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משרדי הממשלה

משרד

מס' תיק

יוזמות מדיניות ושיתוף

פעולה עם הפלסטינים

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מחלקה

מס' תיק מקורי

President Yassir Arafat? s speech at the meeting in the Swedish Paliament building, 5 December 1998:

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Allow me, first of all to express my sincere appreciation to all those who have responded to the Swedish government's gracious invitation to attend this ceremony commemorating the launch of the Middle East peace process, from Stockholm, capital of this ancient land, Sweden.

On this occasion, and on behalf of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Palestine National Authority, the Palestinian people and myself personally, I would also like to extend my heartfelt thanks and deep appreciation to the Swedish government for the enormous effort it has invested in organizing and sponsoring this ceremony, and for allowing me the opportunity to speak before you today.

And allow me as well, to express my especial gratitude to my dear friend, Sten Andersson, that seasoned veteran and long-time companion along the path to peace, who has sacrificed so much of his time and energy in order to bring peace to our area that has suffered so greatly from war and destruction.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Some ten years ago, during the first week of December 1988, the city of Stockholm was the scene for a new and important change in the Arab - Israeli conflict. At the initiative of its then foreign minister, Sten Andersson, the Swedish government sponsored the first vital steps that brought together the different conflicting parties in the Middle East.

Sweden's good offices then succeeded in paving the way for the first dialogue between the P.L.O., the American-Jewish personalities and the administration, after a long political estrangement between the two sides. This step was to constitute the first link in the chain of events ultimately leading to the Madrid peace conference of 1991.


The success of Sweden's good offices also led to the consolidation of our continuing dialogue with all supporters of peace within the American jewish community, within the Israeli peace camp, and abroad.

But as we commemorate Sweden's groundbreaking and effective role in 1988, we must also recall Sweden's distinguished historical record in support of the cause of peace and justice in our area since 1948, and its traditional role as defender of all peoples struggle for freedom and independence whereever they may be.

It is no surprise therefore, that we should return to this gracious and hospitable land, to commemorate the past history of our common efforts in the cause of peace, and to reaffirm our total and unconditional commitment to renew these efforts to ensure the success of the peace process, and bring

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Ladies and Gentlemen,

We did not come to Stockholm today to tell you about the wounds of our history steeped with suffering and pain, with blood and grief. Nor did we come here merely to reiterate our rightful and legitimate demands for freedom and independence. Nor did we come, to accuse or criticize any party or quarter whatsoever. And we did not come here, to announce our negotiating demands or to disclose their details. Rather, we have come to this important engagement to make use of the opportunity it provides on the anniversary of the 1988 initiative in order to achieve a new and positive goal. That goal, is to develop a new and contemporary political discourse, one that we believe will be appropriate to the coming phase, and that we hope will strengthen the foundation of peace, and increase the chances ot fulfilling our aspirations from the current peace process in the Middle East.

As you konw, our region is witnessing a sustained and irreversible effort in the pursuit of peace in the Land of peace, the Holy Land. A just and comprehensive peace, a peace of the brave, that is our unwavering strategic choice. But we are very aware that the road to peace is still long and hard, and that we will face many difficult and acute challenges before we achieve our hopes. We also know that the era of peace is not the same as the era of war, and that the requirement of violent struggle are not those of the struggle for peace, and that the bitter struggle for peace, may be still harder and more difficult than the challenges of confrontation and war.

As we near negotiations over that which we treasure most in the final status talks, we find it necessary to develop some concepts and principles that will guide our political and negotiating approach, and that can serve as a broad framework for the talks. This framework is based on non-contentious universal political, moral and spiritual human values; such values that cannot be disputed or rejected, no matter what political or ideological differences there are between us.

From this perspective, we see that our first task is to undertake a qualitative change in our political discourse. **This means the transition from the logic of war and confrontation to the logic of peace in our mutual dealings**. For actions and words that may be appropriate to the era of war and confrontation can no longer be useful or appropriate in the era of peace and co-operation. Thus we call on all sides to restrain and modify their words and deeds, according to this principle and in support of it.

In this context, the transition from the logic of war to the logic of peace requires a readiness to reach an agreed settlement that is based on legitimacy, and international resolutions. We believe that a necessary condition for achieving peace in the region, is the recognition of the deep attachment of both the Palestinian and Israeli peoples to the peace of the brave in the Holy Land of Palestine. Consequently, there can be no just solution to the conflict without agreement on the existence of two states on this precious land; the state of Palestine alongside the state of Israel, co-existing by mutual agreement and acceptance, and in a manner that does not infringe on the vital interests of either side.

The transition from the logic of war to the logic of peace also requires both sides to refrain from violence or armed action or the use of war as a tool of policy in order to impose a settlement on other side.For our part, we wish to emphasize that the Palestinian side doues not seek today, and will not seek tomorrow, to enter into any military struggle or any arms race with Israel or with any other party in the area.

On a different level; for peace to endure, **there can be no alternative but to acknowledge the principles of equality and reciprocity**. It is self-evident to us, that any agreement must be based on the complete moral, political and legal equality between the two sides, for there can be no real meaning to peace in our view, without both sides' strictest commitment to the equality and mutuality of their obligations and rights.

Thus, each side is entitled to full and equal consideration of its national dignity, human rights and national aspirations. Equally, each side is entitled to fulfill its aspirations to live in peace and dignity on its own soil, within agreed, secure and recognized borders free from war or the threat of violence.

Furthermore, **any resolution of the conflict must be based on principles of fairness and justice**. There is no doubt that any agreement that is not based on a minimally achievable level of justice for both sides, will be neither stable nor durable nor sustainable. Nor will it stand the test of future challenges; indeed any agreement that ignores the principle of justice will merely sow the seed of bitter renewed conflict in the future rather than serve to end it.

Within this same context, we believe that the political and national rights of one side cannot be attained at the expense of the other, and that any settlement should allow for the Palestinian and Israeli peoples to live, work and move freely in any part of Palestine or Israel, without prejudice to the sovereign rights or laws of either side.

Among the principles that we hold true, is the **need for a comprehensive settlement**. Thus we believe that a final settlement should encompass all issues, as agreed in the agenda for final status talks, such that no issue is left without resolution, and nothing is left to stoke the fire of future conflict or give cause for it to be ignited anew.

Here we must also stress the necessity of a comprehensive settlement in the region as a whole. This should include all tracks, including the Lebanese and Syrian tracks, based on our starting point at the Madrid Conference of 1991, that is to say, based on international legitimacy especially UN resolutions 242 , 338, and 425 and the principle of land for peace.

We also believe that **we cannnot build a just and durable peace, in the shadow of the raw balance of power or military might alone**; for if political agreements are to prove lasting and durable they must correspond to legitimate needs and aspiration; such needs that cannot be addressed through reliance on naked force or domination alone.

It is necessary to pause here to give **special attention to the issue of security**. First of all, we wish to reaffirm that we are committed to

everything that has been agreed upon till now in order to ensure that nothing will disturb the peace and stability of either side; and that no party will challenge the peace process or threaten its future; we are fully cognizant of the sensitivity of this issue, and of the depth of the fears of the Israeli people and their security concerns.

However, even as we reaffirm our belief in the importance of the security issue and the need for co-operation to ensure it, it is important to recognize that the Palestinian side has its own security fears and concerns and that the essence of security is mutuality; the security of one side cannot be obtained at the expense of other.

We believe, that each side has the equal right to live in peace and security free from war or violence, or the threat of war and violence, and that each side must endeavor to ensure that its territory shall not be used for military operations or violence or the threat of violence against the other side.

In addition, we believe that each side should refrain from military alliances or agreements that are aimed at the other side, or that threaten its security. For its part, the Palestinian side has no intention of joining such hostile military or political alliances or axes against any of the states in the area.

But we must state, quite frankly, that we believe that the security of one side cannot be attained through the occupation of another's territory and that the retention or annexation of territory under the guise of security will not reinforce the chances of peace, and will not constitute a real and effective response to possible future security threats.

Lastly, we believe that real security will spring from peaceful coexistence and normal interaction between peoples and states, and from the process of building common relations and interests, free from an environment of domination and intimidation, or the threat of force and violence, and free unilateral steps that undermine the interests of either party.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

These principles and values can be seen as forming a general framework that will guide our approach to final status issues. But there are also some operational principles that we would like to put to you today. We hope these will help to clarify and hasten the settlement to which we aspire; a settlement that encompasses the issues agreed at Oslo concerning the final phase that will follow the interim phase. This necessitates that every effort be made to reach an agreement and to delineate the borders of the Palestinian State before May 4, 1999.

First, there can be no alternative to resolving the disputed issues between the two sides except through negotiations, which result in a maturally acceptable and agreed settlement. For disputes can only be settled by negotiations.

Second, each side should refrain from taking unilateral actions that may threaten or undermine the outcome of the negotiations, especially the annexation of land and the building of settlements.

Third, the city of Jerusalem should be open to all its inhabitants without exception or discrimination, and should remain undivided by physical barriers, trenches or fortifications. We believe, that the vital interests of both sides in the Holy City, should be mututally recognized, and that both parties should acknowledge that there can be no resolution of the issue of Jerusalem without taking these interests into account.We must emphasize here the need to end attempts to change the character of Arab Jerusalem.

We also believe that any settlement should respect the legitimate religious rights of all communities and religions equally, and should ensure the safety and security of all their holy places wherever they may be.

Fourth, there can be no final settlement without a just and mutually acceptable solution for the refugee problem, those sons and daughters of ours who have been dispossessed and dispersed from their lands since 1948.

Fifth, and with regard to security; the Palestinian side is ready to consider any security arrangements that do not conflict with the principle of Palestinian sovereignty over Palestinian soil.

As we reaffirm that violence is not an option, we wish to emphasize that common and reciprocal security is our goal in building peace and peaceful coexistence.

Sixth, in return for a final agreement that ends the Israeli occupation of Palestinian land, we believe it will be possible to deal with Israeli security concerns via the following mechanisms:

- agreed arrangements on the ground,
- bi-lateral and multi-lateral agreements,
- international guarantees and agreements,
- and finally, last but not least, true reliance on the logic of peace.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

We believe that the values and principles that we have put forward today, constitute a sound basis for the attainment of a durable peace in the Middle East. And that if these values and principles were to be truly embodied and translated into reality by agreement in the final status accords, we would have fulfilled our national hopes and aspirations on the ground.

For these values and principles which have universal moral and human resonance, constitute no challenge, except to those who reject the logic of peace.

And present no threat, except to those who would deny human values, and hide nothing, but a genuine intention to enter the era of peace and turn the page on war and destruction.

And have no ulterior motive, but to carry the message of a peace of the brave to both the Palestinian and Israeli peoples, and bring them, after a century of conflict, the fruits of coexistence, stability and a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East.

YAIR- PLEASE READ THROUGH & TELL ME WHETHER YOU WANT TO KEEP EVERYTHING. IT IS LIGHTLY EDITED OTHERWISE ALL THE DISCUSSION OF THE WORKSHOP IS HERE. THE PLAN IS TO SEND IT TO EVERYONE WHO WAS AT THE WORKSHOP & OTHER RELATED + RELEVANT PEOPLE. SLOM

The Issam Sartawi Center for Peace Studies (Al-Quds University)

The Society for International Development (SID)

The Economic Cooperation Foundation (ECF)

present

A WORKSHOP ON STRATEGIES AND STRUCTURES FOR CIVIL SOCIETY-LED PEACE PROCESSES

Ambassador Hotel, Jerusalem

5 November 1998

Sponsored by:

The Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES)

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ABBREVIATIONS

CBC	Cross Border Cooperation
CRB	Charles Bronfman Foundation
ECF	Economic Cooperation Foundation
EU	European Union
FAFO	Norwegian acronym for Applied Institute of Sciences
FES	Friedrich Ebert Foundation
GOI	Government of Israel
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
PA	Palestinian Authority
PCH	Palestine Council of Health
PIES	Palestinian-Israeli Environmental Secretariat
P2P	People-to-People
SID	Society for International Development
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UN	United Nations

SESSION I: GREETINGS AND OPENING REMARKS

MR. BUHBE: I welcome you all in the name of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation. I am in charge of the West Bank and Gaza Strip program. FES was founded as the legacy of Friedrich Ebert, the first democratically-elected President of Germany, and is rooted in the German Labor and Social Democratic movements. Attached to it are such names as Willy Brandt, Helmut Schmidt, and the newly-elected Chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder. In the spirit of social democracy and international cooperation, FES has engaged in activities in over 100 countries. Our cooperation in this region, the Middle East, is run through offices in Tel Aviv (Herzliya), East Jerusalem, Amman, Cairo and Beirut.

In general, we work country by country. However, if our partners see a potential in cross-border activities, we are glad to help them carry out such encounters. Yesterday several of the participants took part in such an encounter. We met with the Palestinian governor of the Jenin area and the heads of Israeli municipalities adjacent to Jenin. I do not want to elaborate on the level of cooperation that has already developed. Suffice it to say it was made possible by many. The Jenin dialogue partly goes back to efforts which started two years ago with our foundation's invitation to Brussels, so we are happy to see this dialogue still continuing. Subsequent meetings hopefully will come along, and FES is willing to support similar activities as long as there is genuine demand from both sides, to engage in such a dialogue.

DR. ZIDANI: On behalf of Al-Quds University and its President who is with us here, Sari Nusseibeh, and on behalf of the Sartawi Center for Peace Studies and its staff, I am pleased to welcome all of you, Israelis and Palestinians and representatives of international organizations and diplomatic missions. A special welcome is due to his Excellency, the Belgian Minister for Development Cooperation, Mr. Reginald Moreels. Also special thanks are due to the representatives of the FES for sponsoring and supporting this activity. I am confident that by the end of the day the deliberations and exchange of ideas and experiences will make us wiser and more determined to contribute our share to the process of reconciliation, not as politicians, but as representatives of civil society structures.

A few words about such encounters. First, in the Palestinian-Israeli context, as this gathering proves, the possibility and desire of engaging in free and open dialogue is not in question these days with or without the support, encouragement or participation of third parties, whether between groups of the same profession or groups dedicated to the same values and principles or groups advocating similar or identical social-political causes.

Second, since Socrates, we philosophers believe that dialogue is both intrinsically and instrumentally good. It is a common search for the truth. It is a common search for shared values and interests. It is a common search for a better and deeper understanding of yourself, of the other and of the situation. It is premised on the commitment to what is true, to what is right and to what is useful. It is also premised on the willingness to revise one's goals and priorities and the willingness to overcome insulation and self-righteousness and to shed prejudices and false beliefs.

Third, it is difficult to dialogue at difficult times. Difficult times in this respect might mean times of violence and counter-violence, or times in which the values of freedom and equality are not available to some or all the parties to the dialogue.

Fourth, there is a set of conditions, which should obtain for dialogue to be genuine and productive. First, dialog parties should be able to recognize each other as holders of equal rights or as representatives of groups which have or should have equal group rights. Second, parties to the dialogue should enjoy, to some reasonable degree, the values of liberal democracy such as free expression, tolerance, etc. Fourth, it is natural that two main kinds of issues should assume special importance in these encounters. First, what it takes to achieve or build or sustain a just and permanent peace; and second, what it takes to instill or transmit or promote democratic values and practices, or to make the transition to democracy quicker and smoother, in our case.

Finally, any attempt at cooperation or joint effort by Israelis and Palestinians that is inconsistent with the above order of priorities is doomed to fail, or at least to be ineffective. It is clear that engaging in a dialogue with the other in your own community is no less important than engaging in a dialogue with the other who represents or is a member of another community, culture, religion or state.

Neither peace nor genuine democracy can be attained without creating, sustaining and nurturing structures of civil society. Handshakes in remote capitals can start a peace process, but for the peace process to continue and succeed, it needs support from those who are dedicated to peace and democracy. Civil society structures and associations are the best candidates for this important mission. This mission, needless to say, includes making sure that the effects of the process, if any, are recognized and, when possible, remedied. Thank you and I wish you success in your deliberations.

DR. HIRSCHFELD: It is a pleasure to be with you this morning. The meeting was supposed to be opened by his Excellency Minister Without Portfolio Hassan Asfour. He will not be here today because the GOI has finally decided to vote in favor of the Wye Plantation agreement, so he is busy elsewhere. Our first meeting with Hassan Asfour was at the beginning of the political dialogue, which took place at the end of June 1989, in Holland. The former Minister of Foreign Affairs went from one hotel to another because we could not meet each other and could only speak with each other via someone going up and down the stairs.

We have come a long way since 1989. We met Hassan during the Oslo talks, and the Oslo agreements have moved us much ahead in the dialogue. But since the Oslo agreement, we have the task and the challenge not only to make peace between the governments and not only to have an understanding between the top leaderships, but to make peace between our peoples. We have so far gone through two stages, and yesterday we began moving into the third stage. The first stage was islands of dialogue or projects of cooperation, which was very good and fine. It was supported from the outside and the inside and was the beginning of islands of good will among our peoples. From there we went on to the establishment of structures of cooperation in health, research, the environment, and in other fields too where we had already developed structures of cooperation. Yesterday we began to move in a new direction. It is an important new step in P2P development. We began to develop a coordinated strategy. We have many actors pulling in many different directions. That may be part of the strategy, but how can we develop a very target-oriented strategy aimed at enlarging the peace camp on both sides, creating the political, social, economic and personal means to bring peace to our people, giving a push to the decision-makers, and afterwards stabilizing the peace.

So today is the beginning of our strategic talks, the aim of the conference. We have organized the conference in such a way that, in this exercise where we try to develop a

common strategy for P2P peace, we first of all want to learn from the very valuable experience of others. Great achievements have been made in other areas of the world, particularly in South Africa and Northern Ireland, and we are very happy today to have with us people from South Africa and Northern Ireland who can share with us some of their experience. And we can talk with them and learn from their experience in developing strategies they have already implemented.

The first session will be directed at seeing how P2P structures work. There will be some description of existing Israeli-Palestinian structures, but we mainly want to listen to the experience of Northern Ireland. James Magowan will talk about cooperation there, and we will see what we can learn from that. Andre Zaaiman will give us very important insights into the tremendous and valuable experience that has been gained in South Africa. Last night we got a taste of it, and we need to develop far more of this kind of strategic dialogue.

Beyond the strategy of structures, we will at the P2P experience when peace has not yet been concluded – that means we are going through a negotiating process with a lot of give-and-take and lots of pressure and counter-pressure on both sides. How do we overcome those pressures on both sides, and how can P2P structures fill the need of sustaining the dialogue when there are rough seas in the negotiating process? There is much experience to be learned elsewhere. The questions are similar, and there are many questions -- regarding security, regarding dialogue, regarding permits, regarding how to maintain, sustain and widen dialogue under difficult conditions. This is very important for developing strategy.

Beyond that, we will have one session which will go deeper into the South African experience which has gone beyond having gained peace. We will discuss the strategy developed there and see how it does or does not relate to our situation. We have the honor of having Glenda Wildschut with us, and she will tell us about her experience. Yesterday we discussed symmetry, asymmetry, empowerment, outreach, non-outreach. All these questions may come up in the South African example. Yesterday evening there was a unanimous decision that the P2P enterprise should not be conducted in such a way that nobody hears about it.

Therefore, we will hold a special session to look into issues of how the media can be used and how we can turn P2P dialogue into something that will use the media to make people aware of our activities, to take it upward and onward to the next step. So we have quite a hard-working program ahead of us. I hope you will be patient with us in the on-going discussion. It is a beginning, so there may be flaws. But I believe it is a very important beginning that will take us to a better strategic understanding, and therefore permit us to develop the tools we need in order to get what we need, which is peace and stabilization and the sustainment of peace.

MR. SAVIO: I would, first of all, like to thank the sponsors, and in particular the FES with whom we have been working for a long time, together with Al-Quds University and the ECF. We are here because SID has given P2P a high priority in its activities. It was the Israeli chapter which, in the beginning of this decade, around 1990-1991, came up with the idea that we should organize some dialogue with others in the region. And now that we are hopefully going to have a Palestinian chapter, I think these two chapters will continue that activity alongside the work of the international organizations.

Our first experience was in 1995 with the organization of an economic foundation here. We organized the first meeting of an NGO, which was very interesting. I came out greatly encouraged. Of course, the deterioration of the implementation of the Oslo agreement greatly changed the reality of our expectations. We decided that the only thing we could do would be to give some help in the sharing of experiences and to use our networks as a mechanism for gaining the exchange of experiences. Last year we held a world conference in Spain, in Santiago de Compostela, with about a thousand participants. One part of that conference was dedicated to a full-day workshop where we were brought together people from different areas of conflict -- such as Cyprus, Central America, Northern Ireland, South Africa -- together with Palestinians and Israelis. And during a full day there was debate on how people were or were not important or relevant in solving the conflicts. What I remember very clearly from that day's debate was that peace can only be made by people, not by protocols of the state or the governmental authorities. It is something which can come from the people, and the South African experience was particularly important in demonstrating that if the people want to do something, nothing can stop them.

This, by the way, is the experience we have been finding everywhere, such as in the people's revolution in the Philippines. There are new important elements of internal and international activities. We are now in a world where the state, which was for a long time the sole actor in international relations, today is just one player, and not the main player any longer. Civil society has taken upon itself a very important element of transition from a period in which the mechanism of state through governmental parties was the only way of participation and consensus, into a much richer and more flourishing and enriching element of tapestry of the different elements of civil society which are bringing up a more important agenda. If you look to the history of the UN, you will see that any new idea, from the International Court of Justice to the protection of children, has come from women in particular, but generally speaking, people from civil society from outside the UN who came with an agenda which was then implemented in international machinery.

Here again, the contribution can only be to share different perspectives and different realities. Today we have people with us from South Africa and from Northern Ireland. They will simply report and share their experience. Every situation is different. No situation can be simply transplanted. But of course, all situations have some elements in common. What we stress is that all situations have the people in common, and it is the people that we have to address when we look for a solution to conflict. The experience of other countries is very clear. No solution can be found without the people.

One personal remark which I know will not be very popular, but it is my duty to be very frank with friends. When you come to conferences, particularly here -- and yesterday I went to Gaza, for instance -- you have the feeling that this part of the world is its own time zone. The world is moving on, but here you find the same kind of debate, the same kind of concerns, the same sufferings, the same problems, the same fears. Today, for instance, $1 trillion will move around the world encouraging speculation. $800 billion will go around in the world in Stock Exchange speculation. And the figures of the foundations continue every day regardless of what we feel here. Time is no different. Time is only one time capsule. No conflict can continue to live on the principle that it will always find external financial support. Time catches up with everything, and this region needs to be in a normal trading partnership with the surrounding parts of the world, in a normal system of production, in a place where the

citizens can produce their best for their economy, for their personal fulfillment and for their economic development. And this can only be achieved in a situation of normality. I think time will inevitably bring this reality here, and we simply have to put ourselves in synch with the times. I know this is not a kind of internal reflection, but as an outsider, I would like to share that personal view with you.

MINISTER MOREELS: I want to thank, first of all, the FES and all the organizations here who invited me to address you. This has become, especially in the last years, a life commitment inspired by my former humanitarian engagements, that human beings are capable of their best -- I call it a kind of hidden heroism -- in crisis situations, but also capable of their worst. Some people who live normal lives with families and employment, etc., can become potential murderers when chased by media, by hatred, etc. I think that humanitarian work is an ethical and secular duty, but that it does not solve anything in the long term and in the middle term. This is what brought me to enter politics, and I became responsible for development and cooperation policies.

Immediately after my arrival in Cambodia I had to amputate both legs of a seven-year-old boy who had stepped on a mine. I will spare you the details of this very long, ten to fourteen-hour operation, but it is very shocking, even for a medical surgeon, to have to amputate both legs of a young boy. In eastern Iraq, I was one of the two medical witnesses immediately after the chemical warfare gassing of thousands of Kurds in 1988. I and various colleagues have operated on countless people wounded by weapons in various conflict areas in the south and the east. Of course, such cases leave an indelible scar, even on the incidental humanitarian observer. One can be vaccinated against a lot of diseases, but one cannot be vaccinated against human suffering and misery. If you try to immunize yourself against human suffering and misery, you become cynical. That is a problem. The figures of the latest report on human development are clear regarding the social impact of violence. The proportion of civilian casualties and the total numbers of war casualties rose from five percent at the beginning of the century till now, 90 percent in the conflicts in the 1990's, in what I call the dirty wars in the evolution toward criminalization of conflict since the end of the Cold War. In the last ten years, two million children died in armed conflicts, four to five million were handicapped, and twelve million became homeless. The actual progress made in the south and east and the improvement in the indicators of human development -- for example, regarding life expectancy, school enrollment and infant and maternal mortality -- is cancelled by the armed violence which perpetuates poverty or makes it real. The most productive members of the generation have been murdered or maimed for life and extra taxes must pay for the additional investment in health care aimed at the care of war victims.

So for me, the two main challenges to the social-economic development of many societies are, first of all, small arms and light weapons, and secondly, the pandemic of AIDS. We strive for human development both in the north and the south. Consequently, we examine the ethical and political challenges in helping to prevent the outbreak of violence. It is, therefore, the case in Belgium -- as in other donor countries -- that conflict-prevention and building were listed as a priority for international cooperation by supporting many NGO's and multilateral organizations. Within the framework of the Belgian policy of cooperation, I would launch a general principle. First of all, I think the paradigm of development has to be rethought after 30 or 40 years of contradictory results. I prefer to speak of the dignity of human beings because development is not only based on social-economic standards. I am not

addressing this message to the 1.5 billion people living below the minimal social-economic standards. I am addressing this to all people now emerging. It is better to speak of dignity than of development because cultural and spiritual values have to be strengthened. We too often impose our projects from western donor countries and do not take enough into account the grass roots level and grass roots organizations working with the local communities.

Secondly, I stick very strongly to the security-first approach. One thing we all agree on universally is that there is no human development without security. There is now much discussion in the world community about the parallelism between democratization and development, but there is a unanimous concept that there is no development without security.

Thirdly, of course all peace processes that we support from the outside could be very interesting and very useful sometimes, but we have to be discreet and modest in our support to peace processes, such as between Israel and the Palestinians, Northern Ireland and South Africa. They are all laboratories for peace-building, and it is more and more my personal opinion that a peace process cannot succeed without being honored by the local communities themselves. Belgium is supporting, in Burundi, a dialogue between Burundi's parliamentarians in order to launch internal dialogue. This was supported in cooperation and in exchange with a lot of South African parliamentarians. I went to Burundi as the first responsible from a European government, just to support not only the external process -- because remember, the external process could not prevent the genocide in 1994 in Rwanda -- but to stimulate and strengthen from the outside, the international community, the internal peace process.

I think an internal peace process that is complementary or in compliance with an external peace process can be the most useful and most fruitful thing that can happen. In Rwanda, after the genocide, we funded special judicial assistance, barristers -- preferably Africans, of course -- to defend both victims and accused people, because there can be no reconciliation between people justice. In Angola, broadcasting with an American organization, Search for Common Ground, showing the positive aspects of national reconciliation. These are only three examples of initiatives in the field of conflict-prevention and peace-building. Sometimes, of course, these types of projects are received with skepticism, not only by politicians and civil servants, but especially by inspectors of finances in different administrations because. For instance, when a conflict comes to an end and the peace process is successful, they say the peace process would have been a success even without the project. Or they may say, when the peace process is not successful and conflict continues, that a lot of money was spent for nothing and the project was not successful. So it is not easy. My delegation of civil servants administration and cabinet, can testify that it is more difficult to support this type of initiative than to build dispensaries or to invest in what I call food-security projects and so on.

Lastly, I would remind you that I co-organized with Dr. Oscar Arius, a Nobel prize winner, on the 12th and 13th of October, in Brussels, an international conference on sustainable disarmament for sustainable development. This ended in Brussels with a call for action. Of course, this is not a binding treaty, but a call for action so that programs can flow into a binding treaty in ten or fifteen years. But it did emphasize the catastrophic damages of the illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons.

It made the connection for the first time between development and disarmament, and it focused on the dramatic situation of soldiers and children. This call for action was attended by 600 participants of 98 governments and hundreds of NGO's, at the same level. We gathered people together in the same conference room and in different workshops and with many of Nobel prize winners. I personally took this last Thursday to the Secretary-General of the UN, Kofi Anan, and this will now be included in all international discussions concerning small arms and light weapons.

In addition to the problems of the viability of such programs, there are still more important difficulties, which deal with the implementation of projects of tripartite programs in the global democratization process. While it is obvious that these tripartite programs have to go hand in hand with continued political negotiations, past experiences have shown that concrete results can be obtained through civil society-led initiatives. NGO's and civil society can play an important role in government decisions, and I will add that the role played by the NGO community as a whole to support the creation of the permanent international court was extremely fruitful.

The present Israeli-Palestinian peace process was also preceded by a dialogue between Israeli and Palestinian academics, intellectuals, people from religious organizations, women's organizations. Of course, civil society is already beginning to build bridges and conceptual understanding to identify the challenges facing the other side. I wrote a little book about this kind of field diplomacy, which already began in 1973 between Israelis and Palestinians. I would like to pay tribute to this peace process. I hope, deep in my heart as a European, that the Wye Plantation agreement will be voted in the Cabinet and in the Knesset and that it is accepted by the PA. I would also like -- a day late -- to pay tribute to Mr. Rabin three years after his assassination, and to President Arafat and to all those involved in the past and present peace process. In this context, we must value this agreement signed at the Wye Plantation which will hopefully reactivate the peace process which was stalemated for a long time. The agreement will be seen as an important step forward, but already involved in the Oslo accords were the construction of a Palestinian port, the establishment of industrial sites, the attraction of private investment, better arrangements for free movement of people and commodities and so on.

In the Israel-Palestinian context, Belgium is supporting cooperation programs between Israeli and Palestinian universities. I remind you that we are facing many problems now because we are holding elections in Belgium in June 1999. There is not armed violence, but there is verbal violence between the two communities within the special status of Brussels. There is not even a final status of Brussels. I personally, as a politician now and a member of the Federal government, am a bit anxious about the evolution even of our country. We have two different communities which are verbally violent about sometimes extremist positions against each other But of course, there are some exchanges we make. I have been told that perhaps Jerusalem is nearer to Belfast than to Brussels because there has been a lot of violence.

But the specificity of the programs -- I refer now to the programs we are supporting -- was that researchers and academics were brought together not only to exchange concepts, but also to cooperate on a day-to-day basis to find solutions for common problems such as the scarcity of water which has been an important impediment to peace Peace-promotion efforts should therefore be linked to the achievement of concrete results from which both sides will benefit, and through this cooperation should grow better understanding between Palestinians and Israelis. There are many

other examples, of course, in which I have been involved. This cooperation is intended to reach more people both sides in order to give the Oslo arrangement broad among the people and to call upon governments to negotiate. P2P is part of the Oslo accords and wishes to contribute to the strengthening of the peace process.

I will conclude by raising some questions, even though I -- and my entire delegation -- are personally of the usefulness of this kind of P2P project, and I can assure you that we will continue to support this type of project. But I want to conclude with some questions. How can such projects, which are mostly very discreet, become better known by the bigger public in order to influence public opinion? How can these projects, mostly led by civil society, influence the politics of the governors? And I am aware that there is lot of networking here between civil society and politicians and the private sector, etc. I know that. Thirdly, can P2P projects be a factor in restarting the peace process when it process is blocked? What are the practices and lessons learned from this conflict-prevention project? And lastly, which kind of role can or should the regional actors in the peace process play? I think, for example, of Jordan, Egypt and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Uganda, Tanzania, South Africa and African countries.

MS. WILDSCHUT: Please share your reflections on how you see the nexus between an organization at the civil P2P level and the link between peace processes happening at the political level. What is the link between the small "p," activities happening at the grass roots level, and perhaps the big "P" activities happening at the political level, and how can one strengthen what we call in South Africa the parallel process – in other words, developing leadership and political leadership at the grass roots level, as well as influencing and connecting with political leadership at the macro level.

MINISTER MOREELS: For me there is only one big P, and that is the merger of politics and ethics. If you do not merge ethics into international politics, then of course you are moving toward a small p. Concerning the training of what we call local political responsibles, I am very much in favor. And I know that it is very difficult, even in our own country, with all the degrees of competencies voted to different political and administrative levels. But I am very much in favor of all decentralization policies that are now in implementation in different countries. Of course, decentralization does not serve as an alibi for deresponsibility. But the fact of decentralization in training people and setting up some communication networks, modern technology faxes and infomatics, is very important. Too often we witness people implementing, at the central level in the capital, very important plans concerning the health sector, concerning education, etc., but with no faxes, no communication means to transmit them to the different areas. That is completely crazy. So we are done working state to state, governmental cooperation, and they cannot even transmit these different planning schemes to the decentralized levels. So it is perhaps not a complete answer, but the first big P is to plead for more ethics in international politics, as an individual, even as a politician, trying to strengthen this in your own government even if it is a lonely struggle. And it is a lonely struggle. On the other hand, decentralization policies have to be implemented, as well as the training of local political responsibles and administrative and other social-sector skills.

THAER ABU DIAB -- PALESTINIAN DIRECTOR OF PIES: You talked about the concept of security coming first. I think Palestinians and Israelis understand security a little bit differently. I would like you to elaborate a little more about what you mean by security issues here.

MINISTER MOREELS: The security-first approach to me means demilitarization. I know that is a very sensitive matter. I have seen this in Jerusalem. It is sensitive. But I dare to stress this approach because I have witnessed far too much the realities of the armament of regions, of areas, with small arms and light weapons. The security-first approach is, first of all, demilitarization; secondly, freedom of movement; and thirdly, not only physical security, but also food security, health security, etc. I extend this term. It is not only for physical individual security, but also food security, basic human rights, access to potable water, to food, to a home, and of course to freedom of movement. That is the answer to your question. But I know demilitarization in conflictive areas is a very sensitive issue because everybody says they have to defend themselves against the others.

