peace process back on track. Last year the Palestinians (and the Israelis) took off for Oslo when they felt that Washington was resisting. That is being sensed again, and thus the resistance--at least for the Palestinians--to return to Washington to negotiate.

One of the interesting guidelines at Oslo was an early-on agreement to avoid history and just do deal with the circumstances of today. No multi-thousand year old religious dispute can be satisfactorily resolved in time to help resolve the peace negotiation, a political matter. Attempting to redo that Jerusalem part of that 16 year old UN resolution which did indeed generate so much anger can only have a negative impact, exactly the sort of thing that was avoided in Oslo.

One last comment. If anything should be the focus at this moment they should be the problems "on the ground", the immediate issues. Obviously I am referring to the question of the settlements, the authority of the IDF and the incipient Palestinian police. Rabin finally is taking some of the necessary steps to protect Palestinians but needs to do more--and should be encouraged. Good, but going backwards to a definitional question--albeit a particular critical one such as Jerusalem--is just sheer poor judgement at this kind of a moment. Even the Palestinians are making this error. Yes, although they are raising those "on the ground questions," they themselves are venting too much anger over the Jerusalem item. As they did in Oslo they should bypass it

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note that not even Arafat--as was expected he might--is calling for the dismantling of the settlements.

To repeat, exactly why the US seems to be engaged in what looks like a tilt bewilders me. I hate to burden you when there is so much domestic shenanigan swirling around you, but I think it is important for you to focus on this relatively narrow matter to know why this is occurring. You have a major foreign policy breakthrough within your grasp. My fear is that the peace may get away from you. So why has Washington been moving in the opposite direction by urging the exclusion of Jerusalem from the definition of the Occupied Territories? Why does the peace process itself not have the highest priority in Washington? Somebody has not been thinking clearly--if peace really is the top priority.

The Jerusalem/UN resolution matter is merely the current manifestation of the tilt, but it keeps reappearing. That's the broader problem. Your response at the press conference may have rendered this letter irrelevant. But that the question arose at all is disturbing. Now, the question is whether your peace team is convinced.

Respectfully,

SKS/kc
clinton.1

cc: Secretary of State Warren Christopher

The Palestinian-Israeli Negotiations

Results of a Palestinian Public Opinion Poll

Center for Palestine Research and Studies
(CPRS)

This copy is translated from Arabic to English by

DATA Studies & Translations
P.O. Box 9013
Bethlehem, West Bank

1) Do you agree that the PLO should return to the negotiating table?

	West Bank & Gaza Strip	West Bank	Gaza Strip
1. Yes	17.2%	14.5%	22.2%
2. No	32.5%	39.5%	19.[illegible]
3. I agree that the PLO should return to the negotiating table on the condition that [illegible] is provided.	38.8%	39.6%	37.[illegible]
4. I do not know	11.5%	6.4%	21.[illegible]

2) Do you agree that negotiating [illegible] with the postponing of the settlement issue to the final stage of the negotiations [illegible]?

	West Bank & Gaza Strip	West Bank	Gaza Strip
1. Yes	[illegible]	8%	8.7%
2. Yes	[illegible]	30.5%	33.9%
3. No	[illegible]	58.2%	52.4%
4. I do not know	[illegible]	3.2%	5.0%

3) Do you think that the soldier who committed the [illegible] Mosque massacre in Hebron?

	West Bank & Gaza Strip	West Bank	Gaza Strip
1. Acted on an individual basis	[illegible]	1%	2.[illegible]
2. Worked with a terrorist group	[illegible]	12.8%	[illegible]
3. Collaborated with the Israeli army	[illegible]	25.8%	[illegible]
4. [illegible]	[illegible]	56.0%	[illegible]
5. I do not know	[illegible]	4.4%	[illegible]

What is your evaluation of the performance of the PNA after the Ibrahimi mosque massacre (PLO handling of events related to the massacre)?

	West Bank	Gaza Strip
1. Good in general	[illegible]	20.9%
2. Median	[illegible]	24.5%
3. Below required standard	48.6%	46.1%
4. I do not know	10.3%	8.5%

Given the Political and economic conditions the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are going through and the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, are you optimistic or pessimistic regarding the future?

	West Bank	Gaza Strip
1. Optimistic	25.8%	30.8%
2. Pessimistic	37.1%	40.1%
3. Not sure	27.1%	29.1%

If elections were held to elect the members of the Self-Government Authority Council, who would you vote for?

	West Bank	Gaza Strip
1. Democratic Front	3.0%	2.1%
2. Fatah	34.8%	40.1%
3. Hamas	14.1%	19.8%
4. Republic Front	6.1%	8.6%
5. Feeda	2.6%	0.6%
6. Islamic Jihad	3.6%	3.5%
7. People's Party	2.4%	1.0%
8. Independent Islamists	9.0%	[illegible]
9. Independent Nationalists	12.5%	[illegible]
10. Other organization (specify)	1.1%	1.2%
11. No one (from the above mentioned)	10.8%	9.4%

In your opinion what is the best method to select members from the West Bank and Gaza Strip for the Palestinian National Council

		West Bank	Gaza Strip
1. Nationwide general elections in the West Bank and Gaza Strip	[illegible]	80.2%	[illegible]
2. Continuation of their appointment by the PLO leadership	[illegible]	9.0%	[illegible]
3. To be appointed by the representatives of various groups based on the share system	[illegible]	8.9%	[illegible]
4. Other (specify _____)	2.3%	1.9%	[illegible]

If elections were to take place in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to elect the members of the Palestinian National Council, would you

	West Bank & Gaza Strip	West Bank	Gaza Strip
1. In support of it as a replacement to the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority Council	35.4%	36.7%	25.5%
2. In support of it, if it is not a replacement to the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority Council	29.5%	30.3%	30.5%
3. In support of it, if the armed individuals are not considered members of the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority Council	24.7%	23.9%	25.7%
4. Other (specify _____)	10.4%	9.1%	18.3%

District	Population	Number of Clusters	Sample Distribution
Nablus city	45,852	5	100% cities
East Nablus	2,685	1	89% villages, 11% camps
West Nablus	53,253	6	92% villages, 8% camps
Nablus Area	201,880	22	

District	Population	Number of Clusters	Sample Distribution
Tulkarm	45,589	5	25% cities, 64% villages, 11% camps
Tulkarm	90,938	10	33% cities, 67% villages
Tulkarm Area	200,882	22	

District	Population	Number of Clusters	Sample Distribution
Jenin	68,724	7	14% cities, 34% villages, 12% camps
Jenin	78,498	8	100% villages
Jenin Area	201,222	22	

District	Population	Number of Clusters	Sample Distribution
Jericho	28,557	3	38% cities, 24% villages, 21% camps

District	Population	Number of Clusters	Sample Distribution
North Ramallah	76,963	8	84% villages, 16% camps
South Ramallah	97,855	10	20% cities, 80% villages, 13% camps
Ramallah City	35,178	4	25% cities, 10% villages, 8% camps
Ramallah Area	220,694	22	

District	Population	Number of Questionnaires	Sample Distribution
North Hebron	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]% villages, 16% camps
South Hebron	[illegible]	[illegible]	68% villages, 12% camps
Hebron City	[illegible]	[illegible]	100% cities
Hebron Area	[illegible]	[illegible]	

District	Population	Number of Questionnaires	Sample Distribution
Bethlehem City	28,645	[illegible]	[illegible]% cities, 51% villages, 16% camps
Bethlehem Surrounding	74,972	[illegible]	[illegible]% cities, 74% villages, 16% camps
Bethlehem Area	238,914	[illegible]	

District	Population	Number of Questionnaires	Sample Distribution
Jerusalem City	[illegible]	[illegible]	14% cities, 86% villages
Jerusalem Surrounding	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]% cities, 42% villages, 9% camps
Jerusalem Area	[illegible]	[illegible]	

District	Population	Number of Questionnaires	Sample Distribution
Gaza and the North	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible] Beit Lahia, Jabalia camp, AL-Nuseir
Gaza City (1)	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible] camp., Al-Shiek Radwan, Al-Nasr
Gaza City (2)	[illegible]	[illegible]	AL-Remal, Al-Durj, Al-Sabra
Gaza City (3)	[illegible]	[illegible]	Al-Tufah, Al-Shujaia, Al-Zaytoun
Southern Part of the Gaza Strip	[illegible]	[illegible]	

District	Population	Number of Quarters	Sample Distribution
Middle Camps	[illegible]		[illegible] Al-Maghazi, Al-Nisserat, Al-Zawaida, Deir Al-Balah

District	Population	Number of Quarters	Sample Distribution
Khan Younis Area	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible] Khan Younis camp, Qarara, [illegible] Absan Al Kabira, Absan Al Saghira
Rafah Area	142,945	20	Rafah City, Rafah Camp
Northern Part of the Gaza Strip	[illegible]	[illegible]	

From: Yair Hirschfeld
to: Uri Savir

March 13, 1994

I. SUGGESTIONS FOR POLICY AIMS TOWARDS THE PALESTINIAN "INSIDE"

1. Israel's foreign relations are strongly influenced by the development of the Israeli-Palestinian relationship. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, being presently involved in negotiations with the "outside" leadership, has an interest to define several policy aims related to the development of the Israeli-Palestinian (inside) relationship.

2. Israel's long-term aims are:
   a) to create a political separation between Israel and the Palestinian territories;
   b) to create stability in the security, the political, the social and the economic spheres;
   c) to create an intense web of institutional and human relations between Israel, the Palestinian self-government entity and Jordan.

3. Israel's short-term aims in the territories are:
   a) to create employment opportunities in the West Bank and Gaza;
   b) to enforce, as far as possible, physical separation;
   c) to implement the Oslo agreement, as soon as possible, and although negotiating with the "outside", create a constructive relationship with the "inside" leadership and various strata of Palestinian society.

II. SUGGESTED PRACTICAL STEPS

1. Promoting Employment in the Construction Industry:

   In order to create immediate employment and self-employment a complete liberalization of the cement import is suggested. At times of closure, or of economic crisis, due to decreasing outside employment opportunities, increasing private construction activities have in the past created an effective security valve.

   Permitting cement imports from Egypt and/or Jordan to the West Bank, Jericho and the Gaza Strip, willdecrease the costs for cement by over 50 % and offer a major impetus for private and public construction activities and would create immediately thousands of employment opportunities, decreasing also the demand for employment in Israel.

   In confidential talks with the Egyptian and Jordanian governments, as well as with the Palestinian leadership, a quid pro quo could be quickly agreed upon in such a way, as to compensate the owners of Nesher (Clal, Koor and the GoI) for possible short- and long-term losses.
   A coordinated approach of the MFA and ECF should be prepared.

2. Promoting the Implementation of Economic Key Projects

The Palestinians are planning presently to start work on the implementation of several economic key projects, to include: the establishment of a PDB (Palestinian Development Bank); the construction of a port in Gaza; the establishment of a car industry in Gaza; the construction of a 120 Megawatt power station in Gaza to be combined with the desalination of sea water (to be guaranteed at a m3 price of US $ 0,70); the promotion of public housing projects and the implementation of tourism development projects.

The MFA and ECF can offer practical support behind the scenes, assist in permitting the Palestinians to obtain financial and technical aid from various governments and be instrumental in obtaining the necessary permissions etc. Moreover, related cooperation agreements may be prepared and agreed upon confidentially and concluded in such a way, as to permit the creation of an ongoing effective working relationship between Israeli and local Palestinian partners.

Undoubtedly, practical and visible movement in the implementation of these projects will provide the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza with the necessary confidence in the success of the peace process.

3. Cooperation in Technical Research and Human Resources Development:

In cooperation with Hasib J. Sabbagh (Consolidated Contractors, with 35 000 employees and an annual turnover of $ 1,5 billion) a joint Israeli-Palestinian Research and Development Programme shall be worked out. Sabbagh is presently engaged in establishing a Technical High School and University in Kalandia and is interested in obtaining support from Israel.

The MFA and ECF should prepare together a cooperation programme, to include tri- and multilateral activities, as well as the creation of bi-lateral working groups (to be funded by US-AID, the EC, various foundations, private Palestinian donors, as well as Israeli governmental and non-governmental sources etc.)

4. Cooperation in Education and Culture:

A Israeli-Palestinian working group on educational matters already has been established. The MFA and ECF are presently engaged in mapping suggested activities. A variety of programs may be submitted for funding from local Israeli, jewish and foreign resources.

Those programs should serve the following aims:
- disseminate Palestinian culture and folklore in Israel; (not necessarily on a symmetrical bilateral basis);
- develop joint educational approaches against stereotypes and the perpetuation of mutual hostility;
- develop joint teacher training courses;
- develop programs for adult education.

5. Cooperation in Social Welfare and Health

In this sphere the practical political arrangements for defining the financial criteria of Israeli payments from paid in Social Security Funds, will largely determine the character of future Israeli-Palestinian cooperation in this sphere.

A series of cooperation projects should be prepared, and sponsored in full coordination with the existing framework created by Ruhama Morton and Fathi Arafat. Other institutions, universities, the associations of social workers, doctors, nurses, etc. should be encouraged to take part in ongoing activities. A variety of activities should be coordinated with the WHO.

6. Cooperation on the Regional and Municipal Level

On the Palestinian side, the regional (local) political leadership, businessmen, other professional groups and associations tend to be interested in creating an effective working relationship with their regional (local) Israeli partners. Simple geographical realities, the forces of the labour market and the natural search for new business opportunities, mainly of small enterprises, make such a cooperation imperative.

For the promotion of this kind of daily regional (local) cooperation, three different tactics should be adopted: First, small grants should be provided for promoting a variety of local business cooperation schemes; second, local institutes should act as centers for promoting a close relationship with neighbouring Palestinian areas (e.g. Givat Haviva with the area of Tulqarem and Qalqiliya; IPCRI with the Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Ramallah area; etc.); third, a variety of municipality to municipality programmes should be developed; assuming that presently Palestinian municipalities will be hesitant, a variety of tri- or multilateral programs with the assistance of the European Community and others, should be sponsored.

7. Cooperation in Policy Planning

Whereas the official negotiations are led today with the "outside" leadership, it appears useful to create a variety of brainstorming groups with the "inside" political, academic and professional leadership.

Ongoing activities:
ECF, in cooperation with the Truman Institute (Hebrew University) and the Monaster Institute (Ben Gurion University) on one hand, and the Palestinian Research Institute "DATA" on the other hand, has established six joint Israeli-Palestinian working groups on: labor relations, trade, industry, agriculture, financial institutions, and macro-economic assessment of the benefits of peace.

Planned activities:
a. ECF will establish together with the Truman Institute and the
Sari Nusseibeh consultancy group working sessions on joint Israeli-Palestinian management of the aquifer. The EC will finance this project.

b. ECF together with the Truman Institute and in cooperation with PASSIA (Mahdi Abdul hadi), plans to establish a working group on issues related to Jerusalem. The Friedrich Ebert Foundation has offered to finance this project. The Belgian Government has expressed its interest in financing related, possible follow-up projects.

c. ECF together with the Truman Institute and in cooperation with the Middle East Program of the Royal Institute of International Afairs, Chatham House, intend to establish a trilateral Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian working group for the investigation of issues related to the envisaged establishment of a future Jordanian-Palestinian Confederation.

d. The Truman Institute, in cooperation with Harvard University, intend to establish a multilateral US-israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian working group for the investigation of issues related to the refugee problem.

e. Together with FAFO and SETECO from Norway, working vis a vis PECDAR, ECF intends to assist in the preparation of an Infrastructurue Development Plan for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

III. SUGGESTED COOPERATION BETWEEN THE MFA AND ECF

We suggest that cooperation between the MFA and ECF will be based on a 13-Point Program:

1. The ECF will in cooperation with the MFA work out a joint Egyptian-Jordanian-Palestinian-Israeli proposal, regarding the suggested liberalisation of cement import from Jordan and Egypt to the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and Israel.

2. The MFA and ECF will coordinate activities for providing active assistance to the Palestinian leadership for the quick promotion of planned Palestinian economic development projects. Several joint meetings with Palestinian economic decision-makers will be held.

3. The MFA and ECF will finish as soon as possible the ongoing mapping activity of proposed Israeli-Palestinian cooperation projects.

4. The MFA will in consultation with ECF prepare an Israeli-Palestinian Industrial Research and Development Program, to be submitted by ECF to Hasib Sabbagh. Activities for necessary fund raising shall be coordinated.

5. The MFA will in consultation with ECF create a standing committee for the promotion of Israeli-Palestinian Education and Culture Programs. The activities of this committee shall be coordinated with Shimon Shamir, Dan Bitan and Aliza Shenhar on the Israeli side, and with Fathi Arafat on the Palestinian side.

6. Jointly accepted programs shall be submitted for financing to UNESCO, the EC, various European Governments, various US agencies and foundations and others.

7. The MFA will initiate a joint policy session with the Ministry of Health and the Bituah Leumi, in order to verify and coordinate health and social welfare policies towards the Palestinians in the West Bank, Jericho and the Gaza Strip.

8. Based on the findings of (7) the MFA will in consultation with ECF create a committee for the promotion of Israeli-Palestinian cooperation projects regarding issues of health and social welfare. The activities of this committee shall be fully coordinated with Ruhama Morton and Rafi Walden on the Israeli side, with Fathi Arafat, and possibly independently with Dr. Mamduh al-Aker and Mustapha Bargouthi, or others, on the other hand.

9. Various bi-, tri-, or multilateral working programs regarding health and social welfare may be prepared in full coordination with the WHO; which would ease the ensueing search for funding.

10. The MFA will suggest to the Ministry of Finances the establishment of a cooperation fund for small Israeli and Palestinian enterprises.

11. The MFA will in cooperation with ECF, assist Givat Haviva, IPCRI and other local agents to prepare Israeli-Palestinian cooperation program for specific regions.

12. The MFA will in consultation with ECF prepare multilateral seminar and colloquia programs regarding municipal development work. The European Committee, and various European governments shall be asked to organize and finance such programs.

13. The MFA, ECF and the Truman Institute will pursue an ongoing dialogue regarding the pursuance of various academic brainstorming activities carried out in cooperation with Palestinian partners.

==========

סודי ביותר
אישי

כ"ג באדר תשנ"ד
6 במרץ 1994

931092

אל: ד"ר יוסי ביילין

מאת: ד"ר יאיר הירשפלד וד"ר רון פונדק

הנדון: דו"ח פגישה עם ד"ר מאהר אל-כורד

1. נפגשנו בוינה פעמיים (4-3 במרץ 1994) עם ד"ר מאהר אל-כורד, אשר הגיע לפגישה באישורו המפורש של יאסר ערפאת. כזכור, היה אל-כורד מהצוות המקורי למו"מ באוסלו.

2. בתחילת הפגישה הראשונה תאר אלכורד את המאבק הפנימי הקשה האוחז את הנהגת אש"ף, בין מחנה עראפת לבין מחנה אבו מאזן ואבו עלא (פרוט ראה בדו"ח נפרד).
המדובר במאבק פוליטי על כוח ללא קשר לעמדות הצדדים לגבי התהליך המדיני. עם זאת תוצאות המאבק גורמות לכך שעראפת הפרגמטיסט בד"כ נאלץ להציג עמדות יותר "לאומיות" ויותר קיצוניות. המאבקים מבית פוגעים בתהליך המדיני על אף שעראפת רוצה ליישם מהר ככל האפשר את ה- DOP.

3. אל כורד הציע שנקבע תוך מספר ימים מקום ותאריך לפגישה חשאית בינינו לבין אש"ף. כל צד יבוא עם עוד שניים או שלושה אנשים בכדי לדון על חבילה שתכלל ארבעה אלמנטים:
א. פתרון המשבר הנוכחי בעקבות הטבח בחברון (הצעות בנושא ראה בהמשך).
ב. גישור מהיר על הפערים שנותרו בהסכם עזה - יריחו, והליכה מהירה לחתימת ויישום ההסכם.
ג. בניית צעדים כלכליים תוך שיתוף פעולה הדוק על בסיס ה- DOP
ד. מימוש הצעדים הכלכליים והליכה לבחירות על בסיס יציבות פוליטית, בטחון ותנופת פיתוח.

נקבעה התקשרות טלפונית ביום שני הקרוב (7 במרץ) והוסכם שתאריך היעד לפגישה החשאית יהיה סוף השבוע הקרוב (12 מרץ).

4. הביע בפנינו את ההערכה הרווחת בקרב צמרת אש"ף ביחס למדיניותה של ישראל באשר לעתיד השטחים, לדעתם קיים מחנה אחד הרוצה לראות הסדר ביניים שבעקבותיו יצאו הפלסטינים מחוזקים ויציבים כלכלית ומדינית, דבר שיביא לידי הסדר קבע המבוסס על ההבנות של אוסלו.

מאידך קיים מחנה שני שרוצה לראות בתקופת הביניים התפוררות פלסטינית, אלימות פנימית, חוסר יציבות והידרדרות כלכלית בכדי להראות לעולם שאין אפשרות להגיע לפתרון ישראלי - פלסטיני, ושהדרך היחידה היא קונדומיניון ירדני - ישראלי על השטחים. להערכת צמרת אש"ף המחנה השני מתחזק עתה ומיישם את תפיסתו בשטחים.

5. באשר לפתרון המשבר הנוכחי, הציג בפנינו את ארבע התביעות הפומביות של אש"ף, אל כורד שוחח בנושא עם תוניס והדרישה הפלסטינית היא שישראל תאמץ לפחות שתיים מהתביעות. לדעת אש"ף צריך לפרק את המתח באמצעות צעדים סמליים אשר ישפיעו פסיכולוגית על האוכלוסיה בשטחים. שתי התביעות החשובות יותר הן בנושא הנוכחות הבינלאומית ובנושא הוצאת ההתנחלות מלב חברון והעברת תושביה לקרית ארבע. באשר לפרוק המתנחלים מנשק עלה הרעיון שעל המתנחלים יהיה אסור לשאת בגלוי נשק כאשר הם נמצאים בריכוזי אוכלוסיה ערבית.

6. אש"ף גם מציע דרך נוספת לשחרור המתח באמצעות הצהרה ישראלית אשר תאמר שישראל ואש"ף יקיימו ועדה אשר תדון בנושא ההתנחלויות לקראת הסדר הקבע.

7. אל כורד מניח על סמך שיחותיו האחרונות עם תוניס, שאש"ף יוכל להכריז שהוא חוזר לשולחן המו"מ תוך מספר ימים, אם ישראל תצא בהצהרה בנושאים הבאים:
א. ישראל תהיה מוכנה לדון מייד עם אש"ף על צורת הנוכחות הבינלאומית
ב. הגבלת המתנחלים בנשיאת נשק
ג. העברת ההתנחלות בלב חברון
ד. הקמת ועדה חצי רשמית לדיון בפתרון הקבע בדגש על ההתנחלויות.

8. בכל מקרה אל כורד הבהיר שאין קשר בין חידוש המו"מ הרשמי לבין נכונותו של אש"ף לפתוח מייד בשיחות חשאיות על החבילה הרחבה.

9. במהלך השיחות עלו מספר נושאים נוספים בדגש על נושא שיתוף פעולה כלכלי ישראלי - פלסטיני (דו"ח בנפרד).

/

לוש.

4 מרץ 1994

אל: ד"ר יוסי ביילין

מאת: ד"ר י.ו ונשטוק / ד"ר רון שוקרון

נושא פגישה עם ד"ר מאהר אל-כורד.

1. לפגישתנו הזו"נה בפאריס (2-3 מרץ 1994) עם ד"ר מאהר אל-כורד אשר הינו לפגישה בלוסיון המפורסם של יאסר ערפאת. כצפוי היה אל כורד מבלות ומקור, למרות הכלוסיון.

2. בתחילת הפגישה הרצאנה תאור אל כורד את המאבק הפנימי הקשה (לאומי את הנהגת אש"ף, בין מחנה ערפאת לבין מחנה אבו מאזן ואבו עלי. (פרוט נאה זכות לפרט).

3. המבוכה במאבק פוליטי על כוח ללא קשר לעמדות הצדדים לסכסוך המדיני. עם צאת תקנות המאבק שורמות לכך שערפאת הינו אישיות בדמה לנשיאי אמצע אמריקה "לשומות" ולאו קיבוניות. המאבקים מבית פוגעים בתהליך המדיני על אף שערפאת רואה לייסם מחדש כנגד הנשיא את ה - PDSD.

לדבריו אל כורד, העומדה שהקשר העיקרי בין ישראל לבין אש"ף נמצא בידיים של אבו עלי ואבו מאזן מזדקה את ערפאת מהתהליך ומורמת לכך שהוא מתנהג כסיכומים שנעשו ללא ידיעתו, ללא קשר לשורת הסיכומים.

4. אל כורד הציע שנקבע תוך מספר ימים מקום ומועד לפגישה משלחת בינוי לבין אש"ף. כ 33 יהודי או אנשי שיים אך שמות אנשים אלו יפורסם לבין הנפגשים. אנשים הנוי לבין על תקלה שיתבלוו אוכלוסיה אלמנטים:-

א. פתיחת המשבר הנוכחי בעקבות הטרור התקרון (בעזות הנשק הוא. קהאמס).

ב. ג'יהאד מכיר על ישראל שניתנה הסכים עצה-ריחו, וכולה מכונה לחמאת ליישם הסכם.

ג. הקיצוניים בצדדים הכלליים תמיד שיתוף פעולה הדוק על בסיס ה- P.D.D.

ד. מאחז בצדדים הכלליים וכולה לחתירות על סמים יציבות פוליטית, דלחון ותנועת נתיה.

(117)

5. על מנת שלא כולנו תהיה את ערביות מסרם ומרכין.
הוא הביע עניינו הלהבה על כך או על סרם בעבותיו על ערביות
מוסדות על: - ערביות הוא הוא אותו בין לצדר, או: ערביות
הוא אינדיסנסקל לתהליך השלום.

4. הביע תמנינו את ההערכה ברוחת תקרה בשת אשף ביתם למלוותה
על ישראל באשר לעתיד השלום. לצערם קיים ממנו אחד הרואה
~~הסכנה~~ בנים שבשקבתיו ובאו הפלסטינים מאוכזבים וליבים כלכלית
ומדינית, בקר שיכול לגי הסכנה קבע המקומם על הבעיות של
אוסלו. מאידך קיים ממנו שני שרואה לרואות בתקומת הבנים
הפדרות פלסטינית, יוזמות כלכלית, תוסר יציבות והגברת
כלכלית, בכך להרואות לעולם שאין אפשרות לחיים ישראל-
פלסטין, ושהבדים הילדה הוא קונפדרציון ירדן - ישראל על השטח.
לחברת בחרת אשף, ממנו הבני מתמקד עתה ומיש את
תפיסתו בשטחים.

6. באשר לתהליך המשבר הנוכחי, הליץ הנמנו את אחבע התקיעות
הנמתקיות של אשף. על כולנו שאת בקשר עם תונס והלהיבה
הפלסטינית הוא שישראל תאמץ לפחות שתים שהתביעות. לצערו אשף
בדיק לברוך את ההתה באמצעות בצדים סתמיים אשר ישנה
פסיכולוגית על הציבור בשטחים. שתי הפקיעות המשוחות ותה
הן בקשר הנוכחות הדיפלומטית והקשר הפלאת הפתרונות * מלך
תקרון ובאחרת תשקיה לקריית אחבע. באשר לברוך בהתרחים
מתקשין על הבשין שעל ההתרחים הוא אחרה לשאת בשלו נשק
בשאר הם נמצאים קרובים אוכלוסיה ערבית.

7. אשף גם מציע בכך נוספת לשתרור ההתה באמצעות הלהבה
ישראלית אשר תשתה ישראל ואשף יקוה ובצה סתרת אשר
תצון ~~בצה~~ על קשיים הקורים לפתבון בקצב ההתה קונפדרציון
אלא לפלסטינים הוא מציע. (אשף שונה מציע שובצה כנות אלה תקום מ"ג
הפלסטינית הוא כוח מרגיע.

8. על כורח אנו"ס על סמך ראיות והאמונות את תנוס, שאשר יבוא להכרע שיעול תוכר לעולמן והאומה תוך מספר ימים, אז ישראל תצא מהכרה בנושאים הבאים:-

א. ישראל תביע מוכנה לבוא מ"מ עם אשף על לורת הנהגות הבינלאומית.

ב. הפלגת המתנחלים בקיצוניות רק.

ג. הערכת הבתי"חות בלי תקרון

ד. הקמת עצה תל-רואות לעיון בסמכויות הקצין בנוגע לחלוקת

9. בכל מקרה, על כורח הקביר שלום קשר בין תיבוש האומה הנשמה לבין נכונותו של אשף לסיים מ"ג זכויות ישראל בהתלה הבתחה.

10. במהלך ביטחות שלו מספר נושאים נוספים בנוגע לנושא שיתוף המערכה. כגון: ישראל-פלסטין (צמא בנפט).

11. לסיכום הפרקים שלמנית בוים שני הקרוב (7 מרץ) ובו נסיים שתהיה ביצד לסיים הפגישה קביה סוף השבוע הקרוב (21 מרץ).

סודי ביותר

ד"ר הירשפלד וד"ר פונדק

<u>מתוך פגישה עם מאהר אל-כורד - בושאים כלכליים</u>

וינה - 4-3 מרץ 1994

1. אל כורד משמש עתה כאחד מראשי הצוות הכלכלי ליד ערפאת. בראש הצוות עומדים חמישה פונקציונרים ואל כורד הוא הכלכלן היחיד מביניהם. צוות זה המכונה "הטקניקל קומיטי של תוניס", עוסק בעיקר בתוכניות פיתוח ופרויקטים גדולים בשטחים, המבוססים על קשרים בילטרלים בין אש"ף לבין מדינות או גורמים כלכליים בינלאומיים מתוך ראיה כלכלית רחבה שנועדה לנסות ולהבטיח תנופת פיתוח ולא רק שיפור הקיים.
2. במהלך הפגישה הדגיש אל כורד שיש לו עניין רב בהמשך שיתוף פעולה איתנו ובפעילות מול גורמים ישראלים דרכנו.
3. עד עתה יש לאש"ף התחייבויות ברמות שונות והבנות עקרוניות עם גורמי חוץ בסדר גודל של כמיליארד דולר, ולמעשה כל המערכת ממתינה לאור ירוק מערפאת לחתום על עסקאות ולאפשר לפעילות להתחיל להתגלגל.
4. לדעתו כל העניין של PECDAR (שבראשו עומד כזכור אבו עלא) יתגלה בסוף 1994 כ-UNSUCCESSFUL EXERCISE. הבעיה העיקרית לדבריו היא ש-360 מליון דולר המוקצבים לפיתוח מופנים למעשה על פי המתוכנן לפעילויות הקשורות רובן ככולן ל-REHABILITATION & MAINTENANCE. אין כסף לפיתוח אמיתי שיראה על ידי האוכלוסיה ויצור מקומות עבודה, אין כסף לשיכון, אין כסף לחשמל, אין כסף לכבישים חדשים, וכו. לפיכך לא תווצר בשטח תחושה שמשהו קרה בפועל למעט אולי כפר שיתחבר לכביש ראשי או מרכזת טלפונים חדשה בעיר יריחו.
5. מעבר לזה כל המבנה של PECDAR לקוי לדעתו ומבחינת לוח הזמנים אין סיכוי שעד סוף שנת 1994 הם יוציאו אפילו 50% ממה שמוקצב להם, דבר שעלול לגרום לכך שהמדינות התורמות יורידו את התמיכה שלהם בשנים הבאות באותו היחס. אל כורד הביע דעות מקצועיות מאד לא מחמיאות אודות הצוות המוביל של PECDAR בשטחים.
6. לדבריו בצמרת אש"ף יש רצון אמיתי לפתח שיתוף פעולה כלכלי הדוק עם ישראל, ועמדתו של ערפאת תומכת לחלוטין בקו זה. לשם דוגמא ההוא סיפר שהוא פנה לערפאת והציע שהפלסטינים ישתפו פעולה כבר עתה עם חברת המלט "נשר" ותגובתו של ערפאת היתה חיובית מאד. לאחרונה, בעקבות הבעיות ביישום הסכם עזה-יריחו, ביקש ערפאת להמתין עם ההתקשרות, לדחות אך לא

לבטל.
7. במקרה והתהליך המדיני יתקדם מהר ותתפתח הבנה טובה, הרי שיתוף הפעולה עם ישראל יתפתח בקצב מהיר. אך גם במידה והתהליך לא יתקדם טוב - ובתנאי שהפיתוח בשטחים יחל - נילתן יהיה לפתח שיתוף פעולה כלכלי תוך שילוב ישראל וישראלים בפרויקטי הפיתוח בשטחים.
הצעתו היא שעל בסיס פרויקטים בילטרלים (פלסטינים-אירופאים או פלסטינים-אמריקאים) יבנו משולשים כאשר הישראלים ישמשו צלע שלישית שתעמדת בקשר עם הממן כ-SUBCONTRACTOR. במקרים מסוימים יוכלו הישראלים גם להשתתף כמשקיעים.
נושא עצמאי הראוי בכל מקרה לשיתוף עם ישראל הוא בתחום שוק הפיננסים ותחום הביטוח.
8. אל כורד הקדיש פרק נפרד משיחתנו לנושא ה-MASTER PLAN לשטחים. לדעתו הדבר מאד חיוני ועבודה מקצועית בנושא תימשך מספר שנים. על פי תפיסתו צריך להקים קבוצת עבודה משולשת שתעסוק בנושא ותכלול צוות מקומי פלסטיני (הזכיר מוסד מהסוג של דמי עבד אלהאדי), קונסורציום אירופי-פלסטיני, וצוות ישראלי אשר יביא איתו את הנתונים, את הידע המקומי, ואת הכסיון מהשטח.
הפלסטינים כבר הקימו את הקונסורציום האירופי-אמריקאי. מן הצד האירופי ישבן חברות מאיטליה ומצרפת ומן הצד האמריקאי עומדת חברת TAMS שאחד משותפיה הבכירים הוא שה"ח כריסטופר. לאחרונה הסתבר לערפאת שבמקביל לפעילות הזאת, וכתוצאה מחוסר התאום השורר במחנה הפלסטיני, פעל אבו עלא בנפרד וסיכם עם הנורבגים ועם הקהילה האירופית (אשר ממנת שתי קבוצות הולנדיות) על פרויקט דומה של "מסטר פלן" לשטחים. עובדה זאת הפתיעה את ערפאת וקאדומי והחריפה את המתח הקיים בין קבוצת אבו מאזן - אבו עלא לבין קבוצת ערפאת. בסופו של דבר החליט ערפאת לנסות לשלב את הקבוצות הנורבגית וההולנדית כחלק מהקונסורציום הקיים.
בכל מקרה התוכנית תתווה קוים מנחים לעתיד ולדעת אל כורד חייבת להעשות בתאום עם ישראל.
9. באשר ל-PDP (בנק פיתוח פלסטיני), סיפר ששוחח לאחרונה עם ריין מהקהילה אשר עידכן אותו שהקהילה הקציבה 2 מיליון אקו עבור סיוע טכני לבנק.. בנפרד מקציבה הקהילה 100 מיליון אקו לחמש שנים אשר יתחלקו שווה בשווה להלוואות ולסיוע ישיר. העמדה הפלסטינית היא שאם יקום בנק פיתוח הרי 50 המיליון להלוואות יועברו דרכו. הקהילה הסכימה לכך.
10. במקביל מקימים עתה קונסורציום שיכלול קבוצות פיננסיות אירופית-אמריקאית ויפנית אשר יהיו שותפים עיסקיים במימון פרויקטים בשטחים. גם הסעודים נרתמים עתה לסיוע פיננסי בילטרלי.
העדיפות הראשונה של ערפאת היא שיוקמו פרויקטים אשר יורידו את מספר

המובטלים בשטחים, דבר אשר יסייע למאבק בעוני ובכך יחזק את אש"ף והמחנה המתון במאבק מול החמאס והקיצונים. אש"ף גם מקיים מו"מ עם החברה האמריקאית "מריל לינץ'" במטרה שתשמש יועץ עיסקי ופיננסי להקמת הקונסורציום ובנק הפיתוח ולאפשר לה גם להיות משקיעת משנה. בהערת סוגריים סיפר שערפאת העדיף את "גולדמן סאקס" אך "מריל לינץ'" מוכיחים יעילות רבה יותר במגע מול אש"ף.

11. הדגיש שלדעתם יהיה צורך בשיתוף הדוק עם המערכת הכלכלית והפיננסית הישראלית וכבר עתה למשל לא ברורים להם התקנונים והחוקים על פיהם תוכל המערכת הפיננסית הפלסטינית לפעול.

בהקשר זה סיפר אודות הפרשה הקשורה לבנק האמור לקום בשיתוף בין בנק לאומי - קבוצת חנא סניורא - בנק ספרדי - ובנק מרוקאי. לדבריו כל ההבטחות שנתן סניורא על פיהן יועברו כספי ההשקעות לשטחים דרך בנק זה הינם חסרי יסוד. הקבוצה הפלסטינית נקראה לתוניס ונזעפה על ידי ערפאת, וביתתיים המרוקאים פרשו מן הקבוצה. אל כורד ביקש להבהיר שכדאי לבנק מכוסבד כמו בל"ל ולבנקים ישראלים אחרים להזהר מהבטחות שווא.

12. הדגיש שכבר עתה צריך להתחיל לתכנן יחד פרויקטים גדולים של שיתוף פעולה ישראלי-פלסטיני. חזר על הצעתו משיחות אוסלו בנושא תכנון הקמת אזור סחר חופשי בין עזה לבין אשקלון והציע לפתוח דיון בנושא.

13. נמל עזה - בעיני הפלסטינים חשוב מאד להקים נמל בעזה. ברור להם שנמל מסחרי גדול וקונבנציונאלי יהיה יקר מידי ולכן נוטים לקבל את ההצעה להקים נמל צף (המצאה של חברה סקוטית ובניה על ידי חברה הולנדית) שעלותו נמוכה ומשך בנייתו מהיר.

מחיר הנמל עצמו נע בסדר גודל של 10-12 מיליון $ והעלות הנוספת (היותר גבוהה) מורכבת מבניית שובר גלים ומתקני קבע בחוף (מחסנים, פיתוח שטח וכו'). הסה"כ אמור להגיע לסכום של 40-60 מיליון $.

לצורך הפרויקט ייזם אש"ף הקמת קונסורציום של חברות אירופאיות (שלוש הולנדיות, אחת איטלקית ואחת צרפתית) אשר יבצעו את שלב I של הפרויקט. ההולנדים כבר התחייבו לתת מענק בסך של 20 מיליון דולר לפיתוח הנמל בתנאי שחברות הולנדיות תהיינה מעורבות בשליש מהפרויקט.

כבר עתה הקציבו ההולנדים סכום של 250 אלף דולר לצורך מימון בדיקות מקצועיות על ידי חברה הולנדית אודות הנזקים הסביבתיים האפשריים כתוצאה מהקמת נמל קבע ונייד. המדובר גם בנזקים לחופים הישראלים כתוצאה מסחף ושינוי כיווני זרימה.

הצעד הראשון בתחום שיתוף הפעולה הכלכלי הוא לארגן קבוצה ישראלית שתעסוק מולם בנושא המסטר פלן. הפעילות מותנית בחתימת ההסכם בין אש"ף

HOTEL
INTER·CONTINENTAL
WIEN

Meeting with Mehdi al-Hawi

& Iranian Security Friend
the Iranian source for
FAFO on the Hawari

late August 1986 leg of
secret US-Iran channel

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ROOM TO ROOM CALLS

Please press button # and 0 for Room with 3 numbers.
For Rooms with 4 numbers please trop the 0.

Bitte drücken Sie die Taste # und wählen 0 für Zimmer mit 3stelligen Nummern.
Für Zimmer mit 4stelliger Nummer bitte die 0 weglassen.

HOTEL
INTER·CONTINENTAL
WIEN

-2-

Sabil al-Mansur, Hayat
Mel $200,-

Welfare Society → not many
many
Blank Salad,
Sour Cream
Shrimp
Herbs Tomatoes Eggs Celery
January Decorations
Thanksgiving Ms. Mustafa,
- Sabah & Sayyid Khamis prepared
the 88 - Thatcher.

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HOTEL
INTER·CONTINENTAL
WIEN

-3-

I Actual Measures - un realistic

(1) Some form of international Research -
(will prepare could be needed and a package.

(2) Permanent -> cooperation ->

(3) a settlement -> yes on Client - not in Arab Haven,

(1) undecided - when to be needed and;

(3) Ultimately all settlement, - very unrealistic - Yet establish more group in Arab states

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HOTEL
INTER·CONTINENTAL
WIEN

You book out of pity and one →
Theodorakis → Dell Rabbodanti
to Kurzer Orlow.
important PR campaign

II Rosa Actually:
To re negotiate about
those ten of refrain →
talk now of Romanian stakes
Yes Ata Some support
Your Analect - appeal
"we will be Amerika"
Kill it!

(was talk a Turi)
Semi Journal Frary a Finalbuch

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Für Zimmer mit 4stelliger Nummer bitte die 0 weglassen.

HOTEL
INTER·CONTINENTAL
WIEN

III Fund Stat

Sellent - 3 cotegen
man apcold -
if a Pramerund of
"ex dupe of Erday"
carries -
of Valley Fever -
A is very complicated.

Next week -

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HOTEL
INTER·CONTINENTAL
WIEN

(1) [illegible] security
[illegible]

(2) [illegible] Future
of Settlement [illegible]
Final Status
– in parallel – to
restart negotiations
about an Interim [illegible]

→ If Israelis insist on
[illegible]

→ if [illegible]

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Für Zimmer mit 4stelliger Nummer bitte die 0 weglassen.

HOTEL
INTER·CONTINENTAL
WIEN

in Croatia

Prophet 1en:
Iere mechaleh me ly
>eyy-)
"I shtem may la. 2en.>
pa shofet"

Christophe 1en:
1) shofet i th rymlud, th
meken d anlle in th Holy
2) Drebet i th diejn i celib
to pere

Authority of
and eyn / a chen shmd

Johannesgasse 28, A-1037 Wien, Tel. 43(1)711 22-0, Telex 13 12 35, Fax 43(1)713 44 89

ROOM TO ROOM CALLS

Please press button # and 0 for Room with 3 numbers.
For Rooms with 4 numbers please trop the 0.

Bitte drücken Sie die Taste # und wählen 0 für Zimmer mit 3stelligen Nummern.
Für Zimmer mit 4stelliger Nummer bitte die 0 weglassen.

HOTEL
INTER·CONTINENTAL
WIEN

Hubig mit Herrn ...

Peter Skokan →
Projekt Hr Ilyn
Hr Chy –
wichtig.

Thursday Thomas Jensen

Allen Hr mitteilen, kommend
Norwegen Bild
Multiple activity →

ABB – $50 000 000,– bis
+ Irving
120 m

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ROOM TO ROOM CALLS

Please press button # and 0 for Room with 3 numbers.
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Bitte drücken Sie die Taste # und wählen 0 für Zimmer mit 3stelligen Nummern.
Für Zimmer mit 4stelliger Nummer bitte die 0 weglassen.

Sascha Chmela

HOTEL
INTER·CONTINENTAL
WIEN

Lieber Max —

$ 50 000 000,—

Happy Project —

Herr Ref.

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ROOM TO ROOM CALLS

Please press button # and 0 for Room with 3 numbers.
For Rooms with 4 numbers please trop the 0.

Bitte drücken Sie die Taste # und wählen 0 für Zimmer mit 3stelligen Nummern.
Für Zimmer mit 4stelliger Nummer bitte die 0 weglassen.

2540
3500.
200
1000.

$ 7240,-

Finalizing the Agreement

Each step to be documented:

(a) Contract
- Demonstrate approval
→ deed will
Lastly → Trade rec.

(b) Public Deeds →
+
1) Note Recorded
2) Drawing of the
Settler
3) Documents Settlement
in Hebrew
Bill Romer, Hebrew
Deed Room

(Y) Offered Freelle a
Colonial Hallway

Unfortunately have to make-
way out → until he and
Brock - County &
Lehi - Rds

→ West way
through - Walnut.

St. - unpaved

1136

15°



Mark: Kreuz Teller:

Ten →

Alle Mu-Segment weiß

Stiehl ca 6 Punkte

true with eps

Dr. + Mrs. ele
Probst - Mal
la bel reun!
(la bel i reunk)

Fleche el Kent

a) pere Dart:

J-7 yrs Fell Zero Tho
put Schmuckert →

Dart →
Scotland - Marine Develop. Corp.

Invest

Dutch pet-prod $270 000,- → study
a incremental effects

Technical (Kent)
Consult of T Corp to Dart of Can
3 Dutch Eng & Tech, 1 F
Palos Ne Dam
[P 1 E (French)
→ Fort Thom Can: Fleuch
$21 000 000,- in cash put by I3 to Dutch pool.
French Tech to → pur mon

→ Pre-contract → will there be a
Pre-bonus?

Hola Comp.:

→ Detail breakdown with
Exact study with a math-

Two steps:

① Involved Form of
② Negotiate contract-

& months to completion

Coordinate with Israel:

① Republic to Import + Export
Program in the Part of Iran

10 months time-
also security arrangements →
Israel Consultant.

Fishing: in 10 days (will go to Demand)

EC - Chennai - net work of municipalities

Cape Cape → Can provide market for Trade

→ Fishing type, equipment, boats,

→ Transport by lorries

→ dairy farms (check stock)

→

- Need to Trade entrepreneur -

→

Electricity → Repeated (not taken out of the picture

- Work but many be put stone; also EC potential beaches capital

- require enhancement

Water

In general Plant →
40 MW
Desalinat
cut cost of desalinat by 40%

ABB - 120 MW
connect with Desalinat pl
sell water 75 cent pr
to m³
18 - 20 Mill m³

Note: Proposal by next meeting - committee arrangt by Mahi.

Tamura: Contents of the PDR.
Hotels: Sent Tamura Kyowa Co.
Bus-Company → Tribelhof

Marine - Flecked Red
Mottled Grey
Dark Grey
SOFO AM. Newspaper
Hall
POB 21

Sales & Marketing in the group

to contact:

NOMURA
Schroeders PLC
Rothschild - Switzerland
Kidder Peabody - General Electric
Mediobanca Centrale Italy
Assicurazioni Generali
Banca Commerciale Italiana

→

to organize the launch will be:
negotiated by Merrill Lynch

René Grether
305-995 9278

Trading in terms of the
of the world

37 5 10 5

Legal Framework

Thesis

Th - the Temple

Check: Yours Truly -

Phone:

~~37-7800~~

9-10 a.m

5-7 p.m

002761/799762

N

the Ultimate

A Story Should Told

Introduction

סודי ביותר

כ"ו בשבט תשנ"ד
7 בפברואר 1994

896488

אל: שה"ח
ס/שה"ח

מאת: יאיר הירשפלד

הנדון: דו"ח פגישה עם ד"ר מוחמד מחנוק - 2.2.94

1. הפגישה התקיימה ברומניה תוך כדי ועידה. בין המשתתפים היה שה"ח הירדני לשעבר, כמאל אבו-ג'עבר, כמו-כן נכח נציג פלשתינאי, נציג מצרי, ונציגות בכירה של ממשלת רומניה.

2. בשיחה עם ד"ר מחנוק, שהתקיימה ב-4 עיניים, נאמרו ע"י הלבנוני הדברים הבאים:

א. הלבנונים מעוניינים להתחיל בשיחות חשאיות איתנו ולדון על שלושת הנושאים הבאים:

1. קליטה חברתית-כלכלית של האוכלוסיה הפלשתינאית בלבנון, אך מניעת מעורבותם הפוליטית. ההצעה היא לאפשר להם קבלת תעודת זהות פלשתינאית וגיבוש תכנית לקליטתם הכלכלית בלבנון.

2. שת"פ כלכלי באזור.
הלבנונים רוצים להפוך את בירות למרכז הפיננסי של המז"ת. מבקשים לדון איתנו על הנושא ולקבל את תמיכתנו.

3. צמצום מעגל העימות בלבנון.

ד"ר מחנוק, ממוצא סוני-מוסלמי, מקורב לראש ממשלת לבנון. ביקש לשמור איתו על קשר באמצעות PAUL CLAIRET בקהיליה האירופית (קליירה לא מצוי בסוד העניינים, אמור לשמש רק כדוור.)

3. בשיחה עם כמאל אבו-ג'עבר הובע עניין ליצירת דו-שיח בינינו על מהות הקונפדרציה הפלשתינאית-ירדנית ואפשרות להקים קהיליה ישראלית-ירדנית-פלשתינאית. כמאל אבו-ג'עבר הבהיר שרצוי לקיים שיחות דו-צדדיות איתנו ומשולשות ישראלית-ירדנית-פלשתינאית והציע לתאם את הצעדים הבאים עם יורש העצר הירדני, הנסיך חסן.

בינתיים נוצר קשר בין אבו-ג'עבר למארח הרומני, השגריר CELAC. צ'לאץ' הוזמן ע"י יורש העצר לפגישה בעמאן שתתקיים ביום ה' (10.2) אחה"צ. צ'לאץ' יגיע לירושלים ביום ו' בבוקר ומעוניין לדווח על הפגישה עם יורש העצר. מבקש לכן פגישה עם שה"ח וסגנו.

פ ו ח

~~Report a the Color~~

(1) מ"ן 28/1 ל 1/2/94

~~[illegible]~~

רשימת כלים נדרשים בלבד. מהנדס ירדן אל-הנוק:

נדרש יהיה כאשר יורכב על גורר

נדרש לבנון מתאן -

נדרש מצרי מתאן ~~[illegible]~~ ירמוכן

נדרש יעדכון מיוחד: (בשפה: Repatsem)

מ רכש מקור המצרי בולגרי וקולמבי

כאשר עובד Real Chief מהנדס הנוכחי

(2) ~~[illegible]~~

2) נדרש המצרי כרוך שוקר.

לא הית. השפה Chief קיומ

שעדיף לפני מומחי של Betzel הסרטן

לא עוד. לפני ומיון.

יומיין לפני הנעלת מפרט הסרטן-

נוכחי ל Chief ג. כדור שוקר. יכין לפני

ומיד. הוספה. שמשלם סרטן קדלה

פורמלי: עם ישראל - ולכן לפי תורה
כשעת צום סוכות צוותה.
אולם, הסוכה היא ציווי עיקרי לשעה
עם לומדה. שהרי לי - שהסוכות בנרמזו
לכתחילה שיהיה עם לומדה ענושין
היחידים היחיד הסוכה לומדה.

ב). חשיבות הנושאים ביחס ערכם היום.
כל הדברים הנ"ל מכוונים לכשעת
האספה עצמה. היום על הדעות
המתחרות בין הישיבה (ישראל, הפלסטינים,
ובכלל, מדינת סוכה ולבנון)
וגם בין חשיבה מחשבה (עם סוכה)
מחשבה עמוקה מהות ועמל. האחד.
ותפקיד מה בין לעמוד ולהחזיק
לעמוד והחזיק לעמוד ולהחזיק
שיש עליה.

4) במפגש המסיים אומר היה רק
הנציגים הלימדו דיר מתמוך מחנוך
הגיש - מופלק - סוני וקרוי מאוד למרבה ההפלגים
בלמידון.
מלוא הזיע מפגש מדבקה וימנו.
וגם רוצה להתחיל את קושים * קודם
דמיונים מבוס: משותפת בלב האוכלוסיה
הפלטפורמות בלה

~~המסה המרכזי שהוא לדבר~~
~~לשר המולך: שלה~~

דיר מתנה אישי להדיר מסר מרכזי,
לשר המולך: על לשמוע לדעתו מוים אין סוררה
של מורלה של למדון.
והזיע עין ד קו-שיח ישיר ויתנו,
והזיע למדון ~~מהנושיח~~ הדאוים:
* מירוש מבוס משותפת בלב האוכלוסיה
הפלטפורמות בלמדון. היום קלוטרם
ה מדרחים והכלים בלמדון
~~על אפשרות פלטפורמות בלמדון~~ (mentalities the of understanding)

של הממלכות.

3) ~~סיכום~~ סיכומים של נציגות הקהילות היהודיות בישראל.

סוכם שהנשיא ואחרי הדיון מעוניין לקיים פגישה עם Raul Eisenberg ואנשי הקהילות היהודיות בארצות שונות.

4) הוחלט שהנושא הבא שידון בפגישה הקרובה של הנשיא עם נציגי הקהילות יהיה: הקשר של הקהילות עם מדינת ישראל.

5) הוחלט שיקיים דיון בנושא הבא - הקשר של הקהילות עם ישראל:

א) בראש וראשונה יש לדון בשאלת הדרכים הבאות:

1) הפלגים השונים בקרב NCJ (National Council for Jerusalem) שמתנהלים היום בקרב מוסדות הפלגים.

2) הקשרים הקיימים בין הפלגים ומקורם. לדון בדרכים שבהן ניתן לחזק את הקשר של PNA (Palestine National Authority) עם ה NCJ

3) הפלגים השונים בקרב יהודי

ורושלים ארץ ובין מרכז הסוכנות
מבינות מוסלמיות וערביות.

גושאי ירושלים היו תורים מרכזי
(לא לפרסם) רשויות הדרג
עם מרכז הסוכנות, הסוכנים בירושלים
למעט מי ובין לשעה מפרקים
פומינג. ירושלים ולבין בפתח.
בקלות לסרוסלוסים.

מרכז מרקמל הוקם כדבר לבירור
את הקולות מרובה משלשם גושאן
ורושלים: בפסטינו, ירדנים ושרלים.

ז) גושאן הקונפדרציה מרכז מרקמלוק.
רובה לבירור קולות מרובה
משלשם - פלסטינאית - ושרלים, ירדנים
הוכן על ידש רשות היתה על עמדת
כדי לפרר עין ניוש הסיכה
מלסון מסן על הגושאן. על
לפרסום ועת על פ"ס -

מרכז מרקמל הוקם ו היה מרון
לבירור קולות מרובה. משלשם
(Arab Affairs Study Society for Israel
International Affairs)
לבין ECF -

6. המנגנים והשיטות שבהם מתנהלים היחסים הבין-

יחסים הינה מורכבת מכך ש- [illegible]
שלושה מישורים, שהם למעשה. השלום נתון
על כפות תומכן בשלושה מקורות, כשהשלום
שלא יהיה שלושת שלהם מקום לכוחות מעורבים
בעשייה.

הדוגמה הטובה שכל הקורא עליה ועסק בהשגת
בשלמותה והשתרותה היחסים (Workshop
הוא הניסיון שעשתה עיראק (בעזרת ישראל)
להשתלט על כווית בפלישה שלה ובסיפוח
שלאחריה. מתקופת.

ניתן להניח שרבים מהקוראים הבינלאומיים השתכנעו
יחסים בכוחות שעמדו לרשות כשלמות שלהם,
כפיזיה, הבחינה שלהם).

7) המנגנים והשיטות שבהם הנהלים והמבנה-

מבנה הינה מורכבת מהשלמת שלושה
מאפיינים עיקריים שלהלן - הסוג שמקור המבנה
בהשפעה הרשות המבנה.
הדגש הבסיסי שלהלן הינה לקורא
הקהילה שמדובר בשתי פעמים בין ECF לבין אוניברסיטאים

הנ"ל ר' עלה ברוב הכלל בקורסו
בלא שיקים עליו למאמץ עלת הראלן
בשלמי לשלום בסיונו.

ב) ראשית ההשתתפות שלו בפעולות הקונגרס הבין-לאומי
לגיאוגרפיה היה ב-1931 בפאריס (Paul Vidal de la Blache)
בראש משלחת רחבה בראשות פרופ' ויידאל דה לה בלאש
עולה ויפה אחד שאול יקיר לו מאוד.
הוא ממשיך בקשר אישי עמו, ובכל מחוז שנדמה
לבקר בצרפת הוא מבקר גם אצלו בביתו
בפאריס.

ג) השתתפות שלו בקונגרסים
בין הקונגרסים שהוא מבקר בהם מסתיים
כ- Excursion בדרך, לפרק הזמן.
בין מדריכי למשלחת לאוניברסיטה הוא בדרך כלל.
ורואים לו לכל מקום הזמנות לעמוד
על דעותיו.
בשנת 1934 בקונגרס בלונדון שהוא בעצמו
מארגן בקונגרס ואומלל לחזור עלת הקשר עימו.

סיכום ומלצות

4 מומלץ לעודד את הרחבת לשון מסמן מסמ"ן נוסף – הוספת פונ'.
בדק המצרפת תיכון: סרטים הרצוף, הפלסטינאי, לדוגמה, ספרי.
בדק המצרפת ביה"ס הופעל מומלץ ביטוי כוונים של כוונה, כולם מרכז ומיכל בר-ה.

נושאי הוועדה לדיון:
פרויקט בלבלק "שמונה פעולה בלבל.
בדיקה הישק המצרפת ביתי כון לגיון הישחי:

2) הרחבת הרקע רקע קיר מתנה
דוגמאות Paul Cézanne.

3) ציורים תובנים עדיפה משוק שם
חסן מוכן עדיף על-הנוף.

Stanley K. Sheinbaum

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMO: FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH YASSER ARAFAT, TUNIS, 7:30 p.m., JANUARY 12, 1994

DATE: January 21, 1994

S. K. Sheinbaum

I spent about an hour and fifteen minutes alone with Arafat at his Tunis office where I had been twice before. The most recent time was when I interviewed him for the *NPQ/Los Angeles Times* Syndication partnership in March 1993 in which interview he issued a call for elections in the territories.

I expected more time with him but the meeting was cut short. (See below.) I had decided to see him because as so many have put it I am one of the few Americans with whom he might talk openly and even listen, and what with the Palestinian/Israeli negotiations on dead center I thought it was worth the trip.

My general plan was two fold. First, I wanted to describe how the dynamics of the situation including some of the things he was doing were creating a situation that was working against him. Second, I wanted to discuss the criticisms of his Palestinian supporters, both friendly and hostile. (Sadly we never got to that.) Prior to the visit I spent several days in Jerusalem to meet with members of the government to obtain their perspectives and then in the West Bank with Palestinians across the political spectrum excluding Hamas. Arafat was most cordial, but I found him very laid back and unresponsive in the first ten minutes or so. There were times when his responses became confused and he would repeat himself especially on matters where I was trying to make a point.

Because the issue of the size of Jericho had become one of the three or four sticking points in the negotiations and because I felt I could use the Jericho question for a broader point I wanted to make I opened with it. I said I did not understand why he was letting that issue help create a sense that he was stalling. In the ensuing six or seven months the PLO would have jurisdiction over the entire area anyway. So why the focus on it now?

Further I questioned his asking for a larger area of Jericho for the interim agreement when that area would include six settlements. Regarding this latter point

345 North Rockingham Avenue Los Angeles California 90049 Telephone (310) 472-9541 FAX (310) 476-9853

of settlements I pointed out that it was too soon for the Israelis to themselves arrive at a clear position on the three most major items of the overall negotiations, that is, Jerusalem, statehood, and the settlements generally, especially in the West Bank. To keep pressing on the larger Jericho area now when that discussion would force Israel to deal with the settlements issue before they clearly were ready to--or wanted to--and thus were going against the September 13th agreement.

