מדינת ישראל
משרדי הממשלה

משרד

תיק מס'

תחלקה

יזמות לשיתוף פעולה כלכלי בינים עם הפלסטינים

22/5/1992 - 6/11/1991



שם תיק: יוזמות לשיתוף פעולה כלכלי ולהסכם ביניים עם הפלסטינים

מזהה פיזי: פ-5821/3

מזהה פריט: 001rt7w

כתובת: 3-311-5-10-7 תאריך הדפסה: 28/12/2022

Agreement Steps to be taken within the next three months

22/5/93

(1) The PLO will announce a formal, irreversible and complete end to all terror activities.

(2) A Palestinian police force will be established. Training of the force will be carried out in Jericho and Egypt and one month before the elections in Palestine. Interim period: the police force will take responsibility for establishing this police force and all terror activities in Jericho and Palestinian military and paramilitary units will be dismantled.

(3) The Israeli Government and the Palestinians will start negotiations on agreement regarding the modalities of elections. (elections will be held three months after the signing of this agreement).

(4) A partial transfer of authority will be implemented immediately and will (early agreement)

include the following spheres:
Health, education, public welfare
and the administration of taxation and
benefits.

5. Israel will start ~~to withdraw~~ the first step
~~pursuant~~ to ~~the prot~~ a period
~~a step~~ to implement a withdrawal
of withdrawal from para.
~~The com~~ ~~complete~~ withdrawal of
will be completed within six months.
The para step will be fully coordinated
thereafter. A ~~fast~~ chapter para
Scheduling Programme will be agreed upon.

6. Israel will ~~agree~~ ~~left gradually~~
~~the closure~~ ~~start~~
report to UN in pre step
left the closure, immediately
after the dismantlement of Palestin
military & para military units.

(7) A trusteeship ~~for the administration~~ of the peace Strip will be established ~~in full cooperation~~ between ~~the~~ Israel Palestine representatives (for Town of the Peace Strip) the governments of Egypt and Jordan ~~in~~ full cooperation with the government of Israel.

(8) An Israeli-Palestinian CMP will be the result of joint economic consultations, implementing an integrated economic reconstruction programme for the Peace Strip. It may effort will be undertaken to raise necessary international economic, financial and technical support.

(9) This MO-Part Agreement will in no way prejudice the implementation of ~~Palestinian self-government~~ the DoP regarding the West Bank, and will contribute to the ~~peaceful~~ full implementation of the ~~Palestinian~~ legitimate rights of the Palestinian people;

(10) Regarding all ~~the areas~~ ~~that~~ permanent issues (to be included in the DoP)

(11) Joint Israeli-Palestinian committees regarding all permanent issues that are to be included in the DoP will be established immediately.

The New Israel Fund's Capacity-Building Center for Social Change Organizations

שתיל Shatil شتيل

שירות תמיכה וייעוץ לארגוני מתנדבים
מיסודה של הקרן החדשה לישראל

Date 19/3/97 תאריך

דף לוואי למשלוח בפקס

Facsimile Transmittal Cover Sheet

TO: ECF למען:

ATTN: ערי סלומן לידי:

FROM: אלונה ורדי מאת:

FAX: 03-695 8238 מס' פקס:

מס' הפקס שלנו:02-6735149
Our FAX # from abroad: 972-2-6735-149

# of pages including cover sheet 5 מס' דפים, כולל הדף הזה

Comments: הערות:

ערי שלום,

מצ"ב ההצעה לסמס + תקציב + מכתב עדכון
לרון כיוונים. שלחתי גם תקציר אליו.

תודה רבה

אלונה

אם לא התקבלו כל הדפים, אנא התקשרו למשרדנו:02-6723597
If you do not receive all pages, please call: 02-6723597

משרד ראשי: רח' יד חרוצים 9 ירושלים 93420 ת.ד. 53395 ירושלים 91533 טל: 02-6723597 פקס: 02-6735149
חיפה: רח' קדימה 4 חיפה 34382 ת.ד. 6147 חיפה 31062 טל: 04-8376826 פקס: 04-8381642
באר שבע: רח' הרצל 118 באר שבע 84420 ת.ד. 5045 באר שבע 84150 טל: 07-6282003 פקס: 07-6274836
Main Office: 9 Yad Harutzim St. Jerusalem, Israel. P.O.Box 53395, Jerusalem 91533 Tel: 972-2-6723597, Fax: 972-2-6735149 Shatil @ Shatil. nif. org. il

מפעלות החינוך שליד הקרן החדשה לישראל

עמותה מס' ASSOCIATION No. 580221570

9 Yad Harutzim St., P.O.B. 53410, Jerusalem 91534
Tel. 02-723095, Fax: 02-723099

יד חרוצים 9, ת.ד. 53410, ירושלים 91534
טלפון: 02-723095, פקס: 02-723099

Campaigning For Our Environment

כנס בינלאומי לארגוני סביבה מן המזרח התיכון

תקציר:

מפעלות החינוך שליד הקרן החדשה לישראל, מגיש בזאת בקשה לסיוע במימון כינוס של ארגוני אזרחים הפועלים למען הסביבה.
מטרותיו של הכינוס הן:
ליצור אפשרות מפגש והכרות בין פעילי סביבה מישראל, ירדן, מצרים, מן הרשות הפלשתינית וממדינות האגן המזרחי של הים התיכון.
ליצור מסגרות למידה משותפת של משתתפי הכנס לרכישת כלים ומיומנויות לניהול מאבקים למען איכות הסביבה.
לאפשר לימוד הדדי מנסיונם של המשתתפים.
לבדוק אפשרות של יצירת סדר יום משותף לחברי קהילות שונות באיזור.
לנסות למנוע יחד מעבר של מפגעים סביבתיים ממדינה למדינה.

רקע:

התנועה הסביבתית - מארגוני מומחים לארגוני אזרחים

במדינת ישראל, כמו גם במדינות השכנות, נמצאת התנועה הסביבתית במעבר מארגוני מומחים לארגוני אזרחים. יחד עם קיומם ארוך השנים של ארגוני סביבה מקצועיים המושתתים על אנשי מקצוע, קמו בשנים האחרונות עשרות ארגוני אזרחים הפועלים למען הסביבה מתוך הקהילה. ארגונים אלו מאופיינים במחויבות גבוהה למטרה, יכולת טובה לגיוס בסיס קהילתי לפעילותם ומוטיבציה גבוהה. עם זאת, הם חסרים את הידע המקצועי העשוי לסייע להם להשיג את מטרותיהם. מספרם ההולך וגדל של הארגונים הקהילתיים והמקום שהם תופסים במארג הארגונים הפועלים למען הסביבה, מעלה את הצורך ליצור מסגרת לימוד והעשרה משותפת שתתרום ליכולתם לפעול ביעילות להשגת מטרותיהם. המסגרת המוצעת הינה כינוס של ארגוני סביבה אזורי, בו יטלו חלק ארגונים מן הרמה הארצית ומן הרמה המקומית.
היות וכולנו חולקים את אותם משאבי טבע - מים, אוויר, אדמה וכולנו נתקלים באותם מכשולים בבואנו לפעול למען הסביבה, קיום כינוס איזורי יכול להעשיר את חברי הארגונים הללו, לתרום להצלחת פעילותם ולהביא להכרות מעשירה עם תושבי המדינות השכנות.

על הגורם המבצע:

שתי"ל, שירות תמיכה וייעוץ לארגוני מתנדבים, מייסודה של הקרן החדשה לישראל, נוסד בשנת 1982 ונועד להשלים את הסיוע הכספי באמצעות שירותי ייעוץ וסיוע מקצועי. כמו כן, יוזם שתי"ל פרויקטים שמטרתם להתמודד עם בעיות השעה ובעיות מהותיות בחברה הישראלית. הסיוע ניתן בתחומים הבאים: פיתוח וניהול ארגוני, גיוס מתנדבים והפעלתם, פיתוח משאבים, שימוש באמצעי תקשורת, סנגור וניהול מאבקים ציבוריים. הסיוע והייעוץ ניתנים בידי אנשי מקצוע מתחומים אלו.

מפעלות החינוך שליד הקרן החדשה לישראל

עמותה מס' 580221570 ASSOCIATION No.

9 Yad Harutzim St., P.O.B. 53410, Jerusalem 91534
Tel. 02-723095, Fax: 02-723099

יד חרוצים 9, ת.ד. 53410, ירושלים 91534
טלפון: 02-723095, פקס: 02-723099

פרויקט "סביבה וקהילה" של שתי"ל החל את פעילותו בספטמבר 1995. הפרויקט פועל מתוך הנחה שתמיכה ביוזמות קהילתיות מקומיות תחזק את המודעות לנושאים סביבתיים בציבור כולו, ושהרחבת הבסיס הציבורי של הפעילות בנושא תיתן תנופה משמעותית להגדלת המודעות, המעורבות והאחריות של אזרחים וקהילות לסביבתם. הפרויקט מסייע לכ- 30 קבוצות אזרחים מכל רחבי הארץ, ערבים ויהודים, הפועלים למען סביבה מתוקנת במקומות מגוריהם.

לארגון הכנס חבר שתי"ל לארגון "EcoPeace" שהוא ארגון הגג של ארגוני הסביבה במזרח התיכון.

תכנית הכנס

הכנס יתקיים בין התאריכים: 28-29-30/5/1997 במלון הילטון טאבה.

התכנית כוללת מושבי מליאה וסדנאות העוסקים בנושאי סביבה איזוריים - פיתוח חופים, חינוך סביבתי, שמירת טבע וסילוק פסולת. וכן בנושאים של ניהול ארגוני מתנדבים, העלאת מודעות ומעורבות הקהילה, גיוס משאבים, שימוש במדיה לפעילות למען הסביבה ועוד.

משתתפי הכנס

משתתפי הכנס הם פעילים מארגוני אזרחים מישראל, הרשות הפלשתינית מצרים וירדן וכן גם מדינות האגן המזרחי של הים התיכון. סה"כ כ- 85 משתתפים.

תועלת הכנס

מתוך ראייה שגורל הסביבה יוכרע, בסופו של דבר, בידי האזרחים עצמם ובמידת ההשפעה שתהיה להם על קובעי המדיניות, אנו רואים חשיבות גדולה בקיום מסגרת למידה זו - מעבר ליצירת אפשרות מפגש של פעילים למען הסביבה מן האזור כולו.

מפעלות החינוך שליד הקרן החדשה לישראל

עמותה מס' 580221570 ASSOCIATION No.

9 Yad Harutzim St., P.O.B. 53410, Jerusalem 91534
Tel. 02-723095, Fax: 02-723099

יד חרוצים 9, ת.ד. 53410, ירושלים 91534
טלפון: 02-723095, פקס: 02-723099

תקציב: (בדולרים)

הוצאות:

לינה וכלכלה		
(לפי $100 X 3 ימים X 85 משתתפים)		25,500
טיסות של משתתפי הכנס ממדינות האזור		
(ר' פירוט בבקשת התמיכה)		6,500
טיסות ותשלום למרצים מאירופה		
(לפי $1,250 למרצה X 4 מרצים)		5,000
הסעות לישראלים ולפלשתינים לטאבה		
(2 אוטובוסים X $1,000)		2,000
ניהול הכנס		
(לפי 2 משרות לשלושה חדשים X $1650)		9,900
הוצאות משרד		5,000
הדפסת חומר		3,000
	סה"כ	$56,900

הכנסות:

קרן Bundstift		10,000
EcoPeace		15,000
שתי"ל		5,000
וועדת תמיכות של משרד החוץ		
(עדיין לא אושר)		10,000
	סה"כ	$40,000

THE EDUCATIONAL ENTERPRISES OF THE NEW ISRAEL FUND

CHUCK, DENIS, RICK
~~DESA~~


18.03.97 ENVIRONMENTAL EDUCATORS @ US EMBASSY

·US enviro educators invited to Is. to edu. about environment education w/ Israeli orgs.

·Naomi Tzur: director of SPNI in Jerusalem — Amram Ben Zahav
·Judith West: Municipality of Tel Aviv. — Jamal Sefer (from Gaza)
·Gidon Bromberg: ECO-PEACE

·intro. enviro edu. programs in region · has met w/ P.A.

·Devorah Ziv: head of enviro. edu at Ministry of Environment
·Arny Uzan: enviro educator in Haifa
·Shai Moscowitch: JNF, consultant



① ·Is, P.A., Jor., Leb reps. went to the US to look @ enviro. edu.
↓ ·ME ENVIRONMENTAL EDUCATION FORUM

① NEED · a need for a reg'l enviro. edu. prof. society
② INTEREST · strong interest in est. a reg'l enviro. edu. forum
· est. a steering committee
· listserver on the Internet · formal offices in CYBERSPACE

② CHUCK · school teacher · his org. is aiming to create an environmentally literate citizenry
· to be enviro literate you need eco, bio, pol., + edu exp.

·In Israel, a general positive attitude towards the environment
· the problem is awareness but people do not want to do anything

Awareness → Concern → Understanding → Action

DEVORAH: from MINISTRY of ENVIRONMENT

- kids need to know what skills are needed
- how do we perceive local systems? how do we confront them? what are they a result of? how do we take responsible actions?
- do something physical to get all 'in'
- enviro. educators are external to educ. system - OUTSIDERS
- teacher workshops
- in many ways is is adv. b/c educators are connected to govt
- is there a State-curriculum?
- every lesson must have a physical activity
- TEACHABLE HABITAT
- dead trees - the local land primarily b/c it is solvable
- JOURNEY FOR THE PLANET
  'task oriented
- COAST-WATCH (connected to Euro)


Eco-Peace (Gideon - teaching enviro. policy @ B.G.)

- PARK PROJECT - dev. by kids
  - animals
  - planning - meet w/ officials
  - meet w/ city council, School Board, etc.
- connect kids w/ Internet (Rainforest Pgz)
- OWNERSHIP is key
- Pal/Is PARK? ——— enviro. secretariat? summer school? students?
- NATURE ZNR (NGO) - SPNI
- community/household clean-ups
- "INTERPRETATION" - State-hired educ @ parks

Step Phil re landscape architecture

beacon

"SURVIVING SURVIVAL — MENTALITY"



3.

- Can NGOs + Enviro. Dept. in Is. find a effective voice between Is.-Pal.?
- seige/survival mentality is part of the problem of enviro that we face
- LIVING WATER /ECO-PEACE/ MEEF
- ~~But~~ concepts of SUSTAINABILITY aren't prominent in enviro. projects

ENVIRO. SECRETARIAT? ——— is/ not enough land or space for car/apt.

- AGENDA 21 ?
- COALITION building for environment
- Send an e-mail for list-serve to EDWARD JAY MILLER
- ADOPT-A-PARK Project
- ADOPT-A-NEIGHBOURHOOD
- Stephanie (Carmel Society?)
  - Ab/Jew activities found on a peice of land

- PROJECTS AIMING TO BRING ABOUT COOP BETW ADULTS + KIDS

יהודית בלינקה
משפחת לאונרד הסכירה
מתיל ברוס
ת.ד. 230
באר שבע 84102

(DRAFT ONLY)

A WORKSHOP TO PROMOTE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE ACTIVITIES

SPONSORED BY:

The Friedrich Ebert Stiftung

&

FAFO

&

The US Council on Foreign Relations

IN COOPERATION WITH:

The Palestinian Center for Peace

~~The~~ *Economic Cooperation Foundation*

* perhaps a research/survey phase, similar to the S.A. project needs to take place where a book/draft/etc. of all dif. types of P2P activities (potential) are listed - kind of like a directory

& list of ideas in Arts & Culture Field Environment

Bethlehem - March ,1997

Bethlehem
March, 1997

1. INTRODUCTION AND RATIONALE

While progress in the official Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process is slow and unsteady, it is of utmost importance to sustain, encourage and further develop the-People-to-People (P2P) peace process. This unofficial track (NGOs level) of contacts, of dialogues, then of sporadic cooperation has begun well before the official Peace Process by small groups. It has somewhat grown parallel to the first phase of the Process, between "Madrid" and Oslo', especially on the academic level, with dialogues and conferences discussing solutions to aspects of the Israeli-Arab or Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Since Oslo the unofficial track received a great boost with unfolding prospects to become a P2P and a Civil Society Peace Process. It was gradually encouraged by the official track, either through the multilaterals and the donors or even directly between Israeli ministries and the emerging PA. The Oslo II accords gave this trend an official and formal blessing by recognizing the importance of multi-level and diversified cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians.

BE MORE SPECIFIC w/ WHY P-P STARTED
- filled a vacuum...
- in response to ...
- why urgent
- who

Actual experience shows that P2P activities in various fields have gained, on the Israeli and Palestinian side, active supporters for peace. P2P activities have become an effective instrument for crisis prevention and conflict resolution. To extend the outreach and attempt to impact on a critical mass of the respective problems required a redoubling of efforts. In the period of negotiating a permanent settlement, in the face of the existing volatility of official Israeli-Palestinians relationships, P2P activities are gaining particular importance by building trust relationships and creating a public atmosphere conducive to negotiations.

P-P effective where other negotiations are not b/c...

The Frederich Ebert Foundation and FAFO propose a workshop of the leading actors (project developers and implementers, policy makers and funders) to report on current P2P activities. Such a workshop would be a first, yet crucial, step towards initiating an ongoing coordination dialogue, and provide added impetus for the amplification of P2P, as well as checking more and less effective initiatives thus far implemented, and helping to determine broad priorities for P2P.

2. CURRENT PEOPLE TO PEOPLE ACTIVITIES

At present two principle trends/ approaches to promoting P2P have emerged. One approach, lead by the EU, the American Government, the Norwegian Government, through the auspices of the FAFO structure, and most recently the Canadian Government, is based on the provision of funds specifically targeted for the purpose of such P2P or dialogue activities. The funders announce a formal *"call for projects"* and then review joint proposals submitted to them in terms of pre-defined criteria. The proposals submitted in response to these calls have been diverse and innovative, covering a variety of professional and interest areas. The USIA and the FAFO structure have already disbursed their first round of funds and the FAFO structure is in the process of reviewing the proposals submitted for the second round. The response following its most recent *"call for projects"* was overwhelming. The EU, through MEDA-DEMOCRACY, and has provided significant support for P2P activities in its first year of operation.

well

The bulk of current P2P activities take the form of projects which bring together a diverse range of NGO's and groups for an encounters/ dialogue based activities in civil society. Such activities have, over the past few years, been pioneered by youth organisations, particularly in the form of summer camps and other activities. Youth NGOs remain a major force in promoting such interactions and the past year has seen a drive to create an Israeli-Palestinian Youth Network to promote and broaden such activities to incorporate youth previously not involved. In the meantime, Peace Now Youth & the Palestinian Peace Movement (including the Gaza based PYUCP) have embarked on a program of regular local dialogue groups.

Other actors, to name a few from an exhaustive list, who are active on bringing together groups and disseminating resources include; PPIC-Al-Jiser, ASS, ICPME, Midreshet Adam, Givat Haviva, Al Wasiti, Melitz, Palestinian Youth Union for Cooperation and Peace - PYUCP, etc.).

A second approach pursued to date, is based on the concept of "hub" development. This approach proposes the development of specific structure ("hubs") that will actively facilitate and promote activities around a specific topic, interest area or group.

The pace of "hub" development has been set by the Belgian government, who in cooperation with the Palestine Consultancy Group (PCG) and Charles Bronfman Foundation (CRB) is establishing a ***"Hub" for Cooperation in Research and Education.*** This research hub will finance, in the coming year alone, a variety of trilateral Belgian-Israeli-Palestinian research projects. Budgets will also be dedicated to encourage the "mushrooming" of such initiatives; i.e. effecting further cooperation programs on that will involve other Middle East countries, as well as other European, the American and Japanese participants.

Additional "hubs" or "hub" development activities include;

◊ ***Professional Cooperation Activities:***
- * *Cooperation Amongst Journalists.*
- * *Cooperation Between Public and Community Service Providers.*

Of particular importance is the dialogue and cooperation between journalists. The development of an ongoing and active exchange of ideas can facilitate a positive impact regarding the dissemination of ideas towards peace, address stereotypes, fear and aspirations.

In addition, teachers, social workers, community workers, and health care workers are largely responsible for providing social welfare and community services to their societies, and therefore act as multipliers of social and political messages. There are a multitude of initiatives presently being promoted, and as with youth, structures to facilitate cooperation between these professionals are at present being considered.

◊ ***Culture and the Arts***

The artists and performers of each society have the potential to mobilize large sectors of the population to any popular cause. Many Israeli and Palestinian artist are prepared to dedicate their art, talents and their time on a non-cost basis to the common cause of peace. The creation of a mobilizing structure to promote planned and focused cooperation activities is particularly important as a multiplier effect may be achieved in this field at an extremely favorable Cost-Benefit ratio.

* FILM IDEA

◊ ***City to City***

A special form of P2P cooperation can be organised on the level of City to City pairing, which permits the mobilization of all sections of the society in cooperation programs. City to City programs enable municipalities to create a solution orientated professional dialogue, and to establish a structure for effective mutual assistance and support, thus providing for a wide range of social encounters. A first attempt has been started in cooperation with the mayor of the city of Tel Aviv, Mr. Ronnie Milo, and the mayor of Bethlehem, Mr. Elias Frej. The mayor of Tel Aviv has recently declared his intention to broaden this form of cooperation by convening a forum of Israeli and Palestinian mayors which will actively develop and implement the City to City program.

◊ ***The Environment***

Recognizing that environmental cooperation contributes to both environmental conservation and provides an instrument for bridge building, the Palestine Council of Health and the Society for the Protection of Nature (SPNI), and various environmental NGOs, developed the concept of a Palestinian-Israeli Environmental Secretariat, *"Nature Knows No Boundaries"*. A proposal for support for the secretariat has been submitted to the Dutch government, and funds have been secured for the first activities.

3. People-to-People Workshop

The Frederich Ebert Foundation and FAFO propose a workshop of the leading actors to report on the past and present P2P activities. This workshop, to be held in Bethlehem, will address the following objectives:

a) Provide an opportunity for the various funders, implementers and "hub" developers to report on their activities, thereby providing an initial stocktaking exercise of P2P activities;
b) Initiate greater coordination between funders and implementers;
c) Allow for a comparative discussion and analysis of activities;
d) Raise and address impediments confronted in promoting P2P,;
e) Consider ways of raising funder support for P2P activities, particularly ways of expanding the existing fund base by securing greater support form private and public foundations and enlisting the support of the corporate community in the form of corporate citizenship;
f) Consider measures to expand the scope and impact of P2P activities, including possible strategic prioritizing of areas and communities for P2P, and raise ideas draw in such sectors in each society;
g) Consider effective media exposure of activities so as to maximise the effect of P2P on public opinion.
h) swap + share ideas

4. A Workshop Concept

a) Activity Reports

P2P Funds:

Representatives of the FAFO structure (The People to People Program), the EU, Canada and the USIA representatives will report on their activities to date. The report should include a discussion on initial objectives and criteria development, the response to the call for projects, and report on the activities themselves. The Norwegian, EU and US representatives, along with Canadian representatives should outline future activities.

Program Implimenters:

The second session of activity reports will provide an opportunity for those involved in promoting various NGO-NGO activities and civil society interactions to report on activities. A list of possible NGO presentations will be developed in cooperation with the various funding structures and the workshop organizers. Following a brief set of formal presentation, an opportunity for other presentations will be made by other participants.

Hub Development:

A third session will be dedicated to presentations of targeted activities and hub development to report to the participants their activities and efforts to date. Report on the following activities will be presented by those active in their promotion:

1) Research and Education Cooperation Promotion
2) Professional Cooperation Activities:
    * Cooperation Amongst Journalists.
    * Cooperation Between Public and Community Service Providers.
3) City to City
4) The Environment

5. A Workshop Program

Opening Session: (Thursday Morning - 8:45 a.m. - 9: 30 a.m.)
Opening Remarks and Introduction of the Participants

Dr. Ebehard Rhein on behalf of FES, Tarje Larsen on behalf of FAFO, Henry Seigman on behalf of the US Council on Foreign Relations

Session 1: A synopsis of P2P Funder activities (9:30 a.m. - 11: 00)

Chaired by:

1. Report and Presentation of Norwegian P2P activities:
   By Ms. Lena Abramson - FAFO & Mr. Svien Sevje - Norwegian Representative Office

2. Report and Presentation on American support for Dialogue Funds:
   By Mr. David Good - USIA & Consul Ed Ebington

3. Report of EU support for Israeli-Palestinian activities:
   By Dave Kriss and Geoffrey Healy

4. Report and Presentation on Canadian support for Dialogue activities:
   By Diedre Kent and Shawn Barber - Canadian Fund

5. Questions and answer session and contributions from the floor.

Session 2: A presentation of P2P Implementers activities (11:30 a.m. - 13: 00 p.m.)

Chaired by:

1. Youth Activities
   By Hen Raz (Peace Now) and Ali ..... (Palestinian Peace Movement)

2. Civil Society Interactions
   By Ziad Abu Ziad (Al-Jiser) and Avram Infield (Melitz)

3. Other participants will be approached in coordination with various finders and actors active in promoting P2P.

4. Questions and answer session and contributions from the floor.

Lunch Break: (13:00 p..m. - 14:30 p.m.)

Session 3: P2P Hub development activities (14:30 p.m. - 16: 30 p.m.)

Chaired by:

1. Research and Education Cooperation Promotion
   By Sari Nusseibeh (PCG) and Jenet Aviad (CRB)

2. Professional Cooperation Activities:
   - Cooperation Amongst Journalists.

   Ofer Bronstien (ICPME), Sufyan Abu Zeidah (PCFP),

   - Cooperation Between Public and Community Service Providers.

   Dr. Hikmat Ajjuri (PCH) and Dr. Ron Pundik (ECF)

3. City-to-City
   Mr. Ronnie Milo and Mr. Elias Frej

4. The Environment
   Dr. Mohammed Saidi and Dr. Yossi Leshem (SPNI)

5. Questions and answer session and contributions from the floor.

Concluding Session: (17:00 p..m. - 18:30 p..m.)

This session will attempt to analyze and review the presentation made in the three previous sessions. Attention will be focused on discussing the promotion of P2P activities, inter alia, greater participation, increased financial support, priority communities and interest areas for P2P, and possible solutions to impediments confronted, will be discussed.

Chaired by: Dr. Yair Hirschfeld &

Formal Dinner and report-back to diplomats: (19:00 p..m. - 21:30 p..m.)

Brief Remarks:
Amb. Sven Svedman (Norway), Amb. Indyk (USA), Amb. Jessee (EU),

Reportbacks by session chairs:

Other Guests:
Ambassadors and Representatives to the Palestinian of the following countries:
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark, the EU, France, Germany, Holland, Norway, Spain, Sweden, the United States,

Representatives of the Foundation Community:

~~Session 6~~

Follow up

- booklet packed full o' suggestions

אגף לשימור סביבה וטבע

רחי השפלה 6,
תל-אביב 66183
טל 03-6388742/4,
פקס. 03-5374302

הודעה בפקסימיליה

אל: גאדי סומן

מס' פקס': 02-6958238

מאת: אלי גלרמן

מס' דפים (כולל דף זה): 3


תאריך: 26.1.97

הנדון: students

Enclosed is a budget for 6 months, for $12,000, as we discussed.
Of course I'd be twice as happy to double it, for the course of a year.

Eli

במידה ולא קיבלת את המסמך בשלמותו נא ליצור קשר לטלפון 03-63888742-4



רח' השפלה 4,
תל-אביב 66183
טל. 03-6388742/4,
פקס. 03-5374302

אגף לשימור סביבה וטבע

ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVISM AMONG ISRAELI UNIVERSITY STUDENTS
AND
PROMOTING A "PEOPLE TO PEOPLE" PROGRAM BETWEEN
ISRAELI AND PALESTINIAN STUDENTS

DEVELOPING ISRAELI STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS

Goal:

- Promoting Environmental Activism at Israeli Universities

Targets:

- Establishing student "green cells" on 4 university campuses.
- Recruiting a "hard core" of eight students at each of 4 universities within six months.
- Involving the student group in environmental actions organized by SPNI and by other environmental protection groups.
- Promoting independent student initiatives in local, national and regional issues.
- Meetings with Palestinian student environmental activists and action on common issues.

Work Plan: Attached (in Hebrew)

Management:

The program will be overseen by Emily Silverman, Director of the Center for Environmental Organizing, Environmental Protection Department, SPNI. Silverman holds an MA in Public Policy from Tel Aviv University and has twelve years of experience in community organizing and organizational development. The program coordinator is Eran BenYamini, who holds a BA in Physics from the Technion, Haifa, has studied acting at the Poor School in London, and is active in local Israeli environmental issues.

Six Month Budget

Program Coordinator	$600 per month @ 6 months	$3600
Travel and Office Expenses	$400 per month @ 6 months	$2400
Student Activities Supplies (flyers, stickers, banners, etc)	$500 per campus * 4 campuses *2 actions	$4000
National Student Meetings	$1000 per meeting * 2 meetings	$2000
TOTAL BUDGET		**$12,000**

שלבים:

הכנה לגיוס	1. יצירת קשר עם פעילים קיימים באוניברסיטאות. 2. גיוס טלפוני ("מפה לאוזן"). 3. סידרת פגישות עם אגודות הסטודנטים וגיבוש תוכניות פעולה ספציפיות לאוניברסיטאות. 4. סידרת פגישות עם עורכי עיתוני סטודנטים. 5. הפקת פוסטרים להפצה עם תחילת הסמסטר. 6. מינוי מגייס מקומי. 7. אירגון אירוע ראשוני עם סטודנטים (הפגנה ב 23/1/97). 8. זיהוי איש הנהלה/סגל "דוק" בכל אחת מהאוניברסיטאות (לעזרה בבירוקרטיה).
גיוס	1. מפגש ראשוני בשבוע הראשון לסמסטר, וזיהוי נושאי מאבק מקומיים (מיחזור, תחבורה וכו'). 2. הקמת דוכני התחמה (וסקרים) באוניברסיטאות. 3. ניהול דישום ומיחשובו. 4. אירגון הרצאה/יום עיון בנושא סביבתי.
גיבוש מבנה	1. זיהוי "גרעין קשה" ואקטיביסטים. 2. מינוי איש קשר עם הנהלת האוניברסיטה. 3. מינוי איש קשר עם האגודה. 4. מינוי איש קשר עם הארגונים הירוקים.
פעילות בקמפוס	1. סקר סביבתי. 2. שבוע איכות סביבה. 3. הרצאות. 4. נושאים מקומיים למאבק (ירושלים-יער ירושלים, חיפה-מרינות, ת"א-תחבורה). 5. פגישות שבועיות של ה"גרעין הקשה". 6. משא ומתן עם הנהלת האוניברסיטה. 7. החתמת עצומות. 8. הקמת מרכזי איכות סביבה באוניברסיטאות. 9. שילוב איכות סביבה בתוכנית הלימודים.
פעילות ארצית	1. הפגנות עם ארגונים ירוקים אחרים. 2. אירגון עצמי של מחאות. 3. זיהוי מפגעים אקולוגיים מקומיים.
פעילות עם סטודנטים פלסטינים	1. החלפת מידע בנושאי אירגון וגיוס. 2. שיתוף והחלפת מידע בנושאי מפגעים אקולוגים ואנשי מיקצוע. 3. שתדלנות הדדית. 4. מאבקים בנושאים משותפים.

