מדינת ישראל

משרדי הממשלה

משרד

יח"פ


סמל יקרי

26.9.1994 — 15.7.93

משא ומתן עם הפלסטינים ופעילות

לשיתוף פעולה ופיתוח כלכלי

30/6/94 — 10/4/94



שם תיק: משא ומתן עם הפלסטינים ופעילות לשיתוף פעולה ופיתוח כלכלי -כרך ב'

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תאריך הדפסה: 19/10/2021

יח"פ

משרד

Meeting between Shlomo, Yair and Gail;
June 30, 1994, 12.30 to 14.30

1. Shlomo has been asked to go to D. He reports to the son and towards the head of the Mukhabarat, who both, report to Assad. This way Assad maintains control over obtaining accurate reporting.

[redacted]

3. During the last visit of Christopher to Damascus, Assad promissed to do something about the MiA's and to prepare a detailed report, about whatever Syria knows and can do in regard to the MiA's. Lee Hamilton has written a "very strong" letter to Assad, saying that the future of Syrian-US relations depended very much on the outcome of the MiA issue.

So far, Assad has ignored these American demands and he may try to ignore the issue. On the other hand, Assad always states that he keeps his promises. This is true, but only if he is steadily reminded of his obligations and is induced to carry them out.

4. Assad's position at home is strong. Assad believes also that time is working in his favour, that Rabin needs a breakthrough on the Syrian front, and that Clinton's re-election depends on achieving an Israeli-Syrian peace. He therefore, tends to increase his demands and is confident that Israel and the US will make further and further concessions.

5. Shlomo told Faruk ash-Shara that there are three possible options: The first, there will be a breakthrough and Rabin will win the elections; the second, there will be no breakthrough and Rabin will adopt tough language and measures against Syria; in this case Rabin will also win in the elections; the third option is that nothing will happen and the sense of continuing insecurity will prevail; in this case Rabin will lose the elections and the coming to power of the Likud will be a disaster for everyone. Shara tended to accept this analysis.

6. The decision of Christopher to postpone his trip to the Middle East has been very beneficial: it has shown the Syrians that they are not in the center of the world and that they can miss the boat. In reaction hereto, the Syrian position has already started to soften a little bit. The Ambassador in Washington (M<uallem) has already received an o.K., under certain circumstances (Shlomo did not elaborate, but the conditions appear to relate to Lee Hamilton promises for an improvement of US-Syrian relations), to open up a secret backchannel with Israel.

7. A further process of softening up is necessary. A second cancellation of the envisaged Christopher visit may be useful. In case, Christopher should go this time, it is necessary to define clear conditions and make it evident that for every move the US will take, Assad will have to pay a price for. Otherwise, Assad's demands will only continue to rise.

8. The Syrian system is build in such a way that any movement towards peace will necessarily endanger the power grip of the Mukhabarat over the country and the people. Other sections of the population, the intellectuals, the business community and the military leadership are in favour of peace. Assad has the potential power to change his ruling coalition from supporting and being supported by the Mukhabarat, to support and being supported by a new alliance of the intellectuals, the bureaucracy and the army leadership. Yet, it has to be understood that it is not an easy move for him to do. Kissinger had given in 1974 in the Disengagement Agreement too much security. Assad has claimed, speaking to his people, that ever since, the Syrian strength has prevented Israel from firing even one bullet against Syria. In a way, the perceived sense of security, makes it difficult for Assad to move.

9. The Israeli move in Lebanon, kidnapping Dirani, was a big blunder. First of all, Assad does not care about Lebanon and he does not care if several thousand Syrian soldiers there get killed, or not. He cares about his own security and the security of the Syrian army.

10. The situation of the Syrian army is bad. They have no money to buy equipment, and most of their weapons are obsolete. They have some missile capabilities, they are hidden in some caves, but most probably if they should be fired, only 50 % of them may take off the ground. They have build special anti-airplane training installantions, with domes; each of the cost two million British pounds; but also these installations are obsolete.

11. Assad would understand a position taken by Rabin, saying it is either peace or war. If there will be movement towards peace, Israel will be generous, but if not other options are open, too. Rabin has to be seen by Assad, and by the Syrian people, as strong. It makes sense to tell the Americans publicly, if you don't bring any positive answers from Damascus, don't come to Jerusalem.

Meeting between Yossi and Shlomo, Washington June 30, 11.30 p.m. to 0.30 a.m. (present: the Gurs, Yair and Gail)

Yossi: Described the need for a confidential dialogue. Although it is not necessary to duplicate the Oslo model, an exchange of ideas to prevent misunderstandings is necessary. (Yossi quoted as examples misunderstandings on Rabin's decision for a plebiscite, Yossi's statement on settlements, and the last Rabin statement, regarding the likelihood of war). Finally Yossi asked, whether a backchannel was possible.

Shlomo: answered in the affirmative; and went on to say that he had discussed with ash-Shara Israeli developments and had presented three options: first, a breakthrough; second, Rabin getting tougher; or third, Rabin losing the next elections, because time for moving ahead was missed. Shlomo assumed that a breakthrough had to be achieved not later than the summer of 1995.

Yossi: said: even earlier.
Shlomo: related to Israeli mistakes made in Lebanon. Assad was pleased, as long as his two enemies, Israel and the Hisbollah were fighting each other. Assad did not care about Syrian soldiers killed in Lebanon. Asked by Yossi, what should be done, Shlomo, answered that action had to be taken, to induce the Syrians to stop the Hisbullah from acting.

Yossi; said that Israel could not employ the threat of war.
Shlomo, answered saying, Assad had to be told that he had no choice; or that the choice was either peace or war.

Yossi asked what Assad's motive to make peace would be.
Shlomo responded by saying: Does he make peace? Yet, evidently Syria's military weakness, the desire for economic development, the desire of the people for stability all could play a role.

Yossi, complained that Syria's position towards peace had deteriorated since January.
Shlomo said that Assad believed Syria to be the center of the world, and sensed his capability to assert more concessions by taking a position of toughness.

The meeting concluded by the mutual desire to maintain an ongoing dialogue.

(P.S.: Kissinger described negotiations with Assad as follows: "His tactic was to open with a statement of the most extreme position to test what the traffic would bear. He might then allow himself to be driven back to the attainable, fighting a dogged rearguard action that made clear that concessions could be exacted only at heavy price and that discouraged excessive expectations of them.) Years of Upheaval p. 781.

7. Hence, to promote the peace process will necessitate an ongoing tactics of "confrontation and dialogue".

II. DEFINE AIMS FOR POSSIBLE PROGRESS

1. Progress in negotiations can - as a rule - be achieved by three different means:
   1) agreed mutual confidence building measures;
   2) agreement on procedure;
   3) agreement on substance;

2. In the forthcoming negotiations, to be led by the US government, realistic aims should be defined, in three categories:
   a) the optimal aim: a first agreement on substance: would be to achieve a joint Israeli-Syrian MoU that could be accompanied by an Israeli-US and a parallel Syrian-US MoU.

      In such a joint Israeli-Syrian MoU contradicting claims may be maintained, which on one hand would asure Syria of the validity of its territorial claims over the Golan Heights, on the other hand would maintain an open end and asure Israel that progress would be made in managable stages, guaranteeing that each stage was a full agreement in itself and progress from one stage to the second was not automatic.

   b) the tactical aim: a first agreement on procedure: would be to achieve understanding on the creation of trilateral (Israeli-Syrian-US) committees;

      one on security issues; one on political cooperation and one on economic affairs.

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      such US-Syrian confidence-building could be achieved in stages:
      the first stage: a US-Syrian agreement guaranteeing effective Syrian action against the militant arm of the Hisbullah, against the Palestinian negation front groups, seated in Damascus, and a closing down of the anti-Arafat propaganda activities.
      the second stage: a US-Syrian agreement providing for the beginning of economic cooperation and bringing about a final end to the Arab boycott.

3. Evidently the best development would be a combination of all three options (II/2/a,b and c). However, also the other options, including first headway initially only on the US-Syrian level should not be rejected. An American-Syrian agreement bringing about a decrease of terror activities and further movement against the boycott would enable further progress on other peace fronts and thereby only can enhance Israel's future negotiating position towards Syria.

III. DEFINE WORKING MODALITIES

1. The US Role

All three parties, the US-Government, Israel and Syria have a vested interest in permitting negotiations to be led by the USA.

- The U.S. Government wants to gain its lost self-confidence (due to Oslo) and demonstrate at home and abroad that the USA still maintains a monopoly on peace making;
- Israel and Syria need to achieve progress on the basis of a self-contradictive agreement; this can only be made possible with the assistance of the US-Government and the signing of parallel MoU's, following the techniques developed during the early stages of the Israeli-Egyptian peace process;
- Israel will need substantial strategic and other assistance from the US-Government in order to be able to make necessary concessions on the Golan Heights;
- Syria is mainly interested in goods the US Government can deliver and not Israel.

2. The Role of an Effective Back-Channel Diplomacy

In order to

- build confidence;
- to check various policy actions ahead of time;
- to obtain an idea of what is doeable and what not;
- and to guide US policy planning

a back-channel-dialogue is needed.

I. GENERAL WORKING ASSUMPTIONS (REGARDING SYRIA)

1. Syria's defense expenditure has continously decreased since 1987. In 1987, 14 % of the GNP was earmarked for defense purposes, in 1993 it was only 7 %. The decrease of general defense expenditure is partly upset by increasing investment for the development of missile capabilities. (source: Z. Maoz) The assumption may be drawn that Assad's Strategy for Peace is intended as a long-term policy, however, the point of no return has not yet been passed.

2. Assad undoubtedly has the ambition to permit Syria to act as a regional leader. For this purpose he has involved Syria heavily in Lebanon, he has built an alliance relationship with Iran and he claims publicly that he will negotiate with Israel only a comprehensive peace and not a "separatist peace agreement" as Sadat did.

   Peace with Israel is in his mind a different means to obtain for Syria a leading regional role. Peace may not be desirable, if it will cause Syria to play a subordinate role and permit Egypt, the Palestinians and Jordan to take the lead in determining Middle Eastern affairs.

3. Evidently economic interests encourage Assad to seek a peace solution and encourage large-scale investment in Syria. Reportedly, Syrian businessmen have accumulated $ 50 bn. in accounts abroad, probably a high percentage hereof from drug monies, which could be reinvested in Syria.

4. For these three reasons: to provide for Syrian security at reduced cost; to enable Damascus to play an important regional role and to improve economic conditions, Assad has a strong interest in improving relations with Washington.

5. On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that the regime is basing its power upon the Mukhabarat and the army leadership, who will lose their power grip, by an ongoing peace process: increasing international control against terrorism and drug traffic will decrease their collective power position, while economic growth will tend to strengthen the Syrian business community and the government technocrats.

6. Being faced with the challenge of improving Syria's security, regional and economic position by moving towards peace, on one hand, while being threatened by potential opposition of the ruling elite (the mukhabarat and the army leadership) on the other hand, Assad undoubtedly will take the road of minimal opposition and will try to obtain as much as possible by paying as little a price as possible.

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Example for a Possible Trilateral MoU, to be accompanied by bilateral MoU's.

1. The Israeli-Syrian-American MoU would have to include the following points:

a. mutual recognition of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which Israel and Syria and the other states in the region will live in security and peace;

b. mutual recognition of the fact that security is enhanced by a relationship of peace and by cooperation between nations which enjoy normal relations. Under the terms of an Israeli-Syrian peace treaty that will be negotiated the parties shall agree to special security arrangements such as demilitarized zones, limited armaments areas, early warning stations, the presence of international forces, liaison, agreed measures for monitoring, and other arrangements the Governments of Syria and of Israel agree to be useful;

c. agreement to move in three stages towards the implementation of UN SC Resolution 242;

d. agreement to develop a joint Israeli-Syrian-American strategy concept that will contribute to the creation of a system of security, stability, prosperity and peace in the Middle East and will guarantee the implementation of a comprehensive peace in the area;

e. agreement to sign a treaty of peace, including full normalization of relations between Israel and Syria;

f. agreement to establish and start work immediately on three trilateral committees:
first, an Israeli-Syrian-American Security Cooperation Committee, which will coordinate miltary measures and take common action against terror activities;
second, an Israeli-Syrian-American Economic Cooperation Committee, which will plan regional economic development; and
third, an Israeli-Syrian-American Strategy Cooperation Committee, which will plan regional security cooperation.

g. immediate start of intense negotiations, which will lead within a period of six months to the signing of an Israeli-Syrian agreement on the first stage.

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June 29, 1994

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The Israeli-American MoU would have to include the following points:

a) an understanding that each stage is an agreement in itself, and movement from one to the other stage, will not be automatic.
b) a definition of conditions that will make it sensible to cross Syria out from the terror list; a mechanism that will verify Syrian adherence necessary in order not to be put back on the terror list, including a US obligation to put Syria back on the terror list, in case of non-adherence to the agreed principles.
c) a definition of conditions that will open the way for Syria to obtain improvement of relations with the US.

30.6.84

① ~~Any more attack on Heyballah~~
~~V big boss is held~~

Chris shd give Syria no hope that there is an American solution

① MAA's as condition 4 Chris - written report

② After receipt of MIA & Chris trip → demand on peace
   ⓐ move 2 back channel
   ⓑ message by Chris 2 Assad because we're moving ahead on peace Heyballah must stop / Assad directly accountable.

③ Work out MOU in back channel which can be delivered via Chris
④ " Amer can't want peace more than the Syrians
⑤ "Assad - you're accountable

Yossi:

① ~~Important that~~ Recognized the Syrians had/it wanted official back channel. Even if not official critical that there be an exchange of ideas.

② ~~Did~~ Shlomo responded yes. He has authorization to say that it is possible after July 15 provided a certain conditions R met by person not available until 7/15 (Hamilton???).

He went on to say that in case Chris visit appeared 2 be too promising to Assad so back channel would be possible need to put pressure on Syrians.

Yossi - What is Assad's motivation for doing peace? Shlomo responded: is he doing peace?

Yossi: Deterioration in Syrian press to Israel. Why?

Shlomo: They believe they're at the center of the world & must ~~go~~ kick. If they're kicked they will respond

Luke

By example of new approach of reference by them: should a telli. met ~ war

~~Yossi: that~~ news

Shlomo had told a-Sharon there were
3 options:
Rabin creates a breakthrough - he will win elections.
Rabin will publicly oppose Syria - he will win elections.
Rabin will not buy ahmedinejad, he will lose the elections, an afterwards Syria would have big trouble with the Likud.
a-Sharon accepted this analysis.
Although Shlomo believes that there was time to wait until the summer of 1995.

Yossi - even less than that.
Shlomo: But you are also mistaken.
Yossi: Such as?
Shlomo: To believe all your actions in Lebanon are a big mistake. You are ~~Yossi: what should we do~~ living with the Hizballah. Arafat would not care less. The opposite, he hates the Hizballah as he hates Israel - if they fight each other he will only be happy.
Even if Israel kills Syrian soldiers in Lebanon he does not care.

Yossi: What he should we do!
Shlomo: Look - if the price for peace, that is

pleased you have had chance to see
get the main sent of the plot - by
putting the main points in abbreviated form,
pp or turn off the tap.
You have to let Arrow have at least ten.
He could in one week put on to
the Yes ballot: terrorists. He gave them
that racket.

Yossi: We cannot threaten with war
Allen: You should give to the press that to him
we choose - for you to tell peace a war.
Mr Shelach told me - taught. he sent peace - the military not peace -
Yossi: What would be Arrow's method
to make peace?
Allen: Does he make peace?
Yossi: Likely in the past: Egypt pressure
shown us for not making peace. Him over
pressure - When they are beat you
barely in a very hostile manner

Allen: The Syrians believe they are at the
end of the road -
Arrow assume that a agreement
with Israel will make Olmert
win the next election - a settlement and
a agreement Olmert will lose.
He [illegible] the Muchabarat knew
that you will own a decrease

of the pers - allocation of A is only
a matter where Mr. A is
w not when the French & Syr people
pers will not make sense to pu-
w A won't be given as useful.

Yossi: We are grateful for the opportunity to be
we want to maintain contact.

Albeau: OK.

Policy Plan

Talk with Albeau - after Yossi & pers left.
1 July - 10:30 - 1:30. (telling the answers
(Y.H. draw up the talking
policy plan)

1) ~~It is important~~ If there's Policy Plan
the talking policy plan should
be considered:
1) the Cent Steps:
2) For the next coming visit of
Christopher to the ME
the following moves should be taken:

a) ~~this~~ Christopher shall be
encouraged to demand categorically
from Assad to live up to his promises
& submit a detailed written report
about the M.-A., prior to

Christopher; arrived.
(Khomeini's concern that Arab has more knowledge about the Islamic - see
Saudi discussion)
In case of refusal - the visit should be postponed - until compliance.

b) ~~To Damascus it is of great importance~~ first stop to Damascus - how to make it clear to Assad - that although there may be an American role, there is no American solution!
(otherwise the Syrians will never agree to a direct back channel - & they will only have this line.

c) Christopher visit to Damascus have to demand from Assad a clear description & commitment to full peace, normalization & security measures he may be told that the Israelis are not ready - & Christopher will only return if & more in depth / substantive answer is given.

(Dealy must find it is urgent to show strength ~

2/ The Second Stage -

~~After having decided on the factory model~~ =>
prod

After a visit to Israel -
(after July 15, 1994)

By July 15, the decision should be taken to establish a lead channel -
What probably will be necessary because are two developments

a) US promises for improvement of US-Syria relations at the level of ~~...~~ talks (:)
See Herald Tribune Christophe.

b) a rejection of Assad's conditions - totally his - he has to make further on the way of peace ~ creating a sense of settlement.

Start work in cooperation with Shamir ~~on the~~ on
on the text of an American draft for an Israeli-Syrian-US Mou.

prepare the grant for ~~a~~ the next visit of Christopher

Letter for Christopher promising to go to Denver for drafting purposes shall submit a Israeli claim. Due to new map - please report action; Herbalbel must be stopped for this / any terror activity & Israel will hold Syria directly accountable henceforth.

Answer may comply; he may check ~~the~~ ~~sincerity~~.
In case of continuing Herbalbel terror attack -
Israeli regime should hit the army headquarters of the Syria unit responsible for the area from which Herbalbel attack was launched. (Hopefully this will not be necessary).

3) The Third Stage

After having received first reaction - the M.o.C Draft - by the 2nd stage Christopher visit -
an upgrading of the bombardment may be

demanded.
Real need of drafty to start there

At this stage →
a) some of the people on the level of VI-Syrn relations should intervene,
b) ~~a~~ in the background
discussion of regional, economic & security issues should start.
c) the measures to be planned.

II/ Immediate Actions

1) Shlomo will see Denis Ross Wednesday July 6, 1994.

In order to turn the visit to be a successful meeting
we should ask Denis Ross to tell Shlomo:
a) Iran

replaced/

~~the~~ pel: Muslim ~~in~~ Syrn - (withdrawal)
all the other ~~or~~ parrots - Hyrcan pull

Shlomo pushes his argument in part of the peace agenda.