Arafat then took me by surprise when he made it absolutely clear that all he is asking of Jericho now does not include any settlements. Besides which, he claimed--and I was not in a position to argue the point--those really were not settlements, but rather farms in which the Israeli farmers did not themselves live. He pulled out several maps and showed me that the area that he has been asking for did not include the settlements--at least according to his map. My problem then was that almost everything I had just picked up in Israel, both from official Israelis and from Palestinians, loyal to Arafat or not, they all felt that Arafat's Jericho demands did indeed include those six Jericho settlements. I even asked him if he was lying to me. (He did not throw me out of the office.) Nevertheless, I felt somewhat impeached by his claim that he had carefully excluded those settlements from his demands for Jericho now. Further, he said, even if they were settlements in the sense of the Gaza or the West Bank settlements why couldn't the Israeli military be allowed to protect those settlers in the same way that the Palestinians had already agreed to for the settlements in the Gaza. He also said that he was expecting that was to be the arrangement for a good part of the West Bank settlements.

In fact, that led to a discussion of "withdrawal" versus "redeployment". He purported that right along he was not opposed to "redeployment" provided the mission of the remaining troops was to protect those Jewish settlers where it was agreed that the Palestinians could not effectively do so. Ergo in that sense he was for deployment *within* withdrawal, and he made much of that phrase.

With regard to needing a larger piece of Jericho now rather than smaller he also said he had to have room to settle Palestinian refugees. Gaza was no longer possible, it being already over crowded.

Both in the discussion about "redeployment" and in subsequent discussion about the borders and the security checks he constantly iterated and reiterated that his demands were designed to protect the dignity of the Palestinian people. This discussion became almost the main thread and contention point throughout the meeting. I kept trying to explain that what he thought was protecting the dignity of his people was in fact rhetoric that was having the opposite effect. Not only among Israelis, but also among Palestinians there is the constant complaint that his demands for special arrangements at the borders, or for security, were in their minds designed to build into the interim agreement aspects of sovereignty and/or statehood even though the Declaration of Principles made it clear that those kinds of matters

were for five years hence. I told him that the situation had gotten so that every time he mentioned his demands about security checks, or Israeli troops at the borders, or the various roads he explains it all in the context of the dignity of his people. That very phrase to almost all parties--and I emphasized all-- has come to mean some toehold on sovereignty or statehood now.

In some cases such as Elias Freij, the Mayor of Bethlehem, he explicitly asked me to pass on the message to Arafat using his own name that by thus implying statehood now, sometimes even explicitly, Arafat was jeopardizing the Israeli/Palestinian agreement and the Palestinians would be left without anything. Freij says he remains a loyalist to Arafat, but is clearly worried about this misplaced focus--i.e. dignity rationale.

With the Clinton/Assad summit then a half a week away I tried to impress on Arafat the danger that the Palestinians again could be left behind. There was already talk and some sense that the impending optimism about a Syrian deal was reducing the determination of many parties to complete the Palestinian accord. Even though all parties are increasingly accepting that if a comprehensive agreement--an absolute necessity for the region--is not achieved the increasing demands of Arafat would mark him as the spoiler and would thereby further weaken his bargaining hand. Unfortunately that sort of argument does not impress him.

At another point we got into a discussion about Prime Minister Rabin, and Arafat allowed very strongly that he does not think that Rabin is serious about bringing the Palestinian track to a conclusion. I expressed considerable dismay at his perception of where Rabin is. I made it clear that Rabin was jeopardizing the stability of his government by fighting so hard for the agreement--especially against the Likud elements. The failure to resolve the impasse with the Palestinians could surely mean the downfall of Rabin's government. He just kept disagreeing about Rabin, and none of my arguments seemed to register.

(In fact a number of times especially on the Rabin factor and about Arafat's dignity rhetoric we found ourselves actually shouting at each other.)

I had brought with me a Rabin quote from Monday's *Jerusalem Post* to the effect that if Arafat was as worried as he seems to be that no investment funds were forthcoming from the Europeans, he, Rabin, felt that Arafat should understand that as long as he was injecting demands with implications now for statehood or sovereignty those kinds of monies would never be forthcoming. Oddly, Arafat himself had that very same article on his desk and pointed it out to me as if it were Rabin who was standing in the way of the flow of development monies.

When I later relayed this part of the conversation by phone to Nabeel Shaath, the lead Palestinian negotiator in Taba, he who is as frustrated as anybody, told me that

what I was witnessing between Arafat and Rabin was part of the circular loop that somehow had been created between the two of them. Obviously, there never had been much love lost between them, but now with the negotiations in progress every time Arafat ups the statehood ante, so to speak, Rabin then applies the brakes in Taba--causing Arafat to get even more angry. Shaath advised not taking this expressed anger about Rabin too seriously. Arafat understands this escalation game, he said.

(On Sunday, the 9th, the day before the resumption of the Taba talks following upon their post-Cairo two week hiatus, I had flown down to Taba via Eilat to see Shaath, a good friend. I only had about an hour and a half with Shaath but he at that moment was preoccupied with the leaks of the reports that had come out about the Cairo meeting two weeks earlier between Abu Mazan and Shimon Peres. Two tentative papers had gotten into the hands of both Arafat and Peres, and each were treating them as if they were the final conclusions of that Cairo session. It was generally felt that Peres had gone to the press too precipitously based on th se tentative papers. Then when Arafat renounced those "conclusions" he was charged with reneging on what had actually been agreed to in Cairo. This created a moment of chaos and further tension which complicated the negotiating problem for both the Palestinian and the Israeli negotiators, Shaath and General Shahak. Those two seem to get along quite well but are constantly being thrown off balance by the public exchanges between the Israeli and the Palestinian leadership.)

Somewhere in all this there was an almost tangential comment by Arafat to the effect that he was looking forward to a confederation solution between the Palestinians and Jordan. My inference, not based on other than his perfunctory remarks about that, is that that is one way out of his dilemma which I see as his inability--despite all his demands for statehood--to administer a government of his own as well as a way of possibly coping with th continually deteriorating support from his followers. Maybe, but time was running out, and I couldn't pursue it. It was too vague to be very useful.

I also hoped to have more time with him to discuss the criticism of those among his Palestinian followers who are critical of his leadership. The main thrust of that criticism is his failure to function democratically, but rather autocratically. At the very moment I was about to launch into that subject a somewhat dramatic thing occurred which really broke up the meeting. His Foreign Minister Khaddoumi, who right along has been a leading rejectionist against any accommodation with the Israelis, burst into the room and reminded Arafat that there was a meeting of the PLO Executive Committee supposed to start fifteen minutes earlier. Whether Arafat had remembered that or not it was clear that he was neither pleased with having to deal with that meeting nor with our meeting being broken up. Appropriately--given that it was Khaddoumi who intruded--he is one of the evidences of the stated failure of democratic processes on Arafat's part. His sudden

increasing reliance on Khaddoumi is used as a major example that not only is he turning to Khaddoumi in general and not to his broader support base, but also even for technical economic matters about which Khaddoumi has little experience.

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One cannot resist some amateur and impressionistic psychoanalyzing after such a meeting with Arafat. I caution that less than an hour and a half was involved. I found the man very discouraged as if things were getting beyond his control. My tack of raising those factors which might be making his position even more difficult--intended on my part to make him deal with his problems more seriously--may have served merely to have discouraged him further. In many instances he became non-responsive, and the only manifestation of a genuine reaction was that of anger, especially at Rabin whom he has come to believe is working against the process. We all know that it is one thing to be in opposition without responsibility and accountability, but it is a far more complex role if one is to lead. With his support drifting away I believe he is trying to convince himself that he is on the right course and that the argument that he is defending the dignity of his Palestinian people in the final analysis convinces him, nobody else. It comes down to being a rationale for floundering. He resorted to that dignity argument too often--and resisted my counter-argument that that rhetoric was falling on deaf ears.

Exactly how much of what I had to say actually got through to him is impossible to judge. At the end, however, there was a demonstrative expression of how much he likes to talk with me--and please come back as soon as possible.

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WHAT FOLLOWS? The instinctive reaction on the part of many will be to steer an even wider berth around Arafat partially on the grounds that he is not up to handling the situation, partially on the grounds that he was willing to give up too much in the September 13th agreement, or indeed that he did not protect the dignity of his people by doing so. Certainly that's a very limited list among the seeming infinity of anti-Arafat arguments.

That kind of thinking of course misses the major point which is that a consensus has developed that a regional or comprehensive solution is the only way to achieve stability in the Middle East. That should be the priority of priorities. If our aim is for a comprehensive peace rather than seeking opportunity to somehow dump Arafat we should be working instead to stabilize the Palestinians. They, after all, are a key ingredient for the broader problem. We should not get caught up in Arafat being the issue.

One must be particularly careful in analyzing how this dismal portrayal of Yasser

Arafat plays into that bigger picture. It is almost a truism that the overall problem will not be resolved unless the Palestinian question is sufficiently attended to. The American client is Israel--sometimes against their own wishes--making the Arafat/Palestinian factor all the more critical. Israel has the most to lose if that more limited agreement with the Palestinians is not brought to a final conclusion. Over the long run Israel will remain in a perpetual state of vulnerability if regional stability is not achieved.

Evaluating Arafat and the Palestinians must be undertaken in the context of two dynamics, the first has to do with the Palestinian leadership, and the second is increasingly apparent since the events surrounding the September 13th signing on the White House lawn.

The latter first: Only a few weeks prior to the surfacing of the news of the Oslo agreement Secretary Christopher held what seemed to be a very successful meeting with President Assad of Syria. Observers felt that the probability of a Israeli/Syrian agreement was very high. One question at that time was whether this would impede or help move along the Israeli/Palestinian agreement. There has been an unfortunate ebb and flow of enthusiasm for one of these two potential agreements or the other. Syria in August and now again. Following upon the January 16th summit and the current sad state of the Palestinian track the push for the Syrian agreement is again replacing the Palestinians as the priority interest. One hears much more of this coming out of Washington than from Jerusalem.

However, if a comprehensive peace is indeed a serious goal the prioritizing of either the Palestinian track or the Syrian track serves to undermine the attempt to achieve the broader purpose. Either/or should not be the modus operandi. Rationales for dropping one or the other are a dime a dozen. Now that it is accepted that Arafat is in serious trouble within his own house it becomes very easy to drop him or put aside the Palestinian track. It is too easy given Arafat's faults and extraordinary record of bad judgements e.g. the Gulf War, autocratic leanings, dubious finances, failures in economic planning, etc., to dismiss Arafat as a participant and worse to cooperate with other groups to try to change the Palestinian leadership. But, to repeat, Arafat is not the issue. Not at this moment.

One is reminded of the U.S. dissatisfaction with Prince Sihanouk in Cambodia in the late 60's which led to the American role in replacing him with Lon Nol who looked good on paper--but only on paper. He had no real popular base. Similarly many names being mentioned as alternative to Arafat today do not manifest the kind of popular support so essential for so drastic a move. The choice of Lon Nol in Cambodia was enough to open the gates for the Khmer Rouge, and the murderous years that followed with as many as two million Cambodians dead. The irony today is that Sihanouk is back in the saddle anyway.

For the Palestinians any artificially engineered shift of power at so sensitive a moment would seriously and negatively impact the movement toward resolving the peace agreement. The mechanisms are too delicate--especially with the comprehensive consideration in mind.

The major thing the U.S. and Israel should be pressing for within the September 13th agreement--even demanding--is that Arafat be made to mount elections in the territories. Fast. He promised that.

Arafat has to be legitimatized. If the elections do not accomplish that then who replaces him is a matter for the Palestinians themselves to determine. There are groups e.g. the People's Party, and others, some even formerly Marxist, who might show surprising strength. Hamas of course is a serous danger. How he is replaced is almost of greater import. So elections soon are critical if stability is to be maintained. However, the longer time passes without elections the more splintered the population will be and the more potent Hamas could become.

At the same time U.S. and Israeli policy should also be pressing--and helping--Arafat on structuring economic development mechanisms and obtaining resources from wherever possible. It is fairly clear that Arafat himself has been singularly unsuccessful also at this and his very presence on the scene may very well deter potential investors. There are even rumors that Arafat is making private deals about which one can be suspicious. With elections to be mounted hopefully soon the more that the Palestinians can see occurring positively on the ground as the result of investment in economic development the more positive we can hope the election result will be.

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אישי

אל: שמעון פרס
מאת: יאיר הירשפלד
20 ינואר 1994

הערות אודות האסטרטגיה הישראלית במו"מ עם אש"ף

האסטרטגיה הישראלית

1. האסטרטגיה של "ערוץ אוסלו"

האסטרטגיה שהתפתחה במהלך ערוץ אוסלו היתה מבוססת על העקרון של 'עימות ודיאלוג'. מחד היינו מעורבים בדיאלוג עם הנהגת אש"ף שבמהלכו העברנו את המסרים הבאים:

א. רצוננו לחזק את ערפאת ואת המעגל הפנימי המקורב אליו.

ב. רצוננו לקדם את תהליך השלום בצורה כזאת שתוביל בשלב הראשון לשלטון עצמי פלסטיני בשליטת אש"ף, ומנקודה זאת תוכן הקרקע לכניסה ישראלית נוספת ולהקמת ישות לאומית פלסטינית.

מאידך, הצגנו באוסלו תקיפות טקטית בנושאים המהותיים. במקביל יזם רוה"מ רבין את גרוש אנשי החמאס, את הסגר על השטחים, את מבצע דין וחשבון, ולא איפשר למשלחת הישראלית בוושינגטון להגמיש עמדות. יתרה מזאת, במהלך תהליך אוסלו לא היה להנהגת אש"ף ברור האם רוה"מ בכלל תומך - באופן מלא או חלקי - בהבנות המתגבשות, או שמא הם ידרשו לויתורים משמעותיים נוספים בכדי שירבין ישתכנע ויצטרף לתהליך.
במילים אחרות, האסטרטגיה של מסלול אוסלו היתה מבוססת על שילוב של תקיפות טקטית וגמישות אסטרטגית.

2. האסטרטגיה בעקבות החתימה בוושינגטון

לאחר ה-13 ספטמבר 1993, השתנתה האסטרטגיה מתקיפות טקטית לגמישות טקטית, ומגמישות אסטרטגית לתקיפות אסטרטגית. צוות המו"מ הישראלי הציג ויתורים מרחיקי לכת בנושאים הקשורים לפרטים אך אימץ גישה נוקשה אשר תבעה דבקות ביצירת הסדרי ביניים תוך התנגדות לכל צעד המכוון לעבר תהליך מבוקר ומוסכם של NATION-BUILDING.

משמעויות האסטרטגיה הישראלית הנוכחית

1. התגובה הפלסטינית

הטקטיקה והאסטרטגיה הישראלית החדשה יצרו אצל הפלסטינים את התגובות הבאות:

א. הפלסטינים חוששים להתקע עם עיסקת עזה-יריחו תחילה. יתרה מזאת, הם חוששים שעל ידי אימוץ הפרוש הישראלי של ה-DOP, הם יספקו לגיטימציה להמשך הכיבוש הישראלי בגדמ"ע.

ב. ערפאת חושש מהחלשות מעמדו שלו, בעיקר במועד שלאחר כניסתו ליריחו.

ג. לאור הויתורים הישראלים במישור הטקטי, נוכחו הפלסטינים לדעת שתביעות ולחץ מתמשך מביאים לויתורים ישראלים נוספים.

ד. החשש וחוסר הבטחון הפלסטיני ביחס להסדרי הביניים גרמו להם להציג כבר בשלב זה עוד ועוד תביעות ביחס להשגת סמלים לאומיים.

2. משמעויות ותוצאות

האסטרטגיה הישראלית הינה מתכון לאסון. העובדה שהאסטרטגיות הישראלית והפלסטינית סותרות זאת מהאחרת יצרה מצב בו משא ומתן יכול להתקדם רק על ידי תזוזה ממשבר למשבר.

וכך, התביעות הפלסטיניות נתקלות בסרוב ישראלי, דבר שיוצר מצב של קפאון עליו ניתן להתגבר רק על ידי אירועים הדדים, ויתורים טקטים ישראלים מרחיקי לכת, והחלטה הדדית להסכים היכן שניתן ולהותיר סלעי מחלוקת בלתי פתורים, דבר שיוצר את הבסיס למשבר הבא.

המשך דפוס המו"מ על פי המסלול של קפאון-משבר-התקדמות-קפאון-משבר מביא לצעדים פלסטינים שיוצרים דה-סטבילציה, וכך סולל את הדרך לכשלון בבחירות הבאות בישראל.

אסטרטגיה אלטרנטיבית: חזרה לטקטיקת אוסלו

1. במטרה להצליח במו"מ עם הפלסטינים יש לחזור לעקרון של גמישות אסטרטגית ותקיפות טקטית, או במילים אחרות על ישראל להראות לערפאת בתהליך של 'עימות ודיאלוג':

א. שממשלת ישראל מציעה תמיכה מלאה בהנהגתו האישית של ערפאת.

ב. שתזוזה לכוון הסדר פתרון הקבע הכולל PALESTINIAN NATIONHOOD בתוך מסגרת קונפדרטיבית ירדנית-פלסטינית, הינה דבר אפשרי אך מחייבת תאום.

ג. שממשלת ישראל תתעקש על יישום מלא של ה-DOP, ושהיא לא תעשה ויתורים מעבר לאמור בלשונה וברוחה של ההצהרה.

2. בכדי לשמור על הגישה של גמישות אסטרטגית ותקיפות טקטית ובכדי ליצור מצב קבוע של 'עימות דיאלוג', מוצעת להלן אסטרטגיה המבוססת על שישה צעדים מדורגים:

א. צעד I - משא ומתן בו יסוכמו ארבע נקודות:

1) תוכנית ESDP (ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME) שכתצוגה ממנה יופשרו כספי הסיוע הבינלאומי במטרה לשפר את התנאים הכלכליים בשטחים ולהתקדם לקראת שיתוף פעולה אזורי.

2) הסכמה על עקרונות בסיסיים ביחס להסדר הקבע.

3) תאום מדיניות ביחס להסדרי הביניים בהתייחס לעקרונות מוסכמים אודות עקרונות הסדר הקבע.

4) השגת הבנה ביחס לבחירות בשטחים.

ב. צעד II - עיבוד הפרטים של ה-ESDP.

ג. צעד III - עיבוד עקרונות מוסכמים של הסדר הקבע.

ד. צעד IV - עיבוד מדיניות מוסכמת ומפורטת של הסדר הביניים הנגזרת מההגיון של עקרונות הסדר הקבע.

ה. צעד V - עריכת בחירות בשטחים.

ו. צעד VI - פתיחת מו"מ על הסדר הקבע.

<u>צעדים מעשיים מוצעים</u>

מימוש האסטרטגיה המוצעת, תעשה באחד משני האופנים הבאים:

א. בפגישתך הקרובה עם ערפאת תוצג בפניו עמדה תקיפה בנוגע למו"מ הנוכחי. במקביל תוצג בערוץ בלתי פורמאלי (בטכניקה שהופעלה לפני פתיחת ערוץ אוסלו) האסטרטגיה המוצעת בניר זה ויעשה מאמץ להשיג "הצעה פלסטינית" בהתאם לדעיונות הנ"ל.

ב. לחילופין, בפגישתך הקרובה עם ערפאת, תרמוז לו שממשלת ישראל מעוניינת בחיזוקו, בדומיננטיות אש"פית במהלך תקופת הסדר הביניים, ולפיכך עדיף מכל הבחינות להגיע במהירות להסכם על עזה-יריחו. בכדי להחיש את תהליך המו"מ מוצע גם להתחיל במגעים חשאים לא פורמאלים אודות הסדר הקבע.

אישי

אל: שמעון פרס
מאת: יאיר הירשפלד
20 ינואר 1994

הערות אודות האסטרטגיה הישראלית במו"מ עם אש"ף

האסטרטגיה הישראלית

1. האסטרטגיה של "ערוץ אוסלו"

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משמעויות האסטרטגיה הישראלית הנוכחית

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הטקטיקה והאסטרטגיה הישראלית החדשה יצרו אצל הפלסטינים את התגובות הבאות:

א. הפלסטינים חוששים להתקע עם עיסקת עזה-יריחו תחילה. יתרה מזאת, הם חוששים שעל ידי אימוץ הפרוש הישראלי של ה-DOP, הם יספקו לגיטימציה להמשך הכיבוש הישראלי בגדמ"ע.

ב. ערפאת חושש מהחלשות מעמדו שלו, בעיקר במועד שלאחר כניסתו ליריחו.

ג. לאור הויתורים הישראלים במישור הטקטי, נוכחו הפלסטינים לדעת שתביעות ולחץ מתמשך מביאים לויתורים ישראלים נוספים.

ד. החשש והחוסר הבטחון הפלסטיני ביחס להסדרי הביניים גרמו להם להציג כבר בשלב זה עוד ועוד תביעות ביחס להשגת סמלים לאומיים.

2. משמעויות ותוצאות

האסטרטגיה הישראלית הינה מתכון לאסון. העובדה שהאסטרטגיות הישראלית והפלסטינית סותות זאת מהאחרת יצרה מצב בו משא ומתן יכול להתקדם רק על ידי תזוזה ממשבר למשבר.

וכך, התביעות הפלסטיניות נתקלות בסרוב ישראלי, דבר שיוצר מצב של קפאון עליו ניתן להתגבר רק על ידי איומים הדדים, ויתורים טקטים ישראלים מרחיקי לכת, והחלטה הדדית להסכים היכן שניתן ולהותיר סלעי מחלוקת בלתי פתורים, דבר שיוצר את הבסיס למשבר הבא.

המשך דפוס המו"מ על פי המסלול של קפאון-משבר-התקדמות-קפאון-משבר מביא לצעדים פלסטינים שיוצרים דה-סטבילציה, וכך סולל את הדרך לכשלון בבחירות הבאות בישראל.

אסטרטגיה אלטרנטיבית: חזרה לטקטיקת אוסלו

1. במטרה להצליח במו"מ עם הפלסטינים יש לחזור לעקרון של גמישות אסטרטגית ותקיפות טקטית, או במילים אחרות על ישראל להראות לערפאת בתהליך של 'עימות דיאלוג':

א. שממשלת ישראל מציעה תמיכה מלאה בהבהגתו האישית של ערפאת.

ב. שתזוזה לכוון הסדר פתרון הקבע הכולל PALESTINIAN NATIONHOOD בתוך מסגרת קונפדרטיבית ירדנית-פלסטינית, הינה דבר אפשרי אך מחייבת תאום.

ג. שממשלת ישראל תתעקש על יישום מלא של ה-DOP, ושהיא לא תעשה ויתורים מעבר לאמור בלשונה וברוחה של ההצהרה.

2. בכדי לשמור על הגישה של גמישות אסטרטגית ותקיפות טקטית ובכדי ליצור מצב קבוע של 'עימות דיאלוג', מוצעת להלן אסטרטגיה המבוססת על שישה צעדים מדורגים:

א. צעד I - משא ומתן בו יסוכמו ארבע בקודות:

1) תוכנית ESDP (ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME) שכתצורה ממנה יופשרו כספי הסיוע הבינלאומי במטרה לשפר את התנאים הכלכליים בשטחים ולהתקדם לקראת שיתוף פעולה אזורי.

2) הסכמה על עקרונות בסיסיים ביחס להסדר הקבע.

3) תאום מדיניות ביחס להסדרי הביניים בהתייחס לעקרונות מוסכמים אודות עקרונות הסדר הקבע.

4) השגת הבנה ביחס לבחירות בשטחים.

ב. צעד II - עיבוד הפרטים של ה-ESDP.

ג. צעד III - עיבוד עקרונות מוסכמים של הסדר הקבע.

ד. צעד IV - עיבוד מדיניות מוסכמת ומפורטת של הסדר הביניים הנגזרת מההגיון של עקרונות הסדר הקבע.

ה. צעד V - עריכת בחירות בשטחים.

ו. צעד VI - פתיחת מו"מ על הסדר הקבע.

<u>צעדים מעשיים מוצעים</u>

מימוש האסטרטגיה המוצעת, תעשה באחד משני האופנים הבאים:

א. בפגישתך הקרובה עם ערפאת תוצג בפניו עמדה תקיפה בנוגע למו"מ הנוכחי. במקביל תוצג בערוץ בלתי פורמאלי (בטכניקה שהופעלה לפני פתיחת ערוץ אוסלו) האסטרטגיה המוצעת בניר זה ויעשה מאמץ להשיג "הצעה פלסטינית" בהתאם לדעיונות הנ"ל.

ב. לחילופין, בפגישתך הקרובה עם ערפאת, תרמוז לו שממשלת ישראל מעוניינת בחיזוקו, בדומיננטיות אש"פית במהלך תקופת הסדר הביניים, ולפיכך עדיף מכל הבחינות להגיע במהירות להסכם על עזה-יריחו. בכדי להחיש את תהליך המו"מ מוצע גם להתחיל במגעים חשאים לא פורמאלים אודות הסדר הקבע.

המנהל האזרחי
אזור יהודה ושומרון
מחלקה לענייני ערבים
אישי ר-85 00007
02 ינואר 1994

<u>תפ"ש - י.ע.ע</u>
איו"ש - רמ"א
תפ"ש - ע. המתאם

הנדון: **<u>ג'מיל טריפי - סיכום פגישה</u>**

1. בפגישה קצרה שהתקיימה היום (2 ינו' 94) עם ג'מיל טריפי, העומד בראש הועדה האזרחית לשיחות טאבה/אלעריש, התייחס לעמדות הצדדים בעקבות מפגש קהיר האחרון וכן הגיב לנאום המלך חוסיין מאתמול 1 ינו' 94.

2. טריפי תקף בחריפות את הצד הישראלי וכן את המלך חוסין ונשיא סוריה, על יחסם כלפי עראפת והפלסטינים בימים האחרונים. לדבריו, ישראל משנה ב- 180 מעלות את יחסה כלפי הפלסטינים, ומפעילה עליהם מכבש איומים תוך נפנוף באופציה הירדנית וזניחת הסכם אוסלו לטובת מו"מ עם סוריה. טריפי אמר שהוא תומך במאה אחוז בעמדת ערפאת ומטיל את האחריות להתפתחות השלילית במו"מ על ישראל בלבד.

3. טריפי טוען, שאבו מאזן היה בהיר מאד בדבריו למשלחת הישראלית בקהיר בשבוע שעבר, שעה שאמר שתוכן הנייר עליו סוכם יועלה לאישור "ההנהגה המדינית", שכן למשלחת הפלסטינית אין כל אוטוריטה לאשרו. לדברי טריפי אף הובהר לישראלים שהמשלחת הפלסטינית עצמה אינה מסכימה עם חלקים שונים באותו נייר.

4. טריפי מיקד דבריו בביקורת כלפי שה"ח הישראלי, ואמר: "דרך האיום בה נוקט פרס כלפינו אינה מוצאת חן בעינינו ואיננה מקובלת עלינו. עוד בורסאי החל פרס באיומיו כאילו בידי ישראל קיימת האפשרות לממש את האופציה הירדנית וללכת למו"מ עם סוריה אם המו"מ עם הפלסטינים יקלע למבוי סתום". טריפי הוסיף ואמר ששה"ח הישראלי מעונין להוכיח שהוא מסוגל לכופף את הפלסטינים לתנאיו אך הדבר לא יעלה בידיו. בנימת רוגז ובטחון עצמי אמר, כי לא יעלה בידי ישראל לממש את האופציה הירדנית וגם לא לזנוח את הבעייה הפלסטינית ולפנות לסוגיית יחסיה עם סוריה. זאת, משום שהעם בישראל וממשלת ישראל יודעים היטב שהבעייה הפלסטינית היא "הבוערת" והמטרידה ביותר, שכן היא כרוכה במעשי רצח, זריקות בקת"בים ואבנים והפרות סדר יום-יומיות, ואילו החזית הסורית שקטה ותוכל להשאר כך עוד 50 שנה, ללא הסכם שלום.

5. טריפי טען, שההתנהגות הישראלית הנוקשה כלפי ערפאת והפלסטינים רק מעודדת את המלך חוסין להשתלח בפלסטינים, כפי שעשה בנאומו בפני קציני הצע"י אתמול. טריפי "הרעיף" קללות נמרצות על המלך והסביר, שחלק מהתביעות הפלסטיניות וההתעקשות הפלסטינית בנושאי המעברים מכוונות כלפי המלך. כך למשל, דרישת הפלסטינים להנפת דגל על הגשר מיועדת להפגנת הנוכחות הפלסטינית למען יראה המלך ויבין שהאדמה כאן היא אדמת פלסטין ולא שייכת לירדן. הצד הפלסטיני אינו מוכן להניח למלך חוסיין שום פתח להתערבות בסוגיית המעברים והתנועה בהם.

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אפרים לביא סא"ל

ע/רמ"ח לענייני ערבים

המנהל האזרחי
אזור יהודה ושומרון
מחלקה לענייני ערבים
אישי ר-85 00007
02 ינואר 1994

<u>תפ"ש - י.ע.ע</u>
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הנדון: **<u>ג'מיל טריפי - סיכום פגישה</u>**

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אפרים לביא סא"ל

ע/רמ"ח לענייני ערבים

The Office of
Faisal Husseini

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

مكتب
فيصل الحسيني

Resolutions from the

Workshop: " Preparing for the Palestinian Investment Conference"

1- The importance of convening the full fledged conference in the city of Jerusalem because of its significance as the capital of Palestine.

2- The Conference will be convened in the Spring of 1994. This conference will be done in conjunction with the Palestinian leadership in the planning and the execution phase.

3- The scope of the conference is to remain Palestinian-Palestinian with the possibility of expanding it to include Arab participants as the political situation ameliorates further.

4- Create a new situation in Jerusalem where the preservation of the Arab nature is primal through immediate investments in the city using the existing loopholes in the legal system. In the working sessions of the conference there should a special session or panel focusing on the issue of Jerusalem.

5- A remedy of the economic situation that deteriorated due to the occupation, with a special focus on the infrastructure, having in mind creating jobs for Palestinians, as the unemployment rate is exceeding 60%.

6- At the macro level there is a need to have a clear guidance program presented to the private sector with Palestinian economic priorities clearly marked by the Palestinian National Authority and the relevant National Economic Councils as designated by the PLO .

7- At the micro level, the participants at the workshop stressed the need to have substantial project feasibility studies and real projects available at the Spring conference.

8- Legal and investment guidance brochures should be also made available at the conference. This is to be done with the understanding that a lot of legal and economic questions will be only answered by the politicians as the talks proceed.

9- The creation of a liaison committee abroad to coordinate all the work of the conference with the local administrative committee and help lobby the business people abroad.

10- The need to create a follow-up mechanism after the adjourning of the conference to service the business people and potential investors.

مبنى بيت الشرق – القدس ص.ب ٢٠٤٧٩ هاتف ٢٧٢٠٤٢-٢٧٣٣٣٠-٢٧٣٧٠١ فاكس ٢٧١٦٢٠
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end 1993

COM/93.458-5

EC SUPPORT TO THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

Communication by Mr. Marin and Mr. van den Broek

EC SUPPORT TO THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

Communication to the Council and the Parliament

1. Introduction

With the breakthrough represented by signing of the Israeli/PLO Agreement the Middle East peace process has reached a critical phase. The relationship between Israel and the Palestinians is at the core of the Arab/Israel problem. The difficulties between Israel and the Arab neighbours may now begin to be resolved. A comprehensive peace settlement could be within reach if negotiations are pursued in all tracks of the Madrid framework. The signature of an agenda for negotiations between Jordan and Israel is an initial indication of this.

However, the situation is not irreversible. Public opinion both in Israel and in the Occupied territories is volatile and could be influenced in the short term by extremist acts of violence and in the longer term by the failure to secure concrete economic achievements.

The comprehensive nature of peace is not yet secured and the future of the Israel/PLO Agreement is therefore uncertain.

For the future the success of the peace process will depend on two factors :

- the engagement of Israel, Syria and Lebanon in concrete negotiations;

- the perception by the populations concerned that the first steps towards peace are bringing an immediate improvement in material conditions.

On the diplomatic front there should be continued support for the process begun in Madrid, with emphasis now on Syria and Lebanon.

On the economic front the time is now right for the EC, together with the international community and especially the Gulf countries, to embark on an ambitious co-operation programme which would embrace the economic development of the West Bank and Gaza, bearing in mind the need also for international efforts in favour of the region as a whole.

The progress being made in the bilateral negotiations should have an impact on the multilaterals. The European Community, which has been called upon to play a leading role in this area, should take the opportunity offered by the new climate in Israeli/Palestinian relations to give an impetus to regional cooperation.

The Community has built up experience of activities in the region as a whole and in the Occupied territories over a number of years and is now the largest aid donor to the territories (see details in annex 1).

The present paper sets out the Commission's views on how the EC could lend its support to that process in dealing :

- with the most urgent and specific needs, to help the Palestinians succeed in their move towards autonomy;

- with the global aspects of the region, to ensure that both Israel and the Mashrak countries derive positive and concrete benefits from the peace process.

2. Future EC cooperation with the Occupied territories, Israel and the Mashrak countries

To ensure the success of the peace process it is essential that efforts to bring conditions in the Occupied territories up to a satisfactory economic level are accompanied by action to support the economic development of the region as a whole.

(a) West Bank and Gaza

For the years 1994-98, the Commission proposes that 500 Mecu be made available by the Community in the form of grants and long-term loans. Half of this amount would be charged to the Community budget and the remainder is expected to be provided through EIB lending (with appropriate guarantees from the Community budget). For statutory reasons, EIB participation in the assistance package would require the introduction of new legal and administration arrangements. EIB lending would therefore develop progressively after those arrangements have been introduced and until 1996 under the 1.8 billion ECU ceiling currently in place(1).

The Commission considers this amount to be an appropriate contribution taking account of the overall needs and absorptive capacity of the Palestinians and the financial capacity of the Community.

The World Bank has estimated on a preliminary basis the minimum capital requirements of Gaza and the West Bank to be in the range of 500-550 million US$ per year (1994-2003).

The Commission proposes that the Community should make a substantial contribution, the remainder to be forthcoming from other sources (Member States, other European countries, USA, Arab Gulf States, Japan, Canada, Australia, etc.).

The Community's approach should focus on two complementary aims : in the short term, capitalising on projects already under way and which bear fruit in 1993/94, to give visibility to EC co-operation; in the medium term, to contribute to the economic normalisation of the territories :

- Projects already under way which could be easily extended are in the fields of housing, small credit and assistance for business and small and medium-sized enterprises, solid waste removal, sewage, Gaza hospital; to these could easily be added construction of classrooms, completion of industrial parks set up by the Israeli civil administration (see annex 2 for projects under immediate preparation);

- in the medium term EC resources should contribute to improving the economic and social infrastructure (housing, schooling, water supply, sewage). At the same time they should help the Palestinians to rapidly generate urgently-needed employment, in particular by providing a modern infrastructure for private

(1) EIB loans on the horizontal cooperation facility of the "Redirected Mediterranean Policy"

business activities (telecommunications, road connections, electricity, industrial estates, etc.), and by creating an environment favorable to the development of small and medium-sized enterprises.

Financial cooperation could be channelled through the future Palestinian Council. This is in accordance with standard practice in the Community and Member States.

In order to enable the Palestinians to handle large amounts of international assistance, the Commission considers it important to help them to establish the requisite technical and financial machinery, a planning and financing authority (which might be designed along the lines of the Lebanese Council for Development and Reconstruction).

The Commission is prepared to put at the disposal of the Palestinians the necessary technical assistance.

Coordination between donors is necessary. It is the Commission's view that the Community, as the main financial contributor, should seek to play a central role in this coordination.

In the Commission's view, it will suffice to set up, in the context of the Regional Economic Development Working Group (REDWG), a sub-group entitled "Palestinian and Economic Development Working Group" (PEDWG), in which all donors would participate, with the World Bank being fully involved. This Group could meet regularly once every 3 months in the beginning and later twice every year.

The Commission's representative in the territories should take up his position shortly, together with his staff of technical assistants.

(b) Israel and the Mashrak countries

The necessary focus on Gaza and the West Bank should be complemented by increased Community cooperation with the region as a whole.

There must be an appropriate balance between the Community's substantial assistance in favour of some 4 million Palestinians(1) on the one hand, and 80 million people living in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Israel on the other hand.

In its communication on "Future Relations and Cooperation between the Community and the Middle East" (COM (93) 375), the Commission has set out its long-term vision.

It has proposed a dual approach:

- the need for the Community to help the countries of the region (including the Palestinians) to step up their regional cooperation;

(1) including the Palestinians in the region assisted by UNRWA.

- the need for the Community to upgrade its contractual relations with each of the countries of the region if they so desire.

Regional Cooperation

The Community could offer these countries a substantial volume of technical and financial assistance for regional cooperation. Since 1992 the Community has already done so. Under the new Mediterranean policy for 1992-96 it has set aside considerable budgetary and loan resources for regional cooperation in the Mediterranean in general (Maghreb, Mashrak, Turkey).(2)

Due to the absence of peace and therefore cooperation, only a small amount of these resources have been used so far in favour of the Middle East.

The prospect for peace will open new possibilities for cooperation in the region. There will be, in the years to come, new requirements for the financing of appropriate intra-regional infrastructure (roads, telecommunications, etc) and water and energy projects, etc.

The Commission believes, therefore, that the Community should be ready to announce its willingness to underpin that process through making available, as part of a wider international action, appropriate finance and through offering its know-how on regional cooperation.

Especially in the longer term, it would be useful to examine ways to promote joint management of regional strategic resources and infrastructures. This could prepare the ground for the establishment, when conditions permit, of a Regional Community for water, energy and infrastructure. To this end, the Commission has set up a working group to study the principles which could underpin this idea and the ways to assist in its long term implementation.

Furthermore, the Community has a specific role to play in promoting regional cooperation among the political and intellectual decision-makers of the region. To this end, the Commission intends to step up its own efforts to organise seminars, workshops, etc., in order to bring together leaders of the Middle East countries, as the Commission has done with the Israelis and Palestinians in the years 1989-93.

The Community is ready to invite regional parties to exchange views on the priorities for regional cooperation over the coming years.

Until 1995-96, financial resources will be made available within the context of the Mediterranean Policy to meet the initial priorities. In addition, the EC will look further ahead at the possible need for additional budget and loan resources, in order to allow the necessary long-term planning to proceed.

(2) 360 Mecu per annum EIB loans and 65 Mecu per annum, on average, budgetary resources.

Upgrading EC bilateral relations

The 1975 EC/Israel Cooperation Agreement, providing essentially for free trade between Israel and the Community, should be replaced by a new Agreement. In particular it should open new areas in the fields of trade, services and cooperation in a wide range of sectors (in particular science and technology). To this end, the Commission submits a proposal for Negotiating Directives and hopes that the Council will speedily act upon these.

The EC should be prepared to respond positively to any wish by Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria to embark on a new dialogue with the Community.

More particularly, in order to help the Arab countries of the region to enter into free trade with Israel and among themselves, it might be helpful if the Community, at the same time, embarked on a process leading to the establishment of a free trade area with these countries in the foreseeable future.

It is not possible to negotiate an international agreement with the West Bank and Gaza; however, ways should be found to arrive at a structured relationship between the EC and the Palestinian self-government, covering all aspects of cooperation with them.

3. In conclusion, the Commission calls upon the Council and the Parliament:

- to endorse these general guidelines, which are designed to underpin the on-going Peace Process;

- to note that the Commission will make further specific proposals as and when necessary;

- to keep the matter under regular review within the appropriate institutional set-up.

COM/93.458-5

ANNEX 1

COMMUNITY AID TO THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

1. Background

Up until 1980 the Community aid to the Palestinian population, whether inside or outside of the Occupied territories, was limited to the refugees. From 1971 on there had been a cooperation with UNRWA which was and still is formally translated into Conventions. Between 1971 and 1980 the total amount of this aid was $ 132 million. In 1981 a new approach for the benefit of the Palestinian population started consisting of direct Community aid under different budget lines which until 1986 reached a total of ecu 8.98 million. From 1987 on there has been a specific budget line (now Article B7-406) for direct development aid to the territories.

2. Guidelines

Community action is based on the 1980 Venice declaration: support of UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338; the right of Palestinians to self-determination; the right of all states in the area to live in security and peace.

The 1986 Council guidelines defined the main principles of the Community attitude towards the Palestinian population and Israel with regard to the territories.

The priority areas are the following:

- small-scale employment-generating projects or measures in the agricultural and industrial sectors, in particular by giving support to measures in the agricultural sector which would increase food self-sufficiency

- education/training, particularly in the vocational and technical fields;

- upgrading of local Palestinian institutions, such as Arab-run Municipalities, Universities and Colleges, professional organisations, etc. particularly through linkages with similar institutions in the European Community, in-country training, seminars.

In the 1989 European Council declaration of Strasbourg the Community and its Member States strongly confirmed their previous position and emphasized their commitment to support the Palestinian population in the territories. Education and health were singled out as areas to which particular attention should be devoted.

3. Description

Community aid to the Occupied territories has five main headings:

(i) **Aid to refugees through UNRWA**. This takes place mostly through contributions to the regular UNRWA budget, which are spent on education, health and food aid programmes. In the years 1971 to 1992 this aid amounted to about ecu 518 million. It is for all refugees, even those who are not living in the Occupied territories. Since the latter represent approximately 38 percent of the total, it is estimated that under this heading aid to the territories amounted to about **ecu 197 million** for 1971-1992.

(ii) **Aid through co-financing with European NGOs**. In 1979-1992 the total amount contributed by the Commission was **ecu 12.8 million.** This was equivalent to a 38.6 percent contribution to projects for a total value of over ecu 33 million.

(iii) **Direct development aid** under budget lines B7-406 and B7-701 amounted in 1991 to ecu 70 million (including ecu 60 million exceptional aid) and in 1992 to ecu 17 million (including ecu 5 million exceptional aid). The figure for 1993 is ecu 35 million (including ecu 20 million for new actions). The total amount devoted to these lines from 1987 up to 1993 is **ecu 139 million**.

(iv) **Aid to promote direct Palestinian exports** from the territories to Community markets.

The Community has reduced import levies for certain Palestinian agricultural products from January 1993 to zero.

(v) **Emergency and exceptional aid interventions** : In 1992 the Community approved a contribution of **ecu 5 million** towards running costs of Palestinian hospitals. They will be disbursed in 1993/1994. In December 1992 the Community approved 6,000 T of wheat flour for the Gazan refugees through UNRWA and in June 1993 an additional amount of 6,000 T of wheat flour, 600 T of rice and 600 T of sugar were approved for refugees and non-refugees of the Gaza Strip.

ANNEX 2

PROJECTS UNDER PREPARATION BEFORE

THE END OF 1993 FOR GAZA AND THE WEST BANK

	MECU
Solid waste disposal in Rafa and Gaza City	2.5
Sewerage in Gaza Strip	10.0
Universities and Community Colleges, West Bank & Gaza	15.0
Technical assistance and studies	5.0
Establishment of local public TV and radio authority	2.0
Various infrastructures (energy, transport and communications)	0.704
Cooperation networks (local governments, universities and media)	2.30
Economic co-operation in the private sector	0.65
Support for the electoral process	4.0
Humanitarian aid(1)	6.0 (estimate)
Total :	48.154

The current housing programme will also be accelerated, leading to increased job creation.

(1) a Commission evaluation team is currently in the Occupied Territories.

LE SOUTIEN COMMUNAUTAIRE AU PROCESSUS DE PAIX AU PROCHE-ORIENT
Fiche Financière

1. INTITULE DE L'ACTION

EC support to the Middle East Peace Process
(Assistance financière aux Territoires de Cisjordanie et de Gaza)

2. LIGNE BUDGETAIRE CONCERNEE: Poste B7-406

3. BASE LEGALE: néant

4. DESCRIPTION DE L'ACTION

4.1. Objectifs spécifiques de l'action

En vue d'améliorer les conditions de vie de la population palestinienne, l'action vise le financement de l'investissement et des frais de fonctionnement dans les domaines de l'infrastructure, de la production (agriculture, pêche, l'industrie) des services (incl. tourisme), du commerce exterieure, du développement urbain et rural, de la santé, de l'environnement, du developpement des instituion et administrations, de la formation et de l'enseignement. Elle permet également l'assistance technique nécessaire pour l'exécution de telles aides et le coût de l'instruction et de suivi des projets.

4.2. Durée

1994 - 1998

4.3. Population visée par l'action

Les actions sont destinées à la population palestinienne des Territoires de Cisjordanie et de Gaza.

5. CLASSIFICATION DE LA DEPENSE (B7-406)

- *DNO*
- *CD*
- *Types de recettes visées: néant*

6. TYPE DE LA DEPENSE/RECETTE (B7-406)

- *Subvention à 100 %*
- *Aucun remboursement n'est prévu*
- *L'action proposée n'implique aucune une modification du niveau des recettes.*

7. INCIDENCE FINANCIERE

7.1 Mode de calcul du coût total de l'action pour l'exercice 1994

Le montant proposé en engagements tient compte de l'expérience acquise dans le passé, des besoins évidents et de la capacité d'absorption des institutions concernées. Il reflète aussi l'engagement de la Communauté à développer son soutien en faveur des Territoires Occupés, la déclaration du Conseil Européen de Strasbourg des 7 et 8 décembre 1989, et les orientations de la reunion informelle des Ministres des Affaires Etrangères à Aeden Biesen les 11/12 septembre 1993.

Vu d'une part le reste à liquider dû notamment à un engagement de 5,0 ECUS fin 92 et d'autre part la nécessité d'augumenter l'assistance aux territoires afin de contribuer à la reussite de l'accord intervenu entre Israel et l'OLP le 13 septembre 1993 une augmentation significative des credits d'engagement et de paiement est demandée.

7.2 Ventilation par éléments du coût de l'action en MECU (B7-406)

VENTILATION	Budget 93	Budget 94	Budget 95	Budget 96	Budget 97	Budget 98	Total
Assistance financière aux Territoires occupés de Cisjordanie et de Gaza	15+20	50	50	50	50	50	250

Les montants sont exprimés en écus courants

7.3.: néant

7.4. Echéancier indicatif des crédits d'engagement
(pour les actions pluriannuelles assorties d'un MEN)

- Période d'application : 1994 - 1998

en MioEcus

Situation cumulée fin 1992 (1)	Budget 1993	APB 1994	PROGRAMMATION INDICATIVE				TOTAL
			1995	1996	1997	1998	
44	15 + 20	50	50	50	50	50	250

8. DISPOSITIONS ANTI-FRAUDE PREVUES DANS LA PROPOSITION D'ACTION

Dispositions anti-fraude

Contrôles normaux de la commission

9. ELEMENTS D'ANALYSE COUT-EFFICACITE

9.1. Objectifs

Objectif(s) spécifique(s) : liens avec les objectifs plus généraux et les autres actions proposées dans la programmation financière indicative

En vue d'améliorer les conditions de vie de la population palestinienne, et de suporter le processus de paix dans la région l'action vise le financement de l'investissement et des frais de fonctionnement dans les domaines de l'infrastructure, de la production (agriculture, pêche, l'industrie) des services (incl. tourisme) du commerce exterieurs, du developpement urbain et rural, de la santé, de l'environnement, du developpement des institutions et administrations, de la formation, et de l'enseignement. Elle permet également l'assistance technique nécessaire pour l'exécution de telles aides et le coût de l'instruction et du suivi des projets.

9.2 Justification de l'action

- *Coût: 250 MECU dans B7-406 pour 1994-1998 ce qui permettra à la* Communauté de donner un support au processus de paix et une aide significative à des populations qui ne sont pas couvertes par les accords de coopération conclus avec les Etats voisins.

- *Effets dérivés (Impact au-delà de(s) objectif(s) spécifique(s)*: Les actions financées par cette ligne de crédit visent au developpement et renforcement de l'autonomie institutionnelle et économique qui réduira la dépendance des teritoires vis à vis du financement exterieur.

- *Effets multiplicateurs (capacité de mobilisation d'autres sources de financement)*: L'efficatité des actions de cette ligne budgétaire pourrait être multipliée par les efffets stimulants sur l'économie des Territoires Occupés qui attireront du capital local et international. De plus, la coordination avec d'autres donateurs l'influencera postivement les actions financées par cette ligne budgétaire.

9.3 Suivi et évaluation de l'action

- *Indicateurs de performance sélectionnés*

  Des Indicateurs de performance spécifique sont établis pour chaque projet (par exemple: augmentation de la production en agriculture et du taux d'éautosuffisance alimentaire, volume des exportations des territoires concernés).

- *Modalités et périodicité de l'évaluation prévues*

  Les principaux secteurs financés feront l'objet d'évaluations annuelles.

- *Appréciation des résultats obtenus*

  Les résultats obtenu jusqu à présent montrent que la dégradation socio-économique a été ralentie par les actions prècédents de la Communauté.

9.4. Cohérence avec la programmation financière

- L'action est-elle prévue dans la programmation financière de la DG pour les années concernées ? Oui.

- Indiquez à quel objectif plus général défini dans la programmation financière de la DG correspond l'objectif de l'action proposée: apporter une contribution à la réalisation des objectifs economiques et à la stabilite politique de la région.

- Principaux facteurs d'incertitude pouvant affecter les résultats spécifiques de l'action: La situation politique et sociale encore incertaine.

Eberhard RHEIN

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AM-Cab

THE EUROPEAN CONTRIBUTION TO THE ME PEACE PROCESS(*)

1. Europe (EU) has never been a player in the limelight. Our contribution to the Peace Process getting started has not been decisive (no more than any other contribution so far to solving major world conflicts).
   We have just been putting one or two bricks into a difficult edifice, which is still under construction.

2. Up until 1991 (Madrid Conference), the European role consisted essentially of strengthening the Palestinian hand:

   - through development aid, in particular in institution building;

   - through showing a rather cold shoulder to Israeli overtures for closer links with Europe.

   This policy was not very successful. It certainly alienated the Israelis, who misunderstood it as being anti-Israeli, but maybe it has also given some wrong signals to the Palestinian side and, in any case, it was not a constructive policy in the sense that it did not pursue clearly defined realistic goals. It took the Americans to overcome the Israeli/Palestinian deadlock, as we all know, and, even here, it is doubtful whether, in the

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(*) London, January 7, 1994, 20th Century Fund.

absence of the Gulf War, the Americans would have felt compelled to undertake the extremely tiresome shuttle diplomacy (Mr Baker).

In retrospect and in justification, it may be pleaded that probably not much else could really have been done from the European side as long as a Likud government was in power.

Indeed, the only thing that Europe could usefully do at that time was to maintain pressure on Israel and on public opinion and demonstrate that the Palestinian dilemma was a no-win situation.

3. During the last two years, and definitely with the new Labour government, Europe has taken an infinitely more constructive approach (compared to the earlier antagonistic approach).

Europe has, indeed, put very high hopes into the Labour government. It has displayed full confidence in the basic strategy and even gone along, though reluctantly, with some of the harsher tactical actions which that government had resorted to (expulsion of the 400 Hamas members).

The European approach has been a two-pronged one:

- Vis-à-vis Israel, Europe has tried to demonstrate that peace pays. Relations with Israel have become closer, more constructive and even more cordial than they have ever been during the last 10 years.

  Europe has gone out of its way to pave the ground for a new agreement with Israel which, if and when concluded, would bring Israel much closer into the European court than ever before, not only in the

economic sphere, but also in the scientific and even the cultural spheres.

- Vis-à-vis the Palestinians, Europe is also trying hard to demonstrate that peace will pay dividends. That is the reason why Brussels has been so extremely fast, after September 13, to come up with its unprecedented US$600 million aid package for the years 1994-98 and that is why the European Commission has emptied all its drawers and shifted more funds (grants) than ever before in favour of Palestinian projects.

  Indeed, never before has Europe been induced to make available such an impressive aid package in such a short time; and never before has Europe set aside as much aid per capita to any country in the world as it has to the Palestinians (US$25 per capita per annum).

  The European action has certainly had a catalytic effect on the global aid package of almost US$2.5 billion which was pledged in Washington on October 1.

  Would the United States or Japan have been prepared to put up similarly important amounts of aid without - once again - Europe setting the example?

3.1 In addition to its action in the financial development field, Europe has also, during the past 2 years, done a lot in bringing together Israelis and Palestinians from different walks of life and in making them think and work together. Here Europe (and not only Norway) has played a truly political role, however, modest it may have been.

Thus, Brussels served, even before Oslo, as a discreet meeting place, where Israeli and Palestinian intellectuals and political leaders could quietly reflect on the future coexistence of Israel and a Palestinian entity and where Israeli and Palestinian women got together to establish a foundation for future joint political work (Jerusalem Link).

Indeed, quite a few of those now responsible, both on the Israeli and the Palestinian side, have been able to meet their respective counterparts in Brussels during the years of opposition or resistance.

Much of this work was European-financed, took place in European offices or meeting rooms and was facilitated discreetly by European officials behind the scenes.

3.2 The European role has been wider than its contribution to the Israeli/Palestinian reconciliation (even if that remains the core issue).

As of early 1993, we have started thinking on post-conflict scenarios for Israel and the whole Mashrak region. We have asked ourselves, in particular, how peaceful the coexistence could usefully be underpinned by various forms of economic co-operation.

This was a rather natural job for Europeans to be done for two reasons:

- The European chairmanship of the REDWG

- The European experience in economic co-operation since 1945.

The result of that internal reflection was a paper that the Commission submitted to European Ministers in early September 1993. It contains three basic messages:

. Without a higher level of economic and social well-being, there will be no durable peace in the region.

. As long as the prosperity gap between Israel and its neighbours continues unabated (10 : 1), tension and even conflict is bound to continue.

. Without tearing down national borders and opening up the tiny economies of the region to more regional interaction and even active co-operation, economic development will be hampered and this lack of economic development will kindle unnecessary tensions.

- There will have to be more trade between the countries of the region (who do less than 5% of their trade between themselves).

- There will have to be a division of labour between wealthy Israel and its poor neighbours.

- There will have to be infrastructure programmes, tying together the national road networks, electricity grids or natural gas grids.

- There has to be joint management of the increasingly scarce water resources and the fragile environment, in

particular in the Gulf of Aqaba and the Mediterranean coast.

The watch word of the future, therefore, will have to be "interdependence" and no longer national self-sufficiency.

Very cautiously, almost by teaspoons, we have been trying to preach that gospel. The parties were anything but enthusiastic, ranging from Palestinians too much preoccupied with nationhood, to Syrians barring, at least for the time being, any regional contacts with their neighbours, and in particular with Israel.

Still, we managed to produce the unthinkable, that leaders from Israel, Egypt, Jordan and Palestine dared to discuss in private, but jointly, with regard to their common future:

. How much trade do they want to do with each other?

. How free should such trade be?

. Could they envisage at any time a free trade area or even a customs union?

. Could they envisage common institutions, even beyond the purely technical sphere?

. What do they think about joint ventures of Israeli and Arab businessmen in industry, trade or banking?

Could they accept limiting their national independence by pooling their resources; buying part of their energy supply from their neighbours; and being linked through water, gas or electrical connections to their neighbours?

Even to discuss subjects of such a delicate nature would have been anathema 20 months ago.

Would it have been conceivable for an Israeli central banker to recall to fellow bankers from Egypt and Jordan that they have common interests in mutual prosperity, in reciprocal trade, investments and co-operation and that, if they do not seize the opportunity of changing fundamentally the image of the region to one where people are capable of living and working together and one in which there are opportunities for business to be done, the train of history which has stopped momentarily to focus on the region would not come back for a very long time?

So, in a nutshell, we have tried to stage an exercise in confidence-building, for without mutual confidence there would be no lasting peace in the region.

8. What about the future?

Europe is committed to playing a more high profile role in the Middle East. For once, Europe feels a certain political commitment to fully playing its part and helping the parties to overcome decade-long mistrust and conflict.

The European Council has clearly decided that the Middle East constitutes, no less than Eastern Europe, a priority region for the future Common Foreign Security Policy.

There should, therefore, no longer be any isolated national actions. European foreign policy towards the region should essentially be a Europe-wide common action or, at least, a co-ordinated action by several Member States.

The European role in future will have to be both political (and there should be more of this) and economical:

- Politically, Europe will continue to dialogue with all the parties, intervene when and where opportune, send signals, warn (if necessary), but in particular try to encourage the parties to come to terms in their negotiations and to substitute co-operation for mistrust and antagonism.

- Economically, Europe will have to continue its "crusade" for more regional co-operation. It will have to do so patiently and tenaciously, for there is no alternative.

  To that end, Europe will have to be prepared to co-finance a series of initiatives for more regional co-operation. Such initiatives may range from simple manoeuvres to municipal networks and feasibility studies for road networks, electrical interconnections or even regional power plants.

  The Middle East should, therefore, become not only one of the major beneficiaries of European financial co-operation, but it should also,

over time, become a much more attractive place to do trade with and to invest in.

9. In conclusion, despite unavoidable setbacks, despite non-respected time-frames, there is, for the first time after so many years, hope that conflict, hatred, misery, military posture and military ways, will give rise to a new understanding and to an era of co-operation in the Middle East.

We cannot, as Europeans, substitute ourselves to those in charge in the Middle East, but we can, and we should, contribute our share to transforming the Middle East into a better place to live and to work in.