A DRAFT PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERNAL DISCUSSION ON:

A STRATEGY TO PROMOTE PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE ACTIVITIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

ISRAEL - THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY - JORDAN - EGYPT

JANUARY 1997

ECF

A Strategy to Promote People-To-People Activities in the Middle East

Israel - the Palestinian Authority - Jordan - Egypt

1. **Introduction and Rationale** **P. 1**

2. People-to-People Target Groups **P. 2**

1. The Academic Community *P. 2*
2. Cooperation Between Professionals *P. 2*
3. Culture and Arts Cooperation *P. 2*
4. Women *P. 2*
5. Youth *P. 2*
6. City to City *P. 2*

4. The People to People Institutional Partners **P. 3**

1. The "hub" for Cooperation in Research and Education *P. 3*
2. Professional Cooperation Activities *P. 4*
The Establishment of a "hub" for Cooperation Amongst Journalists
Cooperation Between Public and Community Service Providers.
3. Culture and the Arts *P. 4*
4. Women *P. 5*
5. Youth *P. 5*
6. City to City P. 5

5. Methodology of People-to-People **P. 6**

a) Setting Initial Goals *P. 6*
b) Stocktaking *P. 6*
c) Needs Evaluation. *P. 6*
d) Project Evaluation. *P. 6*
e) Fundraising. *P. 7*
f) Crises and Impediment Management. *P. 7*

6. Principles of People-to-People and Modalities of Implementation P. 7

1. INTRODUCTION AND RATIONALE

While progress in the official Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process is slow and unsteady, it is of utmost importance to sustain, encourage and further develop the-People-to-People (P2P) peace process. This unofficial track (NGOs level) of contacts, of dialogues, then of sporadic cooperation has begun well before the official Peace Process by small groups. It has somewhat grown parallel to the first phase of the Process, between "Madrid" and Oslo', especially on the academic level, with dialogues and conferences discussing solutions to aspects of the Israeli-Arab or Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Since Oslo the unofficial track received a great boost with unfolding prospects to become a P2P and a Civil Society Peace Process. It was gradually encouraged by the official track, either through the multilaterals and the donors or even directly between Israeli ministries and the emerging PA. The Oslo II accords gave this trend an official and formal blessing by recognizing the importance of multi-level and diversified cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians.

In Annex VI, Article I: Objectives, of the accords, we find inter alia:

1) *"The two sides are determined to establish dialogue and cooperation on the bases of equality, fairness and reciprocal ....In striving to live in peaceful coexistence, the two sides will seek to design and implement various programs which will facilitate the efforts leading to full reconciliation...*

2) *To that end, the two sides agree to establish and maintain between them an extensive program of cooperation in fields of human activity including in economic. scientific, social and cultural fields. involving officials, institutions, and the private sector."*

Actual experience shows that P2P activities in various fields have gained, on the Israeli and Palestinian side, active supporters for peace. Those who have engaged in active dialogue or in practical professional programs tend to be staunch supporters of peace, even if their former positions were originally hostile.

A variety of P2P activities, particularly in spheres of cooperation between youth, inter-religious dialogue and certain joint research activities, are also being carried out on a multilateral level, particularly between Israeli, Palestinian, Egyptian and Jordanian partners, and have even included Moroccan and Tunisian partners and others. We have learnt that P2P activities have become an effective instrument for crisis prevention and conflict resolution. In the period of negotiating of a permanent settlement, in the face of the existing volatility of official Israeli-Palestinians relationships, P2P activities are gaining particular importance, they act as an important safety network and buffer in crises situations. They assist to build trust relationships and create a public atmosphere conducive to negotiations. Moreover, P2P activities prepare the way for the period of peace consolidation that has to follow the sighing of the final status accords, and thereby contribute to new relationships of trust.

2. PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE TARGET GROUPS

Being understood that the primary and overriding aim of P2P activities is to create an effective mechanism of conflict resolution and stabilisation of social relationships between former adversaries, it is evident that P2P activities have to target the active involvement of the following groups;

1. The Academic Community:

This community asserts the intellectual leadership within each society and often sets the moral parameters that can convert long standing enmity towards a more cooperative approach to co-existence. Moreover, the academic community in the Middle East speak the same universal professional language and share common social and scientific research interests. This community has a vested interest in developing various structures of cooperation which can be extremely beneficial to each side. Moreover, the academic and scientific community have a very strong interest in developing professional relationships with their colleagues in Europe, the US and countries where research facilities and capabilities are well developed, thereby creating both the interest and need for a variety of trilateral and multilateral cooperation programs.

2. Cooperation Between Professionals

a) Of particular importance to P2P activities is the dialogue and cooperation between journalists who work in the media. The development of common professional attitudes and their impact on conflict resolution, crises prevention and stabilisation cannot be overestimated.

b) Teachers, social workers, community workers, and health care workers are largely responsible for providing social welfare and community services to their societies, and therefore act as multipliers of social and political messages. Also here, substantive cooperation creates a real win-win situation for each side and permits all regional actors to obtain the support of national and international institutions, and enjoy the benefits of collaborating with leading world experts in various fields.

3. Culture and Arts

The artists, actors, comedians, singers and performers of each society all have the potential to mobilize large sectors of the population to any popular cause. The possibility to engage the artistic community, particularly the Israeli and Palestinian communities, and the Egyptian and Jordanian communities, for the cause of peace promises to create extremely important public repercussion of such well planned and focused activities.

4. Women

Modern research indicates that of all the forms of investment in development activities, investment in women has shown the most rewarding returns. Of particular importance for the social, cultural and economic development of any society is to guarantee the increasing involvement of women in the labour force.

This not only adds additional income sources, but contributes to a more equal gender relationship and facilitates more modern outlooks on life. The latter, in turn contributes to the desire to deepen cooperation and solidarity, which are important pillars of stability and peace. For reasons of geographical proximity, and also due to a variety of cultural and social similarities, the cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian women's organisations offer great potential benefits to both societies.

5. Youth

The most fervent segment of any society is its youth. The young generation of the Israeli and Palestinian, and other Middle East societies tend to possess, as everywhere else, two special features. On the one hand, the younger Israeli and Palestinian generations do not share the prejudices of their parents. Youth, therefore tend to be far more open to cooperation than other segments of society. One the other hand, youth tend to harbor and support radical positions, and are often carried away by the primitive preaching of extremists. These two factors, the positive potential on the one hand, and the danger of radicalism on the other hand, make P2P between youth particularly important.

6. City to City

A special form of P2P cooperation can be organised on the level of City to City pairing, which permits both or more, sides to mobilise all sections of the society in cooperation programs. This is of great political importance as this approach allows for the involvement and mobilization of former and present opponents of the peace process in peace making activities. City to City programs enable municipalities to create a solution orientated professional dialogue, and to establish a structure for effective mutual assistance and support, thus providing for a wide range of social encounters. An additional advantage of the City to City P2P framework may bee seen by the fact that with relatively little outside help, many internal resources can be mobilized and made available.

3. THE PEOPLE TO PEOPLE INSTITUTIONAL PARTNERS

The effectiveness of P2P activities for the promotion and sustainability of peace in the Middle East demands strong structural support for P2P activities. As P2P encounters are by definition a non-governmental activity, governments should be asked to offer support, yet supporting and implementing institutions should be non-governmental actors. For the time being the following structure is emerging, more as a result of indigenous initiatives, and not so much as a result of theoretical planning.

1. The "hub" for Cooperation in Research and Education:

The Belgian government, in cooperation with the Palestine Consultancy Group (PCG) and Charles Bronfman Foundation (CRB) is establishing a "hub" in this field. This research hub will finance, in the coming year alone, a variety of trilateral Belgian-Israeli-Palestinian research projects. Money will also be dedicated to encourage the "mushrooming" of such initiatives; i.e. effecting further cooperation programs on Research and Education that will involve other Middle East countries, as well as other European, the American and Japanese participants. USIA for instance is planning to send

one or several delegations of American academics to plan a variety of P2P Research and Education projects.

The Steering Committee of this Research and Education "hub" will encourage involvement of Egyptian, Jordanian and other Arab actors in order to widen the circle. So far the project has been financed during the first 10 months simply out of indigenous Palestinian and Israeli resources. Following the development of a joint concept and strategy plan, the Belgian government is offering financial support, which will enable the Israeli and Palestinian partners to develop a sustainable structure and raise additional funds from local and international governmental and non-governmental sources, as well as from foreign private Foundations.

2. Professional Cooperation Activities:

a) The Establishment of Israeli-Palestinian "hub" for Cooperation Amongst Journalists.
Some important pioneering work has been carried out in this field by a variety of private individuals and activities lead by the government of Denmark. We propose that the EU establish a small work-group to develop a strategy for the promotion of this P2P hub. The preparation of a detailed working agenda, the involvement of professional leaders, and the laying of an orderly network relationship, should be envisaged as the first goal, to be followed by a more detailed working program thereafter. We may decide to ask the Danish, and/or Spanish, and/or The Society for International Development (SID) to take upon themselves sheperdship of the hub.

b) Cooperation Between Public and Community Service Providers.
A great deal of work has been carried out in this field by a variety of Israeli and Palestinian organizations including; the Palestine Council of Health (PCH), The Palestinian and Israeli Ministries of Health, Physicians for Human Rights, Social Workers for Peace, etc. The governments of Sweden and Denmark have given significant support to programs in this field. The government of Israel, through the auspices of MASHAV, has allocated important funding for technical support and HRD activities. Moreover, the World Bank provides funds for a variety of Human Resource Development (HRD) programs. These programs are, as a rule, provided bilateraly to the PA. Whereas these bilateral funds to the PA should be maintained, a more cost-effective provision of such HRD may be developed on a trilateral or multilateral basis. As in the case with Research and Education Cooperation, and media, it is important to establish a supportive structure that will create an ongoing impetus for further activities.

We suggest that the Swedes and/or Danes and/or Dutch be asked to lead this "hub".

3. Culture and the Arts

Representatives of Israeli and Palestinian cultural and arts groups have mobilized the support of the Austrian government for P2P activities that employ the various medium that art and cultural activities provide. Also here, a group of dedicated activists on both the Palestinian and Israeli sides have already invested much in the creation of important P2P activities, and the Israeli and Palestinian art community are prepared to dedicate their art, talents and their time on a non-cost basis to the common cause of peace. The creation of a

mobilizing structure for such cooperation appears to be particularly important as the multiplier effect may be achieved in this field at an extremely favorable Cost-Benefit ratio. We suggest that the Austrian government should be engaged by the EU to take a lead in this field.

4. Women

In the past, several Israeli and Palestinian organisations have been actively involved in the respective peace camps and a variety of social bonds have been created as a result of these joint activities. A variety of European and American groups are presently engaged in supporting and developing civil society activities, particularly amongst women's groups. We believe that these activities are of cardinal importance, and we seem them as complementing the promotion of Israeli-Palestinian P2P cooperation in this field.

At the Beijing Conference, held in 1995, where calls were made to promote women's employment strategies, as well as programs to counter violence against women and programs to improve child care. We suggest the creation of a joint Israeli-Palestinian, and probably regional, program to develop employment strategies. The World Bank has shown interest to provide seed money for such a program. We suggest that the EU initiate a dialogue with the USA and Norway, so as to develop effective sheperdship of women's P2P activities.

5. Youth

There are a large variety of P2P cooperation activities amongst youth. Particular mention should be made of the Norwegian, Swedish and Austrian governments, as well as the EU and several public and private organisations who have given effective support so far. To date these activities have been confined to relatively small numbers, and have not created a dramatic outreach affect.

6. City to City

So far, on the Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian-Egyptian side, very little has been done in practice to promote City to City programs. A first attempt has been started in cooperation with the mayor of the city of Tel Aviv, Mr. Ronnie Milo, and the mayor of Bethlehem, Mr. Elias Frej. The mayor of Tel Aviv has recently declared his intention to broaden this form of cooperation by convening a forum of Israeli and Palestinian mayors which will actively develop and implement the City to City program.

4. METHODOLOGY OF PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE

a) Setting Initial Goals

To promote the P2P concept a small Steering Committee will encourage the existing P2P "hubs" to develop their activities. The overriding aims of P2P activities are as follows:

* To permit the people of the Middle East to overcome prevailing enmity and hostility.
* To develop safety networks of friendship and cooperation to overcome crises situations.
* To take a leading role in the process of peace consolidation.
* To develop regional and inter-regional cooperation that will enable Middle East societies to develop security, prosperity and stability.
* To enable various sectors of the Middle Eastern Society to develop their own capacities as quickly and as cost-effectively as possible.

Evidently, the promotion of an extensive network o P2P activities will contribute to the formation of public opinion that shall be conducive for and supportive of peace. The steering committee should pay attention to the promotion of this aim. Each of the "hubs" will define in more detail the specific goals of cooperation that will guide their work.

b) Stocktaking:

Their will be a review of present situation of ongoing projects, available funding resources and the development of ideas for P2P activities. The efforts of the stocktaking exercise will provide the necessary information to facilitate coordination and free information flows between funders and implementers. The data collected in the stocktaking exercise will provide for the creation of a ***P2P "Home Page"*** on the Internet. This home page will provide information on funds available for P2P activities, describe projects, past and present, and allow for a free flow of information. Moreover, the P2P "Home Page" will provide access to other relevant web sites.

c) Needs Evaluation:

Each of the six "hubs", under the leadership of the shepherds, will be asked to prepare a needs evaluation for proposed short, medium as long term activities. Special attention will be given to areas identified as priorities and programs that will generate the sustainability of activities.

d) Project Evaluation:

The "hubs" will be asked to develop evaluation criteria and establish a small evaluation committee who will report their findings to the hubs as well as to the overall Steering Committee.

e) Fundraising:

The seed money for the work of the "hubs" will be provided by the respective shepherds, The EU and other governments, public and private foundations as well as Corporate

Donors (Corporate Citizenship)[1] , will be encouraged to work together with the various "hubs" in accordance with their own wishes. The Steering Committee should develop an effective dialogue with the respective Governments, the Foundation Community and the Corporate Community in order to ensure that adequate funding for P2P activities is made available. The Steering Committee may also organize a workshop to help define conflict prevention and conflict resolution methods which should not only be applied in the Middle East, but also in other parts of the world, and might assist the public and private donors to channel the funds towards self-sustaining conflict prevention and conflict resolution projects.

f) Crises and Impediment Management:

The Steering Committee will be responsible for leading a dialogue with Middle Eastern governments in order to encourage them to provide as much practical help as is feasible. Certain technical facilities will be developed to maintain the sustainability (also during crisis situations) of P2P efforts. Effective logistical support should be provided to implementing organisations in order to enable them to conduct their ongoing activities.

5. Principles of People-to-People and Modalities of Implementation

Each "hub" will have to develop specific principles. The one overriding principle to be respected by all groups is that of ***Equality and Reciprocity***, additional principles should include the following;

* "Hub" activities should permit the relative advantage of each side to be developed in such a manner as to develop a win-win situation and promote such a culture.
* The activities should be planned in order to guarantee the sustainability of the P2P effort.
* The "hub" members should identify possible risk factors and design strategies to overcome these risks.
* The right to free and equal access to funding for all organisations who support the peace process should be guaranteed.
* The "hub" shepherds and partners should strive to broaden the circle and include groups not previously involved, especially those groups who are skeptical of the peace process.
* P2P activities should enable a broad dialogue between all segments of Middle East society and in doing so widen the consensus for peace.
* P2P activities should be an effective instrument to create a wide popular coalition for peace in every country of the Middle East, and between the countries of the region.
* The activities and the process must be handled in such a way so as to constantly and effectively create an impact on public opinion.

---

[1] By Corporate Citizenship we refer to the growing number of multi-national corporations who re-invest their profit into the societies in which they operate. The peace process and the lifting of the Arab boycott has facilitated the entry of many major corporations in the region, and these corporations should be approached to support such activities, as a form of "peace tax".

A DRAFT PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERNAL DISCUSSION ON:

A STRATEGY TO PROMOTE PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE ACTIVITIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

ISRAEL - THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY - JORDAN - EGYPT

JANUARY 1997

ECF

A Strategy to Promote People-To-People Activities in the Middle East

Israel - the Palestinian Authority - Jordan - Egypt

1. **Introduction and Rationale** **P. 1**

2. People-to-People Target Groups **P. 2**

1. The Academic Community *P. 2*
2. Cooperation Between Professionals *P. 2*
3. Culture and Arts Cooperation *P. 2*
4. Women *P. 2*
5. Youth *P. 2*
6. City to City *P. 2*

4. The People to People Institutional Partners **P. 3**

1. The "hub" for Cooperation in Research and Education *P. 3*
2. Professional Cooperation Activities *P. 4*
The Establishment of a "hub" for Cooperation Amongst Journalists
Cooperation Between Public and Community Service Providers.
3. Culture and the Arts *P. 4*
4. Women *P. 5*
5. Youth *P. 5*
6. City to City *P. 5*

5. Methodology of People-to-People **P. 6**

a) Setting Initial Goals *P. 6*
b) Stocktaking *P. 6*
c) Needs Evaluation *P. 6*
d) Project Evaluation *P. 6*
e) Fundraising *P. 7*
f) Crises and Impediment Management *P. 7*

6. Principles of People-to-People and Modalities of Implementation P. 7

1. INTRODUCTION AND RATIONALE

While progress in the official Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process is slow and unsteady, it is of utmost importance to sustain, encourage and further develop the People-to-People (P2P) peace process. This unofficial track (NGOs level) of contacts, of dialogues, then of sporadic cooperation has begun well before the official Peace Process by small groups. It has somewhat grown parallel to the first phase of the Process, between "Madrid" and Oslo", especially on the academic level, with dialogues and conferences discussing solutions to aspects of the Israeli-Arab or Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Since Oslo, the unofficial track received a great boost with unfolding prospects to become a P2P and a Civil Society Peace Process. It was gradually encouraged by the official track, either through the multilaterals and the donors or even directly between Israeli ministries and the emerging PA. The Oslo II accords gave this trend an official and formal blessing by recognizing the importance of multi-level and diversified cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians.

In Annex VI, Article I: Objectives, of the accords, we find inter alia:

1) *"The two sides are determined to establish dialogue and cooperation on the bases of equality, fairness and reciprocal ....In striving to live in peaceful coexistence, the two sides will seek to design and implement various programs which will facilitate the efforts leading to full reconciliation...*

2) *To that end, the two sides agree to establish and maintain between them an extensive program of cooperation in fields of human activity including in economic. scientific, social and cultural fields. involving officials, institutions, and the private sector."*

Actual experience shows that P2P activities in various fields have gained, on the Israeli and Palestinian side, active supporters for peace. Those who have engaged in active dialogue or in practical professional programs tend to be staunch supporters of peace, even if their former positions were originally hostile.

A variety of P2P activities, particularly in spheres of cooperation between youth, inter-religious dialogue and certain joint research activities, are also being carried out on a multilateral level, particularly between Israeli, Palestinian, Egyptian, and Jordanian partners, and have even included Moroccan and Tunisian partners and others. We have learnt that P2P activities have become an effective instrument for crisis prevention and conflict resolution. In the period of negotiating of a permanent settlement, in the face of the existing volatility of official Israeli-Palestinians relationships, P2P activities are gaining particular importance, they act as an important safety network and buffer in crises situations. They assist to build trust relationships and create a public atmosphere conducive to negotiations. Moreover, P2P activities prepare the way for the period of peace consolidation that has to follow the sighing of the final status accords, and thereby contribute to new relationships of trust.

2. PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE TARGET GROUPS

Being understood that the primary and overriding aim of P2P activities is to create an effective mechanism of conflict resolution and stabilisation of social relationships between former adversaries, it is evident that P2P activities have to target the active involvement of the following groups:

1. *The Academic Community:*

This community asserts the intellectual leadership within each society and often sets the moral parameters that can convert long standing enmity towards a more cooperative approach to co-existence. Moreover, the academic community in the Middle East speak the same universal professional language and share common social and scientific research interests. This community has a vested interest in developing various structures of cooperation which can be extremely beneficial to each side. Moreover, the academic and scientific community have a very strong interest in developing professional relationships with their colleagues in Europe, the US and countries where research facilities and capabilities are well developed, thereby creating both the interest and need for a variety of trilateral and multilateral cooperation programs.

2. *Cooperation Between Professionals*

a) Of particular importance to P2P activities is the dialogue and cooperation between journalists who work in the media. The development of common professional attitudes and their impact on conflict resolution, crises prevention and stabilisation cannot be overestimated.

b) Teachers, social workers, community workers, and health care workers are largely responsible for providing social welfare and community services to their societies, and therefore act as multipliers of social and political messages. Also here, substantive cooperation creates a real win-win situation for each side and permits all regional actors to obtain the support of national and international institutions, and enjoy the benefits of collaborating with leading world experts in various fields.

3. *Culture and Arts*

The artists, actors, comedians, singers and performers of each society all have the potential to mobilize large sectors of the population to any popular cause. The possibility to engage the artistic community, particularly the Israeli and Palestinian communities, and the Egyptian and Jordanian communities, for the cause of peace promises to create extremely important public repercussion of such well planned and focused activities.

4. *Women*

Modern research indicates that of all the forms of investment in development activities, investment in women has shown the most rewarding returns. Of particular importance for the social, cultural and economic development of any society is to guarantee the increasing involvement of women in the labour force.

This not only adds additional income sources, but contributes to a more equal gender relationship and facilitates more modern outlooks on life. The latter, in turn contributes to the desire to deepen cooperation and solidarity, which are important pillars of stability and peace. For reasons of geographical proximity, and also due to a variety of cultural and social similarities, the cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian women's organisations offer great potential benefits to both societies.

5. Youth

The most fervent segment of any society is its youth. The young generation of the Israeli and Palestinian, and other Middle East societies tend to possess, as everywhere else, two special features. On the one hand, the younger Israeli and Palestinian generations do not share the prejudices of their parents. Youth, therefore tend to be far more open to cooperation than other segments of society. One the other hand, youth tend to harbor and support radical positions, and are often carried away by the primitive preaching of extremists. These two factors, the positive potential on the one hand, and the danger of radicalism on the other hand, make P2P between youth particularly important.

6. City to City

A special form of P2P cooperation can be organised on the level of City to City pairing, which permits both or more, sides to mobilise all sections of the society in cooperation programs. This is of great political importance as this approach allows for the involvement and mobilization of former and present opponents of the peace process in peace making activities. City to City programs enable municipalities to create a solution orientated professional dialogue, and to establish a structure for effective mutual assistance and support, thus providing for a wide range of social encounters. An additional advantage of the City to City P2P framework may bee seen by the fact that with relatively little outside help, many internal resources can be mobilized and made available.

3. THE PEOPLE TO PEOPLE INSTITUTIONAL PARTNERS

The effectiveness of P2P activities for the promotion and sustainability of peace in the Middle East demands strong structural support for P2P activities. As P2P encounters are by definition a non-governmental activity, governments should be asked to offer support, yet supporting and implementing institutions should be non-governmental actors. For the time being the following structure is emerging, more as a result of indigenous initiatives, and not so much as a result of theoretical planning.

1. The "hub" for Cooperation in Research and Education:

The Belgian government, in cooperation with the Palestine Consultancy Group (PCG) and Charles Bronfman Foundation (CRB), is establishing a "hub" in this field. This research hub will finance, in the coming year alone, a variety of trilateral Belgian-Israeli-Palestinian research projects. Money will also be dedicated to encourage the "mushrooming" of such initiatives; i.e. effecting further cooperation programs on Research and Education that will involve other Middle East countries, as well as other European, the American and Japanese participants. USIA for instance is planning to send

one or several delegations of American academics to plan a variety of P2P Research and Education projects.

The Steering Committee of this Research and Education "hub" will encourage involvement of Egyptian, Jordanian and other Arab actors in order to widen the circle. So far the project has been financed during the first 10 months simply out of indigenous Palestinian and Israeli resources. Following the development of a joint concept and strategy plan, the Belgian government is offering financial support, which will enable the Israeli and Palestinian partners to develop a sustainable structure and raise additional funds from local and international governmental and non-governmental sources, as well as from foreign private Foundations.

2. Professional Cooperation Activities:

a) The Establishment of Israeli-Palestinian "hub" for Cooperation Amongst Journalists.
Some important pioneering work has been carried out in this field by a variety of private individuals and activities lead by the government of Denmark. We propose that the EU establish a small work-group to develop a strategy for the promotion of this P2P hub. The preparation of a detailed working agenda, the involvement of professional leaders, and the laying of an orderly network relationship, should be envisaged as the first goal, to be followed by a more detailed working program thereafter. We may decide to ask the Danish, and/or Spanish, and/or The Society for International Development (SID) to take upon themselves sheperdship of the hub.

b) Cooperation Between Public and Community Service Providers.
A great deal of work has been carried out in this field by a variety of Israeli and Palestinian organizations including; the Palestine Council of Health (PCH), The Palestinian and Israeli Ministries of Health, Physicians for Human Rights, Social Workers for Peace, etc. The governments of Sweden and Denmark have given significant support to programs in this field. The government of Israel, through the auspices of MASHAV, has allocated important funding for technical support and HRD activities. Moreover, the World Bank provides funds for a variety of Human Resource Development (HRD) programs. These programs are, as a rule, provided bilateraly to the PA. Whereas these bilateral funds to the PA should be maintained, a more cost-effective provision of such HRD may be developed on a trilateral or multilateral basis. As in the case with Research and Education Cooperation, and media, it is important to establish a supportive structure that will create an ongoing impetus for further activities.

We suggest that the Swedes and/or Danes and/or Dutch be asked to lead this "hub".

3. Culture and the Arts

Representatives of Israeli and Palestinian cultural and arts groups have mobilized the support of the Austrian government for P2P activities that employ the various medium that art and cultural activities provide. Also here, a group of dedicated activists on both the Palestinian and Israeli sides have already invested much in the creation of important P2P activities, and the Israeli and Palestinian art community are prepared to dedicate their art, talents and their time on a non-cost basis to the common cause of peace. The creation of a

mobilizing structure for such cooperation appears to be particularly important as the multiplier effect may be achieved in this field at an extremely favorable Cost-Benefit ratio. We suggest that the Austrian government should be engaged by the EU to take a lead in this field.

4. Women

In the past, several Israeli and Palestinian organisations have been actively involved in the respective peace camps and a variety of social bonds have been created as a result of these joint activities. A variety of European and American groups are presently engaged in supporting and developing civil society activities, particularly amongst women's groups. We believe that these activities are of cardinal importance, and we seem them as complementing the promotion of Israeli-Palestinian P2P cooperation in this field.

At the Beijing Conference, held in 1995, where calls were made to promote women's employment strategies, as well as programs to counter violence against women and programs to improve child care. We suggest the creation of a joint Israeli-Palestinian, and probably regional, program to develop employment strategies. The World Bank has shown interest to provide seed money for such a program. We suggest that the EU initiate a dialogue with the USA and Norway, so as to develop effective sheperdship of women's P2P activities.

5. Youth

There are a large variety of P2P cooperation activities amongst youth. Particular mention should be made of the Norwegian, Swedish and Austrian governments, as well as the EU and several public and private organisations who have given effective support so far. To date these activities have been confined to relatively small numbers, and have not created a dramatic outreach affect.

6. City to City

So far, on the Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian-Egyptian side, very little has been done in practice to promote City to City programs. A first attempt has been started in cooperation with the mayor of the city of Tel Aviv, Mr. Ronnie Milo, and the mayor of Bethlehem, Mr. Elias Frej. The mayor of Tel Aviv has recently declared his intention to broaden this form of cooperation by convening a forum of Israeli and Palestinian mayors which will actively develop and implement the City to City program.

4. METHODOLOGY OF PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE

a) Setting Initial Goals

To promote the P2P concept a small Steering Committee will encourage the existing P2P "hubs" to develop their activities. The overriding aims of P2P activities are as follows:

* To permit the people of the Middle East to overcome prevailing enmity and hostility.
* To develop safety networks of friendship and cooperation to overcome crises situations.
* To take a leading role in the process of peace consolidation.
* To develop regional and inter-regional cooperation that will enable Middle East societies to develop security, prosperity and stability.
* To enable various sectors of the Middle Eastern Society to develop their own capacities as quickly and as cost-effectively as possible.