He does all he can to be kind -
She got a scholarship to travel ; almost
daughter-in-law (Beryl)

type ; are teachers - you have to keep the
the Reinwards ; attached

5517/2 2

DECLASSIFIED

VERBAL MESSAGE

From YH to MA

Date: **Tuesday June 28th 1994** **2.00-3.00 pm.**

Place: **American Colony Hotel**

Subject: **Israeli Points for Discussion in Preparation for a Joint Agenda on Jerusalem.**

1. Open City and United City.

2. Two communities with control of their own affairs eg. land registration, personal registration, building, housing, zoning.

3. Election system and representative system eg. Is it to become a Jewish majority? House of Representatives and Senate?

4. United municipality and local boroughs (or councils). eg. the Basque countries have more than one police system.

5. Rotating mayorship, how can a system be managed which provides answers or mechanisms?

6. Greater Jerusalem affairs which go into Palestinian areas and Israeli areas.

7. Jurisdiction and legislation under common law or personal law?

8. Arbitration and compensation for properties. How to establish a special authority and a system to govern the relationship.

***

Option A: Shared Powers

1. One and open city.

2. Two communities, each handles its own affairs in some fields and shares in other fields.

3. Palestinians and Israelis will vote and be electad to their central political authority , as well as acting in positions in their government and administration. Taxes like income tax, VAT, welfare tax etc. will be paid by palestinians to their government and by Israelis to the Israeli government.

4. The basic municipal unit will be the borough, governed by an elected commitee. There will be equal number of Palestinian and Israeli boroughs. The borough will handle the affairs of its inhabitants in the fields of education, religious services, culture, welfare, use of land, planning and building authorization, local police etc

5. The City Municipality will consist of one represantative of each borough. The mayorship will be rotated. The City's Municipality will supervise the activities of the Boroughs' Commitees and lay down regulations for them in certain fields, as well as tax collecting.

6. The Area from the municipal boundries of Beith Lehem in the South, Ramallah in the North, Ma'ale Edumim in the East and Mevasereth Zion in the West will have a Metropolitan Municipal Authority, to be elcted by the residents in that area. The Metropolitan Municipal Authority will be an overall municipal authority for the area which its functions will be to coordinate metropolitan activities and development, to authorize land registration, to be responsible for security and police forces and to certify residenship.

7. Palestinians will be subjected to the Palestinian legislation and jurisdiction in the matters of criminal law and personal status.

8. Claims for ownership rights over estates and for compensations for expropriated estate already used will be made before a special authority to be agreed upon.

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25/6/1990

A PROPOSED PEACE CHOREOGRAPHY
==========

I. General

1. The end of the Cold War, the defeat of Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War, and the decline of the intifada, created positive global, regional and local circumstances, conducive for peacemaking and the creation of a new system of stability and security in the Middle East.

2.

Negotiations with Syria:

The First Step:

As a first step, the signing of an Israeli-Syrian-American MoU should be envisaged, to be accompanied by the simultaneous signing of a parallel Israeli-American MoU and a Syrian-American MoU.

The Israeli-Syrian-American MoU would have to include the following points:

a. mutual recognition of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which Israel and Syria and the other states in the region will live in security and peace;

b. agreement to move in three stages towards the full implementation of UN SC Resolution 242;

c. agreement to develop a joint Israeli-Syrian-American strategy concept that will contribute to the creation of a system of security, stability, prosperity and peace in the Middle East;

d. agreement to sign a treaty of peace, including full normalization of relations between Israel and Syria.

e. agreement to establish and start work immediately on three trilateral committees:
first, an Israeli-Syrian-American Security Cooperation Committee, which will coordinate miltary measures and take common action against terror activities;
second, an Israeli-Syrian-American Economic Cooperation Committee, which will plan regional economic development; and
third, an Israeli-Syrian-American Strategy Cooperation Committee, which will plan regional security cooperation.

The israeli-American MoU would have to include the following points:

a) an understanding that each stage is an agreement in itself, and movement from one to the other stage, will not be automatic, but will depend upon full implementation.
b) a definition of conditions that will make it sensible to cross Syria out from the terror list;
c) a definition of conditions that will open the way for Syria to obtain

(2 עמודים)

23 יוני 1994

אל: שמעון פרס, יוסי ביילין, אורי סביר

מאת: רון פונדק

אופציה ירדנית על חשבון הפלסטינים ?

1. ישראל נמצאת בפני צומת הכרעות חדשה במו"מ המדיני כאשר שני מהלכים עומדים עתה בפנינו. האחד, המשך המו"מ עם הפלסטינים על ה-EARLY EMPOWERMENT ועל הרחבת האוטונומיה לכל הגדמ"ע, והשני, כניסה למו"מ אינטנסיבי על הסכם שלום עם ירדן.

2. ברור שהמהלך עם ירדן הוא הקל מבין השניים והתנגדות לו היא זניחה. מבחינה בטחונית אין כמעט בעיות צפויות, ומבחינה ציבורית הוא זוכה לתמיכה רחבה מאחר וקהל מובן שהוא טומן בחובו בעיקר תוצאות חיוביות. שלום, או אפילו רק נורמליזציה, יתרמו לחיזוק הממשלה, להאצת התהליך הכולל, ולעליה במצב הרוח הלאומי בישראל.

3. מאידך המהלך הקרוב מול הפלסטינים - הן זה הכרוך בהעברת סמכויות מוקדמת ולבטח זה הקשור בהחלת הסדר הביניים על כל השטח - טומן בחובו מו"מ קשה ומייגע, הרבה החלטות לא פופולריות, וסיכוי סביר שמצב הבטחון האישי, בעיקר של המתנחלים, עלול להידרדר הן מסיבות שקשורות לחיכוך הנוסף בין הממשל העצמי לבין מתיישבי הגדמ"ע, והן מפרובוקציה של הגרעין הקשה מבין המתנחלים. ברור גם שמהלך זה יוביל לגינוי [illegible] קור ציבורית הן בארץ והן בקרב יהודי ארה"ב, וישמש בסיס [illegible] האופוזיציה ולהחרפת המאבק הפוליטי.

4. הפלסטינים מצידם ינסו כנראה לחזור על הטקטיקה [illegible] באוסלו, ואותה המשיכו במו"מ על עזה-יריחו: הליכה על סף [illegible] העלאת דרישות ללא קשר להסכם או לרוחו. מטרת טקטיקה [illegible] היא [illegible] להפגין לציבור הערבי שאין הם מוותרים על עקרונות [illegible] כבר [illegible] באוסלו וקהיר, ובכדי לחתיש את ישראל עד כדי השגת [illegible].

5. כתוצאה מהאמור לעיל, ישנם חוגים מסו[illegible]ים כולל [illegible] רוה"מ, [illegible] להוביל לשינוי מדיניות שבבסיסה טמונה ההנחה [illegible] כלהלן:

א. השלב הנוכחי עם הפלסטינים הו[illegible] בהצלח[illegible] ישראל מחוץ [illegible], רמת הפיגועים והפרות הסדר ירדה, [illegible] שלב [illegible] יגרום [illegible], ביקורת, וקשיים עד כדי חוסר אפשרות יישום. (במש[illegible] יש [illegible] בכירים ממשה"ח שאמרו שלמעשה אין סיכוי [illegible] ביניים).

ב. קיימת אפשרות לחזור לנוסחה ה[illegible] הטובה [illegible] האופציה הירדנית.

[illegible] התומכים בגישה זאת, הגעה להסדר עם ירדן היא קלה, וניתן להחל[illegible]לית או לנווט זאת מאוחר יותר, שהשלב הבא באשר לעתיד הגדמ"ע [illegible] ירושלים יתבצע מול הירדנים ולא מול הפלסטינים, מתוך מגמה לאפשר [illegible] לסדר את העניינים מאוחר יותר מול "אחיהם" הפלסטינים.

7. המסקנה האופרטיבית של חוגים אלו היא שעל אף האמור בהצהרת העקרונות אסור להכנס עתה למו"מ אמיתי עם הפלסטינים על העברת סמכויות [illegible] הסדר הביניים, וכמובן לא להבטיח להם דבר לגבי פתרון הקבע. מבחינה [illegible] מניעים הללו לגרור עתה רגליים בטוענה שהשלב הבא יתבצע רק אחרי [illegible] גם [illegible] הצלחה בשליטתו על עזה-יריחו.

[illegible] חדשה זאת [illegible] ישנה סבירות גבוהה שנהיה עדים [illegible] של תהליך השלום מול הפלסטינים. לא מדובר רק בחימור [illegible] עמידה בעקרונות עליהם הסכימו הצדדים [illegible] ישראל גם מול [illegible] ערביות אחרות.

[illegible] פתרון [illegible] בעיקר לא במצב הנוכחי [illegible] מקומם את [illegible] על חשבון דחיקת הפלסטינים [illegible] נכון ואין כל סיבה שלא לפעול במקביל מול שני הגורמים תוך [illegible] בעקרונות [illegible] ישראל עם הפלסטינים בספטמבר 1993, ועם הירדנ[illegible] ביוני 1994.

TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY אוניברסיטת תל-אביב

THE MOSHE DAYAN CENTER FOR
MIDDLE EASTERN & AFRICAN STUDIES

מרכז משה דיין ללימודי
המזרח התיכון ואפריקה

June 19, 1994

Mr. Harry Kney-Tal, Director
Policy Planning Staff
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Jerusalem

By fax: (02) 303-005

Dear Harry,

I very much enjoyed our meeting last week. Please extend my thanks also to Eli and Moshe for their time as well as their participation.

I really am not entirely sure about the context or purpose of your "assignment" to me. Nevertheless, I thought it might be interesting to construct a statement that would capture what I think are the basics of what would be needed for the creation of a serious and ongoing dialogue on a regional basis. I have written it as if it were an expression of common concern among a group of Middle East influentials; as such, I also have used a somewhat more "expressive" language than I ordinarily might employ if I were writing this for Ottawa!

I would be interested in your reaction and I would be willing to develop any of these points -- or others -- in a more serious and substantive fashion if it would be of any use.

I do hope that we will have another opportunity to meet. I look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely yours,

David

David B. Dewitt
Dayan Research Fellow

(R) hard copy being forwarded by mail. D.

Professor of Political Science & Director (on leave)
Centre for International and Strategic Studies
York University
Toronto, Canada M3J 1P3

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Peace in the Middle East:
From a Vision to a Reality

-- draft --
19 June 1994

It is self-evident that the Middle East has not seen a period of tranquility and prosperity for generations. Although some have witnessed marked improvements in their standard of living, others have been less fortunate. Similarly, while some have found stability and opportunity, others continue to fear for themselves and for the future of their children. No where has the turmoil and disquiet of conflict and violence been so protracted as between Israel and its Arab neighbours; no where have so many worked so hard for so important causes and yet been left unfulfilled; and yet no where is the potential so promising. Madrid began the most recent inter-state process; Oslo and Cairo have added a dramatic new dimension; the region clearly is on the verge of a new era.

We now are in a period of uncertain transition. The end of the cold war has unleashed new forces and created fresh opportunities. However, old and seemingly intractable problems yet remain. The challenge -- indeed, the resposibility -- we now face is to use these new forces and opportunities to remove impediments and to transform relations which perpetuate conflict and misery, hinder creativity and development, and block our moving down the road to peace and security.

We recognize that the demands before us are not merely the disengagement of forces, the establishment of ceasefire lines, the creation of demilitarized zones, or declaratory statements of recognition of international resolutions. As important as each of these are, they are acts which reflect a state of belligerency. We acknowledge that that time has past. We now face the imperative of building a stable, peaceful, and productive region based on national integrity, state sovereignty, mutually recognized boundaries, and secure political, economic, and social environments. Our task is to find accommodation to competing and, at times, conflicting interests and claims such that the independence, security, and well-being of communities and their legal authorities are guaranteed and protected. We recognize the historical imperatives which motivate people to act, but at the same time we give primacy to the future rather than the past.

From time immemorial peoples of the Middle East -- from the Tigres and Euphrates basin across the expanse of North Africa -- have laid claims and counter claims to land, to resources, to leadership. Our histories have been cyclical -- feast and famine, wealth and poverty, grandeur and decline, invasion and repulsion -- much like the histories of other parts of the world. However, unlike elsewhere, out of our world were forged the three great monotheistic religions and, just as with the other contradictions,

so these sowed the seeds of competition and conflict. It is this which both holds us together and tears us apart in a manner unlike any other, for religious beliefs and devotion transcend time and place and propels their adherents forward. It is now time to seek accommodation and to create an environment in which all peoples will be afforded opportunity, security, and a life free of fear.

While the modern Middle East is a region of diversity, it is also an arena in which the state has become the common principal political structure. We recognize the legitimacy and integrity of each and every state party and signatory to the United Nations Charter and, in so doing, also accede to the rules of law as codified through custom, convention, and charter. As such, we acknowledge that states' boundaries are not to be altered by the use of military force. Changes in territory which result from peaceful means agreed to by all the parties directly affected are to be welcomed. We recognize that a fundamental principle of such action, in the spirit as well as the intent of international law, is the prior consent of the inhabitants of said territory, not merely the agreement of existing governing authorities. Clearly, we believe that in this spirit the future for Israel, the Palestinians, and the Arab states and peoples is a promising one.

The possibilities we face are momentus, but they must be addressed with care. As representatives of our countries, our governments, and our peoples we are obliged to ensure no false steps, to create no unfulfilled expectations, and to take no unwarranted risks. Therefore, we recognize the continued need to seek support for our efforts from the international community. While each government must assume primary responsibility for the security of its state and people, during this period of uncertain transition from war and protracted conflict towards peace, stability, and prosperity we call upon the United States, Russia, the states of Europe, Asia, and the Americas to recommit their wealth, knowledge, and capabilities to our efforts. Very practical issues must now be faced and they require a sustained commitment.

The decades of conflict, violence, and war between Israel and the Arab world now require measures which will reassure all parties that aggression by one against another is neither intended nor possible. Measures which instill confidence and trust are to be welcomed. While it may still be too soon to call for a regional security framework, the time is ripe to begin creating the foundation for such an arrangement. We therefore call for the creation of an ongoing regional forum at the track-two level[1] to establish a "habit of dialogue" so that the process of inculcating norms of transparency and, thereby, reassurance can be initiated.

---

[1] Track-two refers to meetings in which non-governmental experts join governmental experts, but where the latter participate in their individual, non-official capacities.

We view this as an informal and regular parallel to the continuing multilateral and bilateral post-Madrid talks.

The protracted nature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well as the Israel-Arab inter-state conflict has undermined aspects of social and economic development. We strongly support efforts by the states of the region to work with the international community in securing capital, technology, and other scarce resources as we seek to make the next century the century of development and prosperity. It is too early to define the exact nature of the Middle East economic community. But it is now essential that the political dynamics be supported by detailed and far-reaching initiatives addressing the future of inter-state financial, commercial, productive, labour, and trading relations within this part of the Middle East. In so doing we recognize the inherent right of each sovereign state to decide upon its own future, yet we also must ensure that no governmental decision is made without access to knowledge of both costs and benefits. In this regard, we must be prepared to recognize the connection between the interests of each state and the future well-being of the region. Differential demographic patterns combined with the uneven distribution of natural resources require both the acknowledgement that a single formula for all will not do and that any formula must take into account the regional contexts. Otherwise, continued uneven development likely will exacerbate rather than ameliorate conflict. We therefore support the creation of a regional commission on sustainable economic development.[2]

The turmoil in which the states and the peoples of this part of the Middle East have been caught up since before the turn of the century has hampered political, economic, and social developments. We are now in a period of transition -- we hope to a just, equitable, and lasting peace. The opportunity cannot be lost. We acknowledge the need to find the means to ensure that our peoples have the education and the freedom to contribute meaningfully to the building of our respective countries. Each state and each people has its own traditions and cultures, and within those the place of the individual, the community, the village, and the central government have specific meaning. We respect the differences just as we expect that all governments will endeavour to fulfil the spirit as well as the letter of the United Nations Charter and the attendant conventions and covenants. As with our concern for sustainable economic development, we recognize that social relations -- between individuals, between communities, between states -- differ within and across societies and cultures.

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[2] The phrase "sustainable economic development" is used to highlight the understanding that for economic development to be both productive and compatible with inter-state regional politics and economics as well as domestic politics, sustainability has to be a central aspect of any calculus.

Although differences thus must be acknowledged, nevertheless issues such as the relationship between the individual and governing authority, the conditions of free speech, the role of the intellectual, the place of the media, and the opportunity for citizens to be educated and to have productive employment all impact upon the stability of regimes and regions. We therefore recommend the creation of a regional commission on social forces and human relations.[3]

The ambiguities which so often are necessary in the world of diplomacy cannot be allowed to hamper the opportunity for claiming a secure peace, a stable society, and a productive environment. Therefore, while the regional commissions on sustainable economic development and on social forces and human relations focus on the domestic factors of the state as the building-blocks of regional cooperation, it remains necessary also to commit resources to a regional commission on military security. This effort would have two principal components. First, it would focus on the "hard" side of the security equation, addressing the primary responsibility which every state and government has to ensure the physical survival of its citizenry and land, to defend against potential aggression, and to guarantee the maintenance of its political and social character. Even in the face of peace, we recognize the necessity for a responsible role for the military. Second, this commission would articulate the fundamental relationship between the military security of the state, its regional context, and the centrality of social forces and economic development as a necessary condition for peace, stability, and prosperity. As such, this commission on military security will focus on arms control, confidence building, transparency, and reassurance in order to dampen fears of insecurity and to reduce the probability of war by accident.

The Madrid meeting began the process. The Oslo and Cairo declarations moved us forward. We must now ensure that these remarkable precedents were not put forth in vain. We cannot turn back. We are now caught up in the vortex of this uncertain transition. We who represent our governments and our peoples are now obliged to introduce certainty to this period. Building upon the work to be undertaken by these three inter-governmental commissions -- on sustainable economic development, on social forces and human relations, on military security -- we call for the creation of a senior ministers' council on cooperative security that will be responsible for integrating the findings of the three

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[3] Social forces and human relations are terms used to denote the relationship between the productive capacity and potential of society and the fact that governments do much to regulate and to manage the conditions under which human relations -- whether individual or collective -- interact and are more or less productive.

MEETING OF THE REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT WORKING GROUP
15-16 JUNE, 1994, RABAT

CONCLUSIONS ESTABLISHED UNDER THE CHAIR'S AUTHORITY

The fifth meeting of the Regional Economic Development Working Group took place in Rabat on 15-16 June 1994. The delegations participated actively and constructively in the discussions.

The Group welcomed the Agreement between Israel and the PLO signed in Cairo on 4 May as an important step towards a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East. The Group also welcomed the progress achieved during the Trilateral Meeting held in Washington on 6-7 June 1994 on Jordanian-Israeli trade. It stressed the importance of creating and maintaining momentum in peace efforts on all fronts. The Group noted that progress in the bilateral tracks had entailed greater emphasis on the value of the multilateral tracks and their potential contribution to a lasting peace.

The Group agreed that Syria and Lebanon had an important part to play in its work. It hoped, therefore, that they would soon be able to participate. Meanwhile the Chair undertook to keep them closely informed on progress.