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
JERUSALEM

החוץ
שלים

תהליך השלום הרב-צדדי
פעילות בין סבבים
ריכוז ועדכון - דצמבר 93'

ק.ע. כלכלית COPENHAGEN ACTION PLAN

מס' סד'	פעולה	אחריות	מיקום ותאריך יעד	הערות
.1	סמינר - תחבורה	צרפת/קהיליה	מחצית 94'	
.2	סמינר - תחבורה	קהיליה	1994	
.3	איסוף נתונים-תחבורה	קהיליה	1994	כביש י-ם-עומאן
.4	היתכנות - תחבורה	קהיליה	1994	כביש טאבה,אילת עקבה
.5	סמינר-תעופה אזרחית	קהיליה	מחצית 94'	
.6	איסוף נתונים - רשת חשמל איזורית	אוסטריה-קהיליה	יוני 94'	
.7	סמינר - חיבור רשתות חשמל	אוסטריה-קהיליה	ספט' 94'	
.8	איסוף נתונים - חשמל הידרו אלקטרי	קהיליה	אביב 94'	
.9	איסוף נתונים - צינור גז מצרים - עזה	איטליה	1994	
.10	סמינר - תיירות אזורית	יפאן	קהיר פב' 94'	
.11	סמינר - תיירות אירופית ואמריקנית אזורית	קהיליה/ארה"ב	קהיר פב' 94'	
.12	סמינר - תיירות	שוויץ	1994	
.13	איסוף נתונים-חקלאות	ספרד	אביב 1994	
.14	איסוף נתונים - שרותים וטריניריים	קהיליה	1993	

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
JERUSALEM



החוץ
שלים

מס' סד'	פעולה	אחריות	מיקום ותאריך יעד	הערות
15.	סמינר - שירותים וטריניריים באיזור	קהיליה	אביב 94'	
16.	סמינר - משק פיננסים בריטניה	לונדון	אביב 94'	
17.	איסוף נתונים - שת"פ פיננסי/אזורי	בריטניה	1994	
18.	סמינר - שת"פ מסחרי/ אזורי	קהיליה	1994	
19.	סמינר - JOINT VENTURES	קהיליה/שוויץ במז"ת	סוף 94'	
20.	איסוף נתונים - שת"פ אזורי בסחר	גרמניה	1994	
21.	איסוף נתונים מתקדם - שת"פ אזורי בסחר	גרמניה	ינואר 94'	
22.	סמינר - סחר אזורי	קהיליה/שוויץ	מרץ 94'	
23.	סמינר-פיתוח סחר אזורי	ארה"ב	ארה"ב, יוני 1994	
24.	סמינר - הכשרת כח אדם	ארה"ב	ארה"ב, יוני 1994	
25.	סמינר - וטרינריה	ארה"ב	מז"ת, אפריל 1994	
26.	סמינר - מים	ארה"ב	ארה"ב, אביב 1994	
27.	איסוף נתונים - הכשרת כח אדם	גרמניה	1994	
28.	איסוף נתונים - הכשרת כח אדם	הודו	1994	
29.	סמינר - הכשרת כח אדם	גרמניה	קיץ 1994	
30.	סמינר - הכשרת כח אדם	בנק עולמי	1994	
31.	סמינר - שת"פ איזורי-שלטון מקומי	קהיליה	קהיר, דצמ' 93'	

מס' סד'	פעולה	אחריות	מיקום ותאריך יעד	הערות
.32	סמינר - שת"פ איזורי אוניברסיטאי	קהיליה	קהיר, דצמ' 93'	
.33	סמינר - שת"פ איזורי תקשורתי	קהיליה	1994	
.34	איסוף נתונים - שת"פ כלכלי איזורי	קנדה	אביב 1994	
.35	סמינר - שת"פ כלכלי איזורי	קנדה	1994	

ק.ע. לפליטים

מס' סד'	פעולה	אחריות	מיקום ותאריך יעד	הערות
.1	סמינר - הגדרת המשפחה	צרפת	תוניס, ינואר 94'	
.2	איסוף נתונים - בריאות הציבור	איטליה	אין עיתוי מדוייק	
.3	איסוף נתונים - רווחת הילד	שבדיה	אין עיתוי	
.4	איסוף נתונים - מאגר מידע	נורבגיה	1994	
.5	איסוף נתונים - הכשרת כח אדם	ארה"ב	1994	
.6	איסוף נתונים - פרוייקטים כלכליים קטנים	קהיליה	1994	

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
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ק.ע. למים

מס' סד'	פעולה	אחריות	מיקום ותאריך יעד	הערות
.1	איסוף נתונים - מאגר מידע	קהיליה/ארה"ב	ינואר 94'	
.2	סמינר, איסוף נתונים-מאגר מידע	צרפת	צרפת, מרץ 94'	
.3	סמינר - סטנדרטיזציה במאגרי מידע	ארה"ב	ארה"ב, מרץ 94	
.4	איסוף נתונים - דגם נהר הירדן	ארה"ב	1994	
.5	התקנת מערכות - איסוף מים מהגגות	קנדה	1993/94	
.6	סמינר - ניהול מים אזורי	או"ם	ג'נבה, דצמבר 93'	
.7	סמינר - חיזוי מזג אויר	ארה"ב	ארה"ב, מרץ 94'	
.8	סמינר - הכשרת כח אדם-מים	ארה"ב	אביב 1994	חופף לפריט 26
.9	סמינר - התפלת מים	עומאן	עומאן(?), אביב 1994	

ק.ע. לאיכות הסביבה

מס' סד'	פעולה	אחריות	מיקום ותאריך יעד	הערות
.1	סמינר מומחים - זיהום ים מפרץ עקבה	קהיליה	מז"ת,דצמבר 93	
.2	סמינר-ניהול אינטגרטיבי - חוף ים	קהיליה	1994	החוף בדרום מזרח הים התיכון

מס' סד'	פעולה	אחריות	מיקום ותאריך יעד	הערות
.3	איסוף נתונים - מדבור	בנק עולמי/אום	אביב 94'	הקמת יחידת תאום אזורית לקראת תכנית פעולה. היפאנים התחיבו למימון כחצי מליון דולר
.4	סמינר-קוד התנהגות סביבתי	יפאן	קהיר, פבר' 94	
.5	מרכז אזורי לחינוך סביבתי בעמאן	קנדה/ירדן		
.6	איסוף נתונים - הקמת מאגר מידע א"ס בשטחים ורשת פיקוח זיהום אויר	אוסטריה		מימון אוסטרי כ-600 אלף דולר
.7	סמינר - איכות אויר	ארה"ב/מצרים	אביב 94'	
.8	פרופיל סביבתי - עזה	הולנד	דצמבר 93'	ביצוע פרוייקט בילטרלי הולנד-פלס'
.9	איסוף נתונים - טיפול בפסולת מוצקה ושפכים	ארה"ב	1994	
.10	סמינר - זיהומים תעשייתים	יפאן	ראשית, 1994	
.11	סמינר - איכות הסביבה	קנדה	ראשית, 1994	
.12	סמינר - פסולת מוצקה	איטליה	מחצית 1994	
.13	הקמת מוסדות א"ס פלס'	ארה"ב, יפאן, קהיליה	-	

המנהל האזרחי
אזור יהודה ושומרון
מחלקה לענייני ערבים
צח"א 02442
27 דצמבר 1993

רמ"א
צח"א

נדון: **<u>הבחירות למועצה הפלסטינית (P.C.) - ניתוח והמלצות</u>**
(ישיבות צח"א 25, 29 נוב', 8, 20, 26 דצמ' 93)

<u>כללי</u>

1. עפ"י הסכם העקרונות (סעיף 3), אמורות להתקיים בתוך תשעה חודשים מיום החתימת על הצהרת העקרונות, ביולי 1994, בחירות "פוליטיות ישירות, חופשיות וכלליות", למועצה הפלסטינית בגדה המערבית וברצועת עזה. הבחירות, כך נקבע, יהוו "צעד מכין משמעותי לתקופת הביניים, לקראת הגשמת הזכויות הלגיטימיות של העם הפלסטיני ודרישותיו הצודקות".

2. בהתאם ל-D.O.P ייחתם הסכם מפורט בין ישראל לפלסטינים לגבי קיום הבחירות, לרבות מבנה המועצה וסמכויותיה. הבחירות למועצה הפלסטינית הן תנאי להעברת הסמכויות.

3. בהנחה שהתאריכים שנקבעו בהצהרת העקרונות (שאינה חוזה משפטי מחייב) אינם קדושים, ובהתאם להנחת המוצא שאי קיום בחירות ביולי 94 בהסכמה בין הצדדים אינו גורר עצירת התהליך, נבחנת במסמך זה סוגיית הבחירות ועיתויין בהתייחס לאינטרס הישראלי והאש"פי, ובהתייחס למידת הישימות של קיום בחירות ביולי 94.

<u>פירוט</u>

<u>הנחות יסוד</u>

4. להלן פירוט הנחות היסוד לקיום בחירות:

א. אש"פ ומנהיגו לא יוכלו להימנע מקיום בחירות בשל לחצים מצד חלקים גדולים באירגון באוכלוסיית ה"פנים" (גורמים מרכזיים בפת"ח, מע"פ, פד"א, חז"ע, חז"ד וחמא"ס).

ב. קיום הבחירות מחויב על פי הסכם העקרונות, אך ניתן **לדחות** את מועדן בהסכמה בין ישראל ואש"פ.

ג. דחיית הבחירות (בין אם בהסכמה או שלא בהסכמה) **לא תעצור** בהכרח את התהליך או תביא להשהייתו.

ד. אש"פ יוכל להמנע מתבוסה ולהצליח בבחירות רק אם יעלה בידו להמשיך את התהליך ולהביא לישומו תוך הבטחת הבטחון והמנהל הציבורי התקין וקידום הכלכלה ("תקופת מבחן").

<u>הגדרת האינטרס הישראלי</u>

5. להלן הגדרת האינטרס הישראלי:

א. המשך התהליך המדיני ומימוש הסכם הביניים **עם אש"פ**.

ב. התקדמות לעבר הסדרי הקבע עם מנהיגות פלסטינית **נבחרת** ובעלת לגיטימציה, הפועלת במערכת פוליטית מאוזנת ומיוצבת, ולחילופין: הפסקת ההתקדמות בתהליך בהיעדר מנהיגות כזו.

<u>הגדרת האינטרס האש"פי</u>

6. להלן הגדרת האינטרס האש"פי בבחירות:

א. קיום בחירות בתנאים שיבטיחו את נצחון אש"פ, והימנעות מהסתכנות במפלה ואובדן לגיטימציה בבחירות ביולי 94, שבעיקבותיהן אש"פ לא יוכל להביא למימוש ההסכם.

ב. קבלת לגיטימציה שתבטיח לאש"פ את המשך תהליך המו"מ ותעניק לו יכולת שליטה אפקטיבית וקבלת החלטות והכרעות בנושאים מדיניים ואחרים.

ג. הבטחת הסיוע הפיננסי המאסיבי ממדינות המערב, הדורשות מאש"פ לקיים מינהל ציבורי תקין ומשטר דמוקרטי, שיסייע לביסוס שילטון אש"פ.

ד. השגת איזון פנימי וייצוב המערכת הפוליטית הפלסטינית; מעבר ממצב של "מהפכה" למצב של התמסדות באמצעות הקמת מוסדות פוליטיים; הפיכת החברה הפלסטינית לדמוקרטית.

<u>בחירות ביולי 94 במבחן הישימות</u>

7. להלן שורת סיבות וניסוקים המוכיחים כי בחירות ביולי 94 אינן עומדות במבחן הישימות:

א. **היבט אירגוני-טכני** - הלו"ז הקצר שנקבע בהסכם העקרונות אינו יכול לאפשר לפלסטינים היערכות נאותה לקיום הבחירות (קביעת שיטת הבחירות בהסכם עם ישראל, קביעת סדרי הבחירות, ארגון הסברה ותעמולת בחירות וכו'). **הערה:** יצויין, כי הפלסטינים תובעים שתוענק זכות בחירה עפ"י מירשם האוכלוסין מ-4 יוני 67, ואילו ישראל עומדת על כך שפנקס הבוחרים יהיה על פי מירשם האוכלוסין הקיים של המנהא"ז; נדרש זמן מינימום של שלושה חודשים להערכות המנהא"ז לבחירות.

ב. **אוירה וסדר ציבורי** - ניתן להניח, שפרק הזמן בין אפריל ליולי 94 יתאפיין בחוסר יציבות ואי שקט (לרבות הפרות סדר, אלימות וטרור) בשטחים, כולל באזח"ע וביריחו. בתנאים אלו יקשה מאוד ליצור אוירה ציבורית נוחה ומתאימה לקראת קיום בחירות. יתר על כן, ספק אם עד יולי 94 יסתיים תהליך הקמת המשטרה הפלסטינית, האמורה לאבטח את הבחירות.

ג. **היבט אלקטורלי** - חשש מתהליך דה-לגיטימציה גובר של הנהגת אש"פ, שיגרום למפלתה בבחירות, להבעת אי אמון בערפאת ועצירת התהליך כולו (התמוטטות ההסכם). **הערה:** התפתחות כזו בשעה שצה"ל מחוץ לאיזור והסמכויות בידי הפלסטינים פוגעת בעיקרון ההפיכות.

ד. **היבט לאומי** - אש"פ יחשוש מפני השלכותיהן של בחירות המתקיימות ללא הפזורה על אחדותו של העם הפלסטיני, במיוחד אם ידרוש לקיים בחירות תחוקתיות ובהשתתפות מועמדים ממז' י-ם, ועל כן יעדיף לדחות את קיומן למועד מאוחר יותר.

ה. **היבט פסיכולוגי** - מגוונים הקשת הפוליטית בחברה הפלסטינית נשמעות דעות, כי אש"פ והחברה הפלסטינית אינם בשלים עדיין לקיים בחירות פוליטיות-דמוקרטיות כלליות וחופשיות, בשל העדר מסורת דמוקרטית. ההערכה היא, כי בחירות ביולי 94 תשאנה אופי של "משאל עם" לגבי הסכם העקרונות והאמון בהנהגת אש"פ, ותוצאתן תהיה בהכרח שלילית על החברה הפלסטינית, באשר תיווצר קוטביות תחת אחדות. על פי גישה זו, נדרש פרק זמן נוסף כדי להכין את אש"פ והאוכלוסיה לבחירות דמוקרטיות.

ו. **היבט מהותי** - הכרה כי לא ניתן לעבור משלטון ריכוזי לשלטון דמוקרטי יציב באמצעות בחירות ביולי 94, ויש לאפשר תפקודו של גוף ביניים, מועצה ממונה, לפרק זמן קצוב, שתכין חוקה, תגדיר את סדרי השלטון, תקבע את מוסדות הממשל שיעמדו לבחירה, ושאליה יועברו סמכויות המנהא"ז.

<u>סיכום והמלצות</u>

8. קיום בחירות כלליות ודמוקרטיות הוא אינטרס פלסטיני וישראלי משותף.

9. על הצדדים להסכים על עיתוי מתאים שיצמצם למינימום את סיכון הפגיעה בהמשך התהליך, שהוא היעד העיקרי, ויעמוד במבחן הישימות בהיבטים שהוזכרו לעיל (סעיף 7), אך לא יאוחר מתחילת הדיונים על הסדר הקבע.

10. ישראל תתנה את קיומו של המו"מ על הסדרי הקבע ואת המשך התהליך בכללו, בכך שהצד הפלסטיני ייוצג על ידי הנהגה לגיטימית שתבחר בבחירות דמוקרטיות.

11. עד למועד הבחירות שיוסכם בין הצדדים, ימשיכו ישראל **ואש"פ** בתהליך המדיני ובמימוש הסכם הביניים, תוך הסכמה על פריסת המשטרה באיו"ש והעברת הסמכויות מהמנהא"ז ל"רשות הלאומית" (P.A.), או ל**מועצה ממונה זמנית**, עד כינון המועצה הנבחרת.

12. הגוף הממונה יפעל במתכונת מועצה נבחרת. הסכמת ישראל להמשך התהליך (העברת סמכויות ופריסת המשטרה) ללא בחירות תוצג כויתור ותנוצל במו"מ.

בברכה,

אפרים לביא סא"ל

חבר צח"א

המנהל האזרחי
אזור יהודה ושומרון
מחלקה לענייני ערבים
צח"א 02442
27 דצמבר 1993

רמ"א
צח"א

נדון: **הבחירות למועצה הפלסטינית (P.C.) - ניתוח והמלצות**
(ישיבות צח"א 25, 29 נוב', 8, 20, 26 דצמ' 93)

כללי

1. עפ"י הסכם העקרונות (סעיף 3), אמורות להתקיים בתוך תשעה חודשים מיום החתימת על הצהרת העקרונות, ביולי 1994, בחירות "פוליטיות ישירות, חופשיות וכלליות", למועצה הפלסטינית בגדה המערבית וברצועת עזה. הבחירות, כך נקבע, יהוו "צעד מכין משמעותי לתקופת הביניים, לקראת הגשמת הזכויות הלגיטימיות של העם הפלסטיני ודרישותיו הצודקות".

2. בהתאם ל-D.O.P ייחתם הסכם מפורט בין ישראל לפלסטינים לגבי קיום הבחירות, לרבות מבנה המועצה וסמכויותיה. הבחירות למועצה הפלסטינית הן תנאי להעברת הסמכויות.

3. בהנחה שהתאריכים שנקבעו בהצהרת העקרונות (שאינה חוזה משפטי מחייב) אינם קדושים, ובהתאם להנחת המוצא שאי קיום בחירות ביולי 94 בהסכמה בין הצדדים אינו גורר עצירת התהליך, נבחנת במסמך זה סוגיית הבחירות ועיתויין בהתייחס לאינטרס הישראלי והאש"פי, ובהתייחס למידת הישימות של קיום בחירות ביולי 94.

פירוט

הנחות יסוד

4. להלן פירוט הנחות היסוד לקיום בחירות:

א. אש"פ ומנהיגו לא יוכלו להימנע מקיום בחירות בשל לחצים מצד חלקים גדולים באירגון באוכלוסיית ה"פנים" (גורמים מרכזיים בפת"ח, מע"פ, פד"א, חז"ע, חז"ד וחמא"ס).

ב. קיום הבחירות מחויב על פי הסכם העקרונות, אך ניתן **לדחות** את מועדן בהסכמה בין ישראל ואש"פ.

ג. דחיית הבחירות (בין אם בהסכמה או שלא בהסכמה) **לא תעצור** בהכרח את התהליך או תביא להשהייתו.

ד. אש"פ יוכל להמנע מתבוסה ולהצליח בבחירות רק אם יעלה בידו להמשיך את התהליך ולהביא לישומו תוך הבטחת הבטחון והמנהל הציבורי התקין וקידום הכלכלה ("תקופת מבחן").

<u>הגדרת האינטרס הישראלי</u>

5. להלן הגדרת האינטרס הישראלי:

א. המשך התהליך המדיני ומימוש הסכם הביניים **עם אש"פ**.

ב. התקדמות לעבר הסדרי הקבע עם מנהיגות פלסטינית **נבחרת** ובעלת לגיטימציה, הפועלת במערכת פוליטית מאוזנת ומיוצבת, ולחילופין: הפסקת ההתקדמות בתהליך בהיעדר מנהיגות כזו.

<u>הגדרת האינטרס האש"פי</u>

6. להלן הגדרת האינטרס האש"פי בבחירות:

א. קיום בחירות בתנאים שיבטיחו את נצחון אש"פ, והימנעות מהסתכנות במפלה ואובדן לגיטימציה בבחירות ביולי 94, שבעיקבותיהן אש"פ לא יוכל להביא למימוש ההסכם.

ב. קבלת לגיטימציה שתבטיח לאש"פ את המשך תהליך המו"מ ותעניק לו יכולת שליטה אפקטיבית וקבלת החלטות והכרעות בנושאים מדיניים ואחרים.

ג. הבטחת הסיוע הפיננסי המאסיבי ממדינות המערב, הדורשות מאש"פ לקיים מינהל ציבורי תקין ומשטר דמוקרטי, שיסייע לביסוס שילטון אש"פ.

ד. השגת איזון פנימי וייצוב המערכת הפוליטית הפלסטינית; מעבר ממצב של "מהפכה" למצב של התמסדות באמצעות הקמת מוסדות פוליטיים; הפיכת החברה הפלסטינית לדמוקרטית.

<u>בחירות ביולי 94 במבחן הישימות</u>

7. להלן שורת סיבות ונימוקים המוכיחים כי בחירות ביולי 94 אינן עומדות במבחן הישימות:

א. **היבט אירגוני-טכני** - הלו"ז הקצר שנקבע בהסכם העקרונות אינו יכול לאפשר לפלסטינים היערכות נאותה לקיום הבחירות (קביעת שיטת הבחירות בהסכם עם ישראל, קביעת סדרי הבחירות, ארגון הסברה ותעמולת בחירות וכו').
הערה: יצויין, כי הפלסטינים תובעים שתוענק זכות בחירה עפ"י מירשם האוכלוסין מ-4 יוני 67, ואילו ישראל עומדת על כך שפנקס הבוחרים יהיה על פי מירשם האוכלוסין הקיים של המנהא"ז; נדרש זמן מינימום של שלושה חודשים להערכות המנהא"ז לבחירות.

ב. **אוירה וסדר ציבורי** - ניתן להניח, שפרק הזמן בין אפריל ליולי 94 יתאפיין בחוסר יציבות ואי שקט (לרבות הפרות סדר, אלימות וטרור) בשטחים, כולל באזח"ע וביריחו. בתנאים אלו יקשה מאוד ליצור אוירה ציבורית נוחה ומתאימה לקראת קיום בחירות. יתר על כן, ספק אם עד יולי 94 יסתיים תהליך הקמת המשטרה הפלסטינית, האמורה לאבטח את הבחירות.

ג. **היבט אלקטורלי** - חשש מתהליך דה-לגיטימציה גובר של הנהגת אש"פ, שיגרום למפלתה בבחירות, להבעת אי אמון בערפאת ועצירת התהליך כולו (התמוטטות ההסכם).
הערה: התפתחות כזו בשעה שצה"ל מחוץ לאיזור והסמכויות בידי הפלסטינים פוגעת בעיקרון ההפיכות.

ד. **היבט לאומי** - אש"פ יחשוש מפני השלכותיהן של בחירות המתקיימות ללא הפזורה על אחדותו של העם הפלסטיני, במיוחד אם ידרוש לקיים בחירות תחוקתיות ובהשתתפות מועמדים ממז' י-ם, ועל כן יעדיף לדחות את קיומן למועד מאוחר יותר.

ה. **היבט פסיכולוגי** - מגוונים הקשת הפוליטית בחברה הפלסטינית נשמעות דעות, כי אש"פ והחברה הפלסטינית אינם בשלים עדיין לקיים בחירות פוליטיות-דמוקרטיות כלליות וחופשיות, בשל העדר מסורת דמוקרטית. ההערכה היא, כי בחירות ביולי 94 תשאנה אופי של "משאל עם" לגבי הסכם העקרונות והאמון בהנהגת אש"פ, ותוצאתן תהיה בהכרח שלילית על החברה הפלסטינית, באשר תיווצר קוטביות תחת אחדות. על פי גישה זו, נדרש פרק זמן נוסף כדי להכין את אש"פ והאוכלוסיה לבחירות דמוקרטיות.

ו. **היבט מהותי** - הכרה כי לא ניתן לעבור משלטון ריכוזי לשלטון דמוקרטי יציב באמצעות בחירות ביולי 94, ויש לאפשר תפקודו של גוף ביניים, מועצה ממונה, לפרק זמן קצוב, שתכין חוקה, תגדיר את סדרי השלטון, תקבע את מוסדות הממשל שיעמדו לבחירה, ושאליה יועברו סמכויות המנהא"ז.

<u>סיכום והמלצות</u>

8. קיום בחירות כלליות ודמוקרטיות הוא אינטרס פלסטיני וישראלי משותף.

9. על הצדדים להסכים על עיתוי מתאים שיצמצם למינימום את סיכון הפגיעה בהמשך התהליך, שהוא היעד העיקרי, ויעמוד במבחן הישימות בהיבטים שהוזכרו לעיל (סעיף 7), אך לא יאוחר מתחילת הדיונים על הסדר הקבע.

10. ישראל תתנה את קיומו של המו"מ על הסדרי הקבע ואת המשך התהליך בכללו, בכך שהצד הפלסטיני ייוצג על ידי הנהגה לגיטימית שתבחר בבחירות דמוקרטיות.

11. עד למועד הבחירות שיוסכם בין הצדדים, ימשיכו ישראל **ואש"פ** בתהליך המדיני ובמימוש הסכם הביניים, תוך הסכמה על פריסת המשטרה באיו"ש והעברת הסמכויות מהמנהא"ז ל"רשות הלאומית" (P.A.), או ל**מועצה ממונה זמנית**, עד כינון המועצה הנבחרת.

12. הגוף הממונה יפעל במתכונת מועצה נבחרת. הסכמת ישראל להמשך התהליך (העברת סמכויות ופריסת המשטרה) ללא בחירות תוצג כויתור ותנוצל במו"מ.

בברכה,

אפרים לביא סא"ל

חבר צח"א

under the eyes of the world.

6- There is another disagreement between us on the meaning of outside security. We have accepted that outside security to be under Israeli supervision. However, we have not accepted that Israeli soldiers would be stationed on our borders because that, then, will transform us into an Israeli suzerainty. Outside security in our view and according to International Law means that Israel will provide for the security of our borders if these were threatened by a

STATE OF PALESTINE

PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION

Office of the President

دولـة فلسطين

منظمة التحرير الفلسطينية

مكتب الرئيس

17/12/93

PREFACE

Following the signature of the Declaration of Principles (DOP) between Israel and the PLO on 13 September 1993, the stage was set for a new phase of development in the Occupied Territories (OTs) in order to support what is otherwise an extremely fragile situation.

Within this context, the ILO organized a multidisciplinary mission in response to a request by the PLO leadership. The terms of reference of the mission (Annex I) required the ILO to: (a) come up with a coherent *policy framework* in the fields of labour and social policy; (b) contribute to *capacity building* by providing specific proposals for institutional arrangements and related training; and (c) design a package of mutually reinforcing *technical assistance* projects in order to give content to the policy framework.

The mission, which visited the OTs over the period 6-19 December 1993, was formed as follows:

S. Radwan:	Chief of Mission Policy Framework Employment
A. Berar:	Women in Development
P.H. Chandrasekharan:	Employers' Affairs
W. Clatanoff:	Active Labour Market Policies
Ph. Egger:	Employment Creation
F. Fluitman:	Training
C. Gillion:	Social Security
W. Hamdan:	Workers' Education and Organization
M. Henriques:	Small Enterprise
M. Lafougere:	Labour Administration
F. Mehran:	Labour and Social Statistics
A. Nagata:	Logistics
Y. Qaryouti:	Rehabilitation – Date changed (February
G. Querenghi:	Workers' Education and Organization
G. Ople:	Mission Secretary

The mission had an extensive programme of visits and interviews in the West Bank, AND Gaza and with relevant Israeli institutions (Mission Programme in Annex II). Moreover, to provide a platform for wider dialogue, the mission organized six workshops on specific areas where the mission members interacted with their counterparts from the Technical Committees, resource persons and representatives of employers' and workers' organizations and NGOs (Annex III). Another Workshop on rehabilitation was also held for three days.

The mission worked closely with Orient House under the guidance of Mr. Faisal Husseini, and with aa counterpart team headed by Mr. Istambuli and interacted closely with the UNDP and World Bank.

The present "Aide Memoire" provides a summary of the main findings of the mission to be discussed with the counterpart team on Saturday, 16 December 1993. It begins by a brief survey of the major characteristics of the economy and society of the OTs, and the constraints on their future development. Part II outlines the approach to be adopted in responding to those constraints, and Part III provides the elements of a programme of action over the short and medium terms. Finally, Part IV charts the steps for follow-up.

Extreme care has been taken to ensure that these proposals reflect real needs, take into account the realities of the situation and the need to set the priorities in facing up to the rising expectations.

17.13.93

Samir Radwan
Chief of Mission

CAPACITY BUILDING FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT: AN ILO PROGRAMME OF ACTION FOR TRANSITION IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

AIDE MEMOIRE

I. THE CONTEXT

1. Following the signature of the Declaration of Principles between Israel and the PLO on 13 September 1993, the stage is set for a new phase of development in the Occupied Territories (OTs) in order to support what is otherwise an extremely fragile situation. In response to a request from the PLO leadership, the International Labour Office (ILO) organized a multidisciplinary mission to the OTs over the period 6-19 December. The mission worked closely with the Palestinian counterparts and attempted a process of consensus building through the organization of seven workshops. Moreover, the mission tried to coordinate with major agencies (especially the World Bank and UNDP) to avoid overlap.

2. The thrust of the proposed programme of action is to contribute to the capacity building for the labour and social sectors over the immediate (1994) and medium (1994-98) terms through policy design, institution building, and the training of those who run those institutions.

I.1 Characteristics of the OTs Economy and Society

3. The present situation of the economy and society provided the backdrop to the work of the mission.

4. Two major features characterize the OTs economy: its being dependent and highly regulated. The dependency is partly a result of structural factors where a narrow economic base (traditional, family-based agriculture; narrow industrial base of small enterprises; and limited access to foreign markets) has not been able to generate sufficient employment to sustain a rapid increase in the labour force. It may be mentioned that industry has accounted for only 8 per cent of GDP sine 1985, and its share in employment has been 16 to 17 per cent in the West Bank (1985), and in Gaza declined from 18 per cent in 1986 to 13 per cent in 1992. The industrial sector is essentially composed of small establishments with nearly half employing 1-4 workers. The agricultural sector which provides livelihood to one-quarter of the population, can hardly play the role of an engine of growth. Primarily composed of small and fragmented family farms, it contributes a quarter of the GDP in Gaza and 35-40 per cent in the West Bank.

Palestinian women in the occupied territories of West Bank and Gaza strip could be characterized as follows:

- A low participation rate estimated at about 16 per cent of the labour force;
- Access to a very limited range of occupations characterized by low productivity and low return to labour;
- Considerable discrimination in wages and conditions of work. The wage rates for women are estimated at only 50 to 60 per cent of wage rates for men for the same job. Arbitrary firing of women after marriage or birth of children constitutes a common trend. Lack of maternity protection benefits and child care facilities hamper significantly women's participation on equal terms.
- High fertility rates; the population growth rate in the West Bank and in Gaza is amongst the highest in the World at about 4.7 per cent.

Although the official rate of participation should be interpreted with caution as it does not take into account the extent of women's participation in agriculture and informal sector activities; it reflects the limited opportunities and unequal terms of participation of Palestinian women in the local labour markets. Currently, women are employed mainly in teaching and nursing by the Civil Administration and UNRWA, in social work with UNRWA and the numerous NGOs and community welfare organizations operating in the Occupied Territories; sub-contracting work for Israeli factories in textiles and work in a range of small producers' activities in food processing and other types of low productivity jobs. Although, the absence of social protection is a general phenomenon affecting both men and women workers, the latter are particularly concerned in view of their social disadvantaged position and low bargaining power. In sub-contracting work and employment in the manufacturing and small workshops sector, absence of leave, long working hours, low pay and risks of losing the job after marriage and birth of children are current practice. Women play an important role in the agricultural sector, although no precise data exit, it is estimated according to some studies, that women perform up to 60 to 70 per cent of agricultural tasks, mainly as family labour and occasionally as wage labourers. This contribution is not sufficiently recognized and apart from a number of small projects by NGOs, women do not have access to inputs and extension in this area. Women's work in agriculture is also constrained by the general difficulties of access to land and water entailed by the occupation.

11. There is a clear gap in social protection. Certainly UNRWA, NGOs and donations from abroad provide a social safety net, but these arrangements are adhoc, not sufficient and not formalized. This situation affects particularly disadvantaged groups such as the handicapped and ex-detainees who face particular hardships. Their situation must be acknowledged and special efforts are required to ensure their integration through training and employment.

been virtually no change throughout the 1980's with per capita GNP at US dollars 1678 in 1991 and 2068 in 1992 against US dollars 1676.9 in 1980 and 1794.7 in 1982. Between 1986/87 and 1991/92, per capita GNP growth has averaged slightly less than 1 per cent. Given the uncertainty over population data, per capita incomes may even be somewhat lower (by 10 to 15 per cent it is estimated) than these figures suggest. Such low growth performance is attributed both to the structural features of the economy depicted above as well as to the recession in the region in general during the 1980's.

8. The rate of open unemployment is reported to be between 4 and 5 per cent in the West Bank between 1989 and 1992 save a jump to 10 per cent in 1991. In Gaza it is reported to be between 3 and 4 per cent. Other surveys point to somewhat different rates of unemployment. The 1992 FAFO survey records unemployment at 7 per cent.[3] Other surveys point to a high 41 per cent unemployment rate in Gaza for 1993.[4] A recent estimate by the World Bank puts unemployment at 25 per cent for 1993. These discrepancies can be attributed to definitional and measurement differences. However, it must be pointed out that the concept of open unemployment may not be entirely relevant here. In the absence of any unemployment benefits, there can be no administrative recording of the unemployed. Furthermore, temporarily unemployed persons would tend to find some employment, albeit at much lower levels of earnings, as unpaid family labour in family farms and establishments. There is no information on youth unemployment although it is likely that its incidence may be more severe than the above averages suggest. A more significant concept here would be under employment. One useful indicator is the total weekly work hours which dropped considerably for all workers in the Occupied Territories in 1988, following the outbreak of the Intifada (by as much as 37 per cent in the West Bank and 26 per cent in Gaza for workers in the Territories, and 20 and 29 per cent respectively for those employed in Israel). The weekly levels of work hours have risen to the pre-Intifada levels only in 1992, suggesting a period of considerable underemployment.

9. The social situation reflects the limited options open to the OTs. Despite notable progress in recent years, there are formidable problems. First, it has been estimated that poverty is the lot of 17 per cent in the West Bank and 32 per cent in Gaza in 1993. Second, poverty is directly caused by lack of access to employment. As mentioned earlier un- and underemployment are high especially in recent years. The infrastructure is dilapidated, and the incentives for the private sector are limited.

10. Women bear the brunt of this situation, and in many cases have to be the breadwinners of the household through difficult sub-contracting and home-based work. The position of

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[3] FAFO. The Palestinian Society, 1993.

[4] M. Okashe, Al-Azhar University, Gaza, unpublished.

5. Moreover, the OTs has been a "labour reserve" for the Israeli economy where, at peak, some 35 per cent of the labour force found employment; and the Gulf states, where some 10 to 15 per cent and their families were living. As a result of the inability of the OTs economy to generate sufficient employment opportunities, increasing numbers have become dependent on employment in Israel. The total number of workers employed in Israel has well exceeded 100,000 in recent years (save in 1991) up from 75,000 in the early 1980s. Although higher relative wages render such employment attractive, its precariousness has been repeatedly stressed.[1] Such employment is rationed through a complex system of permit delivery, is limited in duration (three months initially and then annually), is subject to numerous security restrictions, and hence subject to great fluctuations in total days actually worked. This is the case particularly since the Intifida (uprising) of December 1987, the Gulf War in early 1991 and the border closure in March 1993. In recent years (1990-92) one-third of the employed labour force in the West Bank and 39 per cent of the employed labour force in Gaza has been working in Israel. Palestinian workers are massively employed in un and semi-skilled work in the construction sector in Israel. The share of workers employed in the construction sector has increased from 47 to 48 per cent in the mid-1980s to just under 75 per cent in 1992. Employment of skilled Palestinians has been mainly in the Gulf States up to 1991, and it is estimated that 10-15 per cent Palestinians worked in the Gulf. Income from abroad represents a sizeable share of total national disposable income. In 1990-92, the gross national product (GNP) exceeded the gross domestic product (GDP) by some 32 per cent. Wage payments to Palestinians from the Occupied Territories working in Israel as well as remittances from abroad (net factor income) together account for some 24.5 per cent of GNP in recent years.[2] It is not surprising that in such a situation the OTs economy has been subject to external shocks: the Gulf War and the closure of Israeli labour markets led to a loss of 9 per cent of GDP.

6. Finally, the dilapidated infrastructure can hardly provide sufficient basis for investment growth. All these characteristics in addition to the regulatory constraints on factor and commodity markets have led to a lack of impetus to growth, increasing unemployment and vulnerability to external shocks.

7. All this was reflected in slow growth and increasing unemployment. During the 1980's growth of GNP has been around 3 to 3.5 per cent on average. GNP increased by 7 per cent over 1980-85 and by 9 per cent over 1986-91. In 1992 GNP (in constant 1991 prices) jumped by 27 per cent. The growth in domestic output has picked up in recent years with GDP averaging a 4.7 per cent annual growth over 1986/87-1991/92. In per capita terms there has

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[1] ILO. Report of the Director General, appendice, vol. 2, International Labour Conference, 80th Session, 1992.

[2] World Bank. Developing the Occupied Territories: An Investment in Peace, World Bank, September 1993.

II. TRANSFORMING THE ECONOMY AND SOCIETY OF THE OTs

12. Despite these negative factors, the OTs possess good points of strength: a reasonably qualified labour force; a relatively high standard of living; a trained administration (working now with UNRWA and the Civil Administration); a social consensus for change. It is thus imperative to draw on these assets in order to achieve the transition from dependence to sustainable development.

II.1 Objectives

13. Taking a forward look, the task is to contribute to the transition from dependence to sustainable development through assistance in achieving three major objectives:

(i) Creation of employment opportunities:

14. The magnitude of the task for employment creation may be gauged from the following. In 1992 the labour force of the Occupied Territories was estimated at 333,400. It has grown at an average annual rate of 3.2 per cent over 1986-1992. If present rates of labour force participation and growth are maintained, the labour force would double by the year 2014. Over the next ten years up to 2002 the labour force could grow at the present trend by 41 per cent to reach 471,500. This implies an annual entry on the job market of 12,500 persons. This figure does not take into account present levels of un and under-employment nor any return migration. The Palestine Development Programme assumes the return of some 500,000 persons over 1994-2000.

15. The demand for labour is more difficult to predict. The overall employment elasticity of GDP growth has been 0.7 in recent years. This would imply an average rate of growth of GDP of no less than 5.5 per cent to absorb the annual labour force increment. Within the Occupied Territories employment has grown at an average rate of 3 per cent in recent years (1986-92), slightly lower than the growth of the labour force. If the present trend were to continue the employed labour force within the Occupied Territories in the year 2002 would be 282,000. The implication is that if a level of 100,000 workers employed in Israel can be maintained throughout the period then a shortfall of some 90,000 jobs would still prevail in year 2002. Two conclusions must be drawn. First, reliance on work in Israel will remain critical in the foreseeable future. Second, raising the levels of labour absorption in the Occupied Territories is of foremost priority. The level of job creation that can be expected through the planned multilateral investment programme in infrastructure (200 million dollars per year for five years)

can be estimated at 15,000 per year.[5] Civil service jobs will not be able to exceed by much the present levels of some 32,000 (including UNRWA and Civil Administration),although an early retirement scheme could facilitate new recruitments. Clearly much of the job creation will have to come from higher levels of growth particularly in the private sector. (These trends are depicted in Figure II.1)

(ii) Reduction of poverty

16. Recent estimates by the World Bank on the incidence of poverty indicate that about 17 per cent of the population of the West Bank, and 32 per cent of that of Gaza live in poverty.[6] The picture is further compounded by the precarious nature of employment which is the main source of livelihood for the majority of the population. It is thus assumed that employment creation is the main remedy for poverty reduction.

(iii) Social protection

17. Given the ad hoc and incomplete nature of social protection, there is a need to design a cost effective system building up on existing facilities.

II.2 Elements of a strategy

18. To achieve such objectives, the strategy should have three building blocks:

(a) to design a cohesive policy framework;
(b) to lay the foundations for institution building;
(c) to manage the process of transition in a prudent and cost-effective way, trying to strike a balance between high expectations and the requirements of investment in the future.

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[5] With a wage share of 40 per cent of total investment and an average monthly wage of dollars 450 or NIS 60 per day (at 3 NIS to the dollar).

[6] World Bank: The West Bank and Gaza: the next two years and beyond.

(a) Setting the policy framework

(i) Design of development policies under scenarios of political uncertainties

19. The signature of the DOP in September 1993 has ushered a new era of peace promises. However the process of negotiations is so protracted that any policy prescription should take into account the possibility of varying scenarios for political developments. The present strategy is based on the assumption that peace will be concluded and there will be a transfer of power to a Palestinian National Authority.

(ii) Setting the policy framework and assuring policy coherence

20. Perhaps the most difficult task confronting the new Palestinian authorities will be the high level of uncertainty surrounding whatever economic, labour and social policies are adopted. While the signing of the Declaration of Principles (DOP) on 13 September 1993 has clearly set in motion a process towards Palestinian autonomy and self-rule, neither the transitional nor permanent status negotiations have been concluded, and therefore many important influences on employment, wages and social conditions in OTs are unknown. Therefore, Palestinian officials concerned with labour and social policies must consider a series of alternative policy scenarios and design strategies which will lead to efficient and equitable labour markets which contribute to economic growth and social justice under these scenarios.

21. In this context, it is important to note that a Labour "Authority" or "Department" is not explicitly included in the list of institutions to be created by the Council which are enumerated in Article VII Paragraph 4. However, Annex III[7] to the DOP, in articles 8 and 9 does call for programs in the labour and social areas, including the development of a Human Resources Development and Cooperation Plan. The ILO, if asked by the parties, would assist in the preparation of this plan, as well as the Human Resources Plan called for in Annex IV of the DOP, as an important part of its technical assistance activities.

22. The level of uncertainty surrounding employment and social policies is further compounded by the fact that the labour market is a "derived" market, i.e. labour market conditions are primarily influenced by factors and circumstances outside of the labour market itself - factors such as the level and composition of investment, trade flows, interest rates, commodity prices and foreign exchange values. Since virtually all of these are now also uncertain, there will be a double uncertainty concerning the levels of employment, wages and income generated by the labour market, the effects of which will in turn feed back upon itself

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[7] Protocol on Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation in Economic and Development Programs.

since the employment and incomes generated in the labour market will then largely determine the level and distribution of personal disposable income -- which will be the primary determinant of the level and type of goods consumed and hence production and trade patterns.

23. Despite these uncertainties, the ILO believes that it can identify the basic building blocks of employment and social policy for Palestine. In the ILO's view, careful attention to policy determination and implementation must be given to five inter-acting areas: (1) The relative roles of public and private sector activities; (2) Wages policy; (3) Diminishing regional imbalances; (4) Maximizing the returns on sectoral linkages; and (5) Targeting specific groups for labour market and social interventions. Furthermore, efficient and equitable employment and income in a dynamic and growing Palestinian economy will come about only if there is consistence and coherence not only between these five policy areas but also between the broad area of employment and social policy and other areas such as trade, water and land, monetary, economic development and investment, and macroeconomic policies. These linkages, and the need for policy coherence will be noted as we briefly explore the five building blocks of employment and social policy.

III. PROGRAMME OF ACTION

24. To translate those principles in reality, the ILO proposes a programme of action including seven components of policy design, institution building and direct technical assistance. These components are:

(i) Labour administration (the creation of a Labour and Social Welfare Department, and the design of active labour market policies)
(ii) Industrial Relations (workers' education, strengthening workers' and employers' organizations, creation of a tripartite forum)
(iii) Employment creation (small enterprise, public works, support to private sector initiative)
(iv) Training (vocational training, rehabilitation of detainees and disabled)
(v) Social protection (social security, social safety nets)
(vi) Women in development (representation, equal opportunities)
(vii) Social and Labour Statistics (statistical abstract, contribution to the Master plan)

Table III.1 provides a summary of these proposals.

25. The programme of action is to be implemented through two major projects: (a) Labour and Social Welfare Institutions; and (b) The Social Fund for Development. Each will have a CTA and supporting staff, and will work as part of the National Authority. The CTAs should draw on the relevant departments of the ILO to provide needed expertise. The budget for technical assistance is estimated at US$5 million, and investment at US$50 million. Funds are

Table III.1 ILO Programme of Action

Summary Table

	Programmes and Projects	Tech. Assistance	Investment	Total
III	1. LABOUR ADMINISTRATION 1. Establishment of a Department of labour and social welfare	500,000	1,500,000	2,000,000
III	2.INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS STRENGTHENING WORKERS ORGANIZATION			
	1. Strengthening the institutional capacity of workers' education centers in Nablus and Gaza.	108,000		108,000
	2. Training of trade union leaders.	82,000		82,000
	3. Training course for trade union trainers (Turin Centre)	110,000		110,000
	4. Local trade union seminars	42,000		42,000
	5. Training, Research and Project Promotion centre of the Palestinian trade unions	700,000	1,000,000	1,700,000
	STRENGTHENING EMPLOYERS ORGANIZATION			
	1. Strengthening the Chamber of Commerce	15,000	295,000	310,000
III	3.A.SMALL-SCALE ENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT 1. Establishment of a National Small Business Council	300,000	70,000	370,000
	2. Capacity building for the Chamber of Commerce	1,000,000	1,500,000	2,500,000
	3. Facilitating linkage with the Emilia Romagna Industrial District.	80,000	800,000	880,000
	4. Creation of a productivity awareness and development of plans for a tripartite Palestinian Productivity Center	1,200,000	90,000	1,290,000
	5. Study of experiences todate in the small-scale credit area	40,000	-	40,000

III	3.B Employment-intensive public works			
	1. Employment intensive public works	504,000	(50-80 million)	504,000
III	4. Training and Rehabilitation			
	1. Training advisory services	200,000	-	200,000
	2. Establishment of a National Training Resource Center	500,000	-	500,000
	3. Rehabilitation of vocational training centers	300,000	2,000,000	2,300,000
	4. Strengthening capacity of the central national committee on rehabilitation	25,000	55,000	80,000
	5. Development of a national vocational rehabilitation plan	55,000	-	55,000
	6. Establishment of two vocational rehabilitation centers in Gaza and Rafah	1,000,000	2,500,000	3,500,000
	7. Income generating project for disabled persons	70,000	930,000	1,000,000
III	5. Social Protection			
	1. Overview of current social protection and advisory services	250,000	-	250,000
	2. Design of social welfare, social security and health care financing schemes	960,000	290,000	1,250,000
III	6. Employment and equality for women			
	1. Strengthening the capacity of the technical committee on women's affairs in the areas of employment and labour policies	66,000	-	66,000
	2. Employment promotion and social protection for women in the sub-contracting sector	250,000	950,000	1,200,000
	3. Entrepreneurship development for Palestinian women	360,000	340,000	700,000
	4. Targeted poverty alleviation for specific groups	480,000	1,320,000	1,800,000

III	7.Social and Labour Statistics			
	1. A labour and social statistics publication	10,000	23,000	33,000
	2. Taking over the CBS labour force survey	102,000	58,000	160,000
	3. National programme on labour statistics	175,000	75,000	250,000
	TOTAL	9,224,000	14,056,000	23,280,000

* This programme does not include the proposal on the rehabilitation of ex-detainees costed at USD 28.5 million.

expected to be raised within the Consultative Group initiative in Paris or by direct contact with multi-bilateral donors. The duration of this assistance is 5 years.

IV. FOLLOW-UP

26. To ensure the proper implementation of the programme of action outlined above, the following steps are envisaged.

(i) Building consensuses

It is proposed to hold a one day National Workshop in February 1994 to discuss the ILO mission report. This workshop should be attended by members of the Technical Committees, resource persons, representative of employers and workers organizations, as well as those of UN agencies and the donor community.

(ii) Immediate ILO actions

This programme will be preceded by a number of activities for immediate intervention (December 1993-February 1994) to deal with some of the urgent needs. These activities, financed from ILO budget, will amount to US$250,000.

(iii) Project development

The ILO will work with its Palestinian counterparts to prepare project documents to assure funding, and to complete the implentation arrangements, for the attached project outlines.

DETAILED PROGRAMME OF ACTION

1. LABOUR ADMINISTRATION

III.1 LABOUR ADMINISTRATION

I. Introduction

The social situation is alarming whether from the standpoint of employment or of precarious and dangerous working conditions. The situation is made worse because there is at present no labour administration that can really protect workers or help them in finding employment. There is not only an institutional vacuum but also a policy and legislative vacuum.

The new Authority must establish from scratch a Department of Labour and Social Welfare[8] covering in particular labour inspection services, employment services and social welfare services. It may be necessary to spell out the role and orientations of the new Department:

(a) The role of central services

(i) To design and implement coherent and concerted policies for worker protection, employment promotion and vocational training, migration, industrial relations, and social security;

(ii) To establish and supervise a decentralized administration able to protect workers conditions and rights without impairing the flexibility that enterprises find ; to undertake the tutelage of the social security agency, and to regulate, supervise and monitor the functioning of private pension and health insurance schemes.

(iii) To devote particular attention to disadvantaged groups: the disabled, ex-detainees, women, rural population, school drop-outs, etc. Solidarity is a basic principle of labour administration.

(iv) To protect migrant and cross-frontier workers and conduct for this purpose international negotiations;

(v) To associate workers and employers organizations in the design and implementation of a national labour policy so as to facilitate sound industrial relations, both for the protection of workers and for the improvement of growth prospects and economic development; and.

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[8] For the moment, it is envisaged both labour administration and social welfare would be combined in a single ministry; once experience has been obtained it may be appropriate to separate the two functions.

(v) To draft a labour legislation. The new labour code should serve initially as a "reference framework" so as to guarantee fundamental worker rights and it should focus on certain basic institutions and encourage the development of links between them.

(b) The role of decentralized services

(i) Labour inspection services should ensure the application of the legal provisions relating to safety, health, wages, hours of work, welfare and the protection of children and young persons. Any further responsibilities which may be entrusted to labour inspectors should not interfere with the effective discharge of their primary duties or prejudice in any way the authority and impartiality which are necessary to inspectors in their relations with employers and workers.

The labour inspectorate must be founded on clear principles, with emphasis on prevention, advisory and information services to employers and workers on the most effective means of complying with the legal provisions, collaboration with social partners, protection first and foremost for the most underprivileged and helpless workers (especially children and home-workers).

Without efficient labour inspection, it would be virtually impossible to apply labour legislation, as a whole, and, most international standards as well.

It is clear that the efforts which labour inspectors devote to the improvement of the safety and health of workers and to the democratization of human and social relations, has a favourable impact on economic development. The competitiveness of enterprises is impaired by absenteeism, accidents at work and professional illness.

(ii) Public employment services should provide assistance to workers who have lost their jobs or who are looking for employment; organize the labour market in such a way that vacant posts are filled as quickly as possible by the most qualified workers and that skill requirements are matched by a corresponding availability of skills; devise or implement employment creation schemes. They should serve both jobseekers and employers. They must play a dynamic role in social and economic development (small enterprise development, vocational guidance and counselling, etc.). They should devote particular attention to disadvantaged groups.

(iii) Social welfare services are required to disburse cash benefits under social assistance schemes (means-tested, minimum income schemes), to provide a range of social services for the disabled and disadvantaged (particularly the frail elderly and poor families with children), and to ensure access to basic health care services for those who are not otherwise covered.

Labour administration services contribute not only to a country's social development but also to its economic and political development.

2. ILO Proposals

Given the institutional and legislative vacuum, the ILO proposes the establishment of a Department of Labour and Social Welfare. This Department will include:

(a) The central services

- Creation of general directorates. The organizational chart will depend on the functions that the future Authority assigns to the Department of Labour (proposals are indicated in Annex 1). It would seem advisable, at this initial stage of setting up a labour department, that as many functions as possible are assigned to a small number of general directorates.

- Creation of a tripartite advisory board (to advise the Head of the Labour Department on the broad lines of labour, employment and social policies.)

- Creation of a national labour institute. Training must be aimed primarily at officials of the Department of Labour but also at employers and workers representatives. Training is both a priority and a precondition for an efficient labour administration. Above all, trainer training courses must be organized urgently in all the spheres of competence of the Department.

(b) The decentralized services

- Labour inspectorate would be set up under the authority of the General Labour Directorate. A labour inspection policy should be devised. It is suggested that in an initial phase, two pilot offices be set up, one in Gaza and one in the West Bank. (These two offices should use the services of a safety specialist, a medical doctor, a jurist, and a conciliator.)

- Employment services. It is suggested that the employment services come under a general directorate of the Department. It is suggested that employment agencies currently used solely for Palestinian workers working in Israel be reorganized.

(c) Timetable of reforms

Obviously, priorities must be established and phases decided upon.

In the first phase, the following should be established:

- the general directorates of the Department;
- the National Labour Institute;
- the National Tripartite Advisory Board;

- the Social Security Agency;
- two pilot labour inspection offices; two public employment agencies, one or two labour tribunals; and social service and social assistance offices.

In the second phase, the Department of Labour and the decentralized services (labour inspectorate and employment services) should be made fully operational through the territory.

(d) External assistance

External assistance would seem necessary. This could take the form of:

- Advisory services for different durations (with the appointment of a head of project) in the various spheres of competence of the Ministry:

  (i) Organization and functioning of the Ministry of Labour, labour inspection services and employment services (methods; training; computerization, etc.);

  (ii) Policy elaboration:

  - Labour and industrial relations
    - health and safety at work
    - working conditions
    - women's protection
    - child protection
    - vocational rehabilitation for the disabled
  - Employment promotion
    - vocational training
    - migration
  - Social security/welfare
    - coordination and tutelage of the social security agency
    - regulation and supervision of private pension and health insurance schemes
    - welfare service and benefits
  - Statistics

  (iii) Training: Assistance in the creation and running (trainer training) of a National Labor Institute; assistance in training abroad (courses, field trips, etc.);

  (iv) Labour legislation: assistance with the drafting of legislation and the establishment of a national labor policy.

3. Technical Assistance in the Field of Labour Administration

Project Idea 1.1: Establishment of a Department of Labour and Social Welfare

1. Context

The social situation is alarming whether from the standpoint of employment (considering the importance of unemployment, underemployment, etc.), of the significant number of disadvantaged groups (disabled, ex-detainees, women, children, etc.) and precarious or dangerous working conditions. In this situation, there is at present no labour administration that can protect workers, help them to find an employment or to organize sound industrial relations. There is also a legislative and policy vacuum.

2. Immediate objective

To create a labour administration able to design and implement a coherent and concerted policy to protect workers, to facilitate industrial relations, to promote employment, vocational training and social welfare.

3. Activities

- To help create institutions (general directorates of the labour ministry, employment services and inspection services, etc.).
- To help train the staff in organizing courses, seminars, training trainer courses and to organize a National Labour Institute.
- To help elaborate a labour legislation and a national labour policy.

4. Output

- Creation of a Department of Labour
- Adoption and implementation of a labour policy and a labour legislation
- Staff trained.

5. Budget

- Chief of project for two years and various experts (40 work/months)
- Financing of training activities (seminars, courses, fellowships, study tours, etc.)
- Equipment for the National Labour Institute.

The total budget is estimated at US$2,000,000.

2. INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

III.2 Industrial Relations

III.2.A Strengthening Workers' Organizations

I. Introduction

Keen to participate in the ongoing social and economic debate, the trade unions in the West Bank and the Gaza strip stressed that workers' organizations like employers' organizations are to play an important role in the complex situation that is likely to characterize the new phase of development. They have a contribution to make as partners in the society and as participants in the social dialogue.

Leaders of GFTU in Gaza and the West Bank emphasized that in order to ensure the smooth functioning of the transition period, it is important to set up a tripartite machinery in which the three parties are present. It is the intention of trade unions in the OTs to exert every effort to create a general climate of mutual respect and understanding. As such workers can make an important contribution to the consolidation of democracy and the preservation of social stability.

But for them to participate in this endeavour, it is imperative that workers have strong and representative organizations to serve as vehicles for their involvement in the development process.

Admitting that the circumstances under which the Palestinian trade unions had to carry out their action over the 26 years of occupation did not enable them to consolidate suitable structure, they confirmed that constraints will continue to affect the labour movement and its role in building up the new Palestinian entity if immediate action is not taken to redress the situation.

Despite the efforts made during the last couple of years to enhance and upgrade their efficiently, the two trade union organizations - the General Federation of Trade Unions (Gaza) and the General Federation of Trade Unions (West Bank) continue to be largely handicapped by, inter alia, the following problems:

- the conditions of occupation, including restriction imposed on freedom of movement, hampers trade unions from playing fully and freely their role in the field of negotiations and participation in the economic and social development.

- the high degree of political involvement and close linkages with political parties, have led to continued factional problems, especially in the West Bank.[9]

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[9] Two main trade union blocks have withdrawn recently from the Executive Committee of the GFTU (West Bank). They contest the legitimacy of the Secretary-General and the Executive Committee.

- the dwindling financial resources decreased capacity to defend and promote the interests of their members, which in turn led to a diminished interest in trade union membership.

- fragmented sectoral unions reflected in the large numbers of such unions (more than 120 unions in the West Bank). A situation caused by weak organizational structures and outdated trade union standing orders.

- the constant amendments imposed by the Israeli Military Command and the Civil Administration on the Egyptian and Jordanian labour laws, which basically regulate the trade union rights and organization, have placed numerous restrictions on civil liberties and free exercise of trade union rights.

- the question of trade union representation of Palestinian workers of the OTs working in Israel. It is not possible for GFTU in Gaza and the West Bank can at present defend the interests of these workers.

II. ILO Proposals

To meet the legitimate requests, needs and aspirations of workers in the OTs, the ILO proposes to assist trade unions in their efforts to achieve the following objectives:

(a) the establishment of free, independent and democratic trade unions with view to the protection and promotion of human and trade union rights.

(b) strengthening the capacity of trade unions to participate in economic and social decision making process in order to defend and promote the interests of their members.

(c) improving the structures and activities and active involvement of trade unions in tripartite endeavours.

(d) developing of workers' education programmes with a view to assisting trade unions to expand their membership and activities and improving their capacities and negotiating skills.

3. Technical Assistance to Workers' Organizations

Project Idea 2.1: Strengthening the Institutional Capacities of Workers' Education Centres in Nablus and Gaza

1. Context

Respond to the urgent request made by the leadership of the General Federation of Trade Unions in Nablus and Gaza for ILO immediate assistance to support the development of adequate institutional capacities for workers education programmes of basic and intermediate levels.

2. Immediate objective

Rehabilitating of already existing workers' education centres in Nablus and Gaza.

3. Activities

(a) Provision of educational and office equipment
(b) Translation into Arabic of a series of workers' education manuals

4. Output

By end of the project (immediate implementation)
(a) Two operational workers' education centres in both Nablus and Gaza
(b) Acquisition of adequate educational and office equipment
(c) A series of workers' education manuals duly printed in Arabic.

5. Budget

Total cost of project: US$108,000

(a) Rehabilitation of premises

Gaza	US$10,000
Nablus	US$45,000

(b) Office and educational equipment

Gaza	US$20,000
Nablus	US$12,000

(c) Workers' education publications US$19,000

Project Idea 2.2: Training of Trade Union Leaders

1. Context

Due to various restrictions imposed on trade unions and its leadership, trade union leaders in the OTs lack adequate technical capacities that permit to manage better their organizations and play an effective role in national development efforts.

2. Immediate objective

To enhance the capabilities and knowledge of trade union leaders in a wide range of labour, economic and social issues and to upgrade their management skills.

3. Activities

(a) Conducting a 2-3 week course for 20 trade union leaders on issues such as trade unionism, freedom of association, collective bargaining, employment policies, safety and health, labour and legislation, labour inspection.
(b) Two fellowships on trade union policies in several unions in industrialized countries.
(c) Advisory services from experts specialized in the above-mentioned fields.

4. Output

20 trained trade union leaders.

5. Budget

US$81,500.

Project Idea 2.3: Training Course for Trade Union Trainers (Turin Centre)

1. Context

Palestinian workers' education centres lack the availability of qualified trade union trainers, fact that has contributed in turn in limiting the capabilities of trade unions to educate their members about their rights and to prove them with the necessary skills.

2. Immediate objectives

To prepare qualified trainers to run training courses and activities for union members.

3. Activities

(a) Conduct in the Turin Centre a 3-4 week training course for 15 trade union instructors.
(b) Two fellowships on advanced training in workers' education centres of industrialized countries.

4. Output

15 trained trade union instructors capable of running local training courses in the OTs.

5. Budget

US$110,000.

Project Idea 2.4: Local Trade Union Seminars

1. Context

Trade unions in the OTs, which is undergoing rapid political, economic and social change, are confronted with new challenges that require new approaches to the protection of workers' rights and interest. Workers education courses can play an important role in exploring trade union policies in many areas, including responses to these challenges.

2. Immediate objective

Focus on improving the capacity of trade union members through workers' education to better understand their rights and better defend their interests.

3. Activities

(a) Conduct seven (7) local courses (25 participants each) for a period of 5 days in the different regions of the OTs.
(b) One of the courses will be especially organized for women trade unionists.

4. Output

(a) Expand trade union membership
(b) Enhance knowledge and technical capacities of workers.

5. Budget

US$42,000.

Project Idea 2.5: Training, Research and Project Promotion Centre of the Palestinian Trade Unions

1. Context

The project, aimed at fostering workers' active participation in the development and modernization of Palestinian economy, reflects the urgent need expressed by the trade unions to have a national centre specializing in the training of trainers; advanced training, research/documentation of study materials and teaching aids.

2. Immediate objectives

(a) To strengthen the GFTU in the OTs by providing them with the most suitable educational programmes as well as effective teaching methodologies and advanced equipment.
(b) To promote employment generating schemes.
(c) To foster workers' participation in the design and implementation of the most appropriate national development policies.

3. Activities

(a) Provision of technical and advisory services for the design of the organizational structure of the Centre, the preparation of the relevant curricula and the prediction of the most appropriate teaching aids.
(b) Acquisition of equipment, including computers for the management and administration of the Centre as well as for the research/documentation branch.
(c) One-month course for six instructors in charge of educational activities at national level.
(d) One two-week course for the training of 20 instructors in charge of educational activities at local level.
(e) Ten one-week courses at local level.
(f) Provision of advisory services for the design and implementation of research activities and the promotion of socio-economic projects.

4. Output (by the end of the two-year project):

(a) A training, research and project promotion centre established, properly equipped and fully operational. The Centre includes the following branches:

(i) training
(ii) research - documentation
(iii) design, promotion and assessment of socio-economic projects.