Evidently, the promotion of an extensive network o P2P activities will contribute to the formation of public opinion that shall be conducive for and supportive of peace. The steering committee should pay attention to the promotion of this aim. Each of the "hubs" will define in more detail the specific goals of cooperation that will guide their work.

b) Stocktaking:

Their will be a review of present situation of ongoing projects, available funding resources and the development of ideas for P2P activities. The efforts of the stocktaking exercise will provide the necessary information to facilitate coordination and free information flows between funders and implementers. The data collected in the stocktaking exercise will provide for the creation of a ***P2P "Home Page"*** on the Internet. This home page will provide information on funds available for P2P activities, describe projects, past and present, and allow for a free flow of information. Moreover, the P2P "Home Page" will provide access to other relevant web sites.

c) Needs Evaluation:

Each of the six "hubs", under the leadership of the shepherds, will be asked to prepare a needs evaluation for proposed short, medium as long term activities. Special attention will be given to areas identified as priorities and programs that will generate the sustainability of activities.

d) Project Evaluation:

The "hubs" will be asked to develop evaluation criteria and establish a small evaluation committee who will report their findings to the hubs as well as to the overall Steering Committee.

e) Fundraising:

The seed money for the work of the "hubs" will be provided by the respective shepherds, The EU and other governments, public and private foundations as well as Corporate

Donors (Corporate Citizenship)[1] , will be encouraged to work together with the various "hubs" in accordance with their own wishes. The Steering Committee should develop an effective dialogue with the respective Governments, the Foundation Community and the Corporate Community in order to ensure that adequate funding for P2P activities is made available. The Steering Committee may also organize a workshop to help define conflict prevention and conflict resolution methods which should not only be applied in the Middle East, but also in other parts of the world, and might assist the public and private donors to channel the funds towards self-sustaining conflict prevention and conflict resolution projects.

f) Crises and Impediment Management:

The Steering Committee will be responsible for leading a dialogue with Middle Eastern governments in order to encourage them to provide as much practical help as is feasible. Certain technical facilities will be developed to maintain the sustainability (also during crisis situations) of P2P efforts. Effective logistical support should be provided to implementing organisations in order to enable them to conduct their ongoing activities.

5. PRINCIPLES OF PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE AND MODALITIES OF IMPLEMENTATION

Each "hub" will have to develop specific principles. The one overriding principle to be respected by all groups is that of ***Equality and Reciprocity***, additional principles should include the following;

* "Hub" activities should permit the relative advantage of each side to be developed in such a manner as to develop a win-win situation and promote such a culture.
* The activities should be planned in order to guarantee the sustainability of the P2P effort.
* The "hub" members should identify possible risk factors and design strategies to overcome these risks.
* The right to free and equal access to funding for all organisations who support the peace process should be guaranteed.
* The "hub" shepherds and partners should strive to broaden the circle and include groups not previously involved, especially those groups who are skeptical of the peace process.
* P2P activities should enable a broad dialogue between all segments of Middle East society and in doing so widen the consensus for peace.
* P2P activities should be an effective instrument to create a wide popular coalition for peace in every country of the Middle East, and between the countries of the region.
* The activities and the process must be handled in such a way so as to constantly and effectively create an impact on public opinion.

[1] By Corporate Citizenship we refer to the growing number of multi-national corporations who re-invest their profit into the societies in which they operate. The peace process and the lifting of the Arab boycott has facilitated the entry of many major corporations in the region, and these corporations should be approached to support such activities, as a form of "peace tax".

3. Problem Analysis: Small-and Micro Enterprises and Women Ventures in Palestine

3.1 PALESTINE—A BRIEF PROFILE

Palestine (then, also known as the Occupied Territories, or OT) consists of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Together with what are now Israel and Jordan, the OT were among the areas ruled by the Ottoman Empire prior to 1917. Towards the end of World War 1, Britain gained control of Palestine, and in 1922, the areas were entrusted to Britain by a mandate from the League of Nations.

Escalating strife and unsuccessful British attempts to mediate between the Jewish and the Palestinian nationalism caused Britain to return its mandate to the UN in 1947. The UN suggested Palestinian and Jewish independence on a partition basis. The Palestinians and Arabs rejected the suggestion, and the state of Israel was proclaimed in 1948. In the aftermath of the ensuing military conflict, the Gaza Strip came under Egyptian control and the West Bank, under Jordanian control. During the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the West Bank and Gaza were occupied by Israel. Since then, Israel has administered the areas as the occupying power, except that Eastern Jerusalem has been formally annexed by Israel and is considered as part of Israel by the Israeli Authorities. Israel's annexation of Eastern Jerusalem has not been recognized by the UN.

The West Bank and Gaza have a combined area of about 6,000 square kilometres; a 1991 population of about 1.7 million; a GNP of about US$ 2.9 Billion; and a GNP per capita of US$ 1,715.00. The population of East Jerusalem is about 300,000, including about 150,000 Jews, mostly settled there since 1967. In addition, there are about 135,000 Israeli settlers residing in some 150 settlements that have been built in the OT over the past 25 years.

GTZ-Form-81-122

It is estimated that currently, about 3.5 million Palestinians live outside of the OT. Some have maintained residency rights in the OT and are, in principle, free to return, while the return of others will be subject to negotiation between Israel and the Palestinians. How many Palestinians might actually return would also depend upon their perceptions of future economic opportunities in the OT.

The economy of the OT is mainly service-oriented with agriculture accounting for about 30 percent of GDP in 1991, industry about 8 percent, construction about 12 percent and services the remaining 50 percent. Private sector activity dominates the OT economy, accounting for about 85 percent of GDP. A striking feature of the OT economy is its heavy dependence on the Israeli economy. Until the recent border closure with Israel, about one third of the OT labour force worked in Israel (mostly on a daily commute basis), and earnings from these workers accounted for more than one quarter of the GNP of the OT. Over 90 percent of the OT trade is also with Israel. Remittances from Palestinians working in the Gulf countries have been another important component of the OT disposable income.

3.2 Training Needs of Women Entrepreneurs in Palestine

In examining the training needs for women entrepreneurs, the present document broadly considers the total population and the intakes into the Palestinian formal and informal educational systems. Formal education ranged from the 20 community colleges to the eight universities in Palestine, while informal training is provided by numerous women centres, NGOs, vocational schools etc. In spite of the numbers, the WB reports that formal education in Palestine has not successfully provided marketable skills[1]. As with their involvement in industry, women seemed to be invisible in education and training too.

[1] The World Bank, Emergency Assistance Programme (EAP), Washington DC, page 64.

Palestine's population is illusive. Estimates fluctuate widely depending on the source. An independent and WB-supported research claimed around 2.0 Million resident population - about one million each for West Bank and Gaza. Women represent 51 percent of population. About 64 percent of the West Bank population is rural. In Gaza, 45 percent is in the refugee camps, 12 percent is in the rural areas, and the rest is in the city. Almost half the population is under 15 years old, with the exception of Gaza Strip, where the percentage is higher[2].

Relatively low fees charged by the local universities prompted achievements in higher education - particularly among women. In Palestine, women are expected to continue higher education in local institutions rather than to study abroad. A 1993 Council for Higher Education statistics reported that with 20,500 student population in eight universities, 38.9 percent are women. Due to their accessibility, Palestinian women still favour the 20 or so community colleges. With 7,300 total student population, females represent 54 percent.

Women seemed less enthusiastic in technical or industrial training too. Of the 694 students in three community colleges, only 3.3 percent took various techno-industrial courses. A recent Women's Studies Centre report claimed that women receive minimum on-the-job training in the textile and garments industries. In the sample survey, 32.7 percent of the women were unskilled workers who use only one machine; 13 percent were in packing and folding[3]. In those firms hiring both male and female staff, women did not receive equal pay for equal work. In the garments industry, pay was usually related to the length of employment, favouring those who stay unmarried over a longer time period.

Since it began, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for the Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA) has been the main provider of both

---

[2] World Bank, Developing the Occupied Territories: An Investment in Peace, Vol. VI, Human Resources and Social Policy, Washington DC, September, 1993, pages 7-10.

[3] S. Hindiyeh and A. Ghazawneh, Socio-economic Conditions of Female Wage Labour in Palestinian Factories, Preliminary Survey, Unpublished manuscript. Ramallah, Women's Studies Centre, June 1990.

GTZ-Form-81-12-2

their business proposals. Interestingly, this need is more pronounced with male than with female participants[5].

Entrepreneurship and Education: Overall, the participants from the SYB-Bethlehem tended to be more entrepreneurially-inclined vis-à-vis those from SYB-Gaza and SYB-Nablus. Those from Gaza had the highest desire for employment-oriented options (e.g., they still want to find a stable job in either Israel or the Gulf states) in lieu of entrepreneurial careers. But many of those from the SYB-Gaza have been unemployed for more than two years. This is despite the fact that those who participated in the SYB-Bethlehem and SYB-Nablus tend to have higher educational attainment compared with those from the SYB-Gaza.

Business mathematics: sessions in the three courses were not very encouraging. Men performed better than women. While there is a considerable awareness in the concepts of interest rates and "profit and loss", the participants were generally weak in the fundamentals of decimals, percentages, and fractions. Considering that the areas covered use three currencies (US Dollars, Jordanian Dinars, and New Israeli Shekels) with varying degrees of rules, characteristics, policies, fluctuations, etc., puts more pressure on the local entrepreneurs to be more adept with business mathematics.

Motivation: Judging from their attendance and active participation, the dedication of the SYB-Gaza participants came on top. For example, the schedule of the SYB-Gaza had been disrupted by the return of Mr. Yasser Arafat, President of the Palestinian Self-Rule Authority to Gaza after 27 years in exile. But, in spite of the fact that the course venue was under heavy security (located next to Mr. Arafat's hotel), the participants diligently attended the sessions-on time. Likewise, one participant from SYB-Gaza got married while in the course but absented himself for only one day. In SYB-Bethlehem, the Hebronite participants attended the sessions despite a two-day strike.

---

[5] The recent evaluation of CEFE's global performance also claim that men are generally more interested in loans than women as a reason for joining the courses.

Capacity to Trust and Family Businesses: largely as a result of occupation, Palestinians tend to have difficulties trusting one another. Building trust is a painful process. This prevails more among the Gazans and is less articulate in Bethlehem and Nablus. In Gaza, preference is given to family members as business partners rather than those outside the family. Consequently, three partnership projects emerged from the SYB-Gaza and only one in SYB-Bethlehem. Family and Small Business seem inseparable in Gaza and Nablus and less so in Bethlehem.

Women's Social Position: Women in Palestine enjoy less rights than men, regardless of the religion they adhere to. Based on the patriarchal concept of women as dependents, they have substantially lower entitlements when it comes to inherital matters. Women's access to economic resources is limited. The dowry system constitutes almost the sole backbone of women's minimum security, often purchased in assets. Likewise, the ability of women to divorce their husbands is very restricted. On the other hand, although considered as unusual, muslim men may exercise their right to polygamy.

Thrives in Times of Crisis: constantly aware that hard times can strike any day, many Palestinian women purchase productive properties, such as sewing machines - by desposing their personal property (e.g. from the dowry) or obtaining loans from relatives - to enhance their families' income. In times of crisis, Palestinian women draw on their best household skills (e.g. sewing, embroidery, food-related activities) in order to earn additional income and simultaneously manage their households.

Burdened with household chores: Time- and energy saving tools and household equipment is still a rarity in Palestinian households. Laundry is done by hand, launderettes do not exist. Time spent on house-cleaning food preparation, childcare and laundry can consume most of a woman´s time. Men do mostly the buying of food, due to their mobility.

Move towards Self-employment and Entrepreneurship: despite the above elements that put constant constraints on Palestinian women, there is a noticeable shift towards entrepreneurial activities. A reported increase in the number of women studying business administration at Bethlehem

GTZ-Form-81-12-2

University speaks for itself[6].In addition, the Institute for Applied Social Sciences (FAFO) reports favourable attitudes towards women in business[7]. When exposed to entrepreneurship intervention, Palestinian women generally respond positively, although still in a shy and non assertive way. They appreciate encouragement through direct learning experiences as they were offered in the SYB courses.

3.3 The Business Milieu

Closer examination of the sector reveals *less than hospitable,* but nonetheless *still a hopeful* business milieu. The WB's Emergency Assistance Programme (EAP)—the strategic basis for donor's assistance to Palestine—concluded that the economy is under severe strain. Many observers believe that there are three most likely causes for this crisis. First, some essential ingredients for successful industrialization—raw materials (except, for sand, salt and stone quarries), indigenous investment capital, access to markets, conducive and supportive regulations, and a technically trained and skilled work force—are either nonexistent or unavailable in sufficient quantities. Second, the EAP fingered some structural imbalances in the past development initiatives. Third, the benefits envisioned in the "Palestinian-Israeli Peace Accord" are still yet to unfold.

The prevailing business milieu is still volatile and full of uncertainties. At one time, it can be very peaceful. Then suddenly, a bomb explodes. Deaths, chaos, and silence follow. Then the borders close for undefined periods. Frequent power outages and skyrocketing factory space rentals (and very time-consuming to acquire them!) make business creation an almost acrobatic adventure. There is an acute shortage in telephone and fax lines. Technology and management support infrastructure is very

---

[6] See **UNCTAD**, Palestinian Women and Economic and Social Development in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, study prepared by Ms. Hind Kattan Salman (UNCTAD/DDS/SEU/2), Palestine, October 19, 1993, page 40.

[7] **UNDP**, At the Crossroads: Challenges and Choices for Palestinian Women in the West Bank and Gaza, New York, January 1994, page 13.

weak. Strong dependency with Israel economy and a depressed local market make operations difficult. Finally, existing firms need qualified male and female professional workers.

Local institutions providing technology and management support and training services are either fragile or still being established. Financial institutions for mobilizing and directing the flows of funds for micro- and small enterprise promotion are in their embryonic states. Other support services such as market surveys, consulting, technical information, policy research and entrepreneurship development are only now being initiated. The regulatory and tax systems are, to say the least, *user-unfriendly*. Local professionals—more so, women professionals—with practical experiences in managing such institutions and programmes are scarce.

Palestine's economy is inextricably intertwined with Israel's. Palestinian entrepreneurs rely heavily (about 80 percent of industrial exports) on Israeli markets. The few who succeed in penetrating Israeli markets can be rejected by the slowly emerging Palestinian markets—an unnecessary *catch-22* situation. Production capacity hovers dismally within 30 to 50 percent of rated capacity. Exports to the Arab markets via Jordan and Egypt are curtailed by complicated procedures certifying that exportable products do not have components of Israeli origin. Then, about 40 to 60 percent of the raw materials come from Israel. Finally, many enterprises depend on the Israelis for subcontracting, employment contracting, marketing tie-ups, know-how and quality standards certification.

Unemployment is very high. While 40 percent is the most often quoted figure, many believe that unemployment is now as high as 60 percent in the Gaza Strip alone. This will become even worse, if the thousands of Palestinian prisoners in Israel are released. Underemployment figures are equally depressing. In Gaza, many in the refugee camps are either disabled, illiterate, or totally frustrated with their lives. Here, the unemployed women urgently need to get into the job markets, soon. In such markets—considering the already very low employment rates—women can hardly compete with their male counterparts.

GTZ-Form-81-12-2

Recent events can also worsen unemployment. The WB's Holst Fund, which pays the salaries (including 9,000 Palestinian policemen) and operating costs of the Palestinian Authority (PA) is broke. Many donor countries failed to make good on their pledges. The Fund is US$ 16.4 Million short on its February, 1995 budget. To make matters worse, Economics Minister, Ahmed Qreia and Planning Minister, Nabil Sha'ath[8] claimed that the tax collection system is not well functioning yet. Meanwhile, Israel is recruiting more workers from Romania, Thailand and even from some South East Asian countries.

Then, business rules keep changing. With the self-rule, the PA started issuing new rules to better govern business activities. Many West Bank entrepreneurs are adamant to changes. The *short-term* nature of their investments (e.g., mostly in building construction) coupled by their constant mobility suggest that many West Bank entrepreneurs will settle elsewhere as more changes (e.g., increases payments for land, security, waste disposal, taxes, etc.) are introduced. The reverse is true for those in Gaza. Even with the PA, Israeli and Jordanian legal systems, they are able to operate well—frequently, without even knowing the rules.

Despite the litany of difficulties, the Palestinians as well as the donor community are confident about the resiliency of the economy. Indigenous entrepreneurship is alive and well in many micro- and small enterprises. If peace and stability promised by the Israel-PLO September 13, 1993 accord will endure, the economy appears capable of sustained long term growth. Entrepreneurs are equally optimistic. They reckon that the recent border closure is a blessing in disguise. ***We will learn self-reliance and re-focus our efforts in developing a sustainable local markets***, they claim. The entrepreneurs behind these surviving enterprises, against the here-with described business milieu are the true economic heroes.

[8] The Jerusalem Post, March 1, 1995, Volume LXIII, Number 18906.

3.3.1 Industry and Economy

Despite policy agreements in favour of industrial development in Palestine (i.e. the Oslo Agreement and the Cairo Agreement), the Palestinian industry's contribution to GDP has remained low (e.g., somewhere araound 12 percent of West Bank's and 6 percent of Gaza's) - about a quarter of industry's share in comparable countries. The sector - consisting of at least 4,300 enterprises[9] - yields rudimentary products such as clothing, textiles, leather, wood and wood products, tourism, construction, pharmaceuticals, quarries, plastics and paper products. By type of products, enterprises are distributed as follows:

Table 1: Enterprises by Products

Subsectors	West Bank[10]	Gaza[11]	Total
Textiles & clothing	483	591	1074
Wood and products	485	312	797
Metals and products	826	414	1240
Others	668	592	1260
	2,462	1,909	4,371

Since almost all are privately owned, most enterprises are extremely small — with perhaps, only 50 firms employing more than 50 workers. About 60 percent employs no fewer than four persons and a mere 7.5 percent had ten or more workers. Besides construction - where ten percent of the available workforce is engaged - the sector's 20,000 workers in the West Bank

[9] The word ***enterprise*** refers to profit oriented micro- and small enterprises doing basic manufacturing, industrial services (including micro-vending and retailing), small construction activities, transport, basic mineral exploitation and tourism.

[10] Israeli statistical source, 1987.

[11] Union of Industrialists Field Survey - Gaza, 1993.

and 9,000 in the Gaza Strip is only 15 to 17 percent of the aggregate work force[12]. Although current figures may have already sharply declined, reliable sources accept that aggregate assets and sales grow by less than one percent annually.

3.3.1.1 Industrial Statistics

The Promotion of a National Information System based in the Jordan Ministry of Planning, a regional type of GTZ Project based in Amman, Jordan is currently assisting the PA in establishing the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS). The technical assistance project is concerned about the development of the economic and industrial statistics. Specifically, it is providing support in the preparation of the most recent census of business establishments in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The census is almost completed and bulk of the work is now in the data-entry and computer assisted tabulations. Both the project and PCBS expect the final report by end of April, 1995. Meanwhile, the development of the social and population statistics including capacity building support to the PCBS is being provided by the Norwegians via the famous Institute for Applied Social Sciences (FAFO).

3.3.2 The Financial Institutions

The financial institutions in Palestine include banks, UN-assisted schemes, credit-providing NGOs, the European Union (EU)-assisted financial institutions like Economic Development Group (EDG), Agricultural Development Corporation (ADCC) and Technology Development Centre (TDC)[13]. As it was in the past, much of the funds for start-ups or expansion of the few established family businesses come from internal savings and overseas remittances. The less formal and small loans market is dominated by UNRWA's income generating and small enterprise programmes.

---

[12] The World Bank, Developing the OT: An Investment in Peace, volume III, Private Sector Development, Washington, DC, page 30.

[13] There is a plan to merge all these EU-assisted banks into the proposed Palestinian Enterprise Bank. In WB, the assigned officer is Dr. Orlando Sacay.

GTZ-Form-81-12-2

In June 1991, UNRWA began a new credit scheme (via a US$ 315,800 BMZ grant) in Gaza to support job-creation through small enterprise activities. By January 1995, seven other donors[14] increased the capital to US$ 5.4 Million. Germany topped the donors list via four separate donations valued at US$ 1.3 Million (or 32 percent of the total). Since then, UNRWA has established the largest and most successful non-profit credit programme in Gaza and the West Bank maintaining a recovery rate of 98 percent, an annual repayment rate of 96 percent and a very respectable sustainability vis-à-vis other credit schemes[15].

Women employees account for only seven percent of the employees of the enterprises that have received loan from UNRWA. These women are almost wholly engaged in home-work either on their own or working with another woman home-worker. One woman owned enterprise accounts for 33 percent of all women employees. Buouyed by its success, UNRWA - Gaza developed the Solidarity Group Lending (SGL) programme, a revolving fund for enterprising women. Today, it has provided short term working capital loans to 36 solidarity groups composed of over 200 women micro-vending and micro-enterprise owners. Even at a short gestation, it has achieved a repayment and recovery rate of 97 percent.

3.3.3 Women in Industry

As with the other economic sectors, women in Palestinian industries are almost invisible. Little is known about women's roles and contributions. The very few ones are in small labour-intensive enterprises doing subcontracting for Israeli manufacturers of garments, shoes, wood and leather products, and the repair of durable goods[16]. In Gaza, women may be seen

---

[14] The others are: Norway (US$ 0.89 million, or 22%), Italy (US$ 0.48 million or 12%), Australia (US$ 0.42 million or 10%), Japan (US$ 0.36 million or 9%) and both Canada and US (US$ 0.45 million or 11% of total).

[15] Fore more in-depth information, reference is made to a recent evaluation by the German BMZ of UNRWA's Income Generating Programme in Gaza/West Bank - German Contribution - (Preliminary Findings and Recommendations: Jerusalem, 24.03.1995).

[16] Policy Research Incorporated, Development Opportunities in the OT (West Bank and Gaza Strip): Industry and Trade, Clarksville, Maryland, October 1992, page 60.

GTZ-Form-81-12-2

in garments and textile industries. Other industries employing women are: embroidery, sewing of garments, knitting, machine weaving, and carpets weaving. Most women are in the informal sector—another invisible economic sphere. Only one in five will hint on women becoming potential entrepreneurs.

The great challenge for the Palestinians will be to stimulate the economy to establish self-sustaining internal market for employment. In the immediate future, the alarming level of un- and under-employment, compounded by the extremely low female labour participation rate and other poverty-related issues are likely to dominate the economic development thrusts of the PA. Current policies exacerbated by the increasing drop-out rates for girls are likely to make it more difficult for women to compete in the labour market on equal footing with men in the next decade. All predictions indicate that neither the well planned donor investment programmes nor the full staffing of the PA civil service will create sufficient jobs to bring unemployment—more so with women—to an acceptable level. It is therefore essential that both the private and the public sectors should continue to provide employment opportunities that can mainstream women not only as potential employees; but as employers too.

3.4 SME Training Interventions for Women in Palestine

While a number of institutions servicing women exist in Palestine, most of them focus on health, population, governance, and education. Many of the few institutions dealing with micro-, small and medium enterprises' promotion are not gender conscious. Thus, only a handful players are claiming to promote women entrepreneurs. These few fall into three categories: women organizations (including NGOs), GOs and donor-initiated "projects".

3.4.1 Women Organizations (including NGOs)

Recently, various women's associations and NGOs promoting small enterprises and income generating activities started granting loans to women. There are a total of 179 organisations assisting women, in one way or another, in Palestine. Table 1 shows their geographic distribution by types[17].

Table 1: Distribution of Women's Organizations in Palestine

Areas	Voluntary Societies	Centres & Committees	Production Projects	Coope-ratives	Total
Jenin	8	3	4	1	16
Tulkarem & Quialqia	7	6	0	0	13
Nablus	13	8	2	0	23
Ramallah	14	7	2	7	30
Jerusalem & Jericho	18	9	3	0	30
Bethlehem	7	7	0	7	21
Hebron	6	4	0	2	12
Gaza Strip	9	23	1	1	34
Total	82	67	12	18	179

Most organizations provide very basic assistance to women. About 154 in the West Bank and 49 in Gaza provide day care and kindergarten services. Fourteen in the West Bank provide special schools for women and ten provide special counselling services (against only two in Gaza Strip). There are nine organizations having assistance to the orphaned and nine others for the elderly women in the West Bank. Finally, 39 organizations in the West Bank and three in Gaza provide health and rehabilitation services.

17 Bisan Centre for Research and Development, Women Studies Committee, Directory of Palestinian Women's Organizations, sponsored by the UNDP, Ramallah, May 1993.

GTZ-Form-81-12-2

In the recent years, women were able to receive small loans from the General Union of Palestinian Women and other women's NGOs which promote the creation of small business enterprises for women as well as income-generating activities. Save the Children and Shu'un al Mar'a (Gaza Strip) sponsored an evaluation of income generating projects in the Gaza Strip[18]. Their findings showed that these projects have had significant impact on the social and economic development of women by enhancing their self-esteem and allowing them to gain experience.

However, 80 percent of the projects implemented by women NGOs either failed or were forced to close down for a variety of reasons, including problems beyond the control of those participating in them. Other reasons for lack of success included a top-down management approach, lack of financial and management experience, and insufficient attention to the feasibility studies. Most of the projects evaluated did not contribute to sustainable income nor did the income cover the basic needs of the workers. All recommended that to enhance women's economic well-being, employment opportunities must be created and women must be empowered with entrepreneurship skills.

The NGOs assisting women (four are profiled in this project proposal as potential partner institutions) are generally weak but with a lot of potentials. As the PA attempts to channel development funds to *short term* job creation measures (e.g., street cleaning, painting of walls, police, etc.), US funding routed via Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs) and other NGOs have been drastically slashed. The Cooperatives Development Project (CDP) of the United States has closed its doors in Palestine last February 10, 1995 releasing 70 professionals back into the job market. Four (including Catholic Relief Services, American Near East Refugee Aid, Cooperation in Development and Save the Children) more major NGOs are fighting for survival. Given a push, appropriate entrepreneurship training and institution-building measures can potentially be taken up by the four partner institutions selected for this present project.

---

[18] Save the Children Fund and Shu'un al Mar'a, Evaluation of Women's Income Generating Projects in the Gaza Strip, Gaza, July 1992, pp 22-23.

Government Initiatives

The PA has yet to officialize its main policy conduits for women. In lieu of a Ministry for women affairs, it now seems that a high level Women's Affairs Committee (WAC) will be installed before the end of 1995. At best, GO initiatives on women in development issues can be described as diffused. Due to its popularity, many of the newly formed executing Ministries carry various objectives that directly or indirectly address women issues. For example, the Social Welfare Ministry that has its own women development department using community-based interventions. Similar activities exist in the Ministry of Youth.

Recently, the PA has gradually started focusing on the institutional coordination issues. There is now a move to put all the coordination effort within the Women's Affairs Committee (WAC). WAC's by-laws is currently being processed. The by-laws have already been signed by the Ministry of Jurisdiction and Justice. In the last meeting of the PLO, no one raised any objection to the WAC's by-laws. It is expected to be signed into law within the next six months (i.e. by October 1995).

3.4.3 Donor-initiated Projects

Sustained interests for the promotion of women entrepreneurs in Palestine among the bilateral and multilateral donors is not apparent. WB, UNDP and US AID do not foresee specialized women entrepreneurship programmes in the next two years. UNDP's primary concern is to put women in positions of governance. US AID has a virtual monopoly in small enterprise promotion, that in its view is benefiting both men and women. Even then, US AID's efforts is only nearly three-months in the ground. German aid (except for BMZ's credit assistance scheme for the UN Relief and Works Agency for the Palestinian People, UNRWA and five very small GTZ projects) is minor.

There is very little done specifically for the systematic and sustained promotion of women entrepreneurs in Palestine. This is mainly due to lack of technical and methodological approaches on what work and what

doesn't. Practically, all the institutions screened in preparation of the present document did not have a specific approach to the promotion and care of women entrepreneurs in Palestine.

US-AID has the Small Business Support Project (Private Sector Support): West Bank and Gaza Strip (or SBSP) (since January 1995), and a forthcoming MicroEnterprise Development Project that will have a start-up focus and will carry a significant amount of credit assistance. The forthcoming project will be assessed by the Gemini Group with the intention of providing a credit programme for the micro enterprises throughout Palestine.

SBSP is implemented by the Development Alternatives, International (USA) in collaboration with eleven partner institutions[19]. Its target are existing enterprises that are to be provided with high-quality and affordable services to promote growth and diversification. Businesses must be involved in manufacturing and tourism. While it is not focusing on women, SBSP provides three basic services wherein some kind of fee-charging schemes will be applied: Business Advisory Services, training, information, and business associations advocacy.

The UN-ESCWA and the UNDP-Programme of Assistance to the Palestinian People (PAPP) and Business Development Centre (BDC) teamed up

---

19

- o Al-Azhar University of Gaza
- o Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture of Hebron, Ramallah, and Nablus
- o Bethlehem University-Business Development Centre
- o Birzeit University-Continuing Education Department
- o Development Resource Centre
- o El-Rowad Skills Development Centre
- o Federation of Palestinian Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture
- o Palestinian Trade Promotion Organization
- o Palestine Chamber of Commerce in Gaza Strip
- o University Graduates Union in Hebron
- o The Islamic University of Gaza-Business Research Unit

to mobilise funding support for business incubators in West Bank and Gaza. Run like a business, business incubator is a micro-facility with a small management staff that provides the physical work space, shared facilities, and access to technical and business support services in one integrated and affordable package. External support will be needed for 3 or 4 years until sustainability has been properly demonstrated. Besides the obvious funding issue (PA through PECDAR will have to consider allocating donor funds, e.g., under $900,000), the project is currently being readjusted in line with UNDP and PA's vision to consider industrial zones in Gaza.

Other initiatives include a German (regional Institute for International Vocational Training, Nordrhein Westphalia) vocational and technical education project in Nablus; and the promotion of a National Information System for West Bank and Gaza which is part of a regional GTZ project based in the Jordanian Ministry of Planning.

3.4.4 Private Sector Initiatives

Most private sector initiatives are on the various chambers of industries, associations and federations.

The Development Resource Centre (DRC) is a non-profit organization (based in New York and Gaza)dedicated to the industrial development of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Specifically, the DRC seeks to develop reliable channels for the transfer of technology between the industrial and agro-industrial sectors of the OT, and sources of production machinery and technical innovation worldwide. Its goals are to: (a) promote the establishment of technically developed and viable production activities, (b) upgrade the technical level of existing production, and (c) enhance the overall level of technical skills of the local labour force.

DRC runs five programmes: (a) research; (b) database; (c) project development; (d) technical training; and (e) technical references. Funding comes from private donations; government agencies (European Union, Canada Fund etc.), UN agencies (the UNDP, UNITAR, and UNIDO; and private institutions. DRC works with organizations in the private sector

GTZ-Form-81-12-2

on a fee-for-service basis in implementing projects in line with DRC's mission. DRC is relying on nominal service fees directly from its clients to offset programme activities. These fees are considerably less than charges in the private sector amounting to 1/3 of what is charged by the Israeli and local middlemen.