1. Copenhagen Action Plan - Update

The Group reviewed progress in implementing the Copenhagen Action Plan (CAP). It agreed that there had been much activity in all nine areas of the CAP's work. The CAP should yield visible benefits in the short and medium term. The long-term vision was for the region itself to create with the assistance of outside partners. It would be the result of regionally agreed priorities. The Group noted that the CAP was open for further development. It should accomodate the economic interests of the entire region, including Syria and Lebanon.

The Group heard a report from the European Commission summarizing activity in the areas of the CAP's work.

2. Copenhagen Action Plan - Follow-Up

The Group considered the future direction of the CAP. The Group agreed on the need for the region to be more directly involved in taking initiatives and setting priorities. It stressed, however, that fully-fledged cooperation among the regional parties would only be effective with credible support from the international community. In this perspective, the regional parties raised the question of financial arrangements

needed in this regard. Some regional parties proposed that the idea of a regional financial institution be studied for discussion at future meetings.

Projects should be focussed and prioritised according to criteria agreed among the regional parties.

Against this background, the Group took note of a set of guidelines for cooperation among the regional parties and of the establishment of a monitoring committee for intersessional activities (Annex A).

3. Shepherds' Reports

3.1 Communications and Transport

France reported on a seminar, "Transport in the Middle East", held in Paris on 3-6 May 1994 in coordination with the European Commission. The seminar underlined the significant role of transport in economic development and identified existing regional barriers to the movement of people and goods. It concluded that a comprehensive approach within a regional framework was necessary and suggested eight initiatives including the establishment of a coordinating group on regional transport.

The Gavel Holder confirmed the European Commission's continuing support for the French Shepherd in the Transport and Communications sectors.

The United States announced its intention to conduct a feasibility study on Regional Air Navigation and Communications Systems in the Middle East.

3.2 Energy

Austria reported on an investigation undertaken jointly with the European Commission on the integration of electricity grids.

The European Commission reported on the results of a desk study of the concept of a Dead Sea Hydro Project.

The Group noted that both studies were in draft form and would be presented for expert examination to a workshop in the near future.

3.3 Tourism

Japan reported on the Tourism Workshop held in Cairo on 6-7 February 1994 and on the subsequent meeting in Rabat on 13 June 1994 of a small informal group. Among the topics discussed had been infrastruture development, the development of tourism-related industries and the human resources required

for tourism, regional tourism marketing, professional training, a tourism database, the streamlining of frontier procedures and a future region-wide association for tourism. Participants in the Workshop would meet again in order to transform ideas into specific regional projects and joint actions.

Japan informed the Group of a proposal for a seminar in January 1995 on small and medium enterprises (including those related to tourism), to which experts from the region would be invited.

3.4 Agriculture

Spain reported on a study aimed at establishing the agricultural situation of each of the regional parties and the perceived role of agriculture in their economies now and in the future. The overall objective of the study was to identify opportunities for regional cooperation which would benefit the regional parties and promote the Peace Process.

Spain informed the Group of its intention to organize a workshop on plant protection in the near future.

The European Commission reported on a mission to the region to target veterinary issues for regional cooperation which identified a general interest in establishing closer regional cooperation in the field of animal health. The mission recommended a regional workshop between veterinary services and the Commission which would prepare a work programme for regional activities and special Palestinian requirements.

3.5 Financial Markets and Investment

The United Kingdom reported on three areas of work:

- an International Conference on Financial Markets held in London on 28-29 April 1994, which successfully increased awareness of recent economic reforms and developments in the Peace Process; and the opportunities for regional cooperation in the financial sector;

- a consultancy study on regional stock markets, the report of which identified some areas in which regional cooperation would be desirable;

- the development of banking in the West Bank and Gaza, for which the Bank of England was providing assistance.

The United Kingdom informed the Group that, subject to the views of other delegations and, in particular, the regional parties, that it was considering the possibility of organizing workshops on some of the themes of the International Conference on Financial Markets, such as the legal framework, accountancy, stock markets and investments.

3.6 Trade

Germany reported on the completion of the first stock-taking study on regional trade and barriers to it. The results would be considered in a workshop planned for the autumn in conjunction with the European Commission.

3.7 Training

The Unites States reported its sponsorship of:

- a five day seminar in April on Animal Health in cooperation with the Egyptian Government. It covered a wide range of issues and identified opportunities for improving coordination in addressing regional health threats;

- a two week course currently taking place in Florida on innovative techniques for water management. This course was taking place in conjunction with the Water Working Group.

The United States explained that a useful method of providing regional "training" was found to be through seminars and workshops on specialized topics where experts were able to share their expertise.

The United States also briefed the Group on new training initiatives which it was undertaking as shepherd for training in the Refugee Working Group and within the framework of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee. Training for Palestininans had sought to encourage self-sufficiency and self-management and discourage dependency.

3.8 Networks

The European Commission reported on its promotion of the creation of nine networks as instruments for solving problems and creating confidence between the regional parties to the benefit of peace for the whole region. A launch conference took place in Cairo on 13-15 December 1993 following which technical assistance contracts were signed in connection with "Peace-Urbs", "Peace-Campus" and "Peace-Media".

3.9 Bibliography

Canada presented an updated survey of the Literature on Economic Cooperation and Integration in the Middle East. Noting that the literature survey was prepared in collaboration with Israeli, Palestinian and Jordanian research centres, Canada agreed to examine ways of building on the work done to date by, for example, including Egyptian references and convening a workshop to act on the survey's findings.

3.10 Public Health

Italy reported on its proposals for activity in a new sector, Public Health, in the context of the CAP.

The Group welcomed the progress achieved in all areas of the CAP and expressed its appreciation for the efforts of the shepherds and their associates. The regional parties noted the benefits they had derived from the activities of the shepherds and looked forward to further collaboration with them.

4. Copenhagen Action Plan 2

A revised plan incorporating new proposals made during the meeting is attached at Annex B.

5. Database Presentation

The European Commission reported on the establishment of a Middle East Peace Process Information Bank (MEPPIB) containing documents and other texts, events and addresses relating to the multilateral working groups. It described how members could both contribute relevant information and benefit from the resulting pool. The Group recognized that the database could be a practical tool for those involved in regional cooperation. The European Commission encouraged all members to make full use of the database.

6. Report from the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee

Norway, in its capacity as Chair of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC), reported to the Group on the meeting of the AHLC held in Paris on 9-10 June 1994. The Group noted with interest the encouraging outcome of this meeting and emphasized the need for further financial assistance to cover start-up costs. Efforts towards regional cooperation should take into consideration the special circumstances of the Occupied Territories.

7. Next Meeting

The Group took note of Germany's offer to host the meeting, a decision on which the Steering Group would take.

Monitoring of the Copenhagen Action Plan

1 Effective regional cooperation in the Middle East requires the achievement of comprehensive peace and the establishment of confidence and mutual trust.

2 With the aim of building a sustainable peace and regional economic cooperation, the regional parties have agreed the following guidelines.

- The purpose of regional cooperation is to stimulate economic and social development and to reduce regional economic disparities.
- Economic cooperation must be voluntary with all parties gaining in the process and receiving fair reciprocal advantages. No project should disadvantage any regional party.
- Good domestic economic management is a pre-requisite for effective economic cooperation.
- Regional cooperation should promote integration into global markets.
- Regional cooperation will require the active assistance and full commitment of the international community.
- Regional cooperation requires a gradual approach and careful preparation. Partners may proceed at different paces towards the common objective.
- Regional institutions and International Financial facilities should be used where appropriate to support efforts towards regional cooperation.

3. To respond to the challenge of rapid development in today's global economy, the regional parties recognise that it is necessary to :

- tackle jointly common challenges, through coordinated efforts;
- remove obstacles to a more prominent role for the private sector;
- exploit fully their respective advantages by promoting regional trade, facilitating investment and developing infrastructure;
- encourage the free flow of people, goods, services, capital and information within the region.

4. In order to ensure sufficient opportunity for regional initiative, a REDWG monitoring committee has been established open to all regional parties to be chaired by the REDWG gavel holder with the participation of the co-sponsors and co-organisers. The committee, established by and reporting to REDWG, will:

- monitor the implementation of the Copenhagen Action Plan (CAP)
- organise sectoral activities, including convening expert meetings and sectoral subcommittees, with the guidance of the "shepherds"
- identify, with a view to its implementation, an evolving programme of viable priority projects to be presented to the REDWG.

In order to facilitate this work, the EU will place its regional data bank at the disposal of the committee.

This approach will be reviewed at the next meeting of the REDWG.

Annex B

REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT WORKING GROUP
COPENHAGEN ACTION PLAN II, JUNE 1994

Sponsor	Subject	Status

COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSPORT

1. France/EC	Workshop of transport officials from the region	completed
2. EC	Workshop on regional road infrastructure (priority projects)	planned
3.EC	Workshop on regional railways	planned
4. F/EC	Workshop on port and maritime sector	planned
5. F	Workshop on road transport regulation	planned
6. EC, US, ICAO, F	Workshop of civil aviation officials	planned
7. US	Feasibility study of regional navigation and air traffic control	planned
8. F	Economic feasibility study of Gaza port	planned
9. EC/F	Study on conditions and costs of transport in the regions	planned

ENERGY

10. EC/Austria	Study of electricity grid interconnection	draft completed
11. EC	Review of existing studies of hydro-electrical power plant on the Dead Sea-Red Sea and Mediterranean	ongoing
12. EC/Austria	Workshop on electricity inter-connection planning including Dead Sea Hydro	planned
13. Italy	feasibility study of Egypt/Gaza pipeline	planned

TOURISM

14. Japan	Workshop on regional cooperation in tourism, (number 1)	completed
15. Japan	Workshop on regional cooperation in tourism (number 2)	planned
16. Japan	Seminar on policies for promotion of small-medium enterprises, including those related to tourism	planned
17. EC	Workshop of European tour operators and regional tourism officials	planned
18. US	Workshop of American tour operators and regional tourism officials in Egypt	planned
19. Switzerland	Feasibility Study on regional training of hotel and tourism personnel	planned

AGRICULTURE

20. Spain	Study on agricultural development in the region (food self-sufficiency and regional trade)	completed
21 Spain.	Workshop on plant protection	planned
22. EC	Mission to identify areas of veterinary medicine networks in animal health and livestock improvement, joint vaccination	completed
23. EC	Workshop of senior veterinary officials to prepare a work programme	planned

FINANCIAL MARKETS AND INVESTMENT

24. UK	Conference on financial markets (Follow-up under preparation)	completed
25. UK	Study on greater cooperation among stock markets	ongoing
26. EC	Workshop on the business, legal and regulatory environment for the private sector	planned
27. EC	Conference to promote Europe-Middle East Joint Ventures, Cairo	planned
28. US/Switzerland	Economic Summit for the Middle East, Marrakech	planned

TRADE

29. Germany	Study on regional cooperation in trade for goods and services	completed
30. Germany	Follow-up to the above study	planned
31. EC/ Switzerland	Workshop on the administrative simplification of the movement of goods	planned

HEALTH

32. Italy	Study on communicable diseases in the region	planned

TRAINING

33. US	Regional Workshop on water management systems in conjunction with the Water Working Group	completed
34. US	Regional seminar on animal health in the Middle East	completed
35. Germany	Study of vocational education and technical training in the Region	ongoing
36. Germany	Workshop based on results of above study	planned
37. India	Prefeasibility study for a technical centre in Gaza and Jericho to create trainers for the region	planned
38. World Bank	Network of regional training institutes organised by EDI	planned

NETWORKS AND INFORMATION

39. EC	Workshop on EC and regional cooperation amongst municipalities	completed (network ongoing)
40. EC	Workshop on EC and regional cooperation amongst universities	completed (network ongoing)
41. EC	Workshop on EC and regional cooperation amongst media	completed (network ongoing)
42. Canada	Updated review of the literature on economic cooperation in the Middle East	completed
43. Canada	Inter-sessional activity based on above	under discussion
44. EC	Regional Data Bank	ongoing

2.4

Freq :

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Meeting between Shimon Peres and Faisal Husseini
Sunday, June 12, 1994, 15.30 to 16.30
present: Avi Gil and Yair Hirschfeld

Shimon: You are giving us alot of trouble.
Faisal: Do you refer to Arafat's statement regarding "jihad"?
Shimon: Yes, and the story of the letter. It is simply not done.
Faisal: Those, who are keeping their word, are paying the price, like me.
Shimon: This is true for us too.
Faisal: We preparing ourselves for Gaza and Jericho. In Egypt they have developed a (state) routine. We have none. This is the problem. Sometimes a lot of trouble occurs because of the procedure. It can happen that I will be the last one to be informed. We have to change from a revolutionary movement to a state. The other problem is related to economic matters.
Shimon: The Holst Fund was my idea. We could be of more help, if help between us could be coordinated.
Faisal: There is the issue of Palestinian labour in Israel. It has gone down strongly.
Shimon: We are providing 15 000 more permissions. It is altogether 45 000. You know if there is a catastrophe we close it again. Evidently work in Israel provides immediate relief as it creates very quickly additional income. Today we proved 25 000 permits to labourers from the West Bank and 20 from the Gaza Strip.
Faisal: It should be increased. We are also concerned about the efficiency of the ongoing contacts.
Shimon: The Palestinian police in Gaza is very good. The problem is that we get six different (contradicting) requests from six different sources. There are many people dealing with te same issue on your side.
Faisal: Send a letter to Abu Mazen and ask him: who is who? You know another difficulty is that the people in charge in Gaza tend to think only about their needs and are not aware of the repercussions or side effects on the situation in the West Bank.
Shimon: You have a very good man for Gaza. It is Abd el Razeq Yihia. Send him here. You know so far everybody tells us a different story.
Faisal: We should address the problem of releasing prisoners. For Gaza it is easy. All of them who come from the Gaza Strip shall be released there; vut for Jericho it is different. It is a big problem. There are certain cases, we prefer to keep in Jericho.
Shimon: The people who had life sentences.
Faisal: There are also others, we need to send to Jericho and keep them from their villages. It creates a series of problems. First, Housing; shall we put them in camps?
Shimon: You can buy from us the caravans.
Faisal: We are speaking to your people about it; but we can only buy on credit. There are more problems: shall we watch the prisoners, or otherwise they will run away. We could give them training and see if we can add them to our forces; but this is against the agreement. Give us a chance to handle the issue effectively. Release them gradually, every day two or three.

Shimon: You spoke to Yossi Sarid about it?
Faisal: Yes.
Shimon: Do you already levy taxes?
Faisal: We have not yet started.
Shimon: Are you afraid not to be popular?
Faisal: It is an organisational matter. Regarding popularity it is an ongoing up and down curve. When Jericho was closed by you, everyone was against the peace process.
Shimon: Now it is quiet in Jericho.
Faisal: Yes. Concerning Jerusalem: What will happen?
Shimon: We will keep all our promises. We kept everything. On August 19 and 20 in Oslo we made some promises. But what he did with the letter was terrible. What we promised we shall keep; but everything above it, is out of the promise. We should keep Jerusalem quiet. They are now shouting about other letters. It is full of rumours.
Faisal: I tried to stop it. I was saying to Yair, we will not ask for change, as long as you do not implement change on the ground, ~~quietly~~. I had an agreement with Shahal: Women, men over 40. children under 16 and Palestinians in the area of Jerusalem could enter freely, or on the basis of a one-year permit. It was at first implemented and then withdrawn. We said to ourselves this is for security reasons and we understand this. But it went on for weeks and weeks. The checkpoints create claims and complaints it adds a lot of bitterness. We had difficulties for the Arab Studies Society. In Isariyyeh you took private land; some activities could have been done on public land; why did you have to cause friction and take private land? There is another difficulty in Valayeh (?). Before 1967 it was part of the West Bank.
Shimon: All these small things should be investigated.
Faisal: About the Orient House.
Shimon: It it does not deal with political matters of the autonomy it will be o.k. Did you speak to Shahal.
Faisal: I said the Orient House it outside the activities of the autonomy and agreed with Shahal.
Shimon: We will keep our promise.
Faisal: The Orient House and the Technical Committees shall carry out research that will assist the Autonomy, but we shall not implement it.
Shimon: Now, you speak to me like to a lawyer. I'll ask Shahal to go into the details.
Faisal: For the work of the technical committees. What are the limitiations?
Shimon: Both of us need a little rest. We have to build good relations. The whole art is to build good will. No relationship can survive otherwise.
Faisal: Many things are happening in Jerusalem. There is confiscation of buildings.
Shimon: Let the dust settle down.
Faisal: We want to see some positive change.

Shimon: If there is investment, we will offer support. In Jerusalem there are some remnants of refugee camps. We would encourage the building of permanent housing for them. It should be done with Japanese assistance and we should establish a joint committee.
Faisal: Permits for construction should be given in certain places, which are categorized as "absentee property".
Shimon: Again I don't have the necessary legal knowledge. I shall speak to Shahal.
Faisal: If we reach a modus for promoting work in Jerusalem, all opposition will calm down.

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אל: אבי גיל

מאת: יאיר הירשפלד

בהענות לבקשתך אני מציע שהשר ישקול פגישות עם האישים והגורמים הבאים:

1. המנהיגות הרגיונלית:

א. מוסטאפה נאצ'ה - ראש עירית חברון
ב. מנצור שאווה - ראש עירית עזה המיועד
ג. מאהר מאסרי (אחיו של שה"ח הירדני לשעבר ונציג של משפחת מסרי בשכם)

2. המנהיגות של מפלגות התומכות בשלום אך אינם בפתח

א. נציגים ממפלגת השעבי (הקומוניסטים לשעבר) - מומלץ פגישה עם סמיר עבדאללה וראסם אל חטיב הממלאים גם תפקידים כלכליים חשובים
ב. נציגים ממפלגת פדא (החזית הדמוקרטית לשעבר), נציגיה המומלצים הם: זהירה כאמל, וריטה גרסיאני (המייצגות גם את שדולת הנשים בשטחים)

3. המנהיגות הכלכלית/עסקית

א. מומלץ להיפגש עם אנשי עסקים המובילים כמר כאמל חסונה שמייצג קבוצה פלסטינאית ירדנית שעומד להשקיע 200 מליון דולר (מומלץ לאפשר לכמאל חסונה לבוא לפגישה עם הנציגים הנבחרים של הקבוצה)

זוהי רשימה חלקית בלבד, אך מייצגת גורמי כוח חשובים בשטח, לא הומלץ בכוונה להיפגש עם נציגי פתח המקומיים כדי למנוע חיכוכים מיותרים.
המלצתי היא שנתחיל בקיום פגישה בין השר לבין ראש עירית חברון בהקדם האפשרי.

ב ב ר כ ה,

יאיר הירשפלד

THE WASHINGTON POST May 29, 1994

Unsettling the West Bank

Those Once-Divisive Loan Guarantees for Israel Can Help Build the Peace

By Khalil Jahshan, William Quandt and Jerome M. Segal

THE ISSUE of Israeli settlers and settlements in the West Bank and Gaza cannot go long ignored. If mishandled, the fate of the settlers will undermine the prospects for later stages of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. Ironically, the $10 billion U.S. loan guarantee program—just two years ago the single most contentious issue in U.S.-Israeli relations—could serve as a vehicle of conciliation and peacemaking.

Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin has courageously said that peace is more important than settlements. So far he has given no indication of how, or under what conditions, settlements might be removed. But Israel has the capacity on its own to adopt non-coercive policies that could at least reduce the magnitude of the settler population, leaving until later negotiations the precise details of how settlements will be dealt with in a final peace agreement.

Khalil Jahshan is executive director of the National Association of Arab Americans. William Quandt is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. Jerome Segal, president of the Jewish Peace Lobby, is a research scholar at the University of Maryland.

When the Camp David accords were signed in 1978, some 10,000 Israelis lived in the West Bank and Gaza (beyond the expanded municipal boundaries of Jerusalem). Then, during the 1980s, the Israeli government intensified substantially its financial incentives to lure more Is-raelis to settle in the West Bank. The goal was to make it impossible for any future Israeli government to relinquish the area. As a result, more than 130,000 Israelis now live in the territories, excluding those in expanded Jerusalem.

American aid, up until 1991, contributed to the settling of the West Bank by cushioning what would otherwise have been a substantial drain on the Israeli budget in the form of subsidies to settlers. Now, when peace is a real prospect, the time has come for the United States and the Israeli government to reverse the financial incentives.

An appropriate instrument for this is the $10 billion loan guarantee program authorized by Congress in 1992 to provide housing for hundreds of thousands of Jews expected to emigrate from the former Soviet Union. Since actual immigration has turned out to be less than anticipated, the loan guarantees—now largely unused—could facilitate emigration from the territories by financing housing within pre-1967 Israel for tens of thousands of returning Israeli settlers.

Here's how such a program might work:

- Relocation assistance would be made available to families that agree to leave apartments and homes in the territories.
- These properties would become the property of the Israeli government and might at some later date be transferred to Palestinians, within the context of final status negotiations.
- The amount of assistance provided would decline over time. In the first year, $100,000 per family might be made available. This could be reduced in $20,000 increments each year, so that settlers waiting until the fifth year would receive only limited compensation. In short, those who leave early will be rewarded.

At present, there are approximately 25,000 Israeli families living in the territories. If, in each of the next five years, 4,000 families took advantage of the program, the cost to the Israeli government would be just over $1 billion dollars, a limited part of the total $10 billion in U.S.-guaranteed loans.

A program of this sort will not draw the most ideological of the settlers from the territories, and it can also be expected that smaller groups of extremists committed to violence will not leave in response to financial incentives. But polls show that even now more than 30 percent of the settlers are ready to leave if compensation is provided. And this number will grow once the process is started.

The program could be implemented unilaterally by the Israeli government; no negotiations with the Palestinians are required; and no coercion would be involved. Moreover, it would still leave open the future of the settlements themselves and of those settlers who remain. By agreement, those issues are to be dealt with in the final-status negotiations, which according to the Declaration of Principles are to "commence as soon as possible but not later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period."

The advantages of assisting the settlers to leave now are compelling.

By reducing the size of the settler population, the problem of dealing with settlements in the final status negotiations will be significantly easier, both to negotiate and to implement. Indeed, if this is not done, the settlement question may prove "a deal breaker" in the final status talks.

A government-assisted exodus of settlers would also send the clearest possible signal to the Palestinians that the Israeli government is serious about ultimately withdrawing from the West Bank. This would greatly strengthen the position of Palestinian moderates who have been negotiating with the Israelis.

Moreover, a major return of Israeli settlers from the territories would help limit violence in coming years. With respect to extremists on the Israeli side, it would demonstrate that the effort to create permanent facts on the ground has failed and that Israelis were leaving the territories regardless of attempts by extremists to disrupt negotiations. An exodus of settlers from the territories would also refute the claim of Palestinian extremists that the only way to end the occupation is to mount violent attacks on Israelis.

The precedent of ample compensation paid to settlers who left the Sinai when peace was achieved with Egypt has created an expectation of compensation among Israeli settlers. They will not leave without it, and the real choice is whether the process begins now or in five years. Logic says do it now.

The main obstacle standing in the way of this idea is the Israeli government's view that settlements and settlers are bargaining chips to be saved for final status negotiations. This outlook is reminiscent of old Palestinian arguments that acceptance of Resolution 242 or Israel's right to exist was a card to be held until the final stages of negotiations. However, the PLO made these decisive concessions in 1988, recognizing that peace negotiations are not a zero-sum game and that both sides must take steps to strengthen each other, regardless of whether there is an immediate quid pro quo.

It is time for Prime Minister Rabin similarly to recognize that it is in Israel's interest to act now to reduce the number of settlers. The United States, as Israel's closest ally, has a specific role to play in encouraging and facilitating this significant contribution to the peace process.

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המנהל האזרחי
אזור יהודה ושומרון
מחלקה לענייני ערבים
צח"א 00688
12 מאי 1994

רמ"א

הנדון: העברת סמכויות מוקדמת - משמעויות וחלופות

כללי

1. בהסכם הצהרת העקרונות נקבע כי עם העברת הסמכויות האזרחיות בשלב "עזה וירי[illegible] תחילה יחל מו"מ על העברת חמש סמכויות לממשל העצמי הפלסטיני: [illegible]סים, חינוך, רווחה, בריאות ותיירות - אשר יוחלו/על כל איו"ש מיריחו. חמש הסמכויות כוללות כ- 80 אחוז מעוב[illegible] המנגנון ונתח ניכר מתקציב המנהא"ז.

2. בשל הבעייתיות הצפויה בי[illegible]ברה מוקדמת של חמש הסמכויות, נשקם נסיון מצד למראל ל[illegible]יר את הדיון הנוכחי זה לשיחות וושינגטון, ובכך לנתק אי[illegible]מושו של סעיף זה בהסכם הצהרת העקרונות מן היישום של [illegible]ברת כלל הסמכויות בשלב עזה ויריחו. ואולם, בהסכם קי[illegible] (9 מברי 94) וכן בהסכם הסופי ליישום הצהרת העקרונות [illegible] מאי 94), נקבע שהסכם ההסמכה המוקדמת יידון לאחר השלמת הסכם עזה-יריחו.

3. נראה כי דרישת אש"ף למי[illegible] את ההסמכה המוקדמת נובעת מן החשש שישראל, מסיבות שונות, [illegible]יצור את יישום הסכם הצהרת העקרונות. לפיכך, מעוני[illegible] אש"ף, באמצעות ההסמכה המוקדמת, להבטיח את המשך מימוש [illegible] ההסכם בדרך של "הכנסת רגל בדלת", עובדה אשר לא תותיר לישר[illegible]אל ברירה אלא להמשיך בתהליך.

4. במסמך זה יפורטו המשמעו[illegible]ת העיקריות הכרוכות בהעברה מוקדמת של סמכויות ויוצגו ארבע [illegible]לופות בנושא. שתי החלופות הראשונות מציעות גישות [illegible]ישות לעניין העברת הסמכויות, שאינן מעוגנות בהצהרת העקרונו[illegible] ובהסכם שנחתם ב- 4 מאי ליישום הצהרת העקרונות. שתי [illegible]חלופות האחרות מתייחסות להעברת מוקדמת של חמש סמכויות, [illegible]כפי שנקבע בהצהרת העקרונות ובהסכם היישום.

משמעויות

5. נראה כי הבעייתיות בהסמכה המוקדמת נובעת משתי סיבות מרכזיות:

א. העברה חלקית של חמש סמכויות במונחק מכלל הסמכויות - עובדה אשר מחייבת קיום של שני גופי שלטון על אותה אוכלוסיה ובאותו שטח.

ב. החלת סמכות שלטונית של הממשל העצמי הפלסטיני במונחק מן השליטה על השטח.

6. להלן המשמעויות העיקריות של ההסמכה המוקדמת מבחינת ישראל והמנהא"ז:

א. תהליך דה-לגיטימציה מואץ של השלטון הישראלי (המנהא"ז) בצד חיזוק כוחו של אש"ף בעיני האוכלוסיה.

ב. הגברת החיכוך השלטוני בין השלטון הישראלי ובין הרשות הפלסטינית.

ג. פגיעה שלטונית בלתי אפקטיבית, הן מצד השלטון הישראלי והן מצד הרשות הפלסטינית (הנעדרת אמצעי אכיפה בתחומי אי"ש) בשל חצב הכפל השלטוני.

ד. כרסום פנימי של המינהא"ז כמערכת אירגונית.

ה. החלשת היכולת הבטחונית וצמצום השליטה של ישראל בשטח.

ו. צמצום התקציב של המינהא"ז בהפעלת הסמכויות הנותרות.

דפ"אות

7. העיקרון אשר על פיו נתחו הסמכויות בהצהרת העקרונות הוא העברת הסמכויות לממשל העצמי הפלסטיני בשלבים אשר כוללים שלושה מימדים/מישורי התייחסות:

א. מימד הזמן - עפ"י מועדים אשר קובעו ב- D.O.P. ו/או עפ"י תאריכים חדשים אשר יוסכמו עליהם במהלך המו"מ.

ב. המישור הפונקציונלי - עפ"י נושאי הסמכויות בכל שלב (ההבחנה היא בשלב זה ויריחו בין העברת כלל הסמכויות, ההסמכה המוקדמת והעברת יתר הסמכויות לקראת הסכם הביניים).

ג. המישור הטריטוריאלי - עפ"י התחום הגיאוגרפי בו מוחלות הסמכויות (ההבחנה היא בין עזה ויריחו לכלל אי"ש).

הדפ"אות שיוצגו להלן יהיו עפ"י מישורי ההתייחסות הנ"ל.

22/5/94

פירוט הדפ"אות

דפ"א א': העברת סמכויות בתלושה טריקוריאלית

עיקרי הדפ"א - כלל הסמכויות שעברו לידי הרשות הפלסטינית ביריחו עפ"י חלוקה טריטוריאלית ובמשך זמן עליהם יוסכם מראש.

מישורי החויחסות -

א. מימד הזמן - הצדדים יסכימו על לו"ז חדש לשלבי חביצוע. מסגרת הלו"ז הכללי - ממועד סיום המו"מ בנושא העברת הסמכויות ועד המועד שיוסכם לביצוע הבחירות הכלליות למועצת הממשל העצמי.

ב. המישור הפונקציונלי - שלב ההסמכה המוקדמת של חמש סמכויות יוחלף בהע ית כלל הסמכויות.

ג. המישור הטריטוריאל - יוסכם בין הצדדים על תוכנית להעברת כלל הסמכוי - בתחך טריטוריאלי (על בסיס נפתי).

יתרונות -

א. הסדר לגבי העברת הס כויות ייעשה במקביל להסדרים הבטחוניים על התחו יגיאוגרפי.

ב. שיטת ההעברה של הסמ יות לממשל העצמי הפלסטיני תחיה עפ"י דגם אחיד וללל בעיות הנובעות מכפל שלטוני על אובלוסיה ו/או שטח

ג. לישראל תהיה אפשרו לעקוב ולפקח על אופן החלת כלל הסמכויות ע"י הממש העצמי הפלסטיני, כאשר הממשל העצמי יקבל לידיו את "נת השלטון והשליטה" בצורה הדרגתית.

ד. מצד הממשל העצמי הפ סטיני עשוי דגם התקדמות ההדרגתית ביישום ההסכם המיש - הטריטוריאלי לזכות באמון באשר להמשכיות התהליך ו לחקל על אופן החלת הסמכויות בפועל.

חסרונות -

הדפ"א תורגת מהצהרת העק נות, מהסכם קהיר וההסכם החתום ליישום ה-D.O.P.

דפ"א ב': העברת מירב הסמכויות באו"ש במהלך אחד

עיקרי **מדפ"א** – **מירב הסמכויות** באו"ש יועברו לידי הרשות הפלסטינית ביריחו במהלך הדרגתי –רצוף אחד.

מישורי **המיוחסות** –

א. **מימד הזמן** – מגדרת **"לו"ז** ממוער סיום המו"מ בעניין העברת **הסמכויות** ועל **העריכת** הבחירות הכלליות למועצת **הממשל** העצמי.

ב. **המישור הפונקציונלי** – ההסמכה המוקדמת תורחב מחמש **סמכויות** למירב **הסמכויות** האפשרי, שיועברו בצורה מדורגת אך רצופה.

ג. **המישור הטריטוריאלי** – מירב **הסמכויות** יוחלו על כלל או"ש.

יתרונות –

א. תוסר הבעייתיות הם **ובת** הנובעת מפיצול **סמכויות** בין **המנהא"ז** לרשות **הפלסטינית**, ולא תועמד במבחן מעשי.

ב. **העברת מירב הסמכויות** תגיג **מששות** בצד **הפלסטיני** לגבי **המשכיות** ורציפות **התהליך**.

ג. **תמיכת** העיבור ברשות **הפלסטינית** ובתהליך כולו **תתחזק**.

חסרונות –

א. **דפ"א** זו תורגת מהצי **ית** העקרונות, מהסכם קהיר וה**הסכם** המתום ליישום ה- **D.C**.

ב. יתכן כי הרשות **הפלסטינית** תתקשה בניהול תקין והפעלת **הסמכויות** בכלל או**"ש**, לפחות בתקופה **הראשונה** (היעדר **מוכנות**).

ג. ישראל תוותר מראש **-** "**נכסים**" העשויים לשמש אותה **מבחינה** טקטית בהמש**ך** יתול המו"מ.

נספ"א ג': העברה מוקדמת של חמש שמכויות באו"ש לרשות הפלסטינית

עיקרי תפ"א - חמש השמכויות יקבעו בהצהרת העקרונות להעברה מוקדמת בכל או"ש - ויועברו לרשות הפלסטינית ביריחו.

מישורי המו"מ -

א. פיתוח הזמן - עמ"י - ר"ן שוקבע ב- W.U.N. ו/או עו"י מועד חדש שיוסכם ע"י בין הצדדים.

ב. המישור הפונקציונלי - יועברו חמש השמכויות שנקבעו ב-D.O.P.

ג. המישור הטריטוריאלי - השמכויות שיועברו יחולו בכל או"ש, בהתאם ל- D.C.

יתרונות -

א. תפ"א מעוגנת בהסכם - גאולת העקרונות ובחשפתם לציבור, ויישומה מבטיח את המשך התהליך כמוסכם.

ב. חיזוק כוחו של אש"ף בעיני האוכלוסיה.

ג. האחריות למעשים או מחדלים של חמשרדים שיועברו תחול על הרשות הפלסטינית.

חסרונות -

א. ראה פירוט בסעיף 5 לעיל.

ב. המו"מ על יישום תפ"א זו צפוי להיות מסובך ומורכב (לאור הכמות הגדול של מימשקים בין חמש השמכויות ליתר הקמ"טים) ולהימשך זמן חודשים - תקופה החופפת את משך תזמן המקורי שנועד להשלמת המו"מ הקבע (עד הבחירות והקמת המועצה הפלסטינית - לפירוק חמנהא"ז).

ג. יידרשו מנגנוני תיאום יעילים בין חמנהא"ז לרשות הפלסטינית.

דפ"א ד': העברה מוקדמת של חמש הסמכויות באיו"ש לקמ"טים פלסטינים

עיקרי הדפ"א - חמש הסמכויות שקבעו בהצהרת העקרונות להעברה מוקדמת בכל איו"ש - יועברו לקמ"טים פלסטינים, שיפעלו תחת שליטת המנהא"ז (המשרדים - בירתחו, יחות - באיו"ש).

מישורי התייחסות - זהה לדפ"א.

יתרונות -

א. המנהא"ז יוכל להמש ולנהל את המשרדים בצורה אפקטיבית; השליטה שראלית בשטח לא תיפגע.

ב. הרשות הפלסטינית לצטרך להתמודד עם בעיות שליטה קשות הצפויות לח, יעדר אמצעי אכיפה בתחומי איו"ש.

ג. מידת התיכון השליל בין השלטון הישראלי והרשות הפלסטינית תהיה מצמת, יחסית.

חסרונות -

א. תיווצר בעיה של "ז כפולה" של הקמ"טים למנהא"ז ולרשות הפלסטינית מחייב הסכמת לגבי יחסי הגומלין בין הקמ"טים למנהא, לרשות הפלסטינית ולגורמים אחרים.

ב. יידרשו הסכמים מפו לגבי תיקף הסמכויות שיועברו לקמ"טים הפלסטינים בכל אחד ממשרדי המשרדים (לרבות בשאלת הסמכות לחוק חקיקה ראשית וחקיקה משנית).

ג. יידרשו הסכמים מפו בעניין מזיקת שבין תקציב הקמ"טים הפלסטינים לבין תקציב הרשות הפלסטינית.

ד. תצד הפלסטיני עשו דחות מדפ"א ויעדיף הפרשנות למית הסמכויות יועברו רשות הפלסטינית (דפ"א ג').

קיבוע והמלצות

ארבע הדפ"אות שתוארו כת[illegible]חסות, למעשה, לשני מצבים עיקריים:

א. נכונות הדדית מצד [illegible]ראל ואש"ם להכניס שינויים ב-D.O.P. ובהסכם ל[illegible]שומו בנוגע להעברה מוקדמת של חמש סמכויות. למצב זה [illegible]ינות הדפ"אות הבאות:

1) דפ"א א' - תעב[illegible] סמכויות בחלוקה טריטוריאלית.

2) דפ"א ב' - תער[illegible] מירב הסמכויות באיו"ש במהלך אחד.

ב. רצון הדדי של ישראל ואש"ם להיצמד ל-D.O.P. ולהסכם הנוגע ליישומו. לכך [illegible]זה נכונות הדפ"אות הבאות:

1) דפ"א ג' - תעב[illegible] מוקדמת של חמש סמכויות באיו"ש לרשות הפלסטינ[illegible].

2) דפ"א ד' - תעב[illegible] מוקדמת של חמש סמכויות באיו"ש לקמ"טים פלסט[illegible]ים.

המלצות

מבין דפ"אות א' ו-ב' - א[illegible] מועדפת (במידה וישנה נכונות לתרו[illegible]מה-D.O.P.).

מבין דפ"אות ג' ו-ד' - [illegible] מועדפת (במידת ויש רצון להיצמד ל-D.O.P.).

מבין דפ"אות א' ו-ד' - א מועדפת.

אפרים לביא, טא"ל

חבר צח"א

From: Yair Hirschfeld
to: Yossi Beilin Ramat Yishai, May 2, 1994

I. Report on Meeting with: Abe Solomon

1. On April 28, 1994, I had a two-and a half hour meeting with Abe Solomon at the house of Gail Pressberg. (in her presence).