SESSION II: DEVELOPING STRUCTURES TO PROMOTE DIALOGUE AND COOPERATION

MR. BAUER: I come from a research institute called FAFO in Oslo, but I am here directing a secretariat for an Israeli-Palestinian P2P program. The topic under discussion during this session is how to develop structures that can promote dialogue and cooperation between the peoples. We will relate this discussion to the experiences from this area, and we have several speakers who will talk about the experience in setting up structures in the Israeli-Palestinian context.

The idea for the Palestinian-Israeli P2P program was born during the Oslo negotiations, and was later formalized into the appendix of the Oslo 2 agreement in 1995. In this agreement, the two parties agreed that the authorities on both sides should promote structures that could help dialogue and cooperation. The objective was to increase cooperation between the peoples on an equal basis, and also enhance relations between the two. It was built on the assumption that you cannot make peace with the same mindset as you are making conflict, so there was a need to involve much more broader segments of the population into activities that could put them into contact with each other and increase and improve relations between them.

Although the word is not mentioned in the text of the agreement, I think the issue of trust was at the basis of the thinking here. You need to develop trust and some guidance from the entire population when you are approaching the final-status core issues of the conflict. Also based in this agreement was an assessment that the relations in daily life were not symmetrical. Although we know it is not possible to cooperate on an equal footing between the two parties, we wanted to create a project where it would be possible to have arenas for exchange where the asymmetrical relationship was overcome. The two authorities wanted this in order to give legitimacy to cooperation and P2P activities, and also to put resources into this field. I am just going to give a few ideas on how we worked on setting up these structures.

First of all, Norway was invited to participate in setting up the program and facilitating it. Norway has tried to take a very modest role in doing this because we think it is the role of the parties to actually define what should be done and how they want to do it. We set up a steering structure for the program where the two parties actually decide on the content and what is actually to be done. But Norway, together with Israeli funding for the program, actually decides on where to put the funds at the end of the day. We have linkages to the top parties on both sides, and both parties set up a planning group on each side to do the actual day-to-day work and to select the programs and projects to be undertaken under the umbrella of the program.

Norway has been mainly setting up à Norwegian secretariat to serve the two parties in their decision-making and implementation of the program. Norway has funded mainly the Palestinian participation in the program, while the CRB has been providing the funding for the Israeli partners. We set up a program where we invited, through advertisements in the papers, all NGO's who wanted to participate to come forward with projects and ask for funding. We have not been very strict as to the topics of cooperation because we think that this cooperation that is centered around a problem within a civil society could be a good topic for promoting these relations. But we have been very sensitive to equal partnership in the projects. We have had many more Israeli NGO's approaching us for funding than Palestinians, and we have not funded anything that is not agreed by the parties and that is not based on an equal partnership within the projects. We have set up separate contracts with the two parties to make sure that the funding that can empower the civil society on the Palestinian side is actually going directly to this. We have placed two such advertisements in the newspapers, and received approximately 200 applications for funding over the last two and a half years. Out of this we have funded 90 projects to date. This means we have involved approximately 600 to 700 NGO's together who have actually developed applications for this program. We have been active in several fields. We have projects within the cultural sector, within youth, adult dialogue and seminars, environment, and we have also promoted school exchanges between teachers and between school classes on both sides. We have also supported media projects, but we found this very difficult and the whole concept of working with the media in this situation will have to be reworked. We have not only been passively searching for organizations who want funding. We have also actively been trying to promote the idea among organizations in the peripheral areas. It is easy to create cooperation projects in the Jerusalem area.

We have tried to favor and give priority to projects in the northern part of the West Bank, to Gaza particularly, and also in the more remote areas of Israel. In addition, we have tried to set up arenas for cooperation across the projects. We had a huge conference with approximately 100 participants in Gaza in December last year where two persons from each of the projects at that time met over two days to discuss their experiences, and also to develop a feeling of togetherness. We will now set up additional seminars and conferences across these different projects in order to increase the learning from project to project. Before I give the floor to the other participants, a couple of remarks.

First, I do not think you can really achieve a P2P breakthrough only with the civil society and the NGO sector. There is a very, at times constructive and at times not very constructive, relationship between the political arena and the work of the NGO's. It is very difficult to move forward without mobilizing structures and mechanisms and institutions on a higher level of society. On the other hand, it is also not possible to honor P2P work within the official framework in the high-level organizations.

Secondly, it is very important in this field of operations that we do not try to overstructure the field, but leave the field to some extent understructured for initiatives and mobilization to occur without being raised from the top. But we need structures that are able to support initiatives taken, and also to promote some arenas for dialogue that can be shielded a little from the political scene, but not too much because we also have to bring experience from these arenas back to the negotiators. We have very been clear on the fact that we are actually supporting an official program and not a private or civil society initiative. This is providing legitimacy from

the top. But we also have to make sure that we can have these kinds of initiatives drawing from the grass roots, and I think we have been able to strike a balance there. We are struggling today with structures that are set up for handling the conflict, not for building peace, and this situation will remain for a while. This means that we have to go aggressively towards areas where we think we can remove obstacles to cooperation and contact and try to increase whatever space there is now for dialogue and cooperation based on equal footing between organizations on the two sides. I will now hand the floor to the other participants in this session so we can hear more about their experiences in strategies for dealing with this very complex peace. Ziad Abdeen will speak about research cooperation.

MR. ABDEEN: I will try to answer the question how does cooperation in the field of research enhance and foster the peace process. I am going to talk about Al-Quds University's experience in this area. Allow me first of all to give you an assessment of the situation three years back. In spite of the absence of a conducive environment for research activities due to lack of research culture, weak research infrastructure and scarce financial resources, compounded by a ban by the Ministry of Higher Education on collaboration with Israeli institutions, we, as a university, decided to collaborate, slowly but surely. We have chosen capacity-building at three levels: at the personal level -- that is human resource development. You call it software; at the facility level, equipment and back- up facilities, hardware; and the networking level, locally, regionally and internationally.

What did we gain from that? Entering into collaboration in the field of research with our Israeli counterparts, and also nationally and internationally, has offered us three major things: opportunity -- which was lacking before -- to meet with each other; affordability to conduct research; and acceptability amongst the scientific community, which is not just a place on a map, but rather a complex network of relationships founded upon shared values. What has been the outcome? Collaboration overtly with Israeli institutions, not covertly. There are 31 on-going projects right now, and an increase in the rate of publication in international journals. In conclusion, the criteria which funding agencies have chosen, and rightly so, are contained in the acronym SMART -- scientific, manageable, achievable, relevant and time dimension. Although this is necessary, it is not sufficient. We should also look for security, mutuality, appreciation, respect and trust. Although collaboration in the field of research has provided us with a multitude of opportunities for pleasure, it has failed to create joy yet. This could be because some of us have joined research activity which we did not love, but have learned to love the research activities we have joined.

MR. BUHBE: We now turn to the Canadian Dialogue Fund, Manon Dumas.

MS. DUMAS: At the Canadian Embassy, being the coordinator of the Dialogue Fund is only part of my job. I am also a political officer. Political officers are typically quite cynical when they observe the region, so it has been my privilege to be involved with the Dialogue Fund because it has allowed me to have a peculiar take on the conflict. I regularly see Israelis and Palestinians who come to my office to submit project proposals, and they come in together as partners. This has rendered me a little more optimistic than most outsiders to the region. I also realize that the people who come to us for funding are the exception. That is precisely why the government of Canada feels there is a real need to make an exception to normal official development-assistance guidelines by allowing some funds to go to a developed

country, such as Israel, in order to help support activities that can one day contribute to the over-all economic and humanitarian development of the region.

Our fund dates back to August 1992, before Oslo, when Canada's official development agency approved funds to establish the Canadian Fund for Dialogue and Development to support multilateral initiatives aimed at advancing the peace process between Israelis and Arabs in the Middle East region. The basic intent and objectives of the Dialogue Fund remain, to date, to encourage contact and dialogue between Arabs and Israelis and to break down longstanding barriers to peace and development at the grass roots level. Because of the underlying political nature of this particular developmental objective, the fund is jointly managed by our Department of Foreign Affairs and the international development agency at our embassies in the region.

The Dialogue Fund at the Canadian Embassy was modeled after a similar fund that Canada initiated at our embassy in South Africa just before the end of apartheid, and exists in five locations in the region: Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus and Tel Aviv. The majority of projects have been Israel-Palestinian cooperation projects. Since the beginning, the Dialogue Fund has supported approximately 100 projects, 73 of these in Israel and the West Bank or Gaza. The activities have ranged from art workshops and environmental camps to academic seminars and conflict-resolution leadership-training.

The Canadian government commissioned an independent review of its Dialogue Fund in 1996, in order to evaluate the fund's processes and objectives. The review found that two key strengths of our fund were that it is a flexible and responsive funding facility available to locally-based organizations and institutions engaged in dialogue and development activities. The fund resides at the embassy and is available year-round. Periodic project reviews take place by committee at the embassy.

A second strength of the fund that was identified is that it is a mechanism, which is not subject to official involvement or interference in its operations from either the Israeli government or the PA. The review also noted significant lessons that are being learned on what works and what does not work in supporting dialogue between Israeli and Arabs. Some of those lessons have since helped us with project-selection criteria to ensure complementary to peace process issues and joint management and responsibility for the project by the partners.

Here we address the concept of symmetry, which is key to successful dialogue with the potential for sustainability, and also avoiding activities that are only theoretical exercises. Rather, we look for projects that involve local populations and community-based organizations in direct support of the peace process. There is a plethora of NGO's in the region. Many donors -- governmental and private -- have limits to our funding capabilities. Therefore, it is very important for Canada to occupy a specific niche in the P2P world. This sometimes introduces some interesting paradoxes.

We are dedicated, for example, to supporting first-time dialogue. We like to examine whether the dialogue would likely to occur without our participation, and we projects that rely on our funding. At the same time, projects need to be successful; i.e., the participants must be enthusiastic and a dialogue product must emerge. This often implies a delicate balance of serious individuals committed to an idea, but who may not have much experience with dialogue. Also, because equality and partnership are very important to the sustainable success of the dialogue, we feel equality must occur

at the administration level as well. By encouraging and dividing our contribution between the parties, we thereby require the partners to work out logistical and organizational details as well. We recognize this is not the most efficient management technique, and involves complicated questions of striking the right balance and prioritizing the principles involved. We make a concerted effort to give direct support to Israeli and Palestinian partners who have demonstrated that they are capable of entering into dialogue on an equal footing and who have the necessary management skills and structures to support project activities.

Another paradox can be found in the subject matters and participants of any given dialogue project. Dialogue must go beyond the easy topics at some stage in order to have a true impact on the politicians of the region. But again, much skill must be displayed in striking feasible, yet meaningful, dialogue activity. In addition, there are several criteria by which we judge a project proposal, designed to always keep the focus on dialogue and sustainability. For instance, administration costs must be very low. We do not provide funding for overhead or on-going salaries. We like the money to go toward the production of the activity itself. This can includes costs for trainers, leaders, lecturers, rental space, meals and accommodations. We look at the fund in a global manner and try to ensure that we touch on a number of important development themes, such as environment, human resource development and education, business, good governance and youth. Women in development is a particularly important theme for us, for which we seek to include components in all dialogue funded projects that we support.

Over-all, Canada's P2P experience has been a good one. We are in the process of renewing our commitment to the Dialogue Fund for another three-year period. We have found that, since 1992, the quality of proposals has improved and the variety of potential partners has been great. We have been given a measure of hope by recent developments in the peace process, but we are aware that work in developing infrastructure for lasting peace at the grass roots level is far from over. Teams of partners who approach the fund must be very committed to achieving dialogue on the ground. We feel that the P2P activities of the Israeli-Palestinian NGO level has gained active supporters for the peace process. Thank you.

MR. BUHBE: We will now hear from Women's Dialogue. I give the floor to Gila Svirsky from Bat Shalom.

MS. SVIRSKY: First, I bring you greetings from my Palestinian counterpart, Dr. Nasser, who is the Director of the Jerusalem Center for Women. She is in Europe and could not attend. I thank her for allowing me to speak on behalf of both centers. I am the Director of Bat Shalom, an Israeli women's center for peace. Together our two organizations comprise the Jerusalem Link.

In July 1997, a nine-year-old Palestinian boy named Hilmi was killed by an Israeli Jewish settler who kicked him brutally in the head for throwing stones at his car. It was terrible. The funeral was conducted and the family opened a mourning tent outside their home. Many peace organizations on the Israeli side got together and came to pay a condolence call to the family. We sat outside under the tent and listened to the speeches of the political leaders on both sides. We sipped the bitter coffee and we agreed that it was a terrible thing to have done and that the reprisals would be terrible in its wake. At some point, one of the women from Bat Shalom asked if we, the women, could meet with the mother of Hilmi We were escorted inside the house and stood in a room waiting for her to enter. When she did enter, she did not speak

Hebrew or English. We did not speak Arabic. She stood there silently for quite a long time, her eyes very red with a very pained expression on her face. She said nothing. Finally, one of the women from our group went over to her and embraced her. A second woman then came over to her and embraced her as well. And then each one of us, 30 or 40 women, came to her, embraced her, kissed her. There were no words that we could speak on either side, but I believe that the message we had was conveyed. Several months later, in September of that year, 1997, there were bombs in Jerusalem placed by a Palestinian terrorist, and many Israelis were killed. Funerals were held. Inciting speeches were made on both sides. The Israeli government carried out its usual reprisals against the Palestinian population who had not thrown the bomb. A delegation of Palestinian women from the Jerusalem Center for Women visited the home of one of the teen-age girls who was killed in the bomb. They sat and made a condolence call with that family. These are two examples of many that joint Palestinian and Israeli women's peace organizing takes to express itself.

We together of the Jerusalem Link set up a women's peace tent at Har Homa-Jabul Abu Ghneim and maintained a presence there for many long days. Following an act of violence, we published statements side by side in both the Israeli press and the Palestinian press, the Palestinian women condemning the terrorism and the Israeli women condemning the collective punishments of the Palestinian population by way of closure for that act of violence. The Jerusalem Link was the first major movement to call upon both our governments and our peoples to share Jerusalem. This major campaign was an attempt to shatter a powerful taboo in our respective societies, each of which regards Jerusalem as exclusively its own. The Jerusalem Link held joint delegations of Palestinian and Israeli women who presented our joint demands for a political solution to innumerable visitors to the Middle East. In this past year alone, we met with Gerhard Schroeder, Tony Blair, Kofi Anan, Robin Cook and Madeleine Albright.

We believe that our joint statements, our joint declarations, our joint activities carry a powerful message, much more powerful than a message given by one side alone. To make a persuasive case for sharing this land, for sharing this city as its capital, you must have both sides saying aloud that they are willing to share it. One side alone is not enough. That is the power of the Jerusalem Link. But we would be unable to accomplish this had we not been two separate structures, two independent centers. Indeed, we think of ourselves as the metaphor for the peace we are trying to achieve, each center autonomous with its own border, its own staff, its own funding, its own constituencies. Sovereign, if you will. Why separate? We have, to some extent, agendas. On the Bat Shalom side, we work to mobilize support for peace and to end our government's violations of human rights on the Palestinian side.

At the Jerusalem Center for Women, in addition to their work on the level of peace and human rights, they educate Palestinian women for participation in civic society, democracy education. Being together gives legitimacy and power to our separate work as well, but our common vision is one of a shared peace, not a treaty of mutual deterrence, not a Wye accord, not even an Oslo accord. Although we support these we want more. We have a vision of a cooperative society. We see, at the end of the road, two societies that are inter-related in every way – culturally, academically, commercially, socially, economically.

In short, what we seek to do in the Jerusalem Link is to build a culture of peace, to hold out that vision to our mutual constituents and to build their trust in each other.

Foundations call it P2P. Diplomats call it confidence-building measures. We call it the Jerusalem Link, sometimes faltering, often flawed, frequently under attack in our own communities, but constant in its shared vision -- a women's joint venture for peace.

MR. BUHBE: I now give the floor to Anne Casper.

MS. CASPER: In addition to being the Co-Director of REPTEC, I am also Vice-Consul for Public Affairs at the American Consulate. I want to start off by asking the question why the US government is even involved in P2P projects. There are those who would see an irony in the fact governments fund -- and in many cases organize -- P2P projects which are an arm of civil society. I would like to talk about that looking specifically at our case, the REPTEC case. REPTEC stands for Regional, Professional and Technical Cooperation. It is a small grants program in support of P2P projects that has been funded the State Department on a yearly basis over the past several years. It is jointly run by the American Consulate -- is the only independent American Consulate and primarily with Palestinians -- and the American Embassy Tel Aviv which works primarily with Israelis. This project is designed to provide seed money for joint projects to foster nongovernmental and private cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians. Jordanian Egyptian participation is also welcome; hence the term regional.

This year the program was given $500,000, and we distributed $500,000 to about 20 projects. That is up from $250,000 last year, and we suspect there will be further money forthcoming in the future. This project began in 1993 as the Palestinian-Israeli Cooperation Program -- PICP -- that brought Israelis and Palestinians together for dialogue and cooperation in a general sense. It evolved into REPTEC in 1996, when it was decided to concentrate more specifically on joint innovative professional and technical programs. Just to give you an idea, among the kinds of programs we fund are an original workshop on AIDS education in the Middle East; cooperative medical programs, especially in primary care; professional cooperation among educators; and joint women's leadership training courses, like the Jerusalem Link.

This year we have money set to go for a joint program to set up a mediation and arbitration center in Jerusalem, joint research for educators and psychologists to investigate the effects of coping with violence on children, workshops between Israeli and Palestinian social workers, and a joint program to fight drug abuse, as well as many other technical and professional programs. One of the reasons we moved from supporting general dialogue and cooperative projects was that, from the experience, we learned that the most successful projects are those where the two sides have a professional need to cooperate. That is, when Israelis and Palestinians come together for an artificially-created reason -- or really dialogue -- many times they do not follow up with one another afterwards. The reasons for this lack of follow-up include closure and the fact that the political environment cannot be separated from P2P, so that when the peace process falters in general, we see a lessening enthusiasm for P2P, especially among Palestinians.

Because of these and other challenges to P2P projects, the idea is to create interaction and cooperation that is sustainable. If there are compelling reasons for people to meet professionally -- such as cross-border issues like the environment and the fight against drugs -- there is more of a chance that Palestinians and Israelis will continue to work together. Listening to my colleagues talk, I noticed that we share many of the same criteria when looking at projects. One of the first things we look at when we get a proposal is, is there a Palestinian and an Israeli counterpart. Many times we get

proposals only from Israeli institutions. One of the goals of REPTEC is to promote strong Palestinian civil society, so we want to promote the development of Palestinian institutions. We also look at whether or not they are equal partners. Another issue is whether one side is helping the other or whether they are working toward a common goal together. These are issues many of you have looked at.

One thing I want to add is that we have gotten some projects this year from Israeli Arabs wanting to do P2P projects with Palestinians. This is an interesting issue, and one that we talked about. What is the P2P aspect between Israeli Arabs and Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza? If people have thoughts on that, I would be interested to hear them. Going back to the original idea of an irony in terms of governmental involvement, I just want to take you back for a minute to the late 1980's. This is where the ideas came from. At the end of the Cold War and with the emergence of a new mood, especially between the US and the USSR, governments were putting on a campaign of waging peace which included a personalization of the peace process -- teleconferencing, meetings -- and it was out of this that the American government thought, after Oslo, that this would be an appropriate strategy in terms of Palestinians and Israelis. This strategy is based on the idea that the peace process is not an abstraction, but that peace has to be based on lasting and genuine relationships between people at the popular level. So P2P is one component of many, and it serves as an umbrella for the peace process itself. I'll close here by saying that our hope is that there will come a time when P2P will be a natural part of this area and that governments will not have to take this role.

MR. BUHBE: We have two speakers left. I first give the floor to Hikmat Ajjuri who will talk about environment and health.

MR. AJJURI: I am the Director-General of the Palestine Council of Health. It is a privilege and a pleasure to address you this morning as someone who has fought for peace and reconciliation between Israelis and Palestinians over the past 15 years. I began this march for one simple reason or conviction, which is that we, the Israelis and the Palestinians, are destined to live together, in peace and harmony or in war and hatred. And I do not know whether it is fortunate or unfortunate, but the choice is ours. The PCH and its main Israeli counterpart the ECF, found that Oslo created a new climate, a window of opportunity to conclude peacefully a long chapter of war and bloodshed between us. With this background, we decided to exploit, to grasp this opportunity and to ride the vehicle of P2P. That was more than three years ago.

In fairness, I would like to emphasize that the vehicle, with its four wheels, was donated by the Swedes, and the fuel which kept us running was donated by many other European countries. Here I must mention the Dutch and the Danes. Other partners who supported us at fuel stops were the Irish, the Canadians, the Americans and the South Africans. And I seek forgiveness from anybody else I have not mentioned who supported this program or this trip in which we hoped and believed wholeheartedly -- the PCH and the ECF -- that this vehicle would end up at the station of peace. One very important partner who has not been mentioned is the Israeli Foreign Office. Mashav, which I believe means foreign aid, a department within the Israeli Foreign Office, has also shared many of our projects, and have rescued some of the projects from falling apart by means of their financial aid at one stage. When the PCH and the ECF decided to travel together on this vehicle, we decided to go through two fields, health and environment.

Let me begin with health, and I will touch briefly on what we have achieved over the past three years. I know that perhaps we are not known because we have kept away from the spotlight, and this is perhaps the nightmare Yair mentioned earlier. We have to do something from now on to tell the world about our work. Maybe it was because of caution or fear. We wanted to give ourselves the chance to build some muscles -- maybe bones -- in order to keep us running and to face the winds, the obstacles, the impediments which all of us here in this room know we have faced over the past three to four years. In the area of health, we have managed to link primary health care centers in the northern West Bank to the north of Israel, and we have successfully, through that project, trained Palestinian doctors and nurses in those centers. In family medicine, with the support of the American Consulate, we have begun a sort of pilot project in which we trained four Palestinian doctors in this area which is hardly known in the Palestinian medical field. As a result of that project, we have developed an entire curriculum jointly between the Medical School at Al-Quds University and Ben-Gurion University in which we aim at graduating post-graduate diploma doctors in this field. This project is still in the pipeline. We have also trained many nurses, mainly from Palestinian society and other Palestinian health NGO's, in Hadassah Hospital. Another big area which makes both of us -- ECF and PCH -- proud is the area of occupational safety and health. We have helped the Palestinians -- i.e., the Palestinian Ministry of Labor -- to lay down guidelines for legislation in the area of occupational safety and health. The final draft is now in the hands of the Ministry to be passed through the Legislative Council to become a law. We managed to do that with the involvement and contribution of the Israeli Kupat Holim, the Danish Working Environment, the Egyptians and the Jordanians. In this project we involved governments and nongovernmental institutions. In addition to that legislative act, we have trained 29 Palestinians from different ministries and NGO's at Ranana Institute, which has more advanced technology and experience in the field.

The other area is the field of the environment. Because we believe that the environment comprises all external factors, conditions and influences which affect the development and the lives of human beings biologically, socially and physically, we thought this area should not go without the fingerprint of PCH and ECF. We have successfully established the Palestinian-Israeli Environmental Secretariat (PIES), and I am proud to say that the two co-directors are here with us today, one Israeli and one Palestinian. And for a change, next to my office, I have a Palestinian and an Israeli working together in one room under one roof. This is not only to raise awareness amongst Israelis and the Palestinians as to the importance of this issue and how much it affects our very survival. I also have a hidden motive. Three years ago, when I decided to work hard in this area, I thought that if we failed, at least we might be able to tackle a common threat. An unhealthy environment is a common threat. We and the Israelis share the same ecosystem.

Finally, I would like to mention two television interviews which I found very alarming. One was seven years ago during the Gulf crisis. A Palestinian was asked about his opinion of Saddam Hussein scudding Israel with chemical warheads, understanding that they might fall on his own head. He said, Yes. I don't mind if it falls on my head as long as it falls on the Israelis' heads. Two weeks ago, while everybody was in Wye discussing our future, there was an interview with an Israeli in the street, an ordinary Israeli young man. He was asked one question, whether he trusts Arafat. The answer was, Why should I? We have nuclear weapons. With this mentality, I must emphasize that what we need to address is not the physical

environment, but the mental environment. We must seek to succeed in establishing a peaceful settlement. I would like everybody here who has anything to do with cooperation, anything to do with P2P, to try to integrate this component in any step we are thinking of to move forward towards a peaceful settlement between us. Finally, I would like to mention that next week, on Sunday, we are organizing a big workshop on drugs, which will be attended by high police officers and judges from Israel and Palestine who will spend one night in Gaza. Thank you.

MR. BUHBE: We have one more intervention before we go to discussion, and that is James Magowan talking about cross-border cooperation (CBC).

MR. MAGOWAN: I come from Northern Ireland, and I speak to you from the professional capacity of someone who has been involved with nongovernmental organizations in establishing cross-border structures between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, and also from a personal capacity as someone who lives in a border area that has seen a lot of the conflict and has really suffered to a degree from the long period of trouble in Northern Ireland. I am going to try and cut this short because of time constraints, particularly in setting the context.

In order to get through this more quickly, I want to discuss a particular theme, and that is one of changing perceptions among people engaging in CBC; what the border is actually about; that the border has been created very much as a barrier, as a buffer zone between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland since partition; and how, over a period of time, when the communities were back to back looking away from each other, how that can be transformed in a way so that the border can be seen more as an opportunity and as gateway for trade and for business, but also for individuals and communities, without that being seen as a threat to the dissolution of the border. That is critical to the issue in Northern Ireland.

In this context, it is important to see the situation of Northern Ireland as a small region of the United Kingdom sharing the island of Ireland with the Republic of Ireland set within the context of the EU which, since 1992, has strived, through the single European Market, to remove physical, fiscal, technical barriers to trade, for example, and to encourage freedom of movement of people, goods, services and capital. I would add, as Margaret Thatcher noted in the negotiations, the single European Market also removes barriers to criminals, drugs, illegal immigrants, and so on. So there you see the juxtaposition of opening borders and what borders are really about. So why CBC in the context of the Irish situation? At the intergovernmental level, it was because it was seen to make economic sense for both the region of Northern Ireland and for the Republic of Ireland. There was an interdependency and a long dependency on the United Kingdom from the Republic of Ireland. Intergovernmental cooperation was seen from that standpoint. What I found interesting in the viewpoints in the discussions today is that it was not just about the economic necessities of the region. It was about developing an understanding of people across the border and the developing of mutual respect. Particularly in the Northern Ireland situation where there exists a divided community -- within the north in any case -- CBC actually lends itself to contributing toward reconciliation to that community on one side of the border. It is, at the personal level, about the spiritual dimension and the cultural dimension. For many people who had never crossed the border in their lives, some of these cooperation programs afforded them the opportunity to embrace each other; indeed, to realize that they do have things in common and that the other side does not have two heads and so on.

The other issue I want to reflect on is the particular problems associated in border ribbon areas right along the border, and the characteristics of border regions, not only in the Irish case, but also elsewhere in Europe. Great encouragement is needed for CBC because these regions are at the end of the line of national policies. The infrastructure does not match that of other member states, for example. They generally have higher levels of unemployment, problems in terms of lack of industrial investment in particular, and generally higher dependence on agriculture, which is a particular problem in the Irish case. So these border regions suffer particular problems that the cooperation strategies have sought to address. I want to just mention two particular programs and structures of CBC.

One is based on thematic cooperation. This has been on-going during the period, and it is interesting when we ask can this happen in the absence of political settlement, well, absolutely yes. In the case of Northern Ireland, political agreement is there. It is in the process of being implemented, although it is stalled at the moment. One of the critical elements in that stalled process is the establishment of the joint north side ministerial council and the cross-border implementing bodies. This does not mean that nothing else happened over the last 30 years. Throughout the course of the troubles there have always been efforts by nongovernment, such as Cooperation Ireland, to foster mutual respect and to encourage practical cooperation between people in Northern Ireland and in the Republic of Ireland, practical activities to engage young people and professionals and get them into organizations that filter out into others. It is particularly important to target those that have a professional involvement, and that has happened very effectively through the cooperation and thematic programs. The structures that have emerged from that have included the joint council between the employers' organizations in Northern Ireland, and indeed, a similar sort of structure that is completely formed now among the trade unions. What is very significant about those structures is that they then had the capacity to start influencing stage two of the negotiations, the north side of the negotiations, to put forward a joint case for economic cooperation that fit within the agreement. So they were able to play a role within that process, and indeed continue to do so.

I will not dwell more on thematic cooperation because I want to discuss briefly the issue of cooperation between regions are in the border area. This has been driven by local authority involvement, and it was fascinating to hear at the meeting yesterday that there is an initiative of this nature being considered here. Some of this discussion has taken place over a long period of time in Northern Ireland. There have been informal -- leading to more formal -- discussions between local authorities for a considerable period of time, particularly those that were dominated by the nationalist community that had an interest in cooperation because they would see that as perhaps a progression toward a united Ireland ultimately. But laterally, it has become more acceptable to the unionist community within Northern Ireland, and particularly to unionist-dominated councils.

This is a very important issue, but CBC can contribute to internal cooperation and reconciliation between the two communities because the dialogue that was established between local authorities started to identify issues in common and started to identify that these regions in the border areas, back to back, far removed from national policy- and decision-makers, could establish some regional identity that transcended the border. The problem was that transcending the border for the unionists was anathema, and it took the agreement -- which effectively consolidated the border, as far as they were concerned, and removed the territorial claim from the Republic of Ireland --

before they felt comfortable with engaging in relations across the border. Once they do that, then they can start to look at the more strategic issues. CBC is not an action. It is not a project. I see it very much as a process that starts from an understanding of the other side, developing a mutual respect, developing friendships. From that people can identify what they have in common. Then perhaps joint initiatives might emerge, like the P2P initiatives here. Then they move on to self-sustaining development of joint projects managed jointly across the border.

Finally, the last stage is joint strategic development. This is a particularly interesting area that we have just about reached in Northern Ireland. In one case, one cross-border region operated for some 20 years before it got to process of joint strategic development because it has taken that time to remove all of the inhibitions and barriers and to develop the competence and the capacity to engage in CBC. And it is not the local authorities themselves. The local authorities are acting as catalysts for others. They are engaging the wider civil society. They are engaging people from local community groups, the business community in particular, and they are the ones who actually do the cooperation. Without competent road-building and telecommunications, for example, it is difficult with joint strategic development because that depends on an ultimate national agreement and national solution. But what they have managed to achieve is a common vision for the region. They realize what the natural resources are within their collective hinterland. They realize together what the opportunities are, and they can develop a plan for the way forward. So when cross-border implementing bodies are put in place in the Northern Ireland context, they will already be able to move forward, having established relationships with each other and established this common vision.

I will conclude by saying that one lesson to learn from the Irish situation is not to raise expectations too high about this sort of strategic development. It is very easy to think about the supply of water or telecommunications or roads or industrial parks and so on, that these are going to be a panacea for regional development and that everything that is needed within a particular region is going to be resourced through cross-border development programs. It is going to take time to develop capacity, and the critical lesson is to set realistic goals and to be realistic about what you can achieve within the competencies that you have. It is about developing the capacity to cooperate, not necessarily delivering the end product, because if you fail to achieve these high-level goals, the whole enthusiasm for cooperation may well be lost.

MR. BUHBE: I would like to sum up my feelings on listening to this panel. At least five themes have emerged that are important to our future work. The first of these themes is that, in the multiplicity of structures emerging in the area, several initiatives are similar. This raises the problem of finding niches -- as we heard from the Canadian case, or about coordination or finding an over-all strategy or trying to concentrate networks into some kind of similar direction.

The second theme is the problem of addressing the relationship between P2P activities and the official level or politics. Some are opting for a shielding strategy where we try to shield P2P activities from politics. Others are saying we need a linkage because we need to influence the political or official level by grassroots P2P activities.

The third theme is the problem or challenge of managing relations, such as in the Jerusalem Link example, in such a way that the conflict is being penetrated in through dialogue, and also to establish a new basis for building dialogue in direct cooperation.

A fourth theme is the relationship between dialogue and substance. It emerged from several examples that it is easier now, in this situation, to build dialogue and cooperation when you have particular areas of substance for these dialogues, areas where you have shared problems and shared challenges, and where you can build the dialogue and cooperation around this substance. This emerged particularly from the Ireland example, and from others around the table here.

The fifth theme is the issue of transparency and openness and the possibilities of making P2P initiatives known without raising expectations too high and losing an appropriate sense of realism. I just want to mention that the secretariat for the P2P program that is led by the two authorities is setting up a data base and also publishing all the projects on the Internet, and we freely give out lists of these projects to involve others in judging what we are actually doing.

I think there may be a sixth theme, the role of the donor in all this. What can the donor community actually do? We are not building strategy. We are critically and constructively trying to respond to the needs from the field. Now I open the floor for questions and remarks from the audience.

PAUL SMITH – ISRAELI REPRESENTATIVE TO PIES: I am sure that all the Palestinians and Israelis in the room, and many of the internationals who live here, have become aware in the past weeks of a debate developing within Palestinian society about P2P. Allegations have been made that, with such generous funding from abroad and all sorts of facilities being made available to Palestinians who take part in P2P projects – such as permits to get out of Gaza and things like that – in fact, what this program is doing is creating a new elite of people who have the facility to travel, who have facilities, who have an income thanks to this program, etc. In this way, they are very tragically divorcing the P2P dialogue from the grass roots of people who do not benefit from it. I would like to hear how people respond to that kind of criticism, perhaps both from a funder's point of view and from an operator's point of view.