INDEX is an information service provider that represents reputable international information resources from Jordan and Palestine. It also represents the European Community, UN, UNESCO, GATT, OECD, IMF, FAO, Council of Europe, Europe Public Tenders, Encyclopedia Britannica, Video Arts, Longman Training, AMIS, EuroPages and the WB in the area. All information resources are provided in hard copies, microfilm, fiche and CD-ROM formats.

FRIEDRICH EBERT STIFTUNG

Tel Aviv Office

Economic Cooperation Foundation
MS. Sharon Roling
22, Dafna Street
Tel Aviv 64929

Tel Aviv, 19.3.1997

Dear Sharon,

Thank you very much for your fax dated March 12, listing Palestinian micro-finance activities. In return, I am sending you a part of a report drafted by a German Agency on the same issue. I also have already sent a copy of it to Sharon Shenhav a while ago.

With kind regards,

T. Karakurt

Türkan Karakurt

Eliyahu House 2 Ibn Gvirol St. P.O.B. 20518 Tel-Aviv 64077
Tel: (972) 3 696 42 02
Fax: (972) 3 696 42 05
E-mail 100067.1621@compuserve.com

"Nature Knows No Boundaries"

Dutch 1733

A Request for Dutch Support to:

Create a Joint Palestinian-Israeli Environmental Secretariat

to Promote:

Cooperation on Environmental Issues and "People to People" Activities

Submitted to: THE GOVERNMENT OF HOLLAND

Submitted by: THE PALESTINE COUNCIL OF HEALTH - PCH
THE ECONOMIC COOPERATION FOUNDATION - ECF
SOCIETY FOR THE PROTECTION OF NATURE IN ISRAEL - SPNI

Date: 2 OCTOBER, 1996

CONTENTS:

LONG TERM ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION	P. 3
INTRODUCTION TO THE "PEOPLE TO PEOPLE" PROCESS	P. 3
THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI ENVIRONMENTAL SECRETARIAT "*NATURE KNOWS NO BOUNDARIES*"	P. 3
AIMS OF THE JOINT SECRETARIAT	P. 4
PROPOSED SECRETARIAT STRUCTURE	P. 4
ONGOING SECRETARIAT - MEMBER NGO INTERACTION	P. 6
SUSTAINABILITY	P. 6
SOCIETY FOR THE PROTECTION OF NATURE IN PALESTINE	P. 7
FOUNDING MEMBERS - ORGANISATION PROFILES	P. 7
SUPPORT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION	P. 8
NOTES REGARDING THE BUDGET	P. 8
NOTES REGARDING THE APPENDICES	P. 9
BUDGET PROPOSAL FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION - YEAR 1	P. 10
BUDGET PROPOSAL FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION - YEARS 2 & 3	P. 11
TOTAL BUDGET	P. 13
APPENDIX # 1	P. 13
LETTERS OF ENDORSEMENT	
APPENDIX # 2	P. 16
PROJECT PROPOSALS	
APPENDIX # 3	P. ???
LIST OF PARTICIPATING NGOS	

"Nature Knows No Boundaries"

LONG TERM ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION:

There is growing acceptance worldwide that detrimental environmental actions transcend beyond political boundaries. This is especially the case with Palestinians and Israelis, who share a small geographic area which is a single ecological system. This ecological unit includes shared surface and subsurface water basins, shared seas, common flora and fauna, common air, shared environmental resources and shared challenges.

Physical proximity and the sensitivity of the shared resource makes cooperation a basic condition for sustainable development.

Although the two governments have started to create mechanisms for formal cooperation, most prominently, the Environmental Experts Committee as specified in the Oslo 2 Accord, there exists a need to facilitate cooperation between the NGO communities and other members of society. All have major roles to play in protecting our environment.

In addition to this "mutual environmental interest", both people are passionate about land and environment. Thus cooperation on environmental issues contributes to conservation as well as providing an instrument for bridge-building and transcending mental "boundaries" between Israelis and Palestinians.

Based on an already successful ongoing NGO dialogue, initiated by PCH and ECF, NGOs have agreed that "people to people" cooperation and bilateral environmental cooperation would be best served by creating an Environmental Secretariat, based on "people to people" interactions.

INTRODUCTION TO THE "PEOPLE TO PEOPLE" PROCESS:

The Oslo and subsequent accords represent a quest by political leaders to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Whilst their endeavors are of paramount importance, the achievement of peace cannot be the work of political decision-makers alone. In order to cement the political process initiated, cooperation and grass roots interactions must be strengthened among broad elements of civil society, by developing a "people to people" dialogue.

The "people to people" dialogue aims at creating a network of interpersonal contacts between ordinary citizens from all walks of life, particularly amongst those sharing a common interest, in order to initiate substantive attitudinal reorientation and thereby strengthen the peace process.

.

THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI ENVIRONMENTAL SECRETARIAT:
"NATURE KNOWS NO BOUNDARIES"

Recognizing that the environment is an indivisible resource shared by Israelis and Palestinians, ECF, PCH, SPNI and various environmental NGOs developed the concept of a *Palestinian-Israeli Environmental Secretariat "Nature Knows No Boundaries"*. The joint Secretariat will be open to all environmental NGOs that support Palestinian-Israeli cooperation. The Secretariat will encourage activities aimed at reorienting attitudes by employing environmental issues as tools for bridge-building, and encouraging activities that promote joint environmental conservation. Moreover, Palestinian-Israeli cooperation will provide ongoing assistance to the Palestinian NGO community from the SPNI and other Israel NGOs.

AIMS OF THE JOINT SECRETARIAT:

The following long-term aims are proposed for the Secretariat;

1) To forge a Palestinian-Israeli commitment to environmental protection and promote joint activism by bringing together different sectors of the civil societies, especially youth, teachers, journalists, adults.
2) To promote "people to people" activities using environmental projects as means to develop shared discourse, reorientate attitudes, and learn to accept the "other."
3) To promote sustainable development based on mutual Palestinian-Israeli interests.
4) To create a mechanism to develop joint environmental projects aimed at upgrading the environmental infrastructure (e.g. liquid and solid waste collection and treatment and, nature and landscape protection etc.).
5) To support Palestinian and Israeli environmental NGOs in initiating and carrying out joint projects by providing technical assistance to member NGOs.
6) To train teachers and guides for joint environmental and other "people to people" activities.
7) To create a joint environmental data base that will serve decision makers, assist in lobbying planners and politicians, and encourage responsible development and joint policy assessment.
8) To provide technical support to the Palestinian NGO community. SPNI and Israeli NGOs will make their facilities available, enabling the founding of a Society for the Protection of Nature in Palestine.

PROPOSED SECRETARIAT STRUCTURE:

The proposed Secretariat, to be lead jointly by full-time Palestinian and Israeli Directors will apply the principle of equitability in fulfilling the above objectives. The Secretariat will be administered from a joint office based in East Jerusalem which will provide a "hub" for joint activities.

The following structure is proposed for the Secretariat:

a) Executive Directors
b) Project Coordinators
c) Advisory Committees
d) Board of Directors
e) Annual General Assembly - AGA

EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS:

The Secretariat will be directed jointly by a Palestinian and Israeli Director. The two directors, who will form the Executive Committee, will divide responsibilities for day-to-day management of the Secretariat.

Directors responsibilities and duties will include;

project management and evaluation
* fund raising and liaison with fund-raisers
* project initiation
* public relations
* work plan preparations
* reporting
* technical assistance to NGOs.

* liaison with Advisory Committees and the Dutch Government

The two Directors will provide detailed quarterly reportage to the Board of Directors. This reportage will be supplemented by a detailed annual report to the Annual General Assembly bringing together all member NGOs.

PROJECT COORDINATORS:
The Directors will be assisted by Israeli and Palestinian Project Coordinators who will administer specific projects, either on behalf of the Secretariat or on behalf of participating NGOs. The Coordinators will be chosen by the Directors in conjunction with the participating NGOs and the Advisory Committees. Funding for coordinators will be raised from specific projects.

ADVISORY COMMITTEES:
Five Advisory Committees will advise Directors on long term planning and project development in specific areas of responsibility.

The proposed Advisory Committees will be composed of experts drawn from participating NGOs. Representatives to the Advisory Committees, two Palestinians and two Israelis, will be proposed by the Directors and the Board of Directors of the Secretariat, and will be approved by partner NGOs at the AGA. The Advisory Committees will meet monthly to discuss issues pertaining to their areas of expertise. Should the need arise for additional Advisory Committees on other topics, the Board will assist the Directors in forming these committees.

The following Advisory Committees are proposed:

1. ***Scientific Research Committee*** - This committee will identify areas for joint research and suggest specific research topics, nominate researchers for joint surveys, evaluate joint research results and propose follow-up action. An example of possible cooperation is the project researching the spread of Rabies.
2. ***Waste Handling Committee*** - Given that pollution knows no boundaries, solid and liquid waste projects will be promoted, particularly along border areas.
3. ***Nature Protection Committee*** - This committee will review the coordination on blending environmental and nature protection laws and suggest activities to promote joint protection measures.
4. ***Education Committee*** - This committee will map out desired education policies and goals for the Secretariat, brainstorm and design programs, and evaluate existing projects.
5. ***Projects Committee*** - This committee will interface with the directors, NGOs, and other committees in order to promote, review and evaluate proposed projects and those being implemented.

THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS:
The 10 member board will be comprised as follows: an PCH representative, an ECF representative, an Palestinian NGO representative to be appointed by PCH, a SPNI representative, and two additional member NGO representatives (member NGOs will rotate annually), two representatives of the Academic Community (annual rotation) and two prominent public figures. The Board will be chaired by a Palestinian and an Israeli to be elected by members of the Board of Directors.

The Board of Directors, composed equally of Palestinian and Israeli representatives, will meet quarterly. Candidates for the four rotating positions will be proposed by the founding NGOs and the

Directors in consultation with the member NGOs. These candidates will be approved by the AGA. Rotation of representation on the Board and Advisory Committees will ensure due representation to member NGOs.

The Directors will be responsible to the Board, and their activities will be reviewed at the quarterly meeting of the Board of Directors. Directors will provide detailed reportage on details of existing and planned activities. The Board of Directors will also receive reports on the activities of the Advisory Committees. In addition, ad-hoc problems and issues will be raised and addressed. The founding NGOs are committed to an open transparent Secretariat, and in order to encourage such transparency, participating NGOs' will receive agendas for each meeting and will be welcome to attend if they should wish to do so.

ANNUAL GENERAL ASSEMBLY:

An Annual General Assembly (AGA), an assembly of all participating NGOs, will provide the forum for participating NGOs to interface with the Executive Committee and the Board of Directors. At the AGA the proposed rotation positions on the Board of Directors (representatives of the NGOs and the Academic Community) will be presented, as well as the new Advisory Committees for the coming year. Furthermore, the AGA will receive a detailed annual report from the Directors, the latter will also present the work plan for the coming year. Participant NGOs will be welcome to contribute to the preparation of the work plan during its development.

ONGOING SECRETARIAT - MEMBER NGO INTERACTION:

In addition to providing an umbrella for joint projects and facilitating technical assistance to Palestinian NGOs, the Secretariat will conduct a series of activities to benefit member NGOs. These activities will include joint workshops and seminars assessing pressing environmental issues, policy developments, training seminars, educational seminars and micro-project development meetings, thus enhancing a regular interface between the Secretariat and the member NGOs.

SUSTAINABILITY:

Dutch assistance will cover core expenses for the first three years. This support will allow the Secretariat to actively promote cooperation activities. In addition to the core assistance requested from the Dutch Government, the Secretariat will develop a variety of projects that will ensure the Secretariat's viability and sustainability.

The following projects have already been submitted on the behalf of the Secretariat:

Two projects were submitted to the EU,

* *Youth Partners for a Better Environment* - *Promoting Grassroots Awareness and Activism in Schools*
* *Environmental Watch* - *Joint Workshops for the Media and Capacity Building for Palestinian Environmental NGO;*

⇒A proposal for the development of guidelines of a joint Palestinian-Israeli Environmental Action Plan (EIAP) has been submitted to the World Bank;

⇒A proposal has been submitted to the Nathan Cummings Foundation aimed at promoting; *"Environmental Activism Amongst Palestinian University Students & Promote A "People to People" Program Between Palestinian-Israeli Students"* .

(Draft copies - see Appendix # 2)

The Secretariat founding members are also discussing projects for educating Israelis and Palestinians on responsible water consumption and the prevention of wastage. SPNI and PCH, in conjunction with veterinary scientists and conservationists, wish to investigate joint measures to counter the rampant spread of Rabies. Additional projects include: projects for Palestinian and Israeli youth on migrating birds using Internet; creating a Palestinian nature newsletter for Palestinian kids using SPNI facilities and resources.

Secretariat proponents have conducted an intense dialogue with Mr. Gerald Hau of EURONATURE with regards to possible cooperation and support for Secretariat activities. *(See Appendix # 1)* SPNI & ECF have also discussed with the Gabriel Sherover Foundation support for a series of environmental workshops to be hosted at the Beth Gabriel Center on the shore of the Sea of Galilee. Other proposals in this regard will be prepared in the near future.

It is the belief of the partner organisations that these and other projects will ensure the long-term viability of the Secretariat. All future projects will include "management" overhead, covering administrative expenses, thus supplementing Dutch funds. A future consideration is a membership fee, both for affiliated organisations and their members. In addition the Secretariat could provided services on a fee basis to local and international environmental organizations and agencies.

A special emphasis of joint projects will be on Palestinian development and technical assistance to Palestinian environmental NGOs. In order to allow for ongoing support and training to Palestinian NGOs an amount of $ 30,000 per anum will be made available.

The Secretariat endeavors to promote Palestinian development through cooperation.

SOCIETY FOR THE PROTECTION OF NATURE IN PALESTINE (SPNP)

A desired outcome of the three-year project is the creation of a Society for the Protection of Nature in Palestine (SPNP). The proposed SPNP should be an equal partner to the SPNI, having developed the capabilities to run similar activities and acquire a parallel infrastructure of field schools and other departments. As a result, long term environmental cooperation will be possible.

FOUNDING MEMBERS - ORGANIZATION PROFILES:

Economic Cooperation Foundation (ECF):
The ECF was established in 1991, as a non-profit organization dedicated to actively promoting peace-making in the Middle East. The Foundation's activities are based on a multi-track approach, incorporating political policy planning and crisis management, promoting economic cooperation and development, and establishing social fabric for Israeli-Palestinian relations in civil society. ECF plays an ongoing role as a catalyst and brainstormer, initiating a variety of projects in many spheres, with the over-arching aim of sustaining and encouraging the momentum of peace in the region.

Palestine Council of Health (PCH)
The PCH was founded in 1992 to assume the responsibilities for health care following the agreement to transfer civil administration authorities to the PNA. PCH currently coordinates NGO, public and UN health care services in order to avoid duplicating resources. Moreover, the PCH has been a leading player in promoting "people to people" activities and, as a result of its leading role, was approached by NGOs to provide an umbrella for "people to people" cooperation.

Society for the Protection of Nature in Israel (SPNI)
The SPNI, established in 1953, is Israel's largest membership organization, involving nearly 20 % of Israel's population in its activities. SPNI has dedicated itself to three major tasks: educating Israelis about Israel's special natural and human heritage; researching the land, its wildlife and its history; and campaigning for the protection of the environment in Israel. SPNI boasts an impressive educational network and infrastructure administering 26 field study centers country wide.

SUPPORT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION:

PCH, ECF and SPNI have informed Israeli and Palestinian officials of their intention to establish the proposed Secretariat. The idea of the proposed Secretariat has been warmly accepted by the likes of Dr. Nabil Shaath, the Palestinian Minister of Planning and International Cooperation, Mr. Jamil Tarifi the Palestinian Minister for Civil Affairs Coordination and Mr. Rafeal Eitan the Israeli Minister of the Environment.

NOTES REGARDING THE BUDGET:

To date, two separate request have been submitted to the Dutch government. A Palestinian request for support totaling $633,000, for five years, was submitted. And, as a result of the Israeli elections, and the resultant changes in the Israeli Government, the ECF submitted a request for $100,000 to the Dutch Government, as previously promised Israeli assistance was no longer available.

The proponents believe that, in light of the election results, and as a result of an ongoing PCH-SPNI-ECF debate to insure the future of the Secretariat, the budget can and should be re-worked within the funding parameters of $733,000. As a result of an ongoing discussion with local representatives of the Dutch government and the desire of the proponents to reduce the overall request the budget has been reassessed. This reassessment of the funding will establish a more balanced and feasible budget.

The reviewed budget we propose provides for support to the Secretariat over a three year period; as follows:

Year 1: $254,000
Years 2 & 3: $210,000
(See the detailed budget)

NOTES REGARDING THE APPENDICES:
We enclose the following Documentation:

APPENDIX # 1:

LETTERS OF ENDORSEMENT

Mr. Rafeal Eitan - Israeli Minister of the Environment
Mr. Gerald Hau - EURONATURE

APPENDIX #2:

PROJECT PROPOSALS

1) Youth Partners for a Better Environment - *Promoting Grassroots Awareness and Activism in Schools*
2) Environmental Watch - *Joint Workshops for the Media and Capacity Building for Palestinian Environmental NGOs*
3) Developing Guidelines for a joint Palestinian-Israeli Environmental Action Plan (EIAP)
4) Promoting Environmental Activism Amongst Palestinian University Students & Promote A "People to People" Program Between Palestinian-Israeli Students

APPENDIX #3:

LIST OF PARTICIPATING NGOS

BUDGET PROPOSAL FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION - (YEAR # 1)

Net Salary Expenses:		**$ 72,000**
1 Palestinian Coordinator	$ 36,000	
1 Israeli Coordinator	$ 36,000	
Gross Salary Expenses:		**$ 36,000**
1 Palestinian Coordinator	$ 12,000	
1 Israeli Coordinator	$ 24,000	

This addition ensure that both Directors receive the same net salaries. Given that the two societies have different tax structures, different Gross salaries are required to ensure parity in terms of net salaries.

SPNI - SALARY TRAVEL

Travel Expenses:		**$ 20,000**
Palestinian Travel Expenses	$ 10,000	
Israeli Travel Expenses	$ 10,000	
Office Expenses		**$ 52,000**
Secretary	$ 12,000	
Rental Expenses	$ 12,000	
Office Expenses - telephone, postage	$ 8,000	
Office Equipment - computers, furniture	$ 20,000	

(please note that for year 1 only)

Activity Funds: **$ 30,000**

material and publication printing expenses
⇒workshops and conferences
⇒joint outings
⇒youth gatherings
⇒joint awareness campaigns

• $ could come from here for Summer School

This money will serve as seed money for the initiation and development of new projects, the execution of one day seminars, workshops and support ad-hoc activities.

Technical Assistance to Palestinian NGOs: **$ 30,000**

This money will be made available to the Palestinian NGO community in order to facilitate institution development and training programs.

Project Development and Assistance **$ 10,000**

⇒Experts Fee
⇒Consultation
⇒Project Development and Promotion
⇒Fundraising
⇒Donor Dialogue

ECF • Y.L. • HIKMAT

Total **$ 254,000**

BUDGET PROPOSAL FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION - (YEARS # 2 & 3)

Salary Expenses:		**$ 72,000**
1 Palestinian Coordinator	$ 36,000	
1 Israeli Coordinator	$ 36,000	
Gross Salary Expenses:		**$ 36,000**
1 Palestinian Coordinator	$ 12,000	
1 Israeli Coordinator	$ 24,000	

This addition ensure that both Directors receive the same net salaries. Given that the two societies have different tax structures, different Gross Salaries are required to ensure parity in terms of net salaries.

Travel Expenses:		**$ 20,000**
Palestinian Travel Expenses	$ 10,000	
Israeli Travel Expenses	$ 10,000	
Office Expenses		**$ 32,000**
Secretary	$ 12,000	
Rental Expenses	$ 12,000	
Office Expenses - telephone, postage	$ 8,000	

Activity Funds: **$ 10,000**

material and publication printing expenses
⇒workshops and conferences
⇒joint outings
⇒youth gatherings
⇒joint awareness campaigns

This money will serve as seed money for the initiation and development of new projects, the execution of one day seminars, workshops and support ad-hoc activities.

Technical Assistance to Palestinian NGOs: **$ 30,000**

This money will be made available to the Palestinian NGO community in order to facilitate institution development and training programs.

Project Development and Assistance **$ 10,000**

⇒Experts Fee
⇒Consultation
⇒Project Development and Promotion
⇒Fundraising
⇒Donor Dialogue

Total **$ 210,000**

TOTAL BUDGET:

Year 1:	$ 254,000
Year 2:	$ 210,000
Year 3:	$ 210,000
Total:	$ 674,000

APPENDIX # 1:

LETTERS OF ENDORSEMENT:

Mr. Rafael Eitan
European Natural Heritage Fund - EURONET

① WHAT IS THE NEXT STEP?

② WHAT WAS THE COMMITTED AMOUNT?

③ WHO DO YOU HAVE (IF ANY)?

④ WHAT IS THE STATUS OF THE FOUR PROJECTS?

⑤ GERARD HALL? ERDMAN TUBE?

⑥ BUDGET!

Economic Cooperation Foundation
הקרן לשיתוף פעולה כלכלי

רח' דפנה 22 ב' תל אביב 64925 טל: 03-6958310 פקס: 03-6958238
22(b) Dafna St., Tel-Aviv 64925, Israel. (T): 972-3-695-8310. (F) 972-3-695-8238

5 December, 1995

FAX

att: Mr. F Lacina
fax number: 0043-1-50 200 60

from: Dr. Yair Hirschfeld

13 pages (not including this one)

מסרג

תל אביב
8 מרץ 1994

אל: יוסי ביילין
אודי סביר
מאת: יאיר הירשפלד ורון פונדק

פגישה עם ד"ר מאהר אל כורד - פרטים משלימים

להלן פרטים נוספים אודות המאבק הפנימי בתוך אש"ף מתוך הפגישה שנערכה עם ד"ר מאהר אל כורד ב-3-4 מרץ 1994.

אל כורד תאר את המאבק הקשה בתוך הנהגת אש"ף בין מחנה ערפאת (הכולל בין היתר את קאדומי ועבד רבו) לבין מחנה אבו מאזן ואבו עלא, כמאבק פוליטי על כוח ולא כמאבק בין מתונים לבין קיצונים.
אל כורד, המתון לכל הדעות, נשלח לשיחות אוסלו כמייצג משרד ערפאת ובוודאי גם עתה לוויאלי למחנה זה. לויאליות זאת היא שגרמה לסילוקו מן השיחות ביוני 1993.
לדבריו אבו מאזן ואבו עלא מנסים להיבנות פוליטית באמצעות התהליך המדיני, ומאז פתיחת ערוץ אוסלו הם מתייחסים לתהליך המדיני עם ישראל כעל ה-BABY הפרטי שלהם. השניים לא רק שרוצים את כל הקרדיט לעצמם אלא גם מרחיקים את ערפאת מהשפעה על התהליך.
המאבק בין המחנות מביא לכך שערפאת מנסה להראות שהוא עצמאי בהחלטותיו גם במחיר של התנגדות לסיכומים עם ישראל שנעשו על ידי אבו מאזן ואבו עלא.
לדעת אל כורד, ערפאת בבסיסו הוא פרגמטיסט וחסר אידיאולוגיה ברורה, אך בכל מקרה הוא רוצה להגיע להסדר הגון עם ישראל על בסיס ה-DOP. אילולא המאבק בין המחנות, היה ערפאת ניגש מייד ליישום הצהרת העקרונות, אך כשגילה כיצד, אבו מאזן ואבו עלא מבוזזים את התהליך מאחורי גבו ומעדכנים אותו סלקטיבית, החליט להראות מי המחליט האמיתי ודרש לפתע לשנות את ההבנות אליהם הגיעו הצדדים בקהיר. הבעיה מחריפה לדבריו כשאבו עלא מציג לעיתים עצמו כמי שעשה (אמנם לטובת הפלסטינים) חזית אחת עם ישראל, ובמקרה מסויים אף נשמע אומר בפורום פנימי: אנחנו והישראלים ניצחנו וערפאת הפסיד. מצבים כאלה מעמידים את ערפאת בעמדה בה הוא נאלץ להציג עמדות יותר "לאומיות" ויותר קיצוניות.
אל כורד הדגיש שיחסיו האישיים עם אבו עלא עדיין טובים. השניים הלכו

יחדיו כברת דרך ארוכה, בעת שעבד במשך 12 שנה תחת אבו עלא במחלקה הכלכלית וב"צאמד", וגם עתה הם עדיין מקיימים שיחות אישיות גלויות לב. עם זאת ברור שאל כורד שרמר טיבה מסרימת לאבו עלא על כך שגרם לכך שהוא הוחלף כאיש השלישי בצוות אוסלו. הבעיה שנוצרה אז בצוות הפלסטיני משקפת את הבעיה הקיימת גם עתה. אבו עלא הוביל את הצוות באוסלו, ואבו מאזן הביא את הצוות מתוניס. לאחר הפגישה השלישית לערך, כשהערוץ באוסלו החל להביב פירות, עשו השבירים כל מאמץ בכדי לעדכן את ערפאת סלקטיבית בלבד באשר לסיכומים ולטיוטות שהוסכמו עם הצד הישראלי. לעיתים קיבל ערפאת דיווח בעל פה בלבד ולא ראה את טיוטות ה-DOP שסוכמו באוסלו. אל כורד, שכאמור היה שליחו של משרד ערפאת לשיחות, עידכן ביתר פירוט את הי"ר, דבר שהיה בבירגוד לאינטרס של אבו עלא שגרם להדחתו מהצוות.

המצב הבוכחי הוא כאמור המשך של הדפוס שהתפתח במהלך המו"מ באוסלו, ולדברי אל כורד אבו עלא, למשל, איבו מעדכן את ערפאת באשר לסיכומים שמושגים בשיחות הכלכליות עם ישראל בפאריס (עובדה זאת אומתה על ידיבו על ידי מקור פלסטיני אחר המשתתף בשיחות פאריס). כשערפאת מגלה לאחר מספר שבועות שדבר מסוים הוסכם ללא ידיעתו או אישורו הוא הופך להיות אופוזיציונר ללא קשר למהות ההסכמה.

8.3.94

Yair & Ron pundak meet with Dr. Maher Al kurd in March 94 in Vienna.
Al kurd specified about the PLO inner battle, between Arafat & his people to Abu Maren & Abu-ala, saying this is a political (not ideological) battle, and how Abu Maren & Abu-ala undermine Arafat.

/

אל:

4 מרץ 1994

אל: ד"ר יוסי בילין
מאת: ד"ר י' ו' רוזנפלד / ד"ר רון שוקן

נושא הפגישה עם ד"ר מאהר אל-כורד.

1. לפגישתנו הגיעה בפתאום (3-4 מרץ 1994) עם ד"ר מאהר אל-כורד אשר הגיע לפגישה בליווי המלווים של יאסר ערפאת. כצפוי היה אל כורד מהנחות המקורי למזכ"ל האו"ם.
2. בתחילת הפגישה הרצאנה הרצאה ארוכה אל כורד את המצב הנוכחי בקשה הצהיר את הנחיית אש"ף בין מתנה ערפאת לבין מתנ' אחרון ואבו עלא. (ברור כאן זכות עבר).
3. המצדד במצב פוליטי על כוח ללא קשר לעמדות הצדדים לצפוי התהליך המדיני. עם כאלה תוצאות המצב שהתפתח לרעת ערפאת הגיע הזמן שערפאת ירד מהבמה הפוליטית עמדות "שהוויתי" ויתור קיצוניות. המצדדים מבית שוללים התהליך המדיני על אש"ף שערפאת רואה לייחס מיוחד בכדי הרצפה את ה - PDSM.
לצדו אל כורד, העובדה שהקשר הציקרי בין ישראל לבין אש"ף נמצא בידיים של אבו עלא ואבו מאזן מבטיחה את ערפאת מהתהליך ומזרמת לרעת שהוחזר מתצהיר הסכומים שנעשו ללא ידיעתו, ללא הקשר לעמדות הסכמים.
3. אל כורד הגיע ערוכה תוך מספר ימים מקום ומועד לפגישה חשאית חדשה לבין אש"ף. כל 33 יהודי אם אמת שניים או שלושה ארגשים דנה לבון על תכלול ארבעה עקרונות:-
א. פתיחת המשחר הנרחב בקרבות הגדה (בלעדית דוגלת הוא קהאמש).
ב. ציוד מהיר על הפרים שנותרו הסכים עצה-רימו, ובלבד מהירה לתמיכת ל"שים הסכם.
ג. הקמת לצדדים כלכליים תוך שיתוף פעולה הדוק עם הסכים ה- PLO.
ד. ארגון בצדדים הכלכליים ובלבד לתמיכות עם הסכים יציבות פוליטית, דלתון ותעשיית מתוח.

4. על כל צד תהיה זכות להביא את עדויות מומחים מטעמו. הוא יגיש בקשה להבאה של כתב או של מסמך בצירופו של עדותו של המומחה. או: עדותו הוא תוגש בתצהיר בשלום.

5. הבית בקשתו את ובהחלטתו הקרוב בשלב אלף בימים למתן החלטה של ישראל באשר לתביעה. לצערם קיים אחד הדוגמה לבעיות בינים שבקבוצתו ובאו הפלסטינים מאוכלסים וילדים כלכלית ומבנית, בכך שיכול לכל הסדר קבע המקומם על ובקנית אחרת. מאידך קיים אחד שני שרואה לבעיות בתקופת הבינים התפוררות פלסטינית, עלומות פנימית, חוסר יציבות ומנהיגות כלכלית, בכך להבעות לעולם שאין אפשרות להגיע למתיחן ישראל-פלסטיני, ושהבדיקה הילדה הוא קונפדרציון ירדן - ישראל על השטחים. לבית המשפט אלף, הסתם בחינה שני מתבקש עזה ומיהם את תפיסתו בשלבים.