(b) Administrative personnel trained in the use of modern procedures and equipment.
(c) Six instructors trained and active in the training branch of the centre.

(d) Twenty instructors trained and in-charge of promoting basic courses at local level.
(e) Teaching aids produced and covering areas such as collective bargaining, safety and health, organizational structure, ILO standards, etc.
(f) A fully operational branch responsible for the design, promotion and assessment of socio-economic projects.

5. Budget

Total project cost amounts to US$1,700,000 broken down as follows:

US$700,000 in technical assistance
US$1,000,000 as investment (to buy land and construct centre).

III.2.B STRENGTHENING EMPLOYERS ORGANIZATIONS

I. Introduction

During the time of occupation there has been little opportunity for genuine employers' association to function effectively. The Chambers of Commerce which exist in all major towns were originally established under the Jordanian or even earlier systems.

Until 1988, the Chambers in the West Bank were members of the Jordanian apex body in Amman. In July 1988 the Jordanian government decided to cut the legal and administrative links with the West Bank depriving the Chambers there of any union or umbrella organization. In 1990, Chambers in the West Bank and Gaza decided to form a Federation which is headquartered in Jerusalem. After elections in 1992 the Chambers have emerged as the most representative employers' organizations although their effectiveness seems to be limited and is circumscribed by a lack of funds.

Despite their current weaknesses these organizations are of fundamental importance in providing support to the private sector, in carrying out the essential function of lobbying and advising the emerging Authority on matters of importance to the private sector. It is also essential that a well developed employers constituent emerge soonest to play a constructive role in developing an industrial relations climate conducive to productive growth and collaboration which will a critical prerequisite for the task of nation building in collaboration with a responsible and representative labour movement.

Currently the Chambers are considered as semi-public agencies and perform various mainly administrative tasks such as providing exporters with certificates of origin. In the view of the mission it is essential that assistance be provided to the Chambers so that they can start to effectively perform their various functions with regard to representing the interests of their members during the crucial upcoming period. During the mission the Federation as well as individual Chambers expressed strong interest in strengthening their role as a genuinely representative employers organization. This will include their role as interlocutor in the ILO context.

2. ILO Proposals

The recommendations with regard to the establishment of a labour department is covered elsewhere in this report and should include adequate provisions for the roles and functions of employers' and workers' organizations. It is within this overall context that the following recommendations for the strengthening of the Chambers of Commerce are made.

(a) *Strengthening the staff of Chambers*

Clearly the effectiveness of the Chambers will be critically dependent upon the quality of staff both within the Federation and the individual Chambers. It is therefore recommended that selected staff members at senior and middle levels be given opportunities for in-country and overseas training. This should include opportunities for attachment to well functioning foreign similar organizations. In this connection, the Amman Chamber has offered to act as twinning partner both in terms of accepting staff members from chambers in the OT and by providing staff members to train in the OT. Subsequently it is also foreseen that similar arrangements and programmes will be developed with organizations in other parts of the world.

In this connection it is recognized that the field of labour relations will be of critical importance in the years ahead. Current labour relations is characterized by a confrontational approach which many senior industrialists and informed observers recognized as being a major constraint to future development and growth in the private sector.It is therefore foreseen that training of Chamber staff will include a strong component to develop the organizations' ability to play a constructive role in this field. In addition, the development of the Chambers will include other areas of importance such as occupational safety and health.

It is suggested that a detailed technical assistance proposal for the development of the Federation and individual chambers be formulated through the fielding of a short term consultant in early 1994.

(b) *Strengthening the Chamber in Jericho*

Since it is expected that the emerging Authority will soon be headquartered, at least temporarily in Jericho, discussions were held with the Federation concerning the strengthening of the local Jericho Chamber to better be able to act as a liaison point with regard to the new administration. To facilitate this ILO will provide certain basic equipment for the Jericho Chamber and cover, for an interim period, some parts of the additional staff cost associated with this strengthening.

(c) *Upgrading the Chambers' support services to small business*

In view of the opportunities and challenges which are likely to open up for the private sector in the year ahead it is essential that effective support services can be provided to upgrade management skills and effectiveness, particularly in the small scale sector. A detailed proposal for a pilot programme to strengthen the Chamber in Nablus in this respect is described under small enterprise development.

Project Idea 3.6: Strengthening the Chambers of Commerce

1. Context

The transition to self rule for the OT makes it essential that effective tripartite constituents develop strong and representative organizations. In this respect an genuinely representative employers organizational framework is an essential part. The current proposal will provide assistance to upgrade the Federation and Chambers of Commerce to be able to effectively represent the interests of their members and to participate in the tripartite labour market and other mechanisms which will be essential for the future development and growth of the emerging nation.

2. Immediate Objective

The Federation and Chambers strengthened to be able to effectively represent the interests of their members with respect to advocacy towards the emerging Authority and the provision of needed services to member.

3. Outputs

- A detailed technical assistance proposal for upgrading the Federation and Chambers.
- The proposal implemented.
- An effectively functioning Federation and Chambers.

4. Activities

- Identification and fielding of a high-level consultant to formulate the technical assistance proposal.
- Implementation of the technical assistance.

5. Estimated Budget

Immediate.

- Short term consultant. Approx. US$ 15,000.-
- Immediate contribution to staff salaries. Approx. 30,000.-
- Short term training, equipment and misc. Approx. 200,000.-

Longer term.

- Full fledged technical assistance proposal. Approx. US$ 310,000.-

3. EMPLOYMENT CREATION

III.3.A SMALL-SCALE ENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT

1. Introduction

The vast majority of enterprises in the OT are small with 95 per cent employing less than ten persons. This applies to the registered 3,700 industrial enterprises which account for only 7 per cent of GNP and 16 per cent of employment, as well the service sector which contributes around 40 per cent of GNP concentrated in such activities as trade, transport and professional services. The dominant sectors of the economy are food processing, wood products, textiles, garments, construction and leather products. Availability of raw materials, indigenous craft skills and geography as a basis for comparative advantage are limited to a few sectors such as stone cutting, soap, wood carving, olive oil, and tourism.

There are several external factors which contribute to the predominance of small scale units and constrain enterprise growth such as: an uncertain political and economic environment which discourages both foreign and domestic productive investment and risk taking; a hostile legal and regulatory environment; a lack of an effective banking system; poor infrastructure; trade relations which result in very limited access to overseas and regional markets; and a lack of effective support services to small enterprises in such areas as management training and consultancy, technology and market information.

A successfully concluded peace process is likely to pose considerable challenges as well as to create opportunities to existing Palestinian enterprises. The environment is likely to become considerably more competitive since trade agreements with regional and overseas partners are likely to be reciprocal with even easier access for foreign products than is currently the case. Also the likely inflow of foreign investment from overseas Palestinians and others will raise the level of competition.

While this is very healthy in the medium and longer term and will be counterbalanced by increased opportunities in the form of market access and a more supportive environment, it must be recognized that many existing Palestinian enterprises are unlikely, in the short term, to be able to meet the increasing competitive pressures. A major shake-out in the private sector could have negative short term employment consequences which would further strain an already fragile situation of high expectations.

While this situation may call for a limited degree of protection or carefully managed investment targeting during the transition period, it will certainly require a well planned programme of support to enhance access to credit and to upgrade management skills and enterprise performance particularly in such areas as business planning, marketing, product standards and quality.

Given such support there is good reason to believe that the existing Palestinian private enterprise sector will be able to rise to the challenges and opportunities ahead by drawing on its

proven ability to survive under very adverse conditions, a history of entrepreneurship, and a well endowed human resource base, and become an important source of employment creation and economic growth.

2. ILO Proposals

To capitalize on the Palestinian private enterprise sector's potential for employment creation and growth, concerted action will be required at following two levels:

(a) Developing a supportive policy and regulatory environment

The key elements of the business environment which need to be addressed are outlined above including the legal and regulatory environment, the banking and financial system, infrastructure and trade regulations. An in-depth review and reformulation of these areas in line with future requirements will be one of the early priorities of the emerging Palestinian Authority and one of the prerequisite for overcoming the current lack of confidence among the business constituents which can be seen in the current reluctance to undertake larger investments in longer term value added activities such as manufacturing.

It is strongly recommended by the mission that this process be started by initiating an open dialogue between the business community (represented by genuine representative organizations) and the emerging Authority on important issues related to the business environment. One way to start this process, described in greater detail below, is by developing a coherent national strategy for small enterprise development through a participatory process involving the private sector, the Authority, the financial community, and other players involved in supporting small scale enterprises.

As outlined above, this policy dialogue should also weigh the arguments for limited, short term protective measures including targeted investment planning during the transition period to avoid a major shake-out among Palestinian enterprises and the related negative employment implications.

(b) Providing enterprise support services

To avoid short term unemployment and to ensure medium term economic and employment growth, it is of importance that an effective system of support services such as management training, consultancy, technology, product quality and standards and market information be developed for the small scale enterprise sector. If implemented in a an effective and timely manner this should enable the existing small scale sector to better cope with increased competition and to take advantage of a growing domestic market and increased access to foreign markets.

The institutional framework for the provision of such services which must be highly practical and need based should to the extent possible be based on existing programmes such as those by the Bethlehem University, Bir Zeit University, YMCA, UNRWA, BISAN, UNDP,

USAID, the Arab Scientific Institute for Research and Transfer of Technology (ASIR), the Development Resource Center, and others. While many of these programmes are well planned they typically operate in isolation with little or no coordination.

Business associations such as the Chambers of Commerce can play important roles both as lobbyists to the Authority and as vehicles for delivery of programmes to strengthen business through training programmes, extension services and other activities to address sector specific and industry wide problems and opportunities. Such associations which exist in embryonic form in several locations (i.e. Jerusalem, Nablus, Hebron, Gaza and Rumallah) should be strengthened through technical support and linkages with similar overseas bodies.

Also the energy and commitment of local authorities must be mobilized and tapped in support of local enterprise development. Experience from many countries such as Italy (i.e. the Emilia Romagne industrial district) clearly demonstrate that local authorities in partnership with the local business community can become key players in an integrated approach to local economic development.

In terms of support services, the area of credit deserve particular mention due to its importance to enterprise growth and the fact that the credit area is particularly plagued by fragmentation. The mission came across 23 different programmes each offering credit to different target groups at a wide range of terms and conditions and with very different degrees of success in terms of repayment rates. Based on information available to the mission it seems clear that the most successful programmes are those which combine credit with substantive follow-up and support services. Despite this proliferation of programmes there is a severe shortage of credit to particularly the lower end of the small enterprise spectrum. The mission suggests an immediate review of experiences to date in the credit area be carried out as a basis for development of a future credit strategy under the overall small enterprise promotion strategy referred to elsewhere.

The above should be undertaken within the framework of an overall national plan for the promotion of the small scale sector, formulated under the leadership of the emerging Authority with the full involvement of the various involved players who understand the local situation and have gained extensive experience in enterprise promotion over the last several years.

3. Technical Assistance for Entreprise Development

Five specific programmes are proposed to address issues and to pilot test key concepts at the policy, regulatory and programme levels outlined above. They are:

- Establishment of a Small Business Council;
- A project to strengthen four Chambers of Commerce through the establishment of Local Enterprise Development Centers which can provide services to small enterprises;
- A pilot project to adapt and transfer the successful sectoral small business development model from Emilia Romagna to the Palestinean context; and
- Activities to increase awareness of productivity issues among the social partners and development of plans for the medium-term establishment of tripartite Palestinian Productivity Center.
- The implementation of a review of experiences to date in the area of credit, with particular emphasis on effectively serving the lower end of the small scale enterprise spectrum.

Project Idea 3.A.1: Establishment of a National Small Business Council

1. Context

The small-scale business sector in Palestine holds substantial potential for contributing to economic growth and employment creation. To be able to fulfil this potential the sector will need a coherent overall strategy for enterprise promotion and a well structured programme of support which ensures that the existing hostile regulatory and legislative environment is changed towards one supportive of enterprise growth. In addition direct support programes including credit, training, consultancy, technology and information needs to be delivered through appropriate private and semi-private sector channels such as chambers of commerce, universities and NGOs. To ensure proper coordination of initiatives a National Small Business Council (NSBC) will be established composed of representatives of the government and the public and private sectors involving participants from financial, training, techinical and scientific institutions who are engaged in one form or another in programmes to support the small scale sector.

2. Immediate Objective

A National Small Business Council (NSBC) with minimum 50 per cent private sector participation established as a central supervisory body to assist in the development of a national strategy for promotion of the sector to ensure overall coordination of support programmes, allocation of funds to service providers and monitoring of effectiveness and impact of policies, regulations and support programmes.

3. Outputs

Phase One:

- Detailed Terms of Reference for the NSBC developed.
- NSBC constituted, initial meetings held and an Executive Committee established.
- Consensus reached on a national strategy for small enterprise promotion

Phase Two:

- Full time secretariat established to serve the NSBC Executive Committee by coordinating and monitoring the various public and private sector programmes to support the small scale sector.

4. Activities

- Implementation of study tour to study overseas small business councils and similar structures
- Formulation of detailed TOR for the NSBC through a participative process involving all key players. Likely to involve a national workshop.
- Determination of NSBC membership with minimum 50 per cent private sector representation.
- Official launching of the NSBC and election of the Executive Committee.
- Drawing up a detailed TA proposal to support the establishment of an effective Secretariat to serve the Committee.

5. Budget

Immediate:

- High level consultant to assist in the development of TOR for the NSBC and to facilitate the first meetings by the Council (4 w/m).
- Study tour for selected officials to explore successful Councils in other parts of the world. US$ 70,000.

Longer term:

- Estimated TA proposal to strengthen the Secretariat US$ 300,000.

Project Idea 3.A.2: Capacity Building for the Chambers of Commerce

1. Context

There is an urgent need to provide management training and consultancy services to entrepreneurs who want to establish a business or expand an existing business. Currently there are few organizations with the ability to provide such services to small scale entrepreneurs. The Chambers of Commerce hold the potential to provide such services since they have good access to the target group and a broader appreciation of the needs of small enterprises while at the same time being more acceptable to the sector since it feels that they belong to these organizations and that they represent their interests. At the same time Chambers are more likely to be staffed by individuals with business experience so that they are able to offer more practical 'hands-on' assistance. The current project will implement a project to upgrade the Chambers of Commerce in four selected locations (likely Nablus, Hebron, Gaza and Ramallah) so that they can provide need based training and consultancy services to small scale members through Local Enterprise Development Centers. It is foreseen that the Centers will be linked to a credit line implemented through a suitable arrangement with the emerging commercial banking system.

2. Immediate Objectives

Four Chambers of Commerce strengthened to be able to provide training, consultancy and information services for entrepreneurs with new or existing businesses.

3. Outputs

- A detailed technical assistance proposal prepared to strengthen the Chambers of Commerce in four selected locations.
- The ILO's training packages Start Your Business (SYB) and Improve Your Business (IYB) translated and adapted to Palestinian conditions.
- Trainers and consultants trained to utilize the training programmes and to provide practical in-company follow-up services.
- Business opportunity identification surveys conducted of the areas where the Chambers selected are operating.
- The Local Enterprise Development Centers established and operating.

4. Activities

- Fielding of a short term consultant to prepare a detailed project proposal in consultation with the Chambers' Staff and a resource group of local enterprise development specialists and NGO representatives.

- Translation and adaptation of IYB, SYB and other ILO training packages as a collaborative process between an international consultant and the Chamber's staff.
- Training of trainers and consultants by international consultants working closely with local resource people.
- Implementation of a business opportunity identification survey for the concerned areas.
- Establishment of the Local Enterprise Development Centers.

5. Budget

Immediate:

- A short term consultant to prepare a detailed project proposal to set up a Training and Consultancy Unit within four Chambers of Commerce.

Longer term.

- A project to strengthen selected four Chambers of Commerce through the establishment of Local Enterprise Development Centers. Approx. US$ 2,500,000.

Project Idea 3.A.3: Facilitating Linkages with the Emilia Romagna Industrial District

1. Context

With the prospect of increased access to regional markets there is an urgent need to enhance the competitiveness of sectors in which Palestine has a comparative advantage. The Emilia Romagna industrial district in Italy is widely recognized as being a very successful model for industrial district development through linking up clusters of small scale enterprises in the same sector (i.e. shoes, food processing, garments etc.) into networks supported by specialized institutions providing technical, marketing and other types of assistance on a financially viable basis. A mission from Emilia Romagna recently visited the OT and will prepare a report setting out their findings and making specific recommendations for applying the Emilia Romagna concept to the situation in the OT. The project will assist in the launching of a pilot project in a specific location covering a specific subsector with potential for good results.

2. Immediate Objectives

The competitiveness of an industrial sector with potential comparative advantage through adaptation of the successful industrial development model which has been developed by the Emilia Romagna district in Italy.

3. Outputs

- Key public and private decision makers from the selected region informed of the Emilia Romagna and other similar models through a study tour.
- A detailed proposal for a specific programme for a specific subsector.
- The programme implemented.

4. Activities

- Implementation of study tour.
- Joint mission by Emilia Romagna specialists and ILO to draw up proposal for project.
- Implementation of project.

5. Budget

Immediate.

- Study tour and joint programme formulation mission. Approx. USD 80,000.-

Longer term.

- Project to adapt and apply the Emilia Romagna model to a specific region. Approx. US$ 800,000.

Project Idea 3.A.4: Creation of productivity awareness and development of plans for a Tripartite Palestinean Productivity Center

1. Context

Palestinian industry is plagued by low levels of labour and capital productivity and low product quality. This is in part due to a fragmented domestic market resulting in limited competitive pressure, but also to lack of managerial skills at all levels of management and an absence of productivity awareness among the workforce. A tripartite productivity center will be established with the objective of dissemminating productivity skills and techniques to enterprises and foster a higher level of productivity awareness among the workforce. This will be achieved through targeted management training, consultancy services and productivity programmes and a carefully orchestrated mass media campaign to disseminate productivity concepts (team work, quality improvement, supervisory practices, waste reduction etc.) to the general work force. To avoid institutional proliferation it is proposed that initial programmes be implemented under the umbrella of the Small Business Council.

In the longer term a dedicated Productivity Center should be set up as a quasi-government institution operating on semi commercial principles. The Center will have a tripartite board composed of representatives from the private sector, labour movement and the government.

2. Immediate Objectives

To increase the productivity and competitiveness of Palestinean industry through the establishment of a Tripartite Productivity Center which will dissemminate productivity skills and techniques and raise the awareness of productivity among the general work force.

3. Outputs

- A national seminar and study tour on productivity implemented as a basis for developing plans for a national productivity movement initially implemented through the SBC and in the longer term through a Palestinean Productivity Center (PPC).
- A PPC established.

4. Activities

- Implement national seminar and draw up detailed proposals for a PPC.
- Plan an implement study tour for key decision makers and private sector representatives to visit productivity centers in Europe and Asia.

- Implement technical assistance project to establish the PPC including a twinning arrangement with successful productivity center in South East or Europe.

5. Budget

Immediate:

- National seminar and study tour. Approx. US$ 90,000.

Longer term.

- Technical assistance to establish the PPC. Approx. US$ 1.2 million.

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IDEAST
Mirror

PALESTINE & JORDAN

Palestinian support for accord nosedives

Amman willing to help set up police training centers in self-rule areas

An opinion poll made public on Thursday showed Palestinian support for the Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles on Gaza-Jericho has fallen sharply since the accord was signed in September although a slight majority still backed it (*see accompanying chart and table*).

The survey of 1,137 West Bank and Gaza Strip Palestinians was conducted one day before the sides missed the December 13 deadline for Israel to begin withdrawing from the occupied Gaza Strip and West Bank town of Jericho.

It was conducted by the Nablus-based Center for Palestine Research and Studies (CPRS).

The poll showed 41.5 percent backed the accord compared to 64.9 percent after the signing of the deal in Washington on September 13, a drop of 23.4 percent.


The poll had a margin of error of three percent.

Palestinians were disappointed when Israel and the PLO, sharply divided over who will control border crossing points, failed to meet the deadline. The sides are still negotiating.

The poll showed 38.1 percent opposed the agreement, a rise of 16.2 percent since September. More than 20 percent said they were undecided or did not feel. Only 6.6 percent said they were unsure in September.

Israel and the Nigerian drop in support was among Palestinians who identified themselves as independents.

DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES
Comparative Chart



Center for Palestine Research & Studies

September poll | December poll

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Cabban / Guanda P.04

MAR 27 '94 10:25PM SMOKING FOR POLICY

IDEAST
Mirror

Trying to reach conclusive assessments about political affiliation among Palestinians at this stage represents a great challenge. Palestinian politics is in a state of flux and the results of the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations are not yet clear. The immediate disappearance of terrorism in Gaza and a major influx of Palestinian entrepreneurs to Hebron and the violence we must be cautious about jumping to quick conclusions and generalizations about Palestinian political affiliations.

[] CONCLUDING REMARKS: According to CPRS, the poll shows that Fatah support among the West Bank will rise. No significant differences can be found in this regard when comparing Palestinians has declined. No significant differences can be found in this regard when comparing

"As indicated in the poll results, the decline in the popularity of Fatah does not mean an increase in the popularity of the opposition groups. The decline may be attributed to an increase in people who identified themselves as "neither nationalist nor Islamist" with Fatah and not a wide-scale Fatah. This change may in fact reflect a temporary disillusionment with Fatah and a wide-scale conversion, a phenomena similar to the "Knight Dream" in the U.S. a few years ago."

The poll showed that 9[illegible] considers took place in January 16, 1994, Fatah scored the largest single Palestinian group. Compared with a number of the opposition groups, Fatah scored in the Gaza and districts of Nablus, Jenin, Tulkarm, and Tulkarm. It could also win Ramallah and Bethlehem. But with some difficulty. Hebron, however, is leading towards the opposition coalition.

"In the Gaza Strip, the political map is even more complex, where it is difficult to determine the final outcome of an election based on 'electoral districts.'

"As indicated in the poll results, Fatah would win in only two districts (Khan Younis and the fourth district (Gaza City north). In the second district (Gaza City south), and the fifth district (middle), Fatah, This change may in fact reflect a temporary disillusionment with Fatah and not a wide-scale conversion, a phenomena similar to the "Knight Dream" in the U.S. a few years ago.

"When we compare Fatah with the opposition groups, we find that Fatah shows a declines with the third district (Gaza City west) and the fourth district (Gaza City north). In the second district (Gaza City south), and the fifth district (middle), Fatah would win in only two districts (Khan Younis and the fourth district (Gaza City north).

"One of the most interesting findings is that the PLO supporters in the Gaza Strip are more disinclined to vote than supporters of other groups. Only 60 percent of PLO supporters identified themselves as certain voters. The three categories are almost of equal standing, with a trend towards the 'swing voters.' The three categories are almost of equal standing, with a trend towards the 'swing voters.' The three categories are almost of equal standing, with a trend towards 'independence' or ambivalence.

"In general, the poll shows that the Palestinian constituency is a complex one. It is going through a process of change, responding to the circumstances of the ongoing current political period. The results of the peace negotiations and the ongoing economic and living conditions will have a major impact on Palestinian political affiliations."

Wednesday 26 January '94 11

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IDEAST
Mirror

Fatah, 12.6 percent for Hamas and 9.6 percent for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).

The majority of Palestinians (71.6 percent) realize that general political elections is the best means to choose the members of the Palestinian Interim Council (PIC). 65.9 percent declared their intention to participate in general elections. As compared with a previous survey, most Palestinians want the PLO to appoint the members of the PIC.

The poll also show that Palestinians are both hopeful and fearful of Palestinian police and security forces. Fear of security and political and civil freedoms prevail mainly Palestinians (51.3 percent) expressing their fear that the Palestinian police may be used as an oppressive tool against the opposition.

[] POLICE TRAINING: In related news, official sources in Amman say Jordan is prepared to help the PLO set up police training centers in the Occupied Territories following a decision by the United Nations to finance such centers, writes *Mideast Mirror*'s correspondent Salameh Nof last.

A Jordanian official, briefing reporters on the nature of Jordanian cooperation with the PLO in the field of security, said that Amman was "not willing or interested in helping the Palestinian affairs without explicitly and publicly asked by the PLO in offer assistance." He said that despite differences with the PLO leadership, we are very much concerned about the security situation in the Occupied Territories in view of rising tension. Also and dwindling support for the peace process."

Jordan-PLO relations suffered a setback after PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat re-

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P.S. STAFF DELIVERY

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World Bank pledges $570m for Palestinians

The World Bank said on Friday that international donors had committed $570 million in aid to the Palestinians in 1994, enough to fund five-year projects fully in the future self-governing territories.

The round of speechifiers at economic talks in Paris among the World Bank, donor countries, the PLO and Israel contrasted with gloom over the deadlock in political negotiations for an Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area.

World Bank vice-president Caio Koch-Weser told reporters in Paris some of the initial money would have to go to paying salaries for the new Palestinian administration and police force until tax revenue fully covered their needs.

He said two donors, notably the European Union, were prepared to make a limited contribution on the running costs of the Palestinian administration. He strongly appealed to other countries to reconsider their reluctance.

PLO economics chief Abu-Ala'a (Ahmed Qrei) said the West Bank and Gaza would enjoy "no holiday from taxation" because the new administration would raise the same taxes as the Israeli occupation authorities had.

Koch-Weser said donors had endorsed the Palestinians' emergency economic development and technical assistance plans.

They emphasized the need for the PLO and Israel to conclude an economic cooperation agreement rapidly and for progress in building self-governing Palestinian institutions.

Koch-Weser said the $570 million in firm contributions for the first year exceeded the amount pledged at an October 1 donors' conference in Washington, when donors promised $2 billion over five years, and "would in our estimate finance the program."

The World Bank estimated that out of $1.1 billion to be spent in emergency development aid and technical assistance in the first three years of self-rule, $200 million would be required to meet Palestinian running costs.

Officials said this was roughly 25 percent of the total administration budget for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Abu-Ala'a pledged that the Palestinians would show "transparency and accountability" in their use of aid money.

That meant both showing Palestinians the administration was working honestly and convincing donors their assistance was being spent properly, he said.

The initial aid would go to rebuilding the decimated infrastructure in the Gaza Strip for transport, electricity, water supply and sewage.

He said the Palestinians wanted their own currency but it was a matter of negotiation with the Israelis and he was not sure it would be accepted.

Asked about comments by Foreign Minister Shimon Peres that the Palestinians had accepted a free trade market with Israel, he said: "I believe that in the very near future, we'll be able to reach an agreement."

He said the Palestinians were concerned to avoid economic dependence, but added: "Of course nobody can imagine there will be a closed border in the months period." *(Reuters)*

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MIDEAST
Mirror

Support declines with youth. ... those in the 18-29 age group, there are fewer supporters (38.9 percent) than opponents (40.4 percent). Women approved the accord (36.2 percent) less than men (44.8 percent).

The head of the polling organization, Nabil Kukali, a Palestinian public pollster for the past decade, traced back from current lows if Israel starts to withdraw from Gaza and Jericho.

"There is about 20 or 25 percent of the electorate which is the floating vote," CPRS head Said Kanduz said. "Even many Fatah supporters now say they do not back the agreement but their disadvantage measures if there was withdrawal."

The poll asked 52.5 percent want an independent state, 26.7 percent want confederation with Jordan, and 15 percent confederation with Jordan and Palestinian state.

Among Gazans, support for a state is 65.8 percent; among West Bankers 45 percent.

There was little change in support for each of the main political factions, with 42.2 percent for

1. Three months after the signing of the Palestinian-Israeli Declaration of Principles — "Gaza-Jericho First" — how do you evaluate the agreement?

	West Bank & Gaza	West Bank	Gaza
a) I approve of it	41.5%	41.0%	42.4%
b) I don't approve of it	38.1%	37.3%	39.5%
c) I am not sure	20.4%	21.8%	19.1%

2. In your opinion, what is the best way to choose members of the "Palestinian Council" of the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority?

a) Appointment by PLO leadership	12.5%	13.5%	11.1%
b) Appointment by political groups	08.6%	05.6%	12.9%
c) Political elections	71.9%	75.7%	65.5%
d) Others	06.9%	05.2%	10.5%

3. Will you participate in the elections for the "Palestinian Council" of the Palestinian Interim Self-Governing Authority?

a) Yes	65.9%	66.5%	64.4%
b) No	21.9%	19.9%	24.9%
c) Not sure	12.1%	13.2%	11.3%

4. Do you think that Palestinian police and security forces:

a) Will treat all Palestinians on equal basis?	50.8%	47.4%	56.1%
b) Will oppress the opposition?	31.2%	34.3%	26.1%
c) Other (specify...)	18.0%	18.1%	17.8%

5. After the formation of a Palestinian entity, I prefer:

a) A confederation with Jordan	28.7%	35.4%	13.8%
b) A confederation with Jordan and Israel	07.1%	07.1%	07.1%
c) No confederation, maintain an independent Palestinian entity	22.5%	16.5%	43.8%
d) Not sure	29.9%	26.3%	27.1%
e) Other (specify...)	10.8%	15.7%	08.2%

6. If elections were held today, you will vote for candidates affiliated with:

a) Hamas	12.6%	10.9%	15.1%
b) PFLP	08.0%	06.7%	11.7%
c) Fatah	42.2%	42.0%	42.7%
d) Fada (Abul Rabbo)	01.1%	01.5%	00.4%
e) DFLP (Hawatmeh)	01.0%	01.6%	00.0%
f) Mish al-Shaab	01.8%	02.0%	01.1%
g) Islamic Jihad	03.4%	03.5%	03.1%
h) Independents	13.8%	16.3%	09.0%
i) Others	15.1%	15.7%	14.5%

Friday 18 December '92

MIDEAST
Mirror

SYRIA, LEBANON, JORDAN & PALESTINE

Palestinians split over further talks with Israel and the economic boycott but solidly behind coordination with Jordan

Some 61 percent of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories back the continuation of Israel-PLO talks on implementing last September's "Gaza-Jericho" deal. But nearly 40 percent say they want the negotiations to stop, according to an opinion poll released on Wednesday by the Center for Palestine Research and Studies (CPRS).

The Center for Palestinian Research and Studies (CPRS) poll of 1,607 Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip also showed the Palestinians more evenly divided over whether Arab states should lift an economic boycott of Israel once peace is established.

The January survey found that 61 percent of the respondents support the Arab economic boycott of Israel, to remain in effect. But 64 percent said they favored lifting the boycott in the future, "depending on political circumstances."

The boycott prohibits Arab states from establishing economic ties with Israel and bans foreign companies operating in Israel from doing business with the Jewish state.

The poll also found that a majority of 61.4 percent were in favor of coordination between the PLO and Jordan.

FINDINGS: CPRS said the poll results "must be viewed in their proper context," summarizing the circumstances surrounding the survey as follows:

- The general political pressure has been decreasing on the interior scene. The euphoria that dominated the early days of the Declaration of Principles has faded somewhat, and people are frustrated with Israel's attempts to hinder and slow down the implementation of the political agreements. This has increased the skepticism of the views of the PLO as people are impatient with its inability to assert its position in the negotiations.
- The security climate during the period preceding the poll in the West Bank had a major influence on the results of these poll. What had a major influence on the results of these poll was the brutal killing of four Palestinians (Tanbus supporters). The brutal killing of four Palestinians by the PLO leadership in many Palestinians and the inability of the PLO leadership to stop such killings has led Palestinians to wonder about the future.
- Internal Palestinian-Palestinian violence is perceived by most Palestinians as a problem of major magnitude. Palestinians feel that both the increase in violence and the inability to stop violence are the responsibility of the Israeli authorities and leadership of political groups. This perceived absence of rule of law has led to a state of "frustration and a trend towards "mob justice" or lawlessness."

The full results of the opinion poll, with comments from CPRS:

1. Do you support the continuation of the current peace negotiations between the PLO and Israel?

	West Bank & Gaza	West Bank	Gaza
a) Yes	60.9%	61.6%	59.1%
b) No	33.8%	34.9%	31.5%
c) Not sure	05.3%	03.5%	09.4%

The results show that the opposition to the continuation of the peace talks is greater in Gaza (45.5%) than in the West Bank (30.1%). This is not surprising given that Gazans oppose the continuation of the negotiations more than Palestinians in the West Bank. Supporters of the political opposition are higher in group supporters in Gaza. It is not surprising that Gazans oppose the continuation of the negotiations more than Palestinians in the West Bank. Supporters of the political opposition are higher in Gaza. The implementation of the Declaration of Principles was supposed to start on December 13, 1993. Instead, the Israeli military government has intensified its measures against Palestinians were on the rise. The economic crisis in the Occupied Territories has deteriorated further. All of this may have resulted in "polarization" of attitudes in Gaza, with fewer individuals saying that they are "not sure" about the issues.

MIDEAST
Mirror

2. As time goes by, do you think that there is a need for further and closer cooperation and coordination between the PLO and Jordan in the political and economic spheres?

	West Bank & Gaza	West Bank	Gaza
a) Yes	64.4%	68.5%	58.0%
b) No	23.6%	17.1%	35.1%
c) Not sure	13.2%	14.4%	11.2%

The positive attitude towards coordination with Jordan could be an expression of general Palestinian feeling that the Palestinian negotiators are incapable of attaining Palestinian rights without Jordan. The results of this question could also be interpreted as a Palestinian consideration of the Jordan, where Palestinians must promote close ties with Arab countries in general.

In contrast, a previous CPRS poll (December 1993) showed that support for a confederation with Jordan was not common as 28.7% of Palestinians supported a confederation, and 33.5% supported an independent Palestinian state.

3. As to the Arab economic boycott of Israel:

	West Bank & Gaza	West Bank	Gaza
a) I don't support its lifting at all	42.5%	38.5%	49.4%
b) I support its termination immediately	13.5%	13.3%	13.9%
c) I support its termination in future, depending on political circumstances	40.0%	48.5%	36.7%

What support there is for the idea of lifting the boycott could be seen as an ideological acceptance of peace with Israel and a pragmatic understanding of the new political and economic realities.

4. In your opinion, what is the most important criterion to be taken into account in selecting important officials for Palestinian institutions? (Please use answer only)

	West Bank & Gaza	West Bank	Gaza
a) Religiosity	16.7%	17.6%	15.3%
b) Professional competence/specialization	58.1%	59.5%	55.7%
c) Role in the national struggle	15.8%	17.7%	13.2%
d) Party affiliation	04.7%	04.6%	01.9%
e) Other (Specify)	04.7%	04.6%	06.7%

Palestinians stands is clear that professional competence is the most important criterion to be taken into account when selecting important officials for Palestinian institutions.

The emphasis on competence was clearer in Gaza than in the West Bank. This difference may be a result of the debate taking place in Gaza over the issue appointments by the PLO for the mayor of the city of Gaza and the leader of Fatah. There appointments provoked widespread discontent, especially among Fatah supporters in Gaza and resulted in a number of resignations.

5. Recently, there have been calls for a "collective leadership" in the PLO. What is your opinion?

	West Bank & Gaza	West Bank	Gaza
a) I support these calls	66.1%	67.2%	63.6%
b) I don't support these calls	11.9%	10.9%	13.6%
c) I support these calls, but this is not the appropriate time to make them	21.4%	21.6%	21.0%

"Collective leadership" is the PLO and wrongly supported. Palestinians seem to overlook further democratic practices within the PLO and show that they are in general agreement over the idea of "collective leadership." However, further explanation must be made to arrive at a common understanding of "collective leadership."

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6. Do you support the present non-Muslim efforts of the "Group of 10" opposing the PLO-Israeli agreement?

	West Bank & Gaza	West Bank	Gaza
a) Yes	44.7%	41.3%	51.6%
b) No	39.2%	41.3%	35.6%
c) Not sure	14.1%	17.4%	12.8%

A large percentage supports co-ordination efforts among the opposition. Support of coordination among the "Group of 10" could be seen as a combination of political support for the opposition groups and a desire by many Palestinians, especially those who oppose the Declaration of Principles and others, to see an effective Palestinian opposition. It could also be seen as a result of the use of non-violent methods in monitoring the conflict among those who oppose the Declaration of Principles and those who agree with it. While many Palestinians are supportive of coordination efforts among the opposition groups, they don't believe that these efforts will prevent the implementation of the DoP.

7. Do you think that the opposition "Group of 10" will be able to prevent the implementation of the PLO-Israeli agreement?

	West Bank & Gaza	West Bank	Gaza
a) Yes	43.9%	46.0%	38.8%
b) No	33.3%	34.3%	
c) Not sure	22.8%	19.7%	27.4%

These attitudes can be explained through the following:

a. The political circumstances surrounding the DoP (and many Palestinians to think that on the political scene than the opposition.

b. The latter will affect the Syrian role in the current political process may undermine the opposition's ability to prevent the implementation of the agreement.

c. There are doubts among Palestinians about the nature of the coalition of the "Group of 10." It is perceived as temporary and directed at major objectives rather than long-term prospects. The groups.

8. Will you participate in the general elections for the "Palestinian Council" of the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority (PISGA)?

	West Bank & Gaza	West Bank	Gaza
a) Yes	66.9%	68.5%	64.1%
b) No	18.1%	20.1%	16.8%
c) Not sure	13.9%	11.7%	19.1%

Nearly two-thirds of Palestinians expressed their intention to participate in the general elections supposed to take place on July 13, 1994.

9. If these elections were held today, you would vote for candidates affiliated with?

	West Bank & Gaza	West Bank	Gaza
a) Hamas	14.7%	13.1%	17.3%
b) PFLP	01.8%	02.5%	01.5%
c) Fatah	23.5%	23.3%	23.3%
d) Islamic Jihad	01.5%	02.5%	00.0%
e) Fada	03.6%	03.9%	01.6%
f) Mish al-Shaab	34.9%	34.2%	36.1%
g) Fatah	06.4%	08.3%	11.8%
h) PFLP	04.1%	02.5%	03.5%
i) Islamic independents	11.8%	13.7%	08.6%
j) Nationalist independents	04.1%	03.9%	03.6%
k) Other organizations (specify)	11.1%	13.0%	09.7%
l) No one			

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Abteilung Internationale Politik
Wolfgang Weege

Bonn, den 10.Dezember 1993

Betr.: Unterredung Rudolf Scharping - PLO-Chef Yassir Arafat und Delegation
08.Dezember 1993, 9.15 Uhr - 10.15 Uhr
Gästehaus der Bundesregierung, Petersberg

Begleitung des SPD-Vorsitzenden:

- Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul
- Christoph Zöpel
- Karsten D. Voigt
- Hans-Jürgen Wischnewski
- Wolfgang Weege

1. Unter besonderer Erwähnung seiner früheren Begegnungen mit Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, Hans-Jürgen Wischnewski und Christoph Zöpel **würdigte Arafat das Engagement** der vielen Freunde in der SPD.

   Mit dem Dank für die bisherige Unterstützung der SPD verband er die Bitte um verstärkte Fortsetzung der Unterstützung im Hinblick auf die enormen Herausforderungen beim Aufbau des palästinensischen Staates.

2. Über das Gespräch mit BK Kohl und die zugesagte politische und wirtschaftliche Hilfe äußerte er sich zufrieden (vergl. Punkt 4)

3. Hinsichtlich der israelisch-palästinensischen Verhandlungen zeigte Arafat sich verhalten optimistisch, daß die Probleme gelöst werden, wollte sich aber auf den Zeitpunkt nicht festlegen. Irritiert zeigte er sich über die israelische Haltung in der Frage des Truppenabzugs ("Was sie vorschlagen, ist kein Abzug, sondern nur eine Umgruppierung") und der Größe des autonomen Gebietes Jericho: "Wollen sie ein Bantustan aus uns machen?".

   Im Widerspruch zu Rabins öffentlichen Äußerungen, daß das vereinbarte Datum für den Beginn des Umsetzungsverfahrens (13.Dezember - Beginn des Truppenabzugs) nicht sakrosankt sei, betonte Arafat die Bedeutung der Einhaltung des Zeitplans als einen wichtigen Maßstab für die Glaubwürdigkeit des Friedensprozesses im Urteil der Bevölkerung und in der Auseinandersetzung mit seinen palästinensischen Gegnern. Er wies auf die mögliche Konsequenz der Verzögerung auch der weiteren Phasen, einschließlich des vorgesehenen Wahltermins, hin.

   Dennoch ging Arafat, auf eine Nachfrage Scharpings, von Januar/Februar 1994 als Zeitpunkt für seine Übersiedlung nach Jericho aus. Voraussetzung sei in jedem Fall die vorherige Installierung der palästinensischen Sicherheitskräfte (die z.Z. in Jordanien und Ägypten ausgebildet werden).

4. Die meiste Zeit verwandte Arafat auf eine eindringliche Darlegung der schwierigen Finanzlage der PLO ("Ich spreche hier unter Freunden ganz offen") und ihrer politischen Gefahren für die Verwirklichung der Autonomie als Keimzelle des neuen palästinensischen Staates: "Ich stehe mit dem Rücken zur Wand".

Die meisten arabischen Staaten und die Islamische Konferenz hätten ihre Unterstützung für die PLO eingestellt: (Saudi-Arabien und die Golf-Staaten wegen Arafats Haltung im Golf-Krieg; Libyen und Syrien wegen der Unterzeichnung des Abkommens mit Israel) und hielten darüber hinaus die von den Palästinensern im Lande einbehaltene "PLO-Steuer" zurück bzw. unterstützten damit die linken (Lybien) und rechten (Kuweit) Gegner des Abkommens (Außenstände z.B. in Kuweit angeblich 120 Mio Dollar, in Dubai 56 Mio Dollar, etc.) Arafat: "Uns geht der Atem aus".

Der PLO-Vorsitzende anerkannte die zahlreichen internationalen Hilfszusagen, die aber in der aktuellen Finanzmisere keine Abhilfe brächten, weil sie projektgebunden und damit erst viel später wirksam seien. Er bemängelte in diesem Zusammenhang die bürokratische Langsamkeit und unnötig hinderliche Auflagen der z.B. der Weltbank und Nichteinhaltung von Zusagen. Die politischen Konsequenzen zeigte Arafat an einem konkreten Beispiel auf: von der EU zugesagte 15 Mio ECU für die Universität Bir Zeit seien bis heute nicht eingegangen. Folge: aus Finanznot müßten die Studiengebühren verdoppelt werden; dies traf die Masse der minderbemittelten Studenten; Iran bot ihnen Unterstützung; die Radikalen gewannen die Wahl zur Studentenvertretung "an unserer Hochburg Bir Zeit".

Arafat kritisierte, daß Israel für die Unterzeichnung der Vereinbarung von den USA reiche Belohnung erhalten habe ("Flugzeuge, moderne Waffen, 240 Mio Dollar für die Kosten des Truppenrückzugs, Bürgschaften für 10 Mrd Dollar"),die PLO als der andere Unterzeichner hingegen gar nichts. Die USA hätten bislang nicht einmal seiner Bitte um Freigabe eingefrorener PLO-Gelder entsprochen.

Von ihm, der auch der gewählte Präsident der Palästinensischen Nationbehörde sei, werde erwartet, binnen kurzer Frist die Maschinerie eines neuen Staates in Gang zu bringen und in Gang zu halten, ohne daß die finanziellen Voraussetzungen gegeben seien. Wie könne er der Verpflichtung des Abkommens zur Gewährleistung der Sicherheit in Jericho und Gaza nachkommen, wenn er für die z.Z. in Jordanien und Ägypten ausgebildeten Polizisten nicht einmal die Gehälter bezahlen könne?

Arafat richtete einen eindringlichen Appell an die Europäer, schnell finanzielle Unterstützung bereitzustellen, "da sonst nicht sicher ist, ob wir die nächsten zwolf Monate überstehen". Sichtbare Fortschritte seien auch das wirksamste Mittel gegen die radikalen Gegner des Abkommens. Der PLO-Chef sah die Europäer nicht nur in einer geschichtlich begründeten Mitverantwortung für den Frieden; er warnte auch vor einer Balkanisierung à la Ex-Jugoslawien mit unmittelbaren Folgen für die Nachbarregion Europa, wenn die gegenwärtige Friedensinitiative scheitere. "Allein können wir es nicht schaffen."

Arafat betonte, daß die erbetene Unterstützung weder für ihn noch für die PLO, sondern den neuen palästinensichen Staat bestimmt sei. Wenn nicht Zuschüsse, solle Europa Kredite zu Lasten des neuen Staates geben, die dieser aus seinem künftigen Steueraufkommen tilge. Wichtig sei allein, daß schnell geholfen werde.

Mehrfach warnte Arafat, der Westen solle ihn nicht behandeln wie Gorbatschow: "viel versprechen, wenig halten". Er kündigte für diesen Fall seinen Rücktritt und die schonungslose öffentliche Darlegung der Gründe an.

Der SPD-Vorsitzende und die Mitglieder der Gesprächsdelegation sicherten Arafat zu, sich nachdrücklich um schnelle und wirkungsvolle Unterstützung zu bemühen.

Hans-Jürgen Wischnewski kritisierte die unbefriedigenden Zusagen bei Arafats Besuch. Bei voller Anerkennung der schwierigen Haushaltslage müsse in einer so ungewöhnlichen Lage durch Umschichtungen Hilfe ermöglicht werden. Er habe mit einem Brief an den

I personally am honoured, grateful
& proud to have had the
privilege of honorary
Fellowship ~~at St Anthony's~~

Kanzler immerhin die Schenkung von zwei dringend benötigten Krankenwagen für Jericho erreichen können. Er berichtete ferner von seinen Bemühungen gegenüber der EU und seinem Plan einer von der Welthungerhilfe getragenen und dem Fernsehen unterstützten Spendenaktion. Auch die FES solle nach zusätzlichen Möglichkeiten suchen.

Er regte ferner Überlegungen an, wie unsere Beziehungen zu den Golf-Staaten, Kuweit und Saudi-Arabien genutzt werden könnten, um sie im eigenen Interesse zur Aufrgabe ihrer finanziellen Zurückhaltung gegenüber der PLO zu veranlassen. Vor allem müsse die Bundesregierung regelmäßig im Parlament gefragt werden, was sie getan habe.

Scharping erklärte seine Bereitschaft, sich bei der SPE-Parteiführerkonferenz mit Jacques Delors, Willy Claes, Felipe González u.a. in Arafats Sinn zu verwenden sowie ggf. einen Brief an den Kanzler zu schreiben.

Die SPD-Delegationsmitglieder kamen überein zu prüfen, ob über die Europäische Investitionsbank (Wolfgang Roth) oder ggf. durch private Banken unverzüglich Bereitstellung von Krediten mit Absicherung durch Bürgschaften der EU und/oder ihrer Mitgliedstaaten erreicht werden kann. Weiter wollen sie sich dafür einsetzen, daß die Erhebung israelischer Zölle auf Warenlieferungen in die palästinensischen Gebiete beendet wird.

Der SPD-Vorsitzende bekräftigte den Willen der SPD, sich auf nationaler und europäischer Ebene sowie im Rahmen der SI energisch dafür einzusetzen, daß die historische Chance dieses Friedensprozesses nicht an wirtschaftlichen Unzulänglichkeiten scheitert.

Zum Abschluß des in freundschaftlicher Atmosphäre geführten Gesprächs gingen Arafat und Scharping davon aus, daß ihre nächste Begegnung in Jericho stattfinden werde.

14/1/1994

Dear Mariano, dear Erwin,

I was struck by the terrible news that Yehoram Gaon has died yesterday night.

He was a great man destined by history to play a critical ~~role~~ essential role in peace making.

We Israelis surely the Palestinians together with us would be wise to keep ~~~~ his debt and remember for generations to come his contribution to the Oslo Agreement.

~~I~~. I remember with great affection his unlimited dedication and his determination ~~to bring people together, by the force~~ to lead us to 333736 peace. His enduring efforts, as his analytical and

06-328844

the force always the essence ~~of dynamic will~~ the ~~impossible~~ and his belief in the possibility of change at both levels, made him an effective peacemaker.

02/710657 — Benita

המנהל האזרחי
אזור יהודה ושומרון
מחלקה לענייני ערבים
קשת צבעים 02389
14 דצמ' 1993

רמ"א

מגמות פלסטיניות בניהול המו"מ ליישום הסכם העקרונות:

משמעויות והמלצות

כללי

1. השיחות בין הפלסטינים לישראל ליישום הסכם העקרונות שנחתם בין אש"פ לבין ישראל ב-13 ספט', התנהלו עד כה בשלושה ערוצים עיקריים:

   א. ועדה בטחונית אשר עיקר עבודתה נעשתה בקאהיר.

   ב. ועדה אזרחית שעיקר עבודתה נעשתה באל-עריש.

   ג. ועדה כלכלית שדיוניה נערכו בפריז.

2. ככלל, מסתמנת בתביעות הפלסטיניות מגמה ברורה לעצמאות מלאה בכל התחומים, כחלק מהנחת היסוד שלהם לפיה הסדר הביניים חייב להוביל למדינה פלסטינית עצמאית. בהתאם להנחה זו גובשה האיסטרטגיה של אש"פ בשיחות ליישום ה- D.O.P., ומנהיגות אש"פ בראשות ערפאת ב"חוץ" וב"פנים" פועלת להכשרת דעת הקהל המקומית, הישראלית והעולמית, לקראת מימוש היעד של הקמת "המדינה הפלסטינית שבירתה ירושלים".

3. תכלית מסמך זה כפולה:

   א. לבחון את המגמות הפלסטיניות העקרוניות כפי שבאו לידי ביטוי במהלך המו"מ עם ישראל ובעיקר בועדה האזרחית (העוסקת בהעברת הסמכויות האזרחיות), ובמדיניות ההסברה הנקטת ע"י אש"פ וערפאת מאז חתימת הסכם העקרונות. (התביעות הפלסטיניות בועדות האחרות, הצבאית והכלכלית, תואמות למעשה את המגמות שהסתמנו בתביעותיהם בועדה האזרחית).

   ב. לנתח את המשמעויות המעשיות וההשלכות האפשריות של המצב המתהווה במישורים הבאים: התהליך המדיני, העברת הסמכויות ודעת הקהל המקומית - ולהציע רעיונות והמלצות להתמודדות ישראלית עם משמעויות והשלכות אלו.

פירוט

איסטרטגיית המו"מ

1. כאמור, הנחת היסוד שהגדירה הנהגת אש"פ להסדר הביניים, לפיה תקופת המעבר תוביל למימוש "הזכויות הלגיטימיות והפוליטיות" (כמוזכר בפתח ה- D.O.P.), היינו למדינה פלסטינית עצמאית - הנחת יסוד זו הכתיבה את אסטרטגיית המו"מ של הצד הפלסטיני ליישום הסכם העקרונות לגבי אזור עזה ויריחו, וממנה גם נגזרות תביעותיהם העקרוניות בשיחות בשלוש הועדות.

2. מהמו"מ שהתנהל עד כה התברר, כי הפלסטינים בחרו להתמקד בשלב זה בתחום **הבטחוני**. שאיפתם העליונה של הפלסטינים כיום היא להבטיח לעצמם את הטריטוריה ואת הסמכות להקים כוח משטרתי, המהווים מבחינתם את הסממנים המובהקים ביותר של שלטון ושל יישות ריבונית.
נראה, כי הפלסטינים ניצלו היטב את העובדה שגם ישראל גילתה עניין מובהק מצידה, למקד את המו"מ בתחום הבטחוני ולהציגו כנושא המוביל במו"מ.

3. מאידך, ייחסו הפלסטינים חשיבות משנית לעיסוק בתחומים האזרחיים. הם מעריכים, כי יוכלו "להסתדר" עם מנהל ציבורי המתפקד באופן חלקי בלבד, תוך בטחון כי יוכלו להמשיך ולהנות משירותים שינתנו ע"י ישראל (חשמל, שירותי אישפוז וכו') גם בהעדר הסכמים רשמיים.
בנקודה זו בולטת העובדה שערפאת למד להבין כי במגע ישיר שלו ושל אנשיו עם הדרג המדיני-המיניסטריאלי בישראל, יוכל להגיע להישגים משמעותיים גם בתחום השירותים, תוך "דילוג" על צוותי המו"מ, הנעדרים סמכות פוליטית.

4. במו"מ עצמו בועדה האזרחית ניצלו הפלסטינים היטב את המצב הנתון של העדר מוכנות טכנית מצידם (מחסור במומחים מתאימים, העדר ניירות עמדה וכו') להצגת דרישות מקסימליסטיות ובאופן בלתי מתפשר לקבל את כל הסמכויות בכל תחום ותחום. בכך הם הפכו מה שנראה כחולשה - לעמדת כוח המשרתת את מטרתם לעצמאות.

5. ערפאת מעוניין לשמר את הלחץ המהפכני בעזה ויריחו כדי לבסס משם את מעמדו ולהמשיך את תהליך בניית המדינה הפלסטינית. להערכתנו, ערפאת חושש מיציבות והתמסדות מוקדמים ומכך שהתהליך "יתקע" בשלב הביניים ויקלע לסטטוס-קוו. על כן, ישאף, כנראה, לדלג על שלב זה ולהגיע הישר להסכם הקבע, או לפחות להגיע למו"מ על הסכם הקבע עם נתוני פתיחה טובים.
כנגזר מכך, מנווט הצד הפלסטיני את המו"מ לנושאים שבתחום סימלי ריבונות ומדינה, מעלה נושאים שמבחינת מהותם אמורים להיות נדונים בהסדרי הקבע (כגון מעברים), ובמו"מ על תחום יריחו יוצר תקדים למו"מ שיתקיים בעתיד על קביעת הטריטוריה הפלסטינית וגבולותיה.

6. ערפאת מבטיח שהאסטרטגיה הפלסטינית, המתוארת לעיל, תתקיים ותשמר באמצעות ריכוז המו"מ בידיו ומניעת מתן סמכויות החלטה נרחבות לראשי הצוותים בועדות המו"מ. במו"מ עצמו הוא נוקט טקטיקה של התמקחות והליכה על-הסף, ומנחה את אנשיו להציג עמדות נוקשות ביותר תוך ניצול מירבי של הנוסח המעורפל של מסמך העקרונות - גם אם הדבר נוגד לעיתים קרובות את רוח ההסכם.

7. **<u>מגמות ותביעות עקרוניות</u>**

להלן פירוט מגמות ותביעות עקרוניות של הפלסטינים, כפי שעלו מהמו"מ בועדה האזרחית עד כה:

א. דרישה לסימלי ריבונות רבים ככל האפשר ולהקמת מוסדות וגופים המורים על ריבונות או נהנים מסמכויות של מדינה.

ב. דרישה לקבל את כל הסמכויות ובמלואן וחוסר נכונות להתפשר על חלקים מהן.

ג. דרישה לצמצם נוכחות ישראלית רשמית (צבא, משטרה וכיו"ב) בשטחי האוטונומיה עד למינימום, וחוסר נכונות להתפשר בנושא זה.

ד. עמידה על עיקרון ההדדיות, המעמיד אותם במישור אחד עם ישראל כאילו מדובר בהסכם בין שתי מדינות.

ה. חוסר נכונות לשיתוף פעולה או אף לתיאום מכוח הסכם כתוב ומחייב.

ו. כירסום בכל סעיפי ה D.O.P הנוגעים להשארת סמכויות בענייני חוץ ובטחון בידי ישראל ומתן פרשנות מצמצמת ככל האפשר לסעיפים אלה.

8. להלן יובאו מספר דוגמאות בולטות לכל אחד מהתביעות הנ"ל:

א. **סימלי ריבונות -**

במהלך המו"מ תבעו הפלסטינים לעצמם את סמלי הריבונות הבאים:

1) כינוי רשות המנהל העצמי הפלסטיני בשם "הרשות הלאומית הפלסטינית" (P.N.A) והתנגדות לכך שתקרא "הרשות הפלסטינית" (P.A) כפי שדרשה ישראל. ואכן, בכל ניירותיהם של הפלסטיניים מופיע הכינוי P.N.A.

2) דרישה כי לרשות הפלסטינית תוענק הזכות להוצאת תיעוד פלסטיני לרבות דרכון פלסטיני שיוכר ע"י ישראל במעברי הגבול.

3) דרישה להנפקת מטבע פלסטיני.

4) דרישה להנפקת בולי דואר וחותמות פלסטיניים לשימוש בינ"ל.

5) דרישה להקמת כוח סמי-צבאי (במסגרת הקמת המשטרה החזקה) שיכלול: כלי שיט, כלי טיס (מסוקים), שריוניות ומקכי"ם. כמו כן ביקשו הפלסטינים לאגד את כוחותיהם במסגרות של **גדודים** שהם למעשה מסגרות צבאיות לכל דבר. דרישות אלו מצביעות על מגמה לבניית גרעין לצבא.

6) דרישה לקבל קידומת בינ"ל נפרדת לתקשורת הפלסטינית הניתנת ע"י I.T.U.

7) דרישה להקמת רשות רדיו וטלויזיה עצמאית (הוסכם ב-D.O.P).

8) במהלך המו"מ התבטאו כי ידרשו שה P.N.A תהיה בעלת סמכויות שיפוט ביצוע וחקיקה נרחבים (עקרון שלוש הרשויות).

ב. **אי ויתור על סמכויות -**

במהלך המו"מ סירבו הפלסטינים לוותר על סמכויות כלשהן כדרישת ישראל, לדוגמא:

1) ישראל דרשה כי הסמכות לאספקת חשמל להתנחלויות תשאר בידה וכן אחזקתם השוטפת של קוי חשמל המוליכים חשמל להתנחלויות ותיקונם במידת הצורך - הפלסטינים סירבו לאפשר זאת.

2) ישראל דרשה סמכות לתקן כבישים ראשיים או כבישים המובילים להתנחלויות - הפלסטינים סרבו. בנושא זה סירבו הפלסטינים גם להצעה ישראלית להשתתפות כספית באחזקת הכבישים.

3) גישה דומה גילו הפלסטינים כלפי דרישה ישראלית לטיפול ואחזקת תשתיות הקשר (טלפונים).

4) ישראל דרשה להשאיר בידיה סמכויות קמ"ט עבודה בנושא רישוי שימוש ופיקוח על חומרי נפץ לצרכי כריה וחציבה - הפלסטינים סירבו (הנושא הועבר לטיפול הועדה הביטחונית).

<u>הערות:</u> הפלסטינים מוכנים לספק חשמל, שרותי טלפון להתנחלויות וכן לשאת באחריות לתשתיות ובלבד שלא יצטרכו להשאיר סמכויות כלשהן בידי ישראל.

במהלך המו"מ דרשו הפלסטינים כי בכל נייר שבו ידובר על העברת סמכויות יאמר כי **כל** הסמכויות תועברנה (ALL).

ג. **סירוב לנוכחות ישראלית -**

במהלך המו"מ התבטאו הפלסטינים מספר פעמים כי לא יוכלו לסבול נוכחות צה"ל או משטרה ישראלית בשטחי האוטונומיה לדוגמא:

1) דרישת ישראל לפטרולים משותפים על צירים בדרך להתנחלויות נענתה בהסכמה ובתנאי שהחיילים הישראליים יסעו ברכב של המשטרה הפלסטינית.

2) הסירוב לאפשר אחזקת תשתיות וכבישים ע"י ישראל נומק ע"י הפלסטינים בין היתר בכך שלא יוכלו לסבול תנועת ישראלים מלווים בכוחות צבא או משטרה בתחומי האוטונומיה.