A second question crystallized in my mind on hearing particularly the Canadian and American policy positions and dialogue. I think I heard both ladies say that they insist on having partners coming to them together for funding. Does that not give rise to the creation of public organizations on the other side who then get very easily manipulated by the one who has taken the initiative into doing a program where, in fact, only one side determines the agenda? Is there not a case to be made to empower people to engage in dialogue before actually starting with the dialogue, and in that sense, using James Magowan's phrase, developing the capacity to cooperate? Is there not a case to be made for that in terms of dialogue funding?

MR. PUNDIK: First, regarding the previous question, this could be an issue to be dealt with, at least partially in the next session which talks about impediments. This is definitely one impediment we all confront. I would perhaps mention a seventh theme also developed through the presentations, which is something we at ECF have tried to promote since the beginning of the idea of P2P. This is the idea of creating what we call professional hubs or structures for P2P. We have tried to create a situation in which the joint Israeli-Palestinian different mechanisms, different structures, are not necessarily rigid in structure but very clearly rigid in substance, such as Bat Shalom and the Jerusalem Center for Women which are two independent organizations dealing with the same issues. PIES is one organization under the same roof. In art we have only a steering committee which is perhaps an embryo for future organizations. In health there are two organizations with one strategy. With cross-borders we have

different activities which might eventually end up as two NGO's working together. This is, in a way, different from other ideas, but in many ways complements other ideas. In this situation, which we believe is very delicate among Israelis and Palestinians, we need as many structures and as many facilities with as little rigidity in relations as we can achieve.

MS. CASPER: In answer to the question about the development of elites in Palestinian society, a few weeks ago, in fact, a Palestinian said to me, What is the difference between now and before Oslo? The answer was, before Oslo – or actually, in a sense, before the Gulf War – all Palestinians were VIP's. That is, all Palestinians had the opportunity to travel back and forth.

MR. PUNDIK: That is incorrect. I must jump in. This is one of the lies that has developed, and we must once and for all -- not here maybe -- correct it. The first closure -- not the first one in the 1991 war -- the first closure was put on by Rabin in mid-1983, before even he himself realized we were serious about Oslo. Even before it penetrated into his strategic thinking that Oslo would be the channel or that we would achieve peace sometime, or an agreement. This was in reaction to what we call the activities in Tel Aviv, Bat Yam and other places. There was no connection whatsoever to the peace process. It happened in the same year of Oslo, and somehow it entered into the mentality that there is a strong link between the peace process and closure. There is none whatsoever. The closure and the Israelis' tough approach toward the Palestinians came before the peace process. Unfortunately, the process did not open the borders, but hopefully that will come as well.

MS. CASPER: Thank you. My point was actually that this issue of separation in Palestinian society of different levels of elites is one that is broader than just P2P. It is much more complex than looking at it as just the result of P2P programs. The issue of closure is one that people have to look at, but the end goal of P2P programs hopefully is to eliminate these structures by building trust. We want to look at it in a broader context. Palestinian society's differences based on insiders and outsiders are based on many other issues, so I do not think you can just lay the blame on P2P.

MR. BUHBE: I just want to say that we are now recording themes rather than discussing them in depth. Some we will have to take to the coffee break and other places. The issue of hub is interesting because it is a notion of coordination without control. That is an important network concept where we there can be coordinated activities between professionals and others without imposing exclusive control.

THAER ABU DIAB -- PALESTINIAN DIRECTOR OF PIES: Many projects have been funded by people sitting here, whether Canadian or South African or the PA or Norwegian and others. As an organization using the environment as a vessel to bring Palestinians and Israelis together, we hear a lot of people saying there is a lot of money for these projects. I disagree with that. Most of the projects are very small. We are talking about $20,000. This is creating a problem. You start a process and in several months or one year it ends. You have no continuity. In fact, we really need more money allocated for P2P dialogue that would run for several years. Many topics mostly bring together Palestinians and Israelis who are already in the peace process. The idea of P2P is really to bring in people who disagree with the Oslo agreement. That is why we use the environment, in order to bring in people who disagree with Oslo but who see that there is a lot in common between us. More money, in fact, should be allocated for such ideas. I also have some comments about Jerusalem. You mentioned Jerusalem as being taboo for the Palestinian community. I feel Jerusalem is

taboo for the Israeli side. Palestinians accept East Jerusalem as a capital. Israelis have to work on this issue in their community really more than the Palestinians. This meeting is excellent. It has brought together many people I do not have the chance to see that much. We have a lack of coordination between P2P groups and a small amount of money, and we need to coordinate more in order to have greater impact.

MS. SVIRSKY: So much gratitude has been expressed here to many governments and associations, and I just want to say that the one that has been instrumental in the founding of the European Link is the European Commission. Many of us in this room owe them an enormous sense of gratitude for their support. It has never been small or puny. It has always been very generous.

MR. AJJURI: We think of P2P as the second leg of a peaceful body. Unless we protect this very important leg, the peace process will be limping forever. We know that it has become, in the mentality of some, like a business. We have to fight this, those of us who really care for P2P. And I say, in the presence of donors, to be very careful and to select their partners.

MS. DUMAS: This may be an apology on behalf of the donor community. We realize there is no ideal structure. We are constantly striving to make the donation of funds for these activities as perfect as possible, but it is not perfect. The important thing for us is to remain flexible. We also have to remember that the donor community, the donors themselves, have their own interests as well, and there is a delicate balance to strike. Finally, we also have to remember that the option is that there would not be any funding for P2P, and I think that would be a worse option.

SESSION III: DOING DIALOGUE AT DIFFICULT TIMES

MR. SHEEHY: In this session we will be looking at the problem of managing the peace process when the going gets tough. The going has been very tough in the last 18 months, so we have a lot of experience to reflect on and that we begin to analyze. Our first speaker is Andre Zaaiman from the Goree Institute. He will be speaking about the IDASA experience, left over from the previous session, which gave us a great deal of raw material and raised a whole number of questions. One small disclaimer. The program says I am affiliated with REDWG. I do not represent REDWG. I am a former executive of the Regional Economic Development Working Group. I was secretary in Amman, so I am not now speaking in any sense for REDWG.

MR. ZAAIMAN: I am going to try to have a quick conversation with you about the experiences we had with an organization call IDASA in South Africa that did very similar things to some of the things mentioned this morning. My wisdom, if there is any wisdom in what I am trying to tell you, comes from two sources. One is hindsight, which puts me in a nice position. The other is to rewrite the past to fit the present. So I am very fortunate. Also, I have nothing to sell to you. I want to make it clear that I am just sharing an experience with you.

And I thought the best way to begin would be to mention something we talked a lot about in IDASA, which is the idea of phenotypes and genotypes. In terms of the genotypes in these kinds of conflicts and interventions, there is a kind of universal logic to them. But in terms of the phenotypes, the phenomenological aspects, there are also very particular things. So I share in the ideas that were mentioned this morning that there are things that are very particular to this particular conflict and to the particular strategies that you will pursue to try and resolve these problems and these challenges. But there are also typical things. This whole thing about grass roots and

elite is not a new thing. We all struggled with that. But obviously, you will resolve this in your own typical way, different to the way we did it. Also, just a quick response to try to link what I will try to say with what went on before, I might throw up a red flag somewhere that one must always be careful that these processes, in my view, are not supply-driven. The donors come in and there is a lot of money, so we make peace because there is money available to make peace. It is very dangerous to structure thinking and logic around that. You have to strike a balance between these things. The organization that I was involved in was called IDASA. It was a nongovernmental organization. You are deeply into the NGO syndrome. We are already trying to run away from it, so we might also want to talk about that. That is a big question.

There are two things I want to mention before I show you the model we used which might be useful for you to capture all the loose strings that were raised in the previous session. One is that we cannot work with blueprints, and that must be clear to everybody. There is a kind of knowledge the Greeks call phrenetic knowledge, and that is knowledge to make things work in a particular environment. That is the kind of knowledge and skills we need, and that is developed by implementing things, thinking about implementing things, thinking about it again. It is not developed by a grand master plan that we then try implement. Those kinds of strategies often go in strange directions.

The other thing we have to come to terms with is that these processes are always contradictory and paradoxical, and we have to learn to get comfortable with that. We are not dealing with a neat problem. It is not an engineering problem. It is a social problem. And social problems, because of the people who are involved in them, are always complex, contradictory and paradoxical. Skills to deal with many types of contradictory facts at the same time as peace-makers or in the mechanics of the peace process are very important.

In terms of the IDASA experience, I want to talk a little about the strategy that we used. This falls into the school of what is known as emergent strategies. In IDASA, we did not use a blueprint, also because we realized, as a small organization, that we had to be extremely humble. The kind of contributions we can make are important, but often small. And they are often outside the frameworks of social engineering. Too often we fall quickly into the idea that we can socially engineer a conflict. In my experience, that is very difficult. We are dependent on actors and activities outside our sphere of influence. In that sense also, we have to learn how to deal, manage and cope with those.

So that is also a very important point, not to use blueprints, not to use classical models of strategic planning, but rather to use the later version developed in the field by a Canadian, the concept of emerging strategies, which has a closer compatibility, a closer link between doing something, thinking about it, doing something, thinking about it, but which also relies a lot on the relationship between tacit knowledge and tacit processes and explicit knowledge and explicit processes. We know that the levels of innovation in society or in process -- peace process in this case -- depend a lot on our capacity to extract tacit knowledge, make it explicit, learn from it, make it tacit again, and go deeper into it. Too often we restrict ourselves to formal science written up in books that we find easy to talk about. But a lot of the skills of peacemaking, like those of an auto mechanic -- somebody who fixes the car rather than the driver of the car -- are tacit.

I think, in your peace initiatives, you have already brought up an enormous amount of tacit skills. These skills -- often unconscious -- might be useful at some stage when you ask yourself, when it works, what did we do right, and to learn from that and to build up your knowledge based on that.

On the strategic, we did not fall into the trap of a blueprint, a grand master plan and strategic planning. We said let's take it step by step, a little action, a little thinking, fit it closely to the environment as it moves, as it fluxes. And also, let us use a lot of our tacit skills and our tacit knowledge, not only in our own organization and in ourselves, but also in our societies and communities.

My second point is how does an organization such as IDASA, which was a nongovernmental organization, position itself in these situations in order to have the maximum amount of impact. The model I will develop starts off with a conflict and paradox which I think you have all felt, that of autonomy and embededness. For an organization to have an influence on the society it has to be embedded. It has to have roots into the society. Otherwise people do not listen to it. As the peace mechanic, you have to be close enough to your society or to your constituency. But if you become too close to that, then you become too much a part of your society and too much a part of the conflict.

At the same time, you also need a certain level of autonomy, a certain capacity to act upon your society and not just to be representative of your society. That is why I found the emerging debate here about grass roots and elite and about participation very interesting because we need to move beyond bipolarizing these concepts. The process is far more complex. We cannot reduce it to very simple things as getting the grass roots involved and everything will work out miraculously. Don't believe it. Participation also becomes an ideology manipulation. You see many cases of NGO's in communities with agendas they worked out the night before, who get into a community and say, What's the problem in this community. The community lists eight things, the facilitator looks at that list and says, Oh, they did not mention the thing about conflict. But look, No. 6 looks like conflict. We'll take that one. And all of a sudden say it will be, You see, guys actually identified the problem. It's about conflict. That is how you set the agenda. Peacemaking by stealth, which is different than by imposition which is what the World Bank often used, but the ends are often the same. We have to be careful not to fall into that trap.

So if one says there is a tension between an organization having certain levels of autonomy and an organization having certain levels of embededness into communities into which it is trying to intervene, another X here is dealing on the macro level and dealing on the micro level.

The framework I am using is a competing-values framework. I am one of those people who wants to have my cake and eat it too. This basically means you have to have all these things at the same time and you have to be equally good at them, and that is the competing-values framework. One has to be macro and micro at the same time. What do we mean by macro and micro? Macro means intervening on the level of the society; and micro, in that sense, is intervening on the level of the community or of the people.

I will tell you a little about our experience in Africa with these kinds of things. In Africa, in the 1960's, with the development industry and donor agencies and so on, everybody talked about the state in the 1960's. The state was God and the state was

going to save everybody and everybody put trust and money into the state. Twenty years later we said, no, the state is bad. The World Bank came and said communities are good. So we dropped society and we went for the community, and the community becomes the miraculous center of saving us and resolving all the problems of the community. That was in the 1980's. That created an enormous tension because you can just imagine what kinds of contradictions you deal with when strategies of community are totally out of synch with strategies of the society, and you have conflicting strategies within one society which leads to greater fragmentation. Eventually society turns inward an unintentionally exacerbates the conflict instead of resolving it.

In the 1990's, we dropped society and communities and the market was what would solve everything. We use contradictions and paradoxes, and you have to work on all these levels. As an institution wanting to make a contribution in our country, we thought these were the two key axes. You need macro and micro. You need to be involved in society and you also need to be involved in the community. In other words, you have to work with the elite as well as with what you call the grass roots. Quite often the representatives of the grass roots are part of the elite, but we do not want to say it. That is often the case. So we need to change our paradigms a little about how we think about these things. Let's look at each of these four blocks and use that framework to say what we need as ingredients of a successful intervention or a successful contribution by an organization, in our case such as IDASA.

Before that, let me just give you the broad model that we used. We said we are not going to be able to change the reality in South Africa, but we can change the way in which people read that reality. We can change the paradigm, but we ourselves cannot change the reality. There are a lot of processes that happen out there and we are just a small organization. We inspired ourselves a little by mathematics. There was an interesting question which we looked at in greater detail recently also at the Institute, which basically involved the whole question of sustainability. And you are all talking about sustainable peace and all these kinds of things. We said, what is this thing about sustainability that everybody is talking about. One of the aspects we looked at in sustainability was the mathematical. It sounds very weird, but we are a bunch of weird people and we like to think in weird ways. One of the questions was how come western civilization -- represented in our case by the donor communities and so on -- are so enduring. In all epochs in the world there has been domination by one civilization over another, but what really has made western civilization and western concepts and paradigms and frameworks and society and ways of organizing society so enduring?

One of the interesting theses we came up with was that, between the 12th and 14th centuries in Europe, there was a switch from a qualitative to a quantitative world view. There is an analysis one can make of art and paintings and how that shifted, from the 12th to the 14th century, to demonstrate this. Also in the way people drew maps -- which is very interesting, I think, for Israel -- you can see the shift. Drawing from that -- and I am going to contradict myself -- I am going to try and reduce what we used as our operating framework into a mathematical formula, a very simple one: D plus A plus P must be greater than S. It is very simple, and I always think that, in intervening in these processes, just make it simple because all these complex theories in the world just confuse everybody when it is already confusing enough. The formula is drawn in part from Keane's work in the theory of scientific revolution, how society and especially position change paradigms. It relates to levels of Dissatisfaction with

the present, the status quo, plus the Attractiveness of the Alternative, plus clarity and commitment to the Process of arriving at the alternative, must be greater than the Status quo. That's it.

From here you can derive a whole range of very interesting and complex strategies to make an intervention, and I am going to give you some examples of how we applied it. First, just to finish with the model, one of the key things we then said was that we needed to build what you call a constituency for peace. We called it critical mass. The key question was how do you make this critical mass. How do you get this critical mass as big and as committed as possible? What did we mean by that? The consequences of a critical mass are trust and commitment. That is what you get when you have critical mass, and that is also what you need to have. The question we asked was, what should this critical mass have for it to play its role as a catalyst of change and a consolidator of change, to weather the storm when the storm gets heavy. We said, in this critical mass we must build shared values, and I will explain how we did that.

We must build in this critical mass shared mental models. This is a very important issue, one that we underestimate. Often, when you deal with societies or communities in conflict, you look at their assumptions, not only about each other, but about society in general. And we discover that people operate from completely different mental models. People's idea of the state, for example, are completely different. And my guess here is that the Israelis come from a Weberian perspective of the state and the Palestinians do not. I am sure they do not. And I think that is one of the reasons why you cannot communicate properly, because you do not have a shared mental model as an example about that.

Last night, in Hanan's presentation, some of that stuff started to come out, and it would have been interesting to tease it out of her more. You also need a common understanding of what the problem is. With so-called hard problems, technical problems, if you say to an engineer there is a vehicle here and we need to get it from this side to that side, they do not fight about what the problem is. They fight about the solution. They say we can build a bridge or put a pont in there or build such-and-such a type of bridge and so on. But in social problems the conflict already starts when we say what is the problem. There is confusion about what constitutes the problem, never mind about what will solve it. In order to resolve that, in order to build a critical mass behind a particular peace movement or peace process, you need to develop a common understanding of what the problem is. You need a common understanding and an acceptance of the rules of the game. If we do not have an acceptance and a common understanding of the rules of the game, the framework within which we are going to differ is going to come under dispute. It is the same problem we face here. If we do not agree about the problem, how can we solve it together? If we do not agree to the rules of solving the problem, how are we going to work together in order to solve the problem?

A last point is the question of institutional isomorphism. Interesting studies have been written for the last 40 years by a whole range of people which are emerging now under the guise of new institutional economics, but the key work was written by two American and British sociologists, interesting stuff on how organizations become isomorphic in particular sectors. It is also very interesting, when I listened to all of you this morning, how this process is already starting to happen and how some people resist the idea that you become more alike. Because that is what happens. If this is an

institutional environment, then the Palestinian NGO's and the Israeli NGO's, through the guise of mathematics or professionalism -- a big strategy -- come to reflect each other. In the idea of critical mass, that is a good thing. In the whole framework of development, I resist that. And of course, that is another question. To get a little more practical now, what does embedded on the micro level mean? It basically means integration. Communities must be well integrated. Often politicians use strategies to divide and rule. They fragment communities. The tribal clans in communities they fragment. If you have too much fragmentation, that is one of the key requirements of the ensemble of the peace process. In some cases, people who are strong in a particular peace process like to fragment and disorient and tribalize even more their negotiating partners. You need to have a certain level of integration in the communities and in the society that you are going to negotiate with. If you do not have that, you run into problems. But at the same time, communities have to be linked. So you need linkage. If you look at studies of ethnic entrepreneurship, you will see -- this dynamic has been studied to death by a lot of people -- quite an interesting phenomenon. In order to succeed, one relies on an ethnic network which is very closed. But at a certain point you have to move out and get more autonomy beyond the family. You can read Putnam's social theory, a British sociologist.

You also need to ensure that communities do not become parochial. Isolating them or fragmenting them is very negative for yourself if you are a powerful force in the negotiating process. Don't do that. At the same time, we need to create bridges. We need a certain level of linkage. Autonomy on the micro level. If we talk about the macro level -- society -- you need organizational integrity. That is the capacity of institutions in the society to operate and to function. A lot of you started talking about that last night, capacity- building -- does the Palestinian state have the capacity and so on. Organizations need organizational integrity. They have to be able, fairly autonomously, to act, to set their own priorities and to act upon those priorities. The question of symmetry that was raised yesterday and today comes into this sphere because, in the end, if the Palestinian state does not have organizational integrity, you will be in trouble in the peace process.

The last point is synergy, which is basically the relationship between the citizens and these institutions. We used the model of state, private sector and civic sector. While, on the one hand, institutions have to be fairly autonomous in the sense that they can set their agenda independently, they also have to have strong links with their citizens and their societies through private-sector links, civic-sector links, etc. That is what we call synergy. Now, for an organization to make an intervention, the ideal position is to be here, right in the middle. But your job is to service -- in other words, to move constantly -- between these axes and to ensure that there is sufficient balance and levels of integration and linkage in communities; that there are sufficient levels of integration between communities and society, state, the private and civic sectors; that there is sufficient movement and balance on the macro level between the organizations and their institutional capacities -- and the language between those institutions and the citizens, for example -- and also linkage in this respect. Your job becomes ensuring that there is a balance and a flow and a harmony amongst all these things.

So the four key ingredients to have critical mass to develop a lot of trust and commitment are to ensure that, in the process, in general communities are integrated, but also linked. We did this in IDASA in house-to-house meetings between opposing factions. Linking outward we did it with cross-border linkages of the programs as you

do. But at the same time you need organizational integrity and synergy between the institutions in society and between society institutions and community institutions. That was, for us, one of the frameworks we used, this mathematical formula and framework. We then said, now how do we make a contribution.

MR. SHEEHY: This is an extremely helpful model which has provided everybody with a way of looking at a problem which will inform the rest of today's discussion. I would now like to call on Cathy Gormley.

MS. GORMLEY: Despite the signing of an agreement in April 1998, and the fact that two of Northern Ireland's most prominent politicians were awarded the Nobel peace prize for their efforts in the peace process, the Northern Ireland peace process has had more crises than most people would choose to remember. The current peace initiative began back in 1992 with the Hume-Adams initiative, followed by the Downing Street Declaration in 1993, the IRA cease-fire in 1994, the faltering talks process in 1995-1996, the breakdown of the IRS cease-fire in 1996, the change of government in both Britain and the Irish Republic as a result of general elections in 1996, and the two-year talks process from 1996 until 1998, during which time the both the Ulster Democratic Party and Sinn Fein were ejected from the talks process for failing to comply with the Mitchell principles of nonviolence. Dissident Republicans planted numerous bombs and the Loyalist murders continued to overshadow the entire talks process. This is a grim descriptive, yet an agreement between all parties in Northern Ireland, with the notable exception of two smaller unionist parties who both refused to take part in the process, was signed in April 1998. A referendum in support of the agreement went to the polls in May, polling 71 percent in favor of the agreement with a voter turnout of 81 percent. Such a high voter turnout indicated that the people had really spoken. Those who had advocated violence no longer had a mandate. The people wanted peace.

The first members of the new Northern Ireland Assembly were elected in June, just one month later. Since June, Northern Ireland has still witnessed many instances of extreme violence, yet nothing has deterred the people from their desire to seek peace. July 1998 saw the height of the marching season in Northern Ireland. The Parades Commission made a decision to prevent an Orange Order parade from marching down a particular road in a particular area in a town called Portadown. For it to be such a small place, Drumcree and Garvaghy Road have received international recognition over the past number of years for the troubles which persist there during the marching season, and 1998 was no exception. A stand-off ensued between the Orange Order and supporters, and the security forces. It continued for number of days and only subsided after the death of three young Catholic children who died when their home was burned down by youths rioting in support of the stand-off at Drumcree. Politically, Drumcree had the ability to break the agreement. It took the deaths of three children to ensure that it did not. Condemnation was so loud and so widespread that the general public left the politicians with no other than to keep the process moving forward.

The Omagh bomb, just four weeks later on August 15, was a similar watershed. Twenty-eight people died when a car bomb exploded in the town of Omagh. It was the single biggest atrocity of the troubles in Northern Ireland. Never before had so many people been killed or injured in one single incident. To those who know little of Northern Ireland, it seems crass and untoward to even attempt to engage in the mathematical comparisons of human tragedy. But in these terms, Omagh was so very

different. Usually casualties will come from mostly one tradition or another in an atrocity in Northern Ireland. The majority or areas in the city are so well segregated that few areas remain mixed. Omagh was in a more rural area of Northern Ireland and did not suffer this segregation to the same degree. And in the Omagh bomb, the casualties came from the two traditions, Catholic and Protestant. They were also from Northern Ireland and from the Republic of Ireland. They were international Spanish students and teachers. There were three generations of just one family. The reaction was absolutely unprecedented. 40,000 people turned out for a memorial service in Omagh town one week later at the same time. Across Northern Ireland a minute of silence was held at ten past three, when the bomb had gone off. These images were absolutely unmistakable. A cross-community loss had in effect brought a cross-community response which had never been seen before. In the past, peace people and peace rallies would have, in many cases, been associated with the more middle-class elements of society, those who were politically in the middle of the road. This particular event evoked a response from everyone.

The impact of this particular terror campaign was quite startling. It did not destroy the peace process. It actually served to make it stronger. The people demanded that it continue. They said that there was no other way. And in spite of the devastation around them, and with a number of evident exceptions, the people pleaded with their politicians to move forward. And the politicians took important steps for peace Gerry Adams, the leader of Sinn Fein, used the C word for the first time in his political career. He said he condemned the Omagh bombing. Coming from a man who for a long time neither condemn nor condone, this was a significant breakthrough David Trimble, the leader of the main Unionist party and first minister-elect of the Northern Ireland Assembly, made a visit to the Republic of Ireland to attend the funerals of some of the Catholic children killed in the attack. He stood in a Catholic Church with his deputy minister and Irish President, again an unprecedented step. And within four days of the bomb, the Real IRA group, who were responsible for the attack, called a cease-fire, only too aware that their support base was no longer there. Currently, in the political arena, the issue of weapons and decommissioning and the failure to meet implementation deadlines have stalled the process again. Yet the overall peace process and the momentum for peace continues to move forward, willed on by the vast majority of people in Northern Ireland. And rather than leave the process in the hands of the politicians, the people's peace process has taken on a life of its own.

There is one group which deserves mention in this forum for the work it has been involved in. There are many too many groups to go into in detail, but this particular group is called the LINC Resource Center, which focuses on cross-community development through the collaborative work ex-prisoners The people's peace process is enhanced at LINC through the work of people like Rab and Michael. Rab is an ex-Republican prisoner who lives in North Belfast. Michael is an ex-Loyalist prisoner who also lives in North Belfast is a particularly complicated area, full of interface points where Catholic and Protestant streets meet and subsequently become the zone of all sectarian tension and violence Michael and Rab, both well respected in their communities, are working together to prevent conflict between the interface points in North Belfast. They are trying bring an element of peace at the grass roots level to an area which is so often forgotten in the wider political spectrum.

An example of their work could be that, during the marching season or the Drumcree stand-off, with tensions running high, the threat of violence persisting and abounding, these two men are in constant contact with other via mobile phones to ensure that the

threat does not turn into reality. Even when the country is in crisis, the talks between the two continue. They know that their work is more vital than ever when the peace process is in crisis. It is exactly at this point that the youths come onto the street in groups waiting to see if trouble will flare up. Word may reach one community that the other community is planning an attack that night. Rab and Michael are the link from one community to the other to dispel such rumors, and if they may be true, to use their own influence within their communities to ensure that the violence does not happen. The result can mean that people are not burned out of their homes and missiles are not thrown across peace walls. Both Rab and Michael know that their work is vital to maintaining any sort of peace in their areas, and they have vowed to continue their work regardless of the peace process.

In addition to these grass roots groups, who else has been noted for promoting dialogue in Northern Ireland, especially at times of crisis? The first one is the business sector. The Group of Seven was set up in 1996, after the violence at Drumcree, which had led to massive rioting across Northern Ireland which cost the taxpayers millions. The Group of Seven is a group of leading industrial and corporate concerns who made strategic interventions in the Northern Ireland peace process. They came together as a pro-peace lobby group which encouraged talks, and at moments of tension, called no stability and pointed to the economic damage which conflict inflicted on the community at large. They were careful not to appear as being pro-British or Pro-Irish. They were broadly supportive of both governments, but were careful to be seen as independent. They consistently outlined the economic advantages of peace and the development of north-south cooperation. The trade unions also intervened when political crises coincided with a number of murders in the workplace. They launched a campaign entitled Work Against Sectarianism, and held a series of lunchtime rallies in support of a peace agreement and against all violence. The trade union rallies were seen as nonpartisan and provided a forum for Catholic and Protestant workers to come together to express their dissatisfaction at the way the process was moving. Businesses and employers have generally been very supportive of allowing employees the time to attend such mass rallies.

Thirdly, the churches. The church leaders have, on many occasions, released joint statements in support of a peaceful settlement to the situation in Northern Ireland. An example of its more recent active pursuits would be the attempts by the Primate of the Church of Ireland, the Archbishop Robin Eames, to break the Drumcree deadlock. He laid out three conditions that he expected the Orange men to abide by while attending their religious service at Drumcree before the contentious march. He called for the establishment of a Portadown civic forum to address the grievances of all the people who lived there. And he also indicated his willingness to act as an intermediary between the residents' coalition and the Orange Order in an attempt to solve the problem, long before the crisis of July 1999.

Fourth, the media. The Irish News and the Newsletter, the main nationalist and unionist daily publications in Northern Ireland, adopted a policy of releasing joint editorials during times of political tension. In a sense, they created a peace paradigm, advocating that it should not be a nationalist peace nor a unionist peace, just a peace. They also organized a series of phone-in referendums to give people the chance to air their voices and make their vote count. They put the power effectively into the people's hands.

Fifth, the EU initiatives, the Special Support Program for Peace and Reconciliation of the EU. The idea was simply to reach over the heads of the quibbling politicians to see if ordinary people could be persuaded to work together at the grass roots level. The tools were 400 million pounds of European money over five years and a new democratic means of delivering it via district partnerships. By making much of the money conditional on cross-community partnerships and by pumping cash into nongovernmental sectors, the EU hoped to foster a climate which would support a peace process conducted at an another level. Although the results are unquantifiable in terms of the peace process, if you take the fact that 20,000 applications were made by groups for cash and nearly 11,000 them were approved, if each group involved had only 20 people in the group, that represents an engagement of some quarter a million people with projects, in part at least aimed reconciliation. With a population of only one and a half million in Northern Ireland this level of engagement represents a significant development. If you were to ask some of these people what it is that keeps Republican, Loyalists, Nationalists, Unionists, Catholics and Protestants together, even after the breakdown of the first IRA cease-fire, the marching season debacle and other instances, the answer is very simple: money. The fact that deprivation exists is a reality for both sides. It is true to say that this program has meant that civil society in Northern Ireland has taken on a life of its own. It gave the communities a taste of what it could be like in the future, a peaceful future. It gave communities a power base that became so strong in itself that some would say it was these very groups that pushed the politicians the talks table, while they moved kicking and screaming the way. It is argued that the credit for the current agreement lies more in the hands of civil society than it does elsewhere Lastly, cross-community education. The significant rise in the number of integrated schools in the past number of years stands as a testament to the fact that parents want their children to talk to one another. They want to alleviate this sense of alienation of the other, and they see no way to do this than to start at an early age and through medium of education. Even for those school children who cannot attend integrated schools for reasons of demography and geography, there have been a number of education-for-mutual-understanding projects which have gathered momentum over the years and have served as an illustration of how children are willing to communicate with each other and engage in dialogue, even when the adults are not. It may take a generation to pass before we can quantify the full implications of this integrated schooling system, but it is one method that will withstand the test of time.

Rather than talk about the practices, structures and programs that promote people's peace processes, I just have one significant point to make, and that is that money talks. The EU initiative in Northern Ireland has shown, more than any other initiative, that giving the people a chance to build upon their own community initiatives in collaboration with other communities has been a great success. Giving people the chance to experience a taste of what life could be like should peace become a reality is enough to hold them in the process. It becomes their process. They control it. They want it to succeed because they have put their effort into it. If there were a special fund set up for Israel-Palestine along the same lines, it could prove to be a success. And I mean a fund that puts money into the communities for a sustained period of time, not for one year. Someone mentioned earlier that as soon as a project gets off the ground the money is gone. Most of the projects in Northern Ireland last for at least three years. But money cannot be the only sustaining factor. It can be used as a tool to get the process moving, but the groups must learn to become self-sufficient and still

want to work together for mutual benefits and understanding, and not for the next grant check.

In conclusion, the Omagh bomb, the tensions surrounding the marching season, the issues of weapons and arms decommissioning, and the release of political have all had the potential to wreak havoc with the peace process, but they have not. The people's peace process has taken on a life of its own. The Sport Council of Northern Ireland's most recent campaign highlights this point perfectly. Their slogan reads, Tolerate, Participate, Celebrate. This is an attempt to diffuse the notion that all sport is political, but it is a slogan, which could be appended to each of the aforementioned groups who have been active in promoting dialogue. Tolerate what other people have to say. Participate in the process. Celebrate its success.

MR. SHEEHY: We have heard from South Africa and Northern Ireland, both eloquent but quite different presentations. Now we will hear from Ron Pundik from Israel and Manuel Hassassian from Palestine.

MR. PUNDIK: When Yair and I went for the first time to Oslo in January 1993, we did not have a clear picture of the Declaration of Principles which was eventually signed, although Yair had developed a structure for it. But what we did have was a kind of picture of the kind of relations we wanted to see at the end of the day between Israelis and Palestinians. Both of us are historians. We could describe in detail the history of the conflict and why we did not yet have peace. But we also knew that the only way to resolve the situation would be through negotiations and through the idea of a political separation. It was not mentioned in the DOP, but it was clear for us also at that time that if everything would go well, eventually a two-state solution would emerge as part of a reconciliation process.

And when we came to Oslo and started the first meetings, what we tried to do was, in a microcosm, through this very small group of five people, to develop a kind of system which later became known as the Oslo spirit, which was then transmitted -- and in a way contaminated -- by the others who participated in this process: a microcosm of relations based on a win-win situation, on respect, on mutuality. Not the supposed mutuality that the current GOI speaks about, but real mutuality and reciprocity. The idea is that the past should not dictate our future.

However, the reality here in our area is a little different from what you had in South Africa, and possibly also from what happened in Northern Ireland. We have too many impediments, unfortunately, today to transform the political goal that we have achieved through the Oslo peace process and translate it into the two societies which still base their relations not on trust, not on mutuality, not on win-win, but on fear, on old concepts, on bitterness one against the other. In a way, they are still translating the realities of the day-to-day -- which is still a kind of occupation -- into the interim period, which we all hoped would have built trust and better neighborly relations between the Palestinian and Israeli peoples.

I will give you one small example. We started our P2P peace process after Oslo when we met Fathi Arafat, Yassir Arafat's brother. We met him at the first time in Tunis on the 13th or 14th of October 1993, just one month after signing the agreement in Washington. We developed a kind of personal relationship, and suddenly we discovered that on the Palestinian side, not only on the ground here in the West Bank, Gaza and Jerusalem, but also in Tunis and also within the leadership, we have partners not only for documents and peace between leaders, but also partners in order

to create what we envisaged as a peace between the peoples. Later, when Fathi came to the territories, we met him here in Jerusalem and decided we must embark upon huge P2P relations, and we began to institutionalize it.