2. Abe made the following remarks:

a. Assad ~~had~~ has a strategic interest to conclude peace quickly with Israel. After his death there ~~was~~ is the danger that Syria would fall into four different pieces: i. a Kurdish region; ii. a Druze region; iii. an Alawite region and iv. a Sunni region. The potential for ethnic warfare was very high, and if prior to his death, stability will not be obtained, civil war in Syria will be unpreventable. In this case the bloodshed in Lebanon from 1975 to 1992 will be "a piece of cake" in comparison to what will happen in Syria.

b. Assad's son, Bashar, a twenty-eight year old eye-doctor has been chosen by Assad as his successor. Bashar was presently taking military training. Abe had seen him several weeks ago, and Bashar had cried, leaning his head at his sholder: "Uncle Abe, I don't want to be a President".

c. At Abe's last visit to Syria (the first and second week of April 1994), the President had encouraged Abe to have talks with Israeli decision-makers. Abe had had a long conversation with Faruk ash-Shara. Ash-Shara told him they wanted peace and talks would be very difficult. Ash-Shara speculated that Israel would in the end be willing to give up settlements, but such a concession would be only made at the very end of the process, after Syria will have made already all major concessions.

d. Hence, Rabin's statement, saying that Israel was willing to relinquish settlements on the Golan, was a major mistake. He, Abe, predicted that this single move will harden the Syrian position, they will "lean back and wait" for further Israeli concessions.

e. Several days ago Abe had discussed Rabin's settlement statement with his ambassador in Washington. He, too, was convinced that Rabin had made a major mistake and also anticipated a hardening of the Syrian position.

f. After Rabin's statement, in talks with Christopher it must be made clear that Israel has already made an important first step. Hence, it was upon Assad to reciprocate

and announce his intention to create full peace with all its implications with Israel. In case such a statement will not be obtained, Rabin should announce that he will break off talks in Washington.

g. Assad, to move ahead in the peace process, needs outside pressure, as he has to face the opposition of two major power groups. The first group, the mukhabarat, fear the consequences of peace, as they know that the present system of control exerted by them, would come to an end. The second power group, opposing peace, is formed by various drug profiteers (from various groups of the establishment), who know that moving towards peace with Israel and towards a rapprochement with the United States, will necessitate an end of the drug traffic in the area.

h. Peace will be meaningless, if it does not create major interaction of trade, tourism, culture, etc. The Syrian business community may be encouraged to invest in peace. Saudi Arabia is investing in peace: they gave Syria US $ 300.000.000,- for water projects and sewage recycling. Abe offered also to get the Bahreinis interested in peace projects.

3. One day after the meeting, Abe was informed that General Ziara had died of cancer. General Ziara had been put in charge of searching for the MiA's in Lebanon and his death was a major drawback.

II. Meeting with Michael Metrinko (US Dept. of State, responsible for earmarking of funds to refugees in the Middle East)

1. On April 30, I had a meeting with Michael Metrinko. He had just paid a visit to Lebanon, Syria and Jordan and had visited Palestinian refugee camps there.

2. Metrinko gave the following report:

a. Lebanon: the Govt.of Lebanon, as well as the US Embassy there, opposed strongly, the earmarking of US funds for Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. The GoL was first and foremost interested in assisting 90 000 displaced families, of whom 70 000 wanted to return to their former (destroyed) homes. The GoL tended also to keep Palestinians out of work and hire workers from elsewhere. As the PL0 has stopped to finance activities in refugee camps, the situation there was getting worse.

b. Syria: Michael Metrinko was well received in the Palestinian refugee camps in Syria. The camps were fully controlled by the Government. The camps were all open and not easily

identifiable, as being different then any other urban or rural settlement. Syrian government agencies were encouraging projects aimed at creating economic development among the refugees.

c. Jordan: Support for US funded projects was obtained from all sides, including the Hamas. All the camp population Michael met, were supporters of Hamas.

d. West Bank and Gaza: after the agreement the US tends to stop to look at the refugee population as refugees. A new policy has not yet been defined.

e. Israel; Michael Metrinko's office is funding the Jewish Agency annually for "refugee rehabilitation" with US $ 70 000 000,-. With these monies transfer costs of Jewish immigrants from Russia are being paid, etc.

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VISIT OF GREVILLE JANNER QC MP TO DOHA, QATAR, ACCOMPANIED BY DOUGLAS KRIKLER, DIRECTOR, THE MAIMONIDES FOUNDATION

2-3 MAY 1994

2 May - Late Arrival - Briefing from British Ambassador, Patrick Wogan

Qatar population: 500,000. Of these, only 100,000 are native Qataris, and the rest are foreign skilled/unskilled labourers mainly from the Indian sub-continent.

In general, Qatar is roughly between Saudi and Oman with regards to its religious tolerence. Like Saudi, there is no recognition of the rights of any other religious groups to practice their religion in Qatar. Qataris are mainly descended from the fundamentalist Wahabbi sect - though any references to this are denied as it is not permitted for sects to exist within Islam.

In Qatar, fundamentalism is denied by apparent openness. The holding of the multi-lateral talks in Doha is a political move not necessarily supported by the population, and designed as much as anything to assert Qatar's independence of policy from Saudi.

Qatar is in fact a very rigid police state - true of all Gulf states and indeed rest of Arab world to greater or lesser extent. A young UK national who was on a contract with the Qatar police has been jailed for six months and sentenced to 50 lashes of the cane for selling alcohol to a Qatari policeman (who was probably an agent provocateur). NB: Amb asked GJ to raise this matter discreetly with the Qatari FM.

The ex-pats in Qatar - both European/American and Asian - are there for the standard of living which is materially far higher than they could get at home.

Qatar produces 400,000 barrels of oil per day - and are very extravagant and wasteful with their resources. The Al-Thani ruling family draw a stipend from all oil revenues. All Qatar nationals get free services (health, education etc) but foreign workers have no rights.

The financial situation in Qatar is getting tighter. They are now beginning to exploit gas. Despite the publicity, Qatar is not really interested in pipelines: too costly and too rigid - i.e. a pipeline to India would require a huge investment for the sake of only one export market which would be a great financial risk. Instead, they are more keen on LNG (liquid natural gas) which would be easier to transport to Japan, the Far East, India and possibly Israel.

Shell Oil pulled out of Qatar after a dispute with the government. Although Shell won the dispute at arbitration the atmosphere was no longer conducive to their continued operation in Qatar. BP also withdrew because of internal difficulties within the company. So there is very little UK business representation in Qatar.

Qatar is terrified of Saudi Arabia. Historically, Qatar was part of Saudi and is linked tribally etc. Q is only an independent State through Western imperialism in the region and fears Saudi subversion. Hence, Q is trying to create relations with as many states as possible (including Iraq, Iran and Israel) to discourage Saudi from seeing Q as a potential target.

The hosting of the multi-laterals was also to please the US - who are also applying pressure for Q to continue its commercial discussions with Israel.

CALL ON CHAIRMAN OF MAJLIS ASH-SHURA, ALI BIN KHALIFA AL-HITMI - TUESDAY, 3RD MAY

Elderly gentleman, slightly hard of hearing. Did not understand GJ's Arabic. One of his tactful colleagues said to GJ: "Please don't worry, Mr. Janner, it's not your Arabic that's at fault. He's just deaf!"

All present wearing white "thawbs" (robes).

Initial pleasantries. Thought GJ was here for the multi-lateral Middle East peace process (MEPP) disarmament conference (see later) and almost refused to believe that it was a coincidence. General chat on need for peace ... working at Parliaments ...

GJ raised IPCAA - saying that everyone had joined except the Saudis who had refused. This went down with all

present and H immediately said he would be honoured to belong. (Note: Anything that Saudis won't do, the Qataris will - constant attempt to assert Qatar independence from Saudi, their massively powerful neighbour.)

H: We have excellent relations with UK and these will continue to improve, both in the field of economy and in foreign policy.

GJ: You have shown great courage in holding MEPP multilateral talks here.

(Everything that GJ said, H would answer something totally unconected ... obviously either couldn't hear or didn't understand his interpreter! Note - he and the Omani Speaker were the only two people with whom it was necessary to work through interpreters.

H: It seems that the Japanese and the US are replacing the UK in business deals with Qatar. Also, Qatari tourists in London are not happy - they keep getting mugged. They do realise that it is not the Londoners who do it, but foreigners in London who do the mugging! Please pass on my greetings to the Queen. (We found out afterwards that they took GJ's title of Queen's Counsel literally. When we arrived at the airport, we were told by the man in charge of the desk at Gulf Air that he had seen television that afternoon and was proud to meet the adviser to Queen Elizabeth - and promptly upgraded us to first class! We later saw the television broadcast and GJ was described as: Adviser to the Queen of England! DK was described in the same broadcast as 'members of the delegation accompanying Mr. Janner'!)

Further discussions on UK Parliament and workings of committees - including Employment Committee.

Looking forward to visit to UK and requested photos in House of Commons.

Mentioned Terry Dicks (see note of briefing by UK Amb).

CALL ON HEIR APPARENT OF QATAR HH HAMAD BIN KHALIFA AL-THANI

Magnificent marble palace, with soaring, spectacular

entrance and domed ceiling with great, marble cascading pillars - designed by Italians and built with imported Italian marble. Wooden lattice-work and stained glass windows. Most impressive building of its kind. Received cordially and ushered into Prince's room - bookshelves with Qur'anic manuscripts, tv and video equipment. Meeting preceeded by television cameras, photographers - preliminary chat, courtesies in Arabic. Accompanied on this visit as on two others by Patrick Wogan (UK Ambassador). HH accompanied by a young PA who also chipped in to conversation from time to time.

HH: How do you feel in Qatar?

GJ: It is wonderful to be here, both as an MP and as a Jewish leader.

HH: (Turning to look at his PA and then back to GJ) I didn't know you were a Jew!

GJ: (As if to stand up) I'd better go then!

HH: (Laughing) On the contrary, you are most welcome.

GJ: We have been in Saudi and you really are very different from them. (More laughter - GJ appealed to their anti-Saudi sentiment.) It is very courageous and important for you to be hosting the multilateral conference here.

very clever!! and a brilliant tactic

HH: We all wish to see peace process continue. We are pleased the Saudis started in the process, but now they seem to wish to disappear.

GJ: Yes - Shimon Peres had expressed disappointment at their reticence.

HH: We in Qatar are under attack in the various newspapers from other parts of the Arab world - in particular Bahrain has criticised our position. The Saudis especially should support the peace. Either way, Qatar will maintain its policy despite the risks.

GJ: You may rest assured that there is much appreciation both for your position regarding the multilateral talks - and as a new and great sporting centre (the Ambassador had told us not only that Qatar was hosting international tennis and other events but that HH himself is fanatical tennis player which is why previous Ambassador got on very well with him. Present incumbent does not know one

end of a racquet from the other.)

HH appreciated this reference and was becoming increasingly relaxed as conversation continued.

GJ: What can the UK do to help Qatar? I know that Terry Dicks has been doing his best and of course he is on the extreme left of his party! (He is in fact on extreme right - when told of proposed flogging of British citizen for selling alcohol to local resident, Dicks replied: Serves him right. If he broke the law like that, flog him! Thus: more laughter.)

HH: It would be helpful to encourage more UK firms to invest in Qatar in the way that the French and Americans are doing.

GJ: We very much regret that BP had to pull out - due to internal problems and not to problems with Qatar. (GJ to talk to John Brown about this on return.)

HH: It is also amazing that British Airways have no direct flights to Qatar, when more Qataris visit the UK than from any other Gulf State. (GJ to raise with British Airways.)

HH has house in St. James's Square which is being renovated and rebuilt. He and his wife spend much time in London. She loves shopping. HH hates it. GJ suggested that wife, Myra, who loves shopping ("when times are tough, the tough go shopping") would happily take HH's wife on shopping trip in London during their next visit to England - whilst the two husbands enjoyed themselves doing something else. Much laughter.

Ambassador referred to HH recent visit to gas producing region to oversee developments in gas stations.

HH: Gas is very important for the future of our economy, especially if we are going to diversify from oil.

GJ: You could make use of Israeli technology. IBM has come to Egypt - Insha'allah, Bukra, Malesh! ("God willing, tomorrow, never mind" - common phrases in Arabic reflecting apathy/lethargy and fatalism of Arabs.) (More laughter). GJ suggested that this would be a good strategy for pipelines to India and Israel - though in reality neither is likely to materialise. They are likely to export gas in the form of LNG - liquid natural gas.

HH: We have spoken with the Israelis. I do hope they are serious. I hope they are not just bluffing for the sake of appearing to be dealing with Arab countries on a trade level.

GJ: They are not just doing it for fun. They are serious.

HH: We are very serious.

GJ: I am going to Israel shortly and I will talk to them about it - to their leaders.

Told them that I was going to Israel for the "brit mila" of my grandson.

HH: We say the call to prayer into the ears of our little boys during circumcision - that's our custom.

GJ: You whisper the call to prayer?

HH: No - we shout it - very loudly! (Laughter)

GJ enquired about their brit customs. PA to HH said that they used to perform circumcision on their boys at age 7, but it is usually now carried out as a surgical operation when they are babies in hospital. Also told us jokingly that in Iraq they say the call to prayer in the left ear - in the right ear they shout: 'Kuwait for Iraq!'

HH agreed to be guest at banquet at House of Commons.

GJ then spoke about IPCAA - HH said he would be very happy to receive further details. (Note: when we arrived at Foreign Minister a few minutes later, he told us that HH had spoken to him by phone and had asked him about the Council.)

Meeting closed with HH saying that he would greatly welcome a further visit from GJ with his family, including his grandson from Israel.

CALL ON QATAR FOREIGN MINISTER HAMAD BIN JASSIM BIN JABOR AL-THANI

Arrived ten minutes late, because of length of talk with HH (above. NB - HH did not want to end the conversation.) Apologised - FM began by asking about IPCAA - saying that

he had received an enquiry from HH. Then GJ thanked him and his people for their courage in dealing with the peace process and hosting the multilateral meeting.

FM: Others will follow where we lead.

GJ: Saudi appears to have certain problems. Are they of their own making?

FM: Yes - Saudi does create problems. We are hoping to push peace process and solve problems for ever. Needs good faith from both sides.

GJ: Peace process very important for the Jewish world, as well as for Israel and Palestinians.

FM: War and hate have failed - now is the time for peace - despite difficulties.

GJ: Your country is a catalyst - both for the peace process (and in the distillation of gas). Impressive use of resources.

FM: Must use gas to replace oil in the event of oil resources running out. Discussed BP's problems - GJ will pass on their concern.

GJ: Thanks for your efforts to put an end to the Arab boycott of Israel.

FM: We will push the Arab League to drop the boycott, if there is movement on the Syrian/Lebanese front.

GJ: In Israel, their type of democracy has given their Government a fragile majority and it needs results. You could help greatly. It is important for peace process.

Gave greetings from Israel's leaders - which FM reciprocated - opposite message to that given to Saudis (i.e. disappointment).

FM: Saudis do not have guts. We have guts.

GJ: That because you are Qataris! (NB: In Qatar, the Q is pronounced G).

FM: I had not thought of that before.

GJ: Thanks for your help to the young Englishman Gavin Sherrard-Smith, (who is due to be flogged for trying to

sell alcohol to a Qatari - the flogging apparently consists of a man wielding a very long, thin cane, with a Qur'an under the armpit of his hitting arm, so that he cannot raise his hand high.)

FM: We are doing our best. It is not easy. We must comply with our law. Your press does not make it easy.

GJ told him what he thought of the UK press - but pointed out that any effort to influence the press could well have the opposite effect.

GJ sought to press FM further, pointing out the ill-will that would be created if the flogging proceeded - but Ambassador indicated that this was enough. FM reiterated that he would do his best but it would not be easy.

Ambassador asked: Are you drafting a statement to conclude multilateral conference?

FM: Yes - we hope to have it ready very soon. Thank you for the opportunity to meet head of Israel delegation at dinner last night - David Ivri. We got on very well. (UK Amb had hosted dinner at his residence for selected delegates to MEPP etc).

FM coming to London very soon - GJ said it would be an honour to welcome him to House of Commons - would liaise through Ambassador.

NOTE ON ATTENDANCE BY GJ AND DK AT MULTILATERAL DISARMAMENT TALKS, 3RD MAY 1994.

Details of participants attached - note: Head of UK Delegation - GJ; Delegation - DK! The only official representative of UK was Francis Geere, DHM, British Embassy.

Private conversations:

1. Israeli delegation, led by David Ivri - angry with Saudis for obstructing/opposing every suggestion. But agreed with view that what really mattered was that, for the first time, the Saudis were actively participating in a multi-national conference which included Israelis - a considerable breakthrough. What mattered was not what they said but the fact that they said it. But the Israelis were angry that the Saudis had remained silent during earlier meetings when draft resolutions had been

prepared and that they only intervened with problems (which they called "clarifications") at such a late stage.

2. "Friend" from aircraft, Prince Turki, headed Saudi delegation. Resplendent in black moustache and lightweight, pale yellow bisht (cloak), trimmed with gold, and white head dress, he was the spokesman for the (above) objections. Saw him briefly and agreed that we would meet in London - he promised to inform his Ambassador when he is coming.

During the session, the Israeli spokesman invited all regional delegates to come to Israel as part of military delegation and to visit various installations, as part of the process of "CSBM"s (Confidence and Security-Building Measures - all delegates continually used acronyms and abbreviations as part of the conference jargon). No response. The Russian Chairman asked for clarification - was this official invitation? And was it unprecedented? Or did it appear in earlier briefings or papers? Israeli replied: We will phrase the invitation however you desire, Mr Chairman, and however it would be most acceptable to the distinguished members of the delegations. But no one present responded - either positively or negatively - despite encouragement from the Russian co-Chairman - probably needing to seek guidance with respective governments before commitment could be given by delegates.

Chats with Israel delegation - some of whom GJ had met before - and one of whom is husband of Naomi Ben Zur.

VISIT BY GREVILLE JANNER QC MP TO THE SULTANATE OF OMAN - ACCOMPANNIED BY DOUGLAS KRIKLER, DIRECTOR, THE MAIMONIDES FOUNDATION

30TH APRIL - 2ND MAY 1994

Saturday, 30th April - dinner with British Ambassador at Residence

(guest list attached).

Note: General Sir Peter de la Billière is now a director of Flemings Bank and was travelling with colleagues in that connection.

The guests included HE Dr. Omar bin Abdul Munim Al-Zawawi - adviser to HM the Sultan. We also enjoyed conversations with the Minister for Development Affairs (HE Mohammed Mussa Al Yusuf) and the Minister for the Civil Service and Deputy Governor of the Central Bank - and also a very successful business man, HE Ahmed Nabi Al Macki. We are keeping in touch with these two.

The Embassy/Residence is about to move - the Sultan wants to extend his palace. Unfortunate, because the view from the balcony is supreme, across the bay with the Portuguese forts on either end, floodlit.

SUNDAY, 1 MAY 1994 - MINISTER OF PETROLEUM, SAID BIN AHMED AL SHANFARI

Opening pleasantries in his office. Powerful and respected man and with top access.

S commented on GJ's Arabic and GJ said he had started learning from BBC tapes - S said: "BBC World Service is invaluable. Please pass message that they should not cut back on BBC funding for overseas broadcasts - radio and TV." Renowned and recognised as being best news service - that was all they listened to during the Gulf War. (GJ to inform HMG.)

Chit-chat and laughter because S has two wives, one in each place. (i.e. one in Muscat, one in his village). S suggested that the best way for GJ to learn Arabic would be for him to take an Arab wife. GJ said that his wife might object!

GJ asked how much oil left in Omani reserves. S said: Ever since I have taken office (about 20 years ago) they have told me that there is only 15 years of oil left - which is what they still say. When known sources run out, we keep on finding others. Plus improvements in technology allow us to use it more economically.