6. באשר למתיחן המשפט הנוכחי, הליך מנהלי את אלבע התביעות הנוכחיות על אלף. על כולם שאת קונפליקט עם תוניס והליכה הפלסטינית הוא שישראל תאלף לפחות שתים שהתביעות. לצערו אלף בדיוק לפרוק את הסתם באמצעות בעבדים סמלים אשר ישנה פסיכולוגיות של ואובדנות בשלבים. שתי בתביעות התשובות ואת הן בפנישה הנוכחות הבינלאומית ופנישה הולאת הבתי חולות * מלך התיחן ומאחרת תושביה לקריית אלבע. באשר לפרוק בחתימות מתשקיף שעל הסתמכות הוא אלפה לשאת בזכות נשקן כאשר הם נמצאים קריבות אובדנות עובדת.

7. אלף עם מלא בכך נוספת לשחרור הסתם באמצעות הלחצה ישראלית אשר תאומה ש'ישראל ואלף יקומו ואבה סמי-רשמית אשר תצוין כבר אחד של נושאים הקשורים להתיחן הקצר והתחלי פנישה והתחלות". אלף אינו מלבד שואבה בצורה אלבע תקוע מיד אלף להבחנה הוא בית מרצע.

8. על כורח אנו עלים מתוך שיחותינו האחרונות את תוכנית שאתך נוכל להביא שיבוא תוכנו לעולמן ובאופן תיכף ומיד, אם ישראל יקבלו את ההצעה בקשרים הבאים:-

א. ישראל תהיה מוכנה לכונן מ"מ את אשף על לורת הנעמות הבינלאומית.

ב. הנקבעת האחריות הבינלאומית כיום.

ג. הערבות הבינלאומית בלי תמורה

ד. הקמת אזור חלי-רשמית לגיוון הפתרון הקבוע קבוע על הנעמות

ה. בכל מקרה על כורח הבהיר שאין קשר בין מיזוג האוניברסיטה לבין נכונותו של אשף למתן מ"מ זכויות ישראל על המקומות הבתבנו.

ו. במהלך השיחות עלו מספר נושאים נוספים בקשר עם נושא מעמדה של ירושלים - כולל (בזה בנפרד).

ז. לקראת הפסקת השיחות ולנוכח היום שיש הקרוב (7 מרץ) ובוסים שתאריך היעד לסיום המשימות יהיה סוף השבוע הקרוב (27 מרץ).

gation to promote to the utmost, within the system of international peace and security established by the present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories, and, to this end:

a. to ensure, with due respect for the culture of the peoples concerned, their political, economic, social, and educational advancement, their just treatment, and their protection against abuses;

b. to develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement;

c. to further international peace and security;

d. to promote constructive measures of development, to encourage research, and to co-operate with one another and, when and where appropriate, with specialized international bodies with a view to the practical achievement of the social, economic, and scientific purposes set forth in this Article; and

e. to transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for information purposes, subject to such limitation as security and constitutional considerations may require, statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social, and educational conditions in the territories for which they are respectively responsible other than those territories to which Chapters XII and XIII apply.

Article 74

Members of the United Nations also agree that their policy in respect of the territories to which this Chapter applies, no less than in respect of their metropolitan areas, must be based on the general principle of good-neighbourliness, due account being taken of the interests and well-being of the rest of the world, in social, economic, and commercial matters.

CHAPTER XII

INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEM

Article 75

The United Nations shall establish under its authority an international trusteeship system for the administration and supervision of such territories as may be placed there-

under by subsequent individual agreements. These territories are hereinafter referred to as trust territories.

Article 76

The basic objectives of the trusteeship system, in accordance with the Purposes of the United Nations laid down in Article 1 of the present Charter, shall be:

a. to further international peace and security;

b. to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement;

c. to encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion, and to encourage recognition of the interdependence of the peoples of the world; and

d. to ensure equal treatment in social, economic, and commercial matters for all Members of the United Nations and their nationals, and also equal treatment for the latter in the administration of justice, without prejudice to the attainment of the foregoing objectives and subject to the provisions of Article 80.

Article 77

1. The trusteeship system shall apply to such territories in the following categories as may be placed thereunder by means of trusteeship agreements:

a. territories now held under mandate;

b. territories which may be detached from enemy states as a result of the Second World War; and

c. territories voluntarily placed under the system by states responsible for their administration.

2. It will be a matter for subsequent agreement as to which territories in the foregoing categories will be brought under the trusteeship system and upon what terms.

Article 78

The trusteeship system shall not apply to territories which have become Members of

the United Nations, relationship among which shall be based on respect for the principle of sovereign equality.

Article 79

The terms of trusteeship for each territory to be placed under the trusteeship system, including any alteration or amendment, shall be agreed upon by the states directly concerned, including the mandatory power in the case of territories held under mandate by a Member of the United Nations, and shall be approved as provided for in Articles 83 and 85.

Article 80

1. Except as may be agreed upon in individual trusteeship agreements, made under Articles 77, 79, and 81, placing each territory under the trusteeship system, and until such agreements have been concluded, nothing in this Chapter shall be construed in or of itself to alter in any manner the rights whatsoever of any states or any peoples or the terms of existing international instruments to which Members of the United Nations may respectively be parties.

2. Paragraph 1 of this Article shall not be interpreted as giving grounds for delay or postponement of the negotiation and conclu-

sion of agreements for placing mandated and other territories under the trusteeship system as provided for in Article 77.

Article 81

The trusteeship agreement shall in each case include the terms under which the trust territory will be administered and designate the authority which will exercise the administration of the trust territory. Such authority, hereinafter called the administering authority, may be one or more states or the Organization itself.

Article 82

There may be designated, in any trusteeship agreement, a strategic area or areas which may include part or all of the trust territory to which the agreement applies, without prejudice to any special agreement or agreements made under Article 43.

Article 83

1. All functions of the United Nations relating to strategic areas, including the approval of the terms of the trusteeship agreements and of their alteration or amendment, shall be exercised by the Security Council.

2. The basic objectives set forth in Article 76 shall be applicable to the people of each strategic area.

3. The Security Council shall, subject to the provisions of the trusteeship agreements and without prejudice to security considerations, avail itself of the assistance of the Trusteeship Council to perform those functions of the United Nations under the trusteeship system relating to political, economic, social, and educational matters in the strategic areas.

Article 84

It shall be the duty of the administering authority to ensure that the trust territory shall play its part in the maintenance of international peace and security. To this end the administering authority may make use of volunteer forces, facilities, and assistance from the trust territory in carrying out the obligations towards the Security Council undertaken in this regard by the administering authority, as well as for local defence and the maintenance of law and order within the trust territory.

Article 85

1. The functions of the United Nations with regard to trusteeship agreements for all areas not designated as strategic, including the approval of the terms of the trusteeship agreements and of their alteration or amendment, shall be exercised by the General Assembly.

2. The Trusteeship Council, operating under the authority of the General Assembly, shall assist the General Assembly in carrying out these functions.

CHAPTER XIII
THE TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL

Composition

Article 86

1. The Trusteeship Council shall consist of the following Members of the United Nations:

a. those Members administering trust territories;

b. such of those Members mentioned by name in Article 23 as are not administering trust territories; and

c. as many other Members elected for three-year terms by the General Assembly as may be necessary to ensure that the total number of members of the Trusteeship Council is equally divided between those Members of the United Nations which administer trust territories and those which do not.

2. Each member of the Trusteeship Council shall designate one specially qualified person to represent it therein.

Functions and Powers

Article 87

The General Assembly and, under its authority, the Trusteeship Council, in carrying out their functions, may:

a. consider reports submitted by the administering authority;

b. accept petitions and examine them in consultation with the administering authority;

c. provide for periodic visits to the respective trust territories at times agreed upon with the administering authority; and

d. take these and other actions in conformity with the terms of the trusteeship agreements.

Article 88

The Trusteeship Council shall formulate a questionnaire on the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of each trust territory, and the administering authority for each trust territory within the competence of the General Assembly shall make an annual report to the General Assembly upon the basis of such questionnaire.

Voting

Article 89

1. Each member of the Trusteeship Council shall have one vote.

2. Decisions of the Trusteeship Council shall be made by a majority of the members present and voting.

Procedure

Article 90

1. The Trusteeship Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure, including the method of selecting its President.

2. The Trusteeship Council shall meet as required in accordance with its rules, which shall include provision for the convening of meetings on the request of a majority of its members.

Article 91

The Trusteeship Council shall, when appropriate, avail itself of the assistance of the Economic and Social Council and of the specialized agencies in regard to matters with which they are respectively concerned.

JT

Antibiotic weakness
Page 5

CHIJJA 23, 1413

NIS 3.40 (EILAT NIS 2.90)

3/6/93
(JP)

Close Peres aide holds indirect negotiations with Arafat in Cairo

Foreign Minister knew of the meetings

DAVID MAKOVSKY, JON IMMANUEL, HILLEL KUTLER and news agencies

NIMROD Novik, a long-time associate of Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, held indirect talks with PLO leader Yasser Arafat last Wednesday in Cairo, mediated by Egyptian presidential adviser Osama el-Baz, Israeli officials have confirmed.

Novik subsequently submitted a report on his talks to senior Foreign Ministry officials, informed sources said.

When asked for a reaction, senior Foreign Ministry officials claimed that Peres did not authorize the talks, but was aware that Novik intended to hold indirect talks with Arafat by way of el-Baz. "Peres knew about Novik's trip, but he did not go on Peres's behest. Novik was not a messenger," a senior official said.

There is no evidence of any face-to-face talks between Novik and Arafat.

Novik was spotted at the Foreign Ministry holding talks with senior officials the evening before his trip to Cairo.

Officials in the Prime Minister's Office say they were unaware of Novik's trip, and refused further comment. Some sources insist that Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin has learned of other indirect contacts between emissaries of Peres and the PLO, not directly from Peres but by way of intelligence reports.

Informed sources say that Novik met with el-Baz on Wednesday both before and after the Egyptian adviser went to meet Arafat at the airport in Cairo. The PLO leader was en route to Tunis from Amman.

There is speculation that Novik's talks were tied to the upcoming round of Washington peace talks beginning on Tuesday, and the effort to hammer out a first-ever joint Israeli-Palestinian declaration of principles that would guide the negotiations.

Novik's meeting with el-Baz last week was first reported by the *Jerusalem Post*.

Novik, a former Peres foreign policy adviser, is now in private business. When Peres became foreign minister last summer, he appointed Novik to the unpaid post of ambassador-at-large.

On Friday, the eastern Jerusalem daily *Al-Quds* reported that "high-level" Israeli and PLO officials have held several secret meetings during the past two weeks in different European cities, including Vienna.

The meetings were held to discuss a joint declaration of principles, Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and the role of the PLO during the interim administration there.

Among the PLO officials present was Mahmoud Abbas, better known as Abu Mazen, who is the senior PLO coordinator of the Palestinian team at the peace talks and is considered one of the PLO's top three officials. The Israeli officials were not identified.

The report, datelined New York, came from "reliable political sources" *Al-Quds*' correspondent wrote.

The Palestinian delegation continued on Friday to press the administration for a more detailed picture of American intentions in the coming round of peace talks, due to begin Tuesday.

The delegation also disputed Israeli reports claiming that the United States was displeased by the Palestinians' list of questions on American positions relating to the Israeli-Palestinian joint declaration of principles for the talks.

The second day of consultations with the American peace team was "very frank and comprehensive" and sought to "define the American role," according to Palestinian spokeswoman Hanan Ashrawi. She said the Palestinians see the US team as "still elusive" on that issue because the Americans "still see their role as emerging."

The two sides held lengthy discussions on Palestinian concerns, which were presented to the US earlier in the week in a letter from Palestinian negotiator Faisal Husseini, said Ashrawi.

While refusing to go into specifics, Ashrawi stated that the 10-point letter seeks "elaboration" of American positions on such issues as the terms of reference for the talks, the principle of land for peace, UN resolutions 242 and 338, the transition between the interim and final status, settlements and Palestinian political rights.

"The issue of Jerusalem is crucial, of course," she added.

Ashrawi disputed reports in Friday's issue of *Al-Hamishmar* claiming the American team was perturbed by Husseini's written questions, and that Secretary of State Warren Christopher was surprised that Husseini would not be attending the early consultations with the Americans.

The Palestinians' questions are, on the contrary, "all being addressed" by the State Department team, she said, adding that the US understood that prior commitments kept Husseini in the United Arab Emirates late last week.

The Israeli delegation is due to arrive in Washington tomorrow, when they will hold a final consultation with the US. The Palestinians will also meet again separately with the Americans tomorrow.

Jordan, meanwhile, said yesterday that its envoy to the United States would head the kingdom's team at next week's 10th round of Middle East peace talks, replacing Abdul-Salam Majali, who became prime minister last month.

Fayez Tarawneh, a US-educated economist and a former minister from an influential tribe in Jordan, is to succeed Majali.

Tarawneh took over as ambassador to Washington in February.

13/06, '93 10:45

11.6.93

מועצת הנוער

I אירגון מטה ירושלים

א) מיקום הנושא על סדר היום הפתוח הראשון.

ב) מיקומה של ועדות מיוחדות;

ג) ועדת הסדרה: יו"ר (~~מזכיר המועצה~~ מ"מ ראש העיר)

ד) ועדת מימון - יו"ר - כל-יום

ה) ועדת משפט - יו"ר - עו"ד מרוץ

ו) ועדת תקציב וארגון - יו"ר - מן קאהה

ז) ועדה לעניני בטחון: יו"ר - מתאם שיון

ח) ועדה לתיאום ומקשרים: יו"ר:
נציג אלומות של

ט) ועדה לשיפ מקומיים יו"ר נציג אלומות

י) ועדה לימי עיון וכוחות
יו"ר מרכז הנוער

6) ורקה למשולש שווה: זה מרחב שכל וקטור

ב) ורקה של מרחב שכולם מסלולים

זה ישראל כלם

ג) ורקה לשדות כלשהן - זה

אדרשם. תמיד

3/6/93

Undertakings

(1) Prepare a comprehensive Town Plan Effect
(a) in town about steps taken -

(2) Prepare an (Int.) Town Stability Plan to include,
(a) Proper security measures (at least Police Force of 30 000
(b) Proper regulation of labour mobility
(c) necessary Infrastructure
(d) proper regional planning;
(e) Sea Port Development
(f) immediate Economic Project
(g) development of trade
(h) rural organisation network (?)

- the Police will prepare their own proposals and said discussions and negotiations should create a comprehensive Stabilising Programme!

(3) A/K visit cancelled. The para steps will be completely demilitarized.

. A Joint Israeli-Pal. Security Plan & Programme will be worked out.

(4) The trusteeship for Jerusalem should be sent. US-Egypt-Jordan w/in UN auspices.
(a final detailed report will be presented to us, at the next meeting)

(5) A.A. proposes full coordination of Israeli and Palestinian position in all multilateral committees - secretly!!

(6) The Egypt. Govt (Hosni Mubarak, Ali Maher and Osama el-Baz) have been in favour of Separation by Aug. 1st.

~~Cooperation of each nation should be~~
Mubarak was extremely pleased.
It should be used to open the Israeli-Egypt dialogue in cooperation.

(7) ~~All contracts in Seaplaney~~ →
Payments for Work on Joint projects
shall be partly raised.
First, before the final o.k. by the Dept
can by with the Government's
offices from many other
government.

(8) ~~Con~~ The Seaplaney channel is not
on the maps Mr. Palest. ~~does~~ had
channel.
In order to prevent fragmentation
actions of all other contracts will
be coordinated with ea-
ch will be subordinated already
to one supreme.

(contact with Univ. of Hawaii,
contact with Research for
Direct Bud).

(9)

30 000 Police (actual
supply)

demilitarized accepted.
~~no de~~

Egypt-U.S. (OK)

(Jordan) not agreed.

for Ok:
security
workers
Trade -
immediate Economic Projects:
sea Port
Infrastructure
---- etc.

for
① Security
② for Iran
③ Lebanon Relief

for Plan Study: → Iran Israel -
immediate measures to stabilize →
security; preparing withdrawal
economic projects;
etc.

② Peace treaty for
③ Aleph

אוניברסיטת חיפה
UNIVERSITY OF HAIFA

אגף מינהל תלמידים
מדור בחינות

JUNE 4, 1993

FROM: YAIR HIRSCHFELD
TO: TARJE RØD LARSEN

RE: SIMULATION - GAME:

PREPARING TWO 100-DAY PROGRAMMES FOR THE INTERIM-PERIOD

1. GENERAL

HAVING ACHIEVED UNDERSTANDING ON DoP, CWP and GUIDELINES MEASURES ARE TO BE TAKEN THAT WILL CHANGE THE PRESENT REALITY OF CONFLICT AND WILL CREATE A NEW ERA OF COOPERATION, OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

THE SUCCESS OF POLICIES TO BE TAKEN WILL DEPEND LARGELY ON THE PERFORMANCE OF THE FIRST HUNDRED DAYS.
HENCE, PLANNING FOR THE FIRST HUNDRED DAYS AND THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A RELATED UNDERSTANDING IS OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE.

2. PARTICIPANTS

FAFO, ECF AND OTHERS, AS SEEMED NECESSARY.

אוניברסיטת חיפה
UNIVERSITY OF HAIFA

אגף מינהל תלמידים
מדור בחינות

3. SPHERES ~~FOR~~ OF PLANNING

ACCORDING TO THE RULES LAID DOWN IN THE SIMULATION GAME, AFTER SIGNING THE DoP, CWP ~~w~~ GUIDELINES, THE FOLLOWING ACTIVITIES ARE TO BE ANTICIPATED:

A. ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMITTEES (see I/5 and 6), INVITATION TO IN & AND OUTSIDE BUREAUCRATS TO START THEIR WORK.

B. THE FOLLOWING COMMITTEES WILL IMMEDIATELY OBTAIN RESPONSIBILITIES: HEALTH, EDUCATION, SOCIAL WELFARE, TOURISM, PUBLIC WORKS AND TAXATION.

C. THE COMMITTEES FOR LAND AND WATER WILL START THEIR WORK.

D. FIRST ACTIVITIES RELATED TO CWP WILL START.

E. DISMANTLEMENT OF TERROR UNITS AND PREPARATORY MEASURES FOR ESTABLISHING LOCAL POLICE.

F. PREPARING FOR ELECTIONS.

4. DETERMINING THE FIRST 100 DAY PROGRAMME

A. PREPARE AND PLAN FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ENVISAGED COMMITTEES, DETERMINE THEIR ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE.

B. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FINDINGS OF THE LIVING CONDITIONS STUDY, FATO WILL IN COOPERATION WITH ECF DETERMINE OBTAINABLE

אוניברסיטת חיפה
UNIVERSITY OF HAIFA

אגף מינהל תלמידים
מדור בחינות

POLICY AIMS IN THE SPHERES OF: HEALTH, EDUCATION, SOCIAL WELFARE, TOURISM AND PUBLIC WORKS.
ACCORDINGLY A BUDGET EVALUATION WILL BE MADE AND POSSIBILITIES OF RAISING NECESSARY FUNDS ARE TO BE CHECKED.

C. POLICIES FOR CWP ACTIVITIES IN ALL THE SPHERES NAMED UNDER 4/B SHALL BE DETERMINED.

D. A SECURITY PROGRAMME WILL BE DETERMINED.

E. POLICY ACTIVITIES FOR THE LAND AND WATER COMMITTEE WILL BE LAID DOWN.

F. A CONCEPT FOR THE PREPARATION OF ELECTIONS WILL BE WORKED OUT.

THE POLICIES LAID DOWN UNDER 4-A,B,C,D,E,F WILL ALL BE PART OF THE ACCEPTED FIRST 100 DAY PROGRAMME.

II THE SECOND 100-DAY-PROGRAMME

1. GENERAL AND SPHERES OF PLANNING

THE SECOND 100 DAYS WILL START AFTER ELECTIONS.

ACCORDING TO THE RULES LAID DOWN IN THE SIMULATION GAME - THE FOLLOWING ACTIVITIES ARE BEING ASKED FOR:

אוניברסיטת חיפה
UNIVERSITY OF HAIFA

אגף מינהל ותלמידים
מדור בחינות

אוניברסיטת חיפה
UNIVERSITY OF HAIFA

אגף מינהל תלמידים
מדור בחינות

A. ESTABLISHMENT OF PIC

B. ESTABLISHMENT OF INSTITUTIONS AS POINTED OUT UNDER GAME RULE I/B

C. PREPARE POLICY AIMS FOR PIC ACTIVITIES IN OTHER SPHERES.

D. PREPARE A POLICY AND A WORKING PROGRAMME FOR INSTITUTIONS TO BE ESTABLISHED UNDER I/B

E. POLICIES FOR CWP ACTIVITIES

F. A SECURITY PROGRAMME

G. RAISE THE NECESSARY BUDGETS

THE POLICIES LAID DOWN UNDER I/1/A, B, C, D, E, F & G WILL FORM THE SECOND 100 DAY-PROGRAMME.

אוניברסיטת חיפה
UNIVERSITY OF HAIFA

אגף מינהל תלמידים
מדור בחינות

ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN JOINT STATEMENT
MAY 12, 1993

ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIANS AGREE THAT IT IS TIME TO PUT AN END TO THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THEM. REAFFIRMING THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE PEACE PROCESS LAUNCHED AT MADRID, THEY SEEK TO NEGOTIATE THEIR DIFFERENCES AND CREATE A PEACEFUL FUTURE IN WHICH ISRAELIS AND PALESTINIANS WILL LIVE SIDE BY SIDE, IN PEACE, FOR GENERATIONS TO COME.

THE GOAL OF THE CURRENT ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS IS REAL AND COMPREHENSIVE PEACE, BASED ON UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338. TOWARD THIS GOAL, IN LINE WITH THE INVITATION TO THE MADRID PEACE CONFERENCE, THE TWO SIDES WANT TO REACH AGREEMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ON INTERIM SELF GOVERNMENT ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE PALESTINIANS IN THE TERRITORIES.

THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS IS BEING CONDUCTED IN PHASES: THE FIRST PHASE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IS DIRECTED TOWARD REACHING AGREEMENT ON INTERIM SELF GOVERNMENT ARRANGEMENTS FOR FIVE YEARS; AND THE SECOND PHASE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE DIRECTED TOWARD REACHING AGREEMENT ON PERMANENT STATUS BASED ON UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338. THE TWO SIDES CONCUR THAT THE AGREEMENT REACHED BETWEEN THEM ON PERMANENT STATUS WILL CONSTITUTE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF

RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338.

THE TWO SIDES AGREE THAT THIS PROCESS IS ONE, AND ITS TWO PHASES ARE INTERLOCKED IN THE AGREED TIME FRAME. THEY FURTHER AGREE THAT THE OUTCOME OF THE PERMANENT STATUS NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD NOT BE PREJUDICED OR PREEMPTED BY AGREEMENTS REACHED FOR THE INTERIM PHASE. THEY FURTHER AGREE THAT ALL OPTIONS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE AGREED BASIS OF NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD REMAIN OPEN.

DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD, A MAJOR CHANGE WILL OCCUR IN THE EXISTING SITUATION IN THE TERRITORIES. FUNCTIONS OF THE ISRAELI CIVIL ADMINISTRATION WILL BE TRANSFERRED TO THE PALESTINIANS, AND THE CIVIL ADMINISTRATION WILL BE DISSOLVED. THE TWO SIDES AGREE THAT AN IMPORTANT OUTCOME OF THIS FIRST PHASE IS THE EMPOWERMENT OF PALESTINIANS THROUGH THE NEGOTIATION OF INTERIM SELF GOVERNMENT WHICH SHOULD GIVE PALESTINIANS GREATER CONTROL OVER THE DECISIONS THAT AFFECT THEIR LIVES AND FATE. IT SHOULD ALSO PUT AN END TO THE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIANS, AND CREATE A NEW RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THEM. IT IS ISRAEL'S VIEW THAT THE SECURITY NEEDS OF BOTH SIDES SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION WHILE OVERALL SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY AS WELL AS THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ISRAELIS IN THE TERRITORIES WILL REMAIN UNDER ISRAEL DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD. IT IS THE PALESTINIAN VIEW THAT THE OBJECTIVE OF SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IS TO ACHIEVE REGIONAL STABILITY AND RESPOND TO MUTUAL NEEDS, AS WELL AS TO CREATE THE CONDITIONS OF REAL PEACE.

OVER THE PAST THREE WEEKS, ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIANS HAVE TAKEN AN IMPORTANT STEP TOWARD THESE OBJECTIVES. THEY HAVE CREATED WORKING GROUPS ON KEY ISSUES, INCLUDING LAND AND WATER, THE CONCEPT OF INTERIM SELF GOVERNMENT, AND HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS AND HUMAN RIGHTS. THE TWO SIDES HAVE ENGAGED IN SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS AND HAVE NARROWED SOME OF THE KEY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THEM, ALTHOUGH THERE ARE MANY ISSUES DISCUSSED IN THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN TRACK AND IN THE ISRAELI-JOINT JORDANIAN-PALESTINIAN PLENARY THAT HAVE NOT BEEN INCLUDED IN THIS STATEMENT AND THAT REMAIN TO BE RESOLVED. THE OMISSION OF THESE ISSUES IN THIS STATEMENT IS WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE POSITIONS OF THE TWO SIDES.

THE TWO SIDES HAVE AGREED THAT A PALESTINIAN ELECTED INTERIM SELF GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY (WHOSE NAME WILL BE DETERMINED) WILL BE ESTABLISHED THROUGH FREE, FAIR, GENERAL, AND DIRECT ELECTIONS. THESE ELECTIONS WILL BE HELD IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGREED MODALITIES TO BE NEGOTIATED, INCLUDING AGREED SUPERVISION AND INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS. DETAILED NEGOTIATIONS WILL TAKE PLACE CONCERNING THE MODALITIES FOR THE ELECTIONS.

THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY WILL ASSUME ALL OF THE POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES AGREED DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS. THIS WILL INCLUDE EXECUTIVE AND JUDICIAL POWERS (BY INDEPENDENT JUDICIAL ORGANS), AS WELL AS THOSE LEGISLATIVE POWERS WITHIN THE RESPONSIBILITIES TRANSFERRED TO IT, SUBJECT TO AGREED PRINCIPLES TO BE NEGOTIATED. DUE CONSIDERATION WILL BE GIVEN TO THE NEED TO REVIEW LEGISLATION IN FORCE IN REMAINING AREAS, AS APPROPRIATE.

THE TWO SIDES HAVE AGREED THAT THE TERRITORIES ARE VIEWED AS A SINGLE TERRITORIAL UNIT. THEY AGREE THAT ISSUES RELATED TO SOVEREIGNTY WILL

BE NEGOTIATED DURING TALKS ON PERMANENT STATUS AND THAT NEGOTIATIONS ON THE LAND ISSUE DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD WILL TAKE PLACE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY; THAT IS THE TERRITORIES WILL BE TREATED AS A WHOLE EVEN WHILE THEY NEGOTIATE THE DIFFICULT ISSUES OF LAND MANAGEMENT, USAGE, AND PLANNING. THEY HAVE DIFFERENT VIEWS ON LAND AND JURISDICTION, WHICH THEY WILL CONTINUE TO DISCUSS.

THIS JOINT STATEMENT REPRESENTS AN IMPORTANT FIRST STEP TOWARD REACHING AGREEMENT ON INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS. THE TWO SIDES WILL DIRECT THEIR EFFORTS TO BRIDGING REMAINING SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCES. THEY HAVE COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO WORK TOWARD CREATING A POSITIVE CLIMATE FOR THESE NEGOTIATIONS. THEY AGREE THAT THERE IS NO ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATIVE TO MAKING THESE NEGOTIATIONS SUCCEED, AND IT IS THE ONLY REALISTIC PATHWAY TO ACHIEVING A JUST AND ENDURING PEACE.

04-APR-1993 12:15 01

אל: שמאי אור, יועד מטן הש

Attention:
MR. Shlomo Gur.

Statement by

Mr. Yasser Arafat

President of The State of Palestine,
Chairman of The Executive Committee
Palestine Liberation Organization

Cairo 29/3/1993

Today, we stand at a historical crossroad: we could either make use of the opportunity to achieve a just and balanced peace, or we would get into a bitter struggle which will reflect itself on the security of our area and the world and will multiply the pain, miseries and cycles of violence the parties in conflict have suffered from in this area for several decades.

The historical and national responsibility we assume as the leadership of the people of Palestine struggling for its freedom and independance, makes it necessary for me today - at this dangerous turning point threatening the peace process with the risk of a breakdown - to reiterate that the PLO is ready to take the real challenge, the challenge of peace. The PLO invites everybody, with no exception, - especially the Israeli leadership - to meet our position with a similar one, to protect the future of our peoples, our sons and our children, to provide a just solution, that can stand the test of time, and provide a shelter under which our coming generations can live.

The option of peace was - and will remain - our strategic choice, in spite of the tragedy our people is living today. In spite of the killing, dispersion, suppression and deportation, our insistence to seize the opportunity of peace never wavered nor weakened.

The boys and girls of Gaza, the men and women of Jerusalem and the West Bank, all the children of this struggling people in and out of our homeland, have stood with the Palestinian Initiative for Peace and with the decisions and policy of their sole legitimate leadership, the PLO, through its legislative and executive bodies, to give a chance for peace in the land of peace.

I reiterate that we have to face, with responsibility and historical perspective, all the challenges and obstacles that stand in the way of peace. Specifically from this angle and not out of any narrow and opportune reasons, we say to the Israeli leadership and to public opinion within Israel that the moment has come to let reason and human conscience reign, so that the relationships of equality built on the principles of justice, human rights and international legitimacy would prevail. We offer our Palestinian hand for peace with confidence, and unequivocal desire to build a just future, free from violence, aggression and oppression.

We reconfirm with absolute certainty, that the path of deportation, suppression, human rights violation and the continuation of occupation never lead to peace.

Negotiations - by their very nature - go through problems and obstacles , and reflect conflicting emotions . The Palestinian leadership , however, with a full sense of responsibility , realizing that the challange of peace is harder and more difficult than the challanges of war, assures the children of the Intifadah and its protectors , that our objective is to strive towards the achievement of the rights of our people , and the conclusion of a comprehensive , just , honorable and permanent peace , on the basis of Security Council Resolution 242 ,338 , land for peace , the rights of the Palestinian People , and holy Jerusalem . Such achievement must be realized in the context of negotiation , and the peace process inaugurated in Madrid in October 1991, in its two parts : the bilateral and the multilateral .