After we had already begun to establish good relations and had a few projects on the ground, in one of the meetings in one of the hotels in East Jerusalem, the first thing that entered into our meeting was the fact that that morning, a bomb had exploded in a bus in Jerusalem. Well, we all know what happened afterwards. We also have some dear friends who suffered a great loss dearly and personally. But what we had in mind at that time was, first of all, what would be the repercussions of this event; how can we continue the dialogue between the two peoples and through P2P; how can we assist, in this case, Fathi A to reach Gaza without being attacked, as he feared, by Israelis because he looks a little like his brother – and Yair took him in his own car to Gaza; and to see what to do the following day because we knew the immediate Israeli reaction would be harsh, blunt, disproportionate – not to what had happened, but in the sense that collective punishment immediately influences the whole idea and all the P2P activities on the ground.

Now, going back to the threats we have been facing in dialogue with the Palestinians since Oslo. It is not only these kinds of facts on the ground -- the problem of closure and that of Israelis who fear assassination if they enter Gaza. There is the notion that an Israeli in the West Bank, Gaza, Ramallah and Jerusalem is unsafe. But we are also talking about conceptual problems. We have, in some circles of society – Palestinian mainly, but also Israeli – resentment of dialogue with Israelis. Take, for example, the universities which have a dictated decision, which courageous people such as Manuel and Sari and others are bypassing through personal relations, from an institutional point of view, to boycott dealing, even on a P2P research level, between universities.

We still have those in the Palestinian territories who say, such as in Egypt and Jordan, that any dealing with Israelis on a P2P basis should not occur before there is a complete and comprehensive peace and after the last inch of Palestinian territory or Syrian territory is given back to the Palestinians or Jordanians or Syrians or whoever. This threatens the whole idea of trying to build, from the bottom up, relations between the two peoples, relations between the two societies, engaging people who would otherwise not have tended to cooperate in order to know the other.

Between us Israelis and Palestinians there is physical fence, but there is a one-kilometer-high thick psychological fence between us and the Palestinians. We Israelis do not know who the Palestinians are. We have figures, we have pictures which are completely irrelevant to what happens on the ground. The majority of Israelis have never met a Palestinian other than as a daily black laborer or a task man or construction worker or a terrorist; and the majority of Palestinians have never met an Israeli other than a settler or a military policeman in the West Bank or Gaza. The whole idea of P2P is to break down this kind of notion, to break through this kind of huge, see- through fence, which exists between us two nations.

At ECF we have dozens of activities with Palestinians. Even if there would be war between us and the Palestinians, we will try never to stop these between doctors and nurses and environmentalists and social workers and students and artists and lawyers and you name it. The threats exist. The whole idea is to combat and to foster dialog between the two peoples. I do not want to enter into too much detail but I would like to say that, as was mentioned earlier, today is one day after the three-year anniversary of Rabin's assassination.

There are two sentences of Rabin's speech at the White House on the 30th of November 1993 that I would like to quote. Rabin was never a great supporter of P2P. He was the man who ordered the breaking of limbs Palestinians during the Intifada, and military people literally broke the limbs of Palestinians because Rabin said so. I do not know whether he meant literally for people to go into the streets and break the legs and hands of Palestinians, but this is what happened. But Rabin, as a result of the peace process and as a result of the Oslo peace process, experienced a complete change of mind. He was like a Doberman, which clamped its jaws on this process, and Rabin did, at the end of the day, decide that this is the only way to accomplish reconciliation, a dramatic historic change between the Israelis and Palestinians. Like a huge ship which gradually, slowly changes course, but finally, eventually, goes full steam ahead, this was Rabin. And towards the end of his life he was fully committed both to the idea of peace and to the idea of reconciliation. This was written in his speech at the first day of the Oslo peace process officially when it was signed in Washington, and to conclude my short presentation I would like to read one small sentence of what Rabin said at that time. He said, "We harbor no hatred toward you Palestinians. We, like you, are people, people who want to build a home, to plant a tree, to love, live side by side with you in dignity, in affinity, as human beings, as free men. "We are giving today a chance to the peace and saying again to you, enough. Let us pray that a day will come when we all will say farewell to arms. "We wish to open a new chapter in the sad book of our lives together, a chapter of mutual recognition, of good neighborliness, of mutual respect, of understanding. We hope to embark on a new era in the history of the Middle East." And P2P is exactly a translation of what Rabin said on that day.

MR. SHEEHY: I would now like to call on Manuel Hassassian.

PROF. HASSASSIAN: When I looked at this topic, dialogue during difficult times, I pondered what I could say. I tried to call on all my social science background in order to come up with certain theoretical remarks, which I thought would be important in shedding some light on practical issues we could discuss and elaborate upon.

One of the primary objectives of dialogue is the development of a common strategy towards peace. Another is resolution of conflict through negotiations, reconciliation or arbitration. For dialogue to be fruitful, there has to be a symmetrical relationship between the partners. Dialogue can be effective only in an ambience of cooperation between political elites, P2P and on the grass roots level. It is functional only when there is equity and parity. There is no doubt that intractable, inter-ethnic, protracted conflicts are over tangible interests such as territory, power and wealth. However, underlying these interests are basic human needs such as identity, security and recognition. These basic human needs cannot be negotiated or suppressed, and unless these needs are satisfied, the conflict cannot be resolved. A settlement that fails to fully address the parties' needs will never bring about a permanent, peaceful end to this conflict.

Therefore, a general resolution has to satisfy the needs of both parties engaged in the protracted communal conflict in a way that is acceptable to the mainstreams of both societies. At minimum, parties in conflict have to change their beliefs about avoiding contact and negotiation with the enemy. Successful resolution of conflict, and especially of protracted ethno-national conflict, requires a profound change in the beliefs, perceptions and cognitions, not only by leaders and negotiators, but by the society at large as well in order to support a negotiated agreement. Leaders cannot

leave their constituency behind in the process of change. They have to necessarily make efforts to change their society's beliefs and images. There has to be a change in the society's beliefs about the conflict of ethos that helps perpetuate the conflict. The change has to encompass societal beliefs about goals that fuel the conflict, the irreconcilability of the conflict, the delegitimization of the opponent and self-image.

Moreover, a peaceful resolution requires not only a change in the ethos of conflict, but also an active construction of a new ethos consistent with a peaceful relationship. This ethos should consist of societal beliefs about cooperative relationships, mechanisms that maintain peaceful relations, a vision of peace and the necessity of providing the conditions for trustful and empathic relations with the enemy. Acquiring an ethos of peace does not necessarily negate all societal beliefs of conflict, such as patriotism or unity. And the changes described do not take place overnight. Rather they may progress sluggishly, even when leaders intensively propagate them. They may require propagation by political, cultural and educational institutions. In the Israel-Palestinian case, decades of the conflict of ethos have greatly hampered the evolution of beliefs that could support a peace process. Without such an evolution it is difficult to advance the peace process, as is evident from the rifts that followed the Oslo agreements.

In this case, although the handful of elites, those involved in the secret negotiations, and we have here two of those distinguished professionals, Pundik and Hirschfeld, seem to have undergone changes sufficient to produce mutual trust, the publics were left behind with enemy images and conflictual relationships and an ethos of conflict. A national narrative, with primal political beliefs and a sentimental attachment to the national group, also plays a pivotal role in achieving resolution. This can be considered a major part of the collective identity. It becomes clear that protracted conflict is often identity conflict. Producing a vision of peace is extremely difficult in societies in protracted conflict whose dynamics are not conducive to such a vision.

Therefore, I would like to raise some questions. What is the role of civil society and what is the relationship of peace to democracy? How can we build trust through academic cooperation as part and parcel of the peace-building process? How could that psychologically pave the way to overcoming the fear and distrust that have accumulated throughout the years between Israelis and Palestinians?

One simple answer is through dialogue. However, the process which should be implemented is far more complex than that. The place of civil society in processes of democratization has been widely studied, particularly in relation to the degree of democracy, and the Middle East is no exception. One could infer that the lack of progress affects the nature of democracy in Israel and the process of democratization in Palestine. However, the sustained search for common ground and the advancement of sectoral peace through academics, professional groups, artists and target sectors can be the most effective way to change attitudes and cognitions through frequent encounters. This can lead to the development of epistemic communities which share a common understanding of the issues at stake and the ways to resolve the problems in the end. Palestinians and Israelis are reflecting nowadays on an additional concern, that lack of progress towards peace is deteriorating the current standards of democracy in Israel and negatively affecting the process of democratization in the Palestinian territories, as reflected also in the treatment of the representatives towards their own people. Hence, assessing the current limited role of those forces supporting human rights and democracy within the respective Palestinian and Israeli civil

societies, one could easily conclude that it is not realistic to ensure progress on this front without simultaneously striving towards peace.

Furthermore, when struggling toward peace becomes accepted as an active priority in both civil society entities, one also stresses that the effectiveness of working concurrently within each community can be maximized by incorporating joint action across societal boundaries. Furthermore, existing circles of cooperation need to be widened, intensified and made more policy-relevant, while at the same time building P2P bridges that explore new avenues to maximize all possible linkages between academic and different sectors within their own and each other's society. The contribution of Palestinian third-sector activities to peace-building is minimal.

This is one of my conclusions of a two-year study that was conducted by a Palestinian research team, as well as by a team from Northern Ireland and from South Africa. We were researching the role of NGO's in peace and conflict resolution, as well as in peace- building. Most Palestinian NGO's have a pre- commitment to national struggle before any commitment to what is commonly referred to as the peace process. Their role is suppressed in the peace process because of procrastination. Given the current political stalemate, the Palestinian public is stymied by Israeli occupation, the inefficacy of the PA, abandonment by the world and the rhetoric of political action as well.

The role of intellectuals in the process of change and major political crisis has been of great importance. Whereas no one can deny the responsibility of such groups individuals in generating extreme nationalism, chauvinism and xenophobic feelings among the masses, there have also been hopes that a vibrant civil society can be a major vehicle for advancing the values of peace A commonality of concerns has made not a few among our colleagues choose to become part of an embryonic epistemic community likely to continue working towards a goal of strengthening human rights and democracy. Academics of both sides overwhelming adhere to principles such as that of professional freedom Palestinian and Israeli social scientists have covered enormously in their writings nearly all areas of explanatory behavior in both societies, and have explained the limitations for supporting peace. However, very few of them have expressed such analysis jointly.

Furthermore, even fewer have tried to effectively communicate such concerns within their own and each other's society. In other words, quoting one of the participants in the regional peace event in Copenhagen: "We need one another. As long as the popular base remains weak, the peace process may falter." While dialogue among groups in civil society leaves ample room for frustration and willful influence by negative forces in the wider picture, most of the participants come up with a positive balance that corroborates our own experience.

Speaking about joint work on Jerusalem, the role of academics assumes great importance. Joint discussions in the past illuminated a number of issues that will be crucial for both sides to consider in the upcoming final status talks. At a more general level, we concur with the statement that, as the former peace process withers away in the background, the attempt to foster dialogue must be kept alive elsewhere until the time is right for the process to go forward again. The academic community has an important role to play in ensuring that that flame does not go out altogether.

Let me conclude by saying, amid the ruins of the peace process and the fate and question of democracy, crackdown on terrorism many times simply translates as the

abuse of the human and civil rights of the population, to serve personal interest and to ingratiate a stronger enemy. Arafat treads a sensitive line attempting to please Israelis and Americans on one front, and his Palestinian constituency on the other. So far he has failed to please either sufficiently and seems to be caught in a battle to maintain a grasp on his own legitimacy. It is unlikely that this situation can sustain itself much longer. Democracy in the Palestinian context has certainly exhibited strong evidence of a stable presence in civil society.

Unfortunately, the role of civil society has been intentionally reduced with the arrival of the PA. Although it is unlikely that democratic forces will ever go away, there is great likelihood that they will be contained by the PA as they could viably contest and confront the PA if they are able to mobilize the lower and middle classes to demand their causes be answered. Though the pluralism of Palestinian politics is always guaranteed, whether such pluralism will be embodied in a multi-party system yet remains to be seen. In many ways, the fate of the peace process will determine the fate of the PA, Yassir Arafat, Hamas, the opposition, civil society, and of course, the question of the future Palestinian polity. In turn, the fate of Palestinian democracy seems to be held in the balance. As often in politics, many signs of encouragement are juxtaposed with an equal number of signs to be wary.

MR. SHEEHY: We have had four very rich presentations, each of which could have been a keynote address in itself, and each of which would have provided the basis for a full session. I suggest we close the session now, but look at this afternoon's program to make sure that people have an opportunity to raise the issues they want about these presentations in the afternoon Thank you very much.

SESSION IV: TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION: LESSONS FROM SOUTH AFRICA

MR. PAZ: This session deals with two very critical and very sensitive aspects of the P2P peace process. One aspect is that of values and ethics within the context of historical action. We live in a very cynical age which has attempted to teach us that everything has a price, but few, if any, things have a value. The most recent economic crisis, besides expose the vulnerability of the world economic system, also pointed once again to the fact that you cannot consider even so contextual and formalized an aspect of human society as economics without value considerations. You cannot separate the world values, the world of ethics, out and away from economics, politics, social life, and certainly not from the peace process. We heard an eloquent statements of this consideration from the Belgian Ambassador this morning, and they certainly hold true for the philosophic, spiritual and religious aspects of the process.

The second thing which this session deals with is something that was also spoken about this morning with great emphasis; that is to say, the significance of the image, the attitude, how you turn the enemy of yesterday into the friend or partner for today, and for tomorrow as well. And in doing that, in considering that attitudinal aspect, you have to deal with the question of the historical legacy which every conflict leaves behind. Yes, Ron Pundik is right. We must start from now and not settle issues of history if you wish to settle a conflict. But when you have moved through that, you must ask yourselves what you do with the historical legacy. Do you leave it to atrophy over time, or do you try to deal with it -- I might even say without exaggeration -- heroically as the people of South Africa did in creating the TRC? These are the actual issues we will deal with. Our speaker is Ms. Glenda Wildschut of South Africa, a nurse, an educator, a person who worked with ex-detainees and a Commissioner of

the Commission for Truth and Reconciliation of South Africa, one of the people who wrote the report of this commission, and one of the people who made the TRC a historical event not only for South Africa, but for all of us.

MS. WILDSCHUT: Thank you very much for considering this presentation an important one, and for devoting the time to listening to the story of the South African experience as it unfolded in the work of the TRC. People often ask me to talk about the Truth Commission, and when they do, I say to them, how much time do you have. We had 34 years to experience human rights violations, from 1960 to 1994, and we have had two and a half years in which to examine those human rights violations spanning over three decades. So you can imagine that we have spent long arduous hours working, in the Truth Commission, trying to uncover the horrors of the apartheid past.

I do not want to spend too much time on that, but rather simply to share some reflections on the work of the Truth Commission with you, and perhaps to look a little more at the moral foundations of the Truth Commission and some of the historical interpretations of the Truth Commission in South Africa. I want to make a disclaimer right from the beginning. I have only been in this region for four days. I guess that qualifies me to be an expert. We have had experts who have come to South Africa who landed at the airport, spent three days, and then wrote dissertations about the South African experience. I am not going to offer any suggestions for solutions for this region. that I am going to do is merely share with you what we have done and why we have done it.

In reflecting on the moral foundations of a Truth Commission, we need to distinguish it from, as well as relate to, three areas. First were the relevant historical circumstances for the Truth Commission of a post-apartheid transition to democracy. That was the historical circumstance or context in which the Truth Commission was developed.

The second was an enabling political environment or enabling political condition for the Truth Commission. That was the negotiated settlement. In our situation we did not have a victor or a vanquished. We did not have a revolution. What we have is a negotiated settlement, the product of quite lengthy, multi-party negotiations and discussions, which first started in Capetown in 1990, and moved through to the World Trade Center negotiations which were the basis for the implement of the government of national unity and for setting the conditions for elections in 1994.

The third aspect are legislative mandates for the Truth Commission. That was the provision of amnesty on individual application and conditional full disclosure. We did not have a blanket amnesty situation in our country. Amnesty had to be applied for individually and had to be applied for on the basis of full disclosure of human rights violations that took place.

If you want to, later on in the discussions, I can talk a little more about what the legal tests and measures were in order to evaluate full disclosure and other legal measures. Foundational questions may be conceived in terms of general moral considerations independent of the legislative mandates, as contextual determinants. Conversely, a historical interpretation contextualized the aims and functions of the general moral ideals and principles on which we based the TRC.

The second important aspect is that TRC is a historical founding action of a new moral and political order. The TRC generates a new and distinctive moral conception,

both of truth and reconciliation, which is not prosecutorial so the issue of retributive justice does not come into it. Secondly, it constitutes a moral conception such as self-validation, and acquires a contextual explanation, unlike forward-looking functions of establishing a constitution as a basis for a new political order.

Maybe I can just explain that. While we were going through the motions, the actions of uncovering the past, w were also in a forward-looking action by developing a constitution, a bill of rights, that moved the nation forward rather than remaining stuck in the uncovering and examining of the past. The actions of the Truth Commission are essentially, as I explained, backward-looking, dealing with the past. Contextually, the TRC is best understood as an expression of a particular historical resolve and political will as captured in the phrase (?), as in the Latin American experience, or Never Again. They respond to a special moral need arising from the political atrocities and human rights violations of a prior regime.

The third aspect for reflection is that the justification of the Truth Commission as a backward-looking settling of accounts depends crucially on the particular moral need arising from the nature of the prior regime. We had to come to terms with the fact that the prior regime was one that imposed and that was involved in human rights violations. Whether this is conceptually based, allowing for clear distinctions between an identifiable sense of perpetrators and victims, or whether it was systemic in character, such as collusion of perpetrators and victims, if we enter into that debate it will become quite problematic. But that is how the South African situation was in that there were clearly-identified perpetrators, but there was also a system which bought into the idea for particular beneficiaries who were not quite seen as perpetrators. Maybe I can just unpack that a little bit.

When we look at the report of the commission, it is true that most the actual perpetrators came from the security establishment, police and security forces, but also people who propped up the apartheid regime were people who came from the business community, the church community, faith communities and elsewhere, who were, in a sense, beneficiaries of apartheid without actually being direct perpetrators of human rights violations. TRC is a product of a political compromise. The TRC does not necessarily amount to a moral compromise, although other compromises were made. Its stated objective was a diagnose of moral needs arising from the nature of the prior regime and its political atrocities. It prioritized the moral need of dealing with identifiable gross human rights violations, and these were murders, abductions, torture and severe ill treatment, and relegating institutionalized and structural apartheid to a contextual status. It is also committed to truth as acknowledgment. In other words, responding to the needs of restoring the human and civil dignity of victims, rather than justice as to perpetrators made accountable but not punished, is the best way I can explain it.

The moral foundation of the TRC depends on the appropriateness of this diagnosis, to use an analogy which may be challenged on two different bases: one, by insistence on the need to deal with structural features of apartheid; and two, through a demand for prosecution and punishment of perpetrators. Perhaps -- for me -- more importantly, in practice, the TRC's commitment to truth as acknowledgment takes a notably democratic and public form. What we had was public hearings. We did not have any private, in camera hearings. Unlike the South African TRC counterpart's in other parts of the world, the establishment and objectives of the TRC were the subject of extended prior public debate. I think it is very important that we did not just establish

a TRC without going through an extended period, prior to its establishment, of very serious, in-depth, vigorous public debate, and in a sense, bringing the nation along with the idea of having a TRC. The TRC is a parliamentary and not just a presidential commission. All the main political parties participated in the structural formation of the TRC, and the 17 commissioners on the commission reflected the political, religious, ethnic and all other complexities of South African society. To a large extent, the TRC conducted its on-going business in full public view, interacting with individuals, communities and sectors of the society in public hearings.

In this way, we have to pay a great tribute to the media. We thought that the work of the TRC would just be a flash in the pan. After our first year there would be diminished public interest in it. But it was through the actions also of the media who stayed with the process all the time that we received so much international and local coverage. This increased both the risk and the opportunities for the TRC in an on-going process relative to the eventual product. Not only was the final product -- such as the final report -- important to us, but also the process of reaching that final product was equally important in the life of the commission. Another reflection, is that the meaning and interpretation of truth and reconciliation as stated objectives of the TRC shifted over time as different sets of agents became involved at different stages of the overall process, and implicitly located in it within different master narratives. Pardon the pun.

During the implementation and planning stages of the TRC, the political sense of reconciliation -- i.e., that of the elites -- was rooted in the experience of the negotiated settlement and implicitly understood in terms that the overall narrative of future nation-building was most prominent. So what was happening at almost a macro political level was very important in the initial stages. In the early stages of the TRC's work, under the leadership of Archbishop Desmond Tutu, a religious sense of reconciliation through the disclosure of truth -- that, is of some transforming process of personal, social and spiritual renewal -- became salient, with a focus on victim hearings staged and framed within the symbolics of a faith narrative. This enabled many to cope with a dramatic recounting of shattering experiences, but proved in some areas an obstacle to people who did not buy into the faith paradigm, such as political activists and those who had problems locating themselves within this narrative of victim's sacrifice and forgiveness, because at many stages the lietmotif throughout the victim's story was that they were sacrificing what had happened to them for a bigger goal, and that was the larger goal of nation-building and reconciliation.

The victim hearings provided a public space, an opportunity for a range of individuals to tell their own stories with their own voices and using their own metaphors, rooted in a diverse local and communal setting, and to have these officially acknowledged even when they may be intentions for the implicit master plan. This relation of so many atrocities through the TRC process itself was also intended to reinforce a countervailing popular narrative demanding justice and punishment. And here I must add that it was justice in the restorative justice paradigm rather than the retributive justice paradigm. More recently, the quasi-judicial and adversarial procedures of the amnesty hearings began to take center stage. The TRC's practices shifted from acknowledging truth as a means of reconciliation to the imperatives of observing procedural rights for those implicated by disclosures and allegations in the course of this process.

A seventh reflection, in line with the transitional function of the TRC process, it was conceived as limited in duration and scope. As such, the process also requires closure to be provided by a final report, including a set of findings on victims and perpetrators This may involve -- and has involved -- a moving beyond the need for truth and acknowledgment to an assumption of authority requiring more general moral foundations. And these are, in providing a final report, giving a comprehensive and definitive account of the nature and extent of human rights violations during its mandated period, the TRC would be tempted not to shift from functioning as a public forum for acknowledging the truth to a clandestine, behind-closed-doors negotiation of what goes into that report. Those who watched the last days of us handing over the report noticed that there were two court actions the TRC just before our publication. Those were from Mr. DeKlerk who wanted us to remove all reference to him in our final report, and also a surprise from the Afrikaaner Congress to stop the publication of our report because it implicated them in human rights violations.

So our prediction that there would be pressure from the outside for us to keep that part of the work of the commission less public was true. In making findings not only on victims, but also on perpetrators, the TRC inevitably had to assume a quasi-judicial function. The evidential and procedural grounds for such a burden had to be founded on general principles of morality and justice. But what has been the most overwhelming and most valuable aspect of the work of the TRC has been that it has given the people the opportunity to reflect on the past and to make a commitment that we can create a society in our country which will ensure that human rights violations do not occur. So apart from just the work of the commission, we are also trying to strengthen other institutions within society to ensure that human rights violations do not occur again.

MR. PAZ: Thank you very much for what has been not only enlightening, but a moving statement. Thinking about moral needs for the foundations for a new society in a process of open and democratic reconciliation and acknowledgment for forgiveness and building the future on the past so that the lessons of the past guarantee that the future will not itself, are lessons which extend far beyond South Africa. Thank you very much indeed, and this is indeed a growing contribution of South Africa to all of us. We have two responders. The first is Rabbi David Bigman, the dean of the yeshiva, school of higher Talmudic learning, at Maale Gilboa.

RABBI BIGMAN: You mentioned the significance of religious leadership in reconciliation in South Africa gives you an optimistic outlook I normally would not have in our particular context. The things I have to say about our particular context are, first, to be very pessimistic based on personal experience. And those who are in the Israeli context immediately understand what I am talking about. However, I think that in the future we can hope for something more significant from religious leadership. Theoretically, we could assume that religious leadership would have a positive and significant influence on the peace process for two reasons.

The first is because of the great religious truths of human dignity and the paradoxical nature of man who has something transcendent in him. This religious truth can be very significant in molding the outlook of one people on the other people's stature. The other thing which is very significant in Israeli society is that the religious outlook can change the focus from one which is purely ethnic and nationalistic and give it another bent, another point of view, which would put it into proper perspective. And the sole source of identity today -- which is either Palestinian or Jewish -- could lend

itself to a different perspective on man and the relationship between man and that which is beyond man. In reality -- it almost seems to be a law of nature -- these great religious truths tend to mold themselves to the smallest context available. The stature of man as a being which has a transcendent nature is very often interpreted in the context of the particular community at hand. The man about whom the sources -- Jewish and Islamic sources -- speak will very often be our neighbor, not the person who lives, in my instance in Maale Gilboa, ten minutes across the future border. I do not know why this is so exactly, but it is the fact that very often the sources are interpreted in the smallest context possible so that it does not change our point of view about our fellow man at all. And the problem is even worse because very often we have the feeling that religious truths have been drafted into the national ethos and the needs of each nationalistic or ethnic community. They are no longer truths in themselves, but rather something used for aspirations. I am speaking about both sides of our conflict, and this is from experience on both sides of the conflict. In a few moments I will give you a few anecdotes that relate to this.

Very often there is no great universal truth at all espoused by religious leaders as universal truth, but rather specific messages which are palatable to their communities and serve the needs of their communities, and thus nothing positive comes out of religious leadership. To illustrate how much this is true, I would like to talk to you about a few experiences that we have had. One was about two years ago when a group of rabbis tried to create a statement in the Hebron community, on both sides, against the use of violence in the conflict and about the sanctity of human life. When we went to the Islamic leader in Hebron, he agreed a hundred percent. He said, You are absolutely right. However, I am only willing to make this statement if within the statement there has to be something about the rights of the Palestinian community in Hebron. Hebron belongs to the Palestinian community which is something. I personally had no problem with this, and neither did those who came with me. However, in trying to get a statement from religious leaders both on the Palestinian side of Hebron and the Jewish side, we knew that statement would not be accepted by their counterparts on the other side of the road.

Therefore, we could not get a general universal statement out of the religious leaders because they had a particular political program at hand, which was perfectly legitimate, but I think was not their role. They should let the political leaders take care of the political issues and they should make the moral statements which are necessary to help people handle the situation. A completely different experience we had was with leaders of the Gaza community who, after the Oslo agreements took hold, came up to the Beit Shean area. We could have a very serious discussion with them about the meaning of human life and something significant that we could pass on to our communities, but this was after there was significant headway in the peace process so that they no longer had a political agenda to push, and then we could talk about other things.

So my pessimistic statement is that I have the feeling that, except for a few maverick people like myself and a few of my friends, there are very few religious leaders on either side that we can find who would be willing to put something positive into the peace process on a P2P basis -- or any other basis -- right now. Everybody seems to have limited truth to their own particular context. However, in the future, after the process, after a basic settlement takes place and people no longer have any need to be pushing a particular political agenda, we may be able to see religious leaders helping each community understand the other community's point of view, and the tremendous

stature of man as man within the religious context can be very important in changing the outlook of one people on the other people.

MR. PAZ: Certainly we would share your hope that the moral potential which is inherent in religion would become part of the concept of peacemaking as well as a product of the peace process itself. Our next speaker is Prof. Bernard Sabella of Bethlehem University. He is also the head of the Department of Palestinian Refugees in the Middle East Council of Churches.

PROF. SABELLA: The topic here is not only very relevant topic, but it is a painful topic, and I feel that at this juncture I come to you with more questions than answers. I will share with you some reflections. I am grateful to (?) of Denmark for having passed on to me an essay written by the former National Research Director of the South African TRC entitled, Now That the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Is Over, Looking Back, Reaching Forward. The essay forces upon me, as a Palestinian, some very difficult questions. And I am sure, if read by an Israeli in a parallel socio-economic, religious, political situation, the response for him/her would be similar in terms of the difficulty of questions as they apply to our Palestinian-Israeli relations throughout this century, and the need to find a way out. Glenda put it very well when she said that the TRC report, or the process itself, was very important in order to reflect on the past.

I have to tell you that neither Israelis nor Palestinians have reflected yet on their past in respect to each other. Some academics do it, but they have their own agenda for doing it. Some NGO's do it, but they have their own agenda for doing it. I don't know if we can do it like they did it in South Africa. Even there they have their own difficulties. I will not dwell on similarities and dissimilarities between our situation and that of South Africa simply because I am not knowledgeable enough about South Africa. What I will say is, how do people in conflict reconcile themselves to their own history and to the history of their enemy, to the pain. How do they reconcile themselves to the pain they have caused others and to the pain that was caused them? Is this possible to accomplish here, in South Africa, in Ireland, in Rwanda, elsewhere in the world? I have to admit that I have no answers, but some reflections that I share with you.

It is difficult to forget, but it is as difficult, if not more so, to forgive. Coming to the point of being willing to consider the history of the enemy, their history, means that one has accepted that there are two histories, two experiences, two versions, two explanations for the land. It actually means being willing, in principle, to share the land. That necessarily forces a thorough self-reassessment and examination, not only on the personal level, but on the group and national levels as well. It is not an easy process because it involves the personal, the family, the sacred, the memories of those who fell, the ideal of the land as an exclusive property for the self, for the group and for the nation. The most difficult thing in acknowledging the other's history is that such contemplation may be perceived by the self as a betrayal of all dear and significant events and others, not simply of the land.

Another difficulty is that if I were to acknowledge their history, would they reciprocate? But even if they reciprocate, they have power and control and I do not have that. Or simply I cannot trust them and their intentions, and they would perceive such acknowledgment as weakness and hence do not have to reciprocate. So where do I go from here? And if I acknowledge the other's history, what would this acknowledgment mean in terms of costs to my own version of history; to my

responsibility to the injustice and wounds that I have inflicted on them, on the others; and to the rehabilitation I have to undergo with all its consequences, material, spiritual and mortal? That is why acknowledging the other's history is indeed a very difficult process. It is not that easy. I am not the kind of wishy-washy guy who says -- and I keep repeating this in Israeli-Palestinian meetings – Oh, I feel I have fallen in love with the Israelis. I do not think I will ever fall in love with the Israelis. But I know that I have to live side by side with them and this forces me as a Palestinian, to reconsider, and this is difficult. Nobody can just whitewash or do the process in a wishy-washy kind of way. I find it very difficult to be expressive and emotional towards the Israelis because I see that the process is a very long one and very complicated.

Let me go back to the text. Acknowledging the other's history is really getting to the phase where one has succeeded in internalizing one's history and in accepting it, not as an all-inclusive version of the land and of its unfolding events and parties. In other words, there is the courage, with all its risks, of acknowledging that even the history of the most sacred is a bilateral proposition, if not a multilateral one – meaning the willingness to share. But the process is not that easy, as evidenced by the responses from South Africa upon the publication of the report of the TRC. I do not think that there will be such a commission here, but this does not mean that both Palestinians and Israelis are not entitled to a process that will at least offer perspectives on possibilities for reconciliation. The danger in not getting to the point of being willing to acknowledge the other's history is that of being ever comfortable with our own exclusive history alike. But this comfort will haunt us, and the generations to come, as they will inherit a version of history that traps one into a restricted and inhibited view of oneself, one's group and one's future. The future, whether we like it or not, invites both of us to reexamine our histories and rewrite them in order to accommodate each other. It is not going to be easy, but we will never be able to be free if either of us continues to be imprisoned in his own version of history.

MR. PAZ: I agree we must break this concept of recognition is betrayal. On the contrary, it is indeed, as you say, only when we are able to accommodate each other within our history that we can then build a firm foundation for what is indeed a joint future.

DR. HIRSCHFELD: A question for Glenda. When, in the history of the movement, did you start thinking about how to solve the issues involved; and how did you prepare to move towards not only reaching an agreement, but beyond that?

MS. WILDSCHUT: It is a difficult question. In the mid-1980's, we had what we call total onslaught days, when the repression heightened considerably. However, two years before that, in 1983, the United Democratic Front had already been formed, and although it was under the aegis of the political movement, they helped to mobilize people at all levels of society into beginning to understand that the end of apartheid was about to happen. Indeed, by 1989 and 1990, there had already been talks between Nelson Mandela, who was still in prison at that time, and the present leadership. Mandela, as you may have read in his book, *The Long Walk to Freed*om, already started communicating with the external wing of the African National Congress that, in order to avert a bloodbath in our country, we needed to think of another way of ending the protracted conflict.

In fact, the leadership in the African National Congress believed in the notion of retributive justice; that in fact, we need to have a revolution and overthrow the government by way of revolution. There were elements within the movement who

were mobilizing at the military level, and in fact, internally we had the formation of what were called self-defense units and self-protection units that were really quasi-paramilitary groups of people within the communities. President Mandela had to, at that time, convince the external leadership that we were going the route of negotiation. He communicated with Oliver Tomwell and requested that, from outside, there needed to be communication with the "masses" to prepare people for a negotiated settlement. That, in fact, happened as groups of people were called out, and I there was a kind of shuttle diplomacy that took place at the time. But there was, through the mass democratic movement and through the United Democratic Front, an incredible movement at the mass people level to, in a sense, seize power. It was like people's power and so on. At the same time, there were also incredible activities in human-resource and capacity-building preparing people to come.