ד. **עקרון ההדדיות -**

במקרים בהם דרשה ישראל מעורבות בסמכות הפלסטינית כגון: זכויות וטו על החלטות פלסטיניות או מתן הרשאות לישראל בתחומי האוטונומיה, העלו הפלסטינים דרישה להדדיות **כמקובל בין מדינות** לדוגמא:

1) בעניין הרשאת קוי אוטובוסים להתנחלויות (קוים שיעברו דרך צירי האוטונומיה) דרשה ישראל להשאיר את סמכות רישוי קוים אלה לעצמה. הפלסטינים התנגדו ולחילופין אמרו כי יסכימו לכך אם ישראל תאפשר הדדיות - דהיינו מתן סמכות לפלסטינים לרישוי קוים שלהם שיובילו נוסעים לתוך ישראל.

2) בעניין שמירה על סטטוס של "שמורות טבע". ישראל ביקשה התחייבות פלסטינית כי לא ישונה סטטוס של שמורות טבע ללא תיאום מראש עם ישראל. הפלסטינים התנגדו ולחילופין דרשו שאם ישראל תשנה מעמד של שמורות טבע בסמוך לגבולות האוטונומיה שתדאג לתאם זאת עם ה-P.N.A.

3) בנושא חינוך ביקשה ישראל כי בספרי הלימוד יקפידו הפלסטינים שלא לכלול הסתה ותעמולה נגד ישראל. הפלסטינים התנו כתיבת סעיף כזה, בהסכם עמם, בהדדיות דהיינו - שגם ישראל תתחייב להוציא מספרי הלימוד שלה הסתה ותעמולה נגד הפלסטינים.

ה. **חוסר נכונות לשת"פ -**

במהלך המו"מ התנגדו הפלסטינים להתחייב לשיתוף פעולה או תיאום במרבית העניינים (למעט עניינים חיוניים להם) מתוך רצון לשמור על עצמאות מלאה בנושא הסמכויות המועברות אליהם, לדוגמא:

1) בנושא העברת סמכויות קמ"ט סטטיסטיקה התנגדו הפלסטינים לכך שייכתב בהסכם כי שיטות לשיתוף פעולה בנושא העברת נתונים שונים ידונו בתת-ועדה, בטענה כי שיתוף הפעולה הוא עניין כללי שאין צורך לציינו במפורש (ואכן בנוסח הסופי הושמט נושא שיתוף הפעולה).

2) בעניין העברת סמכויות שילוט (סמכויות בתחום התחבורה) התנגדו הפלסטינים לשיתוף פעולה עם ישראל בהצבת שילוט בדרכים להתנחלויות למרות ששילוט זה אמור להיות בעברית.

3) בתחום הבריאות סירבו הפלסטינים לציין במפורש כי יתקיים תיאום בעניין המלחמה במגפות ומחלות מדבקות ומניעתן והסכימו רק כי ידובר על העברת מידע בנושאים אלה.

ו. **נושאי חוץ ובטחון -**

במהלך המו"מ בקשו הפלסטינים לכרסם בקביעת הסכם העקרונות, לפיה לרשות הפלסטינית לא תהיה סמכות בתחום הבטחון ובתחום יחסי החוץ. מגמות כאלה באו לידי ביטוי הן באמירות מפורשות של ראשי המשלחת הפלסטינית למו"מ האזרחי והן בנסיון לדרוש סמכויות שמהן משתמעת מעורבות הרשות הפלסטינית בקיום יחסי חוץ עצמאיים. לחלק מהדרישות לסימני ריבונות כפי שנמנו לעיל, יש משמעויות בתחום הבטחון ובתחום יחסי החוץ. להלן מספר דוגמאות למגמה זו:

1) אחד הנושאים המרכזיים השנויים במחלוקת בין ישראל לפלסטינים הינו נושא השליטה במעברים הבינ"ל. לנושא זה משמעויות הן בתחום הבטחון (שכן מדובר בגבולות בין ישראל למצרים ובין ישראל לירדן) והן בתחום יחסי החוץ (שכן מדובר במעברים בינ"ל לכל דבר ושליטה בהם היא סימן ברור לריבונות וליכולת החלטה של "הרשות הפלסטינית" ביחס ליוצאים ולנכנסים אליה).

2) פרשנות הפלסטינים ביחס ל"משטרה חזקה" ודרישותיהם הכוללות כאמור גם מסוקים, כלי שיט, שריוניות, מקלעים כבדים, וכן רצונם לארגן חלק מכוחות המשטרה במסגרות גדודיות, מצביעים בעליל על רצון פלסטיני לקיים גרעין של צבא שמטבעו הינו סימן מובהק לטיפול בבטחון חוץ ולא רק פנים.

3) בהקשר זה של בטחון חוץ התבטאו חברי משלחת פלסטינית, כי על פי פרשנותם את הסכם העקרונות, סמכות ישראל בנושא בטחון חוץ מוגבלת למקרה של תוקפנות או מלחמה מצד גורם חיצוני כנגד ישראל ותחומי האוטונומיה, ואולם בעת שלום סמכות כזו אינה צריכה כלל לבוא לידי ביטוי.

מדיניות ההסברה של אש"פ

9. עם חתימת הסכם העקרונות, נקטו ערפאת ומנהיגים בכירים באש"פ "חוץ" ו"פנים" במדיניות הסברה שנועדה להכשיר את דעת הקהל הפלסטינית בשטחים ובפזורה, ואת דעת הקהל בישראל ובעולם, לכך שאש"פ רואה בהסדר הביניים צעד מכין לקראת הקמת המדינה הפלסטינית שבירתה ירושלים.

10. סוגיית ירושלים וסוגיות מרכזיות ובעייתיות אחרות, כמו המעברים וההתנחלויות, שהיו אמורות לעלות רק במו"מ על הסדר הקבע, הועלו באופן מודגש בהצהרות אנשי אש"פ, במגמה להעלותן על סדר היום במו"מ עם ישראל כבר בשלב זה. לצד כל אלו נמשך השימוש בסגנון מליטנטי וקשה ע"י מנהיגים באש"פ, בהתייחסויותיהם לאנתפאדה ועתידה. לא נעשה כל מאמץ ראוי לשמו, להכשיר את דעת הקהל הפלסטינית בעניין הצורך לבנות אמון ומערכת יחסים חדשה בין העמים.

להלן יובאו דוגמאות למדיניות ההסברה הפלסטינית בנושא יעדי המו"מ, סוגיית ירושלים וההתייחסות לטירור ואלימות.

11. **מדינה עצמאית** -

א. אישים פלסטינים בכירים (אבו מאזן ואבו עלאא'), שהיו שותפים לניסוח הסכם אוסלו, אמרו ערב פתיחת שיחות טאבה (מחצית אוק' 93'), כי ההסכם כשלעצמו אינו מבטיח את מימוש יעדיהם העיקריים של הפלסטינים, לרבות כינונה של מדינה עצמאית, וכי השגת יעדים אלה תהיה תלויה במידה רבה במידת הצלחתם לקיים את המימשל העצמי. ואולם, דברים אלו "נבלעו" במסך הכבד של הצהרות והבטחות של ערפאת ופעילי פת"ח מרכזיים אודות ההכנות להקמת המדינה הפלסטינית. הללו הסבירו בראיונות אין ספור כי הסכם העקרונות מהווה בסיס למדינה פלסטינית.

ב. סמוך לחתימה על הסכם העקרונות אמר ערפאת כי הפלסטינים מתכוונים לבנות ש"ת ולהתיר כניסת פלסטינים השבים עם אשרות כניסה כמו **למדינה עצמאית**.

ג. כרוז פת"ח שהופץ בשכם ב-11 ספט' קרא לציבור להפוך את ה-13 ספט' ליום חג לאומי בו יונפו דגלים לציון הולדתה של **המדינה הפלסטינית**. הכרוז הסביר כי "הרובה הפלסטיני היה אמצעי ולא מטרה, וכעת יש להניחו ולהתפנות לבניית מדינה".

ד. במסמך הסברה רשמי של הפת"ח ממחצית אוק' 93 (פרסום כרוז פת"ח מספר 19, פונקצית "אלשואון אלפכריה ואלדראסאת") נאמר:

"אש"פ על מוסדותיו - המל"פ, המועצה המרכזית והועד הפועל - ימשיכו למלא את תפקידם עד למימוש תוכניתם הלאומית שהיא סיום הכיבוש, מימוש זכות השיבה, מימוש ההגדרה העצמית והקמת מדינה פלסטינית שבירתה ירושלים".

ה. בתום הדיונים של המועצה המהפכנית של פת"ח (14 נוב') פורסמה הודעה הקוראת להקמת חברה פלסטינית, כבסיס **למדינה** שתושתת על דמוקרטיה, שוויון, כלכלה חופשית, צדק, חופש והפרדת רשויות.

ו. בדיוני טאבה הגישו הפלסטינאים את נייר העמדה שלהם לגבי הרכב וסמכויות "הרשות הלאומית הפלסטינית", בו דרשו עבורה סמכויות חקיקה, שיפוט וביצוע.

ז. בימים אלו הסתיים ניסוח טיוטת החוקה הפלסטינית, שהוכנה לאחרונה ע"י קבוצת משפטנים פלסטיניים בראשותו של חבר הועד הפועל של אש"פ ג'מאל צוראני. לדברי צוראני החוקה אינה מיועדת לאוטונומיה אלא **למדינה הפלסטינית**. הדגיש, כי למדינה זו אין גבולות ואש"פ הוא מקור הסמכות של חוקה זו. החוקה מאזכרת בחירות לנשיאות המדינה לשתי קדנציות בנות חמש שנים כל אחת. טיוטת החוקה מגדירה את שלוש רשויות השלטון: המחוקקת, המבצעת והשופטת, שהן בלתי תלויות ואינן נשלטות ע"י הנשיא. עפ"י החוקה, המועצה המחוקקת תכהן בקדנציה של ארבע שנים. יישום החוקה יחל מיד לאחר הבחירות ביולי 94', עפ"י דברי צוראני.

12. **סוגיית ירושלים -**

א. למרות שבהסכם העקרונות נקבע, שסוגיית ירושלים תידון במו"מ על הסדר הקבע, הוטל על פייצל חוסייני במחצית ספט' 93, סמוך לחתימה על הסכם העקרונות, לטפל במעמד מזרח ירושלים לאלתר, "כדי למנוע אובדן זכויות הפלסטינים בעיר". ב-21 נוב' מסר פייצל חוסייני לעתונות כי בקרוב יוכרז רשמית על הקמתה של "ועדת ירושלים", גוף בראשותו שיהיה מעין "עירית צללים" וירכז את הטיפול בנושאים הקשורים בחיזוק ערביותה של ירושלים.

ב. בהרצאה שנשא פייצל חוסייני בירושלים ב-8 דצמ', אמר, כי ירושלים תהפוך לבירת פלסטין רק ע"י קביעת עובדות בשטח באמצעות המוסדות שבשליטת הפלסטינים. הוא הצהיר שיש להפוך את "האוריינט האוס" לבית הממשלה הפלסטינית או לנציגות שלה.

ג. בדצמ' 93 התפרסם מידע בדבר כוונה להעביר את מקום מושבה של "התאחדות הסטודנטים הפלסטינית" מתוניס לירושלים, כדי לאחד את הפעילות הסטודנטיאלית ב"פנים" וב"חוץ". נמסר, כי יוזמה זו היא חלק מהמגמה להדגיש את ערביותה של מזרח ירושלים.

13. **טרור ואלימות -**

א. למעט הצהרה בודדת מצד ערפאת (בספט' 93) על מחוייבות אש"פ לחיים נורמליים ולדחיית האלימות והטרור, והגינויים הכפויים והמאולצים לרצח חיים מזרחי ז"ל ע"י חוליית פת"ח, ממשיכים פעילי הפת"ח ב"חוץ" וב"פנים" לנקוט בסגנון מליטנטי ונוקשה. בהצהרות, במסמכי הסברה ובכרוזים מטעמו, ניכרת מגמת אש"פ לשמר את רעיון "המאבק באוייב הציוני" כחלק מהמאבק הכולל לצד המאבק המדיני. בכירי אש"פ שבים ומצהירים כי האלימות והאנתפאדה ימשכו כל עוד צה"ל לא נסוג וכל עוד המשטרה הפלסטינית לא תפסה את מקומה. עמדה זו, יש לציין, קרובה לעמדת החמא"ס לפיה הפיגועים והאנתפאדה ימשכו בכל מקום בו עדיין שוהים חיילי צה"ל ומתנחלים. לאחרונה אף הצהיר יאסר עבד רבה כי יכולתו של אש"פ לשמור על הבטחון באזור מותנית בכך שהמתנחלים יתפרקו מנשקם.

ב. במסמך הסברה של הפת"ח (ממחצית אוק' 93') מוגדרת ישראל בכינוי המסורתי "האויב הציוני" וכלולה בו קריאה מפורשת לאי סתימת הגולל על אופציית המאבק ושימוש בה כקרדום לחפור בו למען קידום האינטרסים הפלסטינים במו"מ. כמו-כן, כלולה במסמך קריאה לשימור תפקודה הפעיל של ההנהגה הלאומית המאוחדת של האנתפאדה עד להשגת מטרותיה, שהן סיום הכיבוש והשגת העצמאות הלאומית.

ג. כרוז פת"ח שהופץ ב-1 דצמ' 93' ברמאללה, בעקבות הריגתם של אחמד אבו אלריש ופריד אבו טיר מניצי הפת"ח בעזה, קורא להמשך האנתפאדה. הכרוז פונה "לגיבורי האבן והבקת"ב" וקורא להם "ללמד את רבין את לקח האנתפאדה מחדש ולשוב ולהבעיר את אש האנתפאדה ואת רוח המהפכה והמרי ולהפוך אותם ללהבה שתבעיר את הכובש ותאלץ אותו לסגת". הכרוז קורא לנקום את הריגתם של ניצי הפת"ח ולהכנס לשנה שביעית של אנתפאדה "בכוח ובכישרון". בהמשך מוזכרת אופציית המאבק המזויין כאופצייה קיימת עד להשגת שלום אמת: "ידנו המושטת לשלום לעולם לא תניח את האבן או הנשק אלא אם יושג שלום אמיתי המבוסס על עצמאותנו, שיבתנו, הגדרתנו העצמית וירושלים בירתנו. בדרך לשלום נדבק בכל התחיבויותינו, אולם יש גבול לכך ולהבלגתנו ועל ממשלת רבין וכל המפלגות הציוניות לדעת זאת".

ד. כרוז שהופץ ב-6 דצמ' 93 מאשים את צה"ל במעורבות בפעולות טרור נגד תושבים מקומיים, ומזהיר כי הפת"ח יגיב במאבק לוחמני ומאורגן כ"הגנה עצמית" אם תמשך מדיניות "יד הברזל" מצד ממשלת ישראל, צה"ל והמתנחלים.

סכום ומשמעויות

14. הסכם העקרונות נתון לפרשנות הסובייקטיבית של כל אחד מהצדדים. כיום ברור, שהבנת הפלסטינים ופרשנותם להסכם, שונות ומרוחקות מאד מהבנת הצד הישראלי ופרשנותו. נראה, כי הפלסטינים נאותו להסכים להצהרת העקרונות משום שניסוחה הותיר מרחב פרשנות כזה, העשוי להוביל אותם לאוטונומיה מורחבת המתקרבת למדינה ("מדינה בדרך"), כשלב מעבר לקראת מימושה של עצמאות מדינית. על רקע זה יש להבין את הציפיות האדירות ומרקיעות השחקים של הפלסטינים מרגע החתימה על הסכם אוסלו. במידה והמו"מ "יתפוצץ" - הדבר יגרום להתפרצות המונית וחסרת-תקדים בשטח, שתשקף את התנפצות הציפיות.

15. ההערכות הישראליות המוקדמות שתהיה גישה ותנועה חופשית לצה"ל ואזרחים ישראלים בתחומי המנהל העצמי מוטלות בספק. היום ברור, בהתאם להסכמים המתגבשים, כי כל שטח שימסר לידי הפלסטינים ישאר בשליטתם וצה"ל לא יוכל להכנס לערים ולריכוזי האוכלוסיה, ללא תיאום עם הרשות הפלסטינית גם אם יתרחש פיגוע נגד יהודים במקומות אלה. תנועה חופשית של ישראלים בשטחים תתאפשר להלכה אך כנראה לא תיתכן באופן מעשי, למעט בצירים שיקבעו. מה שהובן ע"י מנסחי ההסכם בצד הישראלי, כאילו לרשות המנהל העצמי הפלסטיני לא תהיה כל סמכות לגבי ישראלים (לרבות אזרחים, חיילים, מתיישבים, מבקרים) בכל מקום ביריחו ובאזח"ע - צפוי ליישום באופן שונה.

16. ההערכה שאין סיכוי להקמת מדינה פלסטינית הולכת ומופרכת לאחר שבוחנים את מגמות הפלסטינים והישגיהם במו"מ עד כה. כך הם פני הדברים גם לגבי נושא הסמכות השיורית. ההערכה כי סמכויות שלא יסוכם לגביהן במו"מ ישארו בידי ישראל משום שמקור הסמכות נותר המפקד הצבאי באיו"ש, שוב אינה עומדת במבחן המציאות. במו"מ לגבי עזה ויריחו נקבע תקדים לפיו הרשות הפלסטינית תקבל את כל הסמכויות שלא יוסכם לגביהם במפורש כי ישארו בידי ישראל. המשמעות כאילו סמכויות מועברות מהמפקד הצבאי ל"קמ"טים ערביים" שיבואו במקום הישראלים, היתה אמורה להמחיש את המשך כפיפותם למפקד הצבאי, אך בפועל הדבר לא יהיה כך. גם ההנחה כי תחום הישובים הישראלים יקבע על ידינו ויכלול גם אדמות מדינה המיועדות לפיתוח, ולא יהיה נושא למו"מ בשלב הנוכחי - ספק אם תעמוד במבחן המו"מ.

17. כתוצאה ממצב עניינים זה במו"מ ומדיניות ההסברה שנקטת ע"י אש"פ, הולך ומתהווה מצב מדיני בלתי נוח מבחינת ישראל, שיש בו משום פגיעה באינטרסים חיוניים וביכולת התמרון המדינית בהווה ובעתיד, שבאופיו הוא גם בלתי הפיך.

18. מתרחש תהליך ברור של קעקוע מכוון ושיטתי מצד הפלסטינים לעמדת ישראל הקובעת שבשלב זה מדובר בביצוע יישום "עזה ויריחו תחילה" כהקדמה להסדרי-ביניים. הסדרי הביניים כפי ששמם מעיד על-כך, אינם אמורים להכתיב או להשפיע מראש על תוצאותיו של המו"מ האמור להתקבל בעתיד ועל אופיו של ההסדר הסופי, שידון בנפרד בין הצדדים. עמדתה המוצהרת של ישראל היא התנגדות למדינה פלסטינאית עצמאית, ובכוונתה להותיר את האופציות האפשריות, לרבות האופציה הירדנית, פתוחות. הפלסטינים, לעומת זאת, דבקים בדרישה **שתקופת המעבר תהיה שלב מקדים לקראת הגדרה עצמית מלאה, קרי הקמת מדינה עצמאית.** על-כן הם עומדים על-כך, שתקופת המעבר תהיה השלב הראשון ביישום החלטת מועהב"ט 242 ו-338, ושכבר בשלב זה תוסר רבונות ישראל על השטח, וכי למועצה שתנהל את השטח בתקופה זו (P.N.A) יהיו סמכויות נרחבות, כולל בתחום החקיקה, השיפוט והביצוע. **באופן זה מצטמצמות באופן ברור האופציות המדיניות להסדר הקבע.**

19. עמדות הפלסטינים אינן מפתיעות. מאז ומתמיד הם ראו באוטונומיה אמצעי מסוכן העלול להעניק לגיטימאציה להנצחת השליטה הישראלית במקום שיביא לסיומה. אי-לכך, אין הם מתייחסים לאוטונומיה כאופציה המצדיקה ויתורים מדיניים כלשהם מצידם. רוב הפלסטינים התנגדו לרעיון האוטונומיה כאשר זו הוצעה במסגרת קמפ-דויד. אש"פ דחה את הרעיון בהתמדה וזכה לתמיכה בעמדתו זו מצד כל מדינות ערב, למעט מצרים. בעקבות הכרזת העצמאות של המועצה הלאומית הפלסטינית (המל"פ) בנובמבר 1988, פחתו עוד יותר הסיכויים שהפלסטינים יסכימו לאוטונומיה כלשהי, זולת אוטונומיה מורחבת המתקרבת לרבונות, ואף זאת כשלב מעבר בלבד, לקראת מימושה של עצמאות מדינית המובטחת מראש. הסכם העקרונות של אוסלו בניסוחו המעורפל, איפשר לפלסטינים לראות בו בסיס מתאים למימוש מעשי של אוטונומיה מורחבת כזו, כשלב מעבר למדינה. בפועל, הישגיהם במו"מ עד כה מוכיחים שגישתם נכונה ומשרתת את יעדיהם.

20. הנה כי כן, בידי הפלסטינים הולכים ומצטברים "נכסים מדיניים" כתוצאה מהתהליך המדיני עד כה, המובילים אותם בבטחה לקראת מימוש יעדם העליון: הקמת מדינה פלסטינית עצמאית.

21. המשפט הבינלאומי הפומבי קובע ארבעה תנאי יסוד הכרחיים לקיומה של מדינה עצמאית. בחינת ארבעת התנאים אל מול הישגי הפלסטינים עד כה מוכיח שהם מתקדמים לקראת מילוי תנאים אלו. ארבעת התנאים הם:

א. **עצמאות (INDEPENDENCE)** - זהו התנאי החשוב ביותר והכוונה היא לעצמאות משלטון זר, שמובנה רבונות במשפט הבינלאומי הפומבי. למדינה עצמאית הזכות לכך שלא תהיה התערבות של מדינה זרה בענייניה, ומבחינה מעשית קיומה של ממשלה עצמאית היא אמת-מבחן לעצמאות המדינה (ראה להלן).

ב. **ממשלה (GOVERNMENT)** - קיומה של ממשלה עצמאית ואפקטיבית (ללא קשר לצורת הממשל) המסוגלת להטיל מרותה ולנהל את ענייניה כלפי פנים וכלפי חוץ בצורה עצמאית, מבלי לקבל תכתיבים של מדינה אחרת.

ג. **טריטוריה (TERRITORY)** - הממשלה העצמאית אמורה להפעיל את שלטונה בטריטוריה מוגדרת ואין זה משנה מהו גודלה של טריטוריה זו. הטריטוריה אינה חייבת להיות רצופה, וחלקים שונים ממנה עשויים להמצא במרחק רב זה מזה, כשביניהם מפרידים ימים או שטחים של מדינות אחרות. יתר על כן, אין הכרח שלמדינה תהיה בעלות על הטריטוריה ותתכן, למשל, חזקה של מדינה על טריטוריה הנובעת מחכירה של חלק מן הטריטוריה של מדינה אחרת.

ד. **אומה (NATION)** - האומה מורכבת מאזרחים האמורים לסור למרותה של הממשלה. הזיקה בין המדינה לבין כל אחד מבני האומה מכונה בשם "אזרחות" - NATIONALITY. גודל האומה אינו משנה בהקשר זה ויכולות להתקיים מיני מדינות עם טריטוריה ואומה קטנים מאוד.

22. הקמת ה"רשות הפלסטינית הלאומית" (P.N.A) לצורך ניהול עצמי וההסכמים השונים בתחום האזרחי, הבטחוני והכלכלי, מתבצעים עם הצד הפלסטיני ללא זיקה לירדן. הפלסטינים רואים ב-P.N.A **ממשלה** שעתידה להטיל מרותה על האוכלוסיה הפלסטינית בשטחים, ולנהל את ענייניה כלפי פנים בצורה **עצמאית**, וללא תלות בירדן או בישראל. הם מצהירים שהועד הפועל של אש"פ יהיה מקור הסמכות של ממשלה זו ולא הממשל הצבאי הישראלי, למרות שעפ"י ה-D.O.P ישראל היא מקור הסמכות בשטח. במו"מ ביקשו הפלסטינים שישראל תעביר לידי **אש"פ** את הסמכויות ואז אש"פ יקים באופן חד צדדי את ה- P.N.A, שתנהל את עזה ויריחו בתקופת הביניים. משמעות הדבר היא, שמקור הסמכות יימצא בידי אש"פ ולא בידי ישראל.

23. הצהרת העקרונות קובעת, כי לרשות הפלסטינית בעזה וביריחו לא יהיו יחסי חוץ. ואולם, בכוונת הפלסטינים לנהל את ענייני החוץ שלהם באופן זמני ע"י מוסדות אש"פ "חוץ". בהקשר זה מאלפת במיוחד התבטאותו של ג'מיל טריפי, יו"ר הועדה האזרחית מטעם הצד הפלסטיני, בעת ויכוח על קידומת בינ"ל נפרדת לרשות הפלסטינית. במעמד זה הוסבר לו כי קידומת בינ"ל נפרדת היא מסימניה של ריבונות מדינית וכי יש במתן קידומת כזו משום הענקת סמכות ליחסי חוץ לרשות הפלסטינית בניגוד לאמור בהסכם העקרונות. טריפי אמר בתגובה כי: **ישראל הכירה באש"פ ואש"פ הינו גוף מוכר ודרכו בכל מקרה יש לפלסטינים יחסי חוץ והכרה בינ"ל** ולכן אינו מבין מדוע לא תוכל הרשות הפלסטינית לקבל את מבוקשה בתחום זה.
צריך עוד להזכיר בהקשר זה, שהפלסטינים ביקשו כי ל- P.N.A בעזה וביריחו יהיו סמכויות בתחום יחסי החוץ, בנושאי תרבות וכלכלה. היענות ישראלית תוביל, להערכתנו, ליצירת תקדים בסוגיה זו.

24. להערכתנו, הערתו זו של טריפי מלמדת על הדרך בה מתכוונים הפלסטינים לנהל את יחסי החוץ של הרשות הפלסטינית, שכן לאש"פ תשתית נרחבת של שגרירויות, נציגויות דיפלומטיות במדינות רבות בעולם וסביר כי הללו תהפוכנה (אם לא להלכה, לפחות למעשה) לנציגויות של הרשות הפלסטינית שתקום תחילה בעזה ויריחו ומאוחר יותר בכלל יש"ע.

25. בהיבט **הטריטוריאלי**, אומנם מקור הסמכות ישאר בידי הממשל הצבאי ושאלת הגבולות נותרה לדיון בהסדר הקבע, אך בפועל הרבונות הישראלית תהיה רק להלכה והפלסטינים יהנו **משליטה למעשה** בשטח. יתר על כן, נסיגת צה"ל וההיערכות מחדש מחד, וגבולות הסמכות של הרשות הפלסטינית הצפויה באזור, מאידך, יהוו תקדים לגבי שרטוט קו הגבול המדיני בעתיד.

26. עפ"י דברי היועץ המשפטי של משרד החוץ, י. זינגר ("הארץ", 14 דצמ'), הרי "הכרזת אש"פ על כינון מדינה פלסטינית בשטחים תהווה הפרה מוחלטת של הסכם העקרונות בין ישראל לאש"פ ותביא לקריסת ההסכם כולו". ואולם, סביר להניח שבשלב ראשון יפעל ערפאת להמשך הנחת היסודות למדינה פלסטינית, גם ללא הכרזה מפורשת על כינונה, על מנת שלא ליתן עילה בידי ישראל לדרוש ביטול ההסכם. יתר על כן, עפ"י המשפט הבינ"ל הפומבי קיומה של מדינה כיישות משפטית בינ"ל אינו תלוי בהכרה מצד מדינות אחרות. מדינה חדשה יכולה לקום כאשר היא ממלאת אחר ארבעת תנאי היסוד שהוזכרו לעיל (ראה נספח).

27. בהקשר זה חשוב להזכיר את העובדה שאש"פ פועל במדיניות ההסברה שלו להכשרת דעת הקהל הפלסטינית לקראת הקמת מדינה עצמאית שבירתה ירושלים. אש"פ לא יוכל לסגת מהמחויבות שהוא יוצר בדעת קהל וכל שיבוש של מהלך זה מצד ישראל צפוי לגרום להתפרצות מחודשת, שבה ישתפו פעולה כל הזרמים לרבות הפת"ח.

28. בעניין אופן העברת הסמכויות מידי המנהא"ז לצד הפלסטיני קיימות בעיות קשות. המו"מ על העברת הסמכויות טרם הושלם וקיים חשש שבסופו של דבר ייחתם הסכם בלתי גמור שיכלול את תחומי הביטחון והמשטרה בלבד. הסכם כזה ישמיט מידי ישראל אמצעי חשוב להפעלת לחץ על הצד הפלסטיני להגיע להסכמים בנושאים חשובים וקיים חשש ברור לפגיעה באינטרסים ביטחוניים וכלכליים של ישראל. המנהא"ז יתקשה מאד לתת שירותים לאוכלוסיה באזורים מהם ייסוג צה"ל, בסמכויות שנותרו בידיו, והדבר יהווה מנוף מדרבן להעביר את הסמכויות לצד הפלסטיני. ברור, כי ההסכמים שיושגו בעניין עזה ויריחו, ואופן יישומם יהיו בבחינת תקדים לגבי איו"ש והסכם הביניים בכלל, ומכאן החשיבות במתן תשומת לב מירבית לכל תג בהסכמי עזה ויריחו תחילה.

<u>המלצות להמשך המו"מ</u>

29. כיום מתאפיין ניהול המו"מ בצד הישראלי במרכיבים בעלי השלכה שלילית על יעילות ניהול המו"מ מצד ישראל:

א. גורמים רבים מאוד שותפים למו"מ ולניהולו (צה"ל, שב"כ, משטרה, תפ"ש, מנהא"ז, משרדי ממשלה). גורמים אלו הכינו ניירות עבודה למו"מ מתוך שיקולים מקצועיים, ולעיתים קרובות מתוך ראייה של שלום אזורי בעתיד הרחוק, ללא התייחסות להשלכות ומשמעויות מדיניות, בטחוניות ואחרות, הקשורות לחיי היום יום בתנאים של העדר שלום ואמון בין שתי האוכלוסיות הישראלית הפלסטינית.

ב. העדר "קווים אדומים" ברורים, שיגזרו מיעדים מדיניים של ישראל בהתייחס להסדר הקבע, ויהוו תורה מנחה ומדריכה לכל הצוותים במו"מ. עד כה לא ידועים יעדיה המדיניים של ישראל (מדינה פלסטינית, אופציה ירדנית, קונפדרציה עם ירדן, וכו').

ג. העדר גוף בקרה מקצועי ומיומן למעקב אחר ההתפתחויות במו"מ, לאיתור סחף וכרסום שלא מדעת בעמדות הישראליות ופגיעה באינטרסים חיוניים, ומתן התרעה על כך לדרג המדיני ולמנהלי המו"מ.

30. המצב באש"פ, יש לומר, שונה במידה רבה ממצבנו המתואר לעיל:

א. המו"מ מתנהל ע"י מספר מצומצם של מנהלים ומרוכז ומכוון כולו ע"י ערפאת (אין בעיות תיאום, "עקיפה" וכו', ועל כן מבחינת ערפאת אין צורך בגוף בקרה כלשהוא, כדרישת מתנגדיו).

ב. היעדים המדיניים של אש"פ ברורים מאד (אוטונומיה מורחבת כשלב מעבר למדינה עצמאית) ומנחים את הצוותים הפלסטינים במו"מ עם ישראל. על כן לא נדרשו להם ניירות עמדה: הם דורשים לקבל את כל הסמכויות בכל תחום, תוך דרישה לניתוק מוחלט ככל הניתן מישראל.

31. מצב עניינים זה מעניק יתרונות רבים לערפאת המושך בחוטי המו"מ, ומקדמו לעבר השגת יעדיו המדיניים הברורים. בעיני הצד הישראלי התפרש הדבר כאילו הערכותם של הפלסטינים למו"מ היא בלתי מספקת וגובלת בשלומיאליות חסרת אחריות מבחינתם. ישראל לעומת זאת, על-אף עבודת הכנה יסודית ומאורגנת, מתקשה לאכוף את תנאיה ונוטה להתפשר ולקבל את דרישות הפלסטינים בהעדר "קוים אדומים" ברורים, כדי לאפשר התקדמות המו"מ ועמידה בלו"ז. אין ספק כי הדבר נעשה במחיר סיכון האינטרסים הישראליים.

32. תיקון המצב מחייב איפוא:

א. הגדרה מחדש של האינטרסים הישראלים בתחום הבטחוני, האזרחי והכלכלי, כולל קביעת "קווים אדומים" בכל תחום.

ב. הבטחת העברה נכונה ומסודרת של הסמכויות האזרחיות, שמשמעותה אי חתימה על הסכם כל עוד לא סיימה הועדה האזרחית את דיוניה עד לפרטים הקטנים.

ג. להגדיר לוח זמנים חדש ומעשי יותר להסכם בתיאום עם הפלסטינים ובהסכמתם (יוזכר למשל שהלו"ז המתוכנן להכנת הבחירות ביולי 94 אינו מעשי).

ד. הגברת התיאום בין הגורמים המנהלים את המו"מ והקמת גוף בקרה מרכזי.

ה. הערכות לאפשרות של קריסת המו"מ (ראה בהמשך).

33. ברמה **הטקטית** של ניהול המו"מ נוקט ערפאת בטקטיקה המקובלת אצלו, של יצירת מצבי משבר באופן חוזר ונשנה כדי לקדם את מטרותיו. מבחינת הצד הישראלי - הדבר אינו צריך להיות מרתיע ואינו מחייב "התקפלות" וכניעה. שתי שנות המו"מ המדיני עם הפלסטינים, לפני הסכם אוסלו ואחריו, המחישו באופן ברור את הדומיננטיות של ערפאת בניהול המו"מ: הוא קובע מדיניות והוא מקבל החלטות גורליות וקשות לבדו. הנסיון מוכיח, שלצד עמדות פתיחה נוקשות ובלתי מתפשרות ולצד ניהול מו"מ בטקטיקה של התמקחות בבזאר מזרחי והליכה על הסף, עד ליצירת משברים דרמטיים והשמעת איומים - ערפאת הוכיח את עצמו כריאליסט ומתפשר בשעה שנוכח לדעת כי אינו יכול להשיג את כל מבוקשו.

34. יש להניח, איפוא, כי התעקשות ישראלית במו"מ על עניינים שהם עקרוניים וחיוניים מבחינת האינטרסים הבטחוניים, האזרחים והכלכליים שלה, תוביל לפשרה מצד ערפאת, גם אם הדבר יבוא לאחר "מאבק" ארוך ומתיש ומצבים הנראים כמסכנים ממש את המשך התהליך המדיני. יש להדגיש עם זאת, שפשרה מצד ערפאת תוכל להתרחש בתנאי שכבודו האישי לא יפגע בעקבותיה ומנהיגותו לא תתערער, ובתנאי שהפשרה לא תסגור בפניו את האופציה ליעד הסופי ולא תוצג כויתור על עמדות יסוד. יצוין עוד בהקשר זה, כי יש ביכולתו של ערפאת להציג כל פשרה מצידו כנצחון בעיני עצמו ובעיני הפלסטינים.

35. **המסקנה המתבקשת מדברים אלו היא, שישראל יכולה וצריכה לנהל את המו"מ בכל אחת משלוש הועדות באופן מפורט, יסודי ושלם, ללא פשרות על עמדות חיוניות וללא השארת קצוות פתוחים.**
חתימה על הסכמים נוספים ברמה של עקרונות ובאופן חסר, תותיר בידי הפלסטינים את היתרונות שהם נהנים מהם במו"מ עד כה ותקדם אותם למטרותיהם על חשבונה של ישראל, ותיצור תחושה שלילית של חולשה וכניעה מצד ישראל. יודגש עוד בהקשר זה, שחשיבות הירידה לפרטים בכל נושא ועניין, עולה מאד לאור התחושה הקשה המצטיירת אצלנו לגבי כוונות הצד השני ולאור הקושי המסתמן לגבי יכולת האכיפה והפיקוח שלנו על ישום פרטי ההסכם הלכה למעשה בצד הפלסטיני.

<u>הערכות לאפשרות של קריסת המו"מ</u>

36. למרות ההערכה שערפאת הינו ריאליסט ויידע להתפשר במו"מ עם ישראל, הרי אין להוציא מכלל אפשרות קריסת המו"מ ועצירת התהליך בשלב כל שהוא. הדבר יתכן באחד משני המקרים הבאים:

א. אם ערפאת יתמרן את עצמו במו"מ למצב של התחפרות, באופן שאינו יכול לחזור בו מעמדות מוצהרות והתחייבויות שנתן לעמו, והוא נסחף אחר רגשותיו מעבר לחישוב פוליטי קר.

ב. רצח ערפאת או נטרולו המוחלט ע"י קואליציה של מקורביו ומתנגדיו.

37. כמו כן ברור שיתכנו סיבות לעצירת התהליך מצד ישראל:

א. כאשר ישראל יוזמת את עצירת התהליך לאור ההתפתחויות השליליות בו עד כה מבחינתה (הגעה לקצה יכולת הויתורים וסכנה לאינטרסים חיוניים).

ב. כאשר ממשלת ישראל נקלעת לקשיים מבית (התפוררות הקואליציה, דעת קהל שלילית בעקבות טירור גובר וכו').

38. התרחישים לעצירת התהליך המדיני מהצד הפלסטיני עשוים לקרות בכל נקודת זמן: כעת, לפני החתימה על הסכם עזה ויריחו תחילה, או בהמשך בעת ישום שלב זה, או מיד לאחר הישום. כך או כך יש להתכונן לאפשרות שאש"פ אינו מצליח לאכוף מנהיגות וחדל לשמש כ"פרטנר" לישראל ליישום הסכם העקרונות.

39. להערכתנו, במקרה שערפאת יוביל את המו"מ ל"פיצוץ", יתארגן ה"פנים" ויגלה רצון עז להמשיך את המו"מ בעצמו, וכבר נשמעים קולות בכוון זה מפי אישים ב"פנים" המזוהים עם הפת"ח. לעומת זאת, רצח ערפאת או נטרולו וסילוקו מהבמה, יצור חלל מנהיגותי, שכן ערפאת לא טיפח לידו יורשים ואין ספק שמיד יתפתחו מאבקי כח קשים על ההנהגה, בין הדור הצעיר האינטלקטואלי לבין דור ההנהגה הותיק באש"פ, ב"חוץ" וב"פנים".

40. במקרה של מצב משברי, כולל רצח ערפאת, ברור שגורמי האופוזיציה יעשו מאמץ עליון לקעקע את ההסכם בכל דרך אפשרית וביחוד תוך שימוש בדרך הטרור הצבאית ואולי אפילו הפעלת טרור אישי פנים-פלסטיני שלא הופעל עד כה.

41. במקרה זה תיתכנה שתי אופציות להכרעת המאבק:

א. מאבקי כוח קשים שניתן יהיה להכריעם רק במערכת בחירות מהירה בהשתתפות אש"פ "חוץ".

ב. עליית הנהגה מקומית חזקה על בסיס שילוב בין אישים שהשתתפו במשלחת הפלסטינית לשכבה צעירה יותר מקרב הועדות הפוליטיות.

42. להערכתנו, הסבירות הגבוהה יותר היא שההכרעה על ההנהגה תושג במערכת בחירות למועצת מעבר זמנית שתעלה הנהגה חזקה, נבחרת ובעלת מצע מדיני ברור, שתהיה "הפרטנר" להמשך המו"מ מול ישראל ולישום הסדרי הביניים. מבחינת האינטרס הישראלי, זו עשויה להיות התפתחות חיובית ביותר, שכן בפעם הראשונה תקום **הנהגה נבחרת ומוכרת** שתייצג את העם הפלסטיני, וכל הסכם עימה יהיה מחייב ובעל תוקף.

נספח

מתוך ספרו של פרופ' יורם דינשטין, המדינה והמשפט הבינ"ל

התנאי של **עצמאות** (לקיומה של מדינה) הוא החשוב ביותר, מכיוון שהרבה יחידות מדיניות בתחומי מדינות ממלאות בעצם אחר תנאי-היסוד האחרים. אבל רק מדינות ממלאות אחר כל ארבעת תנאי-היסוד גם יחד. רק במדינה - ולא ביחידה מדינית אחרת - הממשלה, אשר מפעילה את השלטון בטריטוריה, ואשר האומה סרה באופן כללי למרותה, הינה עצמאית משלטון זר.

מדינה קמה - כתוצאה ממילוי ארבעת תנאי-היסוד - גם כאשר תקומה זאת מנוגדת להכרזות ולהחלטות, והיא נובעת ממרד כנגד מדינה קיימת. המשפט הבינלאומי אינו אוסר על מרד כזה, ומכיר בתוצאותיו אם המרד מצליח.

משמתמלאים תנאים אלה, ניתן לדבר על קיומה של מדינה כאישיות משפטית או תאגיד בינלאומי. ברם, מאחר שמדובר באישיות משפטית - ולא באישיות פיזית - מתעוררת נשאלה מי קובע אם תנאים אלה התמלאו. לא קיים בחברה הבינלאומית ארגון מרכזי, המוסמך לקבוע זאת, והכלל במשפט הבינלאומי הוא, שכל מדינה קיימת רשאית להעניק או שלא להעניק "הכרה (RECOGNITION)" לקיומה של מדינה חדשה. יש לציין, כי שאלת ההכרה מתעוררת במשפט הבינלאומי לא רק לגבי מדינות (וממשלות), אלא גם לגבי "מדינה בדרך".

קיומה של המדינה כישות משפטית בינלאומית אינו תלוי בהכרה מצד מדינות אחרות. המשפט הבינלאומי אינו מחייב להכיר במדינה חדשה אשר ממלאה אחר ארבעת תנאי יסוד. המדינה החדשה קמה על פי אמת-מבחן אובייקטיבית, כאשר היא ממלאת אחר ארבעת תנאי-היסוד, ואילו בהכרה הסובייקטיבית יש רק משום הטבעת אישור רשמי על מצב הקיים ממילא, במגמה להסיר ספקות אפשריים. במילים אחרות, להכרה אופי דקלרטיבי גרידא. מדינות הרוצות להטמין ראשיהן בחול (כמו, למשל, מדינות ערב) יכולות להתעלם מקיומה של מדינה אחרת (כגון מדינת ישראל). אך התעלמות מעובדות - פיזיות או משפטיות - אינה גורעת מאמיתותן.

אשר לצורת ההכרה, הריהי יכולה להינתן באורח אינדיבידואלי (על ידי מדינה אחת) או קולקטיבי (בועידה בינלאומית, למשל); במפורש (על ידי הצהרה המדברת בעד עצמה) או מכללא (על ידי פעולה ממנה משתמעת הכוונה להכיר).

שאלת ההכרה מכללא הנה לעתים שנוייה במחלוקת, אך בדרך-כלל מוסכם כי ניתן להסיק אותה במקרים הבאים:

א. כריתת הסכם בינלאומי דו-צדדי, כמו אמנת סחר וידידות בין שתי המדינות.

ב. כינון יחסים דיפלומטיים בין שתי המדינות.

ג. מתן EXEQUATUR (לאמור, אישור המינוי) לקונסול של המדינה החדשה במדינה הוותיקה.

נהוג בפרקטיקה להבחין בין הכרה DE FACTO לבין הכרה JURE DE. הכרה דה-פאקטו ניתנת לרוב בשלב מוקדם ובאופן זמני, שעה שהמדינה המכירה עדיין אינה משוכנעת כי המדינה החדשה אמנם תמשיך להתקיים לאורך ימים כמדינה עצמאית. הכרה דה-יורה, כנגד זה, ניתנת בשלב מתקדם יותר, כשהמדינה המכירה יוצאת מהנחה כי קיומה של המדינה החדשה מהווה עובדה מוגמרת. אך למעשה אין להבחנה זו שום נפקות משפטית, ואין הבדל בין התוצאות העולות מהכרה דה-פאקטו או דה-יורה על פי המשפט הבינלאומי (גם לא מבחינת קשירת הקשרים הדיפלומטיים).

- ס ו ף -

813752
Yair Hirschfeld
RAMAT YISHAI, 30095
P.O.B. 596

December 1, 1993

Dear Stanley,

I would like to sum up the main conclusions of our last meeting of November 28, 1993:

1. The Clinton-Administration faces today a historic challenge of great magnitude: to create peace and stability for the Middle East. The key factor in this endeavour will be to convince President Assad of Syria to take the road to peace.

2. Following your talks in Damascus it is our view that a four stage approach should be adopted:

   a) The First Stage: Confidence Building
   in this stage you should lead an American-Syrian dialogue (fully coordinated with us) in preparation of a Clinton-Assad meeting.

   b) The Second Stage: Policy Planning
   in this stage a simultaneous and confidential US-Syrian and US-Israeli dialogue related to the preparation of a Clinton-Plan for a Syrian-Israeli Peace will be held.

   c) The Third Stage: Consensus Finding
   a confidential US-Syrian-Israeli dialogue will be held (preferentially in the USA):

   d) The Fourth Stage: Breakthrough
   after a US-Syrian-Israeli confidential agreement: Announcement and implementation of the Clinton-Plan leading to the signing of an Israeli-Syrian Peace Agreement.

3. You should present the above outlined Four-Stage Approach as your own concept and discuss it with Clinton and with Hillary and elaborate on the political and historical benefits of this approach for a major role of Clinton, indicating that progress between Israel and Syria, achieved under Clinton's leadership, will stabilize the Israeli-Palestinian agreement, will enable King Husayn to sign and implement an Israeli-Jordanian peace agreement and will lead the way to the signing of an Israeli-Lebanese Treaty of Peace.

   It may be useful to explain to Clinton and Hillary that the proposed Four-Stage Approach emerged in your talks in Damascus and Jerusalem.

4. For the First Stage of Confidence Building the following measures should be envisaged:

a) In preparation of a Clinton-Assad meeting, Assad will be asked to agree to the three following conditions:
   i. Assad will announce the need to put an end to terror activities in Lebanon.

   ii. Assad will be asked to make public his private statement to you, namely that in return for full Israeli withdrawal Syria will establish full diplomatic and trade relations with Israel and a programme of normalization of relations in all spheres of life will be implemented;

   iii. Assad will be asked to agree confidentially to agree to the proposed Four Stage Approach (which should be presented to him as an American concession to him).

b) Following the Clinton-Assad meeting the Lebanese and Syrian armies will take practical and effective measures to disarm the Hizbollah in Lebanon;
in return the American Government will say publicly that Syria is playing a constructive role in Lebanon.

5. It is important that you will be personally instrumental in preparing the Clinton-Assad meeting.

6. I am planning to go to the USA on December 16, and could meet you on December 17, either in New York or in Washington. In case we shall obtain clearing herefore a private meeting with you and Hillary may be useful.

Best regards

Yair Hirschfeld

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT WORKING GROUP
8-9 NOVEMBER 1993, COPENHAGEN

PRESS RELEASE

This was the fourth meeting of the Regional Economic Development Working Group. The discussions focussed on cooperation perspectives for the Middle East region and on development activities in specific sectors. 46 delegations, comprising regional and extra-regional parties, took part in the talks.

The discussions were constructive friendly and forward-looking. The group recognised that the time had come to begin to transform ideas put forward at previous meetings into concrete initiatives to reflect the new context marked by the signature of the Israeli/PLO Declaration of Principles on 13 September.

The group drew up an Action Plan covering the following sectors:

- Communications and transport;
- Energy;
- Tourism;
- Agriculture;
- Financial markets and investment;
- Trade;
- Training;
- Networks;
- Bibliography.

A wide range of prefeasibility studies, workshops and missions are planned for 1994, including:

- a prefeasibility study of a road linking Aqaba, Eilat and Egypt;
- an engineering study for a road linking Amman, Jericho and Jerusalem;
- a study on electricity grid interconnection;
- a conference on financial markets;
- a series of initiatives on training, including an "Educating Workforce 2000 - Symposium on education";
- a study on regional cooperation in trade of goods and services.
- common projects involving the media, universities and municipalities.

Emphasis was laid on private sector involvement to stimulate investment. In order to facilitate the quick implementation of the Action Plan, the European Community has allocated 8 MECUs ($9.2 million) for project preparation, workshops and technical assistance.

The Copenhagen Action Plan prepared by the group is attached.

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ANNEX

REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT WORKING GROUP

COPENHAGEN ACTION PLAN, NOVEMBER 1993

Sponsor	Subject	Venue/Date
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSPORT		
1. France/EC	Workshop of transport officials from the region	1st half 94
2. EC	Regional workshops on technical problems of transport and communications	1994
3. EC	Engineering study, road from Amman to Jericho to Jerusalem	1/94 onwards
4. EC	Prefeasibility study, road from Aqaba-Eilat to Egypt	1/94 onwards
5. EC	Workshop of civil aviation officials	mid 94
ENERGY		
6. EC/Austria	Study of electricity grid interconnection	6/94
7. EC/Austria	Workshop on electricity interconnection planning	9/94
8. EC	Review of existing studies of hydro-electrical power plant on the Dead Sea-Red Sea and Mediterranean	2nd qtr 94
9. Italy	Prefeasibility study of Egypt/ Gaza pipeline	1994
TOURISM		
10. Japan	Workshop on regional tourism, including provision of Japanese small and medium enterprise policy experience	Cairo, 2/94
11. EC/US	Workshop of European and American tour operators and regional tour officials in conjunction with above	Cairo, 2/94

12. Switzerland	Regional training in hotel management and tourism in association with the private sector	1994
AGRICULTURE		
13. Spain	Study on agricultural development in the region (food self-sufficiency and regional trade)	2nd qtr 94
14. EC	Mission to identify areas of veterinary medicine networks in animal health and livestock improvement, joint vaccination	end 93
15. EC	Project-oriented workshop of senior veterinary officials	2nd qtr 94
FINANCIAL MARKETS AND INVESTMENT		
16. UK	Conference on financial markets	London, 4/94
17. UK	Study on greater cooperation among stockmarkets	
18. EC	Workshop on the business, legal and regulatory environment for the private sector	2nd qtr 94
19. EC/ Switzerland	European and regional business conference to promote joint ventures	Region, end 94
TRADE		
20. Germany	Study on regional cooperation in trade of goods and services	1/94
21. Germany	Follow-up study to above	94
22. EC/ Switzerland	Workshop on the administrative simplification of the movement of goods	1st qtr 94
TRAINING		
23. US	Regional business development round table	US, 1/94
24. US	"Educating Workforce 2000: a regional symposium on education"	US, 6/94
25. US	Regional seminar on animal health in the Middle East	Region, 4/94
26. US	Regional workshop on water management systems in conjunction with the Water Working Group	US, Spring 94

27.	Germany	Study of vocational education and technical training in the Region	1994
28.	India	Prefeasibility study for a technical centre in Gaza and Jericho to create trainers for the region	1994
29.	Germany	Workshop based on results of above study	2nd half 94
30.	World Bank	Network of regional training institutes organised by EDI	1994
NETWORKS			
31.	EC	Workshop on EC and regional cooperation amongst municipalities	Cairo, 12/93
32.	EC	Workshop on EC and regional cooperation amongst universities	Cairo, 12/93
33.	EC	Workshop on EC and regional cooperation amongst media	1994
BIBLIOGRAPHY			
34.	Canada	Updated review of the literature on economic cooperation in the Middle East	2nd qtr 94
35.	Canada	Possible inter-sessional activity based on above	1994

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

PRESS RELEASE

The European Community has agreed to make available with immediate effect 8 million ECUs (US$ 9.20 million) for feasibility and engineering studies, seminars and workshops, and technical assistance in order to help the process of regional cooperation in the Middle East.

Studies will be undertaken by the EC to prepare bankable projects, particularly for economic infrastructure.

Most important among these will be:

- Study on electricity grid interconnection;
- Engineering study for a road linking Amman-Jericho-Jerusalem;
- Prefeasibility study of road linking Aqaba-Eilat-Egypt;
- Workshop on the administrative simplification of the trans-border movement of goods.

Projects identified by these studies could be co-financed from funds available in the framework of the the Community's Mediterranean policy. 1.4 billion ECUs (1.6 billion $) of long-term loans are presently available in this context.

This announcement during the meeting of the Regional Economic Development Working Group reflects the Community's efforts to move to more concrete activity in line with the Commission's communication on "Future Relations and Cooperation between the Community and the Middle East".

The Commission's communication said that peace will be sustainable in the Middle East if the peace agreements, once concluded, are followed by a long-term cooperation process, building among the regional parties habits of cooperation and promoting the gradual creation of institutional arrangements. This process could lead them along a path such as Europe followed in the 1950s starting with the Coal and Steel Community.

The Community's programme forms a substantial part of the Copenhagen Action Plan which was drawn up by the Working Group.

MEETING OF THE REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT WORKING GROUP
8-9 NOVEMBER 1993, COPENHAGEN

CONCLUSIONS ESTABLISHED UNDER THE CHAIR'S AUTHORITY

The fourth meeting of the Regional Economic Development Working Group took place in Copenhagen on 8-9 November 1993. The delegations participated actively and constructively in the discussions.

The group welcomed the historic turning point marked by signature of the Israeli-PLO Declaration of Principles and the agreement reached between Israel and Jordan on an agenda for negotiations. They constitute a breakthrough on the way to a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the region and give new impetus to the multilateral framework. The bilateral and multilateral tracks should continue to be mutually reinforcing.

Participants recognised that the time had come to accelerate the work of the group. They welcomed the efforts made to start the process of transforming the ideas put forward at previous meetings into concrete initiatives.

The group agreed that Syria and Lebanon have an important part to play in the work of the group and can benefit from it. It hoped therefore that they would very soon decide to participate. Meanwhile, the Chair will undertake to keep them closely informed of progress.

1. Regional cooperation perspectives

There was a broad convergence of views on regional cooperation perspectives. The group stressed that no party or parties in the region should be disadvantaged by cooperation. A gradual approach was needed to build up confidence, backed up by a long-term vision of what the regional parties themselves wished to achieve. Existing regional institutions and facilities should be used where appropriate to support these efforts. External public financing would be needed to help overcome problems and private sector involvement is critical to stimulate investment. The removal of regulatory and other constraints on the flow of economic resources in the region was recognised as an urgent priority. Dialogue among regional and extra regional parties to that end was essential. The US will facilitate an informal study group of regional parties to discuss these issues.

2. Cooperation in specific sectors

The group heard reports on:

- Communications and transport (France)

The French delegation presented the group with a summary of its Transport Sector Review, covering a wide range of sub-sectors. It contains a series of useful proposals for the inter-linking

of the national transport systems (hardware) and for regulatory improvements (software).

The French delegation will convene a workshop of transport officials from the region to identify future priorities.

- Energy (EC)

The EC and Austria reported initiatives to examine the regional interconnection of electricity grids which will be followed up by a workshop on interconnection planning. The EC also suggested that the studies of a hydro-electrical power plant on the Dead Sea-Red Sea and Mediterranean be thoroughly re-examined prior to the next meeting, taking all aspects into consideration.

Italy offered to undertake a prefeasibility study of an Egypt-Gaza gas pipeline.

- Tourism (Japan)

The Japanese delegation presented the state of play on its work on tourism. They stressed the benefits of developing regional tourism and fostering regional cooperation in such areas as software, infrastructure, local handicraft industries and regulations.

The group welcomed the Japanese proposal to organise a workshop in Egypt in February 1994 to promote regional cooperation (government and private sector) in these areas. The EC and US proposed to hold a seminar of their tour operators, in conjunction with the Japanese initiative, with the aim of promoting tourism to the region in the future.

Switzerland expressed willingness to provide training in hotel management and tourism.

- Agriculture (Spain)

The Spanish delegation reported the results of two expert missions to the region, focussing on agriculture in arid areas, agricultural training and food processing. A study will be submitted to the next meeting of the group identifying possibilities for agricultural development in the region. It will pay particular attention to food self-sufficiency and regional trade.

The European Commission will target veterinary issues. A mission will proceed before the end of this year to identify areas of veterinary medicine, animal health and livestock improvement for collaborative networks and projects for joint vaccination and other disease control systems. Project preparation will include a workshop of senior veterinary officials to finalise proposals.

- Financial markets and investment (UK)

The UK will host a conference on financial markets in London in April 1994 and undertake a study of the potential for greater cooperation among stock markets in the region. Other areas

identified for further work are:- the development of the banking sector in the OTs; reviews of banking legislation and accounting standards; the tax treatment of income on capital; obstacles to financial integration posed by exchange controls; financial mechanisms for facilitating trade; and the role of regional financial institutions.

- Trade (Germany)

The German delegation gave a brief status report on its study concerning the contribution of regional cooperation in trade of goods and services. It expected to complete this report by January 1994. The EC proposed to organise a workshop on the administrative simplification of the movement of goods.

- Training (US)

The US delegation provided a progress report on its training initiative, describing two completed activities (public administration training for Palestinians and a regional agriculture seminar) and four new planned regional activities, namely a business development round table, a symposium on education, a seminar on animal health and a workshop on water management systems. Several other delegations, including India, Germany, Canada, Ireland, the UK, the UN, and the World Bank described their respective training activities and intentions.

- Networks (EC)

The EC reported progress on the establishment of urban and university cooperation networks bringing together institutions in Egypt, Jordan, Israel and the Occupied Territories. These two networks will be launched in a conference in Cairo in December 1993. Other networks for media cooperation are in preparation.

- Institutions, sectors and principles (Egypt)

The Egyptian delegation expressed its belief that the institutional framework for regional economic cooperation is a topic for reflection and discussion. The inclusion of Syria and Lebanon would make a positive contribution to this discussion. An in-depth discussion on this issue would be useful.

- Bibliography (Canada)

The Canadian delegation reported that work is proceeding on an updated version of the Review of the Literature on Economic Cooperation and Integration in the Middle East. The updated bibliography is expected to be available for distribution at the next meeting. It may also serve as a basis for inter-sessional activity.

cOoOo

The group welcomed the significant progress made since its last meeting in Rome and supported the follow-up action indicated. It was further suggested that the work done so far should contribute to further action, both by the private and public sector.

Attached herewith is a list of the group's Action Plan. In order to facilitate the quick implementation of the Action Plan, the EC has set aside 8 mecus ($9.2 million) in 1994 for project preparation, workshops and technical assistance.

3. Recent developments in the Occupied Territories

The Palestinian delegation made an introductory presentation on the opportunities provided by the new context and also identified some of the concomitant concerns. The group heard a report from the Norwegian FAFO Institute on economic data on living conditions in the Occupied Territories.

Norway (in its capacity as chair) gave a report on the outcome of the first Ad Hoc Liaison Committee meeting in Paris on 5 November.

The group took formal receipt of the report commissioned by it from the World Bank on the economy of the Occupied Territories and heard of the World Bank's progress in identifying an action programme for early implementation. The group commended the excellent contribution made by the World Bank to its work.

4. Future work of the group

The group welcomed the action-oriented focus developing in its work. It noted that clear guidance was needed from the regional parties themselves on their priorities and interests before technical work began. An evaluation of prospects for the mobilisation of the capital required to invest in projects was also needed quickly, taking account of existing regional institutions and facilities and private sector resources. The idea of a World Bank Trust Fund was mentioned. The governments of the region should be given adequate time to consider the results of the various studies undertaken before these were presented formally to the working group.

The Chair noted the expressed need for coordination and transparency of all activities undertaken in the context of regional cooperation. At this juncture the REDWG sessions provide the best forum for that purpose and the agenda of future meetings will be duly adapted to take this into consideration, including through a progress report from the Chair on inter-sessional activity.

5. Arrangements for the next meeting

The group will recommend to the Steering Group that its next meeting be held in the first/second quarter of 1994. The group took note of the offers of Germany and Morocco to host the meeting. A decision will be taken by the Steering Group. The co-sponsors indicated that they would continue to promote regional venues.