GJ asked him how he sees the peace process and what it means to the region. S: Is it good for Israel to have good relations with this region. Many similarities - from ancient days - in way of life. Jews have always been better off in the Middle East than in Europe - it was not Muslims but Christians who expelled Jews from Britain, Spain and who exterminated them in Holocaust. We are all natives of the region. Most of the problems between Jews and Arabs in the Middle East have been created by Western Imperialism.

Most Arabs do not want trouble with the Jews - though it is hard to witness the killing of Palestinians. We should all live together.

The main threat comes from Hamas.

GJ: I hope one day to meet you in Israel.

S: I would love to come to Israel - but I must wait for the atmosphere to improve.

GJ: Do not underestimate the role of Oman in creating the new atmosphere.

S: We are very lucky to have such a wise ruler with great vision. He wants Israel and the Palestinians to solve their problems. It is in Israel's interest and that of the whole region to remove dependency on the USA and the West. GJ acknowledged Sultan's role and passed on greetings. (Note: We were told we would have seen the Sultan but he is away in his summer palace in Dhofar - about 1200 miles from Muscat).

S: Jews have very great influence in the world. They were responsible for the collapse of the Soviet empire.

GJ: That is straight out of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion and I hope you don't believe it! What we were doing in the Soviet Union was trying to get Jews out because they were being opressed - but I fear that you overestimate Jewish power.

S: The reason why Jews are hated is their economic influence and power.

(S stated this as if it were a statement of fact - not one which he personally resented in any way. We had no feeling with him that he was anti-Jewish - or anti-Israel. Just a believer in the vast power of world Jewry.)

GJ told him the story of Henry Kissinger and King Faisal - though he did not understand the irony - of Faisal saying that Kissinger was welcomed not as a Jew but as a great human being and K replying: "Many of my best friends are human beings!"

S: Faisal talked about Kissinger as a human being, not a Jew. King Khaled treated the Queen of England as if she were a man, not a woman!

Talked of his friendship with a Dr. Holland, at the Mount Sinai hospital in New York - GJ to try to pass on his good wishes. GJ asked about Oman normalising relations with Israel. S: Oman will be the first to establish diplomatic relations with Israel, when there is a solution to the Palestinian problem.

Oman is very careful about allowing Palestinians into Oman - to avoid importing religious fundamentalism or political subversion into the Sultanate. (There is no Palestinian Embassy - nor any Palestinian or PLO representation in Oman.)

GJ asked if there was anything that he could do, re relations between Oman and UK. S: We would welcome greater co-operation from UK with regards to stability in the oil market. UK acting in its own self-interest wants a lower price and is not co-operating with regards to its North Sea oil. This also applies to Norway. (S will be seeing Tim Eggar in a few weeks - GJ to pass on regards to him). In the past, Eggar has apologised/expressed regrets for the above but said that the UK Government can do nothing about it because it has no power over such decisions by private companies.

S: Oman sells oil at $14 a barrel but downstream - i.e. at the petrol pump - it sells for £80 a barrel! Surely somewhere in between, they would allow the Omanis to sell theirs at slightly higher prices.

NB: Has home in St. George's Hill, Weybridge, Surrey.

NB: He has a friend called Ezra Hanan who is a "very wealthy business man" in Bahrain - and who comes to Oman on business - he is Jewish. There are no Jews living in Oman. (Others told us that there are 600 Jews in Bahrain.)

MONDAY MAY 2ND - MEETING WITH OMAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS H.E. YOSEF ALAWI - AT FOREIGN MINSTRY

As usual, fine, large room - couches - two chairs at one end for FM and GJ, separated by table. On opposite side: Head of West European Section of the Foreign Ministry, adviser and translator.

TV cameras and radio at start - GJ presented parliamentary box - initial conversation about global co-operation and Oman's role as catalyst and bridge builder. GJ mentioned conversations with Biran and others from Israeli delegation - enchanted with Oman.

FM happy with recent signs of progress in Middle East peace process (MEPP). Syria represents main focus for concern for the short term - assuming that the Palestinian track keeps moving.

GJ: Rabin, Peres and Assad are all tough operators - each will continue to press for the results which they think best for their people.

FM: Yes, but we cannot tolerate the toughness of politics. We need wisdom, for the sake of the future.

GJ: Yes, but each side needs to keep its own constituents happy - in particular, the Israeli government which has such a fragile majority.

FM: Yes - but they should be prepared to use the mandate which they won at the last election. If they achieve peace, that will give them the assurance of re-election next time. Israel cannot live without peace - its leaders and its people have realised that.

In the West, the interests of the people are compromised by the interests of parties and of party politics. In Oman, we don't want parties, if this leads to the misery of people. For example, in Britain, the Conservatives are a minority party with a ruling majority! GJ: I cannot deny that, alas! (Laughter)

FM: In Oman, problems come from the outside.

For example, Morocco's difficulties with the Western Sahara reflect on Oman because we have to play the balancing role between the Moroccans and Algerians.

GJ: Do you never take sides, even when one of the protagonists is in the wrong?

FM: We are on the side of stability. Our approach is drawn, from our religion and our culture. Our priority is to make deals and avoid troubles. We look at all the problems from the strategic point of view to the period when the given problem will be terminated.

We are not interested in taking sides in the short term. e.g. We have no reason to be in conflict with the people of Israel or any other nation (oblique reference to Iraqis). Even if we do not agree with the policies of the government.

GJ: What prevents your trading with Israel?

FM: Trade is an art. No one can stop private trade with Israel. But the boycott is a political matter.

GJ: Did your water people talk to the Israelis?

FM: We have to distinguish between the scientific and the political. Clearly we would welcome the scientific advances which Israel has to offer, or for that matter anyone else. For example, the South Africans and the Russians are all developing new technology. We are always interested in technology which will reduce our costs. Israel is concentrating on the technique of reverse osmosis. We are hoping to build a research centre in Oman to deal with water technology.

GJ: What can Britain do to help?

FM: The UK is already helping in our studies. We welcome any help with expertise or equipment. Perhaps you could speak to the Foreign Office. We have excellent relations but a word always helps.

FM: You look very young - do you feel very young?

GJ: In the words of the US Senator, I am fine - when you consider the alternative. We have just come on from Saudi - they have a somewhat different outlook on most things, from you.

FM: The Saudis have their own problems as anyone involved in politics must understand. We are expecting a visit of Douglas Hogg, in connection with GCC (Gulf Co-operation Council) - Note - GJ to discuss with Hogg.

FM: Tell me about your parliament? I understand you are involved with employment - unemployment is a big problem for you, isn't it?

(GJ outlined different approach of Conservatives and Labour to employment, employee protection/market forces etc.)

GJ: Is unemployment a problem with you? FM: The problem in Oman is one of training (NB: Population of Oman is about 2 million - of whom, 350,000 are ex-pats. NB: Qatar - about only 20% of population are native Qataris - the rest largely coming from Indian sub continent. And when you exclude women, the elderly and the young, about 25,000 Qataris are of working age.)

FM: In Oman, we are having to train people to replace our ex-pat workers. This is called Omanisation. Ex-pats are all on two year renewable contracts. But we believe that in five years time it will be much more difficult to get employees from India etc. - India is already opening up to skilled workers - European and American companies are opening in India and skilled workers will find they can earn as much there as they do over here.

Discussion re Hilton and hotels.

FM: Five years ago, a group from Hilton International carried out a study from Cyprus, and found that occupancy did not support feasibility of building a new hotel in Oman. Tourism projects are, though, growing - especially in the South. We are planning a resort there and putting a package together. We have had minor contacts with the Aga Khan Group.

GJ: Would you be interested in any contact from the Hilton Group? FM: I would always be interested to talk with them. (This project is a private one of the Foreign Minister himself - with his company. GJ to discuss with Hilton CE).

GJ: We have really enjoyed being here. FM: Yes

- we do feel closer to British MPs - in fact much closer than to US Senators. He then mentioned Rudi Horowitz (former Senator - GJ to contact - said he had promised help in establishing greater contact with Oman and US Senate.)

As meeting came to an end, GJ mentioned IPCAA - prominent, eminent membership - Foreign Ministers, Presidents, Speakers - and Crown Prince Hassan. Said we would be delighted if he would join. He said that he would be honoured to accept our invitation.

Final courtesies etc. - extremely pleasant and productive meeting.

MONDAY, 2 MAY - CALL ON MINISTER OF INFORMATION OF OMAN - ABDUL AZIZ AL-ROWAS

Tall man, dressed in loose flowing robes, with gold braid and open sandals - glasses and warm smile. Tremendous sense of humour.

Welcomed GJ. GJ: So you are Minister of Information?
R: That's what they say.

GJ: Well, you tell them what to say! (Much laughter). (Pause - tried to restart conversation - Minister started laughing again so did all of us).

R: I like that one!

GJ: Please tell me about your media. I understand that you have tight grip on them.

R: Don't worry, our press does its job. It certainly does criticise the government, although not in personal terms, rather as a matter of their actions. Don't forget that our Ministers appear before the Majlis, and are forced to answer questions.

GJ told story about Roosevelt and Stalin: R'velt: Our press can say anything it likes about the President of the United States - Stalin: Our press can also say what it likes about the President of the United States. (More laughter).

R: Our press is guided by two principles - we do not criticise either religion or the Sultan. We are a small country, with very limited resources. Until 1970,

we faced a great threat to our beliefs, to our integrity and even to our sovereignty. This represents a vivid legacy which affects the law which was drafted in 1980s. At all costs, we must avoid a fifth column particularly amongst foreigners. And we cannot allow our careful building to be destroyed. As we are told in the Koran: 'If you have little, use it well.' We do not engage in any white elephant projects. All our money is spent on social and economic development. We will continue to maintain an independent policy. No better example than in 1978 when we stuck by Egypt when she made peace with Israel. We were not liked for this in the Arab world, but we maintained our stance. This is the reason why we don't criticise our leader - our country is still fighting a great challenge with limited resources.

We have a strong belief in our own position and stand by it and we will not allow others to destroy it. In 1978, I personally headed the Omani delegation to Baghdad in the wake of the Egyptian Peace Treaty with Israel. I felt hated. I was singled out and referred to as: 'The man with the dagger'. (NB: In Oman, the Sultan has decreed that officials should wear their ceremonial dagger, as part of the maintenance of Omani cultural heritage - beautiful daggers in most cases - some with rhinoceros horn and ivory. Similar to Yemeni custom).

I welcomed the Camp David Agreement as a sign of light and told the other Arab delegates that if they could not see the light and wanted me to leave, then I would. But I would not tolerate their resentment of me.

GJ: You are a rebel abroad and a conformist at home. I am a rebel at home and a conformist abroad! (Much laughter). R: Yes. We do not permit personal criticism of His Majesty but we do not have censorship. If someone is upset by anything which has appeared in the press, he can bring it before a committee which investigates the complaint. The committee is made up of members of five different ministries.

R: Let me ask you a question. How do you define 'fundamentalism'?

GJ: Fundamentalism in any form is born out of lack of tolerance and willingness to accept differences of opinion. It is an expression of superiority, born out of an inferiority complex. etc.

R: To me, it symbolizes the vanishing of the

acceptance of a common social code and a feeling of shared humanity.

GJ: Yes - that is why I am trying so hard to open paths of understanding between Jews and Muslims.

Following usual path of conversation about IPCAA - R said that he would be very interested to receive further details (NB GJ to send in due course).

R: Where do you think the Middle East peace process (MEPP) is leading?

GJ: This is the start of a long process of getting to know each other. In the short term, all the political leaders involved depend on the success of the MEPP for their own continued political supremacy. In turn, the MEPP depends on them. We must all help in the setting up of an infrastructure in Gaza and Jericho, to ensure that that takes place. If Labour government not re-elected, there could be real trouble for MEPP - it could collapse. Spoke to Saudis at length about this and told them that their help was vital to maintain the impetus of the MEPP.

R: The problem is one of bridge building. Peace is a newborn child and we must all raise it well. We should not fear the peace. Peace is a holy messenger. The Israeli government and Arafat should be helped to reinforce the process. But Israel has the power to make the process work. After all, they are the ones who occupy the land.

GJ: Yes, but the Arabs hold the key to the question of security. Israel can return the Golan - and Rabin has said that this is a possibility. But whether it becomes reality, also depends on Syria's commitments and her intentions.

R then asked GJ to explain the differences in Israel psychology and approach to settlements in the Golan and on the West Bank - which he did.

Farewell civilities - and promise that when he is in London, R will be GJ's guest in parliament.

MEETING WITH PRESIDENT OF MAJLIS ASH-SHURA
SHEIKH ABDULLAH AL-QATABI

Received us in the magnificent, white marble, Majlis building - in his private office. He had been very ill, but (we were told) had come in specially to meet us. Bearded, with spectacles, gold coloured Omani turban and white robe. Coming to UK as head of delegation, following week (starting May 9th). NB. Emma Nicholson, Chair of the UK Omani Group.

Opening conversation re differences between parliament in UK and Oman - age, experience etc. GJ said that Q had easier job controlling his members than Betty Boothroyd in controlling MPs - despite the fact that she is a powerful woman!

Q: It seems that all women in power in the UK are powerful!

GJ: If you will like, I will arrange for you to marry Emma Nicholson, when you are in the UK - assuming that you are allowed more than one wife.

Q: This would certainly be a marriage between our parliaments!

Chitchat about visit. GJ will welcome him to Parliament as he has GJ to Oman.

GJ: Oman has become famous, both for having hosted the multi-lateral peace talks and as an oasis of peace. Your guests from Israel were very happy in Muscat. I'm sure they would like to welcome you to the Knesset.

Q: Oman has certain convictions which differ from other Arab countries. eg We never refer to Israel as 'the enemy' - as they do elsewhere. This doesn't mean that we have relations with Israel, or agree with her policies all the time.

GJ: I don't agree with the policies of my own government - in fact, much of my life is devoted to trying to get rid of them - lately, with very little success!

Q: Here, we follow the majority of Arab opinion with regard to the Israeli occupation but Sultan Qaboos was the first in the Arab world to call for a peaceful solution to the problem - even before the Egyptians went to Jerusalem.

GJ: You do not have to agree with people to be their friends. Top Israelis have told me of their high regard for Oman and the importance which they place on friendship with your remarkable country.

Q: Oman sacrificed and suffered in the eyes of some Arab countries for her actions in hosting the peace talks but we see that as the route to a solution. In particular, Syria was very displeased and expressed this to a delegation from the Majlis who recently visited Damascus. The Syrians felt that the multi-lateral talks were untimely because of the delicate situation in the bilaterals - but this does not mean that Syria is against peace.

GJ: It is wonderful that Oman has the strength and independence to lead the way. Countries that criticise Oman today will thank her tomorrow.

Q: We put that view to the Syrians. Our actions were designed to push the main negotiations forward and speed up the return of land in exchange for peace.

GJ then spoke about IPCAA - emphasising the number of Speakers of Parliaments and other leaders who belong - including Prince Hassan - and invited Q to join. He replied: I will continue to work for peace, either inside the organisation or outside it (he avoided direct response) (we will take this as acceptance of the invitation and when he is in London, will present him with the details and thank him for joining).

Q: If we all work for justice that will lead to peace.

GJ: Yes, we are seeking justice and friendship - that is the reason for my visit. We shall be very honoured to welcome you to our organisation.

Q: Many people in the Arab world are now calling for peace. We will ensure that progress is made. People are genuine in the search for peace. Calls for the destruction of Israel - driving it into the sea - are now out of date. But the Arab people must also be convinced that the concept of Greater Israel is also dead.

GJ: Rabin and Peres are working hard against the extremists.

Q: We understand the pressures in Israel and in the Arab world. Some people in the Arab world are still calling for Israel to be ignored and left for time to take its course but most have realised that that will not solve the occupation. And your efforts to bring people together are very commendable. We have to give support to the peace process and work hard to reduce the influence of the negative pressure groups. Iran is trying to push Syria away from the peace process but we must not lose Assad.

GJ: Shall we agree to work together for peace?

Q: Yes. How old are you? You look so young.

GJ: 65.

Q: Exactly the same age as I am. Perhaps that's why we share the same views.

GJ: Yes. We have both seen things which the world would have done better to avoid.

Farewells - and Q accompanied GJ and DK through the building to the door - Q: See you in London.

LUNCH AT HOME OF DR. NOEL GUCKIAN - DHM AT BRITISH EMBASSY - WITH BRITISH BUSINESSMEN.

Discussion generally on social matters - living in Oman. But some useful talk about hotels. Specific problems facing would-be hoteliers include: attitude of government; problems of Ramadan (hotels empty and ban on liquor); when not Ramadan, hotels make their profits from the liquor trade - but there is no guarantee that this can continue indefinitely. Depends on government decrees. And may depend on pressure from extremists calling for ban on alcohol as in Saudi); permits required from the government for almost everything.

Best hope for new hotels would be down the coast in Salala, where there is a bad need for a first class holiday hotel/village. Muscat itself has occupancy over the course of the year of about 62%.

Other problems: Government is not willing to invest money in hotels and expects overseas investors to do so - but govnt maintains 51% of the holding. They take 'rent' in return for their holding.

NB: General Manager of Al-Bustan Palace Hotel was away, but his deputy explained that the hotel has only recently started making a profit. It is undoubtedly one of the finest hotels in the world - and reputed to be

the best in the Middle East. Magnificent building in supreme setting. Managed by Inter-Continental. Owned by Omani government.

Discussion over Hilton/British Airways co-operation and joint contract etc.

DINNER IN THE RESIDENCE ON SATURDAY 30 APRIL AT 8PM
FOR GENERAL SIR PETER DE LA BILLIÈRE AND MR NICK BROWNE
HEAD OF MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT, FCO

UK VISITORS
General Sir Peter de la Billière KCB KBE DSO MC

Mr Nick Browne
FCO

The Hon Greville Janner MP

Sir Alan and Lady Thomas
Head of Defence Export Services

Mr Douglas Krikler
PA to The Hon Greville Janner MP

Mr Daniel Janner
Son of The Hon Greville Janner MP

Mr Alan Smith)
) Flemings
Mr Robert Thomas)

OMANI GUESTS
HE Dr Omar bin Abdul Munim al Zawawi, KCMG
Advisor to His Majesty the Sultan

HE Mohammad Musa al Yousuf and Madame
Minister for Development Affairs

HE Ahmad Nabi al Macki & Madame
Minister for the Civil Service & Dep Gov of Central Bank

HE Shaikh Zaher al Harthi
Chairman of Bank of Oman

HE Sayyid Said bin Hilal bin Muhammad Al Bu Saidi
President of the Penal Court

HE Rajiha bint Abdul Amir bin Ali
U/S Planning Affairs, Min of Development

Mr Yahya Nasib
Yahya Enterprises and Central Bank

Mr & Mrs Maqbool Hameed
Oman Holdings International Ltd

Ahmad Suhail Bahwan
The Bahwan Group

Fawzia al Kindi
Central Bank of Oman

BRITISH COMMUNITY
Mr and Mrs David Dobbs

EMBASSY
Mrs Philip Goddard
Host & Hostess = 27

VISIT BY GREVILLE JANNER QC MP TO SAUDI ARABIA, ACCOMPANNIED BY DOUGLAS KRIKLER, DIRECTOR, THE MAIMONIDES FOUNDATION.