So once we were in the phase of negotiations, we were able to bring people along with, for example, the ideas of a bill of rights and constitution-building, the idea of the reconstruction and development programs and the TRC. These were all institutions that were put in place. I guess, because of the unique nature of the TRC, it received more prominence than the other structures that were happening within civil and other society that was used for nation-building. That is, in a very small nutshell, what was happening. We can spend plenty of time speaking about how it exactly happened.

RABBI BIGMAN: After listening to Prof. Sabella, I would like to share with you a little thought I have about our conflict, especially about Israeli society. In traditional Judaism, as in many monotheistic religions, the posture of accepting and acknowledging one's guilt is part of our more, part of our culture. It is a very natural posture for us to take, to acknowledge our guilt towards our fellow human beings. It is part of our tradition. I think the more secular Zionist community and the religious Zionist community today, the social and cultural more is completely different, and I think we are going to have a long haul to convince people to accept the posture that we have guilt towards our fellow human beings. I raise this question now because I am worried about many realms of our society, but wonder also if we have a similar problem in the Palestinian community. Certainly, on the Israeli side, it is against the bent of our Zionist culture. Acknowledgment of guilt is against the general trend of Israeli culture.

MR. PAZ: Would it not be interesting if religious leaders took the lead in encouraging us to think about the problem?

RABBI BIGMAN: Most religious leaders we know are so influenced by Zionism that they cannot get back to the traditional posture. That is where we have the problem.

MS. WILDSCHUT: I was reflecting on the issue of forgive and forget. First of all, in the TRC, there is no imperative to ask for forgiveness. There is not a legal imperative to ask for forgiveness. But what happened, as almost a by-product of the structure of the TRC, was that as amnesty applicants came to apply for amnesty, they also requested meetings with victims. And in those often mediated sessions, they asked for forgiveness. This is also against the bent of most people who come from an Afrikaaner tradition because they also see the relationship of God as a more vertical one. It is not a relationship reflected in a relationship with other people, which is a different paradigm. So there was no legal or other imperative for forgiveness. People were not forced to forgive. You can imagine what the influence of the Archbishop was in this process.

Also, there was no imperative to forget. What we said was we need to remember. The idea was to keep reminding us and keep remembering the horrors of the past and not try to forget. The story-telling was to remember. There was also the buddy system. In other words, you cannot talk, otherwise you will betray the other. This whole issue of betrayal. But the night before the cut-off date for the closing of amnesty applications, we received something like 6,000 amnesty applications, such was the pressure of people. But as the victims were telling these stories and their stories were being corroborated through a range of other processes, people felt the need to apply for amnesty and to come forward. And we had to extend the life of the Amnesty Committee. What is the cost -- many people talked about the cost of this risk -- of having a backward-looking reflection process? The alternatives in our country were just too horrible to contemplate. I think if we had continued with the conflict it would have made Burundi and Rwanda look like a Sunday school picnic. I am very serious about that. The horrors were such that the alternative was too horrible for our nation to contemplate, and that is why we chose this risky middle route, very risky in its nature.

But at the same time as having the TRC, we had to build other structures which provided a safety net to contain the nation, and that was the forward-looking constitution-building, the processes of developing a bill of rights and so on. So we did not only have a backward-looking process of the Truth Commission. We also had a hopeful, forward-moving process within our society.

PROF. SABELLA: I want to react shortly to Rabbi David Bigman. I think we have. I think the problem is, when you acknowledge, when you start -- as Rabbi Bigman has started -- saying that I acknowledge guilt, then in a sense, that could have the implication of sending a message to the other party that I am willing to reexamine what I have done to you, you see. Listening to Rabbi Bigman, I remembered that when Sadat came to Israel in 1978, I was watching television. And I said, if Menahem Begin wants to really make a breakthrough, he would say on television that we, the Israelis, in the process of establishing our state, willingly or unwillingly, did an injustice to the Palestinians. I was hoping that Begin would come out and say this. Well, maybe I am too naive. That is why I am not in politics, you know. But what I think often, and again and again, is that the Israelis to date have sent a message to us that they really do not acknowledge our version of the land. At least this is how I see it.

Now, Rabbi Bigman has said, I don't know if it is the same on the Palestinian side. I would argue that Palestinians have been more accommodating. I do not think that we are yet willing to acknowledge your version of the history. It is as difficult to a majority of us as it is to a majority of you. But at least, because we are forced in a sense to be under your control, in your factories, in your industries, as workers, as people who are searched and so on, we have gone through a process of knowing you more than you think we have. In other words, we know the Israelis more than the Israelis know us. And in a sense, this knowing the Israelis enables us at times to really appreciate things on the Israeli side that even Israelis themselves do not realize that we appreciate.

Therefore, I come back to the conclusion with which I started. The process is a most difficult one, and it should go on. And to inject a kind of political statement here, I do not think that political accords, whether they are of the Wye or Wye-not nature, are really the only answer to our dilemma. I think the answer really involves a process

that would involve NGO's, that would involve people, that would involve academics, that would involve workers and laborers. I wish some of us would go and join Gazan laborers coming back to Gaza from Israel and vice versa. The process should go through all levels. I do not trust that it is simply a leadership process. It should become a process from the people to the people. Unless we do that, then I do not think we will have a process, and the peace process itself will be postponed ten, twenty, thirty years.

MR. PAZ: Let me firstly thank our speaker, Ms. Glenda Wildschut, for not only telling us the story of her work and the work of the commission, but reminding us that there is not only a moral aspect to historical reality, but that if you fail to face up to it, you may face a political as well as a moral catastrophe; and for telling us how one nation, in its particular situation, was able to face up to that dilemma and to use it to build what is indeed a hopeful future. I should also like to thank Rabbi David Bigman and Prof. Bernard Sabella who have both emphasized to us that there is indeed a spiritual aspect and a spiritual responsibility within the context of our discussion. Moreover, as Prof. Sabella clearly especially emphasized, the ability to see history through the other's eyes is what finally will make it possible to build a just and lasting peace with the other. Let me continue at once with the next session, a very brief one. Our next speaker will be Amira Hess, who is well known to every Israeli not only as a correspondent for Haaretz, but as the correspondent for Haaretz in Gaza from Gaza.

MS. HESS: The session that was supposed to speak about mobilizing the media was cancelled, so I will skip the theoretical analysis of the media and the media's roles and just start with a statement that the mobilization of the media in favor of the Oslo process was very successful indeed. It was very successful, especially in the first two years after the signing and the redeployment and transfer of authorities. It was very successful in helping to create the myth that the Oslo process is a peace process. The media here collaborated very faithfully, very meticulously, with the myth that the builders of the Oslo process wished to create, that this is a peace process, not a pacification process, not in a way a surrender process, not a denouncing process of the right to fight against occupation, but a peace process.

So this was the first year and a half or two. Then the media was very successful in its mobilization to create the impression that terror is the result of all the problems, that terror is a Palestinian virus, plus Palestinian hatred, a very anonymous, unjustified hatred towards the Jews which is spoiling everything good which the Jews, the Israelis, wanted to create. So the media was very successful in creating the myth or blaming the PA that it is not fighting terror, it is not fulfilling its part of the deal while we Israelis fulfill every part and every word of the Oslo deal, and because of this terrible terror there is no progress.

This myth was so successful and this mobilization of mainly the Israeli media was so successful because of the first two years were successful in creating the myth that this is a peace process. Donor countries, the Labor party, intellectuals, all those who had made the pilgrimage to Arafat's office in Gaza, Fatah leaders, P2P, people who participated in P2P projects, all had very good access to the media and helped create the myth of the first two years. They managed to set the tone and to create the impression that, indeed, finally there were two equal enemies. Two symmetrical enemies are finally in the process of reconciliation. I insist here on the word symmetrical. According to the Oslo language, one is not allowed to use the use the

term occupied territories. I just learned that. The office of the UN Special Coordinator to the Occupied Territories, okay, the name includes occupied, but in their official documents they are not allowed to use the term occupied territories. The very process itself put into question this international, legalistic, juristic fact that the Palestinian territories are occupied. This Oslo language collaborated with Israeli's long and successful efforts to make the occupied territories into not occupied, but disputed or disputable territories about which two parties are fighting. I am not talking about the whole country in its mandatory borders. I am talking about the occupied territories of 1967. If it were challenging the whole idea or discussing the entire country as disputable as to whom it belongs, okay. But no, it was only about the part after 1967.

The Oslo process enabled the paving of roads which have confiscated so much land from the Palestinians, and actually has made possible the internalization or the perpetuation of the existence of the settlements in the occupied territories without trying to challenge the legitimacy of this Jewish presence, or at least to offer an alternative which would say, okay, Jews are allowed, any Jew anywhere in the world and in Israel, is allowed to live in Halil or Hebron, and any Palestinian in Halil is allowed to live in or move to Haifa or Tel-Aviv. It has not taken this step, and it is not going to go that far and take this step.

I know that the Oslo process, in the eyes of its initiators – at least two of them who are present here – meant only well. Indeed, they are friends who were very successful, again, in conveying to the media what will definitely happen when this process is completed: a state, good relationships, a great economy, a new Middle East, etc. But the media failed in portraying the reality. And I am talking about reality which was evolving in Gaza, first of all, and later on in the West Bank during the first years. And the reality was not of a peace process. The reality was of a demographical separation between two peoples -- not a geographical separation, a demographical separation. I do not have to say what separation translates as in Afrikaans.

And together with that, a complete negation of the Palestinian right to freedom of movement, a complete negation. This is a process which started, by the way -- not by the way -- in 1991, the negation of the Palestinian right to movement. This is a basic resource of any human development, community development and individual development. Since 1991, this resource has been robbed from the Palestinians. The Oslo process did not change it. The Oslo process actually only enforced and emphasized this process under the disguise of separation. That is another myth that was very successfully mobilized in the media because the media portrayed closure as a result of terror. Nonsense. The closure of 1991 had nothing to do with terror, and the big terror attacks which happened in 1994 did not happen as a result of open borders. The borders, not border, the passages that sealed off the freedom of movement of Palestinians was taken since 1991, and more so in 1993, long before we even dreamed in our worst dreams about these mass terror attacks.

We all know, for example, that Peres had the idea very early on to create a different political entity for Gaza separate from the West Bank. This is even written in Yossi Beilin's book. We know it. It is not a secret. So closure was compatible with these ideas of separating first Gaza from the West Bank. Also, closure, especially since 1993, and more so under the redeployment situation, has brought the Palestinian community into a state of pauperization. I do not have the exact figures now, but you all know and you all have access to all this data. There has been a great pauperization of the majority of the Palestinian population.

This is another result of the reality which has been evolving during the last five years. This has involved a permanent decline of the people's expectations from their lives, their future. A good friend of mine from Jabalya asked me what I thought about Wye. I said, Well, you will soon get a state. He said, I was fighting in the Intifada and also before. What do I care about a state? I just want to leave Gaza and go visit friends in the West Bank. This you hear from everybody. What do we want a state for? What do we care about Jerusalem? We just want freedom of movement. The people are restricted to thinking about food and work as if there is nothing more for human beings but work and thinking about work, the uncertainty of what will happen tomorrow if there is no work, and access to food.

The Oslo process, in its practice, maybe not in its intentions – I leave that for more historical research in the future – but the Oslo process, and the process which has been taking place during the last five years, has created a society whose stratas and different segments can be defined according to their accessibility to the freedom of movement or to space. This accessibility to the freedom of movement is not accessibility to the freedom of movement as a basic human right which should be granted to everybody. It is defined as a privilege. Palestinian society is now divided into stratas which are differently privileged, some more privileged and some less privileged, vis-a-vis the freedom of movement. Of course, this privilege is being determined by one power, the Israeli power. We have laborers who can work Israel but cannot sleep in Israel, worker who can sleep in Israel, workers who can get back to Gaza at seven o'clock, workers from the West Bank who can go even without permits because they are from the West Bank, merchants who can go with their cars, merchants who cannot go with their cars, merchants with two cars, merchants with three cars. It sounds like a caricature, but this is the reality. VIP 3, VIP 2, VIP 1. Go to the Oslo agreement and see how, without shame, they defined VIP's. What kind of a peace process is it where you define privilege, who can receive more rights and respectability than anybody else. What a shameful paragraph of the Oslo agreement. And this is being implemented by the letter. Actually the whole society is without rights. There are only privileges, but all are segmented according to different scales of extremity. And now, every strata, with its portion of privilege, is afraid to lose that privilege. Therefore, it is not fighting against the fact that it does not have rights, but rather privilege.

So the process has made the Palestinian society into a society of collaborators. Everybody has to collaborate. Everybody has to preserve his small little portion of privilege or freedom of movement in order to live, in order to survive. You have different scales of collaboration, but it is collaboration. A worker who goes to work in Israel will do everything to preserve his right. He will not go and join demonstrations against the Israeli policy of closure. He will be afraid to lose his permit. He will not divulge details about how he was forced or how he is being asked to really collaborate with the Israeli Shabak -- FBI or whatever -- in exchange for the permit. He will not talk about it because he wants to preserve his privilege. The media was silent about it. I can tell you from my personal experience how I tried – you all know how much I tried – to write about this.

At first it was marginalized. It was overwhelmed by the ocean of good-willing journalists wanting to show how much progress was being made. And you can see this in other media of the world -- especially American media -- where you can hardly find the word closure. The main phenomenon of Palestinian life during the past five years has been closure. A friend of mine looked very hard in the New York Times to find

articles relating to this reality, and she did not find them. The question is not how to mobilize the media to give the message of reconciliation, of truth or peace or whatever. How can we mobilize the media, or who can mobilize the media to tell the truth? And the truth, taken from the reality in Gaza, in Ramallah, is that there is a process of changing Israeli control from one form of control, a more traditional form of occupation, to a modernized one, to, once I heard, a more sterile form of Israeli occupation which is the determination of the Palestinian future. Israelis have not given up the need and the intention and the will and the power to determine the Palestinians' future.

MR. PAZ: We heard this morning many important, provocative and penetrating presentations. I think we can agree that Amira has added one more penetrating and provocative approach to the discussion.

MR. SAVIO: I heard with great interest the last intervention. As a professional journalist, I know that media do not respond to truth as such. There are also market shares and so on. I do not see how we could construct a campaign to have the media tell the truth. That is not the professional position because, to start with, there are several truths, and every paper is convinced it is writing the truth. The problem is how to find a message on which you can carry together different sectors of the country. If that message is simply to ask the media to say the truth, we do not get anywhere. We should think a little more, in spite of all the situations that have been described, about how we can find some binding element in which some kind of dialogue which will eventually lead not to truth, but to good will, let's say, can be conducted through the media. I wonder if you could expand a little, from your personal perspective, on what this binding element could be between the different parts of Israeli-Palestinian society in their different realities which you describes. But if you do not see any binding elements in which something could be done, that would be an important conclusion to reach.

MR. PUNDIK: I am not here to defend the Oslo process. First of all, I agree with half of what you say, but you are shooting yourself in the foot with the fact that you are describing in a way, I think, a very one-sided situation, which is the journalist's way to describe something, not to attract our empathic ear. But in a way, I think you are throwing the baby out with the bathwater, and I think it is a pity, especially with your position. And for those who do not know, Amira Hess is the only Israeli journalist who is, as a matter of fact, writing about the West Bank and Gaza, the occupied territories, the PA, whatever you call it, who is living there, now in Ramallah and previously in Gaza, so at least we can be assured that she is speaking from first-hand experience.

But when we think about P2P, we think exactly about the same outcomes that you would like to reach. For example, my child, who is 13 years old, should be aware of what happens in the West Bank. She will not see it anywhere, not even in Haaretz. But if I take her to Gaza as part of a P2P meeting between 13-year-old children there and she sees what happens in Jabalya camp, and I take a class from Jabalya camp and give the headmaster of this school a permit to come to Israel -- God forbid -- and he comes to Israel because it will be a must and visits Israel with his class, and the Palestinian children meet Israeli children and Palestinian students meet Israeli students, when they come to Israel doing P2P, they are not thinking that one of our people is going to go and tell the Israeli Shin Bet that this bastard talks badly about Arafat or the Authority or whatever.

The whole idea of doing P2P is an outreach into both communities, given the realities. Show them the truth, creating this personal bond between people who understand that the future is together, not through physical, demographical, geographical separation, but through co-existence, mutual acceptance, looking eye to eye, and not through the newspapers, through the truth of the newspapers that you are searching for, but through personal relations. If you say the situation is so bad that P2P is bad as well, I obviously disagree completely with you. We need the media to tell the real story. We need the media to assist us in getting people to these kinds of P2P activities. We need the media to lead us to this co-existence we would like to see, which is eventually a Palestinian state side by side with Israel, not under occupation; to lead eventually not to what we call -- and you can define it as a peace process or not -- but to the end game. And everything leads us to the end game. And the end game, as I said, is eventually open borders, not bypasses and not safe passages and not tunnels, but open borders between two societies who co-exist in security as much as possible.

MR. SUSSMAN: Two interesting insights. One, we all live in our own conflict and we all think our conflict -- Irish, Palestinian, Israeli -- is the most difficult. But we can learn things from other people, and there is need for this kind of dialogue. The second thing is that we need to work with people who are working hands-on on the ground. Many people here today are academics or planners or high-level management. I think there is a real need to work with people who are implementing on the ground. The hands-on people were not well represented today, and never are. There is a need to go down one level and work with the people. Working with a guy like Andre is very instructive because people who are working on P2P on a day-to-day basis need to develop strategies and a vision and see how they integrate. Finally, relating to the pressure, before the Wye agreement, on Palestinian NGO's not to cooperate and not to conduct activities. Even the Palestinians I work with, you have a self-censorship. When things are not going well you will call me and say, well, not now. We have to move beyond.

MR. SMITH: I am the Israeli director of PIES set up by ECF and other organizations to bring together Israelis and Palestinians in joint work on environmental projects. One comment -- to the donor community as well -- is that we have spoken a lot about P2P dialogue and it being self-sustainable, almost existing within itself. But of course, we know that is not true, and we are very much influenced as well by the security, political and historical, realities within which we exist. For many of our projects we are quite aware that it is very difficult – and I am sure that in other developing and conflictual societies there is a similar situation – to come straight into a situation of P2P dialogue when, because of the historical and political reality, in many situations – and in our case it is the environment – the Israeli environmental movement organizations are up here and the Palestinian movement has a lot less infrastructure and is less developed. It is difficult to come straight in to P2P dialogue at that level. We make an effort, within our projects, always to have some type of development or capacity-building structure or mechanism for the Palestinian side so that when 14-year-old kids or students or adult professional groups meet, it is actually a balanced partnership. I am making this comment especially to the donor community as well to take cognizance of the fact that it is necessary, even in funding, to take that into account and allow for that development within a project, so that when we do have the cooperation, it is a balanced cooperation.

DR. HIRSCHFELD: Could we have the continuation of what Andre started to do? What are the practical implications of that?

MR. ZAAIMAN: I want to repeat what I think all the South Africans said, and everybody else, which is that we are not peddling anything. We are not trying to sell anything. I think we recognize very clearly that your situation is rather different to our situation and to our experiences. I will just tell you in a few words how we then went about to implement some of this, how we used this framework to implement and to devise a strategy, again as a contribution. I want to emphasize again that no small institution can create a peace process. I am struck also by the fact that, in our case, walk-on to the negotiation process, as Glenda emphasized, was longer and more public. That created the condition, when the negotiations actually officially happened at the macro level, that the society was more prepared for the whole thing. Civic education programs had started, and the whole framework within which the debate in South Africa was taking place had already been framed, since after 1983, negotiations would be the framework within which we would talk about the future. I know this is not the case in Israel. The results of the negotiations were dumped on the society and everybody got a shock, and you are trying to cope with that.

The other important thing that also came out of both the two previous interventions is the fact that there are some hard truths that one must not mess around with and must put out into the open. In this case, I think some of the stuff that is going on now, or what one sees if one visits Gaza, these are the kinds of things you must be able to say. If are not able to say it, you are not going to get anywhere. At the same time, you should never lose sight, you are absolutely correct, of the end game, where it is you are trying to go. That is what I called this morning mass. That is the alternative in the mathematical formula that needs to be repeated and enlarged.

In South Africa one of the first steps we took was to find a way to suffocate the ability of the regime at that time to its actions and its system, and that was creating a level playing ground. In other words, we also had power asymmetries, but less pronounced than in this situation here. Because of the events that led up to the acceptance of the negotiations, both parties knew there was a historical opportunity and that neither could defeat each other unless we go all the way. I think there was a sort of stalemate in terms of conflict violence as an option, where both parties realized that if we go beyond this, Rwanda is the alternative. So there was a little more symmetry between the parties. From our side, suffocate the ability of the regime to justify its policies and actions. We did this – interestingly enough, having listened to everybody else – by focusing on three groups.

One was intellectuals. We needed to get the Afrikaaner intellectuals close to the regime who provided the regime with the intellectual justifications of its policies and the possibility that this is scientific and that it will succeed, we had to get them away from the regime, isolate them from the regime, create a division between them and take away from the government possibility of having a group of researchers who are consistently backing up whatever they are doing with data and information and argument and so on. That actually happened in 1989. The group of 19, the secret group of Afrikaaner intellectuals who had been providing the government with a lot of their thinking, started to break out in 1989 with a lot of their thinking. They left.

The other was to look at the religious community. As you know, in South Africa the religious community was a great instrument in justifying apartheid and so on. We knew also that we could not get this community behind this critical mass or behind the alternative idea, so we had to just divide them. And so we drove wedges between the progressives and conservatives and amplified the progressive viewpoint sometimes

and sometimes the conservative viewpoint. This creates instability and uncertainties in the regime. They become insecure and start to waiver.

Then, in terms of security establishments, we also had to do the same. We had to expose their incompetencies and abuses. That was very important because, also in the security establishments, you then create diffusion and division and confusion as to what works and what does not work. On the question of alternatives and the formulation of alternatives, in our situation, when we got into the mechanics of the process, we used basically two strategies. One was, at the time when we started to make the first contacts with the ANC, there was no constitutional framework that they proposed as an alternative to the constitutional proposals that we had at that time. Don't forget, the constitutional proposals are the rules of the game. As I said this morning, you have to develop a quick consensus about what will eventually be the rules of the game, and every actor must be able to recognize himself in that game.

So we worked a lot with the ANC to develop proposals, and then diffused them inside South Africa, and that exactly became the alternative. The strategic intention, a short, almost marketing component of that was: united, nonracial, democratic, inclusive South Africa. That is the short speech on that whole process. There was another whole series of scenarios that the business community built and then went on a massive campaign throughout the country. This was a spectacular, almost religious, experience which started in 1987, and went to schools and to business groups and all over the country presenting these scenarios and saying South Africa faces a historical choice. These are the three options. Which would you like? The constitutional alternative option was No. 3, the rosy one, right in the middle, and everybody eventually wanted to go for that one.

A third point was that we needed to create dense webs of social relations. If you look at the ability of your regime of negotiations to resist the consolidation of your critical mass, that is supported by thick and dense networks of social relations. And that is where the P2P things -- sometimes one does not think they are important, but they are often of critical importance. And we did it through a number of things. We had township tours. We took white people to townships and sat them down with black people and showed them how people lived and let those people speak and tell them there is nothing interesting about living in a squat camp like this. There were a lot of house meetings with very good black activists, and bringing in key sectors from those three sectors I mentioned earlier -- intellectuals, youths and religious leaders -- letting them listen to the people in the townships. Taking people out to socialize together. Taking people from South Africa to where the ANC was in exile at that time, and then back -- like going to Tunis. This was a very important experience. We had lots of doubts because it is very expensive to take people to visit a place like that. But really, on a psychological level, it created an enormous change in the mindset of people.

Changing paradigms is a very important thing. It has come up in all the discussions. In the beginning, you cannot change the reality, but you can change the way people look at reality. It is always easier to change what people want than to change what they believe. So that was another sort of tactic we used, focusing on what they want rather than on what they believe. One thing that was very important -- and it was interesting for me that I picked up here that Palestinians and Israelis -- again, I am saying, like everybody else, I am no expert on this region -- but I get an impression that you are talking from different assumptions, and these assumptions have not been externalized so you do not know what you are disagreeing about. When a Palestinian talks about

Palestinians, who knew the reality in the Palestinian-occupied territories, who had common projects without the fat budgets of P2P, who risked a lot for having these contacts, who paved the way for Palestinians to recognize Israelis. So please, I did not mean to speak about P2P and I did not speak about P2P and did not come to preach against them.

MR. PUNDIK: You wrote against it which is bad enough. You are the only one who writes against it. It has influence.

MS. HESS: I want to say you have not invented the wheel. Another thing is that I do not speak here in my capacity as a journalist, because there is always some derogatory tone or tone of degradation when you refer to me as a journalist. This is already the second time. I am speaking in my capacity as somebody who lived in Gaza and who now lives in Ramallah, and as somebody who studied history, so I think I see the historical process through different eyes and I analyze it differently than you. You have studied history. I did as well. Maybe to a different degree. I am also speaking in my capacity as somebody who, long before I became a journalist, belonged to the Israeli left wing who had contacts with Palestinians, long before Labor party people thought of having these kinds of contacts. This is kind of necessary introduction to saying that I am not against dialogue and not against meeting each other. On the contrary. Why do I live among Palestinians if I did not believe this is the way?

MR. PUNDIK: You are making your living.

MS. HESS: I could have had much better ways of making a living, and you know what Ha'Aretz's policies are about wages. I believe the only way to reach the media – and I agree the media is not structured for truth – or to break something in the media's being an accomplice with the authorities, with any authority or power in the world, is by struggle. When you have popular struggles they finally make it through to the media. The media reflects, the media surrenders to power, and therefore also to this power which is assembled by people in popular struggle. The Intifada managed to bring the Palestinian issue into the Israeli media in a tremendous way, and there was an Israeli fight against the media so as not to give the Palestinians a voice. This is struggle, and I think now the real authentic cooperation or being together of Palestinians and Israelis in order to build a different future is in groups such as, for example, the group which is against the demolitions of houses. They go and build houses. This is P2P because this is going out and breaking the myth of symmetry between the people. It wants to show there is not a symmetrical situation. There is group of Israelis who went to harvest olives and was ready to confront settlers who disturbed Palestinian farmers from harvesting their olives. All these things, believe me, contribute so much more, and they always go to common people. They do not go to the elites among the Palestinians.

About the obstacles to Palestinian NGO's cooperation with Israeli NGO's. It is no wonder the PA is putting up so many obstacles. It is hypocritical, of course. Until two or three years ago it was attacking the wrong target. It has not stopped economic cooperation or collaboration. It has not stopped Israeli participation in casinos with Palestinians. It has not stopped all kinds of Israeli-Palestinian economic ventures. It only attacks the popular level because it has the very deplorable tendency to give in to some outward forces or to dim the real reason behind popular resentment to P2P. I say the popular resentment is very genuine, and that is what I wrote about. Popular resentment is about the collaboration with the privilege system, with the past system where P2P has become a venue for obtaining exit permits. Many Palestinians join it

not because of the content, but because they really want to get out of the jail in which they live. Finally, as someone trained in history, the difference between the models you could build in South Africa and the models being structured now is that you were in the process of getting rid of apartheid or of fighting apartheid. We are in the process of building apartheid in this country, inside these mandatory borders of Palestine-Israel. And by not addressing the phenomenon – I believe that all P2P do not want an apartheid situation. But if you do not struggle against the very components which are paving the way to an apartheid system where there are two peoples under one main authority, Israeli authority, which dictates their lives, and two peoples which have different, actually contradictory, sets of rights and access to the resources of this country. One is discriminated against and one has the power to take everything for itself, as long as P2P will not address these components, there will be collaborators in going towards apartheid.

MR. PAZ: I will make three very brief comments in a nonchairmanship capacity. First, it is good to remind ourselves once again that there is a moral dimension to thinking about political and social and economic issues, and this moral dimension must pervade and must be an integral part of our approach to the nature and to the content of the peace process. Let me also add how significant I believe it is to say that until we are able to comprehend that there is perspective on the history which we share, it will not be possible for us to write the next chapter in that history. Having spoken about the moral dimension, let me turn to Amira and say -- and I do not say it simply because Ron and Yair are here -- that there is also a pragmatic aspect of making a peace process, and pragmatic historic realities. There are no perfect realities and no perfect institutions, but I think it is fair to say that the Oslo program is the vehicle which has made it possible to think realistically about creating a situation which will end a hundred years of hostility and will create a Palestinian state beside Israeli living in peace and harmony.

Without that vehicle, as anyone in Israel will tell you, that breakthrough would not have been possible. Granted, every vehicle is a flawed vehicle in the way you perceive it or anywhere else perceives it, perhaps yes or no. But this the vehicle that is changing the historical reality in which we live, and as such, it is the best tool we have to reach the goal I think we all share Finally, of course it is not necessary to claim the invention of the wheel. But it is critical to ask how you use the wheel even if you did not invent it. How do you use the wheel which may be your kind of wheel? Fair enough to say P2P is a basis for building mutual understanding, mutual knowledge, mutual trust, for building an element of a shared stake in creative realities, as well as for some of the things Amira and others have spoken about. This is one of the critical vehicles without which the political peace process cannot succeed, whether it be in good times or -- Wye not -- in bad times as well. So I think, in that sense, the nature and the commitment to the P2P peace's process is not mislaid. Indeed, it is in a very correct place.

SESSION V: TOWARD PEACE MAKING: CONCLUDING REMARKS

MR. BECHET: I was asked during the last session what was for me the main feature of this day, and I was by the fact that we had actually different experiences to talk about. I think the Irish and South African experiences, I would not call them examples or models or whatever, but at least the experiences were, for me personally, very interesting. In this last session we are supposed to draw conclusions. The usual cliche

is that we cannot draw conclusions like this. We are here as much to ask questions as to give answers I think.

MR. ZAAIMAN: I will just make one remark, and that is that I think you need to make sure that the alternative to not dealing with this issue, to not negotiating, is put very clearly and very publicly on the agenda, and that you the commitment to that alternative or to that process or to that agenda that spans all layers and all levels of society. One senses here that there is some kind of – I do not want to say despair, but if the process loses its momentum, it is very difficult to regain it. So the key step for me is, is there an alternative, is it clearly articulated, is that alternative something that inspires people, that will make them focus not on what they have to give up, but on what they can gain if they buy into the process.

Also, try to focus, I am starting to sound a little like a preacher now, but also try to sort out the miscommunications. A lot of the things that have struck me when I speak one on one to Palestinians or one on one to Israelis is that you mean very different things even though you use the same words very often. That is something that has to be addressed. There is a whole range of complicated factors, of course, that complicate this matter, but I think you need to address that. Something that also struck me is that one gets sense that when it comes to the macro level, Mr. Netanyahu is very much in the framework of a tactician and Mr. Arafat is very much in the framework of a strategist, so they talk different languages even on that level. Finally, thank you very much. I have really enjoyed it. I have learned a lot. It has been very interesting to come here. I wish you, from our side, all the best wishes for all your efforts.

MS. GORMLEY: When I came here, I had this rather absurd notion that the places of Israel-Palestine and Northern Ireland were very similar and that lessons could actually be learned from the Northern Ireland case. After today, I am really not so sure. There are distinctive differences which make P2P dialogue easier in Northern Ireland. For example, people choose to be segregated. They choose where they live. The closures and the issue of permits forces this issue in Israel-Palestine, and that is a distinct difference. If we want to have a dialogue we are not prevented from doing so.

Also, in times of tension, there are processes which exist which automatically diffuse it; i.e., the fact that people do work together and shop together and go into town centers together. So even at times of intense tension, there are methods of diffusing that. Sometimes when people go to work there is a certain degree of tension, but the fact is that people have to work together and put that first a lot of the time. There is still very much that needs to be solved in Northern Ireland regarding peace-making. I know I was very positive this morning. I did that purposefully for the conference, but there are issues that still need to be resolved.

The issue of dealing with the past is something that has only been mentioned very much on the periphery. Acceptance and a truth commission may not be the way forward in Northern Ireland. People may not be able to deal with this issue for a number of reasons, including families of those who have disappeared. A group has been set up of relatives of those who disappeared in the 1970's, and the bodies not found. Victims and victimhood, what defines a victim, what makes a victim, definitions in Northern Ireland are very wide- ranging on that particular issue. Of course, the release of political prisoners is also a very contentious issue at the moment. But the main mindset has definitely changed in Northern Ireland towards peace. Slogans, for example. The Republican slogan, Our day will come, was subsequently changed to, Never again. We do not want this anymore. And I they

mean it. The intervention of business and trade unions, the media, the churches and grass roots groups has helped change that mindset. People are not rushing out to embrace each other by any means, but the mind set has changed significantly. Finally, everyone thinks that their own conflict is not as bad as everyone else's. We think we can offer a lesson, and we are grateful that we do not have the problems that other countries do. I would not change the conflict in Northern Ireland for anyone else's. I am glad we have and we do not have yours. I wish you well in your forthcoming ventures and peace processes, and I do hope you have the success that I hope we will continue to have.

MR. JESSE: I am not an expert in P2P. I am just what you would call a civil servant. Perhaps what I can do is give you the point of view of a donor who comes from an area where we have some experience of peace. First of all, the experience of the EU is one of process. It does not stop. The next step is to build common money. But more important is to see why we embarked on this process. We embarked on this process really, because, after hundreds of centuries of fighting, we realized that we had to share the same land.

The EU is a group of people who have decided to share the same land. I heard Andre Zaiman's principle that, at the end of the day, you must have dissatisfaction with the present situation plus attraction for an alternative and commitment to the process, and that must be greater than the status quo. At the end of the Second World War we had all that, and that is where we succeeded. That principle applies perfectly well zones which have been linked in conflict. I would like to say Amira that you said some very interesting thing. I am not so sure I am being truthful to what she said, but it seemed that she wanted to rebalance what the government is doing and what the people do, and try to put everyone in his place.