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REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT WORKING GROUP

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34. Canada	Updated review of the literature on economic cooperation in the Middle East	2nd qtr 94
35. Canada	Possible inter-sessional activity based on above	1994

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Palestinian Elections

Results of a Public Opinion Poll # 2
(November 1993)

The Center for Palestine Research and Studies (**CPRS**) has, so far, conducted two public opinion polls on the proposed Palestinian elections. The results of the first poll were released on the 20th of October, 1993, and were published in local and international newspapers. The response to the first poll was overwhelmingly positive.

Therefore, **CPRS** has decided to continue an ongoing research project on Palestinian elections. A public opinion poll on the topic will be conducted each month until the proposed elections' date (the 13th of July as mentioned in the Palestinian - Israeli Declaration of Principles).

These are the results of the second public opinion poll that has been conducted in the West Bank and Gaza on the 11th of November, 1993. A random sample of **1855** Palestinians, over the age of 18, were interviewed. The sample was distributed according to population size. Effort was made to represent all residential areas (i.e., city, town, village and refugee camp). Age and sex were also considered.

The interviews were conducted on a face-to-face basis in West Bank major towns (Jerusalem, Hebron, Bethlehem, Ramallah, Nablus, Jericho, Tulkarm, Qalqilya and Jenin). In Gaza, interviews were conducted in the following areas: Al-Shati', Khan Yunis, Rafah (town and refugee camp), Al-Breig refugee camp, Beit Lahia village, Al-Zaytoun, Al-Shuja'iyah, Al-Rimal, Qararah village and Jabalya village.

Fifty four well-trained field workers were instructed to visit areas that attract all of the society's groups and strata. These areas included, among others, bus/car stations that lead to villages and refugee camps, main markets, city centers, hospital entrances, ..etc.

1171 questionnaire were received from the West Bank, and **684** were received from Gaza. The margin of error for this study is plus or minus 1%, with a confidence level of 99%.

For further information, please contact **Dr. Nader Sa'id** at the Center for Palestine Research and Studies. **Tel.# 380383 - Tel. & Fax # 380384.**

Methodology

CPRS researchers are constantly trying to refine and improve the validity of the research methodology and the reliability of the collected data. For these purposes, the sample size was raised from 1259 to 1855. This has resulted in a higher confidence level and a lower margin of error.

Moreover, more female data collectors were hired to ensure the representation of women in the sample. They were instructed to visit public institutions that attract women.

Furthermore, the majority of our data collectors participated in an intensive workshop where the goals of the poll were discussed. They were also lectured on survey methods, scientific research, field work, and sampling.

Data collectors worked in groups supervised by qualified researchers. CPRS researchers made random visits to interview stations and discussed the research process with data collectors. All interviews took place on the same day.

Limitations

A poll, such as this one, may have a number of limitations. Errors may have resulted as a consequence of surveying only a random sample, and not the complete population. Errors may also have resulted from non-response which is estimated at 10%. Women comprised the majority of non-respondents. Others refused to respond because they believed that their opinions were irrelevant and were not taken into account when making decisions. A number of non-respondents explained their position as a statement against Palestinian - Israeli agreements.

The reader must also be reminded that 23.5% of those who responded identified themselves as "independents" or "others". Some of them said that they "gave up" on Palestinian politics. Others have "negative" views of Palestinian - Israeli negotiations, but did not identify themselves as part of the opposition groups.

We must also note that one more choice was added to the original choices in question # 5 after the data analysis. This addition has resulted from the fact that 16.4% of the sample chose "others" as their answer. It was clear that a pattern was appearing; 10.8% (out of the 16.5%) specified their answer as "competence".

Sample Distribution

(Expressed as a % of the total sample)

Geographical Distribution

63%	West Bank "including Jerusalem"
37%	Gaza Strip

Area of Residence

46.5%	Town
30.3%	Villages
23.2%	Refugee Camps

Cont...Sample Distribution

Gender

60% males
40% females

Age

48.2% 18 - 28
31.2% 29 - 39
14.4% 40 - 50
6.2% Over than 50

Occupation

12.2% Laborers
7.4% Craftsmen
12.2% Housewives
29.8% Employees
5.5% Unemployed
11.4% Merchants
11.3% Students
1.8% Farmers
8.0% Specialists
0.4% Retired

Education

2.3% No education
20.8% Up to 9 years
29.2% 10-13 years
20.7% Two-year college
24.7% Bachelors
2.3% Masters & PHDs

Marital Status

35.0% Single
64.4% Married
0.6% Divorced & Widowed

Refugee Status

49% Refugee
51% Non-refugee

Place of Interview

8.7% Nablus
7.2% Jenin
6.8% Tulkarm
1.7% Jericho
8.9% Ramallah
5.7% Bethlehem
10.1% Jerusalem
10.8% Hebron
03.2% Qalqilia
19.1% Gaza/North
04.5% Gaza/Middle
13.3% Gaza/South

Remarks

The findings of this poll must be placed in their proper context. Our field workers have reported that there is still a great deal of ambiguity about the elections. There are also doubts about the possibility of an elections taking place, and about their "fairness". At the time of the poll, emotions were running high, as a result of the widespread violence and settlers' provocations in the area. People were also becoming impatient and frustrated with the "no-change" situation on the ground.

The findings of the present poll confirm many of the results obtained in the previous poll. The majority of Palestinians (73%) believe that the best means to choose the members of the Palestinian Interim Council is general elections. In this respect, we notice that there are differences between the West Bank and Gaza. More respondents, in the West Bank (18%) trust the PLO to appoint the members of the Interim Council, with 70.7% of them preferring general elections. In contrast, more Gazans (77%) call for general elections as the best means to choose the members of the Interim Council, and less of them (10.8) prefer appointment by the PLO.

Regarding participation in the elections, 72.9% of West Bankers and only 62.2% of Gazans declared that they will participate. The discrepancy between attitudes towards elections and

attitudes towards participation in Gaza could be explained by a higher percentage of respondents who support the opposition groups (in Gaza 33.1%; in the West Bank 29.6%). Some of these supporters express their opposition to the Palestinian - Israeli Agreement by insisting on an elections (a democratic means), while refusing to participate in an elections that has resulted from an agreement which they have rejected. We must remind the reader that our previous poll showed widespread doubts among Gazans about the fairness of the elections. 28.6% of them think that the elections will be fair, while 32.2% said that it will be unfair, and 39% said that it will be somewhat fair. In the West Bank 44.3% said that the elections will be fair, and 21.6% said that it will be unfair, and 35.9% said it will be somewhat fair.

As to the rights of the opposition under a Palestinian government, the majority of Palestinians (72.3%) said that the government must guarantee the right of the opposition groups to exist and to express themselves. Here, we notice that there is a gap between Gaza and the West Bank. 59.2% of Gazans said "yes" to the rights of the opposition, while 79.8% of West Bankers said "yes". This could be explained by the ironic fact that a higher percentage of opposition supporters "do not think that a Palestinian government must guarantee the rights of the opposition". This could be an expression of an opposition to the Palestinian - Israeli agreements and the ensuing arrangements (i.e., elections, government "assuming that it will be led by the present PLO leadership"). Opposition supporters may also be expressing their fear that government will not in fact guarantee the rights of the opposition.

To Palestinians, the most important factor that they will refer to when choosing the members of the Palestinian Interim Council, is the role of the candidate in national struggle (33.9%). This was the first choice of Fateh supporters, who comprised the largest single group in the sample (41.3%). Academic credentials (21.5%) and "competence" (10.8%) were also important factors. Some Palestinians considered religiosity (15.4%) as an important factor. It is surprising to find out that only 11.2% and 1.5% consider political affiliation and family allegiances as important factors.

The responses to the question on political systems show that the majority of Palestinians (58.1%) prefer a democratic system where all political groups are represented (73.7% if we add those who chose an Israeli parliamentary system). 18.7% chose an Islamic political system governed by one Islamic party. Fewer Palestinians chose a political system that is similar to "Arab governments".

When we compare the results of this poll with those of our previous polls, we notice that there is a small decline in the popularity of Fateh (45.6% on September 10, and 41.3% on November 11). At the same time, there is an increase in the popularity of the major opposition groups (Hamas, PFLP and DFLP) (refer to the enclosed chart). This may be due to the unstable situation in the Occupied Territories, and to "unfulfilled" political economic expectations after the signing of the "Declaration of Principles".

Finally, it is suggested that the results of this poll should be treated in broad terms so as to foster understanding of Palestinian views regarding elections and other important issues. The reader must also remember that the process of attitude - formation is an ongoing one. It is also important to note that there are gaps between "what people say" and "what people mean", and between "attitude" and "behavior".

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"Palestinian Elections II"

Results of a Public Opinion Poll
11 November, 1993

1. In your opinion, what is the best way to choose the members of the "Palestinian Council" of the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority?

	West Bank & Gaza	West Bank	Gaza
a) Appointment by PLO leadership	15.4%	18.0%	10.8%
b) Appointment by political groups	06.3%	06.7%	05.5%
c) Political elections	73.0%	70.7%	77.0%
d) Others	05.3%	04.6%	06.7%

2. Will you participate in the elections for the "Palestinian Council" of the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority?

a) Yes	69.0%	72.9%	62.2%
b) No	15..3%	11.3%	22.2%
c) Not sure	15.7%	15.8%	15.6%

3. If elections were to be held today, you will vote for candidates affiliated with:

a) Hamas	14.6%	12.8%	17.7%
b) PFLP	09.0%	06.8%	12.7%
c) Fateh	41.3%	40.6%	42.5%
d) Feda (Abed Rabo)	03.0%	03.9%	01.5%
e) DFLP (Hawatmeh)	02.3%	03.5%	00.3%
f) Hizb El-Sha'b	03.0%	04.3%	00.7%
g) Islamic Jihad	03.3%	03.8%	02.4%
h) Independents	09.3%	10.8%	06.9%
i) Others	14.2%	13.5%	15.3%

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Cont... Results

4. Do you believe that a Palestinian government, when established, must guarantee the right of the opposition groups to exist and to freely express themselves?.

a) Yes	72.3%	79.8%	59.2%
b) No	11.2%	08.4%	16.1%
c) Not sure	16.5%	11.8%	24.7%

5. When voting for candidates in the elections, the most important factor that I will take into consideration is:

a) Family allegiance	01.5%	01.7%	01.4%
b) Religiosity of candidate	15.4%	13.8%	18.3%
c) Academic credentials	21.5%	22.9%	18.9%
d) Role in national struggle	33.9%	35.8%	30.6%
e) Political affiliation	11.2%	09.9%	13.5%
f) "Competence"	10.8%	10.0%	12.3%
g) Others	05.7%	05.9%	05.0%

6. If a Palestinian State is to be established, I will choose a political system that is:

a) Democratic, where all political groups are represented.	58.1%	58.4%	57.7%
b) Islamic (one-party system)	18.7%	18.8%	18.5%
c) Presidential, similar to most Arab countries.	03.4%	03.7%	02.9%
d) Similar to the Israeli parliamentary system.	15.6%	15.3%	16.2%
e) Others	04.2%	03.8%	04.7%

Cross Tabulation Between Political Affiliation and the Questions of the Poll

1. In your opinion, the best way to choose the members of the "Palestinian Council" of the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority is:

	Appointment by PLO leadership	Appointment by political factions	General political elections	Others
1. Hamas	1.5%	09.2%	80.9%	08.4%
2. PFLP	3.1%	15.1%	71.7%	10.1%
3. Fateh	32.3%	03.3%	63.3%	01.1%
4. Fedah	21.8%	03.7%	74.5%	---
5. DFLP	---	14.2%	81.0%	04.8%
6. Hizb Al-Sha'b	03.7%	09.3%	87.0%	---
7. Islamic Jihad	03.4%	10.3%	84.5%	01.8%
8. Independents	03.7%	06.8%	86.4%	03.1%
9. Others	04.8%	03.2%	75.9%	16.1%

2. Will you participate in the General Elections to form a "Palestinian Council" for the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority?

	Yes	No	Not sure
1. Hamas	55.3%	25.4%	19.3%
2. PFLP	43.8%	34.6%	21.6%
3. Fateh	84.0%	05.1%	10.9%
4. Feda (Abed Rabo)	85.1%	01.9%	13.0%
5. DFLP (Hawatmeh)	74.4%	12.8%	12.8%
6. Hizb El-Sha'b	88.9%	05.6%	05.5%
7. Islamic Jihad	62.0%	12.1%	25.9%
8. Independents	63.5%	07.8%	28.7%
9. Others	51.6%	32.3%	16.1%

Cont... Cross Tabulation

3. Do you believe that a Palestinian government, when established, must guarantee the right of the opposition groups to exist and to freely express themselves?

	Yes	No	Not sure
1. Hamas	65.1%	15.2%	19.7%
2. PFLP	55.3%	30.4%	14.3%
3. Fateh	79.1%	07.3%	13.6%
4. Feda (Abed Raboh)	81.4%	05.6%	13.0%
5. DFLP (Hawatmeh)	85.7%	07.2%	07.1%
6. Hizb El-Sha'b	75.5%	09.4%	15.1%
7. Islamic Jihad	76.2%	10.2%	13.6%
8. Independents	67.6%	08.4%	24.0%
9. Others	66.9%	11.3%	21.8%

4. When voting for candidates in the elections, the most important factor that I will take into consideration is:

	Family allegiance	Religiosity of candidates	Academic credential	Role in national struggle	Political affiliation	competence	Others
1. Hamas	---	63.7%	08.6%	10.5%	07.4%	05.8%	04.0%
2. PFLP	01.3%	01.2%	17.8%	38.0%	29.4%	07.4%	04.9%
3. Fateh	02.6%	03.3%	27.1%	45.5%	11.9%	05.7%	03.9%
4. Feda	---	01.9%	29.6%	37.0%	13.0%	11.1%	07.4%
5. DFLP	02.4%	02.4%	23.8%	40.5%	23.8%	04.3%	02.8%
6. H.Sha'b	02.0%	02.0%	40.0%	26.0%	20.0%	06.0%	04.0%
7. I.Jihad	---	72.8%	03.4%	06.8%	10.2%	04.1%	02.7%
8. Indepen.	---	09.1%	26.2%	39.0%	02.5%	18.6%	04.6%
9. Others	02.0%	09.9%	16.2%	24.9%	04.3%	36.3%	06.4%

Cont... Cross Tabulation

5. If a Palestinian State is to be established, I will choose a political system that is:

	Democratic, where all political groups are represented.	Islamic, one-party system.	Presidential , similar to most Arab countries.	Similar to the Israeli Parliamentary system.	Others
1. Hamas	19.7%	71.0%	01.6%	07.6%	00.1%
2. PFLP	79.6%	00.6%	01.9%	15.4%	02.5%
3. Fateh	71.5%	04.8%	05.9%	16.6%	01.2%
4. Feda	65.4%	05.5%	---	29.1%	---
5. DFLP	71.4%	04.8%	---	19.0%	04.8%
6. H. Sha'b	66.6%	03.7%	---	27.8%	01.9%
7. I. Jihad	13.3%	78.3%	---	06.7%	01.7%
8. Independents	63.4%	09.6%	04.8%	18.0%	04.2%
9. Others	48.0%	18.7%	01.2%	17.9%	13.6%

המנהל האזרחי
אזור יהודה ושומרון
מחלקה לענייני ערבים
קשת צבעים 02281
22 נובמבר 1993

רמ"א
צח"א

הנדון: **לקראת הסכם בלתי גמור - משמעויות והמלצות**
(ישיבת צח"א, 21 נוב' 93)

תאור מצב

1. המו"מ הישראלי-פלסטיני ליישום הסכם העקרונות עשוי להסתיים ב- 13 דצמ' במצב בו תחומי הביטחון והמשטרה סוכמו ונחתם הסכם. בהסכם עשוי להיקבע שהמו"מ להעברת הסמכויות בתחום האזרחי יימשך עד למועד השלמת הנסיגה מעזה ויריחו באפר' 94.

שאלות לבחינה

2. א. המשמעויות והבעייתיות של הסכם בלתי גמור כזה מבחינת המשך ניהול המו"מ בכלל והמו"מ להעברת סמכויות בתחום האזרחי בפרט.

ב. הדפ"אות העומדות בפני הצד הישראלי לאור האפשרות להסכם בלתי גמור בתחום האזרחי.

אסטרטגיית ניהול המו"מ של הצד הפלסטיני

3. בחינה נכונה של משמעויות הסכם בלתי גמור והדפ"אות הקיימות מבחינת הצד הישראלי לאורו של הסכם כזה, מחייבת ניתוח מקדים של אסטרטגיית המו"מ של הצד הפלסטיני.

א. מהמו"מ שהתנהל עד כה, הולך ומתברר כי הפלסטינים מעוניינים מאד להתמקד בשלב זה בתחום **הבטחוני** בלבד, ולהימנע מעיסוק בתחומים האזרחיים. שאיפתם העליונה של הפלסטינים כיום היא להבטיח לעצמם את הסמכות להקמת הכוח המשטרתי, המהווה מבחינתם את הסממן המובהק ביותר של שלטון ושל יישות ריבונית.

בעניין זה נראה, כי הפלסטינים מנצלים היטב את העובדה שישראל מגלה עניין מובהק מצידה, למקד את המו"מ בתחום הבטחוני ולהציגו כנושא המוביל במו"מ, בעוד תחום הסמכויות האזרחיות נותר בצל, כבעל חשיבות משנית.

ב. הפלסטינים מעריכים, כי יוכלו "להסתדר" עם מנהל ציבורי התקין באופן חלקי בלבד, תוך בטחון כי יוכלו להמשיך ולהנות משירותים שינתנו ע"י ישראל (חשמל, שירותי אישפוז וכו') גם בהעדר הסכמים רשמיים.

בנקודה זו בולטת העובדה שערפאת למד להבין כי במגע ישיר שלו ושל אנשיו עם הדרג המדיני-המיניסטריאלי בישראל, יוכל להגיע להישגים משמעותיים גם בתחום השירותים, תוך "דילוג" על צוותי המו"מ, הנעדרים סמכות פוליטית.

ג. נראה, איפוא, כי דחיית העיסוק בסמכויות האזרחיות נוח מאד לערפאת, המבקש להותיר את ניהול המו"מ באופן ריכוזי בידיו. הוא אינו חפץ להפקיד סמכויות, המהוות מוקדי כוח, בידי אחרים מחשש לביזור סמכויות ואבדן שליטה. יתר על כן, ערפאת מעוניין לשמר את האופי המהפכני בעזה ויריחו כדי לבסס משם את מעמדו ולהמשיך את תהליך בניית המדינה הפלסטינית. להערכתנו, ערפאת חושש פן התהליך "יתקע" בשלב הביניים ויקלע לסטטוס-קוו. על כן, שאיפתו, כנראה, לדלג על שלב זה ולהגיע הישר להסכם הקבע.

ד. ביישום אסטרטגיה זו של מו"מ, מנצל ערפאת היטב את המצב הנתון של העדר מוכנות טכנית (מחסור במומחים מתאימים, העדר ניירות עבודה וכו') של הפלסטינים לקבלת הסמכויות, והוא מונע במתכוון מתן סמכויות החלטה לצוות הפלסטיני בתחום האזרחי. בכך הוא הופך מה שנראה כחולשה - לעמדת כוח המשרתת את מדיניותו.

<u>הנחות מוצא כלליות</u>

4. להלן הנחות מוצא שלאורן תיבחנה הדפ"אות:

א. האסטרטגיה הנוקטת ע"י הפלסטינים לדחיית העיסוק בנושא הסמכויות האזרחיות תימשך גם לאחר החתימה על הסכם בלתי גמור, וסביר להניח כי לא יחול בה כל שינוי מהותי.

ב. הסכם בלתי גמור ישמיט מידי ישראל אמצעי חשוב להפעלת לחץ על הצד הפלסטיני להגיע להסכמים בנושאים הכוללים אינטרס מובהק למדינת ישראל.

ג. מאידך, המנהא"ז יתקשה מאד לתת שירותים לאוכלוסיה באזורים מהם יסוג צה"ל, בסמכויות שנותרו בידיו, והדבר יהווה מנוף מדרבן להעביר את הסמכויות לצד הפלסטיני.

ד. לאור העובדה שנושאים הנדונים בועדה הכלכלית טרם סוכמו (והדיון בהם לא יסתיים על 13 דצמ' 93), יאלץ הצוות האזרחי להמתין לסיכומים אלה על מנת להשיג את האינטגרציה הדרושה עם הסכמי העברת הסמכויות. עד אז נושאים חשובים בתחום האזרחי ישארו פתוחים.

ה. המנהא"ז ישאף לבצע את העברת הסמכויות לידי הפלסטינים "בבת אחת", משום הזיקות הרבות הקיימות ביניהן, אך יצטרך להערך גם לאפשרות של העברה הדרגתית.

ו. ההסכמים שיושגו בעניין עזה ויריחו, ואופן ישומם - יהיו בבחינת תקדימים לגבי איו"ש והסכם הביניים בכלל, ומכאן החשיבות במתן תשומת לב לכל תג בהסכמי עזה ויריחו תחילה.

<u>משמעויות עיקריות</u>

5. להלן המשמעויות העיקריות של המצב הצפוי, לאור האפשרות שיחתם הסכם בלתי גמור ולאור מרכיבי האסטרטגיה הפלסטינית במו"מ:

א. עמדות המיקוח של ישראל בהמשך המו"מ הולכות ונחלשות.

ב. קיים חשש ברור לפגיעה באינטרסים בטחוניים וכלכליים של ישראל, לרבות פגיעה חמורה בנושאי איכות הסביבה.

ג. מוקד החיכוך בין השלטון הפלסטיני למנהא"ז צפוי לגדול מאד, עד כדי איום על ההסכם ושלמותו.

ד. האפקטיביות של השלטון הפלסטיני תהיה רעועה מאד ותביא לכרסום התמיכה הציבורית הפלסטינית בו.

<u>דפ"אות</u>

6. להלן פירוט הדפ"אות (עפ"י סדר עדיפות מומלץ):

דפ"א א' -

ישראל תתנה חתימה על הסכם ליישום הסכם העקרונות בהשלמת המו"מ להעברת כל הסמכויות האזרחיות.

יתרונות: תיושם עמדה טקטית חדשה, שתביא לשבירת "כללי המשחק" כפי שהתגבשו עד כה, ותקנה עוצמה מחודשת בעמדות המיקוח של הצד הישראלי. המשלחת הישראלית תתנה את "סגירת" ההסכם הבטחוני והקמת המשטרה הפלסטינית בסגירת הנושאים האזרחיים, והיא לא תראה עוד ב- 13 דצמ' תאריך מקודש. כמו"כ, תבטיח דפ"א זו העברה חלקה של השלטון והסמכות ברוח הסכם העקרונות.

הערה: דפ"א זו מחייבת פעולת הסברה ושכנוע מקדימה אצל הדרג המדיני.

חסרונות: עיכוב החתימה על הסכם לישום וסכנה לאובדן תמיכה ציבורית ובינל"א.

דפ"א ב' -

1) ימופו הסמכויות שיש להן ממשק לישראל וכוללות מרכיבים בעלי אינטרס ישראלי מובהק (במיוחד אלו שהם בעלי זיקות לתחום הבטחוני, הכלכלי ולתחום איכות הסביבה). סמכויות אלו יוגדרו כ"קוים אדומים" שיש לסיים את המו"מ בעניינן ולהכלילם בהסכם.

2) בהסכם הבלתי גמור תכלל רשימת העקרונות הכלליים שיחולו על העברת הסמכויות, הנוגעים לאי שימוש לרעה ע"י הפלסטינים בסמכויות המועברות אליהם, כפי שיסוכמו בין הצדדים (מסמך יועמ"ש 100/00 - 09351, 26 אוק' 93).

3) בהסכם יקבעו מבנה וסמכויות ה- P.A. כפי שיסוכמו בין הצדדים.

יתרונות: הבטחת השמירה על אינטרסים חיוניים של ישראל. בנוסף, סיכום מחייב לגבי העקרונות הכלליים ולגבי ה- P.A. יקדם, במידה רבה, את היעד של מניעת חלל שלטוני, באופן שסיכוייה של הרשות הפלסטינית החדשה להצליח יהיו גדולים יותר במצב שבו מוגדרים ומוסכמים סמכויותיה, תחומי אחריותה ומגבלותיה.

חסרונות: המשך ניהול המו"מ להעברת סמכויות לאחר ה- 13 דצמ' 93 יעשה מעמדת חולשה של הצד הישראלי, בהעדר "קלפים" משמעותיים למיקוח.

דפ"א ג' -

הצד הישראלי יניח לצד הפלסטיני להפעיל את הממשל העצמי שלו עפ"י ראות עיניו, גם בלא שתוסדר העברת הסמכויות האזרחיות באופן רשמי, תוך הבעת נכונות בסיסית לסייע בתחומים בהם יבקשו הפלסטינים.

יתרונות הדפ"א: הצד הישראלי "ישתחרר" מהגישה הפטרנליסטית שלו כלפי הפלסטינים ואילו הצד הפלסטיני ימצא עצמו נדחק לפינה ויאלץ ליזום פניה לשיתוף פעולה להסדרת עניינים משותפים.

חסרונות: סכנה להקמת מנהל ציבורי פלסטיני רופף ביותר ופגיעה באינטרסים ישראליים מובהקים.

<u>העברת הסמכויות</u>

7. המצב האידאלי הוא הקבלה בין העברת הסמכויות הבטחוניות להעברת הסמכויות האזרחיות, באופן שהמנהא"ז ממקם את עצמו בסמיכות לצבא, בהתאם לקצב הנסיגה וההיערכות מחדש. באופן זה אחריות המנהא"ז היתה מצטמצמת לתאי השטח שבשליטת הצבא, ומתן השרותים לאוכלוסיה היה מצטמצם לאותם תחומי סמכות שנותרו בידי המנהא"ז.

8. ואולם, יש קושי רב ביישום אופציה זו שיש לה חסרונות בהיבט חלוקת הסמכויות בין הצד הישראלי לפלסטיני. סביר מאד להניח שהקשר בין המנהא"ז לאוכלוסיה המקומית יתרופף ויקשה על המנהל להגיש שרותים לאוכלוסיה ולבצע את פעולות האכיפה השוטפות המתבצעות ביומיום בליווי צה"ל (הערה: למרות שנראה כי הבעיות הינן פחות אקוטיות ביריחו ויותר רלוונטיות לאזח"ע, הרי שאותן בעיות, במידה שונה של חומרה, תתעוררנה גם ביריחו).

9. מאידך, הרעיון של העברת סמכויות מדורגת (סיום המו"מ בסמכות מסויימת והעברתה לידי הפלסטינים), שהושמע באזני הח"מ ע"י ג'מיל טריפי, כרוך בקשיי יישום רבים מהטעם הפשוט שכמעט כל סמכות מקיימת זיקות רבות עם סמכויות נוספות אחרות (כך למשל, אין כל משמעות להעברת סמכויות כמו ביקורת או מנגנון בלי העברת סמכויות משרדים אחרים).

10. על כן, הדפ"א המועדפת מבחינת המנהא"ז (לפחות ביריחו) היא העברת סמכויות כוללת, בבת אחת, במקביל להשלמת הנסיגה. ואולם, אם נאלץ לבצע העברה מדורגת של סמכויות, יש הכרח להכין תכנית מאוזנת ומושכלת של העברת סמכויות, באופן שיתאפשר למנהא"ז לשמר יכולת להפעיל את הסמכויות שיותרו בידיו (מבחינה תקציבית, למשל), ולשמור על אינטרסים החיוניים למנהא"ז.

בברכה,

אפרים לביא, סא"ל

חבר צח"א

המנהל האזרחי
אזור יהודה ושומרון
מחלקה לענייני ערבים
קשת צבעים 02281
22 נובמבר 1993

רמ"א
צח"א

הנדון: **לקראת הסכם בלתי גמור - משמעויות והמלצות**
(ישיבת צח"א, 21 נוב' 93)

תאור מצב

1. המו"מ הישראלי-פלסטיני ליישום הסכם העקרונות עשוי להסתיים ב- 13 דצמ' במצב בו תחומי הביטחון והמשטרה סוכמו ונחתם הסכם. בהסכם עשוי להיקבע שהמו"מ להעברת הסמכויות בתחום האזרחי יימשך עד למועד השלמת הנסיגה מעזה ויריחו באפר' 94.

שאלות לבחינה

2. א. המשמעויות והבעייתיות של הסכם בלתי גמור כזה מבחינת המשך ניהול המו"מ בכלל והמו"מ להעברת סמכויות בתחום האזרחי בפרט.

ב. הדפ"אות העומדות בפני הצד הישראלי לאור האפשרות להסכם בלתי גמור בתחום האזרחי.

אסטרטגיית ניהול המו"מ של הצד הפלסטיני

3. בחינה נכונה של משמעויות הסכם בלתי גמור והדפ"אות הקיימות מבחינת הצד הישראלי לאורו של הסכם כזה, מחייבת ניתוח מקדים של אסטרטגיית המו"מ של הצד הפלסטיני.

א. מהמו"מ שהתנהל עד כה, הולך ומתברר כי הפלסטינים מעוניינים מאד להתמקד בשלב זה בתחום **הבטחוני** בלבד, ולהימנע מעיסוק בתחומים האזרחיים. שאיפתם העליונה של הפלסטינים כיום היא להבטיח לעצמם את הסמכות להקמת הכוח המשטרתי, המהווה מבחינתם את הסממן המובהק ביותר של שלטון ושל יישות ריבונית.

בעניין זה נראה, כי הפלסטינים מנצלים היטב את העובדה שישראל מגלה עניין מובהק מצידה, למקד את המו"מ בתחום הבטחוני ולהציגו כנושא המוביל במו"מ, בעוד תחום הסמכויות האזרחיות נותר בצל, כבעל חשיבות משנית.

ב. הפלסטינים מעריכים, כי יוכלו "להסתדר" עם מנהל ציבורי התקין באופן חלקי בלבד, תוך בטחון כי יוכלו להמשיך ולהנות משירותים שינתנו ע"י ישראל (חשמל, שירותי אישפוז וכו') גם בהעדר הסכמים רשמיים.

בנקודה זו בולטת העובדה שערפאת למד להבין כי במגע ישיר שלו ושל אנשיו עם הדרג המדיני-המיניסטריאלי בישראל, יוכל להגיע להישגים משמעותיים גם בתחום השירותים, תוך "דילוג" על צוותי המו"מ, הנעדרים סמכות פוליטית.

ג. נראה, איפוא, כי דחיית העיסוק בסמכויות האזרחיות נוח מאד לערפאת, המבקש להותיר את ניהול המו"מ באופן ריכוזי בידיו. הוא אינו חפץ להפקיד סמכויות, המהוות מוקדי כוח, בידי אחרים מחשש לביזור סמכויות ואבדן שליטה. יתר על כן, ערפאת מעוניין לשמר את האופי המהפכני בעזה ויריחו כדי לבסס משם את מעמדו ולהמשיך את תהליך בניית המדינה הפלסטינית. להערכתנו, ערפאת חושש פן התהליך "יתקע" בשלב הביניים ויקלע לסטטוס-קוו. על כן, שאיפתו, כנראה, לדלג על שלב זה ולהגיע הישר להסכם הקבע.

ד. ביישום אסטרטגיה זו של מו"מ, מנצל ערפאת היטב את המצב הנתון של העדר מוכנות טכנית (מחסור במומחים מתאימים, העדר ניירות עבודה וכו') של הפלסטינים לקבלת הסמכויות, והוא מונע במתכוון מתן סמכויות החלטה לצוות הפלסטיני בתחום האזרחי. בכך הוא הופך מה שנראה כחולשה - לעמדת כוח המשרתת את מדיניותו.

<u>הנחות מוצא כלליות</u>

4. להלן הנחות מוצא שלאורן תיבחנה הדפ"אות:

א. האסטרטגיה הנוקטת ע"י הפלסטינים לדחיית העיסוק בנושא הסמכויות האזרחיות תימשך גם לאחר החתימה על הסכם בלתי גמור, וסביר להניח כי לא יחול בה כל שינוי מהותי.

ב. הסכם בלתי גמור ישמיט מידי ישראל אמצעי חשוב להפעלת לחץ על הצד הפלסטיני להגיע להסכמים בנושאים הכוללים אינטרס מובהק למדינת ישראל.

ג. מאידך, המנהא"ז יתקשה מאד לתת שירותים לאוכלוסיה באזורים מהם יסוג צה"ל, בסמכויות שנותרו בידיו, והדבר יהווה מנוף מדרבן להעביר את הסמכויות לצד הפלסטיני.

ד. לאור העובדה שנושאים הנדונים בועדה הכלכלית טרם סוכמו (והדיון בהם לא יסתיים על 13 דצמ' 93), יאלץ הצוות האזרחי להמתין לסיכומים אלה על מנת להשיג את האינטגרציה הדרושה עם הסכמי העברת הסמכויות. עד אז נושאים חשובים בתחום האזרחי ישארו פתוחים.

ה. המנהא"ז ישאף לבצע את העברת הסמכויות לידי הפלסטינים "בבת אחת", משום הזיקות הרבות הקיימות ביניהן, אך יצטרך להערך גם לאפשרות של העברה הדרגתית.

ו. ההסכמים שיושגו בעניין עזה ויריחו, ואופן ישומם - יהיו בבחינת תקדימים לגבי איו"ש והסכם הביניים בכלל, ומכאן החשיבות במתן תשומת לב לכל תג בהסכמי עזה ויריחו תחילה.

<u>משמעויות עיקריות</u>

5. להלן המשמעויות העיקריות של המצב הצפוי, לאור האפשרות שיחתם הסכם בלתי גמור ולאור מרכיבי האסטרטגיה הפלסטינית במו"מ:

א. עמדות המיקוח של ישראל בהמשך המו"מ הולכות ונחלשות.

ב. קיים חשש ברור לפגיעה באינטרסים בטחוניים וכלכליים של ישראל, לרבות פגיעה חמורה בנושאי איכות הסביבה.

ג. מוקד החיכוך בין השלטון הפלסטיני למנהא"ז צפוי לגדול מאד, עד כדי איום על ההסכם ושלמותו.

ד. האפקטיביות של השלטון הפלסטיני תהיה רעועה מאד ותביא לכרסום התמיכה הציבורית הפלסטינית בו.

<u>דפ"אות</u>

6. להלן פירוט הדפ"אות (עפ"י סדר עדיפות מומלץ):

דפ"א א' -

ישראל תתנה חתימה על הסכם ליישום הסכם העקרונות בהשלמת המו"מ להעברת כל הסמכויות האזרחיות.

יתרונות: תיושם עמדה טקטית חדשה, שתביא לשבירת "כללי המשחק" כפי שהתגבשו עד כה, ותקנה עוצמה מחודשת בעמדות המיקוח של הצד הישראלי. המשלחת הישראלית תתנה את "סגירת" ההסכם הבטחוני והקמת המשטרה הפלסטינית בסגירת הנושאים האזרחיים, והיא לא תראה עוד ב- 13 דצמ' תאריך מקודש. כמו"כ, תבטיח דפ"א זו העברה חלקה של השלטון והסמכות ברוח הסכם העקרונות.

הערה: דפ"א זו מחייבת פעולת הסברה ושכנוע מקדימה אצל הדרג המדיני.

חסרונות: עיכוב החתימה על הסכם לישום וסכנה לאובדן תמיכה ציבורית ובינל"א.

דפ"א ב' -

1) ימופו הסמכויות שיש להן ממשק לישראל וכוללות מרכיבים בעלי אינטרס ישראלי מובהק (במיוחד אלו שהם בעלי זיקות לתחום הבטחוני, הכלכלי ולתחום איכות הסביבה). סמכויות אלו יוגדרו כ"קוים אדומים" שיש לסיים את המו"מ בעניינן ולהכלילם בהסכם.

2) בהסכם הבלתי גמור תכלל רשימת העקרונות הכלליים שיחולו על העברת הסמכויות, הנוגעים לאי שימוש לרעה ע"י הפלסטינים בסמכויות המועברות אליהם, כפי שיסוכמו בין הצדדים (מסמך יועמ"ש 100/00 - 09351, 26 אוק' 93).

3) בהסכם יקבעו מבנה וסמכויות ה- P.A. כפי שיסוכמו בין הצדדים.

יתרונות: הבטחת השמירה על אינטרסים חיוניים של ישראל. בנוסף, סיכום מחייב לגבי העקרונות הכלליים ולגבי ה- P.A. יקדם, במידה רבה, את היעד של מניעת חלל שלטוני, באופן שסיכוייה של הרשות הפלסטינית החדשה להצליח יהיו גדולים יותר במצב שבו מוגדרים ומוסכמים סמכויותיה, תחומי אחריותה ומגבלותיה.

חסרונות: המשך ניהול המו"מ להעברת סמכויות לאחר ה- 13 דצמ' 93 יעשה מעמדת חולשה של הצד הישראלי, בהעדר "קלפים" משמעותיים למיקוח.

דפ"א ג' -

הצד הישראלי יניח לצד הפלסטיני להפעיל את הממשל העצמי שלו עפ"י ראות עיניו, גם בלא שתוסדר העברת הסמכויות האזרחיות באופן רשמי, תוך הבעת נכונות בסיסית לסייע בתחומים בהם יבקשו הפלסטינים.

יתרונות הדפ"א: הצד הישראלי "ישתחרר" מהגישה הפטרנליסטית שלו כלפי הפלסטינים ואילו הצד הפלסטיני ימצא עצמו נדחק לפינה ויאלץ ליזום פניה לשיתוף פעולה להסדרת עניינים משותפים.

חסרונות: סכנה להקמת מנהל ציבורי פלסטיני רופף ביותר ופגיעה באינטרסים ישראליים מובהקים.

<u>העברת הסמכויות</u>

7. המצב האידאלי הוא הקבלה בין העברת הסמכויות הבטחוניות להעברת הסמכויות האזרחיות, באופן שהמנהא"ז ממקם את עצמו בסמיכות לצבא, בהתאם לקצב הנסיגה וההיערכות מחדש. באופן זה אחריות המנהא"ז היתה מצטמצמת לתאי השטח שבשליטת הצבא, ומתן השרותים לאוכלוסיה היה מצטמצם לאותם תחומי סמכות שנותרו בידי המנהא"ז.

8. ואולם, יש קושי רב ביישום אופציה זו שיש לה חסרונות בהיבט חלוקת הסמכויות בין הצד הישראלי לפלסטיני. סביר מאד להניח שהקשר בין המנהא"ז לאוכלוסיה המקומית יתרופף ויקשה על המנהל להגיש שרותים לאוכלוסיה ולבצע את פעולות האכיפה השוטפות המתבצעות ביומיום בליווי צה"ל (הערה: למרות שנראה כי הבעיות הינן פחות אקוטיות ביריחו ויותר רלוונטיות לאזח"ע, הרי שאותן בעיות, במידה שונה של חומרה, תתעוררנה גם ביריחו).

9. מאידך, הרעיון של העברת סמכויות מדורגת (סיום המו"מ בסמכות מסויימת והעברתה לידי הפלסטינים), שהושמע באזני הח"מ ע"י ג'מיל טריפי, כרוך בקשיי יישום רבים מהטעם הפשוט שכמעט כל סמכות מקיימת זיקות רבות עם סמכויות נוספות אחרות (כך למשל, אין כל משמעות להעברת סמכויות כמו ביקורת או מנגנון בלי העברת סמכויות משרדים אחרים).

10. על כן, הדפ"א המועדפת מבחינת המנהא"ז (לפחות ביריחו) היא העברת סמכויות כוללת, בבת אחת, במקביל להשלמת הנסיגה. ואולם, אם נאלץ לבצע העברה מדורגת של סמכויות, יש הכרח להכין תכנית מאוזנת ומושכלת של העברת סמכויות, באופן שיתאפשר למנהא"ז לשמר יכולת להפעיל את הסמכויות שיוותרו בידיו (מבחינה תקציבית, למשל), ולשמור על אינטרסים החיוניים למנהא"ז.

בברכה,

אפרים לביא, סא"ל

חבר צח"א

From: Yair Hirschfeld
to: Yossi Beilin

Report on a Meeting with Akram Haniye

1. On November 22, 1993 a meeting with Akram, lasting three hours, was held in Paris in the Hotel Concorde Lafayette.

2. Akram and myself agreed to have a first two-day workshop in Paris, starting on December 22. Akram will be joined by one or two other Palestinians.

Akram proposed that three main subjects should be discussed:

a) The impact of interim-arrangements on the final status; of particular interest to them in this context were mainly three subjects:
i. settlements;
ii. Jerusalem; and
iii. trade

It was important to propose detailed arrangements that would suit the needs of both sides. Most important was to prepare, if possible, a mode of cooperation with the settlements.

b) The nature of final status arrangements;

c) The creation of academic think-tanks, who should prepare studies on specific issues (Jerusalem, refugees, borders, institution-building, security, economic issues etc.)

3. Akram expressed his and the chairman's interest to start now cooperation programs regarding education, culture and history. Coming to Paris on December 22, we should prepare detailed proposals.

4. Akram expressed his interest to permit the Arab community in Israel to play an active role and he wanted to start a dialogue with us, on what should be done and what not.

5. Akram predicted that the talks in Cairo that were to start on the following day would lead immediately to a crisis situation.

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18/11/87

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMO

To: Members of the ARLC

Following discussions during the meeting of the ARLC in Paris on 5 November 1987 and upon the kind invitation from chairman Thomas Kreifer, I had a discussion tour to Paris to discuss the Communication Aid to Work and the Work Bank in support of the Declaration on Principles adopted on 11 September.

During the meetings Chairman Kreifer outlined in great detail how the envisaged the organisation, structure and interactions of the Fonds Solidarité Travail, Centre for Development and Implementation of the Programme, Office of a Partnership with the Third Countries. We shall later during September/early in order to clarify all issues which were raised during the ARLC meeting the Paris.

The proposed recommendations for simplification seem helpful and discussions in order. It is also the continuous type the attached outline adequately reflects the discussions and points which remain to be fixed.

Hans Jürgen Kuhn

Bonn, 18 November 1987

CONFIDENTIAL

TPL/ek

MEMORANDUM

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
DIRECTORATE GENERAL I
EXTERNAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS
Unit I/H-2

AHLC

Brussels, 11 November 1993

NOTE FOR THE ATTENTION OF HEADS OF MNC DELEGATIONS

Subject: Meeting of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee for the co-ordination of international assistance to the Palestinian people
Paris, 5 November 1993

Please find herewith for your information the following documents on the above meeting:

1. Report
2. Agenda
3. Speeches by EC Presidency and Commission
4. Non-paper on Secretariat to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee
5. PLO Decree concerning the creation of a Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction

Please note that these documents are not for distribution (except the Presidency and Commission speeches, should you find it useful)

Corrigendum

Regarding the documents sent earlier today concerning the Regional Economic Development Working Group, Copenhagen 8-9 November, the listing should have been as follows:

1. Press release issued by the Community
2. Press release issued by the Chair (with Action Plan in Annex)
3. Conclusions of the Chair (not for distribution)

S. Aljabar.

S. Aljabar, I/H/2

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7 full Members :

Summary

Objectives and functions of the AHLC and its secretariat agreed after protracted negotiations on 4-5 November. Tunisia and UN included as associate members alongside the PLO, Israel, Egypt, Jordan, with the seven full members being the EC Troika, US, Russia, Canada, Norway, Japan, Saudi Arabia. Next AHLC to take place in first quarter 1994 in Paris, chaired by Norway. Thereafter chair to be held by any one of the seven full members as agreed.

Concerns expressed about politicization of the Palestinian Economic Development and Reconstruction Authority (PEDRA) announced at meeting, which should be brought to Arafat's attention in Brussels on 8 November. Although PEDRA includes the technical departments recommended by the World Bank, these are under tight control from Tunis.

Israelis expressed concern publicly and privately about Palestinian foot-dragging over convening first meeting of the Israeli/Palestinian Economic Cooperation Committee. It is now scheduled for 15 November in Paris.

Constructive atmospherics and skilful chairmanship by Norwegian Foreign Minister but signs of weariness among participants over yet another round of set piece speeches in a forum not geared to tackling practicalities. The Consultative Group will be the power house. Its first meeting will be at World Bank headquarters in Paris on 16 December.

Report

1. Terms of reference for the AHLC

The Norwegians spent a fruitless day on 4 November circulating redrafts of the 1 October paper on the terms of reference for the AHLC following concerns expressed by the Japanese and Saudis among others. The EC argued that there was broad consensus on that paper which should be updated to reflect developments. This approach was finally agreed. The key sticking points were over Saudi and Japanese concerns about the chair rotating and Saudi objections to a reference to the AHLC encouraging the implementation of the economic aspects of the Declaration of Principles which, in their view, was outside the AHLC's terms of reference. Both issues were successfully resolved by the Chair (see annex A for definitive text).

A non-paper on terms of reference for the Secretariat prepared by the World Bank will be made available to partners at the SCG meeting in Copenhagen on 7 November.

2. Speeches

The speeches were remarkably similar. Delegations emphasised that the real test for the success of the Israeli/PLO agreement lay in the success of capacity building and economic development. Common themes included the need:

- to move from pledges to implementing tangible and carefully costed projects in a coordinated manner without losing sight of the regional perspective;
- to take full account of Palestinian views in assessing priorities;
- to maximise transparency and an ethical approach on both donor and recipient side;
- to cover recurrent costs of the Palestinians, particularly for schools, hospitals and other institutions, as well as to find a mechanism to channel such resources to the Palestinians as soon as possible;
- to support private sector development to create jobs and improve living standards;
- to use the expertise and infrastructure of agencies on the ground to channel urgent assistance. Many donors indicated their willingness to channel untied resources through these organisations.

The EC said that donor efforts should aim to plug the gaps the Palestinians were not yet in a position to fill themselves either because structures or tax revenues were lacking. The EC believed it was important to continue to support existing Palestinian institutions in the territories, particularly at municipal level. New institutions should only be created where there were identifiable gaps. The EC hoped the Palestinians would be able to establish transparent fiscal and budgetary authorities quickly to enhance donor confidence. This would enable them to have access to loan financing and to decide for themselves the allocation of funds to meet the running costs of PLO institutions and the needs of Palestinian families.

The Israelis (Uri Savir, DG, MFA) made it clear that they considered themselves full partners in the development of the West Bank and Gaza. Economic development should not be dominated by political considerations either on donor or recipient side.

The Palestinians (Abu Ala) said that priorities for immediate assistance included all the costs associated with the establishment of a police force; support for existing Palestinian social and educational institutions as well as assistance for martyrs' families. A plea was made to simplify and if possible unify donors' procurement procedures by using those of the World Bank, for example.

3. Palestinian Economic Development and Reconstruction Authority

Members of the Palestinian delegation privately expressed reservations to the EC Troika about the structure announced in Arafat's 31 October decree which they considered to be heavily politicised and too much under the control of Tunis. The Troika was careful to welcome the positive elements in the structure (technical departments) and confirmed the EC's intention to help

finance their establishment but said that it believed some fine-tuning might be needed to turn it into the independent managerial and technical body required. It encouraged the Palestinians to continue to focus on practicalities specifically regarding transparency, accountability and a close attachment to the reality on the ground. Other participants, in particular the US, echoed these concerns and argued that:

- the structure should be lean and empowered to make day-to-day decisions on the ground without having to refer to Tunis;
- the Managing Director should be empowered to carry out effective day-to-day operations;
- the structure should be a temporary one which could be absorbed in time into the interim self governing authority;
- donors would need to provide technical assistance to PEDRA to help establish a procurement code based on open bidding and public awards of contracts. An international mechanism to monitor the procurement process would also be necessary.

There was some confusion over the name that will be given to the structure. It may well not be PEDRA in the event.

4. World Bank report on its mission in the West Bank and Gaza

The World Bank (Koch-Weser, Vice-President) gave a detailed report on the World Bank mission currently in the West Bank and Gaza to help the Palestinians prepare an emergency assistance programme covering the next two years, begin the process of capacity building and identify technical studies of high priority policies, programmes and projects. The emergency programme would be presented to the donor community at the consultative group meeting. It focused on maintenance and rehabilitation of physical and social infrastructure. Selective budgetary support was also being considered. The cost of the investment programme for implementation was tentatively estimated at 400-500 million dollars. UNRWA had a set of programmes ready which could provide a conduit for delivering aid immediately. Investments under the programme should not conflict with medium term sectoral strategies.

In the medium term, a technical assistance programme supported by the Bank's 35 million dollar Trust Fund would target training and institutional development as well as support for feasibility studies for priority investments over the next 3-5 years. The programme would also be presented to the Consultative Group meeting. The mission, jointly with IMF staff, was also helping the Palestinians develop a medium term macro economic framework.

Koch-Weser said that short term public sector external financing requirements were in the region of 550-600 million dollars, ie, in line with the figures presented at the 1 October Donors' Conference. For the next 5 years (1994-1998) new commitments pledged totalled 2.1 billion dollars, compared to the 2.4 billion target. Contributions to the Trust Fund totalled 32 million so far. Donor commitments would probably be enough to cover the financing gap for 1994 but there might be a problem in matching donor financing with specific recurrent expenditure needs. Donor

flexibility was needed in disbursement of aid. A strong joint effort was also needed to commit all donors and the Palestinians to adhere to agreed sector policies and priorities and to select projects from an agreed development and investment programme. Koch-Weser said that there were indications "from the field" that this issue might be cause for concern. He did not elaborate. He reinforced Palestinian remarks about simplifying and standardising donor procedures.

Koch-Weser reported that the World Bank's Board of Directors had also approved 50 million dollars for a Trust Fund for Gaza.

5. Donor activities

Japan announced a 5 million dollar contribution to the World Bank Trust Fund and Canada 1.5 million Canadian dollars. The US said that it would announce a 6 million dollar grant to UNRWA on 16 November for housing, schools and clinics in Gaza. In the longer term they were considering a 22 million dollar 5-year private investment guarantee programme to provide risk insurance for local financing institutions making loans in Gaza and the West Bank. Other possibilities included a 21 million dollar waste water system improvement project and a 65 million dollar 3-year housing guarantee programme. The EC provided extensive notes on institutions used to channel its assistance to the OTs, EC procedures for project implementation and details of its aid.

6. Conclusions

The Norwegian Foreign Minister summed up the key themes in the debate and picked up the agreed timings for future meetings as contained in the summary of this report.

Annex A

COORDINATING STRUCTURE FOR INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE

1. The Multilateral Steering Group will continue to serve as the coordinating body for all activities of the Multilateral Working Groups.

2. An Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (at the Senior Adviser level) is established by the Multilateral Steering Group which will:

- coordinate and promote assistance efforts of individual donors to the Palestinian people;

- promote transparency in the activities of donor, Secretariat and recipient;

- take particular responsibility for fostering private sector trade and investment;

- provide a forum for a dialogue regarding assistance activities in order to promote cooperation among donors;

- inform on a regular basis the relevant groups of the multilateral forum of its activities;

- monitor developments in the Palestinian economy as a whole;

- review reports by the Secretariat and pledges made by the donors;

- encourage the implementation of the economic aspects of the Declaration of Principles.

- RESPOND TO THE NEED TO ASSIST THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AS IT RELATES TO THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES

Key needs addressed will be relief, rehabilitation, medium and long-term investments, institution building, and infrastructure. Assistance should take account of the regional context.

3. The AHLC consists of representatives of Canada, the European Community, Japan, Norway, Russia, Saudi Arabia and the United States. The Palestine Liberation Organisation and Israel will be fully associated members of the AHLC, as will Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia and the United Nations.

The Committee will ask the Israelis and Palestinians to keep it informed of the work of the Israeli-Palestinian Economic Cooperation Committee. The AHLC will operate in cooperation with the relevant Palestinian institutions, such as PEDRA, the joint mechanisms of the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles and consistent with Palestinian priorities.

The Chair of the AHLC may call meetings as necessary. The Committee will operate on the basis of consensus.

The seven full members of the group will have equal status.

The gavel may be held by any of the seven members in such a manner as will be agreed upon. The meetings of the AHLC will take place at the World Bank's European office in Paris.

4. Secretariat

The World Bank - complemented by officers on secondment from relevant institutions with expertise and operational experience in the region - will act as a Secretariat. The Secretariat will carry out on an ongoing basis the operational functions assigned to the AHLC. It will act under the guidance of AHLC to ensure transparency. It will be the recipient of information on donor activities in order to fulfil its role.

5. A consultative group will be established. The World Bank, can as appropriate, after consultations with the Chair of the AHLC, call for and chair meetings of the Consultative Group.

A data base of initiatives, projects and other activities will be set up and made available to the AHLC, donors and recipients.

6. Organisations with expertise and a presence in the West Bank and Gaza, including the UN Agencies, will continue and augment their activities in consultation with the Palestinians.

The Working Groups of the Multilateral Process will continue to be concerned with regional issues in support of the overall strategy of economic development in the region.

AGENDA FOR THE FIRST MEETING OF THE AD HOC LIAISON COMMITTEE FOR THE COORDINATION OF INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE

Paris, November 5, 1993

I START UP ASSISTANCE

1. Presentation by the Palestinians.
2. Israeli comments.
3. Presentation by donors and institutions (World Bank and the United Nations).

II COORDINATION OF MEDIUM TERM DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

1. Presentation by Palestinians.
2. Israeli comments.
3. Presentation by members.
4. Organisation.

Annex

SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS RELATED TO THE AGENDA ITEMS

I.1 - Economic priorities and structure set up for internal and external coordination to ensure recipient transparency.

- Indication on specialized institutions already operational or being set up, projects to be implemented (details of immediate action and needs).

I.3 - Presentation of formulas for immediate financing of running costs and setting up of Palestinian institutions, including training of a police force.

- Channels and mechanisms for assuring those costs.

- Procedures to ensure donor transparency.

II.3 - Actions and concrete intentions of actions, availabilities and preferences, sectors of less priority.

- Precisions on types of proposed credits, disbursement conditions, identification of existing interlocutors in the field.

- Proposals for synergy and partnership on a volontary basis.

- Ways and means to avoid excessive bilateralism and diverging conditionality.

II.4 - a) Terms of reference.

- Presentation based on points 1 and 2 of a synopsis of Palestinian priorities and matching donor availability.

- Identification of sectors not covered yet and search for a solution in this respect.

b) Secretariat.

- Setting up of the Secretariat by the World Bank:

  - Description of competences and experiences
  - Need to include experts with field knowledge
  - Inclusion of other relevant institutions

Intersessional activities of the Secretariat

- Consultative group meeting
- Ongoing reporting to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee on initiatives taken

AD HOC LIAISON COMMITTEE MEETING
PARIS, 5 NOVEMBER 1993

SPEECH BY THE EC PRESIDENCY

- On behalf of the European Community and its member states, I should like to extend our warm thanks to the World Bank for hosting this first meeting of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee. I should also like to congratulate Norway for the highly efficient way in which it completed preparations for this meeting.

- The signature of the Israel/PLO agreement on 13 September was an achievement of immense importance. Our purpose here today is to give concrete and practical support to implement that agreement by focussing on the needs of the Occupied Territories and to get the international assistance flowing now.

- Indeed we need to give a clear signal today that the international donor Community is ready to move from pledges to implementing specific, tangible and carefully costed projects, in step with progress made by the Palestinians to identify priorities. It is essential that they are in charge of their own programme.

- The European Community and its member states will continue to make a significant political and economic contribution in support of the Palestinian people in the context of the peace process.

- We welcome the information provided by the Palestinians today on proposals and priorities and on the framework established for the Palestinian Economic Development and Reconstruction Authority to channel donor efforts. It represents a first concrete step. We believe some fine-tuning may need to be done to turn it into the independent managerial and technical body required. We encourage the Palestinians to continue to focus on practicalities as a matter of priority, specifically regarding transparency, accountability and a close attachment to the reality on the ground.

- We also need to ensure that our own structures are geared to delivering aid as efficiently as possible to the Palestinian people so as to ensure visible improvement quickly in their daily lives. With this in mind it is our view that the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee structure should be light, efficient and technical in focus. The objective should be to maximize

transparency both on the donor and on the recipient side. The Commission should also promote synergy among donors so as to avoid duplication in implementing projects.

Donor efforts should aim to plug the gaps the Palestinians themselves are not yet in a position to fill either because the necessary structures are not in place or because of a lack of tax revenues.

We believe it is important to continue to support existing Palestinian institutions in the territories particularly at municipal level. A "bottom up" approach is needed. New institutions should only be created where there are clearly identifiable gaps.

We hope that the Palestinians will be able to establish transparent fiscal and budgetary authorities quickly to enhance donor confidence. We see this as a high priority to enable them to decide for themselves the allocation of funds, particularly to meet the running costs of their institutions and the needs of Palestinian families and to enable them to have access to loan financing. Transparent structures and clear procedures will also insure that EC taxpayers' money is used to maximum efficiency in fostering the development of the Palestinian economy in harmony with the Israeli/PLO Declaration of Principles and with the regional partners.

International donors must act fairly and ethically. So should recipients. It would be useful to establish a code of conduct to that end. My colleague from the European Commission, Mr. Prat, will provide practical details about the methods used by the Commission to ensure transparency in its own aid to Palestinian institutions.

Of course, the development of the Occupied Territories cannot be considered in isolation from the development of the Middle East Region as a whole. A report on our meeting today will be made to the meeting of the Regional Economic Development Working Group in Copenhagen on 8-9 November, which the European Community and its member states have the privilege of chairing. This group will continue to take account of the regional impact of projects proposed for the Occupied Territories. The end goal must be the integration of the economy of the Territories into the regional economy as a whole.

We urge the Palestinians to seize the window of opportunity open today and to capitalise on the international donor community's readiness to support them to the full.

O-N Comments W. Bank ff

1/11/93

THE PALESTINE EMERGENCY DEVELOPMENT AND RECONSTRUCTION AUTHORITY:

PEDRA

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Draft

THE PALESTINE EMERGENCY DEVELOPMENT AND RECONSTRUCTION AUTHORITY: PEDRA

Introduction

In pursuance of the stated objectives specified in the recent Agreement of Principles, the PLO has established an Interim Authority to be in complete charge of all aid programmes. This Authority shall be called: The Palestine Emergency Development and Reconstruction Authority (PEDRA).

This Authority will be responsible for negotiating, planning, coordinating, implementing and monitoring the development of Palestine in preparation for the next interim national government.

PEDRA shall be a self-liquidating organisation: towards the last three months of the first year of its operation, PEDRA shall transfer its responsibilities to the authority or authorities designated by the new government appointed by the elected Council.

Because of the combined emergency and interim challenges that have to be addressed, PEDRA shall pursue two tracks:

the first track shall be to optimise the utilisation of existing capabilities in order to improve living conditions, create employment, and attend to the immense physical and psychological damage sustained by the Palestinian people;

the second track shall be to prepare the studies that will be required by the future Interim Government of Palestine: PEDRA will endeavour to initiate feasibility and engineering studies, and surveys which should accelerate the processes of planning and decision making by the new government of Palestine.

It is planned to undertake the different activities speedily. To do so PEDRA will undertake to mobilise the institutional, intellectual and professional resources of Palestinians, of the Arab countries and also to benefit from the offers of assistance from the international community and organisations in the form of multi-lateral and bilateral assistance.

Obviously, it is necessary to harmonise all this effort in a manner which fulfills the aspirations, hopes, expectations and immediate needs of the Palestinian people; and which lays the foundation for a capability to pursue a coherent developmental programme.

PEDRA: AN OVERVIEW

PEDRA is planned as an Authority designed to integrate and mobilise actual and potential capabilities of the Palestinian people with the offers of assistance. The Authority shall aim to sub-contract most, if not all, consulting and contracting work. However, it shall undertake all this work in an integrated manner, bringing into programmes and projects those Palestinian organisations and institutions which will be the beneficiaries of the planned activities.