The Palestinian people participated in the political negotiations motivated by a serious desire to achieve peace, despite the unfair conditions that we had to accept . We made it absolutely clear from the very beginning that we have accepted to go through the peace process to reach a comprehensive solution of the problem . We agreed to begin with transitional arrangements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories , leading to a just , honorable and permanent settlement within a specified time frame .

The negotiating process has been stalled because the proposals received by our delegation from the other side lacked the minimum balance needed, and because of the policy of deportation and oppression which has reached an alarming level theratening the interests of our people and its basic rights.

the International Community stands witness today , to the continuous daily suffering of our steadfast people. It must support our striving for peace within the context of negotiations that witnessed eight rounds of hard work , and have reached an impasse that benefits nobody , particularly as we approach a new era of regional and international changes and

developments .

We have accepted the option of peace , when the Palestinian people expressed with full sincerity its conscious will to reach a just and permanent settlement realizing its rights through peace and coexistence rather than war and confrontation . Our people has expressed its desire to put an end to violence and the spilling of blood, to generate hope for a secure future. A future that guarantees our peoples the historic opportunity to develop and prosper . A future that achieves welfare, under the protection of democracy that respects the rights of man , and his security .

We are keen to maintain coordination with our brothers in Egypt, Jordan, Syria , Lebanon and the rest of the Arab Countries . We are confident that they are committed to a comprehensive settlement of all the problems of our Area , and their core issue , the Palestine problem . Without an honorable just and permanent solution of the Palestine problem, peace cannot be achieved, and security cannot be guaranteed in the Middle East . We are confident that any progress that can be realized within the context of the peace process is an achievement for all of us . That is why the Palestinian people represented by the Palestine Liberation Organization will not hesitate to bear the full responsibility for establishing that just and pennanent peace.

22.2.93

Measures to Improve the Welfare of the Population of the Territories

1. General

a. The Civil Administration is responsible for the administration of civilian activities in the territories, for the welfare and in the better interest of the Arab population, the provision of public services and their operation.

b. The Civil Administration is responsible for the provision of economic and social services in the territories (education, health, welfare, development, etc.), endeavours to improve those services and raise the standard of living of the Arab population.

c. During the last two years emphasis has been placed on the development of employment opportunities and working places within the territories:

1) Improvement of the general atmosphere in order to create an attractive environment for investment.
2) Legislation to encourage private initiative and local industry, in order to encourage investment and labour absorption.

2. The Measures

a. Here are some details of the economic measures recently taken for the benefit of the people living in the territories:

1) Income Tax Reform:

a) Until the reform, started in 1991, income tax collection in the territories was based upon the system that existed before June 1967, with minor changes (such as periodic rate adjustments) through administrative orders. This system included 11 tax brackets such that marginal income tax rates ranged from 5.5 % to 55.0 %.

b) The goal of the reform was to simplify the calculation system as well a reduce the overall tax burden.

c) The main changes were:

(1) Cancelation of the 55 % bracket and setting of the highest marginal tax rate at 48 %.
(2) Establishment of a minimum wage.
(3) Reduction of the number of brackets from 11 to 5.
(4) Adjustment of the tax brackets.

d) Stages of the Implementation of the Tax Reform:

(1) Stage 1: On September 1, 1991 the existing tax brackets and personal deductions were updated by 14 %.

(2) Stage 2: Implementation of the overall reform as detailed in section c on January 1, 1992.

2) The Law for the Encouragement of Capital Investments

In order to encourage the establishment of new factories to provide additional sources of employment in the territories, the Law for the Encouragement of Capital Investments was enacted. The main incentives under the law are:

a) Income tax and property tax exemption for the first three years that a profit is registered, but no more than six years from the approval of the project as an " approved enterprise ".

b) Approval as an " approved enterprise " is possible for new factories or expansions of existing factories completed on or after January 1, 1991.

c) Until January 1993, 23 projects that will employ 320 workers, with an overall investment of 7.5 million dollars, have been approved in Gaza. Five projects have been approved in Judea - Samaria.

3) Procedure for the Encouragement of Foreign Investments

This procedure enables foreign investors that invest a minimum of 100,000 dollars to reside in the territories for an extended period and later gain residency. Until January 1993, 25 projects were approved in Gaza and 21 projects were approved in Judea - Samaria.

4) Organized Employment in Israel

Every employer in Israel is required to register his employees from the territories, which ensures that those workers receive appropriate wages and social benefits. Today, approximately 70 % of those employed in Israel are registered, compared to 30 % in the past.

5) Import of Monies into the Territories

All the restrictions on the import of monies, by any means (Jordan Bridges, Ben - Gurion Airport, bank transfers, etc.), were rescinded. Any resident can import any amount.

6) Banking

The Civil Administration encourages the establishment of new banks, financial establishments and the expansion of existing financial services in the Territories.

Recently, two new branches of the Cairo - Amman Bank opened in Bethlehem and Tulkarem and two more branches will soon be opening in Kalkiliya and Jericho. A new branch of the Palestine Bank was approved in the Rimal neighborhood of Gaza City.

A group of investors in Judea - Samaria has received approval to establish a new commercial bank.

7) Export Encouragement

We continue to encourage the export of agricultural and industrial goods from the Territories. Toward this goal the fees for trucks crossing the Jordan Bridges have been reduced by over 75 %, for agricultural goods, and over 60 %, for industrial goods. This is in addition to a 60 % reduction of the fee for trucks transporting agricultural goods in 1990.

8) New Factories

In addition to the Law for the Encouragement of Capital Investments and the Procedure for the Encouragement of Foreign Investments, the procedures for the approval of licences to establish new factories have been simplified and streamlined. In 1991 95 new factories were approved in Judea - Samaria and 165 new factories were established in the Gaza Area. In 1992 70 new factories were approved in Judea - Samaria and 90 new factories were approved in the Gaza Area.

9) Transfer of Agricultural Land to More Profitable Crops

Within the framework of the Civil Administration's ongoing efforts to develop the agricultural sector, we encourage the transfer of agricultural land to more profitable crops, through technical assistance and monetary grants, eg.: the transfer of former orange groves to hothouses for flowers in the Gaza Area.

10) Industrial Parks

The Civil Administration has initiated the establishment of new industrial parks at the following sites:

Gaza:

Beit Hanoun
Gaza City (Sheikh Ajlin)
Dir el - Balah
Expansion of the Erez Industrial Park

Judea - Samaria:

Nablus
Hebron

In addition to investments in existing industrial parks.

b. In order to improve the overall atmosphere, creating a more investment - attractive environment, for local and foreign investors, the following steps were taken:

1) The conditions for crossing the Jordan Bridges were improved, including a reduction of the number of body - checks upon entry, the possibility to purchase an exit pass at the post office and go directly to the bridge, without having to apply at the district Civil Administration Office.

2) Cancellation of the need for a certificate that one does not owe monies to the tax offices in order to receive services.

3) Cancellation of the special automobile tax.

4) Reopening of all the universities in the territories.

5) Approval for the opening of new Polytechnical Colleges in Khan Yunis and Gaza.

6) Reinitiation of the refugee resettlement plans in Najleh and Izbat Hanoun.

7) Elections for the Chambers of Commerce (in all the municipalities except Bethlehem).

8) The age over which there is no need for a permit to enter Israel was lowered from 60 to 50 years old.

9) Detainees were released by order of the Prime Minister in order to improve the atmosphere at the Peace Talks.

10) The baricades in several streets and alleys were removed.

11) Houses that were sealed over five years ago were reopened, on a case to case basis.

12) The publication of a new Arabic - language newspaper, "El Man'ar " was approved in East Jerusalem and the distribution of additional Arabic - language newspapers was approved in the territories: " Altihamir ", " Tsabah el - Hir ", " El Katab ", and " Kol el - Arab".

c. In 1992, several substantial legislative changes were made concerning arrest, detention and legal procedures:

1) The period within which a detainee must be brought before a judge was shortened from 18 to 8 days for minors residents of the Territories and adults suspected of disturbing the peace. The security authorities are examining the legal situation concerning adults accused of other offences.

2) By the initiative of the Minister of Justice, it is no longer possible to issue orders for administrative detention for a full year, the maximum is now six months.

3) A defendant charged in military court can submit an appeal of the military court's decision concerning his arrest to the Military Appeals Court.
The result of this change is the expansion of the rights of detainees concerning all matters related to their detention, in order to ensure proper legal supervision of the appeals procedures concerning detention.

4) The authority of the court to issue arrest orders has been restricted to 30 days, following which the arrest order may only be extended by the Military Appeals Court.

These steps, adding to the defence and supervision mechanisms concerning the detention of residents in the Territories were enacted despite increased violent activities.

MIDDLE EAST: ARMS CONTROL AND REGIONAL SECURITY WORKING GROUP:
EC PRESIDENCY PRESENTATION

15/9/92

CONFIDENCE BUILDING IN EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST

Introduction

1. The Community and its member states welcome this opportunity to contribute further to work of this Group. It is my privilege to speak as representative of the Presidency on behalf of the other European Community delegations.

2. The first seminar of this Group heard presentations on how the European states were able to establish an incremental system of confidence and security building measures through the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and its associated negotiating fora. The prominent landmarks have been the documents agreed at Helsinki, Stockholm and Vienna. This process played a major part in stabilising the European Cold War, and paved the way for multilateral conventional arms reductions through the CFE Treaty.

3. I do not intend to cover this ground again, but to look at how elements of the European experience in developing multilateral CSBMs, and I stress the word multilateral, might be applied in the Middle East. I deal with confidence building in the military field; other forms of CSBM are beyond the brief of this group.

Europe and the Middle East

4. There is a growing literature analysing the relevance of European style CSBMs for the Middle East. The current European model - the CSCE - cannot be directly exported. I will review some of the reasons:

(a) By the early 1970s, when multilateral security negotiations in Europe finally began after a number of false dawns, post-war Europe had reached a fairly stable, bipolar standoff. By contrast, contemporary politics in the Middle East still present a complex mosaic of active and recently buried political disputes, and the military balances are complicated and unstable.

(b) For all the tension, there had been no hostilities between the blocs in Europe since 1949. In the Middle East there have been three major military crises in the last decade, and there are a number of potential flash points.

(c) European confidence building measures were negotiated within an established state system (more stable in the 1970s than now). Once the frontiers of the two German states and of Poland were established in 1970, there were no active territorial disputes such as that between Israel and the Palestinians or Israel and Syria, or certain Arab states. No party to European negotiations was dedicated to changing the status quo. That is not the case in the Middle East today.

(d) The greater stability of European political institutions, together with alliance disciplines, made it easier for parties

in Europe to have faith in agreements and Treaties.

(e) There is an obvious difference of geographical scale. Lack of strategic depth is a critical concern to many Middle Eastern states. The confidence generated by CSBMs such as monitoring of military manoeuvres is proportional to the distance these activities are removed from the territory of states which might perceive them as a threat.

(f) European CSBMs were an outcome of a process involving the two superpowers, whereas the Middle East peace process is sponsored by them. This presents a different role for non-regional states and organisations in promoting, monitoring and underwriting agreements.

5. Against all this there are telling parallels between the political conditions in the Middle East today and those in Europe in the 1970s, and there are other reasons why the Middle East may now be ripe for the start of military confidence building;

(a) In the Middle East, a new political mood is developing which in some respects is reminiscent of the onset of detente in Europe in the late Sixties and Seventies. For the first time it allows us to take seriously the idea of multilateral confidence building in the region. Not only are states prepared to talk to each other, but they are focusing these discussions on the central political issues.

(b) The major external powers are cooperating as never before to end conflict in the region.

(c) The peoples of the Middle East, like the peoples of Europe, seek peace and security, and their governments wish to avoid unplanned hostilities triggered by accident or

misunderstanding.

(d) It is now widely recognised in the Middle East that the development of military technology is making war too dangerous to contemplate and massive armament too expensive. Limited war is not a realistic option.

(e) Perhaps most important, there is already a history of sophisticated confidence building and conflict prevention in the Middle East as a result of the various bilateral armistice, disengagement and peace agreements. In fact, in this, as in many things, the Middle East has had a thing or two to teach Europe. I shall return to this point later.

6. On balance, the apparent dissimilarities between the two regions may seem greater than their similarities. But this should not blind us to the potential for new approaches in the Middle East. It certainly does not mean that the principles which underlie European military confidence building, and the lessons which can be drawn from that experience, cannot be useful in the Middle East. We may need different architecture, but we can build with the same clay.

CSBMs: Basic Principles

7. The present edifice of CSBMs in Europe has been gradually constructed on three principles:

(a) The first of these is openness. The first steps in Europe involved lowering the level of suspicion by reducing military secrecy and developing the habit of exchanging information in ways which gave reassurance that military activity did not carry hostile intent. These first steps, at Helsinki in 1975, were very limited in their scope.

(b) The next principle was verification, permitting states to check for themselves that undertakings were being observed. The move to direct verification in Europe came several years after the first steps towards openness.

(c) The third and most recent element is constraint. This involves states not only undertaking to provide information and allow its verification, but also accepting limits on certain military activities. These may be quantitative limits on the size of their military forces, as under the CFE Treaty, or ceilings on military manoeuvres and training.

Realistic Aims

8. In considering how these principles can be applied in the Middle East, we have to start out with realistic objectives. All states in the region have their own agenda of security concerns. So did the states of Europe. But if they had set out in 1973 to negotiate a full blown European security system in one fell swoop they would never have got to the table. Instead, after much hard negotiation, they managed to agree some small, practical steps. The first CSBMs agreed in the Helsinki Final Act were of limited scope and voluntary application. The present system of verified commitments took 20 years to come to fruition and is still evolving; and they remain political as opposed to mandatory legal commitments.

9. At any point in the process of developing CBSMs, the limits of the possible are set by political realities. No state can be expected to agree to anything which jeopardises its security, nor make unilateral concessions to potential enemies. The essence of confidence building lies in finding compromises which on balance all parties perceive to serve their interests. Nor are CSBMs an end in themselves: they

can neither settle political disputes nor provide the tangible security of arms control. But if the will exists, they can contribute to a dynamic of political change and facilitate arms control agreements. The beauty of CSBMs is that they can be negotiated before political disputes have been resolved; and by stabilising the disputes make their resolution easier.

Middle East Experience

10. Earlier on, I mentioned the existing achievements in the Middle East in confidence building and conflict prevention. The various agreements signed between Syria, Israel and Egypt between 1974-1979 are a rich quarry of CBSMs which could have wider application. As you know, they include provision for specified lines of separation of forces; zonal limitations on manpower and weapon deployments; and verification by external observers. There are also the less formal understandings between certain states in the region relating to troop and aircraft deployments.

11. Those agreements resulted from bilateral negotiations. We must hope that the present bilateral peace talks will produce more such agreements in the context of political settlements. But the question this group might address is how present and future bilateral agreements can be facilitated, complemented and perhaps absorbed by a multilateral framework.

Scope

12. We also have to consider the structural questions of which states and peoples in the region are to participate. Presumably, the long term objective will be a network of interlocking multilateral measures, and institutionalised

procedures for consultation, covering the entire region. But without losing sight of this objective, in the first instance it may be realistic to consider a few sub-regional agreements between groups of countries which have a common interest in resolving a particular problem. It seems to us, for example, that there is merit, for example, in the proposal for an agreement on prevention of incidents at sea between the states bordering on the Red Sea. A similar measure may be possible in the Gulf.

Specific Measures

13. In considering specific measures with which a start could be made I make three assumptions: first, that the first step should be to work on increasing openness and communication; second, that initial measures will be voluntary rather than mandatory; and third, that participation in some measures may be limited to regional sub-groups of states.

14. Early transparency measures which might be made to work in the Middle East include:

(a) The voluntary hosting of border tours by external observers and/or observers from the region, perhaps using helicopters, so as to demonstrate absence of hostile intent. The use of other forms of aerial surveillance could be developed from this.

(b) Creation of a forum for contact between senior military personnel in the region. This could eventually lead to more elaborate conflict prevention mechanisms.

(c) Limited provision of information about military holdings, perhaps limited to major categories of armaments deployed

within prescribed areas (ie extending the concept of bilateral limited deployment zones).

15. There are three ideas which we think particularly promising: two are intended to reduce the risk of accidental war; the other would be a first step to increasing openness.

(a) The first is establishment of a network of emergency communications through hotline arrangements on the model of the 1963 US/USSR Memorandum of Understanding and subsequent agreements. A multilateral network of this sort could significantly reduce the risk of accidental war. Introducing it would require an effort of political will among states which have not recognised each other, but this should become more realisable as the habit of contact is instilled through the bilateral peace process and through groups such as this one. A system of instant communications at the political level could be complemented by networks between adjacent forces; here, the East/West Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities Agreement could be a useful model, as could the CSBM on cooperation as regards Hazardous Incidents of a Military Nature.

(b) The second measure would be a mechanism for consultation and cooperation over unusual military activities. Under this, any state with concerns about unusual or unscheduled activity of military forces outside their normal peacetime locations might request an explanation through a regional communications system, similar to that established by CSCE Member States, and the Moscow branch which we will visit on Thursday.

(c) The third idea is for an agreement on voluntary provision of advance notice of planned major military exercises. This could be done among regional states or involve a neutral third party. Transparency on manoeuvres was the first military CSBM negotiated in Europe. The scale and location of exercises to

be covered would have to be agreed, and as in Europe the measure might initially be limited to exercises within a prescribed distance from international borders, although the differences of scale would need to be taken into account.

Role of Outside States: Observation and Verification

16. I have mentioned the role for an external third party as repository for information provided by regional states, in the belief that this might enhance the authority of agreements. If this course were taken, the third party could be a state, group of states, or international organisation. External parties could also, if appropriate, take on observation and verification tasks.

Weapons of Mass Destruction

17. I have not yet touched on the issue of weapons of mass destruction, which is so critical to the building of genuine security and confidence. This is a most sensitive issue. States in the region share a desire for a zone free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. This is not the easiest issue to tackle in the early stages of confidence building. The problems of transparency and verification are formidable; and, as in all Middle East negotiations, there are good reasons not to start with the toughest nut. We also attach importance to universal adherence to global non-proliferation régimes, the latest of which is the prospective Chemical Weapons Convention.

Further Work

18. This presentation has been mainly analytical. The Community and its Member States believe that at this early stage it is important to try to throw some light on general

scope of what we are setting out to do. The ideas we have put forward are intended to be illustrative and not prescriptive. We are willing to assist the regional parties. We do not try to impose views.

19. One area I have deliberately not touched on is institutional and procedural questions. Yet once we have formed a clearer idea of the scope for CSBMs in the Middle East this would be a natural next step. If the regional parties would find it useful, the British delegation, on behalf of the Community and other Member States, is ready to prepare a short paper for the next meeting of the group. This could either describe the procedures adopted for military CSBM negotiation in Europe and suggest possible structures and procedures in the Middle East, or alternatively develop the three specific suggestions we have made for possible CSBMs in the Middle East.

MIDDLE EAST: ARMS CONTROL AND REGIONAL SECURITY WORKING GROUP:
EC PRESIDENCY PRESENTATION

15/9/92

CONFIDENCE BUILDING IN EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST

Introduction

1. The Community and its member states welcome this opportunity to contribute further to work of this Group. It is my privilege to speak as representative of the Presidency on behalf of the other European Community delegations.

2. The first seminar of this Group heard presentations on how the European states were able to establish an incremental system of confidence and security building measures through the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and its associated negotiating fora. The prominent landmarks have been the documents agreed at Helsinki, Stockholm and Vienna. This process played a major part in stabilising the European Cold War, and paved the way for multilateral conventional arms reductions through the CFE Treaty.

3. I do not intend to cover this ground again, but to look at how elements of the European experience in developing multilateral CSBMs, and I stress the word multilateral, might be applied in the Middle East. I deal with confidence building in the military field; other forms of CSBM are beyond the brief of this group.

Europe and the Middle East

4. There is a growing literature analysing the relevance of European style CSBMs for the Middle East. The current European model - the CSCE - cannot be directly exported. I will review some of the reasons:

(a) By the early 1970s, when multilateral security negotiations in Europe finally began after a number of false dawns, post-war Europe had reached a fairly stable, bipolar standoff. By contrast, contemporary politics in the Middle East still present a complex mosaic of active and recently buried political disputes, and the military balances are complicated and unstable.

(b) For all the tension, there had been no hostilities between the blocs in Europe since 1949. In the Middle East there have been three major military crises in the last decade, and there are a number of potential flash points.

(c) European confidence building measures were negotiated within an established state system (more stable in the 1970s than now). Once the frontiers of the two German states and of Poland were established in 1970, there were no active territorial disputes such as that between Israel and the Palestinians or Israel and Syria, or certain Arab states. No party to European negotiations was dedicated to changing the status quo. That is not the case in the Middle East today.

(d) The greater stability of European political institutions, together with alliance disciplines, made it easier for parties

in Europe to have faith in agreements and Treaties.

(e) There is an obvious difference of geographical scale. Lack of strategic depth is a critical concern to many Middle Eastern states. The confidence generated by CSBMs such as monitoring of military manoeuvres is proportional to the distance these activities are removed from the territory of states which might perceive them as a threat.

(f) European CSBMs were an outcome of a process involving the two superpowers, whereas the Middle East peace process is sponsored by them. This presents a different role for non-regional states and organisations in promoting, monitoring and underwriting agreements.

5. Against all this there are telling parallels between the political conditions in the Middle East today and those in Europe in the 1970s, and there are other reasons why the Middle East may now be ripe for the start of military confidence building;

(a) In the Middle East, a new political mood is developing which in some respects is reminiscent of the onset of detente in Europe in the late Sixties and Seventies. For the first time it allows us to take seriously the idea of multilateral confidence building in the region. Not only are states prepared to talk to each other, but they are focusing these discussions on the central political issues.

(b) The major external powers are cooperating as never before to end conflict in the region.

(c) The peoples of the Middle East, like the peoples of Europe, seek peace and security, and their governments wish to avoid unplanned hostilities triggered by accident or

misunderstanding.

(d) It is now widely recognised in the Middle East that the development of military technology is making war too dangerous to contemplate and massive armament too expensive. Limited war is not a realistic option.

(e) Perhaps most important, there is already a history of sophisticated confidence building and conflict prevention in the Middle East as a result of the various bilateral armistice, disengagement and peace agreements. In fact, in this, as in many things, the Middle East has had a thing or two to teach Europe. I shall return to this point later.

6. On balance, the apparent dissimilarities between the two regions may seem greater than their similarities. But this should not blind us to the potential for new approaches in the Middle East. It certainly does not mean that the principles which underlie European military confidence building, and the lessons which can be drawn from that experience, cannot be useful in the Middle East. We may need different architecture, but we can build with the same clay.

CSBMs: Basic Principles

7. The present edifice of CSBMs in Europe has been gradually constructed on three principles:

(a) The first of these is openness. The first steps in Europe involved lowering the level of suspicion by reducing military secrecy and developing the habit of exchanging information in ways which gave reassurance that military activity did not carry hostile intent. These first steps, at Helsinki in 1975, were very limited in their scope.

(b) The next principle was verification, permitting states to check for themselves that undertakings were being observed. The move to direct verification in Europe came several years after the first steps towards openness.

(c) The third and most recent element is constraint. This involves states not only undertaking to provide information and allow its verification, but also accepting limits on certain military activities. These may be quantitative limits on the size of their military forces, as under the CFE Treaty, or ceilings on military manoeuvres and training.

Realistic Aims

8. In considering how these principles can be applied in the Middle East, we have to start out with realistic objectives. All states in the region have their own agenda of security concerns. So did the states of Europe. But if they had set out in 1973 to negotiate a full blown European security system in one fell swoop they would never have got to the table. Instead, after much hard negotiation, they managed to agree some small, practical steps. The first CSBMs agreed in the Helsinki Final Act were of limited scope and voluntary application. The present system of verified commitments took 20 years to come to fruition and is still evolving; and they remain political as opposed to mandatory legal commitments.

9. At any point in the process of developing CBSMs, the limits of the possible are set by political realities. No state can be expected to agree to anything which jeopardises its security, nor make unilateral concessions to potential enemies. The essence of confidence building lies in finding compromises which on balance all parties perceive to serve their interests. Nor are CSBMs an end in themselves: they

can neither settle political disputes nor provide the tangible security of arms control. But if the will exists, they can contribute to a dynamic of political change and facilitate arms control agreements. The beauty of CSBMs is that they can be negotiated before political disputes have been resolved; and by stabilising the disputes make their resolution easier.

Middle East Experience

10. Earlier on, I mentioned the existing achievements in the Middle East in confidence building and conflict prevention. The various agreements signed between Syria, Israel and Egypt between 1974-1979 are a rich quarry of CBSMs which could have wider application. As you know, they include provision for specified lines of separation of forces; zonal limitations on manpower and weapon deployments; and verification by external observers. There are also the less formal understandings between certain states in the region relating to troop and aircraft deployments.

11. Those agreements resulted from bilateral negotiations. We must hope that the present bilateral peace talks will produce more such agreements in the context of political settlements. But the question this group might address is how present and future bilateral agreements can be facilitated, complemented and perhaps absorbed by a multilateral framework.

Scope

12. We also have to consider the structural questions of which states and peoples in the region are to participate. Presumably, the long term objective will be a network of interlocking multilateral measures, and institutionalised

procedures for consultation, covering the entire region. But without losing sight of this objective, in the first instance it may be realistic to consider a few sub-regional agreements between groups of countries which have a common interest in resolving a particular problem. It seems to us, for example, that there is merit, for example, in the proposal for an agreement on prevention of incidents at sea between the states bordering on the Red Sea. A similar measure may be possible in the Gulf.

Specific Measures

13. In considering specific measures with which a start could be made I make three assumptions: first, that the first step should be to work on increasing openness and communication; second, that initial measures will be voluntary rather than mandatory; and third, that participation in some measures may be limited to regional sub-groups of states.

14. Early transparency measures which might be made to work in the Middle East include:

(a) The voluntary hosting of border tours by external observers and/or observers from the region, perhaps using helicopters, so as to demonstrate absence of hostile intent. The use of other forms of aerial surveillance could be developed from this.

(b) Creation of a forum for contact between senior military personnel in the region. This could eventually lead to more elaborate conflict prevention mechanisms.

(c) Limited provision of information about military holdings, perhaps limited to major categories of armaments deployed

within prescribed areas (ie extending the concept of bilateral limited deployment zones).

15. There are three ideas which we think particularly promising: two are intended to reduce the risk of accidental war; the other would be a first step to increasing openness.

(a) The first is establishment of a network of emergency communications through hotline arrangements on the model of the 1963 US/USSR Memorandum of Understanding and subsequent agreements. A multilateral network of this sort could significantly reduce the risk of accidental war. Introducing it would require an effort of political will among states which have not recognised each other, but this should become more realisable as the habit of contact is instilled through the bilateral peace process and through groups such as this one. A system of instant communications at the political level could be complemented by networks between adjacent forces; here, the East/West Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities Agreement could be a useful model, as could the CSBM on cooperation as regards Hazardous Incidents of a Military Nature.

(b) The second measure would be a mechanism for consultation and cooperation over unusual military activities. Under this, any state with concerns about unusual or unscheduled activity of military forces outside their normal peacetime locations might request an explanation through a regional communications system, similar to that established by CSCE Member States, and the Moscow branch which we will visit on Thursday.

(c) The third idea is for an agreement on voluntary provision of advance notice of planned major military exercises. This could be done among regional states or involve a neutral third party. Transparency on manoeuvres was the first military CSBM negotiated in Europe. The scale and location of exercises to

be covered would have to be agreed, and as in Europe the measure might initially be limited to exercises within a prescribed distance from international borders, although the differences of scale would need to be taken into account.

Role of Outside States: Observation and Verification

16. I have mentioned the role for an external third party as repository for information provided by regional states, in the belief that this might enhance the authority of agreements. If this course were taken, the third party could be a state, group of states, or international organisation. External parties could also, if appropriate, take on observation and verification tasks.

Weapons of Mass Destruction

17. I have not yet touched on the issue of weapons of mass destruction, which is so critical to the building of genuine security and confidence. This is a most sensitive issue. States in the region share a desire for a zone free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. This is not the easiest issue to tackle in the early stages of confidence building. The problems of transparency and verification are formidable; and, as in all Middle East negotiations, there are good reasons not to start with the toughest nut. We also attach importance to universal adherence to global non-proliferation régimes, the latest of which is the prospective Chemical Weapons Convention.

Further Work

18. This presentation has been mainly analytical. The Community and its Member States believe that at this early stage it is important to try to throw some light on general

scope of what we are setting out to do. The ideas we have put forward are intended to be illustrative and not prescriptive. We are willing to assist the regional parties. We do not try to impose views.

19. One area I have deliberately not touched on is institutional and procedural questions. Yet once we have formed a clearer idea of the scope for CSBMs in the Middle East this would be a natural next step. If the regional parties would find it useful, the British delegation, on behalf of the Community and other Member States, is ready to prepare a short paper for the next meeting of the group. This could either describe the procedures adopted for military CSBM negotiation in Europe and suggest possible structures and procedures in the Middle East, or alternatively develop the three specific suggestions we have made for possible CSBMs in the Middle East.