There is no doubt that if the governments – or the institutions or whatever you call them – are not the framework or do not provide the framework for people's cooperation, at the end of the day I am not so sure the process will solve anything. You will tell me people are lobbying producing the frameworks. This is a sort of element which is related, but we should never separate what governments do and what the people do. In the case of the EU, another thing which struck me in what Amira said was that she spoke a about free movement. There is no doubt that the real fruits of peace which we greatly appreciate in Europe are free movement of goods, service, capital and people. I was born before the Second World War. When I compare my youth to the youth of my children who are at home in London, in Bonn, in Brussels or in the Hague, if I deny them they that fact and tell them they should not be at home in London because it's full of Brits and we are French, they would look at me with strange eyes and say, okay, you from a different century, but we are at home everywhere. They are, in fact, what we have achieved. I do think if there is anything we can do and people should do in terms of long-term objectives of their action, it is to work on the target of equality in all, and equality in free movement is definitely the supreme equality of all.

I have tried to identify the basic elements which were successful in Europe to see if they apply to P2P. What applies to government should apply to P2P – basically a common structure called the EU of today, or the Common Market or whatever you call it. We cooperated in all fields, larger fields through the years. And I like the definition of critical mass. We have reached such critical mass and we have created such momentum that the thing has not stopped since 1958. It went flat for some time

when General DeGaulle decided he did not want to participate, but it did not go down. Beyond that, our civil society was totally part of it.

If you speak about P2P, one of the best successes of P2P is lobbying. You have two big lobbying centers in the world today, one in Washington and one in Brussels. Brussels is an enormous place of lobbying where people do their business by putting pressure on institutions of government. That is where you see the link between what government does and what people do. And at the end of the day, if we are successful in P2P activities, they should end by lobbying governments to apply changes in the frameworks. Of course, you will tell me that is the job of the political parties. But where do we go if people do not inject ideas into political parties to inject changes into governmental frameworks?

One word on the interest we have in P2P in this region. I again do not agree totally with Amira on the P2P, and reject it totally. I think it was engaged wrongly. Either you said -- or Andre. I don't know -- that if you cannot change reality, at least change the view of reality. Once you change the view of reality, you reality. If you do not embark on P2P, the views will not change and reality, at the end of the day, will not change. The P2P element here is important as an element of culture which brings in the political system, and from the political system, then the governments. Of course it is difficult, it is not easy, but we try to inject something to create contacts between groups of people in order for them to be able to reassess their vision of reality, and from there, start moving to change it.

Our role as a donor here is very simple. If anybody catches me not doing what I say I will be more than happy to discuss it. We are not interested whatsoever in what people do. We dish out money. We give advice from time to time, but we are not directly interested. I thought that it could be very interesting to give a few principles from the little expertise we have. We do believe that if you, as P2P, and governments are no different – if you set your eyes on peace, you have to set your eyes beyond peace. If you do not do that, you will fail somehow. Peace treaties are not the achievement of peace. The achievement of peace is like the consolidation of peace, long-term peace.

That is what we do normally in a normal framework. I know that working in conditions of occupation, of war, of tension, makes it difficult to look beyond. But any objective of P2P work should be an objective long-term basis which goes beyond peace because that is the cement which will consolidate the treaties. Don't forget that in Europe there was the Versailles treaty which triggered, in fact, the second conflict and was one of the reasons for the birth of Hitler. Look beyond, beyond, beyond the procedure, beyond the peace treaty, and be ambitious enough to discuss what is deep and important. There was a discussion yesterday about education, for example. What she was trying to do in education was to speak about long-term education, and that is really the best approach.

A second principle -- and again, I quote Andre here very modestly -- work to acquire critical mass and permanent momentum. Without mass and without momentum, the whole thing collapses. This is true also for governments. It was true for the EU. It is true for P2P. It is true for any lobby, any joint collective activity seeking to live and develop.

A third principle, enlarge the field of cooperation to enlarge your constituency (that of peace). And in this case, one of the elements I again would insist on is long-term

targeting. Try to work as much as possible on all elements which will free the people, free their movement. Movement of ideas, movement of goods, movement of people is extremely important and should be facilitated from any angle possible. Another principle is create joint structures for coordinating strategy in action. For the time being, clearly the fragmentation of initiatives has an interest because it is like people taking initiatives. But if there is no certain type, no Federal approach or no coordinated approach for strategies in action, not in thinking nor in papers or whatever, at the end of the day we do not go anywhere. And this goes again to the principle of critical mass which Andre mentioned. The last principle -- which is very important and will conclude with this -- never work for the donors. Never work for the media. They will never work for you anyway. I disagree with Pundik on this one. Focus on your objectives. Money and coverage will come later.

MR. BECHET: That is exactly what I was about to say.

DR. HIRSCHFELD: I want first to thank everybody for their participation and to say that the discussions that took place today were exciting, and by far surpassed expectations. I believe it has been a very important beginning. I believe it has been extremely thought-provoking. It has not been always easy, but it has been extremely useful. It has put our minds at unrest which is very good, because if the mind is at rest, it is always bad. So I am very thankful for everyone's participation, and I thank everybody personally and all of you together.

Before I go into my ten conclusions, I want to tell a short story which has to do with history. In 1921, the Soviet Union and the Weimar Republic decided to conclude diplomatic relations, and the man who negotiated it on the Soviet side was a man called Karl Radic. He spoke to the people in the German foreign office who were all quite conservative, and decided for diplomatic relations. And then the Germans asked Radic who they wanted as ambassador to Moscow. He said, We will not send you a Communist, but we will send you a Social Democrat if you want. Radic said, No. Send us someone from the very right wing. He took out a plastic ruler and demonstrated that if you put the ends together, they meet. If you try to do it in the middle, it breaks.

The logic of this story is that, if I read Israel Harel about the three crimes of Oslo, and I here listen to Ms. Hess, I feel that the logic of 1921 is in a way true for the logic of 1998, and the radicals on both sides meet. And the truth is to be able to ask Israel Harel or Amira Hess not what she thinks about Oslo, but what her alternative is and what Israel Harel's alternative would be. They would both give me answers, but I do not think they would be very practical ones. Having said that, I believe the remarks of Amira Hess were extremely useful and extremely important as a thought-provoking part of the discussion here because they put a certain reality and a certain perception on the table which is realistic. And it was shouted out with great pain Amira, pain which is definitely felt on the Palestinian side, and it probably became more vocal in the words of Amira Hess. Therefore, it was very useful, although I do not agree with almost everything she said.

Going into Amira Hess's questions, I want to say one more thing. We are dealing with the past, the present and the future. What we have learned is that we have to look at the present, which Amira did in a way that is very painful for her and for us. I do not think it is the entire picture because in a picture in which we look at the past, the present and the future, we cannot only look at the present. But it is important to deal with the present and take care of the things she said and to face the challenge that was

placed before us in her words. Having said this, I would like to speak of the basic conclusions I draw from today's discussions. They are my personal conclusions. You may agree or disagree with them, but I would like to put them on the agenda. I feel these conclusions came out very strongly from this workshop.

The first very dramatic conclusion -- and everybody has said it and I believe there is a consensus about it -- is that if we deal in P2P activities, we need to develop a strategy. We have done work. We have acted on the ground. We have created some abilities on the ground. We also have to think and develop a strategy which is forward-looking. The first dramatic outcome of this workshop is, I believe, a conscientious one, that this day we have started to work on a strategy with all the important inputs that we have received.

The second conclusion flows from that, and that is, particularly if I listen to our friends from South Africa and Northern Ireland, but also looking into our own home – and our own home is the peace camp in Israel -- not the only aim, but the main aim of developing a strategy is not to unite the peace camp between all the different actors, but to coordinate and have an understanding of how all the different actors in the peace camp can become far more effective and far more cooperative and far more able to work with one another, separately and together, in a coordinated and forward-looking way. Definitely one thing that will come out of this workshop is that we will sit together and see what kind of strategy we can build for P2P, a strategy which will make it clear that there is one united purpose for P2P activities, which is to look forward and to move the peace camp ahead to really do the work.

The third need and conclusion I have already to, and it is a difficult one. With all the difficulties and hardships of today – and this is a call from me to our Palestinian friends and also to Amira – we are very much aware of the difficulties of today. We live them, although maybe not from the same angle you do. Let us look to the future. Let us build the future together and work on the future, but let's look forward.

The fourth need which came clearly out of this workshop is that, with all that has been said about different -- and of course we are different -- we still have to learn from each other. We have to learn from the similarities and the differences of the Northern Ireland experience, of the South African experience, maybe of the Guatemala experience, and of other experiences which are important and valuable for us to understand what we are doing and how to move ahead. The more we learn from the other side, the more we will understand, of course without making generalization which are wrong. We do not believe we are part of the Northern Ireland conflict, but we understand there are important issues we can learn from looking at other conflicts and other understandings about conflict resolution.

The fifth conclusion is that Andre's explanations yesterday evening and today were terribly important. We to look very clearly at how to develop a strategy about the opponents of peace, particularly the right wing in Israel, but also the opponents of peace on the Palestinian side. With all the difficulties of Oslo, with all its setbacks, all the things that may be criticized about it, the opponents of peace are now in an ideological crisis. They have lost their ideological tools. They do not know how to handle the pragmatic realities of today There is a necessity to look toward the opponents of peace and develop a clear plan of action, a clear understanding of who do we pull out, who do we exclude, with whom do we cooperate, who do we neutralize, how do we do it, where do we do it and what are the practical moves of doing it. This is a very important part of moving forward.

The sixth conclusion is that we have to continue P2P activities in solidarity with the Palestinian people. Solidarity with the Palestinian people is the beginning of P2P activity, and what Amira Hess calls the only right P2P activity is solidarity with the Palestinian people. This is very important. It is an important part of the entire concept. We have to work together in order to fight against the right-wing activities of the Ateret Cohanim people in Jerusalem. We have to work against the demolition of houses. We have to work for activities where we show the Palestinians we do understand that we are in full solidarity with you in many of your struggles. I only add that solidarity is a two-way street. It cannot be a one-way street. It is a two-way street with regard to our fears and difficulties and pain too. So solidarity is important, and we have to develop activities and continue activities in cooperation with the Palestinians. And we have to also do that in a two-way position.

The seventh point that clearly came up is that we have to develop networks and the capacity for cooperation, and extend the networks and extend the cooperation. There was a clear call by Bauer this morning to go beyond NGO's and NGO players. NGO players are catalysts and activists. They are elites. But we have to use the elites and the catalysts in order to go beyond that and to go toward critical mass and to open up society on both sides for P2P activity, not to make it into an elite activity, but to make it something where we can go into schools and universities and hospitals in order to greatly broaden the involvement of the real critical mass of people. And this is doable.

The eighth conclusion is that we have to start -- and we have started already today, and already before today, and we are very appreciative of this dialogue -- a very intense dialogue with the donors on joint strategy. The wonderful lady from Canada today said there are donor interests which are specific, and this is very legitimate. But there is a common interest to promote peace, and there is a need to develop an understanding and a dialogue on how to move together on a strategy which is part of the entire strategy, but also part of the donor strategy. The money that is provided, how can that be used in order to make money talk, for capacity-building and coalition-building and the building of the will to move ahead?

The ninth, if we do all this, the ninth and tenth needs are more or less the most important parts in order to finalize the work. We have to create a joint image of peace. As Andre said, we have to create a constitution of peace, a knowledge of what peace is really all about, a common understanding of the image of peace, Israelis and Palestinians together. This may be done on the elite side, but it is of great importance that we understand each other, that we speak about the same peace which recognizes dignity, which gives the right for different identities, but also for cooperation and for working together, and which really paves the way for co-existence in a way both our peoples want and need. It is what I would call creating a logic of peace and translating the logic of peace into practical political concepts.

Last but not least, we have to prepare to go to the end game. I do not know if the end game will take us two, five, ten or fifteen years, but it will only come if we move ahead in all these matters. And it is the aim of all our activities in hope that we can work together and work in this direction.

MR. BECHET: I agree with almost everything you said. The one point in which I do not agree is when you talk about donors. I do not think you should work for donors. You should limit the role of donors here. Our role is to facilitate things whenever it is necessary. I do not think every activity here has to be turned into a project. This is a

bias that you see a lot here, and sometimes it is actually an obstacle. But this is a personal remark.

DR. HIRSCHFELD: I am sorry. I think the donors have an interest. The donors work for us.

MR. BECHET: But you have that bias, that every activity has to be turned into a project with a budget and all that. I do not think that is the case. I think there is enough energy, not to mention money. This is not a poor region. We have difficulties, but there is enough energy and money to do that. That does not mean we will not do it anymore. Of course not. We will continue to do it, as neighbors and as friends. As neighbors, we have a very practical interest in seeing a peaceful region because we live next to it. And as friends, we have an interest in peace and justice. I think this is important. So we continue to do it because we believe it is the right thing to do. But do it for yourselves. Do it by yourselves. That is what I wanted to say. That does not mean I disagree with what you said. And we are here as friends.

MR. ZIDANI: Some points emerged through the discussion that I understand differently from the way others have tried to construe them. First, in defense of Amira Hess -- I think she does not need my defense -- but I think what she gave is a vivid description of the harsh reality of occupation as experienced by the Palestinians. That should not be underestimated. That should be taken very seriously. At the same time, this is a sort of reality that we should try, through our joint efforts, to overcome and to transcend. Peace for us means transcendence, overcoming this kind of harsh reality. But as a description of reality, I think it is very apt and very accurate. At the end of the day we are supposed to be wiser, more enlightened, and I hope also more determined to serve the cause of peace, real peace, genuine peace, not only formal peace.

As far as joint projects, joint efforts, joint actions are concerned, I think what should be taken more seriously is the question of equality, the question of equal partnership and the question of the lack of symmetry. We have to come to an agreement about what it means to be equal or unequal under these circumstances. Equality does not mean -- or does not only mean -- equal amounts of money or equal administration. It also means other things for the Palestinians. When we talk about capacity-building I am not talking about financial resources. What it means is that you have to overcome obstacles when it comes to restrictions on your movement, restrictions on your rights. That sort of asymmetry should be addressed more profoundly.

One point that I want to make on the basis of what I heard about the South African and the Irish experience, is that the more I learn about conflicts in other countries, the more I become convinced that our conflict is unique, and unique in many respects. Of course there are similarities. Of course, when it comes to conflict resolution, you have to agree about the rules of the game. But I think the Jewish experience is unique and the Palestinian experience is unique. And it is very dissimilar to the situation in South Africa and very dissimilar to the situation in Northern Ireland. These unique features of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict are not being adequately appreciated either by Israelis or by Palestinians, or even by the third parties. The third parties in this context have been labeled donors, and I think we should change that label.

My fourth point is that when we are talking about the peace process, we are talking about a controversial peace process. Not much has been said about this kind of controversy because here we are radicals from both sides, opposition from both sides.

But why do people oppose this process from both sides? Do they oppose it for the same reasons? I am not sure. Those on the Israeli side oppose the process because they think it might lead to a Palestinian state. The Palestinian opposition oppose this process because they think it will not lead to a Palestinian state. These nuances are very important because they reflect on the kind of persuasion that we should be discussing that we should be engaged in. It is a problematic peace process. It is a somewhat defective peace process. But this is the only game in town. We agree that it is the only peace process between two countries, between occupier and occupied, that is not talking about ending occupation. It is a unique case. We are talking about autonomy. We do not know anything about how final status issues are moving to be resolved. Okay, you say we agree between us about the general features or the end results of this process, but this does not represent the majority view either on the side of the Israelis or on the side of the Palestinians, as far as perceptions are concerned at least.

It is a problematic peace process and we should admit that, and we should also be ready to accept the implications of that and not to say that this is a peace process breakthrough. It has changed everything radically. It is a start. If you are an optimist you say it might lead to these results. But if you are a pessimist you deny that. And there is no evidence in the peace process or in the peace documents to support either view about the results.

And one of the defects of the peace process, as far as philosophers are concerned, is that rational discourse does not get supported by any evidence in these documents. I wanted to comment on the point that was raised that we, probably similar to the situation of South Africa, do need a truth and reconciliation committee or commission here because we need to agree about the past. We have two opposing narratives and accounts of the past, and the past haunts us both. We are looking toward the future, and I think we need to reflect on the past in order to try to rewrite the history of the Israeli-Palestine conflict because we need the kind of future which reconciles us to the other and reconciles us to the past as well. That might be an interesting project for the new historians, both Palestinians and Israelis.

A final point is that I think we have to take into consideration – and this has implications for donors as well – as for activities by Israelis and Palestinians, especially civil society structures in Palestine. Palestine is less democratic than Israel. We have to admit that. This poses challenges for Palestinian civil society groups. They probably have a different emphasis. They have to work with their Israeli counterparts in order to promote peace, but at the same time they have to work within Palestinian society in order to propagate democratic institutions, in order to instill the values of democracy or liberal democracy. The challenges are enormous, and these structures are less strong, more fragile than their Israeli counterparts. Also the pressures from the opposition, coalition, supporters, opponents, I think their unique situation should be adequately appreciated as well. At the same time, we agree that peace is not the monopoly of politicians. Or politicians are not the best makers of peace. For real peace to come, people have to be involved, and civil society structures have much to contribute in that regard. They are doing much, and they can do more in this respect.

MR. BECHET: Thank you, Said. If you have another word for donors I would be very happy, because I do not like it either. I suggested neighbors and friends.

PARTICIPANT: We have also paid with our own casualties. There are hundreds of dead people in our countries, our citizens are dead because of this conflict. At least a dozen countries around the world which have a cause in your conflict. You are not alone in this. We are a part in that completely.

MR. BECHET: And it has made petrol very expensive.

MR. ZIDANI: Partners, not donors.

MR. BECHET: You asked a question earlier, I think you meant it as a joke, when we were listening to the South African story on truth and reconciliation. Said asked me, What is more important, truth or reconciliation? I think it is a very good question. What is more important, justice or reconciliation? Is it more important to bring Mr. Pinochet back to Chile and tell the people to forget about it, or is it more important that people who lost relatives during the dictatorship feel avenged or something? It is a very good question. The whole day I think sort of had as a leitmotif these kinds of questions, this kind of dilemma.

Another very good question was raised last night by Janet Aviad: Can you have dialogue without dignity. Nobody could answer that, which probably means it is a good question. You just mentioned politicians. I am not sure I agree with that because what we have seen in South Africa -- and probably Northern Ireland. I do not know these countries so well -- but what you also see is leadership. You see people who have the courage to go beyond the usual speech, the usual demagoguery. To make peace you need strong leaders. At least one of the two should be a strong leader because only when you are very strong can you go into a new kind of logic -- which is very much what you did -- which is the end of the zero sum game. What you see with weak leaders -- and this is not a judgment on the leaders of the region, of course. I cannot do that -- but with weak leaders you never have that. Weak leaders will say what is good for me is bad for him and what is good for him is bad for me. We have to get away from that kind of logic. To do that, you need more than democracy and more than elections. What is the balance between leadership and democracy? To what extent can leaders go beyond their mandate is a very good question as well.

Finally – and that is the whole debate between Amira and many of us here – what is more important, peace or justice? We have to realize – and those of us who work more on the Palestinian side than on the Israeli side, and that is my case – that for many Palestinians – and this is not a judgment. I am not saying true or not true, but it is there – peace means accepting the status quo. That is the perception that you have. Again, I am not saying it is the right perception, but it is a perception that is there. This is why you have the description of reality that Amira gave us, and the dream and the hope of a better future. And I think it is a very good debate because it is a debate between two truths basically. You mentioned as well, Said, that philosophers probably should be better at making peace or something like that, which reminds me of a very nice short story by the Argentinian writer Jorges about two theologians who fight their whole life. The whole world is divided into two conflicting camps. It is a terrible war that lasts their whole lives. At the end they all die, of course. Both of them die. Both of them go to heaven and both of them are there with God. And the funny thing is that God cannot quite remember which one of them was saying what and vice versa. It is a beautiful story. So I hope one day we will not know who said what in meetings like this. So I would like to thank everybody here.

MS. HESS: I protest the malicious demagoguery of Hirschfeld's words by equating me actually or bringing me close to an Israeli version of Nazism.

MR. HIRSCHFELD: I protest your demagoguery. You have a very important case and a very important position and you come here and present your position, which is legitimate and important, but you present it in a way which is a direct insult to people who are here. It was said as an insult to Ron and to me. This is your right. But if you assume that you can throw dirt at us and spit at us, I will say this: you do not understand human relations.

MS. HESS: You do not know the reality in the Palestinian-occupied territories if that is your answer.

DR. HIRSCHFELD: We did not oppose and we understand the reality in the territories. We live it as you do. What you did was a direct attack on the Oslo process in a way in which we did not want to take the entire meeting to answer. I could answer you on every point you made. I could go into every point you made. This was not the subject. You raised a subject here that you were not asked to speak about, and raised it in a way that was clearly insulting, which we really did not expect and we did not react to it. If you say you have to protest my demagoguery, then protest, but accept my position on that. If you accept it or not, you have to understand that the dialogue is based on dignity and mutual respect. If you do not understand that, then you simply have to take the consequences, which are my reaction.

MS. HESS: If you feel attacked, that means you know there is something wrong with the product that was created or that has evolved, which is what you thought you created in Oslo. It is not in vain that Palestinians approach me and say that they feel what I said. All the rest that you said, okay, that is your opinion. But do not confuse the very superficial form of what Harel says or what the Israeli version of nationalism is to me. This is just as insulting, or even more. I say the reality which was created under Oslo is a very ugly reality because it has disarmed the Israeli peace forces from challenging the real problem of Israel's continuing patronizing supremacy over the Palestinians.

MR. BECHET: I think you have made your point. That was demonstrated by the fact that so many people actually quoted you during the conclusions. This should not be turned into a personal discussion between you and Yair. We all understand what the points are. I emphasized that in my own conclusions. I think it is a perfectly legitimate debate. It is not a question of who is wrong or right or who feels bad or good about the situation. This is not the point. This is a perfectly valid discussion, and probably one of the most important we have had today. So if you agree, I would like to close this session and this day. This is an honor for me. I would like to thank the three organizations who made this possible: the ECF, Al-Quds University who co-organized it, as well, the SID, and of course the FES, who made it all possible. Thanks to the stenographer and to all who have been working with us all day and enjoying this day with us.

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June 4, 1998

Israeli-Jordanian (Draft) Understandings
on the Permanent Status of Palestinian Refugees

The following is a possible set of Israeli-Jordanian understandings, which shall guide Israeli and Jordanian activities with regard to an agreed upon Israeli-Palestinian settlement of the Palestinian Refugee Problem ("PRP") in its bilateral and multilateral contexts.

1. General

   a. The Permanent Status of Palestinian Refugees, which is based on Article V of the DOP, should be discussed in the context of the establishment of a Palestinian State within agreed upon borders.

   b. Palestinian refugeeism shall be addressed as a national collective problem, as well as a problem of individuals.

   c. The Palestinian State shall be seen as the sole representative of the collective claims of Palestinian Refugees;

   d. PS shall take into consideration the special and historic role of Jordan with regard to the Palestinian Refugees under its sovereignty, which is beyond the traditional role of a Host Country. The Parties note that without prejudice to the PS of Palestinian Refugees, Jordan offered Palestinian refugees citizenship, a share in the decision making and provided services to the Palestinian camps. In addition, PS shall take into consideration the prerequisites of Palestinian Refugeeism in other Host Countries.

2. Scope - Unless agreed upon by the respective Parties, future Israeli-Palestinian PS Agreement regarding the PRP, or any provision within it, shall not affect the political status of any individual or community within the borders of the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

3. Principles for the Resolution of the PRP -

   a. Consideration in all relevant actors;

   b. Political, economic and social Stability Building;

   c. Sustainability (i.e. self-sufficient income and stability generating effects);

   d. Comprehensiveness (i.e. addressing all relevant issues);

   e. Time effectiveness;

   f. Graduality;

   g. Conclusiveness - final settlement of the PRP by a formal and final closing to the collective and individual refugee status and all relevant establishments;

   h. Reconciliation;

4. The Parties share the responsibility for the solution of the PRP based on co-operation, which is carried out in a forward-looking manner.

5. The UNRWA definition of a "Palestinian refugee" or a "refugee" shall serve as the point-of-departure for future negotiations;

6. Right of Return - The following statements shall guide the Parties with regard to the PRP:

a. Recognition in the prerequisites of the new era of peace and coexistence;

b. Realisation of the Right of Return through repatriation to the State of Palestine where Palestinian culture, heritage and national identity are enshrined.

7. International Commission for Palestinian Refugees ("ICPR") - Within the framework of a PS Agreement, an ICPR shall be established. The ICPR shall serve as the steering body of the FRPR and of the EDRP (see below Articles 10 and 11).

8. The Multilateral Working Group on Palestinian Refugees - Without prejudice to PS Agreement, the Refugee Multilateral Working Group should continue its work, specifically on humanitarian projects for improving near-term living conditions and economic capacities of Palestinian refugees.

9. Citizenship -

a. The PS of PR must include the granting of citizenship, including inter alia all personal and legal rights, to all Palestinian Refugees;

b. The solution of the PRP shall incorporate a combination of repatriation (to the Palestinian State), integration into the Host Countries, immigration to third Host Countries and limited humanitarian immigration to Israel;

c. Palestine may offer a Palestinian citizenship and issue a Palestinian Passport to Palestinian refugees according to Palestinian law insofar as these refugees do not hold other citizenship and provided that this does not contradict the legislation of other Host Countries;

10. Rehabilitation, Reparations and Compensations -

a. Palestinian refugees should be compensated for suffering and lose endured as a result of the 1948 war.

b. Fund for Rehabilitation of Palestinian Refugees ("FRPR") -

1) In order to settle the PRP, a FRPR should be established. The Fund shall manage and distribute all funds collected for this purpose.
2) Pledges for the FRPR shall be made in consideration of economic capacities.
3) The Parties call upon the international donor community to allocate the necessary funds for a comprehensive rehabilitation program of the Palestinian refugees in Palestine and in the Host Countries.
4) The funds shall be disbursed according to agreed upon principles and priorities, which include inter alia the following:
   a) Implementation of Economic Development and Rehabilitation Programs (on a country basis);
   b) Collective activities (on a community basis);
   c) Reparations (on a per capita basis);
   d) Compensations (on a claim-oriented basis).

11. Guidelines for an Economic Development and Rehabilitation Program ("EDRP")

a. The rehabilitation of the PR shall be based on comprehensive Economic, social and personal Development and Rehabilitation Programs ("EDRP"s), which shall be prepared in co-operation and co-ordination with the international donor community.

b. The gradual elimination of the formal aspects of Palestinian Refugeeism shall be seen as integral to the EDRPs.

12. Conclusiveness -

a. The Parties shall agree on a Settlement of Claims upon the implementation of a PS Agreement regarding the PPR;

b. The Parties shall advocate the revocation of all UNRs, which are related to Palestinian Refugeeism including inter alia UNR 194;

c. All related Palestinian and international organisations shall be dissolved.

The end.

FEBRUARY 1997

DRAFT
NON-PAPER

WORKING PRINCIPLES FOR THE STOCKHOLM BRAINSTORMING GROUP FOR A SOLUTION OF THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE PROBLEM WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF AN ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PERMANENT STATUS PEACE AGREEMENT

1. Guiding Principles :

The Stockholm group will be guided in its ~~considerations~~ deliberations by the following considerations ;

1.1 A solution to the Palestinian refugee problem implies in its historical significance, not merely a move towards Israeli-Palestinian peace-making, ~~rather will and must~~ but a contribution towards peace consolidation and ~~towards~~ an irreversible end of the Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Arab conflict.

1.2 In order to achieve an adequate and visible solution to the Palestinian refugee problem all parties, including the Government of Palestine, Government of Israel, and the Donor Community will have to make an extraordinary effort to raise the necessary funds to make possible such a solution. Accordingly, the basic understandings reached in this regard have to satisfy all parties that an end to the conflict is being realised, and an effective process of peace consolidation will be implemented.

1.3 A solution ~~of~~ to the refugee problem ~~will have to contain~~ should include the following elements ;

1.3.1 A complete rehabilitation of the refugee camps, and the full absorption and integration of the refugees into Palestinian society. This entails overcoming the political, socio-economic, socio-cultural, and psychological characteristics of the refugee ~~complex~~ condition.

1.3.2 Accordingly, the refugee rehabilitation ~~has to create~~ should generate a major move towards economic growth and regional economic cooperation.

1.3.3 A solution ~~of~~ to the refugee problem has to address the issue of compensation, and to settle once and for all the question of abandoned property and assets, including an equitable settlement of the property rights of Jews, who left or had to leave their countries of residence in the Arab world as a result of the Israeli-Arab war of 1947-9.
A mechanism for lump-sum payments and individual compensation will be developed.

??? Do you assume we can get the active support of, say, Iraq, for such an effort? Isn't this a complicating factor that may doom the entire process?

1.4 In developing ~~a~~ workplan ~~for the solution of the Palestinian refugee problem~~ two major considerations, ~~one political and psychological, the other economic~~, have to be taken into account ;

1.4.1 The political / psychological factor : dealing with the refugee problem in itself ~~contains the potential to~~ generate significant political dangers, as it tends to open old wounds and to mobilise emotions that may easily be directed towards a radicalisation of positions and activities and could well be exploited by militant groups ~~and having a~~ serious destabilising effect. Consequently the envisaged workplan has to provide for practical measures on the ground, that will have a stabilising ~~and not opposite~~ effect, and will create confidence ~~amongst the~~ Israeli public and the Donor Community necessary for realising the required financing.

1.4.2 The economic factor : the present State of Israel and the future State of Palestine stand out in their ability to combine high rates of population growth with impressive economic growth. ~~Hence~~ the area of British Mandatory Palestine is ~~in many ways~~ already ~~today, and will in the coming decades increasingly become~~, one of the most densely populated areas in the world.
~~Accordingly~~ issues of spatial planning and their impact on the pricing of land, will have a major effect on the costs, effectiveness, and practicalities of any refugee rehabilitation project. ~~It has to be understood that the~~ growth in population in both Israel and Palestine ~~simultaneously~~ creates both a danger of destabilisation and an opportunity for sustained economic growth and development. Sound policy planning demands the introduction of policies designed to guarantee ~~an economic~~ win-win situation for both sides.
Within Israel a ~~large~~ team of professionals have prepared a development plan for Israel in the year 2020. There ~~exists a need to conduct~~ a parallel planning activity on the Palestinian side, ~~whilst at the same time~~ coordinating the approaches and developing complimentary plans. ~~It is evident that~~ the process of refugee rehabilitation, absorption, and integration must be combined with a program of social and economic development, ~~and has~~ to be an integral part of a joint Israeli-Palestinian development plan for 2020.

2. Developing a Working Plan for the Refugee Problem :

2.1 Prepatory Stage :
During the prepatory stage three major tasks have to be achieved:

2.1.1 Agreement has to be reached on the principle guidelines for the rehabilitation, compensation, disbursement of ~~monies~~ funds ..etc.

2.1.2 Prepatory studies should be conducted regarding 2020 - a socio-economic and physical planning program; specific local rehabilitation projects [in the area South-West of Gaza in current Israeli territory and adjacent Egyptian territory], studies on defining financial needs and instruments for disbursement; on creating social institutions for rehabilitation, and necessary institutions for regional cooperation.

2.1.3 The necessary structure and working mechanism of ICPR have to be prepared.

2.1.4 The prepatory stage has to end with a comprehensive working plan and an understanding of the obligations and duties of each side. It is assumed that the prepatory stage will continue for ~~a duration of~~ two years. During this time ~~it is not anticipated that a comprehensive, agreed upon refugee rehabilitation plan will be carried out. However it is anticipated that~~ agreed upon, visible, pilot projects for rehabilitation will be implemented, both to build confidence within the Palestinian public, and to act as models in preparing a comprehensive approach. These activities will be continued through stage 1.

2.2 Stage One - Rehabilitation and Confidence-Building :

2.2.1 ICPR will be established and will create a mechanism to study private property demands.

you are not worried of the open language?

2.2.2 In order to create confidence and stability ICPR will implement a plan encouraging the emigration, particularly of the Lebanese refugee community and of other refugees so interested, to the USA, Canada, Australia, and other countries. The American legal system provides the necessary mechanism ~~to carry out~~ for such a major move, and other OECD states will be asked to develop parallel programs. It is proposed that these programs should be prepared confidentially, should be carried out swiftly, and should include meaningful numbers of refugees.

not realistic. These are legislative processes.

2.2.3 The area South-West of Gaza and ~~in~~ adjacent Egyptian territory will be developed as a model program to promote an integrated plan of economic development and refugee re-absorption.

for

2.2.4 As it is understood that the process of refugee rehabilitation may take a prolonged period of time to complete, measures for the implementation of gradual change and social rehabilitation have to be guaranteed. In practice this means that the refugee population which has not been rehabilitated will continue to receive welfare services from UNRWA, whilst a trilateral agreement outlining the transfer of gradual responsibilities will have to be signed and implemented between ICPR, UNRWA, and the Government of Palestine. ~~Evidently~~ UNRWA and ICPR will coordinate activities with other host governments as appropriate.

2.2.5 At this stage ICPR together with the Governments of Jordan and Syria will negotiate and develop a rehabilitation and compensation program for the Palestinian refugee population living in these countries. ~~Also in this instance,~~ rehabilitation programs will be part of a broader economic development and regional cooperation concept, and compensation payments from the Government of Israel to these refugee populations will be used for the promotion of such development and cooperation initiatives.

relevant

2.2.6 The compensation ~~monies~~ funds paid by the Government of Israel for abandoned property and asset claims will be paid in a lump-sum to ICPR and disbursed by ICPR

in a lump-sum arrangements to the Government of Palestine, and in certain cases also to the Governments of Jordan and Syria [for ~~compensation payments to~~ their respective Palestinian refugees ~~residing in the relevant states~~ communities]. ICPR together with the Government of Palestine and the other Governments will establish criteria enabling Palestinian citizens to obtain ~~their~~ compensation payments in kind, in the form of land rights and concessions for private economic enterprise that will be bestowed upon them by the Government of Palestine and the other Governments.