The situation will frequently arise that the Palestinian beneficiary organisations lack the professional manpower to participate effectively in PEDRA's activities: PEDRA's approach will be to assist Palestinian organisations to acquire the necessary professional capabilities to become full participants in the processes of planning and implementation. We do not underestimate the difficulties that will face us: however, we expect that all parties will cooperate to facilitate this transition from occupation to independent behaviour.

PEDRA shall endeavour to optimise the utilisation of existing capabilities through the establishment of a dynamic Palestinian economy. This effort will utilise, among others, the following measures:
-- increasing the organisational and managerial competence of local departments and institutions;
-- establishing mechanisms for the staffing of the public sector with competent professional manpower;
-- contributing to the improvement of labour productivity, quality and standards of products;
-- contributing to the deepening of technical skills and increasing exports;
-- contributing to the design and coordination of emergency and short term aid addressed to public health, education and infrastructural development.

Functional Aspects of PEDRA

PEDRA is planned to undertake the following functions:

1. Design and Implementation of Policies

One of the major objectives of PEDRA will be to develop operational policies for the emergency/interim periods. The PLO has reasonably well-defined economic programmes and social policies. The objective of PEDRA is to translate these policies into programmes and projects. Over the short-term PEDRA will be deeply concerned with remedial activities to bring the present economy to full operating condition.

2. Information

Another objective of PEDRA will be to develop directories and informational bases on private and public organisations, institutions and business firms in Palestine with a view to incorporating them organically into the emergency programmes for the interim period; and also into the planning effort to be initiated in preparation for the post-Council period.

PEDRA aims to work closely with members of this institutional infrastructure and offer assistance to promote to its rapid strengthening and transformation. In all these matters the objectives of PEDRA shall be to promote performance-related behaviour, efficiency, openness and public responsibility.

Among national organisations shall be included: educational and medical organisations; universities and technical educational institutions; the various departments of the civil administration; the municipalities; the Chambers of Commerce; charitable organisations; professional associations; unions; committees that were established to prepare for the multi-lateral and bilateral negotiations and also those that were established to monitor the performance of the occupier dominated civil service; formal and informal financial institutions; businesses and industries; others.

3. Design and Implementation of Procedures

PEDRA has to develop and implement procedures to guide and manage: recruitment for the civil service; for contracting, sub-contracting and joint ventures; and financial services to the private sector.

The construction of private and infrastructural projects will imply zoning policies and physical plans; this area will require immediate attention.

Fortunately, some priorities are clear and require little further discussions; others require speedy consultations with existing institutions and organisations.

In all cases, PEDRA shall only prepare the documentation (the Request for a Proposal: RFP) to invite external consultants to undertake feasibility and/or engineering studies. This measure is necessary on two counts: first, it will be impossible to establish high quality professional departments in a matter of weeks; and second, PEDRA wishes to avoid building a large interim bureaucracy.

In so doing, whenever necessary, PEDRA will mobilise external consultants and advisors who can provide the necessary design features and specifications. In all cases the beneficiary of the priority programme will be involved in the preparation of the RFP and in the subsequent steps from the point of initiation.

Many of the existing Palestinian organisations do not possess the professional expertise to contribute to the design or implementation of PEDRA projects. It will be a fundamental objective of PEDRA's mode of operations to contribute to the development of such expertise through training programmes, the use advisory services provided by international organisations and/or the appointment of consultants to assist organisations who demonstrate a readiness to acquire know-how.

In all cases, PEDRA will insist that the institutions so involved make the necessary effort to acquire the management and technology capabilities. PEDRA will publish at an early date detailed information on its programme specifically aimed at the acquisition of technology and management capabilities. PEDRA expects to contribute whatever is necessary to support such an effort by the aided institutions.

It is thus clear from the above that PEDRA does not intend to build a large organisation or to become involved downstream in the actual engineering, construction, and project implementation management. All these efforts will have to be undertaken by the beneficiaries of the PEDRA sponsored programmes.

In all cases the donors of funds will also play an important function in project evaluation, management and implementation. In each project, a specific private firm will assume prime contractual responsibility.

In all cases, PEDRA will do every thing possible to find qualified Palestinian firms located in Palestine and which employ local manpower to assume this function. Palestinian firms still have to compete for each contract, and meet international standards of performance and track

records. This policy is dictated by the overriding need to create employment, to develop institutions, to transfer and accumulate technology.

In the event that no qualified Palestinian firm presents itself to undertake the work, PEDRA will support firms willing to enter into joint ventures with Palestinian firms not located in Palestine and/or international firms. But in all such cases the Palestinian firms have to present clear plans explaining how they intend to participate and to indicate the efforts that they intend to make to acquire the know-how that they lack.

PEDRA will develop policies and procedures to advise and assist Palestinian firms who wish to acquire and accumulate technology. PEDRA will publish in the shortest time possible guidelines to assist firms in Palestine to avail themselves of these PEDRA services.

4. Commissioning and Monitoring of Work

PEDRA will commission and monitor most, if not all, consultancy and contracting work, through the services of independent consultants, ad hoc project managers and UN advisors.

It will publish quarterly reports on the progress of projects and programmes in order to alert all concerned parties of the measures taken and of the progress made.

5. Financial Arrangements with Donors

In view of the complexity and speed of the efforts required, PEDRA proposes to donors that they pay their contributions directly to the contracting agents subject to the prior approval of PEDRA. All such payments to be reported to PEDRA.

In order to transfer know-how in project financial management from donor financial institutions to Palestinian financial institutions, PEDRA recommends to donors to adopt Palestinian financial institutions, in joint ventures with financial institutions in their respective countries. Similar arrangements may be made with local government departments and organisations. Obviously, such arrangements have to be examined case by case.

In all projects and programmes, PEDRA insists on total visibility and public accountability.

6. Accounting and Auditing

PEDRA will maintain an accounting and audit department that will publish monthly reports on all projects, contract awards, assessment of quality of performance, funds allocated, funds disbursed, and work achieved.

One of the fundamental objectives of PEDRA is to establish openness and visibility for all its operations: it is PEDRA's belief that the early discovery of delays and difficulties is essential to reducing cost and increasing economic efficiency.

7. Support of Private Sector

PEDRA shall also initiate and promote bilateral efforts between Palestinian and foreign business firms interested in joint ventures, sub-contracting and any other useful business activity.

PEDRA shall endeavour to contribute whatever it can to promote promising business associations. PEDRA shall contribute towards training of specialised expertise that may be missing, the establishment of industrial and research parks, the development of legal and any other measures that may be required and is within the capability of PEDRA to undertake.

8. Openness and Transparency

In pursuance of its policy of openness, efficiency, coordination and accountability, PEDRA shall publish analytical quarterly reports on all its activities.

PEDRA will use the media on an extensive basis to inform and disseminate information: media will be utilised to alert local organisations on forthcoming projects to encourage them to compete for contracts.

PEDRA will appoint a spokesperson who will inform the public on a regular basis of ongoing activity and the ways and means through which Palestinians may participate.

Institutional Structure of PEDRA

PEDRA shall consist of a small and highly experienced group of professionals as follows:

Executive Chairman

The most senior officer of PEDRA will be the Executive Chairman who has Ministerial rank in the Executive Committee of the PLO. He will manage the Authority according to modern and advanced management methods.

Deputy Chairman

The Executive Chairman will be assisted by a Deputy Chairman who has extensive professional competence in policy analysis and formation in economic matters. The Deputy Chairman will chair the meetings of the Executive Committee of the Authority in the absence of the Executive Chairman.

Director of Operations

A Director of Operations will be appointed to manage the applications of the decisions of the Executive Committee and the operations of the three Divisions of PEDRA. The Director of Operations reports to the Deputy Chairman. Division Directors report to the Director of Operations.

Executive Committee for Policy Planning, Formations, System Design and Programme/Project Selection and RFP Preparation

PEDRA shall establish a high level Executive Committee which will be responsible for establishing PEDRA's policies, priorities, procedures, programmes and the adoption of procedures to implement programmes and policies. It is anticipated that the Executive Committee will consist of about 7 members. The Executive Chairman or his Deputy shall chair its meetings.

The main function of this Committee shall be to:
(i) translate economic, social, political and technological policies into programmes and projects;
(ii) integrate the various policies and programmes with each other.

The Executive Committee will be responsible for the preparation of Requests for a Proposal (RFP) for programmes and projects, and for the assignment of officers to engage consultants for undertaking an RFP.

All expenditures, procedures, programmes and projects have to be approved by the Executive Committee.

The Executive Committee may choose to include voting and non-voting senior advisors as members when and if the need arises..

The Executive Committee will have a Secretariat consisting of about 5 professionals and 5 research assistants.

Audit Unit

PEDRA shall seek to establish an Audit Unit to:

-- monitor the quality of the activities of the Authority,
-- audit it financial affairs
-- ascertain the consistency of its policies
-- ascertain that its contract awards are being made consistently with its philosophy.

PEDRA will seek the assistance of a major EC institution to establish a sophisticated monitoring and audit system.

The Director of the Audit Unit will report to the Deputy Chairman.

Project Design, Planning, Monitoring and Control Division

The priority function of PEDRA is to optimise the performance of the Palestinian economy and to prepare surveys, feasibility studies, development programmes, and projects for the post-Council elections.

The Project Design, Planning, Monitoring and Control Division will prepare procedures and codes for all contracts with consultants and contractors: these procedures and codes have to be presented to and approved by the Executive Committee of PEDRA.

This Division will also discuss practical arrangements with donors concerning cooperation in the implementation of projects.

The first priority of this Division calls for the development of organic links with Palestinian institutions and organisations in order for them to participate in all phases of programme/project development.

This Division will:

-- assist national firms to meet international competitive standards and/or to find associates for joint ventures;

-- assess the various bids submitted by consultants with a view of selecting a consulting firm which will be commissioned to prepare the requisite project documents on the basis of the RFP approved by the Executive Committee.

-- monitor the work of the consultant and accept the final report.

-- evaluate the report of consultants in collaboration with the beneficiary party, external consultants and advisors. The donor may or may not be a party at this stage.

The Director of the Division will submit his report and recommendations to the Director of Operations.

The Director of the Division of International Relations (see below) will be requested by the Director of Operations to contact the concerned donor to discuss the Report and its implementation. Once the Donor approves the funds, PEDRA will invite bids for implementation.

The Director of the Division for Project Design, Planning, Monitoring and Control will evaluate bids, and select the one that is the most appropriate for the occasion; this Director will appoint a consultant to participate in the selection of a contractor.

The Division for Project Design, Planning, Monitoring and Control shall be directly responsible for providing a wide variety of services to Palestinians and their institutions in such areas as information, training, and any support that may be required to complement existing facilities in order to induce a higher rate of return on investment.

The Division of International Relations

This Division will plays a critical role on two fronts. First, the Division will be responsible for close cooperation with all the donors of funds. Second, it will be responsible to coordinate with donors at every stage of the evolution of a project and will implement PEDRA policies in these negotiations and/or contribute to the development and adaptation of PEDRA procedures to meet international acceptance.

The Support Division

This Division provides crucial services that are essential to the functioning of PEDRA: legal, accounting, information, data processing services, management, spokesperson, informational, editorial, translation and publications.

Operating Procedures of PEDRA

It is useful to summarise here the anticipated operating procedures of PEDRA:

-- it will be the only Planning Authority and the only organisation working directly with all donors;

-- it will make its work programme completely transparent to all concerned parties;

-- it will work closely with institutions and organisations (private and public) in Palestine;

-- it will work to strengthen Palestinian institutions to enable them to participate fully in all phases of programmes: from the study phase to the implementation phase;

-- it will seek to promote the forward and backward integration of Palestinian economic activities with a view to the nurturing of economic efficiency;

-- it will establish mechanisms within Palestine at both the national and local levels for integrating the various programmes, studies and projects it is sponsoring;

-- all funds for both consulting and contracting will be disbursed directly by donors through channels that are jointly negotiated: PEDRA will seek to develop the capabilities of Palestinian financial institutions in project financing and financial management;

-- it will publish regular financial reports on its programmes and projects;

-- it will endeavour to assist Palestinian firms to upgrade their capabilities through joint ventures, sub-contracting, the recruitment of qualified manpower and by various other means.

Time Scale of Emergency Planning

1. Emergency planning has to be undertaken immediately in order to attend to urgent matters.

2. Emergency planning should not exceed the period extending beyond the establishment of the elected Council: that is, for a period of 9 + 3 months: 9 months up to the elections, and 3 months to transfer experience acquired to the successor planning authority.

Immediate Planning Objectives

Planning that should be for immediate implementation should aim to achieve a number of specific objectives with immediate and visible consequences. More specifically, the objectives of this phase of planning are:

1. Optimisation of Existing Capabilities

The existing capabilities in the OT in agriculture, industry, education and other services are generally operating at 50% or less of installed capacities.

First Objective
Reduce and/or remove imposed constraints: this is political, and has to be achieved through negotiations.

Second Objective
Negotiate markets for Palestinian agricultural products.

Third Objective
Improve marketing capabilities of Palestinian products in Europe and the US.

Fourth Objective
Planning should increase the options that will be available to the Palestinian Government during the succeeding phases; planning should not close any options.

All studies and reports will be prepared and discussed publicly in order to create awareness of the issues though no major decision will be taken until the post-election government takes over.

Medium Term Policy Objectives

PEDRA will have to define medium-term policy objectives: many of the activities that are initiated during the emergency period may have a long-term impact. PEDRA has to define Palestinian medium- and long-term priorities. Ideally, programmes and projects that meet emergency, medium and long term objectives should be most favoured.

Operational Activities During the Emergency Interim Period

The following are illustrative examples of the categories of activities that PEDRA may consider on an emergency basis.

If investments are to be economically and socially fruitful, they have to be undertaken as much as possible through the use of Palestinian organisations and manpower: the main objective being to create jobs and build institutions.

When international companies undertake to plan, design and implement, it should be a sine qua non condition of such work that Palestinian firms using local manpower will undertake a major part of the technical work.

The association between international and Palestinian firms could be in the shape of joint ventures, sub-contracts or some other suitable arrangement; but in all cases the arrangement has to promote technology transfer.

Training may be provided by the international partner company when and if necessary. It shall be the responsibility of PEDRA to assist companies to locate Palestinian partners and manpower, to define qualifications in short supply and to design training programmes to overcome bottlenecks.

Every effort shall be made to attract and encourage foreign firms and Palestinian firms to locate in Palestine. PEDRA shall examine problems that such firms may face and assist in removing these obstacles if these have to do with skill shortages.

Assistance shall be offered to all Palestinian economic activities with a view to improving the quality of performance, to improving competitiveness and to increasing export opportunities.

All industry and agriculture should be supported through manpower, capital investment to improve output per worker, and science and technology; but these should not be subsidised: every effort should be made to increase quality control (through better training, improvement of management and investment in better tools), performance, competitiveness based on sound understanding of international markets.

Negotiations, development of local institutional capabilities, the creation of jobs, economic planning, development of focused training courses and foreign assistance all have to go hand in hand.

PEDRA will develop broad policy guidelines, a monitoring system and methods to influence adoption of guidelines. Thus it will expend considerable effort to develop a capability to impose realistic, useful and effective policies: compliance has to be obtained through the evident value of the policies rather than frequent arm-twisting and intervention.

Rationalisation of Existing Capabilities

There are a number of capabilities of permanent importance for a dematerialised economy; the measures to develop such capabilities are reasonably well known. It is necessary to begin to introduce in a measured and realistic manner services and support in order to rationalise such key capabilities in, for example: the construction industry; the agricultural sector, specific sub-sectors in the industrial sector.

Recruitment for Palestinian Institutions and Organisations

Planning, coordinating and implementing call for a considerable number of professional manpower specialised in the many fields of expertise. Many of these professionals will be permanently needed in the various departments and institutions of the emerging civil service of Palestine. The undertaking of each of the emergency programmes and projects will require professional manpower at the beneficiary organisation in Palestine. Some departments of the civil service may already have such professional manpower, while others may need additional professional resources.

It is to be expected that hundreds, if not thousands, of such new staff, will have to be recruited in and for Palestine --- not for PEDRA -- and it is essential that this recruitment be performed openly, competitively and involving Palestinians both in the OT and of the Diaspora.

PEDRA will assess the usefulness of establishing an Emergency Civil Service Recruitment Department. This service will review existing job specifications and salary scales, and institute a recruitment campaign to establish data bases on available professional manpower.

Operating Budgets and the Reform of Existing Institutions

Donor countries plan to contribute, as an emergency measure, the operating budgets of existing Palestinian public institutions. PEDRA should assist institutions to undertake internal reforms whenever necessary during the current transition period.

Land Use and Land Use Authority

It is expected that most of the large scale infrastructural projects will be undertaken after the election of the Council. However, a large number of programmes in housing and infrastructure are due to be implemented immediately. It is thus necessary to have some preliminary draft guidelines to aid the current phase of planning.

A compilation of all existing maps, plans, urban studies, etc should be undertaken. It is proposed that a consultative committee of experts in land use and zoning be established to study available data with a view of establishing some basic guidelines for the next 12 months. The same consultative committee should be also invited to plan a comprehensive programme for the development of land use policies.

Transport and Communication Facilities

It is impossible to undertake any activity without an efficient transport and communication systems. The 27 years of occupation have isolated and constrained the people of Palestine, and have left them without the most basic system of communication and transport. Furthermore, telephone lines are in very short supply.

Two of the urgent tasks that PEDRA have to consider are:

(i.) the establishment of telephone communications: probably adding immediately some 20,000 to 50,000 lines in the West Bank and Gaza. Plans for rapid expansion, for example, a growth of 20% for 5 years should be made. PEDRA should establish a high-powered consultancy group to determine the best technology for Gaza: optical fibers, total cell net type, integrated cable multi-media system. A basic objective of the planning is to establish in Palestine joint ventures in R&M and manufacturing for Palestine and eventually for the region.

ii. the development of air, sea and land access to Gaza.

Construction Industry

Construction is the largest industry in Palestine. It is, however, severely underdeveloped. One of the priority areas for attention is the determination of measures that will increase the competence, productivity, efficiency and range of capabilities of existing consulting and contracting firms.

PEDRA may consider the development or extensive services to support existing firms by promoting the establishment of:

-- firms that rent and maintain construction equipment;

-- financial institutions that provide modern financial services to consulting and contracting firms;

-- training in project and financial management;

-- quality control;

-- information services on the markets for Palestinians firms;

-- associations of consulting and contracting firms to enable them to share costs and to develop a capability to lobby;

-- assistance to universities to develop services to serve the needs of this sector;

-- extension services to serve the needs of small firms with 1 to 10 workers: in industrial societies these small firms are responsible for 50% of all construction output. These small firms are usually staffed by highly skilled self-employed technicians.

-- systems of quality control of materials: for example, the encouragement of the use of liquid cement with guaranteed quality and types;

-- encouraging the development of large material supply stores who are prepared to provide short term loans, technical assistance, loan of small power tools, offer training programmes and equipment repair.

-- developing procedures for contract bidding that would give locals a fair chance by providing advisory assistance to secure partners that complement their expertise as well as to transfer technology.

-- Codes and Specifications to standardise construction components in order to simplify construction and to reduce cost.

Industrial Parks

PEDRA should undertake surveys and consultations with a view to creating a substantial number of specialised and mixed Industrial Parks. The focus, location, size, functions offered to users (training, marketing, computer, design, testing, information, financial, and other support facilities), the opportunities for joint ventures and sub-contracts between Palestinian firms and EEC and Japanese firms shall be studied.

The location of these Parks should take into consideration long term land use considerations, population dispositions, transport and communication.

The following types of industrial parks may be considered:

-- clothing manufacturing;

-- leather products: shoes. bags. suitcases. etc:
-- agro-industries: tomatoes products, sorting and packaging, jams, dairy products, pickles, olive products;
-- metal machining, plastics, and system assemblies of specialised equipment: X-rays, spare parts;
-- construction materials and supplies: electrical, mechanical, windows, fitted cabinets, kitchens, assemblies of household electrical equipment for Palestine and exports (always chose the best).
-- refrigerated storage, sorting, packing and exporting.

Research Parks

In order to initiate the integration of higher education with the world of work, it is useful to consider in this emergency phase the establishment of substantial areas near all the major universities and large technical schools to be designated as research parks.

The idea is to encourage existing and new research institutions -- private and public -- to locate in one of these areas. These parks should be operated as a business, and investments for their developments should be invited. PEDRA may wish to sponsor feasibility studies.

Training

Training will play an important role in a number of ways. During the next 5 years, training and education have to be carefully and constantly directed to immediate employment: it is vital to increase economic efficiency and to absorb productively the donor aid that will be granted.

Hence, economic planning and training have to work closely together to ennance the efficiency of all public sector functions in: customs, transport, infrastructure (securing licence to built, advisory services, movement of people).

Objectives of PEDRA Activities in Training

PEDRA shall develop short-term training programmes in relation to its economic and development activities. The focus here is to train and retrain available manpower by providing short-term courses. Long-term education will remain under the aegis of educational authorities.

PEDRA shall work closely with educational institutions at all levels with a view to developing their capabilities and facilities.

PEDRA could consider planning for the establishment of a Manpower Training, Planning and Management Unit

Chambers of Commerce

PEDRA shall assess the need to provide training and support programme to help transform chambers of commerce into active participants. It will also help them to increase their capacity to provide support to the business community.

Agriculture

In this sector there are some key products that could be targeted for attention: the olive industry in all its aspects; dates; citrus, plastic agri-products; melon and watermelon; and agro-industries.

Olive Industry & European Olive R&D

It may be useful to seek the assistance of the International Centre for Advanced Mediterranean Agronomic Studies to secure technical assistance to increase olive tree yields.

Dairy and Animal Production

This is an important activity and a preliminary survey of immediate needs should assist PEDRA to identify a short term remedial measures. It is also possible to develop dairy industries based on imported EC milk powder. EC assistance in the development of a dairy industry would be highly welcome.

There also exists a comprehensive technology for animal feed production based on sea water irrigation. The study should include an evaluation of saline water agriculture and its potential relevance to Palestine.

Long Lead Items and PEDRA Advanced Planning

The following are illustrative examples of the type of topics that may be examined.

A Unit could be established at PEDRA whose main function would be to initiate preparatory work to assist the post-election Government to move ahead as quickly as possible.

A large number of studies, surveys and reports may be prepared during this year. The Unit should prepare detailed Work Programmes for each of these tasks so that the output serves ultimate objectives.

The National Statistical Organisation

A modern state spends between $4 and $10 per capita on the preparation of statistics to enable government and public to take appropriate decisions. PEDRA should undertake a study to establish a National Statistical Organisation, and to train professional statisticians and experts to manage such an Organisation.

The Establishment of a National Bureau of Standards

PEDRA should establish a commission to examine what code of standards should be adopted ,and to design the facilities required for the establishment of a National Bureau of Standards.

National Institute for Quality Management

Palestine has to become an exporting country. The quality of its products will determine its markets and its competitiveness. It is absolutely necessary to establish a National Institute for Quality Management which would provide a strong capability for training and policy research in this domain.

Educational Testing Services

High quality standardised national tests to encourage private and public schools to work for higher standards should be established. It should also administer some university-entrance examinations.

Energy Policy

The supply of energy and various food components (cereals, rice, sugar, etc) will be one of the largest and most permanent drain on foreign exchange. In the case of energy it is absolutely essential to prepare an energy policy in order to promote the use of local and renewable sources of energy as well as to establish as early as possible a sound basis for the efficient use of energy.

Energy efficiency is a well established technology and considerable advances have been made in it. It is a technology that affects car imports,

operations and maintenance, insulation of buildings, code or design of buildings, operations of power stations, power transmission, use and maintenance of power and household equipment.

Solar energy is already in considerable use. Every effort should be made to improve and to extend its use. Renewable wind energy has emerged as a vital and cost effective source of power. The Jordan valley may be an economic source of thermal energy. Italy has developed the technology for geo-thermal energy exploitation and it may be useful to include this and other possible sources of energy supply in the recommended energy study.

The use of renewable energy and the development of energy efficiency will induce substantial savings in foreign exchange requirements.

Local and Central Government

PEDRA will establish a team specialised in Public Administration to study the priority requirements of local and central government , and arrange with universities to establish training programmes.

EC/PEDRA Information Coordinaton Center

This is an emergency, and time is very short. It will be impossible to establish at PEDRA within the next few months an adequate information data base on the enormous wealth of European competence and sources of information, consultancy firms and contractors.

It is thus recommended to establish a coordination center at the EC which PEDRA can contact for rapid assistance with a view to locating European firms and organisations which may be interested in undertaking various activities.

The good offices of an EC Coordination Center should be helpful in providing such information and also in making preliminary inquiries with the parties concerned. In all cases, PEDRA will specify the type of service required.

Operating Budget

It is obviously difficult to estimate PEDRA's operating budget. We expect requirements to be of the order of $10 to $20 million during the 12 months of its operations. We estimate that for this category of emergency, the cost of this proposed operation will be in the range of 1 to 2% of total funds expended.

It is estimated that PEDRA will have to manage and or mediate operations involving aid and business investments in excess of $1 billion during its first year; this is in addition to advance planning.

The rough distribution of expenditure will be as follows: salaries and fees for consultants (some 60 to 70%), office rent (2 to 4%); equipment (5 to 7%); information (5 to 8%); travel, per diem and communications (15 to 20%).

EC/PEDRA Joint Coordination Committee

Most of the funds allocated by the EC will be paid directly to contractors or suppliers. Thus close coordination between PEDRA and EC is essential at all stages of a programme/project: from the initiation of a consultancy to the completion and acceptance of the final product. Otherwise, considerable delays may take place.

PEDRA proposes that a Joint EC/PEDRA Coordination Committee be established to manage this aspect on a day-to-day basis. It will be necessary to develop and agree on detailed procedures so that both parties apply the same standards and methods.

PEDRA will be agreeable to adapt its procedures to EC methods and standards. The major consideration here is rationalising the system to reduce waste of time to all parties concerned.

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אל: יוסי ביילין

מאת: יאיר הירשפלד ורון פונדק

31 אוקטובר 93

פגישה עם ריין

1. נפגשנו היום עם ריין במשרדי הקהילה בת"א.
2. להלן הנושאים העיקריים שעלו במהלך הפגישה:

נושאים כלכליים

א. דווח שעראפת פנה לבנק מסחרי הממוקם בלונדון (ונמצא בבעלות של (DEUTSCHE BANK) וביקש סיוע ביעוץ פיננסי לגבי הפעילות הרלבנטית הפלסטינית באוטונומיה.
הבנק הלונדוני ביקש תמיכה כספית של השוק. הביע ביקורת הן לגבי הרעיון והן לגבי זהות הבנק שנבחר ריין תומך ברעיון המקורי של חברת ייעוץ בינ"ל שתפקח על ההכנסות וההוצאות של רשויות האוטונומיה.

ב. ריין הביע חשש שהפגישה של מזכירות המדינות התורמות (פאריס 5 נובמבר) לא תקדם מספיק את הנושא. הגיב בציניות באשר לפעילות המקדימה כולל נסיונתיו של הולסט להרויח הון פוליטי באמצעות המפגש. קיימת הסכמה בין השוק לבין הבנק העולמי שנציג הבנק העולמי (יוני במוצאו) ינהל בהמשך את הפעילות, בעיקר באמצעות תאום טלפוני בין המדינות השונות.

ג. ריין תומך בעקרון שעל הפלסטינים בגדמע ובעזה לשמר את המערכת האדמיניסטרטיבית הקיימת ולפעול על בסיסה. לדעתו על הפלסטינים לחזק את העיריות הקיימות ולפעול מתוכן. משתמע מדבריו שהוא גם תומך בפעילות על בסיס המחלקות הקיימות במנהל האזרחי ולא בביטולן והתחלה מנקודת אפס.

ד. ציין שהשוק האירופי מוכן להשקיע יותר בנושאי שיכון בשטחים. מאידך השוק לא יקצה כספים למימון שוטף ואף יחדול מלממן אוניברסיטאות ובתי חולים. מימון שוטף כולל מימון המשטרה צריך להעשות מכספי איסוף מיסים. ריין דוחה לחלוטין הרעיון הפלסטיני לשחרר למשך שנתיים את התושבים מתשלום מיסים.

בקשות מישראל

א. הבנק הערבי (בבעלות הפלסטיני שומאן) מעוניין לפתוח סניפים בשטחים. ריין קיבל רמזים מירדן שהרשויות בישראל מכבידות על קבלת אישורים ומבקש לקצר התהליכים הבירוקרטים.

ב. מציע שישראל תגיע להסדר קוטות בנושאי חקלאות עם הפלסטינים, באשר לתעשיה מציע שוק פתוח.

ג. מבקש שישראל תמשיך לאסוף מיסים בשטחים עד העברת הסמכויות.

E.C.F

א. ריין הביע עניין במציאת דרך לסייע כספית ל- ECF. על פי הצעתו אנו אמורים להכין מיידית נייר ובו בקשה של ECF לממן פעילות הקשורה בקידום פרויקטים משולשים (ישראל - פלסטינים - מדינות שוק) סביב תהליך השלום וישום הסכם העקרונות. המדובר ב - START UP CAPITAL שינתן מתקציב הקהילה הקשור לפרויקטים משותפים. ריין מצפה שאתה תתמוך ברעיון בשיחה היום.

ב. ריין הביע עניין ומוכנות לממן שני פרויקטים שהוצעו על ידנו, האחד בתחום בדיקת היתכנות של הקמת קרן פיתוח אזורית ישראלית-פלסטינת-ירדנית. והשני בתחום המסחר בין ישראל-ירדן-פלסטינים,
הוחלט שנעביר מוקדם ככל האפשר הצעות מחקר לשני הפרויקטים.

6/10/93

Orbe

A. Create an Israeli-Palestinian Economic Brainstorming

Working Group

1. Aims:

   a. Create an informal, non-official exchange of ideas in order to challenge, as well as support official policies;

   b. determine jointly the optimal parameters for Israeli-Palestinian cooperation in the economic spheres:
      i. identify mutual fears of cooperation and define necessary limits;
      ii. identify spheres were cooperation is wanted and necessary;
      iii. define parameters for tri- and multilateral cooperation.

   c. evaluate optimal guidelines for Palestinian physical and institutional infrastructure development and identify potential Israeli support and opposition;

   d. evaluate optimal guidelines for promoting Israeli-Palestinian-Arab regional cooperation and identify potential Palestinian support and opposition;

2. Proposed Practical Moves:

   a. obtain agreement of proposed candidates to participate in the suggested brainstorming:
      i. Palestinians: Yussuf Sayigh, Samir Abdallah, Samir Hleileh, Z. Mayassi and Sari Nusseibeh;
      ii. Israelis: Immanuel Sharon, Avishai Bravermann, Avia Spivak, Ehud Kaufmann, Yair and Ron;

   b. organise first Israeli-Palestinian workshop with informal agenda, as soon as possible;

   c. submit confidential report to decision-makers and prepare further meetings once in four months.

3. Budget:

costs of first meeting:		
12 flight tickets	a US $ 1 400,-	$ 16 800,-
2x12 hotel accomodation	a $ 200	$ 4 800,-
conference room, per diem costs and miscellaneous		$ 2 000,-

Ceil !!, per diem (OV rate

200 expert hours (Yair and Ron) per hour $ 100,-		$ 20 000,-
Secretarial work 150 hours per hour $ 20,-		$ 3 000,-
total for one meeting		$ 46 600,-
three meetings a year	sum total	$ 139 800,-

B. Create a Four-Partite Middle East Economic Progress Monitoring Group

Aims:

1. Report on a two-monthly basis on:
   a. coordination and implementation of international aid activities;
   b. coordination and implementation of economic policies between Israel, PISGA, Jordan and others (monitor Israeli, Palestinian and Jordanian policies);
   c. the growth of the Palestinian economy.

2. Establish a close working relationship between leading economists and people with high public standing in Israel, the Territories, Jordan, the United States and Norway.

3. Create a multilateral instrument for public criticism, documenting hereby the effectivity of public accountability and its impact on the creation of democratic patterns of policy making.

Participants:

This project is led by Prof. Stanley Fisher of Harvard University (Institute for Social and Economic Policies in the Middle East [ISEPME]);
the Jordanian group will be led by Tayssir Abu Jaber, former Minister of Labour and Secretary General of the Royal Committee for Social and Economic Policies;
the Israeli group will be led by Immanuel Sharon, former Director-General of the Ministry of Finances and presently chairman of the board of directors of Bank HaPoalim;
the Palestinian group will be led by Sari Nusseibeh, or by Atef Awatmeh, presently head of the Palestinian committee for taxation.

The FAFO Contribution:

As Harvard University is already promoting this project with full speed and its own financial backing, the FAFO contribution should be related to participating in this effort with the assistance of liaison activities to be carried out by Yair Hirschfeld and Ron Pundik, and an economic adviser, who shall assist them.

The Norwegian team, involved in economic development programming should assist in this effort providing guidance, information and ongoing feed-back in regard to the performance of this endeavour.

Proposed Steps:

1. Organisation of a second coordination meeting (a first coordination meeting was held at Harvard at the beginning of October);
2. establishment of liaison offices in Amman, East-Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Boston and Oslo;
3. work on the first report has already started; it should be published within the coming two months.

Budget:

The general budget for this project will be provided by Harvard University; the Norwegian government shall provide financial support for the necessary expert work behind the scenes in Israel and for Norwegian participation.

a. Expert advice; Yair Hirschfeld and Ron Pundik; 100 hours per month (50 hours each) per year	US $	120.000,-
b. Economic experts advice per year	US $	120.000,-
d. travel costs in Israel and abroad	US $	50.000,-
e. overhead, including secretarial expenses and office costs	US $	50.000,-
total	US $	340.000,-

C. The Promotion of Democratic Structures and Thinking

1. General:

The signing of the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles on September 13, 1993, has created the necessary political understanding for the establishment of Palestinian self-government in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Accordingly, the Palestinians will be engaged, in the two years to come and afterwards, in a historic exercise of nation building, to comprise among other tasks: the establishment of national institutions, the formation of the future corps of civil servants, the definition of rules for political, legal and economic decision-making, the promulgation (or the failure to do so) of a constitution and the education for democracy of the public and the young generation.

The international community will offer its strong and powerful support for the Palestinian effort of nation-building and hence has the duty, as well as the right, to contribute not only towards economic development, but similar to the dissemination of democratic principles. This has to be done in a variety of complementary approaches, as will be outlined below.

2. Six Complementary Approaches:

a. Instruction of Police and Civil Servants:

Presently and in the months to come the Palestinians are engaged in training their police forces and their corps of future civil servants. These instruction activities are carried out partly in the territories, partly in Jordan and Egypt and partly abroad.

Particular for the instruction of the police force the provision of courses on human rights, on constitutional thinking, the legal rights and obligations of law enforcement is of vital importance.

FAF0 should head a small task force in this sphere and assist in the preparation of adequate course curricula. Yair Hirschfeld and Ron Pundik will create the necessary liaison with the Israeli Minister of Police and will supervise also the preparation of course curricula.

b. The Creation of a Democratic Ruling Structure:

Palestinian society has developed during past centuries loyalty bonds to the family, the tribe, the region and the nation. An effective ruling structure has to aim at integrating these different loyalties into one holistic approach, which will maintain autonomous rights of decision and policy making on the grass root level, while forming at the same time an effective united national political structure.

The prevailing legal and constitutional situation in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip provides important political rights to the existing structure of the village councils and the municipalities. These structures, their political rights and their impact on grass root participation in the political process should be reinforced within the structure of the creation of an emerging national constitution.

The FAFO task force should prepare in cooperation with the Hebrew University (Prof. Naomi Hazan) a short (and quickly produced) study on a suggested political and constitutional structure. Yair Hirschfeld and Ron Pundik will create the necessary liaison and will supervise the preparation of this project.

c. Developing a Democratic Approach in Economic Decision Making:

The limitations of government involvement in economic decision-making, the accountability of government agencies in regard to their economic (and other) performances, as well as the promotion of private initiative are seen today as central factors in the making of a democratic society.

The creation of a Middle East Economic Progress Report Group (see above: Document B) will create a major contribution to the promotion of a democratic approach in this sphere, too.

d. Public Education on the University Level:

the dissemination of democratic and constitutional thinking among the younger generation, the intellectual elite to come, is of essential importance for guaranteeing (as far as this is possible) a future adherence to democracy.

The FAFO task force should develop a university program, in line with the experience gained by the Sorbonne in promoting such programs in Moscow and St. Petersburg. There, a high-prestige two-year graduate course has been conceptualized and implemented, teaching the principles of democratic institution building, the history of constitutionalism, the legal aspects of democracy, the sociology of grass root politics and modern political philosophy.

For the development of such a program, liaison should be created with Prof. Marek Halter from Paris, who has organised and run this teaching program in Russia. Yair Hirschfeld and Ron Pundik would again create the necessary liaison work and supervise the preparation of the proposed curricula.

Evidently, for the promotion of this program, practical cooperation and financial support should be obtained from

the French Government.

e. Public Education on the High School Level

The dissemination of the concept of democracy among high school students obviously is of great importance in the creation of democratic attitudes and perceptions among the entire society.

The Institute for Education in the Arab Sector of the University of Haifa, headed by Dr. Majjid al-Hajj has gained much experience in the promotion and implementation of curricula for democracy in Arab high schools in Israel.

The FAFO task force should be engaged in adapting these programs to the needs of Palestinian society and their high schools in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Yair Hirschfeld and Ron Pundik will again create the necessary liaison and supervise the adaption of the proposed curricula.

f. Islam and Democracy

The cultural, political and social centrality of Islam and its impact on Palestinian society (and other societies in the Middle East) cannot be ignored in the preparation and dissemination of democratic rules and principles in the entire Middle East.

Islam in its religious doctrines, in its past history of political institution building, in its legal concepts and in its general cultural approach is by no means alien or hostile to the development of democratic principles, although non-democratic political doctrines have in the past and in the presence been developed from Islamic sources.

On the issue of developing democratic thinking based and embedded on the culture of Islam, much work has been done in Germany in cooperation with Egyptian and Pakistani scholars. Such a task force has been headed by Dr. Gudrun Kraemer from the Institut fuer Politik und Wissenschaft (Munich), while related work has been carried out by the Orient-Institut in Hamburg.

The FAFO task force should investigate the adaptability of this approach. Yair Hirschfeld and Ron Pundik shall be engaged in the necessary liaison and supervision of possible program adaptations.

3. Proposed Practical Steps

A FAFO task force should be immediately created, which during the coming six months should develop the necessary programs and submit them for financing to outside public and private donors.

4. Budget

Consultancy work of Yair Hirschfeld and Ron Pundik		
120 hours per month	US $ 100,- per hour	S $ 12 000,-
duration six months		$ 72,000
travel costs and office expenses		$ 18,000

COM (93) 375 final

FUTURE RELATIONS AND COOPERATION BETWEEN THE COMMUNITY AND THE MIDDLE EAST

Communication to the Council and Parliament

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Introduction

1. The Community and its Member States have been fully committed to the achievement of a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East, throughout the Arab-Israeli conflict and have congratulated the parties on the historic step which has been made in negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. This should give an impetus to the other bilateral negotiations and to the multilateral talks on future cooperation.

2. The purpose of the present Communication is to explore longer term perspectives for involving Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, the Occupied Territories and Syria in a process of regional cooperation, supported by the Community, which should consolidate the emerging peace settlement.

3. The Community's experience with regional cooperation and its involvement in the peace process, especially in the multilateral talks, has led it to the conclusion that a longer term approach to problems of regional cooperation and security is now needed. Indeed the parties to the conflict have requested that the Community help develop such an approach.

4. It is, therefore, timely for the Community and its Member States to present to the parties a global perspective on the gains which the region as a whole can expect in the context of a political settlement. The Community is well placed for this task. It has close relations with all the parties directly concerned and has a strong interest in the region's security and stability. In its relations with the Middle East, the Community will continue to promote democracy, pluralism, the respect for human rights, the tolerance of minorities and coexistence of different cultures and religions.

5. Accordingly, this Communication seeks to address three basic questions:

   (i) What are the conditions for cooperation in the region?
   (ii) What role should the Community and its Member States play in making cooperation irreversible?
   (iii) How should the triangle of relations between the Community, Israel and the Mashrak be developed to optimise benefits for all the parties?

I. THE CONDITIONS FOR COOPERATION

1. From peace process to cooperation process

Peace is the pre-condition for the successful development of regional cooperation. The Community's own experience demonstrates that war between previously hostile parties can be made unthinkable through economic integration. While this model cannot easily be transposed to the Middle East, it does suggest that the development of regional economic cooperation can be a powerful tool in reducing the level of conflict, making peace irreversible and encouraging the people of the region to learn to live in peace. In this context, the Community should support efforts by the regional parties to establish systematic forms of cooperation in areas vital to their economic progress and well being such as water and energy.

The peace process should therefore be followed by a "cooperation process" between the parties in the region.

2. Partnership requires balanced economic development

If cooperation is to succeed, it is essential to reduce excessive disparities in income levels between potential partners in the region. Despite efforts on their part, none of the Mashrak countries have yet achieved self-sustaining growth. Israel, on the other hand, enjoys living standards comparable to those in western Europe, although it is a substantial aid recipient. These standards are more than ten times higher than those of its neighbours. According to the World Bank, seven million Israelis could achieve by 2010 a GDP nearly equal to that of the 130 million Arabs in neighbouring countries. These gaps are similar to the income gap separating Europe and the Arab world on the southern Mediterranean coast.

In the long term, the chances of maintaining peace in the Middle East will be significantly influenced by the pace of economic development throughout the area. This requires, above all, enormous efforts to be undertaken by the Arab countries themselves. But it implies, equally, the firm commitment of Europe, Israel and the Gulf countries and the wider international community to assist them in their endeavours.

II. PROMOTING A SUSTAINABLE COOPERATION PROCESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

1. Steps towards regional cooperation

Peace will be sustainable in the Middle East if the peace agreements, once concluded, are followed by a long term cooperation process between the regional parties. A climate of confidence could best be generated in a pragmatic manner through small steps rather than ambitious undertakings. This will encourage the regional parties to reflect together, to develop habits of cooperation and gradually to consider creating institutional arrangements.

Initially, cooperation has more chance to succeed in the private sector and between business federations, universities, municipalities, technical institutions. The process could start with any group of partners ready to go ahead in any field, from economy to culture.

Community experience demonstrates how difficult it is to sustain regional cooperation efforts without institutions. That is why this process should lead the countries of the region along the path of "progressive institutionalisation", as Europe did in the 1950s starting with the Coal and Steel Community.

2. A common regional vision

This cooperative approach has been initiated in the multilateral working groups of the peace process in order to contribute to a common regional vision for the development of the Middle East. To this end, cooperation should go in two directions: the pooling of common capacities and the tackling of common problems.

One of the obstacles to effective economic and social development is the small size of the countries concerned which limits economies of scale. It would, therefore, be useful for the parties to consider how their economic prospects could be enhanced by:

- creating the basis for a future Middle Eastern economic area implying, at some stage, freedom of movement for goods, services, capital and labour;
- efficient regional infrastructures in areas such as transport, communications, energy, water management;
- better use of available resources in tourism, education, research, agriculture, industry.

Energy, water as well as health, the environment and the problem of refugees are among the common problems stretching beyond national borders which should be tackled in order to help the populations to lead a better life, and hence to increase political stability and regional security.

A regional approach to economic development could offer particular advantages to the Occupied Territories and to Lebanon where economic revitalisation is the key issue.

3. The process should be assisted by outside parties

The experience of the peace process shows the usefulness of working with outside partners, acting as catalysts. Their active presence will undoubtedly remain necessary for a long time to come. The basic multilateral institutional framework created at the Madrid conference should, therefore, remain in place. It might well evolve into a regional organisation, along the lines of the OECD, with the increasing involvement of the regional parties and Europe.

III. FUTURE RELATIONS WITH THE MIDDLE EAST

1. A balanced triangular relationship

Europe should be prepared to offer further support to the region to consolidate peace and to encourage regional integration. A triangular relationship between Europe, the Mashrak and Israel should be carefully balanced to open cooperation opportunities according to the capacities of each partner and should also lead to closer relations between Israel and the Mashrak. Accordingly:

1) the Mashrak countries and Israel should be encouraged to undertake economic reforms and regional co-operation;
2) the Community should offer the Mashrak countries a closer partnership along the lines of that offered to the Maghreb countries, while taking into account the specific characteristics of each country concerned;
3) the Community should offer Israel the same concept of partnership adapted to its situation, and should involve Israel more closely with European developments where common ground and interests exist;
4) relations with all the countries of the region should be based on respect for human rights and the strengthening of democracy; in any agreements with the Community the specific clause will be inserted indicating that respect for human rights and the strengthening of democracy are essential elements of the agreement.

In the present state of fragmentation in the region, the gains brought about by reforms at national level will not be able, by themselves, to yield sufficient economic effects. Regional cooperation would add important economies of scale and opportunities for economic specialisation. Therefore, one of the objectives of the future EC agreements with the Middle East countries should be to promote regional cooperation and institutions (for example water and energy management).

Despite the fact that the Community concluded cooperation agreements with the five countries concerned in the late 1970s, the intensity of relations (trade, investments, science and technology, culture, political dialogue) neither reflects the region's strategic importance for the Community, nor its geographic proximity. They have asked the Community to give special attention to the development of mutual relations against the background of the completion of the internal market, European Union, its involvement with countries of central and eastern Europe, the Gulf countries and the Maghreb countries.

The new Community approach should be based on the realisation that the time has come to move away from pure development cooperation to partnership, engendering new forms of cooperation in many fields, whether political, social or economic.

2. Europe and the Mashrak

The Community's commitment to supporting the Mashrak economies will express its confidence in the region's future. For their part, the Mashrak countries will need to demonstrate their commitment to partnership by continuing the reform process and taking concrete measures to promote regional integration.

This partnership should be based on:

- political dialogue;
- progress towards free trade;
- encouragement to reform;
- support for regional cooperation;
- financial cooperation.

Regular political dialogue will be an essential element given the strategic importance of the region.

Trade should be an important element in the new agreements. The progressive dismantling on each side of tariff barriers could lead to regional free trade early in the 21st century. This would have a positive impact on inter-Arab and Israeli-Arab relations. The parties would, thus, participate in a wide area of cooperation and increasing economic freedom comprising Europe and a major part of the Arab world.

It will be essential to assist the Mashrak countries in their efforts to reform their political and economic systems, to move to a market economy and to control population growth.

All possible areas of regional cooperation encouraging the Mashrak countries to modernise their economies, should therefore be envisaged: macroeconomic issues, dialogue in all economic sectors, investment, employment, standards, customs, environment, science, technology, education, infrastructure, culture, demography, combatting drugs, etc.

Appropriate forms of financial cooperation will be developed. The new EC-Mashrak parthership will require adequate funding both from public sources and increasingly through direct private investment.

3. Europe and Israel

Israel's particular profile should be taken into account in future EC-Israel relations and in regional cooperation in a triangular framework.

With a growing GDP per capita of more than $12,000 and a highly trained work force, Israel sees its future as a producer and exporter of high value-added goods and services, closely linked to the European Economic Area and institutions. Israel would wish to participate in various types of networks linking the Community and other European countries, which are not open to non-European third parties.

Although the Community's relations with Israel should be based on the same basic concept of partnership which it intends to apply in its future cooperation with the Maghreb and Mashrak countries, the substance of this partnership should take into account Israel's level of development.

Political dialogue, free trade in goods, capital and services and encouragement for regional cooperation should be included in the Community's relations with Israel in addition to intensive cooperation in all fields from banking to technology, energy, agriculture, industrial property etc.

4. Israel and the Mashrak

Whatever the future configuration of relations between Europe, Israel and the Mashrak, the Community should do its utmost to convince its Israeli and Arab partners to embark on long term cooperative relations and work together towards balanced regional economic development.

It is therefore essential that the eventual peace settlement be strengthened by bilateral and multilateral Arab-Israeli cooperation agreements and possibly by joint institutions.

Israel should be encouraged to participate in the development of the whole region and assisted in this endeavour. The new contractual relations to be established between the Community and all the parties of the region will contribute to this.

IV. CONCLUSION

Regional cooperation will only succeed with support from outside partners. The Community, because of its geopolitical situation, its close links with all the parties concerned and its own experience with regional cooperation, has a major role to play. It could also help to facilitate the rapprochement between the parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict by upgrading its own links with each of the countries concerned.

This paper should contribute to the Community's policies towards the Middle East in the context of the achievement of peace. The resulting guidelines should be translated into work programmes to be implemented while peace is being established in the region and security strengthened.

Other complementary initiatives dealing with short and medium term issues will be proposed shortly by the Commission, as necessary, in the light of the evolution of the peace process.

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

COM(93) 458 final

Brussels, 29 September 1993

COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

EC SUPPORT TO THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

EC SUPPORT TO THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

Communication to the Council and the Parliament

1. Introduction

With the breakthrough represented by signing of the Israeli/PLO Agreement the Middle East peace process has reached a critical phase. The relationship between Israel and the Palestinians is at the core of the Arab/Israel problem. The difficulties between Israel and the Arab neighbours may now begin to be resolved. A comprehensive peace settlement could be within reach if negotiations are pursued in all tracks of the Madrid framework. The signature of an agenda for negotiations between Jordan and Israel is an initial indication of this.

However, the situation is not irreversible. Public opinion both in Israel and in the Occupied territories is volatile and could be influenced in the short term by extremist acts of violence and in the longer term by the failure to secure concrete economic achievements.

The comprehensive nature of peace is not yet secured and the future of the Israel/PLO Agreement is therefore uncertain.

For the future the success of the peace process will depend on two factors :

- the engagement of Israel, Syria and Lebanon in concrete negotiations;
- the perception by the populations concerned that the first steps towards peace are bringing an immediate improvement in material conditions.

On the diplomatic front there should be continued support for the process begun in Madrid, with emphasis now on Syria and Lebanon.

On the economic front the time is now right for the EC, together with the international community and especially the Gulf countries, to embark on an ambitious co-operation programme which would embrace the economic development of the West Bank and Gaza, bearing in mind the need also for international efforts in favour of the region as a whole.

The progress being made in the bilateral negotiations should have an impact on the multilaterals. The European Community, which has been called upon to play a leading role in this area, should take the opportunity offered by the new climate in Israeli/Palestinian relations to give an impetus to regional cooperation.

The Community has built up experience of activities in the region as a whole and in the Occupied territories over a number of years and is now the largest aid donor to the territories (see details in annex 1).

The present paper sets out the Commission's views on how the EC could lend its support to that process in dealing :

- with the most urgent and specific needs, to help the Palestinians succeed in their move towards autonomy;

- with the global aspects of the region, to ensure that both Israel and the Mashrak countries derive positive and concrete benefits from the peace process.

2. Future EC cooperation with the Occupied territories, Israel and the Mashrak countries

To ensure the success of the peace process it is essential that efforts to bring conditions in the Occupied territories up to a satisfactory economic level are accompanied by action to support the economic development of the region as a whole.

(a) West Bank and Gaza

For the years 1994-98, the Commission proposes that 500 Mecu be made available by the Community in the form of grants and long-term loans. Half of this amount would be charged to the Community budget and the remainder is expected to be provided through EIB lending (with appropriate guarantees from the Community budget). For statutory reasons, EIB participation in the assistance package would require the introduction of new legal and administration arrangements. EIB lending would therefore develop progressively after those arrangements have been introduced and until 1996 under the 1.8 billion ECU ceiling currently in place(1).

The Commission considers this amount to be an appropriate contribution taking account of the overall needs and absorptive capacity of the Palestinians and the financial capacity of the Community.

The World Bank has estimated on a preliminary basis the minimum capital requirements of Gaza and the West Bank to be in the range of 500-550 million US$ per year (1994-2003).

The Commission proposes that the Community should make a substantial contribution, the remainder to be forthcoming from other sources (Member States, other European countries, USA, Arab Gulf States, Japan, Canada, Australia, etc.).

The Community's approach should focus on two complementary aims : in the short term, capitalising on projects already under way and which bear fruit in 1993/94, to give visibility to EC co-operation; in the medium term, to contribute to the economic normalisation of the territories :

- Projects already under way which could be easily extended are in the fields of housing, small credit and assistance for business and small and medium-sized enterprises, solid waste removal, sewage, Gaza hospital; to these could easily be added construction of classrooms, completion of industrial parks set up by the Israeli civil administration (see annex 2 for projects under immediate preparation);

- in the medium term EC resources should contribute to improving the economic and social infrastructure (housing, schooling, water supply, sewage). At the same time they should help the Palestinians to rapidly generate urgently-needed employment, in particular by providing a modern infrastructure for private

(1) EIB loans on the horizontal cooperation facility of the "Redirected Mediterranean Policy"

business activities (telecommunications, road connections, electricity, industrial estates, etc.), and by creating an environment favorable to the development of small and medium-sized enterprises.

Financial cooperation could be channelled through the future Palestinian Council. This is in accordance with standard practice in the Community and Member States.

In order to enable the Palestinians to handle large amounts of international assistance, the Commission considers it important to help them to establish the requisite technical and financial machinery, a planning and financing authority (which might be designed along the lines of the Lebanese Council for Development and Reconstruction).

The Commission is prepared to put at the disposal of the Palestinians the necessary technical assistance.

Coordination between donors is necessary. It is the Commission's view that the Community, as the main financial contributor, should seek to play a central role in this coordination.

In the Commission's view, it will suffice to set up, in the context of the Regional Economic Development Working Group (REDWG), a sub-group entitled "Palestinian and Economic Development Working Group" (PEDWG), in which all donors would participate, with the World Bank being fully involved. This Group could meet regularly once every 3 months in the beginning and later twice every year.

The Commission's representative in the territories should take up his position shortly, together with his staff of technical assistants.

(b) Israel and the Mashrak countries

The necessary focus on Gaza and the West Bank should be complemented by increased Community cooperation with the region as a whole.

There must be an appropriate balance between the Community's substantial assistance in favour of some 4 million Palestinians(1) on the one hand, and 80 million people living in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Israel on the other hand.

In its communication on "Future Relations and Cooperation between the Community and the Middle East" (COM (93) 375), the Commission has set out its long-term vision.

It has proposed a dual approach:

- the need for the Community to help the countries of the region (including the Palestinians) to step up their regional cooperation;

(1) including the Palestinians in the region assisted by UNRWA.

- the need for the Community to upgrade its contractual relations with each of the countries of the region if they so desire.

Regional Cooperation

The Community could offer these countries a substantial volume of technical and financial assistance for regional cooperation. Since 1992 the Community has already done so. Under the new Mediterranean policy for 1992-96 it has set aside considerable budgetary and loan resources for regional cooperation in the Mediterranean in general (Maghreb, Mashrak, Turkey).(2)

Due to the absence of peace and therefore cooperation, only a small amount of these resources have been used so far in favour of the Middle East.

The prospect for peace will open new possibilities for cooperation in the region. There will be, in the years to come, new requirements for the financing of appropriate intra-regional infrastructure (roads, telecommunications, etc) and water and energy projects, etc.

The Commission believes, therefore, that the Community should be ready to announce its willingness to underpin that process through making available, as part of a wider international action, appropriate finance and through offering its know-how on regional cooperation.

Especially in the longer term, it would be useful to examine ways to promote joint management of regional strategic resources and infrastructures. This could prepare the ground for the establishment, when conditions permit, of a Regional Community for water, energy and infrastructure. To this end, the Commission has set up a working group to study the principles which could underpin this idea and the ways to assist in its long term implementation.

Furthermore, the Community has a specific role to play in promoting regional cooperation among the political and intellectual decision-makers of the region. To this end, the Commission intends to step up its own efforts to organise seminars, workshops, etc., in order to bring together leaders of the Middle East countries, as the Commission has done with the Israelis and Palestinians in the years 1989-93.

The Community is ready to invite regional parties to exchange views on the priorities for regional cooperation over the coming years.

Until 1995-96, financial resources will be made available within the context of the Mediterranean Policy to meet the initial priorities. In addition, the EC will look further ahead at the possible need for additional budget and loan resources, in order to allow the necessary long-term planning to proceed.

(2) 360 Mecu per annum EIB loans and 65 Mecu per annum, on average, budgetary resources.

Upgrading EC bilateral relations

The 1975 EC/Israel Cooperation Agreement, providing essentially for free trade between Israel and the Community, should be replaced by a new Agreement. In particular it should open new areas in the fields of trade, services and cooperation in a wide range of sectors (in particular science and technology). To this end, the Commission submits a proposal for Negotiating Directives and hopes that the Council will speedily act upon these.

The EC should be prepared to respond positively to any wish by Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria to embark on a new dialogue with the Community.

More particularly, in order to help the Arab countries of the region to enter into free trade with Israel and among themselves, it might be helpful if the Community, at the same time, embarked on a process leading to the establishment of a free trade area with these countries in the foreseeable future.

It is not possible to negotiate an international agreement with the West Bank and Gaza; however, ways should be found to arrive at a structured relationship between the EC and the Palestinian self-government, covering all aspects of cooperation with them.

3. In conclusion, the Commission calls upon the Council and the Parliament:

- to endorse these general guidelines, which are designed to underpin the on-going Peace Process;
- to note that the Commission will make further specific proposals as and when necessary;
- to keep the matter under regular review within the appropriate institutional set-up.

COM/93.458-5

ANNEX 1

COMMUNITY AID TO THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

1. Background

Up until 1980 the Community aid to the Palestinian population, whether inside or outside of the Occupied territories, was limited to the refugees. From 1971 on there had been a cooperation with UNRWA which was and still is formally translated into Conventions. Between 1971 and 1980 the total amount of this aid was $ 132 million. In 1981 a new approach for the benefit of the Palestinian population started consisting of direct Community aid under different budget lines which until 1986 reached a total of ecu 8.98 million. From 1987 on there has been a specific budget line (now Article B7-406) for direct development aid to the territories.

2. Guidelines

Community action is based on the 1980 Venice declaration: support of UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338; the right of Palestinians to self-determination; the right of all states in the area to live in security and peace.

The 1986 Council guidelines defined the main principles of the Community attitude towards the Palestinian population and Israel with regard to the territories.

The priority areas are the following:

- small-scale employment-generating projects or measures in the agricultural and industrial sectors, in particular by giving support to measures in the agricultural sector which would increase food self-sufficiency

- education/training, particularly in the vocational and technical fields;

- upgrading of local Palestinian institutions, such as Arab-run Municipalities, Universities and Colleges, professional organisations, etc. particularly through linkages with similar institutions in the European Community, in-country training, seminars.

In the 1989 European Council declaration of Strasbourg the Community and its Member States strongly confirmed their previous position and emphasized their commitment to support the Palestinian population in the territories. Education and health were singled out as areas to which particular attention should be devoted.

3. Description

Community aid to the Occupied territories has five main headings:

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(i) **Aid to refugees through UNRWA.** This takes place mostly through contributions to the regular UNRWA budget, which are spent on education, health and food aid programmes. In the years 1971 to 1992 this aid amounted to about ecu 518 million. It is for all refugees, even those who are not living in the Occupied territories. Since the latter represent approximately 38 percent of the total, it is estimated that under this heading aid to the territories amounted to about **ecu 197 million** for 1971-1992.

(ii) **Aid through co-financing with European NGOs.** In 1979-1992 the total amount contributed by the Commission was **ecu 12.8 million.** This was equivalent to a 38.6 percent contribution to projects for a total value of over ecu 33 million.