SECRET

DRAFT FOR CONSIDERATION

September 8, 1992

INFORMAL

CONCEPT OF THE INTERIM SELF-GOVERNMENT ARRANGEMENTS

BUILDING BLOCKS FOR AGREEMENT

CONTENTS

A. NEGOTIATING FRAMEWORK 1
1. GOAL OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIANS OF THE TERRITORIES AND TERMS OF REFERENCE: 1
ANOTATIONS: 1
(1) AGREEMENT 1
(2) INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS 2
(3) RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 2
2. PREPARATORY AND SUPPORTIVE MEASURES FOR BUILDING CONFIDENCE .. 3
3. WORKING GROUPS 3
4. TIMETABLE 4

B. CONCEPT OF THE INTERIM SELF-GOVERNMENT ARRANGEMENTS 5
1. JURISDICTION 5
2. PALESTINIAN ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL (PAC) 6
3. STRUCTURE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL 6
4. GENERAL POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL..... 6
* REGULATIONS AND BYLAWS 6
* DECISION MAKING 6
* PLANNING 6
5. SPHERES OF OPERATION 7
6. COOPERATION AND COORDINATION 7
SPECIAL ISSUES FOR COOPERATION AND COORDINATION 7
(1) WATER 7
(2) LAND 8
7. JORDANIAN RELATED ISSUES 8
8. RESIDUAL POWERS 9
(1) SECURITY 9
(2) FOREIGN RELATIONS 9
(3) ISRAELIS IN THE TERRITORIES 9

C. MODALITIES FOR ESTABLISHING THE ISGA AND FOR IMPLEMENTING THE INTERIM AGREEMENT 10
1. ELECTIONS 10
2. ASSIGNMENT OF AUTHORITIES, POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 10
3. ACCESS TO RELEVANT INFORMATION AND PUBLIC RECORDS 10

D. COMPONENTS OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE AND OTHER MATTERS OF COMMON CONCERN 11
1. LIAISON AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION 11
2. COOPERATION AND COORDINATION 11

SECRET

DRAFT FOR CONSIDERATION

September 8, 1992

INFORMAL

CONCEPT OF THE INTERIM SELF-GOVERNMENT ARRANGEMENTS

BUILDING BLOCKS FOR AGREEMENT

A. NEGOTIATING FRAMEWORK

1. GOAL OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIANS OF THE TERRITORIES AND TERMS OF REFERENCE:

Agreed Interim Self-Government Arrangements for a period of five years. Beginning the third year, negotiations on the permanent status will take place, on the basis of Resolutions 242 and 338. (1)

ANOTATIONS:

a. In order to bridge the gaps between the Israeli and Palestinian positions, we propose the use of former accepted formulations, thus, our formulation of the goal of negotiations is based on the accepted terms of reference included in the Madrid invitation.

b. It should be noted that the permanent status negotiations should include Jordan, both as the Madrid invitation relates to the Joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation and to tha Palestinians who are part of it, and because 242 deals with states, as is clear from its language.

b. The formulation we suggest contains three basic elements:

(1) AGREEMENT

Our negotiations must culminate in an agreement containing all relevant elements and issues necessary to achieve the goal of Interim Self-Government Arrangements.

The agreement should be concluded and signed by the negotiating partners, namely, the Israeli and Jordanian-Palestinian delegations. This will grant the agreement its international standing and will assure its acceptability to all concerned.

The agreement we envisage may include a number of documents: the main agreement on the relevant principles, and annexes to deal with special matters (various spheres, elections modalities etc.). (2)

---

1) Israel Draft Common Agenda 2.9.92 - based on the Madrid invitation
2) Based on Israel's Further Ideas and Proposals of 21.8.92

(2) INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS

The basic idea of interim arrangements for a limited period of time stems from the realization that the time for an agreement on the end result is not yet ripe. The interim arrangements should prepare the ground and create the proper atmosphere for the negotiations on the permanent status, it must not pre-meditate or prejudge the permanent status itself.

The Palestinian proposals pre-meditate one solution only - that of a Palestinian state. Thus, the process is reversed and the interim arrangements become the products of the concept of the permanent status and not the products of negotiations. There are different concepts of the permanent status, and they should be raised and negotiated in the proper time and forum, meanwhile, the concept of the permanent status must remain undefined and the interim arrangements should leave all options open for the agreement on the permanent status.

The use of both interim versus transitional arrangements connote the fact that the arrangements agreed upon will not be of a permanent nature, but while the term "transitional" denies the arrangements a value of their own, subjecting them to the pre-meditated end-result, the term "interim" adds to the arrangements a value of their own as a confidence and trust - building measures, so much needed for the continuation of the process.

The basic premise of the interim arrangements is that they should create a change in the reality of life of the Palestinians of the territories. The nature and contents of this change is the essence of the present negotiations.

(3) RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338

It is agreed that the permanent status negotiations and the negotiations between Israel and the Arab states, will take place on the basis of resolutions 242 and 338. (3)

This formulation was achieved on the basic understanding that resolution 242 has different interpretations, inter alia, concerning its territorial aspects.

Thus, it is agreed that the deliberations of the territorial - geographical aspects of these resolutions, together with other matters pertaining to the permanent status negotiations, should not be addressed in the context of the present interim arrangements' negotiations.

---

3) The Madrid invitation

2. PREPARATORY AND SUPPORTIVE MEASURES FOR BUILDING CONFIDENCE

Israel has shown it's good will by implementing some confidence building measures in the territories including releasing of prisoners, easing restrictive and preventive measures and revoking expulsion orders.

It was agreed to create a joint working group on human rights parallel to the negotiations. (4)

This working group should be established together with other working groups which will deal with issues directly connected to the Interim Self-Government Arrangements (see below).

Israel has agreed to a review of the legal systems in the territories, in the framework of a joint working group on legal matters which will deal with various legal aspects of the interim arrangements (see below).

Israel agreed also to allow access to relevant information and public records relating to the agreed powers and responsibilities and spheres of operation, in accordance with the agreed implementation stages of the agreement (see below).

3. WORKING GROUPS

In the framework of our joint deliberations, bearing in mind the need to enhance our negotiations, we proposed the establishment of several joint working groups to deal with some of the substantive issues of the ISGA, even while other matters are being discussed in the plenary.

These working groups may deal with the following matters (e.g.): (5)

Legal matters, including: Review of the legal systems in the territories; legal aspects of the ISGA such as: Administration of Justice; Local Police, etc.

Concept of the Interim Arrangements: Jurisdiction; Structure;

Powers and responsibilities; Spheres of operation

Economic matters pertaining to movement of persons and goods etc.

Election modalities (following agreement on Concept)

---

4) Israel Draft common agenda 2.9.92
5) Israel Draft common agenda 2.9.92

4. TIMETABLE

We already proposed that a time frame will be set to the negotiations, which will be held in an agreed consecutive stages.

Negotiations on elections' modalities could commence only after the concept of the Interim Arrangements is agreed upon. thus, if we proceed properly, negotiations on modalities could, for instance, be completed by December 1992.

Negotiations on powers and responsibilities and on the spheres of operation, if commenced now and held parallel to the modalities' negotiations , could be completed by February 1993.

Thus, elections to the Administrative Council could take place in April - May 1993.

The above dates were offered as a suggestion, based on the achievement of an understanding on the principles and concept of the Interim Self-Government Arrangements and on progress in the negotiations. (6)

---

6) based on Israel's "further ideas and proposals 21.8.92

B. CONCEPT OF THE INTERIM SELF-GOVERNMENT ARRANGEMENTS

1. JURISDICTION

The issue of the territorial-geographical jurisdiction should be deferred to the permanent status negotiations.

The concept of jurisdiction during the interim period of self - government arrangements should be powers-and-responsibilities oriented, based on the four General Principles contained in our informal outline of 20.8.92 - namely:

* Establishment of a Palestinian Administrative Council which will administer the affairs of the Palestinians of the territories in the agreed spheres of operations that affect their own lives, in accordance with the agreement.

* Spheres of operation that affect Israel, the territories, and the interaction between them, and between Israeli citizens and Palestinians in the territories, should be handled by the Palestinian Administrative Council in coordination and cooperation with the designated organs of the Government of Israel.

* Certain areas that affect Israel's basic rights and interests, and residual powers, will remain Israel's responsibility and will be operated by Israel.

* Jordan's participation in the interim arrangements can be of benefit for all.

Thus;

The Powers and Responsibilities of the ISGA will applied to the majority of the walks of life of the Palestinians of the territories, and they will have relevant infrastructure aspects within the territories presently under Israeli military administration.

The Palestinian Administrative Council will, in the framework of the above, be accountable to its Palestinian Constituency / electorate.

The powers and responsibilities of the Administrative Council will not apply to the Israeli security forces and authorities, nor to Israelis in the territories.

2. PALESTINIAN ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL (PAC)

The organs of the Interim Self-Government Arrangements must reflect the agreed administrative-functional characteristics of these arrangements.

Thus:

A Palestinian Administrative Council will be elected by the Palestinians of the territories from among the Palestinians of the territories, to discharge those powers and responsibilities which will be assigned to them, according to the agreement.

3. STRUCTURE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL

the Palestinian Administrative council will be one, freely elected, administrative-functional body.

The number of its members will be 15, in accordance with the functional-administrative spheres of operation that will be operated by it.

The Administrative Council will select its own chairman from among its members, and allocate the spheres of operation among its members.

4. GENERAL POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL

The Palestinian Administrative Council, as one administrative - functional body, will have the following general powers and responsibilities:

* REGULATIONS AND BYLAWS

Power to promulgate regulations in its spheres of operations, subject to the agreement, including arrangements for coordination and cooperation with Israel, as well as Jordanian related aspects.

* DECISION MAKING

Power to enter into contracts, sue and be sued, and to decide on administrative matters relating to the operation of their spheres of operations, such as:

- budget and financing;
- allocation of functions;
- supervise and audit its sections operations.

* PLANNING

Power to engage in planning in those spheres of operation that will be vested with these powers in accordance with the agreement, such as: Zoning, Agricultural production, Water and sewage systems, etc.

5. SPHERES OF OPERATION

The detailed list of the spheres of operation of the organs of the Administrative Council and the powers and responsibilities that will be discharged by them, is contained in our Informal Outline of 20.8.92.

6. COOPERATION AND COORDINATION

In our Informal Outline of August 20, 1992, we envisaged a multi-faceted mechanisms for cooperation and coordination between the Administrative Council and designated organs of the Israeli Government, during the Interim Period.

The cooperation and coordination concept is based on four basic assumptions:

* The operation of some of the suggested powers and responsibilities by the Administrative Council, has security connotations which should be addressed jointly, due to the overall Israeli responsibility for security.

* Some spheres of operation of the Administrative Council should be operated in cooperation and coordination with Israel as a necessity. These spheres include, inter alia, the movements of persons and goods between the territories, Israel and other countries; distribution of vital imported products; operating common infrastructures and joint vital systems (e.g. roads, sewage, electricity).

* Some spheres of operations should be handled in cooperation and coordination for the benefit of the populations of the territories and Israel. these spheres are connected mostly to the various economic activities.

* Improper handling of some of the powers and responsibilities may adversely affect and prejudge the outcome of the permanent status' negotiations.

The main target of this cooperation and coordination concept is, therefore, to avoid creating areas of friction and conflict and enable a smooth operation of the Interim Self-Government Arrangements.

SPECIAL ISSUES FOR COOPERATION AND COORDINATION

(1) WATER

The subject of water in the territories will be determined in the course of the negotiations on the permanent status.

During the interim arrangements' period every additional uses and development of water resources in the territories will be based on the following principles:

* The present use of water in the territories and in Israel will not be adversely affected;

* A joint body of Israel and the Administrative Council will deal with the changing needs of water, and with the preparation of development projects for the benefit of all. Decisions in this body will be taken by consensus. (7)

(2) LAND

The subject of land in the territories will be determined in the course of the negotiations on the permanent status.

During the interim arrangements' period:

* Lawful private possession and ownership of land by any person will be protected without any discrimination on grounds of religion, national or ethnic origin, residence or citizenship;

* Land in the possession of or allocated to or administered by localities inhabited by Israelis, and lands included in the Israeli security locations will be administered by an organ designated by Israel;

* Land in the possession of or allocated to or administered by localities inhabited by Palestinians, will be administered by the Municipal Affairs section of the Administrative Council in accordance with the agreed arrangements.

* Uses of other lands will be subject to approval, by consensus, by a joint body of Israel and the Administrative Council. (8)

7. JORDANIAN RELATED ISSUES

The traditional connections between Jordan and the Palestinians of the territories and Jordan's involvement in the walks of life in the territories, require the participation of Jordan in the interim arrangements in such spheres as:

* Participation, as appropriate, in the review of the existing legislation in the territories taking into account the Jordanian legislation still in force in the territories.

* Taking part in the economic activities in the territories, including the banking and monetary systems.

* Participating, along with Israel, in security arrangements such as joint patrols along the borders and in connection with the activities of the local police force.

* Taking part in other matters, including (e.g.) religious matters, as necessary

* Taking part in the high liaison and coordination committee and in other relevant liaison committees.

---

7) הניסוח מבוסס על החלטת הממשלה מספטמבר 1980

8) הניסוח מבוסס על החלטת הממשלה מספטמבר 1980. הפיסקה על הישובים הערביים הוספה כאן

8. RESIDUAL POWERS

As stated above "certain areas that affect Israel's basic rights and interests, and residual powers, will remain Israel's responsibility and will be operated by Israel" whether specified in the agreement or not.

Those powers and responsibilities will include the following:

(1) SECURITY

The overall responsibility for external and internal security and public order, and all powers vested in it, will remain in Israel's hands (Hague regulations of 1907).

(2) FOREIGN RELATIONS

Foreign relations, being an attribute of a state, will not be exercised by the Administrative Council and will be included in the residual powers which will be reserved to Israel.

Foreign connections relevant to the administration of the spheres of operation of the Administrative Council will be negotiated as appropriate, and will be discharged by the said organs according to the agreement and in coordination with Israel.

Israel will not represent the Administrative Council or any of its organs in foreign countries or in international fora.

(3) ISRAELIS IN THE TERRITORIES

All Israelis in the territories, security forces and civilians, will be under Israeli jurisdiction.

The Administrative Council powers and responsibilities will not apply to the Israeli towns and villages nor to security locations in the territories.

C. MODALITIES FOR ESTABLISHING THE ISGA AND FOR IMPLEMENTING THE INTERIM AGREEMENT

This paragraph deals with the actions that should be taken following the agreement on the Interim Arrangements.

1. ELECTIONS

The elections modalities will be negotiated after the concept of the Interim Self-Government Arrangements will be agreed upon.

The concept of the general elections envisaged by Israel was described in our informal outline of 20.8.92, as follows:

"The Administrative Council will be elected by the Palestinians of the territories from among the Palestinians of the territories, in accordance with the agreed modalities.

The elections will be free, based on the preservation of the rights of peaceful assembly, free expression and secret ballot, and appropriate measures to prevent disruption and disorder.

Israelis will not participate in the elections for the Administrative Council."

2. ASSIGNMENT OF AUTHORITIES, POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Following the elections of the Administrative Council, the agreed authorities, powers and responsibilities will be assigned to the agreed designated organs of the Administrative Council.

3. ACCESS TO RELEVANT INFORMATION AND PUBLIC RECORDS

Access to various relevant information and public records will be provided, as appropriate, in the context of the understandings reached in the negotiations and on the modalities for the establishing the ISGA.

D. COMPONENTS OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE AND OTHER MATTERS OF COMMON CONCERN

This paragraph deals with the ongoing relations between Israel and the Palestinian Administrative Council during the Interim Arrangements' period.

Smooth running of the Interim Arrangements require peaceful coexistence between the populations in the territories and good faith in implementing the agreement.

The mechanisms devised for enhancing the expected good faith and coexistence are as follows:

1. LIAISON AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION

In our informal outline of 20.8.92 we described in detail our concept of monitoring processes and dispute resolution mechanisms:

"The cooperation and coordination regime requires a multi-level system of liaison between the organs of the Administrative Council and various Israeli government authorities and the Jordanian government. The multi-level liaison system will comprise of:

* A high liaison and and coordination committee;

* Liaison committees in the various spheres of operation;

* Special liaison committees to deal with special matters.

In a number of areas a monitoring process may accompany the implementation of the agreements and understandings.

A "trial and error" period may hence be required for necessary adjustments in accordance with the experience that will be gained.

The liaison mechanisms could serve this purpose too."

2. COOPERATION AND COORDINATION

It is expected that the Interim Arrangements' period will be characterized by complex relations between Israel and the Palestinian Administrative Council based on an intricate cooperation and coordination mechanisms.

the mechanisms are described in detail above and in our informal outline of 20.8.92.

August 21, 1992.

Interim Self Government Arrangement Negotiations

Further Ideas and Proposals

1. Enhancing the negotiations: The following outline is submitted in order to enhance and accelerate the negotiations on the Interim Self Government Arrangements. It is based both on the ideas and suggestions described by us in the negotiations and discussed so far, and on the guidelines and policy of the new government of Israel inaugurated in July. We suggest that the negotiations should continue as uninterruptedly as feasible, so that an understanding can be reached as soon as possible. Needless to say, we come to the negotiations with openness, respect and goodwill.

2. The present ideas broaden and augment our former position papers and proposals, by adding new proposals concerning the structure of the Interim Self-government Arrangements, the powers and responsibilities, the modalities of the implementation of the arrangements to be agreed upon as well as other matters.

(2)

3. Administrative Council:

(a) We suggest that the elected organ of the Interim Self-government Arrangements will be an Administrative Council. It will be elected by the Palestinian population of the territories from among the Palestinians of the territories in free democratic elections. This Administrative Council will be delegated the necessary powers to perform its duties and administer the affairs of the Palestinian population of the territories for the interim period, in the framework of agreements discussed hereinafter.

(b) The functioning of the Administrative Council will hopefully augur a new and significant era in the life of the Palestinians of the territories, while not prejudging the negotiations on the permanent status. Let us emphasize: the interim self-government arrangements, as their name indicates, are not a permanent solution. Therefore, whatever is agreed upon in them should keep the options open for the next stage of negotiations, beginning in the third year. At the same time, we suggest to make progress towards achieving success in the negotiations now, even though the permanent status is still not being negotiated. We urge you to share with us this notion and to work with us on the Interim Self-Government Arrangements and their details.

(3)

4. Powers and responsibilities: The concept of Interim Self-government Arrangements and its application should, in our view, be based on a fair and reasonable attitude towards the functions of the Administrative Council. It will definitely deal with a vast list of administrative-functional powers and responsibilities. At the same time, for obvious reasons its powers in various spheres must, in our view, include agreements on coordination or cooperation with Israel, sometimes amounting to sharing of responsibility. The responsibilities for security and foreign affairs as well as all matters dealing with the Israelis in the territories must be preserved by Israel in the framework of Israel's rights. Jordanian-related aspects constitute an important point which should also be dealt with, in conjunction with the Jordanians and through mutual understanding..

5. a. The proposed spheres are as follows:

1. Administration of justice, including courts of law and prosecution.
2. Administrative personnel matters.
3. Agriculture.
4. Ecology.
5. Education and Culture.
6. Finance, Budget and Taxation.
7. Health.
8. Industry and Commerce.

(4)

9. Labor.

10. Local Police, including prisons for criminal offenders.

11. Local Transportation and Communication.

12. Municipal Affairs to include: zoning; water supply; housing; sewage, electricity and by-laws.

13. Religious Affairs.

14. Social Welfare.

15. Tourism.

The spheres are detailed and elaborated on in the attached informal outline, focusing in particular on the Administrative Council. Attached also is a new draft of our proposed agenda.

b. We propose that the Administrative Council will be composed of 15 members, each responsible for a certain sphere of the powers and responsibilities of the Council. Together, they shall bear the responsibility for the overall management of the Council.

c. We propose that the various spheres of operation should be dealt with fairly soon, both in our plenary meetings and in committees. There are numerous details which must be addressed, and we look forward to doing it together with you.

6. Elections: As mentioned before we propose that the Administrative Council will be freely elected by the Palestinian population of the territories from among the Palestinians of the territories. The modalities for the elections should be discussed as soon as an understanding is reached on the principles related to the Administrative Council. They will obviously include all matters pertaining to the elections, including the right to vote and to be elected, the election system, and the campaign and implementation, as well as other related issues.

7. Liaison and Dispute Resolution: We propose that a liaison and dispute resolution mechanism be provided for by the agreement establishing the Interim Self-Government Arrangements. The proposed mechanism is a High Liaison and Coordination Committee, composed of Israel-Palestinians-Jordan. It may serve as a vital tool for all concerned, without prejudice to specific liaison mechanisms in various spheres of responsibility, which may be necessary. It could, inter alia, review those parts of the understandings that may require adjustments based, as appropriate, on the lessons drawn during the implementation.

8. Timetable: If the concept of the Administrative Council is agreed upon, negotiations on modalities and on powers and responsibilities could commence: negotiations on modalities could, for instance, be completed by December 1992, on powers and responsibilities - by February 1993, and elections could take place in April - May 1993. The above dates are offered as a suggestion, based on the achievement of an understanding on the principles and progress in the negotiations.

9. Committees: We are ready to discuss any ideas in the framework of our joint deliberations that may help in giving the process a dynamic nature. In this respect, we propose to establish, without delay, committees to go into relevant details. Committees dealing (e.g.) with the structure, powers and responsibilities of the Administrative Council, including its various spheres of operation (and possible specialized subcommittees as appropriate), could achieve a lot and promote progress. The convening of committees may take place even while other matters are being discussed in the plenary.

10. A. The agreement on the Interim Self-Government Arrangements should include all relevant issues, and should be concluded and signed by the Israeli and Jordanian-Palestinian delegations. This will grant the agreement its international standing and will assure its acceptability to all concerned.

B. The agreement we envisage may include a number of documents: the main agreement on the relevant principles, and annexes to deal with special matters (various spheres, elections modalities etc.).

(8)

5. Borders and related issues.

6. Exploring potential for future cooperation in such fields as tourism, transport, civil aviation, health and drug control etc.

7. Timetables for the implementation of items above and the creation of appropriate mechanisms for negotiations, such as (e.g.) committees, in specific fields.

8. Discussion of matters related to both tracks to be decided upon in common.

15. TOURISM

ere of operations

urist services, s

licensing and
guides, touris

levelopment, opera

Cooperation in
the territories.

Reciprocal rel
services, inclu

Training and

Tourist cross
cooperation o

August 20, 1992

9

INFORMAL DRAFT

COMMON AGENDA

1. A. GOAL OF NEGOTIATIONS

Agreed Interim Self-Government Arrangements (ISGA) for the Palestinians in the territories for five years.

B. CONCEPT OF THE INTERIM SELF-GOVERNMENT ARRANGEMENTS, (including COMPONENTS OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE AND OTHER MATTERS OF COMMON CONCERN).

C. JURISDICTION AND STRUCTURE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL.

D. POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES; SPHERES OF OPERATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL OF THE ISGA:

1. Administration of Justice
   including courts of law and prosecution
2. Administrative personnel matters
3. Agriculture
4. Ecology
5. Education and Culture
6. Finance, Budget and Taxation
7. Health
8. Industry and Commerce
9. Labor
10. Local Police
    including prisons for criminal offenders
11. Local Transportation and Communication
12. Municipal Affairs
    to include: zoning; water supply; housing; sewage; electricity and bylaws
13. Religious Affairs
14. Social Welfare
15. Tourism

Subject to:
- Cooperation and coordination with Israel in the agreed spheres of operations;
- Jordanian related issues;

E. MODALITIES OPTIONS FOR ESTABLISHING THE ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL THROUGH ELECTIONS, AND FOR IMPLEMENTING THE INTERIM AGREEMENT.

F. LIAISON AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION; A HIGH LIAISON AND COORDINATION COMMITTEE (Israel-Palestinians-Jordan).

G. QUALITY OF LIFE OF REFUGEE CAMPS IN THE TERRITORIES (Certain aspects may also be discussed in common with the Israel - Jordan track).

(10)

INFORMAL DRAFT COMMON AGENDA

AUGUST 21, 1992

24-2 משרד החוץ

A. Goal:

The achievement of a just, comprehensive and lasting peace between Israel and its neighbours; the attainment of a Treaty of Peace between Israel and Jordan.

B. Components of Israel-Jordan peace negotiations.

1. Searching for practical steps to arrive at a state of peace through negotiations as envisioned by Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 in all their aspects to be culminated in a Treaty of Peace.

2. Security:

a. Refraining from actions or activities that may adversely

(11)

2. DISCUSSION OF MATTERS RELATED TO BOTH TRACKS (to be decided upon in common) including:

   a. Economic matters

   b. Legal matters

   c. Common liaison mechanisms (see also para. F. above)

3. COMMITTEES OR WORKING GROUPS ON (E.G.):

   a. Structure, Powers, responsibilities and spheres of operations of the Administrative Council, as per para. D. above
   (possible discussions in sub-groups on separate spheres or several interrelated spheres)

   b. Legal matters

   c. modalities of elections to the Administrative Council

   d. Quality of life of refugee camps in the territories

4. PREPARATORY MEASURES FOR BUILDING CONFIDENCE AND ENHANCING AGREEMENT ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INTERIM SELF-GOVERNMENT ARRANGEMENTS (parallel to the negotiations)

August 20, 1992

INFORMAL DRAFT

(17)

THE ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL
OF THE INTERIM SELF-GOVERNMENT ARRANGEMENTS

AN OUTLINE

13

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

The interim arrangements, for five years, will be based on the following principles:

1. Establishment of Interim Self Government Arrangements for the Palestinians of the territories; thus, they will administer their affairs in the agreed spheres of operations that affect their own lives. The ISGA will have those powers and responsibilities which will be allocated to it in the agreement.

2. Maintaining the links and ensuring the freedom of movement between Judea, Samaria, Gaza district and Israel; thus, during the interim arrangements' period, there are spheres of operation that affect:

   - Israel, the territories, and the interaction between them; and
   - between Israeli citizens and Palestinians in the territories,

   that should be handled by the ISGA Administrative Council in coordination and cooperation with the designated organs of the Government of Israel, taking into consideration the concerns of both populations and providing for the benefit of all.

3. Certain areas that affect Israel's basic rights and interests, and residual powers, including in particular, security and Israelis in the territories, will remain Israel's responsibility and will be operated by Israel.

4. Maintaining the traditional ties between the Palestinian inhabitants and Jordan: thus, Jordan's participation in the interim arrangements can be of benefit for all.

(14)

STRUCTURAL CONFIGURATION OF THE INTERIM SELF-GOVERNMENT ARRANGEMENTS

The organs of the interim self-government arrangements must reflect the administrative-functional characteristics of the powers and responsibilities which will be delegated to them, according to the agreement.

1. PRINCIPLES FOR STRUCTURAL CONFIGURATION

* The powers and responsibilities of the ISGA, will be operated by one, freely elected, administrative-functional body - an ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL.

* The number of its members will be determined in accordance with the functional-administrative domains that will be operated by it, and will not exceed 15 members.

* The Administrative Council will select its own chairman from among its members, and allocate the spheres of operation among its members.

2. ELECTIONS

The Administrative Council will be elected by the Palestinians of the territories from among the Palestinians of the territories, in accordance with the agreed modalities.

The elections will be free, based on the preservation of the rights of peaceful assembly, free expression and secret ballot, and appropriate measures to prevent disruption and disorder.

Israelis will not participate in the elections for the Administrative Council.

15

3. JURISDICTION

In operating their designated spheres of operations, the freely elected Administrative Council will have jurisdiction in the framework of the agreed administrative-functional arrangements.

The powers and responsibilities of the Administrative Council will not apply to the Israeli security forces and authorities, nor to Israeli civilians in the territories.

4. LIAISON AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION

The cooperation and coordination regime requires a multi-level system of liaison between the organs of the Administrative Council and various Israeli government authorities and the Jordanian government. The multi-level liaison system will comprise of:

* A high liaison and and coordination committee;

* Liaison committees in the various spheres of operation;

* Special liaison committees to deal with special matters.

In a number of areas a monitoring process may accompany the implementation of the agreements and understandings.

A "trial and error" period may hence be required for necessary adjustments in accordance with the experience that will be gained.

The liaison mechanisms could serve this purpose too.

(12)

GENERAL POWERS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL

The Administrative Council, as one functional body, will have the following general powers and responsibilities:

* Power to promulgate regulations in its spheres of operations, subject to the agreement, including arrangements for coordination and cooperation with Israel and Jordan.

* Power to enter into contracts, sue and be sued, and decide on administrative matters relating to the operation of their spheres of operations, such as:

  - budget and financing;

  - allocation of functions;

  - supervise and audit its sections operations.

(17)

SPHERES OF OPERATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL

1. ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE

This sphere of operations contains the administration and supervision of the various judicial systems and services in the territories, relating to the Palestinian population:

* Operating the various systems of local courts (including general and municipal courts systems);
* Establishment of new tribunals, dealing with specific matters, within the framework of the existing legislation and the agreement;
* Appointment of judges and court officials;
* Issue regulations on procedural matters;
* Operating the central and district prosecution systems;
* Operating the central and district execution offices;
* Publication of courts' decisions and other official documents;
* Fixing the level of court fees;
* Dealing with the process of mitigation and pardon of convicted criminal prisoners;
* Rendering registration services of companies, partnerships, voluntary associations, etc';
* Rendering registration services of patents and trademarks;
* Rendering notary services like: verification of signatures, authentication of documents;
* Rendering services for relevant professional councils: lawyers, accountants and assessors;
* Licensing of lawyers, accountants and assessors;
* Rendering legal aid for the needy.

(18)

Justice (cont.)

The implementation of some of these powers and responsibilities, by this designated organ of the Administrative Council, should be coordinated with the parallel sections of the Government of Israel and the Government of Jordan, as appropriate, and in accordance with the agreement, taking into account the Israeli courts' jurisdiction that would apply in certain spheres - security related and Israelis related.

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSIONS (E.G.)

* Relationship between the legal systems applying in the territories.
* Procedures concerning legal reciprocity and the execution of judgements between the ISGA and Israeli authorities (including the delivery of documents, summoning of witnesses, etc.)
* Registration of companies - exchange of information between Israeli authorities and THE ISGA Administrative Council.
* Registration of patents and trademarks - agreed mutual arrangements between the Israeli authorities and the ISGA Administrative Council.
* Activities of Israeli and foreign corporations.
* Status of the Cassation court.

19

2. ADMINISTRATION OF PERSONNEL MATTERS

This sphere of operation contains all administrative matters related to the organs of the Administrative Council:

* Establishing the Council's organs and determining their organizational configurations;
* Defining the powers and responsibilities of all employees, together with their duties and obligations, on one hand, and their rights, on the other;
* Determining the terms of employment of personnel and their salaries;
* Ongoing management of all employee affairs.
* Organizing general and professional training.