2.2.7 It is anticipated that stage one will continue for three years.

2.3 Stage Two :

2.3.1 Stage two should last for ten-twelve years and involve a comprehensive program for refugee rehabilitation activities.

2.4 Stage Three :

2.4.1 Stage three should last for five years and should be seen as a corrective phase to bring before ICPR unsatisfied clients and to develop and implement a final conclusion of the refugee rehabilitation and compensation work.

you will need a corrective mechanism parallel to phase II - many will not be able to wait 10+5 years for a correction.

3. End-Notes :

3.1 It is understood that in the process of refugee rehabilitation, the refugees will obtain full and equal citizenship either in the State of Palestine, ~~or~~ in third countries to which they emigrate, or in existing countries of residence. In cases of family reunification, these Palestinian refugees will be granted Israeli citizenship.

3.2 It is understood that ICPR's activities will be directed by a trilateral Steering Committee to include the Government of Palestine, the government of Israel, and the Government of Sweden - representing the Donor Community.

3.3 It is also understood that in cases of refugee rehabilitation in, or emigration from, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, special trilateral Steering Committees will be established to be composed of the relevant Government, the Government of Israel, and the Government of Sweden - representing the Donor Community.

"BEILIN-EITAN AGREEMENT"

THE NATIONAL AGREEMENT REGARDING THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE PERMANENT SETTLEMENT WITH THE PALESTINIANS
22.1.97

The central objective of the Zionist movement, from the day of its founding, was the establishment of sovereign state in the Land of Israel. The Jewish state was established in 1948, but it was not until 1977 that the first Arab state, Egypt, recognized and later signed a peace treaty with the State of Israel.

The Camp David Agreements, the Oslo Accords, the Mutual Recognition between the Israeli government and the PLO and the projects of the settlements in the territories under Israeli control since 1967 have created a reality from which none of the involved parties can escape.

Both danger and opportunity are concealed in the dialogue between the Israeli and Palestinian leadership. The last two Israeli governments made the strategic decision to take on calculated risks with the goal of pursuing every possible chance for attaining peace and a relationship of good neighbors between Jews and Arabs in the Land of Israel.

Against the backdrop of a readiness to find a path of historic compromise between Jews and Arabs, a bitter controversy has developed within the Jewish nation about its price: giving up parts of the homeland.

In addition to the prevalent ideological conflict, there are bitter differences of opinion about the degree of security risk that it is acceptable to assume given the risks and threats from the Arab side. There are those who are suspicious that a secure peace is nothing but an illusion, a deceptive vision that will lead Israel into a trap from which it will escape, if at all only at a heavy price of blood. Opposing them are those who claim fervently that the process has potential and that a lasting peace is essential to ensure the security of the State of Israel for generations.

This grave political polarization reached its climax towards the end of 1995. In September the Israeli government signed the Oslo II agreement, which was understood to be a step towards the transfer of the territories of the West Bank to the Palestinians. Protest demonstrations intensified and many saw the signing of this accord as fundamental heresy. A few weeks later Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, of blessed memory, was assassinated for political reasons.
Despite the unequivocal condemnation of the murder and the murderer by the entire senior political leadership in Israel, there were more than a few people who identified with the nefarious act and in their identification made clear that there existed a real danger of civil war. As if we had not already learned the historical lesson of what was bound to happen if we adopted the use of terror as a tool of internal political struggle between Jews and other Jews, while the enemy was storming at our gates...

Members of Knesset from the Likud-Gesher-Tzomet faction and from the Labor faction came together with the common objective of clarifying the areas of agreement and disagreement between them regarding the future negotiations with the Palestinians on permanent status. Following a series of discussions and clarifications they have arrived at the conclusion that it is possible to reach a national consensus on the basis of the following three principles:

A. It is necessary to continue the dialogue with the Palestinian representatives and to pursue exhaustively every opportunity to achieve a permanent agreement with them. In the framework of such an agreement it is necessary to permit the establishment of a Palestinian entity whose status will be determined in negotiations between the parties and the limits on the sovereignty of which will be discussed in the articles below.
B. Under conditions of peace and following the achievement of an agreement on the issue of the permanent settlement, the State of Israel must preserve its ability to prevent any attack or risk of an attack on its territorial integrity, the security of its citizens and their property and on its vital interests in Israel and in the world.
C. No agreement signed by the Israeli government can include a commitment to uproot Jewish settlements in the Western Land of Israel nor will any agreement compromise the rights of the residents to keep their Israeli citizenship and their ties as individuals and as a community with the State of Israel.

A. BORDERS

The position of Israel on all matters concerning the question of borders will be based on the following principles:

1. There will be no return to the 1967 borders.
2. The majority of settlers will live on their settlement under Israeli sovereignty, in order to preserve territorial continuity between the settlements and the State of Israel.
3. The residents of the Israeli settlements that will exist outside of the area that will be annexed by the State of Israel will receive special, agreed upon, arrangements within the framework of which their Israeli citizenship and their ties with the State of Israel, as individuals and as a community, will be preserved. Thus their right of free and safe passage to the territories under full Israeli sovereignty will be preserved.
4. The Jordan Valley will be a special security zone and Israeli army forces will be deployed along the Jordan. The residents of the area will be permitted to remain where they are, according to article 3, above. Another version insists upon an Israeli sovereignty over the Jordan valley.

B. SECURITY COMPONENTS

1. The Palestinian entity will be demilitarized and it will have no army.
2. The Jordan River will be the security border of Israel. Secure crossing conditions will be regulated by IDF forces in proportion to need and to the changing

conditions within the Palestinian entity, effecting the estimated need for the IDF on the borders.

3. The Palestinian entity will establish a strong police force to meet the needs of internal security.
4. No foreign army may be stationed within the boundaries of the Palestinian entity.
5. The security forces of Israel and the Palestinian entity will work to deter and foil acts of terrorism aimed against Jews and Arabs.
6. The Palestinian entity will not sign any military agreement or any other agreement that includes a threat to the territorial integrity of the State of Israel, the security of its citizens or the integrity of their property. It will not sign any agreement regarding boycott or any other illegal steps against the Israeli economy nor any agreement involving negative propaganda against the State of Israel or against the Jewish people.
7. The commitment of the two parties to the agreement regarding the permanent settlements will be strengthened by the fulfillment of all of their other commitments.
8. Any basic violation of the commitments presented in this section will allow the violated party to regard the whole agreement as annulled and will grant the assailed the right to act freely to right the violations and to prevent further violations.

C. STATUS OF THE PALESTINIAN ENTITY AND LIMITS ON ITS SOVEREIGNTY

determination will be recognized. According to an alternative opinion it will be regarded as an enlarged autonomy, and according to another opinion, as a state.

D. JERUSALEM

1. Jerusalem, the capital of Israel, with its existing municipal borders, will be a single unified city within sovereign Israel.
2. The Palestinians will recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and Israel will recognize the governing center of the Palestinian entity which will be within the borders of the entity and outside the existing municipal borders of Jerusalem.
3. Muslim and Christian holy places in Jerusalem will be granted special status.
4. Within the framework of the municipal government the Palestinian residents of Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem will receive a status that will allow them to share in the responsibility of the administration of their lives in the city.

E. REFUGEES

1. The right of the State of Israel to prevent the entry of Palestinian refugees into its sovereign territory will be recognized.
2. The administration of the entrance of refugees into the Palestinian entity and the limits to that entry will be decided upon during the negotiations of the permanent settlement, within the larger discussion of Israel's security issues.
3. An international organization will be founded, in which Israel will play an important role, with the goal of financing any carrying out projects for compensation and rehabilitation of the refugees in their places. The organization

will also address Israeli claims for reparations for Jewish refugees from Arab countries.

4. Israel and the Palestinian entity, each within its own boundaries, will rehabilitate the refugees on the basis of the disengagement of the UNRWA, the repealing of the refugee status and the arrangement of housing and employment and housing with international aid. (For Israel this refers to the Shoafat and Kalandia refugee camps in Jerusalem.)
5. Israel will continue its policy of family reunification on the basis of existing criteria.

F. WATER

The agreement on the issue of water usage, as it was signed in the framework of the interim agreement, will remain in effect. The water authorities of Israel and the Palestinians will establish shared control over its usage.

Any future change of anything related to the issue of division of water, modes of production or means of protection of water purity must be made with the agreement of both parties. In the absence of such an agreement the status quo will remain.

Israel and the Palestinian entity will act together all matters concerning desalination and regional water enterprises.

G. ECONOMY AND TRADE

The economic sphere is one of the cornerstones in the relationship between Israel and the Palestinian entity, with the goal of strengthening their interests in achieving a just, lasting and comprehensive peace. The two parties will cooperate in this arena in order to create a solid economic basis for these relations, which will be grounded in the different economic spheres on the values of mutual respect of each party for the economic interests of the other, mutuality, justice and protection. The parties will invite the Kingdom of Jordan to participate in this economic cooperation.

H. EDUCATION, CULTURE AND GOOD NEIGHBORS

The Israeli leadership and the Palestinian leadership must create a fitting environment for the development of peaceful relations between Jew and Palestinians. It is necessary to encourage educational initiatives, cultural connections and to foster models of Jewish-Arab cooperation as a basis for relations as good neighbors. A true peace between Jews and Arabs in the Land of Israel will be attained when both of the populations will accept the existence of its counterpart on a basis of mutuality and equality.

I. THE INTERIM AGREEMENT AND THE PERMANENT SETTLEMENT

1. There will be a special effort to conclude the talks of the issue of the permanent settlement and especially to finalize the borders between Israel and the Palestinian entity before the intended date for further redeployment.
2. If the borders are not finalized before the third redeployment, Israel will redeploy so that up to 50% of the West Bank will be designated as territories *A* and *B*.

25.12.96

אל: שר האוצר
מאתך נמרוד נוביק

הנדון: <u>מפגש בבית שגריר הקהילה</u>

נכבדי;

1. במוצ״ש, 11 לינואר (אחרי המבול...) בשעה 20:00 מקיים שגריר הקהילה א/ע מצומצמת בביתו לכבוד Eberhard Rhein, מי שהיה מנכ״ל המזה״ת והים התיכון בקהילה האירופית.

2. Rhein היה ונותר ידיד ושותף פעיל בתכניות לשת״פ כלכלי באזורנו (עם דגש על ישראל והפלסטינים) הממומנות ע״י הקהילה.

3. ברם, חשיבותו של הערב חורגת מעבר לאורח הכבוד. זו יכולה להיות הזדמנות חשובה ונינוחה עבורך לשוחח עם השרים הפלסטינים הרלבנטיים על כל נושא שתמצא לנכון -- כולל אפשרות חידוש יוזמת William & Marry.

4. המשתתפים האחרים, נכון להיום, הם:
   - מאהר אל קורד
   - מאהר אל מסרי
   - נאששאשיבי (מתנה השתתפותו בהשתתפותך)
   - יוסי ביילין (לא ודאי)
   - יאיר הירשפלד
   - רון פונדק
   - החי״מ.

5. נשמח להוסיף לרשימה אנשים נוספים שלדעתך חשוב שיקחו חלק בדיון.

6. ברגע שיובהר כי ביכולתך/בכוונתך לקחת חלק, תישלח ההזמנה הרשמית משגריר הקהילה.

בתודה ובברכה,

נמרוד.

h. Ada Ben

i- Eyal Vul

j. P2P —

4. Industrial Park

√. Park 4

11/1 wed —

Dear
ARNON

15/7/96

Non-Paper;
Points for Discussion
Yossi Beilin, Yair Hirschfeld, Ron Pundik and Michael de Hond.

I. Policy Aims:

1. Stabilization of Peace Process throughout the Middle East;
2. Encouragement of Economic Cooperation and Development;
3. Enhancement of popular support for peace process.
4. Development of coordinated US-EU-Regional policy strategies.

II. _Proposed Strategy should be based on Four Pillars:

1. First Pillar: Stabilization of Israeli-Palestinian relations and promotion of Final Status negotiations;

2. Second Pillar: Development of Regional Cooperation; on the bi-, the tri-, the quadri- and the multilateral levels;

3. Third Pillar: Promotion of Stability and Peace Negotiations with Syria and Lebanon;

4. Fourth Pillar: Development of US-European-GCC Regional Plan for the Stabilization of the Gulf Area.

III. Proposed Activities:

A. Coordinated Track One and Track Two Activities:

Proposed ECF-Dutch Cooperation in Support of the Continuing Official Quadrilateral Working Framework

1. An Overview:

In preparation of the Dutch Presidency of the EU, a major effort shall be undertaken to implement Annex III of the Israeli-Palestinian DOP of September 13, 1993.

Our working assumption is that the implementation of all items of Annex III will not be controversial at all and shall be welcome by the Government of Israel, as well as the PA as a confidence building and stability-promoting measure. Moreover, two other

important advantages may be achieved: First, a bilateral Israeli-Palestinian understanding on the implementation of various items on Annex III (e.g. communication, elecricity, energy, trade, etc.) will pave the way for various tri-, quadri- and multilateral understandings, enabling the PA to play a leading regional role and obtain the necessary political reward. Second, various other donor nations in Europe, the USA and Japan are, or may be involved in promoting Annex III projects, a fact that necessitates (and enables) a strong Dutch leadership role in pursueing an integrated European policy and coordinating these policies with the US and the Japanese government.

We are convinced that ECF, being "the heart and the spirit" of the quadrilateral working framework, and also due to its relations with the Government of Israel, the PA and other Middle Eastern governments, will be an essential partner for the Government of the Netherlands, in guaranteeing the effective implementation of this policy concept.

2. Proposed Practical Steps:

After having achieved a first understanding in principle between the Dutch Government, ECF and its Palestinian counterpart (Nabil Shaath) a joint working program shall be agreed upon, comprising of:

a) small workshops and preparation of working papers:

i. workshop of the Harvard Group to prepare a "Water Development Plan" and proposals for the "equitable utilization of joint water resources" as in Annex III/point one.

ii. a workshop for electricity and energy to prepare for an "Electricity Development Program" and an "Energy Development Program" as in Annex III/point two and three. (Ejlenberg is preparing a first presentation for the Cairo Summit).

iii. a workshop for cooperation in the field of finance to prepare a "Financial Development and Action Program" (or parts of it) (ECF,DATA and Horizon are preparing a conference on these matters in Germany, in order to finalize the Clingendael-Naumann project; Mees Pierson are preparing for the PA a proposal for the establishment of a Palestinian Development Bank). (as in Annex III, point 4).

iv. a workshop of IFRI for transport and communications, to prepare "a program, which will define guidelines for the establihsment of a Gaza Sea Port Area, and will provide for the establishing of transport and communications lines to and from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to Israel and to other countries...and will provide for carrying out the necessary construction of roads, railways, communications lines,etc.", as in Annex III, point 5.

v. a workshop of the quadrilateral Harvard Porter team to present guidelines for a "Trade Promotion Program, which will encourage local, regional and inter-regional trade" and for "Industrial Development Programs, (which will provide for the establishment of joint Israeli-Palestinian Research and Development Centers, will promote Palestinian-Israeli joint ventures, and provide guidelines for cooperation in the textile, food, pharmaceutical, electronics, diamonds, computer and science-based industries"), as in Annex III, points 6 and 7.

vi. a working paper defining guidelines for a "program for cooperation in, and regulation of, labor relations and cooperation in social welfare issues", as in ANNEX III, point 8 (along the lines of the ECF-PCH cooperation. The Joint Distribution Committee and Brookdale could be asked to prepare a paper like this in cooperation with ECF and PCH).

vii. A working paper defining guidelines for a "Human Resources Development and Cooperation Plan" to be prepared by ECF, Mashav together with appropriate Palestinian NGO, as in Annex III, point 9.

viii. A working paper defining guidelines for "an Environmental Protection Plan, providing for joint and/or coordinated measures in this sphere", as in Annex III, point 10.

ix. A working paper defining guidelines for a "program for developing coordination and cooperation in the field of communication and media".

b) A Concluding Conference

to be held in The Hague in May 1997, in order to conclude the Dutch Presidency of the EU and provide for the full regionally and internationally coordinated implementation of Annex III.

3. The Proposed ECF Input

ECF will play a leading role in
a) preparing the workshops;
b) other working papers;
c) the Concluding Conference;

ECF will fully cooperate in mobilising official Israeli government support; regional and international support.

ECF should prepare a PR campaign

In order to cover ECF costs, the following steps should be taken:

a. For the preparation of the workshop defining a "Water Development Plan", a defined appropriate slice of the Harvard Water Project will be allocated to ECF and its Palestinian partner.

b. For the preparation of a workshop on Electricity and Energy, the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs shall finance a local workshop, to be led by Ejlenberg (Mees Pierson); ECF will herefrom obtain an appropriate Consultancy fee;

c. For the preparation of a workshop on Financial Cooperation; ECF,DATA and Horizon can carry the costs together with the Naumann-Clingendael budgets. Possibly coordination with the German Govt. will be necessary.

d. For the preparation of a workshop on transport and communications an effort will be made to obtain financing from the French Government and the World Bank. ECF and DATA will prepare a detailed budget proposal.

e. The workshops regarding guidelines on items 5,6 and 7 of Annex IIi are anyhow part of the Porter-project working program. In order to guarantee the success of the Porter project, as well as the preparation of these workshops, ECF will be allocated the budget of the Israeli team of the Porter project and will together with Porter and Weinberg oversee its work.

f. For the preparation of a working paper regarding item 8 of Annex III, the existing ECF-PCH Cooperation Project will result in various guideline proposals that could be incorporated; the Joint Distri. Comm, could be asked to second two of its permanent staff members to do further work (on Joint budget); if necessary the Swedish Govt. could be asked for additional funding.

g. For the preparation of a working paper regarding item 9 a small working group of Mashav, ECF, and the PA (Shaath) could be established; with no costs.

h. For the preparation of a working paper regarding item 10, a small Dutch-Israeli-Palestinian working group of recipients of Dutch environmental project funding, could be established, with no costs.

i. For the preparation of a working paper regarding item 11, an Israeli-Palestinian working group should be established. Funding herefore could be asked for from the EU.

B. Coordinated Track Two Activities
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1. Within the existing track two set up, ECF and the Arab Studies Society shall prepare a working Program for Jerusalem.

2. A track-two approach for promoting and preparing an Israeli-Syrian, and an Israeli-Lebanese peace agreement shall be developed.

   Here our work should deal with three (seemingly) independent issues:

   a) Preparing guidelines for a coordinated EU-US approach in favour of the renewal of the "Damascus Coalition" (Egypt, Syria and the the GCC States) to be coordinated with pre-emptive measures against the creation of a Northern "negation front" (Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Iran);
   b) Preparing guidelines to asure progress in Israeli-Syrian and Israeli-Lebanese negotiations during the present government;
   c) preparing a blueprint for a breakthrough.

3. Within a track two set up (to be decided upon) to enable
   a) a continued Israeli-Gulf states (Oman, Qatar, Bahrein) dialogue;
   b) the preparation of coordinated EU-US policy concept regarding the maintenance of stability in the Gulf.

C. Separate Non-Coordinated Action
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A monitoring mechanism for publicly effective "Peace Watch-Activities" should be established.

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30.6.96

הנדון: עדכון מקהיר

להלן עיקרי שיחת לילה ממושכת (27/6) עם ד"ר אוסמה אלבז (במהלכה התקשר אל הנשיא, עדכן אותו במקצת הדברים וקיבל אישורו והנחיותיו לנושא האופרטיבי - ראה 15 # להלן):

רקע

1. בניגוד למיוחס לאיש, אוסמה מייצג את האסכולה החיובית מבחינתנו בקהיר. בניגוד לשה"ח מוסא הרואה בישראל גורם מתחרה במעמדה של מצרים באזור ולכן, מנסה לנהל את יחסיהם עמנו כ"משחק שסיכומו אפס", הרי שאוסמה הוא מטיף מובהק לשת"פ עמנו מתוך תפיסת עולם אסטרטגית הרואה מתאם אינטרסים לא מבוטל בין שתי המדינות (בלשונו: "אם ישראל מרויחה 6 וכתוצאה מכך מצרים מרויחה 3 - כבר היה כדאי").

2. האיש, שהחל דרכו לפני למעלה מעשרים שנה במסלול עויין מובהק לישראל ואוהד ביותר לפלסטינים, מהווה מזה למעלה מעשור שנים את המטיף העיקרי לתאום ושת"פ עם ישראל ולבוטה בין המטיפים לערפאת ולאש"פ ללכת במסלול התמתנות, התנערות מהטרור ומלחמה בו, ושלום עם ישראל, כל זאת תוך השענות על אמינותו רבת השנים כמגן הענין הפלסטיני.

3. מכאן גם דאגתו -- הבולטת, כמובן יותר מזו של מוסא -- מפני קפאון בתהליך אשר יציגו כחסיד שוטה של שת"פ עם ישראל נוקשה.

4. תחרות "משיכת החבל" בינו לבין מוסא סביב אוזנו של הנשיא נמשכת ותימשך. במהלכה, זכה מוסא "בנקודות" כאשר עקב פריצות הדרך של השנים האחרונות מצרים איבדה את מעמדה היחודי כצינור הקשר של ישראל לעולם הערבי ובהעדר תפקיד חדש ביססה מרכזיותה בעולם הערבי על הובלת מהלכים עויינים (NPT) כגישת עמרו מוסא.

תמונת מצב

5. מאז פגישתי הקודמת עם אוסמה (ראה דיווח אליך מיום 5.6.96) נראה שאנחנו נגררים שוב לתסמונת "תמונת הראי" אשר איפיינה את היחסים בתקופות אחרות: מתוך חשדנות הדדית, שני הצדדים מיחסים זה לזה יותר ציניות, נוקשות, עורמה וכוונות זדון ממה שמוצדק. שני הצדדים מייחסים את הפרשנות המחמירה ביותר האפשרית להצהרות הצד שכנגד -- הכל בהעדר צינורות הידברות ובדיקה אינטימיים, בעלי יכולת של "זמן אמת", אשר יכולים למנוע חלק ניכר מההצהרות והצהרות הנגד.

6. הדברים מתייחסים במידה שווה לתגובות הצד השני לקוי היסוד של הממשלה כמו לתגובותינו להחלטות פסגת קהיר (ראה להלן).

7. כתוצאה, אוסמה חרד להידרדרות בלתי מבוקרת, ומכאן המסר האופרטיבי לראה"מ להלן (15 #).

לו"ז/Dead Line/הצהרות

8. אוסמה דחה על הסף את הטענה כי הציב אולטימטום (6-8 שבועות) להבהרת עמדות ומדיניות ראה"מ. לדבריו, "רק מטומטם יכול להציב dead lines".
לטענתו, כאשר ביטא את קריאת מובראק שלא לשפוט את הממשלה על סמך התבטאויות ראשוניות אלא להמתין להבהרת עמדותיה, נשאל ע"י העתונאים כמה זמן יקח עד שמצרים תקבל הבהרות כאלה. על כך השיב "6-8 שבועות" בהתייחסו ללו"ז נסיעת ראה"מ לארה"ב וביקורו במצרים המתוכנן מיד אח"כ. "ביטאתי הערכה ולא שום אולטימטום".

9. לדבריו, ברור להם לחלוטין -- וזו עמדת הנשיא -- כי תהליך לימוד הנושאים וגיבוש החלופות המדיניות יצריך מספר חדשים. "מאחר וממילא ארה"ב עסוקה בעצמה עד נובמבר, הרי ששה חודשים הם פרק הזמן ההוגן והריאלי". הנשיא חוזר וקורא לעולם הערבי "not to prejudge" את הממשל החדש בישראל בטרם יהיה הסיפק בידו לקבוע מדיניות עצמאית.

10. כתוצאה, הם מבינים כי ראה"מ בביקורו אצלם, לא יוכל עדיין להציג מדיניות מגובשת ותקוותם/ציפייתם כי הצהרותיו - בקוים כלליים -- יקרינו מחויבות לשלום, לתהליך מדיני, לפשרה הסטורית וכד' - כל אותם ביטויים מרגיעים ויוצרי אוירה אותם הזכיר בפגישתנו הקודמת (ועליהם דיווחתי לך במפורט).

סוריה

11. לטענתו, הם שומעים מכל עבר -- ומעבירים לסורים -- כי ראה"מ הוא אדם מציאותי ופרגמטי הרואה עצמו כראה"מ ליותר מכהונה אחת ובודאי שלא ילך במסלול התרסקות אלקטורלי במודל הסרבנות של שמיר. עם זאת הסורים -- וגם אחרים בעולם הערבי -- "עצבניים ומגיבים בצורה לא אחראית על כל מילה נאמרת".

12. תקוותם כי ישמעו מראה"מ מספיק הבעות תקווה כלליות ומחוייבות לתהליך, פתיחות לצרכי ורגישויות צדדים אחרים והמנעות מסגירת דלתות, כדי להעביר לסורים (ולאחרים) ולהרגיעם עד שתתברר המדיניות בפועל.

13. אוסמה חזר על דבריו מהפגישה הקודמת כי מובראק והוא עצמו מצדיקים לחלוטין את עמדת ראה"מ מול סוריה בהקשרי הטרור: "עמדה תקיפה התובעת מסוריה לבחור בין תמיכה בטרור לבין שלום היא נכונה, הגיונית, צודקת ואף אינה עומדת בסתירה לנכונות להתדיין עמה באם תיבחר בשלום".

טק"ק סקאד

14. [מאוד אודה לך באם תוכל לבדוק עבורי אמינות טענותיו העובדתיות בהקשר זה, כלהלן:]
א. הופתע מההתרגשות סביב הנושא ובמיוחד מהעובדה שפרשן אחראי ומנוסה כמו זאב שיף העניק דרמטיזציה ל"סיפור שאינו סיפור" (הוא שוקל להתקשר אל 'ידידו' זאב שיף כדי להביע תמיהתו ולנסות להבין המניעים).
ב. לטענתו, אין מדובר ב"עיסקה סיבובית משולשת שנועדה לעקוף בקרה אמריקאית" אלא בתכנית רב שנתית שהחלה בשנת 1984 של ריענון והשבחה תקופתיים של טילי סקאד מיושנים - ועד היום איש לא נזעק. מאחר והרוסים -- הספקים עד כה -- סגרו את הקו הרלבנטי, מצרים פנתה אל צפון קוריאה. עם זאת, התכנית היא אותה התכנית, המודל (המיושן) אותו מודל, והטווח אותו טווח.

ג. לדבריו מדובר בטווח של 300 מייל אשר אינו מאיים על ישראל אלא אם הטילים יוצבו בסיני, תוך הפרת הסכם השלום. לדבריו, אם יוכח כי הציבו ולו טיל אחד בסיני, תהיה הצדקה לסערה. טען כי מצרים לא עשתה זאת ואינה נערכת לכך כלל. הטילים מוצבים ויוצבו בלב מצרים - ורק שם.

ד. "לשם כך נפר את הסכם השלום? נסכן את כל מה שהשגנו? כל הפניית המשאבים לכלכלה, הזמנת משקיעים מחו"ל, תכניות פיתוח סיני - הכל ילך לעזאזל?", "אנחנו סדאם חוסיין? נסכן 10-15 ישראלים במטח טילים כדי לחטוף מלחמה? כדי להתמודד עם טילי יריחו ועם ח"א הישראלי?"

<u>ועידת הפיסגה</u>

15. הצטערו מאוד על התגובה הצוננת - עד - עויינת לפסגה והחלטותיה:

א. "הנשיא היה גאה במיוחד בעובדה שכל הנוכחים -- כולל קדאפי -- קיבלו דרישתו להסיר הסתייגויותיהם מהחלטות הסיכום" (אוסמה טוען שהיה אחראי אישית לסילוק ההסתייגויות הלוביות).

ב. "בהחלטות לא היו יותר תנאים מוקדמים מאשר בקוי היסוד של ממשלת נתניהו, לכן מן הראוי היה למקד תשומת הלב לא בסעיפים המבטאים תמיכה בעמדות הפתיחה של הצדדים הרלבנטיים למו"מ אלא בלב הסיכום ובהישג העיקרי: קונצנזוס לשלום".

ג. זכורה להם הגישה הישראלית המוטרדת מכל התכנסות בין-ערבית משום הנטיה ההסטורית "to gang up on Israel" ולהתכנס סביב המכנה המשותף הנמוך ביותר.
"אם לראשונה בהסטוריה ועידת פסגה כל-ערבית (למעט עיראק) מאמצת את השלום עם ישראל כבחירה אסטרטגית, אם זה המכנה המשותף הנמוך ביותר בעולם הערבי של היום הרי שהגיעו ימות משיח!"

ד. מצרים מגבשת מחדש מעמדה כגורם המוביל לכיוון המתינות והשלום באזורנו - מן הראוי לעודד אותה במגמה חיובית זו. "לישראל ולמצרים יש רק מה להרוויח משת"פ ותאום בהקשרי השלום. תאום כזה יקשה על מחרחרי הסכסוך לתקוע טריז בינינו".

<u>הצעד הבא</u>

15. אוסמה מיצר של סדרת הצהרות והצהרות נגד תפוזות ובלתי מוצלחות בשני הצדדים. ברור לו כי יש לעשות מעשה כדי לבלום מגמה זו ובמהלך השיחה הוא קיבל מנדט מהנשיא לרעיון קונקרטי שהעלה אשר ביקשני להציג בפני ראה"מ אישית.

עד כאן,

נמרוד.

<u>נ.ב.</u>
אוסמה ניצל את הפגישה כדי לחזור ולהדגיש תמיכת הנשיא בפרוייקט **MIDOR** (בית הזיקוק הישראלי-מצרי המשותף באלכסנדריה; הפרוייקט "שלי" בהיקף של למעלה ממליארד דולר!) וחזר באופן רשמי על החלטת ממשלת מצרים לעלית מדרגה דרמטית בתמיכתה בפרוייקט (שהייתה מרשימה ממילא) בהיקף 200 מליון דולר (!). דומני כי להחלטה זו, שהתקבלה אחרי הבחירות בארץ, יש משמעויות מעבר לתרומה הקונקרטית לפרוייקט. יתר על כן, מאחר והנשיא מובראק מעוניין להעניק בולטות בילטרלית ובינלאומית לטקס הנחת אבן הפינה (אוקטובר?) אני מניח שיבקש להזמין את ראה"מ לארוע.

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IGCC INSTITUTE ON GLOBAL CONFLICT AND COOPERATION
Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation
University of California
A BRIDGE BETWEEN CREATIVE RESEARCH AND POLICY

Title:
The MIddle East Arms Control and Regional Security Talks: Progress, Problems, and Prospects

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Abstract:
The record of the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) Working Group thus far is a mixed one. On the one hand, the very creation of a multilateral process for arms control and regional security in a region where no comparable process ever before existed is in itself a significant achievement. A working agenda then was defined, and by late 1994 a series of initial multilateral agreements had been negotiated for confidence-building measures (CBMs), confidence-and-security-building measures (CSBMs), and other regional security initiatives. Since then, however, ACRS has virtually broken down. The next steps, from negotiation to implementation, for the most part have not been taken. A number of factors have contributed to this breakdown, most notably Egypt's linkage of progress on the entirety of the ACRS agenda to the conflict with Israel on the nuclear issue. A plenary meeting has not been held for almost two years, and ACRS has gone from leader to laggard among the Middle East multilateral working groups.

Events and developments outside of ACRS also have demonstrated both the new possibilities and the continuing problems for regional security cooperation. Particularly notable achievements have been the 1994 Israel–Jordan treaty, which includes provisions going beyond bilateral security agreements to delineate shared positions on multilateral regional security issues, the military and security cooperation agreements signed between Israel and Turkey, and the March 1996 anti-terrorism summit held in Sharm el-Sheikh. On the other hand, progress such as in the Israel–Jordan and Israel-Turkey relationships also precipitated counter-reactions by Egypt, Syria, and others; the very need for the Sharm summit was caused by the spread and intensification of terrorism; and the April–May 1996 fighting along the Israel-Lebanon border demonstrated the risks and volatility that persist on the Syrian/Syria-dominated front.

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The first section of this paper reviews ACRS' record thus far, assessing the bases both for the progress that has been achieved and for the problems that have been encountered in pursuing greater regional security cooperation. The second section advances a series of policy recommendations for enhancing prospects for getting ACRS back on track.<p/>



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THE MIDDLE EAST MULTILATERAL ARMS CONTROL AND REGIONAL SECURITY (ACRS) TALKS: PROGRESS, PROBLEMS, AND PROSPECTS*

Bruce W. Jentleson

Overview

The record of the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) Working Group thus far is a mixed one. On the one hand, the very creation of a multilateral process for arms control and regional security in a region where no comparable process ever before existed is in itself a significant achievement. A working agenda then was defined, and by late 1994 a series of initial multilateral agreements had been negotiated for confidence-building measures (CBMs), confidence-and-security-building measures (CSBMs), and other regional security initiatives.

Since then, however, ACRS has virtually broken down. The next steps, from negotiation to implementation, for the most part have not been taken. A number of factors have contributed to this breakdown, most notably Egypt's linkage of progress on the entirety of the ACRS agenda to the conflict with Israel on the nuclear issue. A plenary meeting has not been held for almost two years, and ACRS has gone from leader to laggard among the Middle East multilateral working groups.

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Israel and Turkey, and the March 1996 anti-terrorism summit held in Sharm el-Sheikh. On the other hand, progress such as in the Israel–Jordan and Israel-Turkey relationships also precipitated counter-reactions by Egypt, Syria, and others; the very need for the Sharm summit was caused by the spread and intensification of terrorism; and the April–May 1996 fighting along the Israel-Lebanon border demonstrated the risks and volatility that persist on the Syrian/Syria-dominated front.