28 - 30 APRIL 1994.

PREFACE TO NOTES ON SAUDI VISIT

This visit was originally set up at the suggestion of the British Ambassador to Saudi - and was approved by the Saudi authorities, at least two months before it was to take place.

About two weeks before the visit, the Saudi Ambassador in London (Dr Ghazi al-Gosaibi) finally set up a meeting with GJ and DK - having been "abroad" or "unavailable" for about six weeks. He explained how "unfortunate it was that his Government knew nothing about the visit in advance ... Ours is a country of strict protocol and visits like this on any official basis have to be approved by His Majesty himself. It is too late to do so at this stage ... I am so sorry. But if you do go - and I hope you will - then it will have to be a private visit. You will be the guest of your Ambassador and he can set up meetings at the Embassy or at the homes of officials on an informal basis."

Which is what happened - except that they gave us complimentary visas; and that we were upgraded by Saudi Airlines and upgraded to a Royal Suite at the hotel and in many ways treated as unofficially official visitors!

We were told by British diplomats at both ends that this sort of behaviour from the Saudis is 'par for the course'. However, the British Foreign Office were treating the visit as a "groundbreaking mission" and would be watching the Saudis reaction with great interest.

THURSDAY 28TH APRIL - MET AT RIYADH AIRPORT BY UK CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, STUART LAING.

Remakably ornate airport, complete with fountains and marble. Taken through to VIP lounge and into car - whilst Embassy aide dealt with passport formalities and collected luggage. Driven in Embassy green Rolls Royce to Hyatt Hotel - 2-hour briefing over dinner from Laing.

The points from briefing:

(1) Outline of structure of power within country -

i.e. absolute monarchy which relies heavily on tribal consensus for power and stability, as much as on rigid control by central state apparatus. Interesting to note that ruling family - Al-Saud - is not the largest or most powerful tribal clan. All policy decisions very much linked to position as "guardians of the holy sites" at Mecca and Medina and need to be seen to be upholding interests of Islam. This has increased since Iran revolution and claims of Ayatollahs to be real champions of Islam.

(2) Perceived threat to Saudi Arabia (SA) comes from Iraq/Iran, not Israel/Palestinians. (However, some feeling that SA using continued "state of war" with Israel to justify arms acquisitions with which to counter Iraq/Iran threat).

(3) Failure of Middle East peace process (MEPP) would not pose immediate threat - Saudis regard it as a more remote worry - but participate in multi-lateral talks; contribute to UN funds; very concerned with Jerusalem issue because of religious connotations.

(4) There is further problem of SA participation in MEPP because of dislike for and cool relations with Jordanians/PLO - because of Gulf War. (King Hussein misjudged visit - SA declared privately afterwards that had King H been a little more patient, he would have seen King Fahd - he had been staying in Palace immediately opposite Fahd's residence and had he walked across, he would have been let in - but that was taking a risk which he probably thought was unacceptable.)

(5) Economy not what it was (20% cut in Budget - overall and in all government departments) and some opposition forces have become vocal - Laing referred to dissident called Masari - arrested - then came to London. Masari has set up Committee for Defence of Legitimate Rights - some reflection of opinion on the street, worried about inequality of Royals' lifestyle - as opposed to that of ordinary people, especially due to squeeze on public purse.

(6) Traditional tribal Majlis (feudal reception by Sheikhs of supplicants with petitions passed for attention to Sheikhs' deputies) is only outlet for popular discontent - except for Majlis ash-Shura - the new SA "Parliament". This was set up about six months ago - 61 selected people - no elections (see later). Shura has met, but with no publicity.

(Laing is bright, well informed Arabist - certain to be appointed Ambassador somewhere soon).

FRIDAY, 29TH APRIL - TOUR OF RIYADH - COURTESY OF REG RAWSON - BRITISH AEROSPACE.

Tour enlivened by Reg's account of public execution by beheading in square known as Justice Square (but referred to by ex-pats as Chop Square!). Foreigners who stray into the area are pushed up to front of crowd, for good view of execution. One clean swipe of sharp sword by big, black arab executioner - traditionally brought over from Nubian tribes in southern Egypt. Victim's head left for crowd to view for some time - much blood. Up to 20,000 people regularly crowd into the square to witness executions which are always advertised in the press. (Justice Square also where they cut off hands of shoplifters etc - and when they do, victim always taken to hospital to tidy severed limb.) Local joke: What do you know about a man if you see that he has two rows of stitches around his neck? He won his appeal.

Pointed out manifestation of segregation between sexes - including boys' schools, low walls and glass windows - girls' schools, high walls and frosted glass windows. Two universities in Riyadh, one for men and one for women. Explained about the Mutawwa' (Religious Police) who enforce closure of shops etc at prayer time and prevent any digressions from strict adherence to religious practices. Feared by locals and avoided by ex-pats who are not exempt from Mutawwa' jurisdiction.

Also explained various buildings around town - all magnificent modern architecture somewhat lacking in character/heritage.

Van passed by with markings: AVC Rock Co. - which Reg described as AVC Rock Group - we were creased with laughter, not least because of Reg's total lack of sense of humour - though he did see the funny side of a rock group on tour of Riyadh.

THURSDAY 28TH APRIL DRINKS WITH BRITISH BUSINESSMEN - AT HOME OF COMMERCIAL COUNCILLOR, CHRIS WILTON, AND MRS. WILTON

(Guest list attached).

Interesting conversations:

(1) Many Saudis not contented with regime, but no

alternative other than to comply - and no serious dissident movement within sight. Majlis ash-Shura designed to placate opposition - too early to tell effect.

(2) Any replacement of regime would involve a tribal consensus and there is none within sight - because no one is prepared to rock the present boat because of what might replace it - in particular, a fear of Islamic extremism.

(3) Deeply upset at Andrew Neill (Sunday Times) revelations of supposed discreet deals between British business and Saudi authorities - which nearly caused the deals to collapse - and which were in fact harmless/proper. When GJ asked what we could do on our return to be of assistance, they suggested: Closing down the newspaper! (As with Malaysia - to which they referred - overseas clients/ customers take attacks by British newspapers much more seriously than British businessmen do - even the same attacks). Very great and genuine hostility to Andrew Neill also felt amongst business community in other countries visited.

(4) The UK ex-pats felt very restricted - and objected to lack of openness in Saudi society. Whilst most of the men enjoyed their stay in Saudi, most of the women do not.

(5) Re Arab Boycott of Israel: Limited feedback - but Saudis generally regard the boycott as a limitation on freedom of trade - and as traders, dislike it.

(6) Would welcome more visits by high level UK politicians - Thatcher (in this respect) was the hero of them all. Compared USA, which has managed to corner much business for US business people - and French also intervene much more effectively (they say) than our government. The only way to take on US business would be by representation from home.

(7) Note from guest list - very significant people and companies represented - private conversations with e.g. Chief Executive of British Aerospace in Saudi - Damien Turner. Two of the people present had seen executions. Both claimed that they were inadvertently shopping in the area; were surrounded by the crowd; propelled to the front - and forced to watch the whole incredible and awful procedure - horrified.

(8) Informal lunch hosted by Mr. & Mrs. John Bunney - Friday - with representatives of British Council, BAe, Offset and BAE - conversation mainly about Saudi society and

how to live in and with it. Incredible stories of discrimination against women.

VISIT TO HOME OF IBRAHIM AL-SHANIFI

Office Address: Ibrahim al-Shanifi Foundation
Al-Bat'ha Street
Al-Sani' Building, 13th Floor
PO Box 22173
Aramscode 11495
Tel: (O) 406 6266 / 405 9558 (H) 457 1992.

Met Ibrahim on aircraft - sat next to DK - got friendly and invited to his home. Found on arrival at hotel message from him to phone - which we did. Arranged to pop by for a quick coffee after lunch. Told by all in SA that this sort of invitation very rare, and priveledged to be invited to SA home.

Home in older part of town - not particularly smart - modest living room, with couches around walls and large coffee table in the centre of the room - showed us separate room for women (we saw none while we were there) - and "coffee room" with shelves stacked with Arab-style coffee pots and a little stove for boiling coffee, and comfortable floor cushions. He said the family gathered together daily for coffee. Kitchen at back which he did not show us nor bedrooms etc. upstairs.

Brought into the room his aged father, uncles, brothers and friends. Sat and drank coffee and talked Arabic mainly. Then when we indicated that we had to go, he said that we must come into the other room and have a taste of Arab food.

In other room - opposite - veritable feast laid out on plastic table cloth on floor - items included kabzi (rice dish with pine kernels and other little pieces), roast lamb and chicken (in large chunks on top of the rice) and whole array of spectacular Arab sweetmeats.

Although we were full up from excellent lunch, did our best to eat and retired bloated - getting up, saying that we really did have to go. Smilingly and protesting, they took us into the other room and said: "Just one minute - we have one or two small souvenirs for you."

Ibrahim emerged with a black bisht (cloak), with gold braid around edges - apologised for it being a little long - had it made specially for me that morning, and

thought I was taller than I am. Then some incense/wood (we were told later, very expensive) - with an incense burner - which he said he was going to replace by sending us an electrical one at the hotel (which he did the next day) - plus two bottles of male Arab perfume in blue velvet type box. We had embarrassingly only brought him a box of parliamentary mints, and returned to the car loaded.

Note: The Embassy car got frequently lost. Was with us the whole time. No street maps available - street names all in Arabic, which driver and DK could read - but no one seemed to know where a given street was - and no A-Z!

Wonderful break and glimpse of great hospitality. Ibrahim promised that he would see us in London - he is a trader, dealing (inter alia) in chocolates and sweet meats. Asked to introduce to Marion.

THURSDAY, 28TH APRIL, CALL ON DR. IBRAHIM AL MUHANNA, DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC RELATIONS, MINISTRY OF PETROLEUM AND MINERAL RESOURCES - AT HIS HOME.

Comfortable, modest home - pink/orange couches and chairs, with gold, moulded wood edges - Arabic/Golders Green style. He was informally dressed - note: considerable privilege to be invited into homes of Ministers, especially on a Friday. Powerful man with access to top level.

After initial chitchat, the conversation turned to Saudi position regarding oil. In response to GJ's question as to who were Saudi's friends/enemies within the oil world, he said that they had no permanent allies or enemies. Instead, countries each act in their own specific interests which at times converge and at other times conflict. There is no political alliance even within OPEC or the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

Then spoke about the wider context of the MEPP. GJ asked why SA did not have a greater input into the MEPP as such. IM asked what sort of input GJ would have expected and (as in all other future conversations) GJ referred to: encouragement of Israel government - through more open approval of MEPP - and financial input into structure and resourcing of Gaza/Jericho infrastructure. Explained Israel's position re e.g. fragility of government coalition; importance of peace process for Saudis; fragile regional stability - strengthened by peace process; and disappointment of SP at failure of Saudis to be more active in process.

IM: Government is in debt to Saudi banks; each department must cut budget by 20%; plus large commitment to arms for defence. SA does want to help and already has made input for multi-lateral talks (points made by all those in SA with whom we later discussed same matter). Said that without SA presuure, Palestinians and Syrians would never have agreed even to attend the Madrid conference. SA is deeply committed to peace but is working within realms of what is possible politically.

He suggested that if Faisal Husenei and Haider Abdal Shafi were to come to SA, they would get more and better results than Arafat or King Hussein - personalities really matter. GJ discussed his input with Palestinian leadership - and offered to pass on this suggestion. (NB later conversation - Dr. Ali Jihani said: Not Hanan Ashrawi because she is a Christian.)

Large Palestinian community in SA which is already involved and would be prepared to make even greater contributions, if pressed - and if convinced that money being spent correctly.

People in SA not very confident about MEPP. Must proceed slowly - one step at a time. PLO leadership is shaky and Saudis in general still do not trust the Israeli government's intentions. It will take a generation to overcome the years of mistrust.

In response to further pressure about possible greater SA contributions he said: "Why does the West not contribute more? Why does your country (UK) not do so?" GJ agreed with him that UK could do more but explained what UK were in fact already contributing - eg training and political input. Plus some financial aid.

DK - suggestion that Saudi relations with Israel could be evolved in line with Morocco/Tunisia model. i.e. whilst no diplomatic relations, contacts could begin starting with trade, cultural visits, political visits etc. And why not host multilateral talks (e.g. Oman/Qatar).

IM - SA always slow to act or to react. This has been our policy during the past 40 years. We are slow to make policy but then we are deeply committed to it. Should start with private sector first. He referred to "Jewish businessman called Tish, from USA, who visited SA and was well received". (NB: GJ to contact him.)

Re gas pipeline, Qatar/Israel - everyone talking

about it, but IM does not think it is viable. SA prefers private, discreet exploration of matters such as this, before public exposure - as there is and has been re Qatar/ Israel pipeline.

People must see a tangible result between Israelis and Palestinians and then peace can follow for the entire region. Palestinians would act as a good social and economic bridge between Israel and the Arab world.

SA has learned very hard lesson in Afghanistan: donated large sums to rebels but situation then turned out very badly - and do not want to be drawn into similar situation. Palestinians may become riddled with internal dissension and violent infighting. "We do not want to waste our money so we want to see what will happen first."

GJ suggested that if SA had a much fuller input, then they could help prevent these problems. (GJ referred to connection with Ladbrokes gaming business and said that if SA wanted to wait for a certainty, then they would have a very long wait indeed - but the odds at present were not at all bad and he could improve them).

Accompanied by UK Charge, Stuart Laing, who said that one should not underestimate SA input - they are participating in multi-laterals and have expressed willingness to contribute aid under multi-national umbrella. But UK government believes that SA should not wait until the ball is rolling before playing a constructive role. Instead the circle will only be completed once all parties "put their piece in" and then the ball will be able to roll more easily. (i.e Difficult to make progress without SA contribution at an early stage).

GJ emphasised disproportionate value of simple gesture on part of SA.

IM: Don't expect money because a) we are cutting back our budget and b) there is a real lack of certainty.

MEETING WITH DR. ALI JIHANI, MEMBER OF THE MAJLIS ASH-SHURA (PARLIAMENT), AT HIS HOME

A large, sumptuous, marble-clad building, immediately opposite the home of Prince Sultan (Minister of Defence and close friend and mentor). AJ is also adviser to the Prince - and Prince is very close to King.

Received us warmly in his large, comfortable, oriental glory living room - and later we adjourned to garden. (On way out, GJ mentioned that one of the beauties of the garden is that there can be no one listening to the conversation - which at that time, was getting very frank - especially from his point of view. He replied: 'Don't worry - no one listens in here.')

Man of middle height, middle age, with black moustache and spectacles; dressed in formal, white robe (thawb), with white headdress (kafiya) with black thongs. Smart cufflinks. Perfect English and extremely relaxed.

Very good friend of David Gore-Boothe (UK Ambassador). GJ said: G-B left Riyadh when he knew that GJ was coming. AJ: (Joking) You should come more often, then G-B will leave more often!

Presented him with parliamentary white china box - which he opened - saying that usually it's not done in Arab countries to open gifts in front of the giver, but hoped we would not mind.

GJ: How powerful is the Majlis?

AJ: The government was afraid of the right wing and religious elements and realised it had to do something. Came up with idea of Majlis ash-Shura. The authorities realised that if there were elections to the Majlis, they would be won by religious or tribal leaders, who would be able to organise votes on their behalf - or possibly by the very wealthy, who could buy votes. In other words, a democratic election would not achieve a democratic result. So instead, they appointed people.

The Majlis could and can be a powerful pressure machine. The King cannot say no for ever. The Majlis has been in existence for over six months, without publicity - why? Still very early days and whilst they have prepared plans, they are not ready to go public. GJ him that he had spoken to SP before leaving - how did he react to SP's 'disappointment' with SA involvement in MEPP?

AJ: I like Peres very much indeed. I respect him. No one is happier than SA and the Royal Family with the prospect of peace because we have the greatest stake in stability. We are very rich, but very weak. That is the worst combination. (NB. GJ to send him copy of SP's book).

SA has been working very hard on PLO and on the

Syrians, through Mubarak - "who is not stupid, but not far from it".

GJ: So why not more public support from SA for the MEPP? AJ: Because to a large extent the legitimacy of the government of SA rests on the fact that we are guardians of the Holy Cities. We cannot be seen to be US agents in the region.

GJ: Yes, but we must ensure success in Gaza and Jericho. We understand that it may not be convenient or possible to deal directly with the PLO. Would it be easier to deal with someone other than Arafat? AJ: Yes, but not Ashrawi because she is a Christian. Hussenei was here recently and there's no reason why we cannot have a good relationship with him. The Saudi authorities are very scared that the MEPP might fail. We have great respect for Rabin as well as Peres - this is a golden opportunity for the whole region. For that reason, SA is working very hard on the Syrians and on the Kuwaitis. It is much easier for Oman and Qatar to take a public stance because they lack the religious element which constrains our activities.

"Prince Sultan has told me hundreds of times that we are not interested in details, but we want a true peace." There is a conviction among educated Saudis that peace will be on Israel's terms. This is because Israel sees it as in her own interests at this time. The reason: Israel is currently militarily superior. And Israel can use its lobby in the US. It is apparent that Israel has now realised that the peace of Rabin and Peres is viable. The Shamir/Sharon concept of peace will never be achieved.

AJ then went into history of Jewish experience in Europe - fully understands history of Jews and believes that unless Arabs truly understand what the Jews have been through, and what the State of Israel means to them, they will not appreciate what true peace means. The Arab world has a long way to go. The concept of the Holocaust as a myth will only change when the school curriculum changes throughout the Arab world. "All this is linked to our duty to press for democracy throughout the Arab world, including SA, and including Israel."

GJ: What do you mean? AJ: Although Israel is a democracy, it still has for example different laws for Jewish and Palestian extremists. GJ explained the position before and after Hebron - and that within Israel itself, Arab citizens have exactly the same rights - without the duty to go into the army - which AJ said he well understood.

AJ: The tactics and the strategies must be defined i.e.- tactic: We must give money to the Palestinians - but we can only do so when we are either able to send delegation to oversee implementation or when an international body exists to do this on our behalf. The strategy: We must realise that the enemy of Israel, Saudi, Egypt and the rest of the Arab world is Hamas - and the plague of Islamic extremism. The peoples of the region must work together to deal with this plague. The US must demand that at the same time as the Arab press and curriculum curbs its antisemitism and racism, we must also press for democracy, so that Islamic extremism loses its appeal.

GJ: Will you please thank Prince Sultan for what SA has done so far - but quietly express to him SP's disappointment - on behalf of Israel's government - a feeling which I share. He said he would do so most willingly.

GJ followed his comments on antisemitism in the Arab world and mentioned the work of Inter-Parliamentary Council Against Antisemitism (IPCAA) - would he possibly consider becoming a member? He replied: I am very embarrassed that I cannot speak publicly on this matter but I would be more than happy to meet with a group of Jews who support IPCAA when next in London - privately. He expects to be in London in early August - GJ: difficult time to get people together, but will try. Has daughter aged 19 and two sons aged 13 and 12 - son of 12/13 called Talal emerged in his pyjamas - chided gently by father but enjoyed GJ magic.