(iii) **Direct development aid** under budget lines B7-406 and B7-701 amounted in 1991 to ecu 70 million (including ecu 60 million exceptional aid) and in 1992 to ecu 17 million (including ecu 5 million exceptional aid). The figure for 1993 is ecu 35 million (including ecu 20 million for new actions). The total amount devoted to these lines from 1987 up to 1993 is **ecu 139 million.**

(iv) **Aid to promote direct Palestinian exports from the territories to Community markets.**

The Community has reduced import levies for certain Palestinian agricultural products from January 1993 to zero.

(v) **Emergency and exceptional aid interventions :** In 1992 the Community approved a contribution of **ecu 5 million** towards running costs of Palestinian hospitals. They will be disbursed in 1993/1994. In December 1992 the Community approved 6,000 T of wheat flour for the Gazan refugees through UNRWA and in June 1993 an additional amount of 6,000 T of wheat flour, 600 T of rice and 600 T of sugar were approved for refugees and non-refugees of the Gaza Strip.

ANNEX 2

PROJECTS UNDER PREPARATION BEFORE

THE END OF 1993 FOR GAZA AND THE WEST BANK

	MECU
Solid waste disposal in Rafa and Gaza City	2.5
Sewerage in Gaza Strip	10.0
Universities and Community Colleges, West Bank & Gaza	15.0
Technical assistance and studies	5.0
Establishment of local public TV and radio authority	2.0
Various infrastructures (energy, transport and communications)	0.704
Cooperation networks (local governments, universities and media)	2.30
Economic co-operation in the private sector	0.65
Support for the electoral process	4.0
Humanitarian aid(1)	6.0 (estimate)
Total :	48.154

The current housing programme will also be accelerated, leading to increased job creation.

(1) a Commission evaluation team is currently in the Occupied Territories.

LE SOUTIEN COMMUNAUTAIRE AU PROCESSUS DE PAIX AU PROCHE-ORIENT
Fiche Financière

1. INTITULE DE L'ACTION

EC support to the Middle East Peace Process
(Assistance financière aux Territoires de Cisjordanie et de Gaza)

2. LIGNE BUDGETAIRE CONCERNEE: Poste B7-406

3. BASE LEGALE: néant

4. DESCRIPTION DE L'ACTION

4.1. Objectifs spécifiques de l'action

En vue d'améliorer les conditions de vie de la population palestinienne, l'action vise le financement de l'investissement et des frais de fonctionnement dans les domaines de l'infrastructure, de la production (agriculture, pêche, l'industrie) des services (incl. tourisme), du commerce exterieure, du développement urbain et rural, de la santé, de l'environnement, du developpement des institution et administrations, de la formation et de l'enseignement. Elle permet également l'assistance technique nécessaire pour l'exécution de telles aides et le coût de l'instruction et de suivi des projets.

4.2. Durée

1994 - 1998

4.3. Population visée par l'action

Les actions sont destinées à la population palestinienne des Territoires de Cisjordanie et de Gaza.

/Au4/cau:th2/FFIN/modele93

5. CLASSIFICATION DE LA DEPENSE (B7-406)

- *DNO*
- *CD*
- *Types de recettes visées: néant*

6. TYPE DE LA DEPENSE/RECETTE (B7-406)

- *Subvention à 100 %*
- *Aucun remboursement n'est prévu*
- *L'action proposée n'implique aucune une modification du niveau des recettes.*

7. INCIDENCE FINANCIERE

7.1 Mode de calcul du coût total de l'action pour l'exercice 1994

Le montant proposé en engagements tient compte de l'expérience acquise dans le passé, des besoins évidents et de la capacité d'absorption des institutions concernées. Il reflète aussi l'engagement de la Communauté à développer son soutien en faveur des Territoires Occupés, la déclaration du Conseil Européen de Strasbourg des 7 et 8 décembre 1989, et les orientations de la reunion informelle des Ministres des Affaires Etrangères à Aeden Biesen les 11/12 septembre 1993.

Vu d'une part le reste à liquider dû notamment à un engagement de 5,0 ECUS fin 92 et d'autre part la nécessité d'augumenter l'assistance aux territoires afin de contribuer à la reussite de l'accord intervenu entre Israel et l'OLP le 13 septembre 1993 une augmentation significative des credits d'engagement et de paiement est demandée.

7.2 Ventilation par éléments du coût de l'action en MECU (B7-406)

VENTILATION	Budget 93	Budget 94	Budget 95	Budget 96	Budget 97	Budget 98	Total
Assistance financière aux Territoires occupés de Cisjordanie et de Gaza	15+20	50	50	50	50	50	250

Les montants sont exprimés en écus courants

7.3.: néant

7.4. Echéancier indicatif des crédits d'engagement
(*pour les actions pluriannuelles assorties d'un MEN*)

en MioEcus

– Période d'application : 1994 – 1998

Situation cumulée fin 1992 (1)	Budget 1993	APB 1994	PROGRAMMATION INDICATIVE				TOTAL
			1995	1996	1997	1998	
44	15 + 20	50	50	50	50	50	250

8. DISPOSITIONS ANTI-FRAUDE PREVUES DANS LA PROPOSITION D'ACTION

Dispositions anti-fraude

Contrôles normaux de la commission

9. ELEMENTS D'ANALYSE COUT-EFFICACITE

9.1. Objectifs

Objectif(s) spécifique(s) : liens avec les objectifs plus généraux et les autres actions proposées dans la programmation financière indicative

En vue d'améliorer les conditions de vie de la population palestinienne, et de suporter le processus de paix dans la région l'action vise le financement de l'investissement et des frais de fonctionnement dans les domaines de l'infrastructure, de la production (agriculture, pêche, l'industrie) des services (incl. tourisme) du commerce exterieurs, du developpement urbain et rural, de la santé, de l'environnement, du developpement des institutions et administrations, de la formation, et de l'enseignement. Elle permet également l'assistance technique nécessaire pour l'exécution de telles aides et le coût de l'instruction et du suivi des projets.

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9.2 Justification de l'action

- *Coût: 250 MECU dans B7-406 pour 1994-1998 ce qui permettra à la* Communauté de donner un support au processus de paix et une aide significative à des populations qui ne sont pas couvertes par les accords de coopération conclus avec les Etats voisins.

- *Effets dérivés (impact au-delà de(s) objectif(s) spécifique(s)*: Les actions financées par cette ligne de crédit visent au developpement et renforcement de l'autonomie institutionnelle et économique qui réduira la dépendance des teritoires vis à vis du financement exterieur.

- *Effets multiplicateurs (capacité de mobilisation d'autres sources de financement)*: L'efficatité des actions de cette ligne budgétaire pourrait être multipliée par les efffets stimulants sur l'économie des Territoires Occupés qui attireront du capital local et international. De plus, la coordination avec d'autres donateurs l'influencera postivement les actions financées par cette ligne budgétaire.

9.3 Suivi et évaluation de l'action

- *Indicateurs de performance sélectionnés*

  Des indicateurs de performance spécifique sont établis pour chaque projet (par exemple: augmentation de la production en agriculture et du taux d'éautosuffisance alimentaire, volume des exportations des territoires concernés).

- *Modalités et périodicité de l'évaluation prévues*

  Les principaux secteurs financés feront l'objet d'évaluations annuelles.

- *Appréciation des résultats obtenus*

  Les résultats obtenu jusqu à présent montrent que la dégradation socio-économique a été ralentie par les actions précédents de la Communauté.

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משרד ראש הממשלה

ארכיון המדינה

טופס מראה מקום להוצאת תעודות יחידות*

חטיבה מס': 5

מיכל מס': 5517

תיק מס': 1

תאריך התעודה: 15/09/1993

שם מחבר התעודה: אלפרים גיא

שם הנמען: תפ"ש - יו"ש

סוג התעודה (סמן √ במקום המתאים):

- ☐ מכתב
- ☐ מברק
- ☐ תזכיר או מיזכר
- ☒ דין וחשבון או זכרון דברים משיחה או דיון
- ☐ פרוטוקול של שיחה, דיון או ישיבה

*הטופס ימולא בשני עותקים. העותק הירוק יוכנס לתיק במקום התעודה שהוצאה; העותק הלבן יצורף לתעודה שהוצאה.

[redacted]

הנדון: <u>שיח' אחמד יאסין - תמצית שיחה</u>

1. ב - 14 ספט' 93', למחרת חתימת ההסכם בין ישראל לאש"פ, נפגש הח"מ עם שיח' אחמד יאסין בתאו בכלא אשמורת. השיחה נמשכה שלוש שעות והתמקדה ברובה בעמדות השיח' לגבי ההתפתחויות המדיניות האחרונות. בשיחה נכח קמ"ן הכלא.

2. השיחה התנהלה באווירה טובה. השיח' היה נינוח לכל אורכה, והשיב בסבלנות רבה על כל שאלה תוך שימוש במובאות מהקוראן וההלכה האיסלאמית.

3. מנימת דבריו ומבין השיטין בתשובותיו, ניתן היה להתרשם היטב שהוא מבטא דעותיו כמנהיג תנועת החמא"ס. לעיתים קרובות דיבר בגוף ראשון, כאשר נשאל לגבי עמדות והחלטות מדיניות של תנועת החמא"ס, וערך הקבלות בין עמדותיו כמנהיג איסלאמי לבין עמדותיו של יאסר ערפאת, כמנהיג חילוני. בתוך כך הדגיש את הלגיטמיות הדתית בה הוא מייצג את הבעייה הפלסטינית לעומת העדר לגיטימיות של ערפאת.

4. השיח' מצוי בפרטי ההתפתחויות המדיניות ועוקב אחריהן באמצעות טלוויזיה וטרנזיסטור שבתאו. למרות הגישות הקיצוניות המוכרות של החמא"ס, שהשיח' חזר והשמיען, הוא גילה פרגמטיות מסוימת בשעה שהסביר כי החמא"ס לא חפעל בכוח נגד הפת"ח להכשלת ההסכם ובשעה שהביע עמדה חיובית עקרונית להשתתפות החמא"ס בבחירות (בתנאים מסויימים) ולנטילת חלק בממשל הפלסטיני בתחומים שבהם תוכל תנועתו להשפיע על אופיה של החברה הפלסטינית.

5. להלן תמצית דברי שיח' יאסין:

ההכרה בערפאת ואש"פ כנציג העם הפלסטיני - יאסר ערפאת אינו נבחר ואינו מייצג את העם הפלסטיני כנציג חוקי ויחיד. ההסכם שחתם עם ישראל נעשה על דעתו ומבלי לשאול את העם הפלסטיני והוא מחייב אותו בלבד. פלסטין אינה רכושו של ערפאת או של שליט ערבי כלשהו, אלא היא שייכת לכל המוסלמים ולכל הדורות, ועל כן ערפאת אינו רשאי לשאת ולתת עם ישראל על קרקע שאינה שלו, והוא יצטרך לשאת בתוצאות מעשיו, שסופם להיות מוכשלים ע"י העם הפלסטיני.

הסכם העקרונות - הוא דוחה את ההסכם באשר אינו מבהיר את הפתרונות לבעיות יסוד מהותיות: הגבולות והריבונות על הקרקע, סוגיית ירושלים, ההתנחלויות וזכות השיבה. הנסיגה המוצעת בהסכם היא מרצועת עזה ויריחו בלבד ואילו ביתר שטחי הגדה תהיה "היערכות מחדש" שמשמעותה המשך שליטה על האוכלוסיה הפלסטינית. מבחינתו, נסיגה מלאה מכל שטחי הרצועה והגדה המערבית שתבטיח את חירות הפלסטינים, היא תנאי בל יעבור להסכמת החמא"ס לבחירות ולמו"מ עם ישראל: "לא יתכן שנקבע את גורלנו ועתידנו (במו"מ עם ישראל) טרם שנקבל קודם את חירותנו".

יחסי פת"ח-חמא"ס - החמא"ס נגד שפיכות דמים בהיעדר סיבה דתית ("סבב שרעי") והיא פועלת כאופוזיציה אחראית: "איננו כאש"פ וערפאת הנוהגים בדרך של חיסול מתנגדיהם". החמא"ס קראה בעבר לדיאלוג פלסטיני וכך עשתה גם לאחרונה; עם זאת היא תתנגד לשלטון דיקטטורי של מפלגה אחת (של הפת"ח) שתשלוט, כפי שהדבר קורה במדינות ערב ותתנגד לדמוקרטיה כוזבת. **השיח' מגנה בתוקף את הקריאות של אחראים בישראל, ביניהם שרים, המסיתים את אש"פ לחסל את החמא"ס בכוח הנשק. זוהי הסתה ברורה למלחמת אחים בקרב הפלסטינאים.**

השתתפות בבחירות למועצה הפלסטינית - שיח' יאסין אמר: "טרם גיבשתי עמדתי לגבי סוגייה זו. אחליט על כך רק לאחר שאדע מהם התנאים בהם יתקיימו הבחירות. לא ייתכן שנלך לבחירות כשהצבא נמצא בקירבת מקום ולא נוכל להביע את עמדתנו בחופשיות במערכת הבחירות". לדבריו, ישראל הוכיחה בתקריות ברמאללה (ב-11 ספט') שהיא מונעת חופש הפגנה של החמא"ס בעוד מאפשרת הפגנות של תומכי ההסכם. החמא"ס לא תיזום מצידה התנגשויות עם הפלגים האחרים (במערכת הבחירות) אך תגיב אם הצד השני יתחיל בכך. במידה והחמא"ס תשתתף בבחירות היא תדרוש את חלקה בסמכויות הממשל, בעיקר בתחומים בהם תרצה להשפיע על אופי החברה הפלסטינית. במקרה זה תשאף גם להשפיע על אופי ההסדר עם ישראל.

קונפדרציה עם ירדן - הרעיון הוא ביסודו רעיון של "איחוד" ובזה החמא"ס תומכת, אך האופציה הזו תיתכן רק לאחר שיושגו זכויותיו המלאות של העם הפלסטיני ותהיה מדינה פלסטינית. מאידך, תתנגד החמא"ס לקונפדרציה עם ישראל.

האינתפאדה - האינתיפאדה תמשך בכל מקום בו כוחות צה"ל נמצאים בשטחים הכבושים. האינתיפאדה פרצה מתוך החלטה של העם הפלסטיני ולא מטעמו של ערפאת ועל-כן ערפאת לא יכול לקרוא להפסקתה. העם עצמו יפסיק את האינתיפאדה כאשר יווכח שקיבל את זכויותיו.

דו-קיום בין שתי מדינות - רעיון קיומה של מדינה פלסטינית לצד ישראל לא יעלה יפה ולא יאריך זמן, אלא יתמוטט בתוך שנים ספורות. זאת, משום שבעיות היסוד לא תפתרנה: לדעתו ישראל לא תסכים לוותר על ירושלים ועל הישובים בגדה המערבית ותרצה להשאיר כוחותיה כדי להגן על ישובים אלה, ומאידך, לא יותר לפליטי 48' להתיישב בשטחי פלסטין.

אפרים לביא, סא"ל

ע/רמ"ח לעניני ערבים

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COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION

FUTURE RELATIONS AND COOPERATION BETWEEN THE COMMUNITY AND THE MIDDLE EAST

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Introduction

1. The Community and its Member States have been fully committed to the achievement of a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East, throughout the Arab-Israeli conflict and have congratulated the parties on the historic step which has been made in negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. This should give an impetus to the other bilateral negotiations and to the multilateral talks on future cooperation.

2. The purpose of the present Communication is to explore longer term perspectives for involving Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, the Occupied Territories and Syria in a process of regional cooperation, supported by the Community, which should consolidate the emerging peace settlement.

3. The Community's experience with regional cooperation and its involvement in the peace process, especially in the multilateral talks, has led it to the conclusion that a longer term approach to problems of regional cooperation and security is now needed. Indeed the parties to the conflict have requested that the Community help develop such an approach.

4. It is, therefore, timely for the Community and its Member States to present to the parties a global perspective on the gains which the region as a whole can expect in the context of a political settlement. The Community is well placed for this task. It has close relations with all the parties directly concerned and has a strong interest in the region's security and stability. In its relations with the Middle East, the Community will continue to promote democracy, pluralism, the respect for human rights, the tolerance of minorities and coexistence of different cultures and religions.

5. Accordingly, this Communication seeks to address three basic questions:

   (i) What are the conditions for cooperation in the region?
   (ii) What role should the Community and its Member States play in making cooperation irreversible?
   (iii) How should the triangle of relations between the Community, Israel and the Mashrak be developed to optimise benefits for all the parties?

. THE CONDITIONS FOR COOPERATION

1. From peace process to cooperation process

Peace is the pre-condition for the successful development of regional cooperation. The Community's own experience demonstrates that war between previously hostile parties can be made unthinkable through economic integration. While this model cannot easily be transposed to the Middle East, it does suggest that the development of regional economic cooperation can be a powerful tool in reducing the level of conflict, making peace irreversible and encouraging the people of the region to learn to live in peace. In this context, the Community should support efforts by the regional parties to establish systematic forms of cooperation in areas vital to their economic progress and well being such as water and energy.

The peace process should therefore be followed by a "cooperation process" between the parties in the region.

2. Partnership requires balanced economic development (in the region)

If cooperation is to succeed, it is essential to reduce excessive disparities in income levels between potential partners in the region. Despite efforts on their part, none of the Mashrak countries have yet achieved self-sustaining growth. Israel, on the other hand, enjoys living standards comparable to those in western Europe, although it is a substantial aid recipient. These standards are more than ten times higher than those of its neighbours. According to the World Bank, seven million Israelis could achieve by 2010 a GDP nearly equal to that of the 130 million Arabs in neighbouring countries. These gaps are similar to the income gap separating Europe and the Arab world on the southern Mediterranean coast.

In the long term, the chances of maintaining peace in the Middle East will be significantly influenced by the pace of economic development throughout the area. This requires, above all, enormous efforts to be undertaken by the Arab countries themselves. But it implies, equally, the firm commitment of Europe, Israel and the Gulf countries and the wider international community to assist them in their endeavours.

II. PROMOTING A SUSTAINABLE COOPERATION PROCESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

1. Steps towards regional cooperation

Peace will be sustainable in the Middle East if the peace agreements, once concluded, are followed by a long term cooperation process between the regional parties. A climate of confidence could best be generated in a pragmatic manner through small steps rather than ambitious undertakings. This will encourage the regional parties to reflect together, to develop habits of cooperation and gradually to consider creating institutional arrangements.

Initially, cooperation has more chance to succeed in the private sector and between business federations, universities, municipalities, technical institutions. The process could start with any group of partners ready to go ahead in any field, from economy to culture.

Community experience demonstrates how difficult it is to sustain regional cooperation efforts without institutions. That is why this process should lead the countries of the region along the path of "progressive institutionalisation", as Europe did in the 1950s starting with the Coal and Steel Community.

2. A common regional vision

This cooperative approach has been initiated in the multilateral working groups of the peace process in order to contribute to a common regional vision for the development of the Middle East. To this end, cooperation should go in two directions: the pooling of common capacities and the tackling of common problems.

One of the obstacles to effective economic and social development is the small size of the countries concerned which limits economies of scale. It would, therefore, be useful for the parties to consider how their economic prospects could be enhanced by:

- creating the basis for a future Middle Eastern economic area implying, at some stage, freedom of movement for goods, services, capital and labour;
- efficient regional infrastructures in areas such as transport, communications, energy, water management;
- better use of available resources in tourism, education, research, agriculture, industry.

Energy, water as well as health, the environment and the problem of refugees are among the common problems stretching beyond national borders which should be tackled in order to help the populations to lead a better life, and hence to increase political stability and regional security.

A regional approach to economic development could offer particular advantages to the Occupied Territories and to Lebanon where economic revitalisation is the key issue.

3. The process should be assisted by outside parties

The experience of the peace process shows the usefulness of working with outside partners, acting as catalysts. Their active presence will undoubtedly remain necessary for a long time to come. The basic multilateral institutional framework created at the Madrid conference should, therefore, remain in place. It might well evolve into a regional organisation, along the lines of the OECD, with the increasing involvement of the regional parties and Europe.

III. FUTURE RELATIONS WITH THE MIDDLE EAST

1. A balanced triangular relationship (EU, IL + MASHRAK)

Europe should be prepared to offer further support to the region to consolidate peace and to encourage regional integration. A triangular relationship between Europe, the Mashrak and Israel should be carefully balanced to open cooperation opportunities according to the capacities of each partner and should also lead to closer relations between Israel and the Mashrak. Accordingly:

1) the Mashrak countries and Israel should be encouraged to undertake economic reforms and regional co-operation;
2) the Community should offer the Mashrak countries a closer partnership along the lines of that offered to the Maghreb countries, while taking into account the specific characteristics of each country concerned;
3) the Community should offer Israel the same concept of partnership adapted to its situation, and should involve Israel more closely with European developments where common ground and interests exist;
4) relations with all the countries of the region should be based on respect for human rights and the strengthening of democracy; in any agreements with the Community the specific clause will be inserted indicating that respect for human rights and the strengthening of democracy are essential elements of the agreement.

In the present state of fragmentation in the region, the gains brought about by reforms at national level will not be able, by themselves, to yield sufficient economic effects. Regional cooperation would add important economies of scale and opportunities for economic specialisation. Therefore, one of the objectives of the future EC agreements with the Middle East countries should be to promote regional cooperation and institutions (for example water and energy management).

Despite the fact that the Community concluded cooperation agreements with the five countries concerned in the late 1970s, the intensity of relations (trade, investments, science and technology, culture, political dialogue) neither reflects the region's strategic importance for the Community, nor its geographic proximity. They have asked the Community to give special attention to the development of mutual relations against the background of the completion of the internal market, European Union, its involvement with countries of central and eastern Europe, the Gulf countries and the Maghreb countries.

The new Community approach should be based on the realisation that the time has come to move away from pure development cooperation to partnership, engendering new forms of cooperation in many fields, whether political, social or economic.

2. Europe and the Mashrak

The Community's commitment to supporting the Mashrak economies will express its confidence in the region's future. For their part, the Mashrak countries will need to demonstrate their commitment to partnership by continuing the reform process and taking concrete measures to promote regional integration.

This partnership should be based on:

- political dialogue;
- progress towards free trade;
- encouragement to reform;
- support for regional cooperation;
- financial cooperation.

Regular political dialogue will be an essential element given the strategic importance of the region.

Trade should be an important element in the new agreements. The progressive dismantling on each side of tariff barriers could lead to regional free trade early in the 21st century. This would have a positive impact on inter-Arab and Israeli-Arab relations. The parties would, thus, participate in a wide area of cooperation and increasing economic freedom comprising Europe and a major part of the Arab world.

It will be essential to assist the Mashrak countries in their efforts to reform their political and economic systems, to move to a market economy and to control population growth.

All possible areas of regional cooperation encouraging the Mashrak countries to modernise their economies, should therefore be envisaged: macroeconomic issues, dialogue in all economic sectors, investment, employment, standards, customs, environment, science, technology, education, infrastructure, culture, demography, combatting drugs, etc.

Appropriate forms of financial cooperation will be developed. The new EC-Mashrak parthership will require adequate funding both from public sources and increasingly through direct private investment.

3. Europe and Israel

Israel's particular profile should be taken into account in future EC-Israel relations and in regional cooperation in a triangular framework.

With a growing GDP per capita of more than $12,000 and a highly trained work force, Israel sees its future as a producer and exporter of high value-added goods and services, closely linked to the European Economic Area and institutions. Israel would wish to participate in various types of networks linking the Community and other European countries, which are not open to non-European third parties.

Although the Community's relations with Israel should be based on the same basic concept of partnership which it intends to apply in its future cooperation with the Maghreb and Mashrak countries, the substance of this partnership should take into account Israel's level of development.

Political dialogue, free trade in goods, capital and services and encouragement for regional cooperation should be included in the Community's relations with Israel in addition to intensive cooperation in all fields from banking to technology, energy, agriculture, industrial property etc.

4. Israel and the Mashrak

Whatever the future configuration of relations between Europe, Israel and the Mashrak, the Community should do its utmost to convince its Israeli and Arab partners to embark on long term cooperative relations and work together towards balanced regional economic development.

It is therefore essential that the eventual peace settlement be strengthened by bilateral and multilateral Arab-Israeli cooperation agreements and possibly by joint institutions.

Israel should be encouraged to participate in the development of the whole region and assisted in this endeavour. The new contractual relations to be established between the Community and all the parties of the region will contribute to this.

IV. CONCLUSION

Regional cooperation will only succeed with support from outside partners. The Community, because of its geopolitical situation, its close links with all the parties concerned and its own experience with regional cooperation, has a major role to play. It could also help to facilitate the rapprochement between the parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict by upgrading its own links with each of the countries concerned.

This paper should contribute to the Community's policies towards the Middle East in the context of the achievement of peace. The resulting guidelines should be translated into work programmes to be implemented while peace is being established in the region and security strengthened.

Other complementary initiatives dealing with short and medium term issues will be proposed shortly by the Commission, as necessary, in the light of the evolution of the peace process.

COOPERATION PROCESS BETWEEN THE MASHRAK AND ISRAEL

PROPOSED GUIDELINES

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I. POOLING COMMON DEVELOPMENT CAPACITIES

1. ESTABLISHING THE BASIS FOR A MIDDLE EASTERN ECONOMIC AREA

1.1. Goods and services

One of the most urgent priorities for virtually all the countries of the Middle East, in particular the countries of the Mashrak and Israel, is to encourage trade and thereby foster an optimal division of labour between them.

The present level of trade in goods and services between the Mashrak countries themselves and between them and Israel is minimal (less than two billion dollars per year, of which about 80% concerns Israeli-Palestinian trade). This situation is due essentially to the political obstacles, high levels of protectionism and inadequate transport links.

With centres like Beirut, Amman and Tel Aviv, no more than 150 km from each other, the low level of trade between themselves is a costly economic absurdity. Peace could bring about change, but as the Egypt/Israel experience since 1981 demonstrates, peace in itself is not a sufficient stimulus to intra-regional trade.

The prospect of a "free trade area" encompassing some 120 million people by 2020 would make the region far more attractive for private investors.

A free trade area between the Mashrak countries and Israel seems to inspire more fear than hope among the potential partners, especially the least developed ones. In order to overcome existing hesitations, two parallel initiatives appear to be required:

- the free trade area will have to be asymmetrical, Israel bringing down its protection immediately or in a much shorter transitional period (say 3-5 years) than the less developed partners (10-12 years)
- the Community (which is in complete industrial free trade with Israel since 1989) , might have to offer the Mashrak countries who are prepared to take up the challenge to establish reciprocal free trade in industrial products.

Thus, the Mashrak countries would not feel isolated in a "club" with Israel, but would feel part of a large group covering all of Europe and Israel. It would also oblige them, right from the start, to focus on competing in Europe and not only within the narrow Middle East region.

By opening up their markets between themselves and with Europe, the tiny economies of the Middle East will be in a better position, to raise the level of efficiency of their economies and therefore to attract more European investment and technical know-how ensuring the reduction of the prosperity gap between Europe and the Middle East.

1.2. Labour

Labour movement has been, and continues to be one of the key factors of economic and social development in the region. On the one hand it has eased the chronic unemployment in the poorer parts of the region (Gaza, Egypt, and Jordan) and, on the other hand, it has helped to compensate for the scarcity of unskilled labour in the high income countries like Israel and the Gulf countries.

Labour movements have, however, also been a factor of political tension in the region. Indeed, millions of workers have been sent home at short notice without due compensation, without accumulation of any social security rights and often even losing much of their savings.

According to western standards, the material and legal conditions of the migrant population have been in many instances inhumane, not subject to appropriate international conventions.

In the future migration will continue but at a lesser intensity, indeed, joint ventures, sub-contracting and intra-regional trade in manufactures and components, might be expected to replace, at least partially, flows of migrant labour.

There will be a need for the region to more properly address the issues of rights and obligations of migrant workers. Ideally, all the countries concerned should be called upon to negotiate a multilateral convention or charter for the protection of migrant workers, similar to those in force in Europe.

As a matter of priority it is necessary to address those issues in relation to Israel and the Occupied Territories for some 100,000 Palestinian workers who may continue to work as frontier workers.

1.3. Capital

The Middle East at large is marked by the rare co-existence of a few major capital exporters (essentially Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and UAE) with all the others needing to import capital, at least for some time to come.

However, in the past, only a small fraction of the overall surplus capital (no more than 10%) was invested in the poorer countries of the region, due essentially to political instability and tension (Israeli/Arab conflict) and poor economic management and performance of many countries of the region.

The combination of peace and economic reforms should have a positive impact on future capital flows and should lead to retaining more of that surplus capital within the region.

Essentially new rules should assist in lifting national restrictions on foreign capital with direct investments, joint ventures, etc. Red tape should be reduced to a minimum.

2. SETTING UP COMMON INFRASTRUCTURES

2.1. Transport

More intensive intra-regional cooperation will require substantial improvement of the existing transport infrastructure to allow for speedy and efficient movement of a much higher volume of goods and persons (including an increased flow of tourists) moving between the different countries of the region.

It would not be economical to consider building railways between the Gulf countries and the Mashrak, let alone introducing high speed trains.

Much needs to be done within the Mashrak and between the Mashrak and Israel. It is there that one should expect a significant increase in the movement of goods and people in the next 10-12 years.

Among the priority tasks to be addressed are the following :

- negotiating appropriate transit arrangements between all the six countries concerned;
- completion, by around 2010, of a road system linking the region to Europe via Turkey ;
- completion of road interconnections between the urban centres of the region themselves to the extent that they do not already exist.

All this will require a minimum of planning and coordination between the parties involved (e.g. border checkpoints, truck dimensions, technical specifications of international highways, mapping of the interconnections, financing of the roads, user fees, etc..)

Transport relations between Israel, Jordan and the Occupied Territories will need to address points relating to port and airport facilities taking into account the excellent international infrastructures in this field in Israel and Jordan and the Palestinian lack of it.

Equipping the Palestinians with both international port and airport facilities would imply multibillion ECU investments which would be to the detriment of the many other priorities for their own development. Therefore, in the Palestinian interest, it would be useful to examine carefully all options, their costs and benefits, including free and non discriminatory access to the Jordanian and Israeli ports and airports .

What applies to the Palestinians may also apply to the Israelis and Jordanians, though to a lesser extent. Jordanians may have an interest in using nearby Mediterranean/Israeli ports and the Israelis may have an interest in using both Aqaba port and airport for certain operations.

An overall study of the transport (and communication) infrastructure for the whole region appears essential.

2.2. Energy

2.2.1. Electricity

Except for the linkage between Israel and Palestine on the one hand and certain links between Syria and Lebanon on the other hand, there are at present no systems of electrical interconnections in the Mashrak/Israel region.

Considering the short distances between major urban centres, especially between Jordan, the Occupied Territories and Israel, and also considering differences in consumption patterns between the different countries (on a daily ,weekly and yearly basis), it is of immediate economic interest for all the countries concerned to interconnect their national grids. This would allow each country to maintain a relatively smaller generation capacity and could, therefore, be reflected in lower electricity rates.

Interconnections between the grids of the Mashrak countries and Israel would not involve high investments. They could be one of the first practical measures of economic cooperation to be taken after peace has been established.

Establishing electrical interconnections will allow the electricity authorities of the countries concerned to engage in a regular dialogue on practical issues related to the production and consumption, electricity rates, technical standards, patterns of power generation, etc ...

The prospect of peace in the region will open a new horizon for the implementation of an ambitious hydro-power project (+/- 800 mgW), linking Israel, Jordan and the Occupied Territories. This project would exploit the 400 m height differential between the Mediterranean and the Dead Sea. A prefeasibilty study should, therefore, be undertaken in order to find out whether such a joint project is technically, economically and politically feasible.

2.2.2. Oil

The Tapline, which was conceived as the main means of exporting oil from Saudi Arabia to the Mediterranean, should have been constructed at the beginning of the 1940s. It would have been a 2050 km oil pipeline linking Ras Tanura on the Persian Gulf to Haifa. Its capacity would have been 250 million tonnes per year. With the outbreak of hostilities in 1947 the initial project was changed to Sidon in Lebanon.

Continuing instability in the two countries to be crossed (Lebanon and Syria) has meant that the throughput has never been more than 17 million tonnes per year and that over time it has been abandoned in favour of safer and more profitable links.

Once peace is reestablished the Tapline could easily be reactivated by an extension from Mafraq in Jordan to Haifa on the Mediterranean. The cost of this operation (about $ 70 million for a capacity of 25 million tonnes per year) should be compared to the cost of transport via the Suez canal which means that it would be profitable.

2.2.3. Gas

The region at large possesses significant natural gas resources, especially in some of the Gulf countries and to a much smaller extent in Egypt and Syria. None of these are linked to the urban centres of neighbouring countries.

It appears promising to map out the regional network of gas interconnections. This could proceed in two stages:

- in the first place, the Egyptian gas pipeline system could be extended to Israel, the Occupied Territories and possibly to Jordan (Aqaba) and Lebanon;
- in the second place, but on a much longer time scale, the linkage of the rich gas reserves of the Gulf with the Mediterranean in order to supply the Mashrak with alternative energy for their power plants or with petrochemical feed stock.

2.2.4. Rationalisation in the Use of Energy

Taking account of demographic factors and trends towards urbanisation as well as the speeding up of economic activity which could result from a peace agreement, the potential exists for a considerable increase in the demand for energy.

In addition to this "spontaneous" potential, account should be taken of the impact, particularly on the demand for electricity, of solutions to the problem of water such as the treatment of waste water or the desalination of brackish and salt water.

It will therefore be particularly important to ensure firm control of energy consumption in all the countries of the region.

It will be essential that Middle East countries with a high level of energy dependency (Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, the Occupied Territories) rationalise their energy legislation and charges and put together joint programmes, supported by the international community, for energy-saving technologies (which at the same time are favourable to environmental conservation).

On this basis Israel, Jordan , Lebanon, the Occupied Territories and Syria could also concert (or co-ordinate) their long-term energy planning as well as their attempts to encourage the use of new and renewable energy sources, particularly solar energy.

The issue of producing in the Mediterranean a model for energy saving will be the subject of discussion at a conference organised in Athens in November 1993 on "energy and the urban

environment in Mediterranean Third Countries" which will be attended by energy-saving agencies from all Mediterranean countries.

3. EXPLOITING COMMON RESOURCES

3.1. Tourism assets

The six countries possess major tourism attractions (sea, desert, mountains, historical monuments, religious sites...). They all hope that, with the end of conflict and tension between them, tourism can be boosted significantly, for each country individually and for all of them collectively.

They have a joint interest in keeping the region internationally attractive in order to get the largest possible number of tourists (which should rapidly exceed 10 million per year if and when conditions of internal and external stability prevail).

As a consequence, tourism is viewed by the countries of the region as having major potential under the following considerations :

- intra-regional tourist flows: when Israelis, Egyptians, Lebanese, Palestinians, Syrians and Jordanians travel from one country to another without major restrictions, this will reduce mutual prejudice and thereby make conflict less likely;
- coordinated, or even joint government action will be necessary to facilitate tourism.

Governments will have to address a number of issues jointly in order to facilitate tourism in the region.

These issues concern items like improvement of transport and communication infrastructures, facilitation of border crossings, simplification or abolition of visa requirements, conservation of historical sites, joint advertising campaigns, security measures, environmental protection, etc.

To this end it would certainly be highly appropriate to have a Middle East Tourist Promotion Committee established at the level of Heads of National Tourist Agencies in order to exchange information and, where appropriate, agree on joint actions.

3.2. Professional expertise

The European Community has successfully engaged in a growing range of transborder cooperation programmes in all fields: local government, universities, small and medium size companies, research institutes, media, culture, etc,...

The objective of these programmes is simple: to create cooperation networks between people, sharing the same expertise. Human interaction is the key factor behind change.

For the Middle East, this approach would present several advantages:

- facilitate the transfer of know-how and obtain synergetic effects in priority areas;
- contribute to the building up of a positive climate of confidence in the region.

Two sectors should be emphasised: "Science" and "culture".

Science

With the exception of Israel, which spends almost 3% of its GDP on research and development, the role of science and technology is not yet very high in the Middle East, essentially for three reasons:

- the relatively low level of economic and social development;
- the relatively small number of scientists;
- its low priority (in budgetary terms).

More intensive regional cooperation in scientific research would undoubtedly be in the interest of all the parties concerned:

- it would permit the Arab countries of the region to benefit from the achievements which Israeli scientists have been able to obtain in such vital areas as agriculture, renewable energy, water and medicine;
- it would allow all of the parties to pool their scarce resources in manpower and finance;
- it could, through joint scientific projects, develop into an important vehicle of better understanding.

Scientific cooperation does not require sophisticated administrative or institutional structures to start with. It can be organised at many levels, with variable numbers of partners involved and a minimum of financial input.

If scientific work is being done in a regional context, it would undoubtedly benefit from outside support, involving both scientists and also some finance. In this respect, Europe could play a major role as a catalyst, as it possesses the biggest and the most highly envied experience of regional scientific cooperation.

Culture

Cultural cooperation would be an essential element to underpin the peace efforts in the Middle East, especially if it would bring young people of different cultural backgrounds together.

There is almost infinite scope for fostering more cultural interaction in the Middle East. Two possible programmes of regional cultural exchanges, both of which have been successfully tested in different European frameworks, might be especially mentioned:

- firstly, a programme for university interchange, along the lines of the Erasmus, Tempus programmes providing for the exchange of graduate students and researchers between the Middle East countries;
- Secondly, a programme designed to promote the exchange of young people between the age of 16 and 25, in particular between Israelis and Palestinians.

To that end a Middle East Student Exchange Fund might be set up, which should co-finance both types of operations.

II. TACKLING COMMON PROBLEMS

1. WATER

The need for cooperation in water is urgent, but it is also highly sensitive and possibly controversial.

With the exception of Turkey, Iraq and Egypt, all the countries of the wider region at large are short of water resources. The steep increase in the region's population will further reduce the per capita availability of water so that the demand and supply situation for water will become even more dramatic during the next century. Water, therefore, constitutes a source of potential conflict between the various parties unless appropriate measures are taken in time.

Theoretically, there exist three possibilities for tackling the water issue in the region:

- reducing the demand for water (in particular for agricultural use);
- technological devices such as systematic re-use of water and desalination of brackish or sea water;
- exchanging water between the present water surplus countries and those having a water deficit.

Despite scarcity, almost all the countries in the region waste water. Water prices, in particular those for agricultural use (80% of the water supply), do not reflect the real costs (investments in irrigation infrastructures and scarcity of water). Raising the level of prices, ideally in a regionally coordinated approach, would reduce demand and promote water-saving technologies.

With the possible exception of Turkey, no country in the region is willing to export its temporary water surplus to neighbouring countries taking into account rising water demands in the future.

Desalination, therefore appears to be the only viable possibility for increasing the water supply in the long-term, for at least the coastal regions. However, it remains a very expensive source of water, even if technological innovations are taken into consideration.

However, the countries might usefully engage in joint research activities in order to develop more efficient water desalination technologies. The Gulf countries have large-scale experience in water desalination (they do not so far have any major power constraints). Israel has engaged in considerable advanced research to develop new and more efficient technologies. All this experience might usefully be brought together.

There is an urgent need to address for Syria, Jordan, Israel and the Occupied Territories the issue of joint management of the Jordan Basin and, in parallel, that of the Palestinian mountain aquifers which flow into the Israeli coastal plains.

At present these water resources are very unequally shared between the parties, Israel absorbs more than 23% of the total sub-regional water resources.

So as to develop a long-term relationship of mutual trust, based on equitable treatment between Israeli citizens and those of its direct neighbours, some sort of joint management scheme could be established between the parties.

One solution to the problem might consist of setting up a Joint Water Corporation, to be commercially run, which would supply at least Israel and the Occupied Territories. Practically, it would imply that the Palestinians acquire a capital stake in the Israeli National Water Carrier, which should by the same token be extended to Gaza and the West Bank. Water would then be made available on a non-discriminatory basis to Israeli and Palestinian users, i.e. agricultural, industrial, householders.

It would undoubtedly lead to a progressive move out of highly water-intensive agricultural production lines. At a much later stage, the construction and joint management of desalination plants along the Mediterranean coast might help to address the issue of growing water scarcity.

2. ENVIRONMENT

The region has not yet been affected by major environmental problems. However, transnational environmental pollution is bound to become a problem in the next decades as a consequence of population growth and of urbanisation.

There is, therefore, a need for the countries to establish cooperation through environmental ministries or agencies. Such cooperation could cover a wide range of subjects, from the measurement of pollution levels to waste disposal (especially for toxic waste), clean air or water standards, sewage and water re-use, etc.

It could also include manpower training, part of which could be organised in a regional framework. One might even consider the possibility of setting up a regional manpower training centre for environment.

The Community, with its large experience in environmental policies, might offer its technical assistance to help set up different forms of environmental cooperation.

Annex 2

ECONOMIC DIAGNOSIS

OF

THE MASHRAK AND ISRAEL

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I. ANALYSIS

1. COSTS OF FRAGMENTATION

90 million people live in six different states and entities. Removing Egypt, with its 55 millions, reveals more starkly the prospect of a region where the average state would have around 7 million people at best.

The Middle East is economically and politically fragmented. The price paid for fragmentation is very high.

Military expenditure is excessive. On average, in 1979-1989, it accounts for 13% of GNP in the Arab Mashrak and 19% in Israel (Europe 3%). Such non-productive expenditures are one of the most important reasons for economic backwardness. They deny resources to investment which would allow for growth in production. Without them, annual average gross investment should increase, from the 20% of GNP to 30% plus, which accounts for the success of fast growing regions such as South East Asia.

Political centralism, which has become the response to internal fragmentation, has an economic policy counterpart. With the exception of Lebanon, each of the region's economies is dominated by public sector production and by controls on economic activity.

Autarky, which is one of the typical expressions of the economic orientations in the region, is a further manifestation of the desire to translate political control into control of economic activity. The consequences are numerous. First, the productivity of capital is very low. Second, scale of production is below optimum size. Together these two factors combine towards high cost, low volume production of goods at severely uncompetitive prices. In turn this leads to a continuation of subsidy and protection that rapidly escalate. As a further consequence inter-regional trade is stifled, either directly, in order to sustain failing productive sectors, or indirectly, as goods cease to be attractive to external markets. Regional trade is only 7% of total trade.

2. FAILING PERFORMANCES

The region is economically failing. Syria and Jordan had annual negative growth of 2.1% and 3.9% respectively in per capita incomes in the decade after 1980. Lebanon was catastrophically worse. Egypt's growth of 2.1.% in per capita incomes was still low. Even Israel could achieve only 1.5% per capita. Overall for the region income growth rate was barely 0.3% higher than population growth rate.

Income levels now are over $10,000 per capita in Israel but the Mashrak Arabs have no more than $800. This disparity in incomes poses a threat to cooperation unless the balance is seen to be becoming more even over time.

Along with failure of income to grow there has been recorded the usual litany of other poverty indicators. Unemployment was 20% in the Mashrak and 10% in Israel in 1990 and has increased. Current account deficits were 7.1% of GNP and budget deficits 15% in the Arab states. Debt was 115% of GNP for the Arabs and 44% for Israel.

Human resources are poorly developed. Illiteracy in the Mashrak is double that in Lower Middle Income (LMI) countries as a whole. Infant mortality is higher, life expectancy lower.

If this story is depressing it needs to be borne in mind that at its core there are two economies, the Occupied Territories and Lebanon, where conditions, though not reliably measured, are considerably worse.

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the economy of the region is a failure.

II. PROSPECTS

1. INCOME DISPARITIES AND EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE

Israel is markedly richer than its neighbours. In 1990 it had 44% of regional production and 6% of population. Per capita incomes are 12.5:1 in its favour. Israel has sophistication in military and other technology that is only matched by some developed countries.

Arab countries in the Mashrak have experienced very high population growth rates. Jordan, Syria and the Occupied Territories are recording rates at over 3%. The present regional average of 2.5%, if sustained over the next two decades, will increase population by 60%.

Except for the Occupied Territories, the region is already the most handsomely-aided region in the World.

Aid per capita 1988	US $
Israel	310.0
Jordan	119.0
Lebanon	56.2
Syria	19.1
Egypt	29.5
O.T.'s	4.4

Since 1988 major assistance has been offered and accepted for economic reform by Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and, to an extent, Lebanon. So far little other than economic stabilisation can be reported.

2. PEACE DIVIDENDS AND ECONOMIC REFORMS

The creation of a stable peace in the Mashrak would have an impact on the economic reform process which is tentatively beginning. Peace could facilitate reform. A shift in priorities could occur. Administrations which focused hard on national security could give more energy and attention to economic and social welfare. A reformist agenda might flourish and the political and social tension associated with structural adjustment would become more manageable.

Peace could also facilitate the liberation of resources devoted to security. Consequently the saving in resources could be made available for increased investment.

Although investment increases alone are not the solution to economic growth, they are one key element. The region on average needs to improve investment levels from the historic 20% share of GDP to an average greater than 25% and, in some cases, Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, for example, to 30% of GDP. The potential for tis shift of resources to investment exists.

Peace would encourage regimes now dominating the economy through the public sector to relax their hold and allow a private sector lead. The effects of this would be to release domestic savings for investment; encourage the repatriation of savings held overseas; and give some encouragement to overseas investors. It should also encourage regimes to shift from a philosophy of self sufficiency to one of greater integration in the world economy. Sound economic management would continue to be necessary.

A private sector lead to the region's economies would create short term redundancy and disruption with significant social and economic costs. But it should end the chronic under-performance of the existing capital base of the region. In the longer term, it should guarantee a more appropriate production pattern, lower production costs, a more viable economy, and higher living standards.

FUTURE SCENARIOS AND THE POPULATION FACTOR

The impact of a programme of national economic reform stimulated by peace has been estimated by the World Bank over the next 5 next year period and to the year 2010.

The Bank believes that, by following the reform path, in 5 to 7 years the effects could be as set out in the table below

Countries	GDP per capita	
	with reform	without reform
Egypt	2.1	0
Israel	3.4	1.2
Jordan	1.5	-0.5
Lebanon	4.5	0
Syria	0.8	-1.6

According to the Bank, the pattern of growth for the region will be at or near nil initially. 5% as an ultimate target is obtainable and indeed has been achieved in the past. Almost every state in the region reached 6% in the period 1965-1980. On average over the 20 years 1990-2010 it could lead to a rough doubling of GDP in total, which implies an average growth rate of 3.5%.

The consequences of the Bank's predictions are set out below [1]:

Countries	GDP per capita 1990 (US $)	Population 1990 (millions)	GDP per capita 2010 (US $)	Population 2010 (millions)
Mashrak	820	83	940	134
Israel	10,600	5	16,860	7

By 2010 Israel would enjoy the 1990 living standard of the average EC citizen. For the Mashrak the outcome of twenty years of reform would be very small indeed. The only consolation to be found in the Mashrak data is in that unemployment would not continue to rise.

At the heart of the Mashrak problem is the projected 60% growth in population. This is achieved if the region continues an assumed increase of 2.5%. The Mashrak average 1985-90 was 2.6%. Five years earlier it was 2.8%. An agenda of peace plus economic reform will not yield substantial progress unless it is allied to strong and effective population policies. If the population growth rate could be brought to an annual average 2% to the final date, income per capita would be $ 1024. A decline to 1.5% would give $ 1127. In themselves these are not achievements that would win much applause from the citizenry of the region. Without really meaningful population policies even so they are not obtainable.

A more satisfactory target for the Arab Mashrak would limit population growth to 1.5% and create a 5% per capita growth. On this basis population would increase only to 112 million and incomes per capita could double by 2010. Whatever the scenarios, increased disparities in income levels will remain.

1 See in app. 2/5 a more complete table including Maghreb.

III. TABLES

1. MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA: SCENARIO FOR THE FUTURE[2]

Region	Population (millions)			
	1990	2010	Increase	%
Maghreb	58	90	32	55%
Mashrak	83	134	51	61%
Israel	5	7	2	40%
Total	**146**	**231**	**85**	**58%**

Region	GDP (US $)			
	1990	2010	Increase	%
Maghreb	82	158	76	93%
Mashrak	68	126	58	85%
Israel	53	118	65	123%
Total	**203**	**402**	**199**	**98%**

Region	GDP/capita (US $)			
	1990	2010	Increase	%
Maghreb	1410	1750	340	24%
Mashrak	810	940	130	16%
Israel	10600	16860	6260	59%
Europe	16000	24000	8000	50%

Basis for calculation (Except for Europe)

Quantitative: GDP increase in the nineties: 3%, between 2000 and 2010: 5%

Qualitative:
- peace (reduction of military expenditures)
- wide ranging reforms of economic policies
- regional cooperation
- financial capacity:
  - . short term: international public aid to offset the negative effects of costs of economic reforms for reasons of social and political feasibility;
  - . medium term: domestic savings, workers remittances, foreign direct investment and commercial loans.

2 Elaborated on the basis of: "Economic and Social Development in the Middle East and North Africa", by Ishac Diwan and Lyn Squire - World Bank Discussion Paper n° 3 - October 1992

2. ECONOMIC DATA

POPULATION	Egypt	Israel	Jordan	Lebanon	Syria	O.T.
Total (1990;m.)	52.1	4.7	3.2	2.7	12.4	2.0
Growth rate (89-90) %	2.47	1.84	3.77	0.04	3.56	2.46
Active population	31.6	38.9	23.1	30.1	23.9	37.7
of which: agriculture %	38	5	10	14	43	47
non agriculture %	62	95	90	86	57	53

ECONOMY	Egypt	Israel	Jordan	Lebanon	Syria	O.T.
GNP per capita (1990 US $)	610	10920	1240	-	1000	-
GDP total bn. US $ 1990	27.47	53.20	3.81	3.79	20.20	1.47
Growth rate (GDP 85/90) %	2.55	3.62	1.69	-	3.39	2.28
Current Account (surplus/deficit as % GDP 1990)	-105	1.3	-29.0	-	12.4	-
Budget Deficit (% GDP 1990)	-18.5	4.2	-18.7	-	-0.6	0
External Debt (US $ bn.)	39.9	20.1	7.7	1.9	16.5	0
Trade Imports $ bn. 1990	14.5	20.3	3.6	-	4.1	* 0.7
Exports $ bn. 1990	8.5	16.9	2.6	-	4.0	* 0.4
Trade balance	-6.0	-3.4	-1.0	-	-0.1	* -0.3
EC Trade $ bn.						
EC Imports	3.818	4.414	0.117	0.16	1.570	-
EC Exports	5.280	6.669	1.056	0.960	1.070	-
Imports	26.3	21.7	3.2	-	38.3	-
Exports	62.2	39.5	40.6	-	26.7	-

* Year 1986, before the intifada

AGRICULTURAL TRADE	1988		1989		1990		1991	
	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2
Egypt	5.3	18.6	3.3	17.3	4.2	14.3	5.9	8.3
Israel	20.5	3.8	19.1	4.3	19.8	4.1	18.5	3.6
Jordan	1.9	12.4	5.2	14.9	4.1	20.6	4.6	19.6
Lebanon	8.1	16.1	9.0	18.0	9.0	16.3	11.9	12.3
Syria	2.8	23.6	2.1	27.4	1.3	30.4	1.4	14.3
Occupied Territories	-	-	-	-		-	-	-

Agricultural Trade - percentage share of agriculture in total Trade with EC.

1. **EC Imports**
2. **EC Exports**

NET DIRECT INVESTMENT % GDP	1988	1989	1990
Egypt	3.4	2.3	0.4
Israel	0	0.2	-0.3
Jordan	1.1	0.1	0
Lebanon	-	-	-
Syria	-	0	-
Occupied Territories	-	-	-

AID FLOWS (US $ m.)	1988	1989	1990
Egypt	1537	1568	5604
Israel	1241	1192	1374
Jordan	416	273	891
Lebanon	141	119	134
Syria	191	127	650
Occupied Territories	9.3	13.3	45.4

Source OECD Financial Flows to Developing Countries.
N.B. Occupied Territories aid flows from non OECD D.A.C. members could be seriously understated.

AID FLOWS: EC Share in total %	1988	1989	1990
Egypt	4	5	4
Israel	0.1	0.1	0.3
Jordan	< 2	< 2	< 2
Lebanon	-	16	9
Syria	-	-	-
Occupied Territories	48	56	42

The Future of relations between the Community and the Maghreb

Summary of Commission Communication SEC(92)401 of 30.04.92

A NEW CONCEPT: EURO-MAGHREB PARTNERSHIP

The Community must develop a new concept on which to base its relationship with the Maghreb, setting itself targets that are both realistic and ambitious. The credibility of this new approach must be secured by the adoption of the instruments that will guarantee its implementation.

1. PARTNERSHIP

The new Community approach should be based on the realisation that the time has come to move away from the idea of development cooperation that has held sway over the past few decades, to the idea of partnership, engendering new forms of cooperation in all fields, whether political, social or economic.

For its part, the Community will make a firm and convincing commitment to help relaunch the Maghreb economy.

For their part, the Maghreb countries will commit themselves to continue with the reform process and to take concrete measures to promote regional integration.

2. A MULTIFACETED CONCEPT

There are three main strands to this approach:

2.1. The emphasis in economic cooperation should be on the instruments that best reflect the Euro-Maghreb partnership approach.

2.2. In addition to the purely economic aspects of cooperation, the new set-up should also incorporate new fields of cooperation that will put Euro-Maghreb relations on a comprehensive footing. These new fields will be identified jointly, and will cover a variety of topics such as culture and social matters, including migration, movement of persons, local collectives and education.

2.3. As regards the contractual framework, the new approach should lead to the conclusion of new agreements with Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia.

3. THE MAGHREB STATES

The three individual states will remain the Community's main negotiating partners in the Maghreb. The approach will be implemented through agreements concluded with each of the three States separately, following the same general outline but with timetables and procedures tailored to the needs of each specific country.

The long-term aims will continue to be the integration of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, and the creation of an economic area embracing the Community and Maghreb countries.

NEW INSTRUMENTS

1. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

Technical assistance is increasingly becoming one of the main instruments of the Community's cooperation policy and should be applied so as to reform economic systems: create stock markets, set-up effective and fair taxation systems, restructure the public sector, privatisation, business administration, etc.

2. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS SUPPORT

There will be no rapid economic development in the Maghreb as long as excessive debt servicing absorbs a disproportionate amount of foreign currency earnings to the detriment of essential imports.

International action might be taken under the guidance of the IMF. Such action would be taken on an exceptional basis and would be strictly conditional upon the beneficiary country's financial policy.

3. INVESTMENT FINANCING

3.1. Over the next two decades the Maghreb will have to spend large amounts on modernising and expanding its productive apparatus and its economic infrastructure (telecommunications, roads, ports, railways, water, irrigation and energy, etc...).

The bulk of investment in infrastructure should be financed through the international capital market and, to a lesser degree, locally. The Community will be involved through the EIB.

4. NEW SPHERES OF COOPERATION

(a) Social sector

The social sector is obviously a special area of discussion in view of its objective importance but also its human and political implications.

(b) Culture and communications

It is important for the Community to pursue, over and above the options defined in this document, programmes aimed at greater reciprocal understanding between the two shores of the Mediterranean.

This implies very diverse operations, such as a communications policy, and action targeted more specifically at young people and the media, etc.

(c) Human rights

Human rights and democracy have become an essential component of the Community's foreign policy. It has been affirmed through political commitments, the inclusion of specific clauses as new agreements have been concluded, and the setting-up of special programmes for certain regions of the world.

(d) Other spheres

The nature of the Euro-Maghreb partnership implies that there should be a dialogue on all matters of common interest.

NEW CONTRACTUAL FRAMEWORK

The possibility of concluding new agreements, called Euro-Maghreb agreements, with the three Maghreb countries should therefore be explored; they would form the basis, framework and symbol of the new Community approach.

Initial contact, particularly with Morocco, has revealed that these Euro-Maghreb agreements could be based on four main components:

- a political dialogue;
- economic cooperation;
- free trade;
- financial cooperation.

1. POLITICAL DIALOGUE

In line with the growing trend of agreements concluded by the Community, the Euro-Maghreb agreements would contain a major political dialogue component.

2. ECONOMIC, TECHNICAL AND CULTURAL COOPERATION

No sphere of cooperation or dialogue should be excluded from the outset. The emphasis would be on aspects which would encourage development such as:

- macroeconomic issues;
- initiation or continuation of a dialogue and cooperation on social issues;
- sectoral dialogues;
- investment;
- cooperation on statistics, standards, customs matters, approximation of laws, etc.;
- environment;
- cooperation in science, technology, education, etc.

3. TRADE

The long-term creation of an open economic area, an area of trade and stability, will therefore be one of the main objectives of the Euro-Maghreb agreements.

4. FINANCIAL COOPERATION

Although the framework has been established for the next years by the fourth financial protocols and by horizontal financial cooperation, the instruments and objectives of financial cooperation could when necessary be adapted to the partners' new requirements. The financial protocols will apply until 1996, by when it will be time to take stock of this type of cooperation and determine the benefits and the limitations.

THE COMMUNITY'S RELATIONS WITH MEDITERRANEAN THIRD COUNTRIES

BACKGROUND NOTE

1. Since the mid-seventies, the Community is linked to most Mediterranean non-Member Countries (MNC)(1) through co-operation agreements. These agreements provide for free access for industrial goods on the Community markets and preferential access for agricultural products. The agricultural products vary from one country to another. The Agreement with Israel provides for industrial free trade on a reciprocal basis which was achieved in 1989; the other Agreements are not reciprocal.

2. There is also provision for economic, technical and financial cooperation. The latter is implemented through five-yearly financial protocols which have provided funds to finance development projects as well as economic co-operation in various areas, such as environment, scientific co-operation, industrial co-operation and training and technical assistance.

3. The Agreements with Maghreb countries also contain provisions relating to workers, but these have had little practical application.

4. In 1987/1988, following the accession of Spain and Portugal, certain additional concessions for MNC agricultural exports to the Community were laid down in Additional Protocols to the Agreements. These concessions, over and above an increase in tariff quotas, foresee a gradual reduction (to zero) of custom duties within those quotas. Preferential rates of duty continue to apply to quantities exported over and above the quotas.

5. In order to strenghten the Community's global policy towards the region, in 1990 the Commission proposed and the Council adopted the orientations for a Redirected Mediterranean Policy (RMP).

6. The RMP provided for

   (i) further limited concessions for agricultural exports covered by the Agreements (reduction to zero of duties within tariff quotas to be reached in 1993 instead of 1995; a 3 to 5% annual increase in tariff quotas over the 1992-1995 period);

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(1) Agreements exist with Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Israel, Turkey, Cyprus, Malta. There is no Agreement with Libya. Autonomous arrangements cover relations with the Occupied Territories.

(ii) a renewal of the financial protocols with Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries (2) amounting to around 2 billion ECU in grants from the Community budget and EIB loans for the 1992-96 period (the latest Financial Protocol with Israel consists of EIB loans only; the latest Financial Protocol with Syria has not yet received the favourable opinion of the European Parliament);

(iii) a special financial envelope destined to support structural adjustment operations in these countries (300 MECU) for the 1992-1996 period); and

(iv) special funds to cater for cooperation activities of interest to all MNC (1,800 MECU in EIB loans of which 500 MECU with a 3% interest subsidy for the environment, as well as substantial budget funds : 64 MECU in 1992, 63,5 MECU in 1993 possibly 300-350 MECU over the 1992-1996 period).

Total funds available to these countries for the 1992-1996 period, including grants from the EC budget and EIB loans, will thus amount to about 4,500 MECU, roughly three times the financial support to the region in the 1987-1991 period.

(2) Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Israel

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