The main body of employees of the organs of the Administrative Council will naturally consist of the present 20000 employees of the Civil Administration.

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSIONS (E.G.)

* Status and guarantee of the accumulated rights of the existing employees.
* Recruiting new employees.
* Employment of residents of Israel in the ISGA organs.

3. AGRICULTURE

This sphere of operations will contain the administration and supervision of all branches of agriculture, livestock and fisheries:

* Developing, planning and regulating production of agricultural products;
* Supervising marketing and distribution of agricultural products, including imports and exports;
* Veterinary supervision and containing of agricultural diseases;
* Agricultural instruction and inspection.

The links between Israel and the territories, especially in the agricultural sphere, are beneficial to all. They are also necessary. Therefore, they require arrangements for cooperation and coordination in some of the agricultural spheres of operations, to be fulfilled by experts from Israel, Jordan as appropriate, and the designated organ of the Administrative Council.

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSIONS (E.G.)

* Marketing arrangements for agricultural products from the territories in Israel and of Israeli products in the territories.
* Exports to Jordan through the Jordan bridges and to Egypt through the Rafah Crossing.
* Exports through Israeli ports.
* Standards and report procedures concerning plant and animal diseases.
* Protection of flora and fauna.

(21)

4. ECOLOGY

This new sphere of operations contain three major areas of powers and responsibilities:

* Developing, setting up and operating environmental projects, such as:
  - sites and facilities for the disposal of refuse of all kinds;
  - effluent treatment systems including sewage;
  - solid waste treatment;
  - toxic-waste treatment.

* Developing, setting up and operating environmental monitoring systems in areas such as:
  - air and water quality;
  - noise prevention.

* Supervision of beaches and public bathing places.

* Environmental education.

Due to the impacts of some of these areas of operation on both the populations of Israel and the territories, environmental operations in the territories should be set up in cooperation with the designated professional Israeli agencies.

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSIONS (E.G.)

* Sewage.
* Solid waste.
* Hazardous waste.
* Mosquitos and other pests control.

22

5. EDUCATION AND CULTURE

This sphere of operations relates to the whole network of educational and research institutions in the territories, from kindergarten to higher education:

* Operation of the governmental network of learning institutions, in accordance with the existing educational system;
* Supervision of non-governmental educational institutions, including colleges and universities;
* Supervision of scientific-research institutions and activities;
* Development and administration of cultural, artistic and sporting activities.

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSIONS (E.G.)

* Archaeological research and sites preservation.
* Arrangements for preventing incitement and subversion inside the educational and cultural systems.

23

6. FINANCE, BUDGET AND TAXATION

This sphere of operation, which is the central economic organ of the Administrative Council, contains the following powers and responsibilities:

* Preparation of the budget of the Administrative Council and its allocation among its various divisions;

* Management and administration of the revenues of the Administrative Council, namely: taxation - e.g. income and property taxes; grants and loans.

* Accounting and disbursing of the Administrative Council's budget and other financial transactions.

* Supervising and regulating the activities of the insurance companies operating in the territories;

The basic reality of economic ties between Israel and the territories, which is vital and beneficial for both their populations, requires economic coordination and cooperation as well as mutual adjustments of economic, fiscal and monetary policies.

The application of this sphere to both economies, including in the spheres of industry and commerce, agriculture, as well as other issues, and Jordanian-related aspects, will be further elaborated.

24

7. HEALTH

This vital sphere of operation contains the following major areas of professional activities:

* Operation of governmental medical institutions: hospitals, clinics and laboratories;
* Supervision of non-governmental health services and institutions;
* Operating the medical insurance program;
* Operating the preventive medicine and immunization programs;
* Supervision the production, importation and marketing of pharmaceuticals;
* Environmental health supervision;
* Licensing of medical and paramedical professions.

NOTE:

During the previous rounds of negotiations we presented a detailed and comprehensive description of this sphere of operations. We also suggested that, notwithstanding the continuation of the negotiations, a delegation of powers and responsibilities will take place, from the Civil Administration to a professional designated organ, which will operate this sphere in an agreed framework, may immediately be negotiated and implemented.

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSIONS (E.G.)

* Immunization and anti-epidemic arrangements.
* Hospitalization, ambulatory and laboratory services in Israel as requested.
* Training of medical personnel in Israel as requested.
* Medical insurance for employees from the territories in Israel.
* Supervision of food quality.

08-27-1992 07:53AM FROM COMMUNICATION TO 873367 P.14

25

8. INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE

This sphere of operations contains several economic powers and responsibilities:

* Developing and encouraging industrial and commercial projects by:
  - direct investments;
  - investment incentives;
  - loans and grants;
* Promoting industrial research and development in order to facilitate advanced industry;
* Supervision of prices;
* Supervision of fair trading practices;
* Licensing of factories and industrial enterprises;

It is self-understood, based on the freedom of movement concept, that discharging these powers and responsibilities by this organ of the Administrative Council, must be based on an overall cooperation and coordination arrangements with Israeli designated authorities.

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSIONS (E.G.)

* Mutual movement of goods and commodities.
* Standards, product labelling, etc.
* Import and export through Israeli ports.
* Import and export through the Jordan bridges.
* Supply of oil and gas.
* Regulating and supervising the distribution of vital products;
* The relationship and application of Israel's free trade area agreements to the interim arrangements.

The above will be further elaborated.

08-27-1992 07:54AM FROM COMMUNICATION TO 873367 P.15

26

9. LABOUR AND EMPLOYMENT

This sphere of operations will render labour and employment services to the population in the territories, including:

* Providing the essential connection between entrepreneurs, those who seek workers, and those who seek employment, by:
  - operating labour exchange and employment offices;
  - Providing opportunities to learn or change occupation, by operating occupational training services.
  - licensing of cooperatives;

* Ensuring that workers will enjoy proper working conditions, rights and payment, by:
  - supervising the adherence of the employers to the labour laws and regulations, and implement safety and hygiene standards;
  - supervising and assisting trade unions.

* Administer the procedures for the employment of workers from the territories inside Israel, by:
  - connecting employers and employees through the employment offices;
  - dealing with permits for work in Israel;
  - advising workers on employment conditions; rights and wages;
  - processing claims for social benefits and compensation of these workers.

The employment of workers from the territories in Israel is beneficial to the economies of both Israel and the territories and it is in the interest of both populations that this connection continue. Cooperation and coordination in this sphere is essential from legal, economic and social points of view, and due to security considerations.

Direct connection between the employment offices of Israel and the Administrative Council, will facilitate procedures of employment in Israel.

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSIONS (E.G.)

* Mutual employment procedures.

08-27-1992 07:55AM FROM COMMUNICATION TO 873367 P.16

10. LOCAL POLICE

(27)

This sphere of operation will include the establishment of a local police force, for the implementation of police tasks to be agreed upon. It should be noted that the overall responsibility for maintaining security in the territories during the ISGA period will remain with Israel.

In this framework the local police tasks may include enforcement of law in areas related to the Palestinians in the territories, such as:

* A. Criminal offenses including offenses dealt now by military courts, such as drug traffic offenses, trespass and tax fraud.

* B. Police tasks such as security of Administrative Council installations and personalities, minor offenses, implementation of court arrest orders, carrying out of court judgements.

* C. MUTUAL assistance between the local police and the Israeli police through service of summons, implementation of arrest orders and carrying out of court judgements.

* D. Dealing and assisting with public judgements order in areas to be agreed upon in the negotiations.

* E. Operating prisons for criminal offenders.

* F. Jordanian involvement in the establishment, training and operation of the police is positively viewed and should be negotiated.

NOTE:

As to the security aspects involved, the Israel security forces and police must maintain discretion in matters pertaining to security as determined by them, which may be brought to military courts.

Police (cont.)

28

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSIONS (E.G.)

* A. Establishment and structure of the local police force and recruitment thereto.

* B. Cooperation between the Israeli and the local police.

* C. Powers and jurisdictions of the local police and its officers.

* D. Size and arms.

* E. Rules of engagement.

* F. Review following initial period of the police functioning.

The above is to be further elaborated in the negotiations.

29

11. LOCAL TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATION

* The transportation section will deal with the following functions:

  - traffic regulations and signs;
  - regulations, licensing and supervision of public transportation services;
  - licensing and supervising car rental agencies.
  - responsibility for safety and anti-pollution regulations and standards;
  - road maintenance
  - registry, licensing and inspection of drivers, vehicles and heavy engineering equipment;
  - supervision of adherence to compulsory insurance regulations;
  - licensing and supervision of driving schools and driving courses;
  - licensing and supervision of garages, auto workshops and spare parts production;

* The communications section will deal with the following functions:

  - Operation of local post offices and local Postal bank branches;
  - responsibility for distribution and collection of mail;
  - Local telephone services: operation, installation and maintenance of lines, exchanges and equipment; operation of payments collection.

The nature of these services requires various levels of cooperation, coordination, strict supervision and trust, between this organ of the Administrative Council and the concerned Israeli authorities.

Subject to be further elaborated.

30

Transportation (cont.)

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSIONS (E.G.)

Transportation:

* Road markings and signs.
* Vehicle purchase and the transfer of ownership between Israeli citizens and residents of the territories.
* Vehicle safety regulations and standards.
* Vehicle traffic between the territories and Jordan.

31

12. MUNICIPAL AFFAIRS

This sphere of operations includes two layers of activities:

* The local and municipal layer which deals with all municipal matters, including: zoning; water supply; housing; sewage, electricity, bylaws, etc';

* The central layer which deals with the following matters:

  - Supervision of activities and meetings of the local authorities;
  - Approval of regular and special local budgets;
  - Supervision and approval of the financial expenditure, accounts and tenders;
  - Approval of loans and grants;
  - Supervision of local tax collection;
  - Appointment of municipal officers (Mukhtars;village council members, etc');
  - Changes of municipal status of localities;
  - Coordination of local emergency services;

The vast and diversified areas of responsibilities, activities and operations, require implementation of arrangements for cooperation and coordination in some elements of this sphere of operations.

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSIONS (E.G.)

* Cooperation between emergency services of the Administrative Council and Israel.

(32)

13. RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS

This sphere of operations will have responsibilities for rendering religious services to Moslems, Christians, Samaritans, and other sects in the territories. These services shall include, inter alia:

* Building and establishing new houses of worship and community centers for the different denominations;
* Preservation and operation of the Holy places and cemeteries of the different denominations;
* Assisting in organizing of major religious ceremonies;

Two major functions are the sole concern of the Moslem population:

* Controlling and managing the Waqf money and assets.
* Supervising and operating the Shari'a courts.

NOTE

Joint Holy places will be operated jointly.

The Jewish Holy places in the territories will be operated by Israel's authorities.

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSIONS (E.G.)

* The Jordanian aspects of these functions, including the waqf administration.

33

14. SOCIAL WELFARE

The welfare services which will be provided to the population in this sphere of operation, are:

* Providing welfare services to families, youth, elderly and hardship cases;

* Health, economic and social rehabilitation for the needy;

* Registration and supervision of charitable organizations and distribution of voluntary contributions;

* Operation of welfare institutions for needy persons, such as the elderly, the retarded, the blind, juvenile delinquents, etc.

* Administration of orphanages and adoption processes.

(34)

15. TOURISM

This sphere of operations contains two main functions:

* Tourist services, such as:
  - licensing and supervision of hotels, restaurants, tourist guides, tourist agencies, souvenir shops, etc'.

* Development, operation and supervision of tourist sites.

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSIONS (E.G.)

* Cooperation in order to expand and encourage tourism in Israel and the territories.

* Reciprocal relations between tourist authorities and tourist services, including exchange of information;

* Training and licensing of tour guides.

* Tourist crossing at the Allenby Bridge and Rafah - coordination and cooperation of tourism aspects with Israel, Jordan and Egypt.

אישי

א מ " נ - מ ח ק ר 179

לשכת	רח"ט	מחקר
טל'	-	02-5431/2
לא -		3805
26	דצמבר	1991

ד"ר יאיר הירשפלד

<u>מנהל פרוייקט ומחקר "הקרן לשיתוף פעולה כלכלי"</u>

הנדון: **<u>תודתנו</u>**

1. קיבלנו בתודה את המסמך בנושא "ההפרדה כלכלית של הגדה המערבית ורצועת עזה מישראל " , שהוכן אצלכם.
2. רב תודות על המאמץ שעשית להעביר את המסמך אלינו.
3. נשמח להמשך קשר בעתיד.
4. ושוב תודה.

גדעון מיטשניק - סרן

עוזר מחקר.

Annex

Assessing Possibilities of Economic Separation

1.) Present General Assessment

Grassroot demand for a greater separation of the Israeli and Palestinian societies and economies has become today a strong political force, both within Israeli and Palestinian society.

The public call for separation has produced contradicting reactions:

On the one hand, fears exist that a total and abrupt separation will cause tremendous hardship, particularly to the families of 130 000 Palestinians working within Israel proper, and hereby generate further despair, emmigration and radicalisation.

On the other hand, it is hoped that a controlled process of separation may well produce important benefits:

Economic separation may pave the way for the creation of over 100 000 new employment opportunities in the territories, generate economic development and the creation of an economic infrastructure, to serve the needs of the Palestinian community of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

The Palestinian leadership has publicly supported the concept of separation, assuming that economic separation will set a more general process of administrative and political separation in motion.

The fear that the process of separation will happen under totally uncontrolled conditions, due to escalation of hostilities, the hope that economic separation will generate economic development and the assumption that political benefits may accrue, make a study on optimal conditions for a controlled process of economic separation imperative.

As a first step, economic separation is intended to provide the Palestinians with control over their own economic affairs. If political slogans or catchwords are needed, what we intend to propose, is UEA (unilateral economic autonomy).

The aim of this study is to identify optimal conditions herefore.

2) Necessary Pre-conditions for the Introduction of Unilateral Economic Autonomy

UEA will necessarily imply the creation of a new administrative relationship between the Isreali authorities and the Palestinian community in the West Bank and Gaza. It will necessitate a radical change of the present system and will permit the Palestinian community to take control over their economic affairs.

The loss of Isreali control over Palestinian economic activity will tend to create strong fears within Israel. For this reason this research will have to evaluate ways and means to diminish potential Israeli opposition. Various options for changing the legal and administrative Israeli control and for creating a Palestinian administrative structure will be checked. Finally, in order to diminish fears of abuse on both sides, and also to create realistic expectations, a one-year working programme will be proposed.

3.) The Research

a) Evaluating Possibilities of Diminishing Isreali Restrictions

Existing motives for the prevailing restrictive administrative measures will be evaluated. A proposal including several options for diminishing and lifting restrictions will be prepared.

b) Evaluating various Options of Creating an Arab Administrative Umbrella for Economic Separation

Options to be checked with the Isreali side will be to provide administrative control over economic development to:

i) Arab Heads of Department within the present Administrative Hierarchy of the Civil Administration; or to

ii) existing municipalities; or to

iii) enlarge the area of jurisdiction of existing municipalities; or to

iv) a Council of Mayors;

v) an all-West Bank, all Gazan Authority for Housing and Employment; or to

vi) an ECC (Economic Coordination Committee);

vii) other options that may come up during research.

Legal, financial and administrative powers and groundrules of the proposed Authority and its relationship to the Isreali authorities will be proposed.

c) Creating Guidelines for a One Year Working Programme

The introduction of the UEA-Initiative should be accompanied by agreement on a One Year Working Programme. Its task should be to minimize Isreali fears, minimize possible Isreali-Palestinian friction, and optimize the effectivity and usefulness of the Palestinian economic effort.

The preparation of guidelines for a One Year Working Programme will necessitate the identification of Palestinian needs and capabilities on one hand and their compatibility or non-compatibility with Isreali plans, on the other hand. Therefore a survey on a regional basis will be prepared and will cover the areas of Jenin, Nablus, Tulqarem and Qalqilya, Ramallah, East Jerusalem, Bethlehem (including Beth Jala and Beth Sachur), Hebron and the Gaza Strip.

i) Survey of Housing Needs

Construction activities among the Palestinian community in the West Bank and Gaza have been hampered, so far, due to lack of privately owned land and due to the fact that permits for construction are as a rule not given on state land.

In each region, construction needs for one year will be roughly evaluated, and accordingly a proposal to allocate necessary state land will be prepared.

ii) Survey of Agricultural Development Needs

Agricultural development among the Palestinian community in the West Bank and Gaza is hampered at times, due to lack of land. In each region, agricultural development capabilities for the period of one year will be evaluated and accordingly a proposal to allocate necessary state land will be prepared.

iii) Survey of Needs of Gazan Fishing Industry

The activities of the Gazan fishing industry are hampered due to Israeli fear of arms smuggling and competition with the Isreali fishing industry. A proposal for the necessary Israeli actions that would be required in order to enable renewed activity of the Gazan fishing industry will be prepared.

iv) Survey of Potential Infrastructure Activities

The proposal for UEA will include a description of infrastructure activities that should be envisaged.

A proposal of allocation of state land to promote infrastructure projects will be made.

Existing Israeli counter-pressures will be identified and ways to overcome them will be proposed.

d) Evaluating Isreali Objections and Ways to Overcome Them

Research to give an analysis of prevailing political, economic, business and psychological support for a process of economic separation and simultaneous causes for opposition to losen control over economic development among the Palestinian community in the territories will be carried out.

An evaluation of ways to overcome prevailing opposition will be given.

e) A Blueprint for Introducing Unilateral Economic Autonomy

The blueprint for introducing UEA will include

- a proposal for changing the present Israeli control system over Palestinian economic activities;

- a proposal for the creation of a Palestinian administrative organisation to direct and supervise Palestinian economic activities;

- guidelines for a one-year working programme, including a proposal for allocating state land for private and public construction purposes; a proposal for allocating state land for agricultural development; a proposal for introducing conditions on behalf of Israel that will permit to revive the Gazan fish industry; a proposal for investment in agro-industry and infrastructure projects.

6/11/1991

THOUGHTS ON
THE PROSPECTIVE DIVIDEND AND
REGIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION

From: Abu Ala

As the Middle East peace process unfolds, hope begins to be generated that, once a political settlement satisfactory both to the Palestinians and the other Arabs, and to the Israelis, has been reached, the political (and therefore the economic) environment would become more suitable for and conducive to intra-regional economic relations and cooperation. This would create the conditions necessary for the flow of investments into programmes and projects whose benefit could be regional or sub-regional, thus permitting the "peace dividend" to materialize and spread widely where heretofore the immense costs of conflict have for decades weighed heavily on the parties to that conflict. We refer here more specifically (though not exclusively) to the presently Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPTs) and the neighbouring states for whom the human and material burdens of the conflict have been particularly heavy.

Naturally, this Memorandum focuses essentially on the OPTs, but also takes into appropriate account the interests of the neighbouring states. It is based on the premiss, legitimate and warranted we believe, that as the OPTs move away from occupation in a meaningful way, into a transitional phase with a substantive content and a large measure of economic decision-making

power, and ultimately into the phase of self-determination and statehood, the Palestinian national economy ought at the same time to be the beneficiary of considerable investment and encouraged to be an energetic partner in the design and generation of sub-regional and regional economic relations and varied development-promoting endeavours. The Palestinian people, with its skills, determination, and the location of its territory in the heart of the Mashreq and with access to the Maghreb, would be ideally situated (not only geographiclly and in terms of manpower capabilities and initiative, but also in terms of the affection in which Palestine is held throughout the Arab region) to be a focus for economic cooperation, interdependence, and complementarity. For all these reasons, the Palestinians can rightly entertain promising economic expectations based both on their own efforts and on external help, from the region itself and the international community at large.

Before we go any further in this Memorandum to identify investment opportunities which hold promise of benefit to two or more countries in the region, and to the prospects therefore of regional economic cooperation, it is essential to state now what we consider to be a central prerequisite for the hopes and expectations expressed or implied here with regard to economic cooperation, interdependence, and widespread development. This is that for the peace dividend to materialize, there must first be peace. And, this peace must be acceptable to the various parties involved in order for it to be sustainable and durable. The Palestinians and the other Arabs believe that the political horse must be placed in front of the economic cart, if there is to be forward motion.

Three premisses need to be stated as essential for regional economic cooperation, not only to materialize but also to be fruitful and sustainable. First, the process of cooperation and the inter-meshing of economic relations can only unfold gradually, given the decades-long "heritage" of conflict in the region. The process can only gain strength and wider coverage with every successful project or programme designed and implemented.

In the second place, the key to the take-off and sustenance of the whole process is that the benefits of cooperation -- the peace dividend -- should be mutually realized and shared, and that no party should feel exploited or deprived in the process. Cooperation should not be so designed as to be seen as a euphemism for exploitation and control by an advantaged party of a disadvantaged one. Interdependence can be what the word means only if every party involved realizes that it will share in the returns as it has to share in the costs and burdens, even if the "shares" are not necessarily equal.

The third premiss relates to the difference in the levels of development achieved in the various countries of the region. Thus, while economic cooperation between technologically more advanced and less advanced economies would be beneficial to both sides, though in different ways, this should not be taken as justification for heavy concentration of new projects and programmes in the economy endowed with greater facilities in the availability of technology, manpower skills, financial capability, and a much more acvanced economy, where more external economies can be expected to materialize than in some other less advantaged economy. Such excessive

concentration would block the development of the latter economy and further widen the development and economic performance gap between the more advantaged and advanced, and the less advantaged economies.

Having for very long suffered from occupation with all the disadvantages it carries with it politically, socially, technologically, and economically, the Palestinians feel the special relevance of the second and third premisses identified in the preceding two paragraphs. This is why emphasis has been placed on those premisses so that safeguards would be provided in the design and siting of new projects and programmmes meant to be of regional significance.

* * *

Our interest primarily in the development of the Palestinian economy need not be disguised: self-interest is a universally recognized driving force. However, it is here maintained that the programmes and projects to be identified in this part of the Memorandum will also all serve the interests of other countries in the region. This is obviously true in the case of programmes and projects which are regional by nature; but it is also true of others which seem to be local and restricted to the Palestinian economy only, such as investment in physical (and social) infrastructure. It is not far-fetched to stress that this kind of investment in infrastructure will enable those other specifically-regional investments to become more viable and more beneficial to all the countries involved in them. This expectation is based on the tenet that

regionally-oriented investments, though sited in the Palestinian economy, would realize greater external economies from the existence in that economy of a more advanced and better performing infrastructure.

Finally, four observations need to be made, before the identification is undertaken of programmes and projects suggested for consideration by the European Community as areas of action worthy of investment and technological support. First, what will be proposed is no more than ideas in need of much more thinking and elaboration prior even to the initiation of pre-feasibility studies for them. In other words, the suggestions are made in the belief that there is a *prima facie* case for each of them.

The second observation is that the list of suggestions is very long, but we realize that only a limited number of programmes and projects can be considered for further examination and possible support. Furthermore, the length of the list itself makes it easier for the EC, as a major likely sponsor, to establish preference for certain components of the list. Some of the suggested projects can possibly be altered or replaced, just as additional projects may be added to the list.

The third observation is that, while the prospective investments will be beneficial to the Palestinian economy (which is meant to be the main beneficiary), and to the other economies that will also be involved in the establishment of a number of the programmes and projects and in their subsequent activity, the EC itself will likewise find it in its interest as a body and that of its constituent members to contribute tangibly in financial and

technological support. This is obviously because the region will become an even more important trading partner with the EC than it already is, as it has been widely accepted by economists for many years that there is a positive and direct association (if not correlation) between the level of development and the volume of trade between countries or regions.

Finally, the fourth observation is that this Memorandum is predicated on the hope that the EC will extend help to the Palestinian economy in the formulation of those programmes and projects selected for consideration, and in the conduct of technical and economic feasibility studies for them, where appropriate Palestinian skills are not available. The EC's continued valuable support for the development of the Palestinian society and economy encourages us, once more, to turn to it for help in the direction just mentioned.

The programmes and projects suggested will now be identified and listed as follows:

I. Transport, communications and telecommunications

a. Land transport, to connect Egypt and the Maghreb countries with the Mashreq and the Gulf sub-region, via Palestine. The road proposed would pass through Gaza and then branch off northwards Lebanon, and eastwards into Jordan, from which good land connections already exist with the Arabian Peninsula.

b. Rail transport: the rehabilitation of the Egypt-Gaza-Palestine line which had been in operation until the mid-1940s, and the extension of the line (if feasible) to the Maghreb countries westwards, and to the Mashreq eastwards.

c. The construction of two international airports, one in Jerusalem and the other in Gaza, which would facilitate the transport of pilgrims -- be they Christian, Jewish, or Moslem -- and tourists, especially from Europe and the Americas, and other countries, to the Holy Land.

d. The construction of a commercial seaport in Gaza with adequate equipment to enable it to handle passengers and trade. The existence of a port would also promote the establishement of a shipping company to carry freight and passengers between Egypt, Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Cyprus, Turkey, Jordan, and othe neighbouring countries.

e. The contracting of the launching of a satellite for the collection of data on the climate, the relaying of TV and news programmes, and other purposes connected to information.

II. Energy

a. The building of petroleum pipelines between the Gulf countries and Iraq to Gaza. In addition to carrying petroleum for use in the transit and destination locations, the pipeline would also make exports possible, and

provide a scope for refining and some petro-chemical industries in Gaza which would, in addition, absorb of the labor force.

b. Consideration of the "Two-Sea-Project" (linking the Mediterranean with the Dead Sea and/or the Red Sea), which would generate electricity and promote touristic activity. However, the project ought to be converted from being exclusively an Israeli project (as its original version suggested in the early 1940s by Lowdermilk stipulated) into a regional one, with its benefits spreading to Palestine and Jordan.

c. Laying of a gas pipeline between Egypt and Gaza, and extending to the neighbouring countries.

d. Launching a project for solar energy storage and use in the southern part of the Gaza Strip, at the juncture of the borders between Palestine, Israel, and Egypt.

III. Tourism

a. Promoting the facilities (transport, hotels, recreation centres, cultural activities, etc... for the attraction of large numbers of tourists, individually and through "package arrangements", to visit Egypt, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and other neighbouring countries -- all of which are extremely rich in touristic attractions in terms of beaches, mild weather, historical sites, cultural heritage, and religious centres. Among the possible attractions we can list: museums and exhibitions, a university and other

institutes for religious studies relating to the three monotheistic religions, fairs offering hand-made traditional products for which the Arab countries listed have rich and varied traditions. In addition to what has been suggested in the present paragraph, the establishment of a "touristic village" by the Jordan river and another by the "Dead Sea" can be considered.

b. There is also scope for developing facilities for purely recreation and holidaying-motivated purposes. The facilities could include the exploitation of Gaza beaches for the building of hotels and touristic centers, especially for water-skiing, sea cruises, etc.; the building of hotels by the Jordan river and the Dead Sea, as well as in mountain areas in Palestine (Jerusalem, Hebron, Ramallah, Nablus), and in the Galilee area, and finally building hotels by scenic springs as in Wadi al-Qalt.

c. The establishment of companies for the promotion and handling of tourism, including jointly-owned and operated transport companies to carry tourists to the various countries which have a considerable tourist industry.

d. The creation of a regional tourist institute or centre in Jerusalem (with country branches) to promote the training of personnel working in the tourist industry.

e. The setting up of zoos, attraction-parks , and camping sites -- all for the attraction and enjoyment of youthful tourists.

IV. Programmes and projects for the development and use of natural resources

a. Joint exploitation by Palestine and other partners of the Jordan river basin and the conservation of its water resources and the protection of the environment against excessive salinity, pollution, and soil erosion. The exploitation will also include the setting up of joint projects in agriculture, livestock breeding, afforestation, provision of pastures, fishing, tourism, and research and training, in addition to investment in infrastructure.

b. Joint exploitation by the three states just cited of the rich resources of the Dead Sea, with concern that excessive exploitation leading to resource depletion, pollution, and environmental deterioration be avoided. The development of the programme includes the utilization of Dead Sea minerals, tourism, and the harnessing of solar energy.

c. A regional project for sea and saline water, and the generation of electricity along with desalination work.

d. The development of a fishing port in Gaza, along with the establishment of an institute for research on marine environment in the Mediterranean area.

e. The building of a cement factory in Hebron. Along with that, the promotion of the setting up of a regional union (federation) of cement-producing industries .

f. Projects for the recycling of sewage and domestic waste water, and the use of the recycled water for irrigation and industrial and construction purposes.

V. Complementarity-promoting projects in trade, finance, and other service sectors

a. The setting up in Gaza and the Jordan basin of free zones, and zones for the processing and re-export of semi-finished products.

b. The establishment of a regional commercial bank and of a stock exchange in Jerusalem.

c. The establishment of a regional insurance and re-insurance centre or holding company in Jerusalem.

d. The formation of a regional centre or company for engineering consultancy and design in Jerusalem.

e. The establishment of a well-equipped and endowed regional university in Jerusalem, as part of an effort to make the city a rich cultural centre which serves all the neighbouring countries. This project will be in addition to the expansion and/or creation of museums, art exhibitions, libraries, and other depositories of cultural riches which embody part of the heritage of the region.

f. The development of the already-initiated Al-Qods Open University, in such a manner as to enable it to serve regional needs and not just those of the Palestinians, especially that it is the only open university in the whole region.

g. The establishment of a regional economic research institute in Jerusalem, as well as one in Jericho specialized in experimentation, training of technicians and extension service personnel, and for the development of green-house agriculture.

h. The establishment of a regional centre for combatting desertification, the development of crops suitable for tropical climate, and the popularization of water-saving techniques in irrigation.

i. Finally the establishment of a regional centre for studies in Jerusalem aimed at the promotion of complementarity, whose areas of interest would include administrative systems, institutional development, financial, fiscal, and monetary systems, programming, and the promotion of private sector responsiveness to investment opportunities and incentives. Such a centre would be able to make notable contributions to the elaboration and design of new regional programmes and projects, and to the follow-up and evaluation of ones already in existence, with a view to suggesting corrective measures where needed.

* * *

It is our sincere hope that the European Commission would consider this Memorandum sympathetically, with a view to the selection of programmes and projects in the development of investment. Obviously, it is hoped that other sources of international and regional finance and support would be found for the promotion of regional economic cooperation and development, in which Palestine sees enormous promise for the future, not only for development but also for peace in the region.

Tunis, 6 November 1991.