A most enjoyable, relaxed and friendly meeting - and an acquaintance which will ripen. Excellent

UK Charge was present throughout the meeting but said almost nothing. Said afterwards that he has a very high regard for AJ.

DINNER AT HOME OF STEWART LAING (WIFE SIBELLA) - CHARGE D'AFFAIRES - GUEST LIST ATTACHED.

NB extremely important guests - whom they made a point of sitting us beside - Director General, Boycott Office, Ministry of Commerce - Saleh Shibani told GJ that the Secondary and Tertiary boycott had wilted - totally off the record, if people come to him from companies and want to know how to deal with the boycott, he shows them how to wheel around it. Cannot remove it publicly until the MEPP is more advanced, but once Peace Agreement signed, is satisfied that it will go.

Expects to spend 12 weeks in UK shortly - has home there. Will contact GJ and be entertained by him. Said much of same in seperate conversation with DK. Above all: they cannot at present remove primary boycott and trade directly with Israel - but they are turning a blind eye to the secondary and tertiary boycotts.

Anthony Abrahams - in law firm in partnership with Clifford Charles - South African and partly Jewish ancestry, knows Sheink (Myra's) family - and friends with the Lewis's (whose son Mark worked for GJ - father official at Brussels).

Preliminary meeting with charming businessman - Nabil Al Midani, before dinner - Saudi national of Syrian origin, has house in Riyadh and Damascus which he visits often. Would be keen to do business in region if peace is forthcoming. Spoke of fear in Syria of military threat of Israel; said this is not just rhetoric but is as real for the Syrians as the Israelis' fear of a Syrian attack. His parents' home was 400 yards from the road along which Israeli tanks had advanced towards Damascus in 1967. Very interesting to hear Syrian perspective - and reassuring that after all he was very firmly in favour of peace - and claimed to represent the general feeling amongst Syrians.

SATURDAY, 30TH APRIL 1994 - BREAKFAST GIVEN BY BRIGADIER (MARTIN) LANCE, UK DEFENCE ATTACHE.

(guest list attached). Absolutely top UK military chiefs, in full uniform - braid and all. Breakfast preceeded by GJ/DK early walk around "Chop Square" where executions take place.

Enjoyable breakfast, relaxed and much laughter.

Bill Wratton - Gulf War hero - said that the UN forces believed that they had entirely destroyed all the Iraqis' nuclear and biological warfare potential and installations. They had not. The fault certainly lay with Intelligence. "We finished the war much too early."

SATURDAY, 30TH APRIL - MEETING WITH HH PRINCE ABDULLAH BIN FAISAL BIN TURKI, PRESIDENT, ROYAL COMMISSION FOR JUBAIL AND YANBU - IN HIS OFFICE.

Talked with great authority and little mention of his official job. Obviously, high in pecking order.

Opening pleasantries and presentation of Parliamentary china

box - HH commented that there is anti-Jewish and anti-Israeli feeling in Saudi, coming from the resentment at the "blind support which Jews give to Israel". People feel that there are covert attempts by Israel to spread disinformation about Saudi - so as to keep up the conflict.

GJ: "You don't believe that rubbish, do you?" GJ talked of importance of peace process and the need to succeed. There is disappointment at limited input of Saudi, in view of its need for stability in the area.

HH: "The most important issue is question of peace with the Palestinians, because of its moral impact. Then Israel will make deals with other governments whose land is occupied." There is internal objection in SA that they have been forced to pay such a prominent role at this stage - HH blamed Syria for trying to drag SA into the talks because they want them to act as underwriters. Discussed Assad (for whom he has low regard) and Kissinger. SA position: That if Israel and Palestinians agree, then no problem. Saudi cannot break Arab and in particular the Muslim consensus. HH needs time to convince people of the viability of MEPP.

We must understand that religious feeling is very strong in SA - this feeling could lead to activism, especially where Jerusalem is concerned. The Jerusalem issue could be used as a route for political extremism - we must be very careful on the Jerusalem issue. It has a very symbolic importance.

SA will never try to hinder the peace process because they see it is a very important and noble objective - which is why they took such a prominent part in Madrid. What more do people want of us?

GJ: "Support for Israel's Government" - NB risks taken by them for peace. Words of approval in public - some sort of recognition of the change. Move towards normalisation of relations. Plus financial support for Gaza/West Bank - so as to help them to meet the expectations of the Palestinian people. And return Israel's brave gesture of goodwill in not retaliating for Scud attacks during Gulf War.

HH: SA definitely committed to the peace process and very important that it should succeed. But element of mistrust cannot be underestimated. Israel has received so much support in the policy centres of the West.

People would react strongly if they felt that governments were pushing SA too quickly. Israel has guilt complex over

its treatment of the Palestinians and injustice of its actions. (GJ - not true. Astonishing that he has this conception, knowing as he does the history of the region and how it was that Israel came to occupy these territories, after having been attacked by the countries concerned.)

HH: Israel represents only 2% of the population of the area and cannot push 98% of the Middle East (i.e. the Arabs) to forget its past actions, overnight. Everyone in the region must maintain their credibility. SA has no particular agenda - it is reactive in its policies in the solution of regional problems.

King has expressed his support for the MEPP - S has regularly attended multilaterals. But you cannot expect any media gimmicks to satisfy Israel's internal agenda.

GJ: Israel does not want media gimmicks, but specific action by SA, to help peace process.

HH: Israel has often tried to pass messages - including to HH personally, at private conferences, in USA and elsewhere - but SA not prepared to accept this sort of approach. "I have tremendous respect for Rabin and Peres. They have taken courageous steps."

Re SA help to Gaza - they have made various pledges of aid. £60 billion dollars have been given away in recent years. There will be more help and participation in the future. They would rather pour money on the problem than blood. US and UK would be excellent conduits for the money.

SA has already granted the permission for Palestinians of Saudi nationality to begin projects in Gaza.

Still perception that Israel wants conflicts and tension, because it serves their own interests, including greater Jewish aid from abroad. Zionist leaders have little credibility with Arab public opinion because of their past activities.

There is no disagreement over the final strategy - the question is one of tactics, to reach those objectives.

GJ: Don't underestimate need for Israel Government to maintain credibility with its own people etc. and MEPP depends on current Israel Government remaining in power.

HH: People try to paint a picture of SA supporting Islamic Fundamentalism. In reality, they only give support to

religious groups - social/cultural/religious activities - mosques, libraries, schools.

In the 1960s, SA gave refuge to Muslim exiles, never used them for political purposes, except to attack Nasser in 60s - in Non-Aligned Movement/UN.

SA was only able to take on Nasser when they finally acquired wealth, with a loan of $100 million from ARAMCO - after Nasser's crushing defeat in 67, the need to use Islam politically was removed. In recent times, SA has only used Islam politically to counter Iran's claims to political leadership of the Muslim world.

The most important thing is for Palestinians to succeed in their peace with Israel. SA will not delay in seizing opportunity to support success of Palestinians in their efforts.

GJ pressed as to what help SA would give.

HH: It is different for us than for the West because we have no structure for investment and unlike the West, we do not get returns on our investment, for our domestic economy/industry - whilst in the West, 70% of loans are ploughed back into their own economies, as their companies get contracts. We cannot offer recipient countries this sort of industrial opportunity. On top of this, as you know, we have made a 20% budget cut across the board in our public departments.

We are all aware that SA has the most to lose from the conflict.

GJ enquired about visit from Faisal Husseini and he said that he has already visited and there would be no problem if he came again.

Congenial wind up.

NOTE OF DISCUSSION WITH HH DR. PRINCE TURKI BIN MOHAMMED BIN SAUD EL-KABIR - CHIEF REPRESENTATIVE OF SA AT THE MULTI-LATERAL DISARMAMENT TALKS IN DOHA, QATAR - SENIOR GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE AT FOREIGN MINISTRY - AND DIRECT DESCENDANT OF IBN SAUD. SATURDAY 30TH APRIL 1994.

Met Prince in VIP lounge at airport - introduced - and he received us with great civility. Said we would talk in lounge and on aircraft. GJ pointed out that we were

travelling economy - he said they will either upgrade you to First Class or I will travel in economy with you!

Dressed in full white thawb with headdress keffiyeh (red) - and brown bisht (cloak), trimmed with gold braid. Black moustache - middle aged - whilst in flight gave GJ following personal details:

Five children, youngest 2, eldest 12 - told oldest daughter that he was going away to conference which was very important - he must make sure that it succeeds. She replied: 'Father, you will never fail' - which pleased him enormously. Hobbies: swimming (many good clubs in Riyadh) - walking. Reading - history, biography etc. - will send him SP's book (see later). Educated at Trinity College, Cambridge - then doctorate at London University - politics, international affairs etc. Extremely well informed - but not about Israel - although knows leaders.

GJ asked him (later) whether it was correct to call him in Arabic (as I have been doing) "ya summo al-Amir" - Your Highness the Prince. He replied: "Your Excellency, you must call me Turki!" GJ said that it would be a great honour to do so, provided that he would call him Greville or Jibril - Arabic equivalent - then conversation about usefulness and international aspects of Angel Gabrielle!

(1) SA has been deeply committed to the MEPP from the start. The Madrid peace process would not have begun without SA's intervention - the Syrians did not want to come. GJ: How did you induce them to do so? HH: Well, they wanted things that we could provide for them.

(2) The bilateral talks must be the primary focus for the MEPP. When they succeed, the multi-nationals will take up. Meanwhile, the multi-nationals will continue to operate in parallel. But they cannot overtake or supersede the bilaterals. Within that framework, SA will continue to work very hard for progress. We have attended very multi-national talk and will continue to do so.

(3) They are delighted at progress in talks between Palestinians and Israel - this will allow SA to be vocal. SA cannot instigate on behalf of Palestinians but if Palestinians state what they want, SA can help. And openly support.

(4) Two key points - peace with the Palestinians. And Jerusalem. GJ: That must come last. He agreed but emphasised importance of Jerusalem to SA as religious

guardians. (Note: Over and over again, Saudis kept emphasising that they have a very special role as the protector of Islam - as Israel and the Jewish people must understand.)

(5) Asked GJ about Israel politics. Do Peres and Rabin really want peace? Assured him that they do - discussed origin of peace process, with this Israel government - told him of close relationship with SP - explained fragile nature of government majority/coalition in Parliament. Told him that SP was disappointed at lack of Saudi involvement. Especially because of the risks which Israel's government was taking - and the progress it had made - and the concessions it was making. He replied: (1) Involvement in multi-national talks; (2) promises to contribute $1,000,000 to Gaza. 'What more do they want of us?'

(6) Spoke of need for Israel government to have something positive to show for the risks/sacrifices - and a really positive gesture from SA would be very important - perhaps a statement from the King? He said: Impossible. We have never taken a leading role. We have always encouraged from the back - and we will continue to do so. Recognise importance of MEPP for us, but we are limited in what we can do - we have not got a parliament like yours or Israel's, but do not under-estimate what we have to do to keep our people in line.

(7) Accepted that there was no threat to Saudi security from Israel - and that Shamir had behaved well in accepting request not to respond to Scud attack. Discussed attacks - he said his people were very frightened - Israelis are used to being close to war, Saudis are not - GJ told him that he was there at the time and the Israelis were not very happy about it either. You never get used to war. He said: Glad they did not respond - it is certainly a factor.

(8) Claimed good relations between SA and most Arab countries - especially, Egypt and Morocco - also Tunisia. OK with all Gulf States. And said relations good with Kuwaitis. Great dangers come from Iran and Iraq - but denied reality of Iranian subversion - real or attempted - in Saudi. Asked for GJ's assessment of Eastern Europe - which he gave to him - with scenario of Zhyrinovsky in Russia and return to similar situation as 1930s.

(9) He asked about UK political scene - GJ gave him his view. He said that he often comes to UK - has a house in Kent. Brings his children with him. Will be delighted to be GJ's guest when he next comes. (NB: Keep in touch through

FCO and Saudi Embassy).

(10) Repeated that it was a pity that they did not know we were coming and that GJ was not received officially as he should have been. Told him the story of official/ unofficial - on/off - preparations. Said he would look into it. It should not have happened.

(11) Asked whom we had seen and showed him list - 'impressive'; 'you've certainly done well'. Told him that talk with him was the happy culmination of a very fascinating visit, which we did not believe could happen. He asked me why not, as many Jews had come to visit Saudi and it was a mistaken impression that they would not be welcomed. There was (he said) a difference between Jews and Zionists. GJ replied: 'I am a Zionist'. HH laughed, winked at DK and said: 'Well, that's another story.'

(12) He gave me his view of the disarmament talks - difficulties in getting anywhere, until peace process concluded - but 'you have to start somewhere, don't you?'

(13) On arrival at Doha (where our plane stopped en route to Moscat), warm farewell - promises to meet, in London or in Saudi - and he then descended from plane to be greeted and embraced by large, gold braided crowd of obviously very distinguished Arab dignitaries. Note: He was accompanied on plane by a colleague, two other senior Arabs (whom he told me were not his relations) - and was given a truly royal reception at airport in Riyadh - obviously an extremely important and distinguished man, with whom we must keep in touch.

Note: Like all the Arabs we met, he was extremely impressed by DK's Arabic - and by GJ's painful attempts at it!

DRINKS AT HOME FOR GREVILLE JANNER, QC, MP
1200-1300 HRS ON 29 APRIL 1994

ANNEX A

The Hon Greville Janner, QC, MP

Mr Daniel Janner

Mr Douglas Krikler

Mr Peter Cross	-	BAe Tel: 477 6400
Mr Andrew Dixon	-	Saudi British Bank Tel: 404 0704
Mr Tim Alston	-	Whinney Murray Tel: 477 6272
Mr Mike Walsh	-	Saudi Arabian Markets Tel: 464 6432
Mr Peter Clogger	-	Rolls Royce Tel: 464 6775
? Mr Mike Parkhouse	-	Saudi International Bank Tel: 478 2306
Mr John Davies	-	Al Alamiya Tel: 465 1520
Mr Nigel Wyndham-Thomas	-	A & O Tel: 462 2888
Mr Damien Turner	-	British Aerospace Tel: 464 6600 x 2001

Mr Arthur Walker

Mr Chris Wilton

(14)

ANNEX B

INFORMAL LUNCH HOSTED BY MR AND MRS JOHN BUNNEY

FRIDAY 29 APRIL 1994 AT 1330 HRS

Mr and Mrs Ken FitzSimons (wife Hazel)	British Council
Mr and Mrs Peter Cross (wife Sue)	BAe Offset
Mr and Mrs Chris Johnson (wife Snowy)	BAe

Host and Hostess

To be confirmed:

Mr Malcolm Ives, British Embassy

ANNEX C

DINNER HOSTED BY THE CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES AND MRS LAING FOR THE HON GREVILLE JANNER QC MP, FRIDAY 29 APRIL 1994 AT 2030 HRS

The Hon Greville Janner QC MP	
Mr Daniel Janner	
Mr Douglas Krikler	
HE and Mrs Warwick Weemaes	Australian Ambassador
Mr and Mrs Andrew Dixon	Managing Director, Saudi-British Bank
Mr and Mrs Hank Ritchie	Mobil Saudi Arabia Inc
Mr Kenneth McKune	Counsellor for Political Affairs, Embassy of the USA
Mr Antony Abrahams	Saleh Al-Hejailan Law Firm (in partnership with Clifford Chance)
Mr and Mrs Hassan Jabri	
Mr Faisal Bashir	Saudi-British Bank; Member of Saudi British Society Committee
Mr Saleh Shibani	Director General, Boycott Office, Ministry of Commerce
Mr Ahmad Abanomi (and possibly his daughter Areej)	Businessman and farmer
Dr Nu'man Othman	King Saud University
Host and Hostess	

ATTENDANCE LIST

ANNEX D

BREAKFAST HOSTED BY BRIGADIER M J LANCE IN HONOUR OF THE HON GREVILLE JANNER QC MP SAT 30 APR 94.

The Hon Greville Janner.

Mr Daniel Janner.

Mr Douglas Krikler.

Air Marshal Sir William Wratten.

Brigadier Martin Lance (Host).

Air Commodore Martin Widdowson.

Colonel Douglas Stobie.

Group Captain Roger Carr.

Commander John Barltrop.

Mr Howard Perkins.

Lieutenant Colonel Derek McLean.

Mr Michael Tonnison.

Minutes for the meeting

with

SP

Date: 10/4/1994

Time: 7:30am

Present: YB, AG

Palestinians: **FH**

FH: I have threee subjects to talk about, one was raised last night, in fact one was raised with me very late, last night.

First, I would like to thank you on your statement on television regarding Afoula and the issue of President Arafat not condemening it. The way and manner you talked about it showa understanding of our internal problems. We clearly condemened less important occasions in the past, but this time it is not so easy. We have a very bad internal situation, we could not concentrate on this alone, we had to connect it to other events. President Arafat is feeling a lot of political pressure. Even some of the steps of the implementation on the ground are not helping us.

I was talking to Nabil Sha'ath about the Cairo talks. About Jurisdiction, we will have no jurisdiction neither on Israeli individuals nor on companies, including those foreign companies in Israel and tourists visiting Israel. This means that anyone who decides ro visit Gaza, we have no right to dela with. This case will touch deeply our economy. We are not sure that this is the final Israeli position, or this a tactic to delay, but we cannot accept this position.

On your jurisdiction: Any palestinian organization that thinks to attack you, you have jurisdiction over them, do you have the right to pick them up; it is our right. It is our right, if this the case than we are better off if you leave things as they are now.

On the Palestinian police; our people think that there are a lot of gaps in this agreement. One of the things that can help us is the fact that our people start sensing that there is Palestinian protection, that they have an authority they can be proud of. Our police must enter in a dignified way; with flags, with their weapons and together. If their entrance is in the way suggested by you in buses, without their weapons, I believe it will be counter productive.

SP: We are only talking about the first 300??

FH: Yes this first group can come to prepare for the others.

SP: In the last week nobody appeared on your side on the Jurisdicial committee, we really do not understand why. They even reopened the Map of Gaza.

FH: Abu Ala'a signed it with understanding that there are changes.

SP: Not the Jericho Map. I am talking about the Gaza Map.

FH: So the Jurisdiction committee did not work, Nabil was forced to work both committees, but both committees did not really work.

SP: We are as interested as you are in concluding the agreeement, we are interested as much as you are to see it work.

FH: We are ready to enter 300 advance men if there is a schedule, and no overlaop will occur with the Israeli forces.

SP: We have to conclude the agreement, let us map up all issues, make pluses or minuses then trade them up.

FH: Jurisdiction, police; on the police, their entrance and schedule, if not thought well, if anyone is killed the police will have to resign much like the days of the intifada.

On Jerusalem: my feeling is that the issues concerned are at a much higher level than the discussions I have with Shahal. I am not against closure of the OPT, we have to work hard to create jobs in the WB/Gaza. I am against the isolation of East Jerusalem and other parts of the OPT. To go ahead without changing the laws, and implement some of the agreements on Jerusalem, in as much security is not touched.