The first section of this paper reviews ACRS' record thus far, assessing the bases both for the progress that has been achieved and for the problems that have been encountered in pursuing greater regional security cooperation. The second section advances a series of policy recommendations for enhancing prospects for getting ACRS back on track.

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5/28/96

POST-ELECTION ACTION PLAN:
ADDRESSING PRESSING PALESTINIAN ECONOMIC NEEDS

Background: Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip have extremely high expectations for the period immediately following Israeli elections. They expect to see a rapid loosening of the closure, progress on the final status talks, and fulfillment of those parts of the Interim Agreement (such as safe passage and Hebron redeployment) not yet implemented. While Israeli security concerns mean that not all of the Palestinian hopes are realistic in the short term, some initiatives could be taken quickly. Steps such as the following will help reinforce the pro-peace segment of the Palestinian population, who have been waiting patiently for the Israeli electoral results. Indeed, Chairman Arafat will expect something tangible that he can point out to West Bank and Gazans as benefits of their cooperation during a painful closure.

STEPS TO TAKE IMMEDIATELY:

1. Return to the status quo of mid May -- immediately after the elections.

Before the tightening of the closure prior to the Shavuot holiday -- and even though security concerns were extremely high at the time -- approximately 7,500 Gazans and 2,500 West Bankers worked in Israel. Some consular, diplomatic, and some NGO Palestinian staff traveled to jobs in Jerusalem. VIPs and foreigners had regular access across checkpoints. An immediate return to this level of access would signal to moderate Palestinians that their economic situation should start to improve.

2. Call for convening the Joint Economic Committee (JEC).

The JEC was expected to convene shortly after Ramadan, but the terrorist bombings shelved all plans for a meeting. We understand the Israeli side is fully prepared for a JEC, and resolving outstanding trade issues is not only a priority for the Palestinians but a prerequisite for trilateral Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian trade discussions. A JEC should be convened at the earliest opportunity.

3. Ease travel and resident status of foreigners of Palestinian origin.

Ever since the February 25-March 4 terrorist attacks, foreign passport holders of Palestinian origin have complained of difficulties in crossing checkpoints, whether they are entering the West Bank/Gaza Strip temporarily or residing there with short-term or permanent visas/IDs. The expertise and, often, financial resources of these individuals can help immensely in developing a sustainable Palestinian economy. Unless certain individuals pose a specific security threat to Israel, Israel should immediately work to ease the process by which these foreign passport holders cross checkpoints.

STEPS TO TAKE WITHIN A WEEK

1. Increase steadily the number of work permits.

Using 10,000 workers a the starting point, Israel should begin to increase the number of permits as quickly as possible for both West Bankers and Gazans. Within a week, 20,000 permits should be issued. By the end of June, the number of permits should reach a minimum of 50,000 workers considered safe enough to have permanent passes to work in Israel; additional workers should be issued temporary or seasonal permits, depending on the Israeli demand. To provide proper security, Israel should consider asking the U.S. to procure special "biotechnics" high-tech equipment to match Ids with the laborers.

2. Allow most diplomatic and NGO staff to return to work and cross checkpoints.

West Bank and Gaza Strip staff of diplomatic, consular, and NGO facilities should be issued passes allowing them to return to work in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, or elsewhere (unless there is specific information prejudicial to certain individuals).

3. Increase of one-trip business facilitation passes and expansion of the program to cover Gazans.

Until the recent tightening of the closure, MATAK offered a revolving system of passes for major West Bank business leaders and merchants to travel into Israel. This practice should be restored, the number of these passes should be increased immediately to 300 daily, and the program expanded to cover 200 daily passes for Gaza business officials and merchants. This initiative can draw on business representatives known by Israel to pose no security threat. West Banker and Gazan business leaders who hold these passes should be permitted to visit each other as well.

4. Restore 20 nautical mile fishing limit.

In the aftermath of the February 25-March 4 terrorist attacks, Israel limited the area, both in width and length, of the Gaza Sea open for Palestinian fishermen. Israel should restore the permitted area to the maps signed in May 1994 as part of the Cairo Agreement.

5. Convene a meeting of the Allenby Bridge committee.

A meeting of the recently formed Allenby Bridge committee, called by the Israeli chair MATAK Deputy Spiegel, should be called to discuss practical improvements. This would demonstrate Israel's seriousness in addressing both Jordanian complaints and Palestinian concerns on access to supplies and markets throughout the region.

6. Publicly confirm the Israeli commitment to industrial zones.

To help address unemployment and Palestinian economic development, Israel should publicly reconfirm its commitment to Palestinian industrial zones. Israel should go on the record to the Palestinian Authority and the donors regarding the Israeli USD 5 million contribution to help build off-site infrastructure as well as the Israeli willingness to allow the industrial zones to purchase Israeli utility services (electricity, water, telephones) as needed until indigenous sources become available.

STEPS TO TAKE WITHIN TWO-THREE WEEKS

1. Convene talks on safe passage.

Safe passage between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is considered by the Palestinians to be a key component of both Gaza-Jericho and the Interim Agreements not yet implemented, and it has important political and economic ramifications. While Israeli security concerns prevent an immediate opening of the two safe passage routes included in the Interim Agreement, Israel should step up talks with the Palestinians on how to begin implementation. Options could include a convoy bus system for cleared passengers and/or lower limits on the age of those who can use the safe passages at first.

2. Meet with the Palestinians to accelerate agreement on the operation of the industrial zones.

The World Bank draft report on industrial zones offers a clear blueprint for the Palestinians, Israelis, and donor community to proceed on industrial park development in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip. A key element to the parks' success is

the security arrangement to be worked out between the Palestinians and Israelis on access of goods and people to the parks even during periods of closure. The Israelis should begin to work with the Palestinians as quickly as possible to define exactly what will be required from a security perspective to allow trans-border traffic to and from the parks to continue. A critical first step would be to establish a joint steering group in the zones chaired on both sides by senior officials able to cut through their respective bureaucracies. Israel should name a high-level focal point to reach a security agreement, with the goal being closure-proof trans-border traffic.

3. Begin to issue 3-month business facilitation passes.

While the Israeli initiative to issue Palestinian business VIP passes ran aground approximately six months ago, the idea remains a good one. 3-month passes (which, if the experiment succeeds, could be renewed for longer periods) to key business leaders in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Holders could cross checkpoints regularly to carry out business in the West Bank, Israel, or Gaza Strip. This would also allow the 500 business day passes proposed above to be shared by business officials who do not have regular need to cross checkpoints, thus expanding the number of Palestinians with potential access to Israel markets and supplies.

4. Initiate a West Bank convoy system to pick up goods at Qarni and Israeli ports.

Goods being exported from the Gaza Strip through Qarni are subject to extensive security checks. Thus, it should be possible to organize a convoy system from the Tarqumiyah checkpoint that would allow West Bank trucks to travel under security escorts to pick up goods at Qarni destined for the West Bank. In addition, West Bank convoys similar to those used in Gaza should be organized from designated West Bank checkpoints to pick up goods from Israeli ports.

5. Begin to upgrade of facilities at Qarni and Erez.

Moving swiftly to expand and upgrade the facilities at Qarni and Erez will help remove bottlenecks to increased trade and travel. Improvements should include the installation of computers designed to track people, cargo, and vehicles. An important part of this is forwarding specific Israeli requests for high-tech bomb scanners and other equipment to the U.S. for procurement under the special U.S. USD 100 million counter-terrorism package.

6. Offer to coordinate efforts for the Cairo Economic Summit.

Israel should offer to coordinate efforts regarding the Cairo Economic Summit to the Palestinian Authority. This coordination would cover not only substantive issues but also the movement of Palestinian participants for both the conference and preparatory meetings.

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   b) Ext Turn to Egypt Tur
2. Industrial Park
3. Para Harbor
4. Tri port

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SESSION ONE: DOCUMENT 2

GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR REACHING AN ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN AGREEMENT ON FINAL STATUS ISSUES

AN AGREEMENT SHOULD;

1. BE DURABLE;
2. BE STABLE;
3. NOT POSE A SECURITY THREAT TO ANY PARTY;
4. ENHANCE BOTH ISRAELI AND PALESTINIAN SECURITY;
5. PROMOTE BILATERAL AND REGIONAL STABILITY;
6. NOT THREATEN THE RELIGIOUS, CULTURAL AND POLITICAL IDENTITIES OF THE PARTIES;
7. BE POLITICALLY VIABLE FOR THE RESPECTIVE COMMUNITIES;
8. TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ARAB CONCERNS AND SENSATIVITIES.
9. PROMOTE THE FREE ASSOCIATION OF PEOPLES;
10. PROVIDE FOR AND PROMOTE THE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE, GOODS AND CAPITAL;
11. PROVIDE FOR THE NON-VIOLENT RESOLUTION OF FUTURE DISPUTES AND CONFLICTS.
12. ADHERE TO THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUITABILITY.
13. PROMOTE A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE.

1/12/1999

The Andrea and Charles Bronfman Philanthropies (ACBP)

The Palestine Consultancy Group (PCG)

DRAFT
NOVEMBER 1999

Policies and Strategies of Future Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation

SUMMARIES OF JOINT STUDIES ON

Science and Technology Education
Middle East Studies
Sociology and Anthropology
Special Education
Water
Agriculture
Public Health

Belgian-Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation Project in Applied Research, Training and Education

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Policies and Strategies Of Future Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation

OVERVIEW AND INTRODUCTION

Maintaining that academic and professional cooperation is essential to real and lasting peace in the Middle East, the Andrea and Charles Bronfman Philanthropies (ACBP) in Israel and the Palestine Consultancy Group (PCG) began promoting joint Israeli-Palestinian research projects even before the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993. ACBP and PCG intensified their efforts after the White House signing, launching in 1998 an ambitious cooperative venture, the "Strategic Planning of Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation in Applied Research and Education.

Strategic Planning has supported seven working groups focused on joint research and cooperation in the fields of science and technology education, Middle East studies, sociology and anthropology, special education, water, agriculture and public health. Having concluded their studies, the working groups are pleased to present their recommendations for future collaboration, many of which have already been instrumental in triggering cooperative education projects.

Strategic Planning is a project of the "Belgian-Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation in Applied Scientific Research, Training and Education," which was jointly conceptualized by ACBP, PCG, the Economic Cooperation Foundation (ECF), the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Belgian International Co-operation (BIC). Strategic Planning is generously supported by Belgian International Co-operation with additional funding from the Andrea and Charles Bronfman Philanthropies.

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THE ANDREA AND CHARLES BRONFMAN PHILANTHROPIES (ACBP)

THE PALESTINE CONSULTANCY GROUP (PCG)

Policies and Strategies of Future Israeli-Palestinian Academic Cooperation

DRAFT SUMMARY REPORT

on

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY EDUCATION

November 1999

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Belgian-Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation Project
in Applied Scientific Research, Training and Education

3a

Science and Technology Education
Working Group Summary

Rationale

Science and technology are becoming increasingly important indicators of economic and cultural success. Broad-based knowledge in these fields is a key to the development of wealth, raw materials, energy and labor. Given the widely varying levels of human and physical resources within and between Israel and Palestine, the Strategic Planning initiative identified science and technology education as a field ripe for joint cooperation. The initiative is encouraged about the potential for success in cooperative endeavors since academics in both countries are already deeply involved in joint projects. New projects between universities and NGO's will further strengthen this involvement and encourage additional cooperation between appropriate government agencies.

Background

Israel has established an advanced science and technology education system at all levels, from elementary to university students. The strengths of Israel's system include a fairly developed physical and human resources, such as curriculum and textbooks, multi-media materials, teacher training resources and civil society activities. Science education in Israel has been greatly furthered by universities and the government, with recent increases in involvement from students' parents and the private sector.

Despite these strengths, however, not all spheres of Israeli society have benefited equally from science and technology education. Differences in socio-economic status and geographic location, for instance, often parallel gaps in private-public investment and level of student achievement.

In Palestine, the science and technology education system is still in its nascence. Recognizing the importance of technology to future economic growth and social mobility, Palestinian academics and officials are prioritizing developing their science education system. However, they face many challenges, including minimal physical infrastructure, a limited human resources infrastructure and a dearth of government and/or private funding

sources.

Process and Results

The Science and Technology Education Working Group, comprised of five Israelis and six Palestinians, met several times over the past year to identify areas of cooperation that would be particularly fruitful. Given the major role that academic expertise has in developing science and technology education, the Working Group focused it s attention at this initial stage on cooperation between universities and other related NGO's and identified the following areas:

(1) Strengthening human resources, including leadership training, curriculum design, educational technologies, teacher training, and research and evaluation

(2) Developing science lab center for school students

(3) Developing science discovery centers (science museums)

(4) Launching model vocational and technological schools and centers

(5) Fostering extra-curricular enrichment centers for elementary and high school students

With financial support from outside foundations, the Science and Technology Working Group looks forward to moving each of these areas forward.

(1) Strengthening Human Resources

In order to assert the centrality of science education in modern society, the Working Group maintains that appropriate educational leadership must be developed, especially for the following areas:

- Curriculum development for all educational levels
- Design of infrastructure, including laboratories and workshops
- Computerized learning environments
- Teacher training programs
- Formative and summative evaluation

Science and technology educational leaders must possess a deep understanding of subject matters, including physics, math, biology, chemistry and computer science; expertise in learning and instruction issues; and a sound understanding of the

cultural, social and economic environment in which the science education will be delivered.

The main source for recruiting and training such professionals is the university campus. The Working Group therefore recommends that Israeli and Palestinian universities initiate programs to prepare cadres of leaders who will in turn disseminate their expertise to science educators.

(2) Regional Science Lab Centers

The science laboratory is seen as the hub of "real" science, where both teacher and student can gain insight and make advances by testing and proving (or disproving) their hypotheses. Lab experiments are essential for enabling the students to link theory with practice and to learn about scientific methodology.

Despite the universally acknowledged importance of lab-based science education, few individual schools can afford their own laboratory. Installing adequate facilities, upgrading and maintaining them and training teachers to use them is too often cost-prohibitive. Regional lab centers are, therefore, a good solution, particularly if they are located in universities, which already possess the necessary expertise and maintenance services.

Israel has two kinds of regional labs, one in which center staff trains science teachers to instruct their own students and one in which center staff teaches visiting classes directly. The first model could be particularly helpful in helping Palestinian educators meet the growing demand for practical work opportunities. The Working Group recommends establishing a one-to-one consultative relationship between Israeli and Palestinian universities, focusing on training Palestinian staff, preparing materials in Arabic, training teachers, and planning for the actual labs and equipment.

(3) Interactive Science Discovery Centers (Science Museums)

At the end of the 1960s, Frank Oppenheimer opened the Exploratorium in San Francisco, capturing the imagination of his visitors by engaging them in a dialogue with his interactive science exhibits. Oppenheimer's concept has caught on, with new centers opening in various communities around the world.

Science centers encourage visitors to develop abstraction and generalization, two of the basic tenants of scientific methodology. Interactive exhibits are also

accompanied by supervised activitsuch as demonstrations and workshops. Science centers are playing an increasingly active role in community education, forming partnerships with schools, community centers and outlying areas. The centers maintain that scientific knowledge is an essential part of modern culture and a necessity for civil life.

Three active science centers exist in Israel – the Bloomfield Science Museum in Jerusalem, the National Museum of Science, Planning and Technology in Haifa, and the outdoor Garden of Science, recently opened at the Weizmann Institute. There are also small local enterprises in Rehovoth and Rishon Letzion and another center is being developed in Be'er Sheva. The centers host a total of 400,000 visitors per year, some 40 percent of whom come in school groups.

While no such centers currently exist in Palestine, they could play a key role in advancing science and technology. The Working Group recommends that Israeli science centers staff advise the architects of nascent Palestinian centers, particularly in the areas of capacity building, staff training, design, building and maintenance of exhibits, educational activities and developing materials in Arabic. Cooperation should be focused on pilot projects to assess the response of Palestinian children from different age groups, schools and communities. One such project has already been started between the Bloomfield Science Museum and Al-Quds University, with preliminary funding from the American REPTEC.

(4) Vocational and technological centers

Technology is increasingly acknowledged as the key to economic prosperity. Yet technology education in many countries is not advanced enough to keep up with the rapidly changing field. Vocational schools, for instance, often teach trades that are outdated, lagging years behind the industry. As the world of high technology becomes increasingly advanced, the gap between what is taught in schools and what is required by the market place grows ever larger.

In order to reverse this trend and prepare students for high-wage, high-skill jobs, two major changes must occur:

(1) Integrating technological literacy into science education for grades K-12

(2) Emphasizing the technological component of vocational education.

Students who chose vocational schools – mostly individuals from lower socio-economic strata – should be encouraged to become "practical engineers." This will require reforms, such as modernizing curricula and teaching methods and updating equipment and labs. Implementing such changes will transform vocational into technical high schools, ensuring students a greater promise of social and economic mobility.

The Israeli system has largely adopted this approach to vocational education and could use its expertise and expertise to benefit the Palestinian system. The Working Group therefore recommends the following avenues for joint cooperation:

- Introducing leadership seminars and training sessions to share experience.
- Opening regional centers to host school students and train teachers, providing technological literacy in updated workshops and labs. Appropriate instructional materials in Arabic should also be jointly prepared for this purpose.
- Developing model regional technological schools to offer cooperative pilot programs for high school students.

(5) Extra-curricular Enrichment Centers

Science-based extracurricular activities have become a central component of after-school programming in many countries around the world, including Israel. Such activities are especially important for gifted and talented students, hungry for science and technology education beyond the quality of formal instruction they are currently receiving. The Working Group recommends studying and developing regional enrichment centers, in conjunction with universities and NGO's, to provide this essential service to the growing number of interested children.

Israel has some thirty years of experience in conducting such activities at universities and other independent NGO's. This vast experience could easily be shared with the Palestinians in a range of cooperative projects.

THE ANDREA AND CHARLES BRONFMAN PHILANTHROPIES (ACBP)

THE PALESTINE CONSULTANCY GROUP (PCG)

Policies and Strategies of Future Israeli-Palestinian Academic Cooperation

DRAFT SUMMARY REPORT

on

MIDDLE EAST STUDIES

November 1999

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Belgian-Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation Project in Applied Scientific Research, Training and Education

8a

Middle East Studies
Working Group Summary

Rationale

The Middle East Studies Working Group agreed that the field of Middle East Studies has to be redefined in both Israeli and Palestinian universities and research institutions. The redefinition should expand Middle East studies to include all the countries of the region, including Israel and Palestine – their past and present, religions, societies, cultures, languages, arts, politics, legal systems, geography and archeology, environment and security. The significance of this redefinition is that issues related to countries and peoples of the Middle East -- including Israel (and the "Land of Israel"), and Palestine – will no longer be viewed as isolated, particularistic phenomena, but rather in their relation to the wider regional context.

The Working Group reviewed the beginnings of cooperation in research on issues related to Middle East Studies and to the peace process. The field has grown in the last ten years, especially since the Oslo accords, to encompass not only final status issues, but also reconciliation issues, coexistence and education, and times of peace developmental topics, such as social problems, health issues and more.

The Working Group also agreed, however, that this growth represents only the initial steps. In light of the fact that both peoples share now and will share in the future the same land, cooperation in research in the conceptually revised Middle East Studies needs to be expanded to its full capacity.

Process and Results

The Middle East Studies Working Group, comprised of six Israelis and six Palestinians, met several times over the past year to identify cooperative projects with the greatest potential of success and to set an agenda for future joint endeavors. Specifically, the Working Group recommends developing projects in the following areas:

(1) Research infrastructures

(2) Mutual Exposure

(3) Oral History

(4) Joint Research

(5) Education for Peace and Coexistence

With funding and support from outside sources, the Working Group is eager to move forward projects in each of these areas.

(1) Research Infrastructures

In order to support high-quality research into the field of Middle East studies, the Working Group recommends the following:

- Developing a research facilities directory, which would benefit scholars, professionals and students. The user-friendly manual should include lists and information on research institutes, libraries, data- bases, Internet sites, publications, collections, archives, etc. It should be made available in a printed form and also on a growing Internet site. Special focus should be placed on Jerusalem resources.
- Developing research infrastructure in both Israel and Palestine, including joint research institutes, libraries, databases, publications, collections and archives.
- Providing tours for scholars and graduate students of libraries, archives archeological sites, etc.
- Translating classical and seminal texts.

(2) Mutual Exposure

Despite improvements since the Oslo Accords, six years later there is still little people-to-people contact between Israeli and Palestinian scholars, even on topics of common interest such as Middle East studies. The Working Group recommends exposing Israeli and Palestinian researchers to the activities of the other side. More exposure will motivate and generate more joint scholarly work. Specifically, the Working Group suggests sponsoring scholarly conferences, seminars and workshops for researchers, professionals and graduate students.

(3) Oral History

This is a vast field, which is only partly addressed today, more on the Israeli side, less on the Palestinian side. The Working Group prioritizes the

collection of narratives of common people, especially their experiences when facing critical cross-roads and traumatic periods and events.

(4) Joint Research

Given the current peace process, the Working Group recommends prioritizing joint applied research in topics related to the peace process, to state and to nation-building issues. Over time, joint research could include more purely scholarly topics, such as classical Islamic poetry, dialects or philosophy.

Several **examples** of broad areas for immediate research, were discussed and agreed, including:

(1) Nation and state building issues such as:

- Institution building (government, communal, civic, economic, trade unions, cultural, military)
- Identity and identity development
- Transition processes and crises
- Democracy, consensus and coalitions building (or opposition)
- Political culture
- Political leadership – roles, style, formation, impact
- Role of the Media
- Role of universities and other education and culture agencies

(2) Religion and Politics, for example nationalism and religious fundamentalism among Israelis and Palestinians

(3) Democracy and Human Rights

(4) Conflict Resolution and Peace, including:

- Sociological, political and ideological profiles of supporters and enemies of the peace process.
- Relevance of theories of conflict resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

(4) Jerusalem – A jointly edited reader of narratives should be developed. Narratives from both sides will clarify the different points of views on Jerusalem and acknowledge them as part and parcel of the coexistence framework in Jerusalem.

(5) Planning Jerusalem by Palestinians and Israeli professionals, based on studies of previous planning.

(6) Geography of the common land, including issues of political, national and religious concepts and symbols, as well as socio-economic issues, land use and infrastructure

(7) Archeology, not less than Geography, can and is a bone of contention, because it is used or abused to underscore or undermine 'historical rights'. It is therefore even more important to further scholarly cooperation and encourage mutually exposure of studies and theories.

(5) Capacity building

- Mutual recognition of degrees and courses;
- Cooperation between Universities in providing student exchange opportunities – individuals and groups.
- Joint supervision of graduate students

(6) Education for Peace and Co-existence

- Initiatives of P2P dialogues between teachers and school and university students continue with a multiplication effect. They should be further encouraged and expanded. Product oriented P2P should also be encouraged.
- Research on textbooks should be continued, expanded, but also refined.
- More extra-curricular experimental instructional materials should be jointly prepared on broadly defined issues of co-existence.

THE ANDREA AND CHARLES BRONFMAN PHILANTHROPIES (ACBP)

THE PALESTINE CONSULTANCY GROUP (PCG)

Policies and Strategies of Future Israeli-Palestinian Academic Cooperation

DRAFT SUMMARY REPORT

on

Sociology and Anthropology

November 1999

Work-Group Members

PCG: Prof. Bernard Sabella (leader, Bethlehem University), Prof. Ishaq Al-Qutub (Al-Quds University), Saqer Al-Haroob (Al-Quds University), Prof. Iskandar Al-Najjar (Al-Quds University), Prof. Aziz Haidar (Al-Quds University).

ACBP: Prof. Yehouda Shenhav (leader, Tel-Aviv University), Prof. Yossi Shavit (Tel-Aviv University), Dr. Haya Stier (Tel-Aviv University) ,Dr. Dan Rabinowitz (Hebrew University of Jerusalem), Dr. Michael Shalev (Hebrew University of Jerusalem). Mr. Nadav Gabay (Coordinator, Tel-Aviv University).

Belgian-Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation Project in Applied Scientific Research, Training and Education

Sociology and Anthropology
Working Group Summary

Rationale

The Strategic Planning Initiativeidentified sociology and anthropology research as essential areas for cooperation, given the historically low level of interaction between professionals and academics in those fields. The lack of cooperation is particularly pronounced since Israeli and Palestinian societies have a uniquely high level of interdependence and mutual influence. Data collection, joint research and the application of findings could thus have an essential influence on the future social development of the region.

Process and Results

Comprised of five Israelis and five Palestinian sociologists, the Sociology and Anthropology Working Group held three workshops over the course of the past year. The central purpose of the meetings was to identify issues for joint research projects and to establish a joint agenda for future endeavors.

The group identified four broad areas in which future cooperation would be fruitful:

(1) Establishing joint, parallel data collection and research infrastructures

(2) Advancing a joint research agenda

(3) Promoting and hosting joint scholarly conferences

(4) Establishing a joint curricula on Palestinian and Israeli societies.

With appropriate financial and technical support, the members of the Working Group look forward to moving each of these areas forward.

(1) Establishing Joint, Parallel Data Collection and Research Infrastructure

The Working Group encountered a nearly complete lack of infrastructure for the joint study of Palestinian and Israeli societies. Although sociology and anthropology are quite established in Israel, research and data collection in -- and about -- Palestinian society are relatively less established. Until now, researchers

have been employing ad-hoc, small and often poor quality data sets that have inhibited comparative studies of the two peoples.

Israel's data collecting mechanisms, including the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), have neither the depth nor the nor the regularity of North American and European data-collection operations, such as the American Panel Study of Income Dynamics or the European Union's Eurobarometer. Palestinian data collection mechanisms are in the nascent stages of development; the Palestinian central bureau of statistics, for instance, was only recently established.

Additionally, there are only the beginnings of sporadic coordinated collection of data on Israeli and Palestinian societies in such areas as education, employment, income, family formation, political participation and quality of life. Regular information in any of these areas would be infinitely helpful to social science researchers seeking to assess developments and gaps between and within the two societies. There is no doubt that availability of comparative data will generate communication between researchers on scientific ground relevant to both societies.

In order to rectify the current situation and to establish an effective research and data collection infrastructure, the Working Group recommends:

- Incorporating the Palestinians into the International Social Survey Program (ISSP)
- Establishing an on-going Palestinian-Israeli Panel Study (PIPS)

ISSP is a carefully designed, comparative attitudinal survey that is currently used for collecting data in thirty countries, including Israel. A group of representatives from all participating countries determines topics for the surveys – such as, the role of government (1996), work orientations (1997), religion (1998), and inequality (1999). Many of the topics are repeated every seven to eight years to provide evidence of attitudinal change over time. The Working Group strongly recommends facilitating Palestinian participation in the ISSP survey – in the short-run, to informally implement the annual questionnaires, which are readily available to non-member countries, and over the long-run to formally apply for membership in the ISSP in order to officially conduct the survey. This will bring the Palestinian research community into dialogue not only with their Israeli colleagues, but also with a large group of international scholars.

In order to promote a genuine and on-going cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians, the Working Group also proposes the creation of a Palestinian-Israeli Panel Study (PIPS) to collect comparative data in fields such as education, employment, income, family formation and political participation. PIPS would be charged with conducting quarterly or semi-annually interviews with representative samples of Palestinians and Israelis, which would be analyzed by in-house scientists and made available to other scholars and organizations.

(2) ***Advancing a Joint Research Agenda***

The working group identified several broad areas in which joint research projects would be mutually beneficial and compelling for both societies. These areas include cross-border phenomena and trends, such as trade relations or the employment of Palestinian labor inside Israel; interdependency, such as the degree and manner in which social policy in Palestine is influenced by models in Israel; and insights into fields for the advancement of both societies, such as education or urban development.

Each joint project would follow a three-stage process of jointly conceptualizing analytical tools, defining research questions and identifying critical issues. Most collection and analysis could be conducted under the auspices of PIPS, detailed above. The Sociology and Anthropology Working Group identified and reviewed twelve suggested examples, including:

- Employment of Palestinian laborers in Israel
- Welfare state formation in the Palestinian territories
- Demographic characteristics and changes of family processes
- Women's participation in the educational system
- Women's economic role
- Effect of demographic changes on women's status within their families
- Poverty and unemployment in Palestinian and Israeli societies
- Perceptions of peace making
- Urban change in Israel and Palestine
- Expansion of higher education in Palestine and Israel
- Displaced Palestinians in 1948

(3) Promoting and Hosting Joint Annual Research Conferences

In order to provide opportunities for comparative research activities, the Working Group also recommends holding at least one yearly conference on a jointly selected topic of interest for both societies. The conference would provide an appropriate framework for exchanging ideas and methods, and ultimately for drawing conclusions that could contribute to the advancement of both societies forward. A joint steering committee would organize and facilitate the conference, including setting its structure, managing it and choosing its themes. Suggested ideas include "otherness", mutliculturalism, nationalism, post-nationalism and the relationship between state and Diaspora in both societies.

(4) Developing Joint Curricula on Palestinian and Israeli Societies

Simultaneous to advancing joint theoretical and empirical research, the Working Group also prioritizes the development of joint teaching modules for universities and colleges both in Israel and Palestine, including:

- Exchanging professors who teach courses in Israeli and/or Palestinian social sciences (e.g. anthropology, sociology, education or economics)
- Jointly developing curricula on Israeli and Palestinian society.

A joint committee will continue to review current courses and seminars at Israeli and Palestinian universities and develop curricula outlines, which could be taught by lecturers from both societies.

Special Education
Working Group Summary

Rationale

Special education widely refers to diagnostic and prescriptive teaching practices for individuals with special educational needs. Without appropriate special education services, children with special needs – who statistically comprise five to ten percent of the population – may suffer from developmental disabilities, which hinder not only their ability to learn and adapt in school, but also their chances to function as independent adults integrated into society.

The Israeli special education system is well established and on par with similar systems in North America and Western Europe. Israel's resources and trained professionals, however, are not always put to the benefit of all the nation's citizens. Israeli Palestinians historically receive a lower level of testing and services, due in part to a lack of personnel and suitable diagnostic materials in Arabic, as well as differential budgetary allocations. Palestinian children with special needs are often at an even greater disadvantage, where there are even more severe limits in budget and personnel.

The field of special education is a fertile one for cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians, especially given their shared need to develop Arabic-language resources and professional Palestinian leadership. Yet until today there has been little sharing of resources and expertise.

Process and Results

The Special Education Working Group, comprised of six Israelis and five Palestinians, met several times over the past year to identify areas where cooperation would be particularly fruitful and decided on the following topics:

(1) Professional development and training

(2) Assessment and diagnostic tools

(3) Civil Society Activity (NGOs -- Non-governmental Organizations).

With appropriate financial support, the Special Education Working Group looks forward to further developing and implementing their ideas.

(1) Professional Development and Training

Providing the best possible services to children with special needs requires trained professionals. The most effective way to recruit and train personnel is by strategically developing a cadre of highly trained professionals, including policy makers, teacher trainers, senior-level educational psychologists, para-medical professionals and other special education professionals. The emerging leaders could then, in turn, train other professionals in the field. Given the scarcity of special education personnel at any level in Palestine or among Israeli Palestinians, the Working Group maintains that training these leaders and decision makers should be given highest priority.

Palestinian universities do not currently offer advanced academic degrees in special education. The Working Group therefore recommends developing programs in conjunction with Israeli institutions and universities, such as joint leadership training programs conducted by senior Palestinian and Israeli lecturers at facilities accessible to students and instructors from all sides. The programs should be adapted to Palestinian culture and language and train and should train senior officials, researchers and professionals in a variety of disciplines, leading to accredited advanced degrees. Specific recommendations of the Working Group include:

- Establishing a leadership recruitment program to locate, recruit and train Arabic speaking leaders in special education;
- Establishing scholarships programs for M.A. and Ph.D. students in special education, emphasizing public policy, teacher training and research;
- Developing pre-service training programs in *Arabic* for school psychologists, para-medical professionals, and other special education professionals;
- Initiating joint research projects by Israeli and Palestinian universities that would serve as a training ground for advanced students of the two countries;
- Jointly developing curricula for university and college courses in special education;
- Translating seminal texts in special education into Arabic.

(2) Assessment and Diagnostic Tools

Early identification and assessment of children at-risk for developmental, physiological, mental, emotional or behavioral difficulties is an integral component of

the treatment of children with special educational needs and vital to the child's long-term development. Several different assessment techniques exist and can be used, but all share a common element: a description of a child's progress along a developmental continuum and a comparison of his or her abilities to a theoretical model and/or a known standard. Few applicable models and standards for the Palestinian community exist in either Israel or Palestine. The Working Group maintains that they must be developed in order to assure adequate assessment and subsequent efficacious treatment.

The Working Group also recognizes the need to train professionals in assessment techniques, including cultural awareness and sensitivity to a child's environmental and family context. Training must also include instruction in the administration of Arabic language and culturally-sensitive instruments. The development of such instruments is also a priority for the Working Group. Specific attention should be focused on children with mild learning disabilities which are currently under-diagnosed and under-treated and can have serious developmental implications.

The Working Group recommends the establishment of joint teams to work on the following projects:

- Setting priorities for translation and standardization of screening and achievement tests;
- Developing Arabic language assessment and diagnostic tools;
- Researching the various cultural aspects of diagnostic services.

(3) *Civil Society Activities (NGO's)*

In many countries, the provision of services to children with special needs and their families is the responsibility of the government. In some situations, however, NGO's have been able to complement these services, especially for children who would otherwise not receive government assistance. The Working Group maintains that education is a basic human right and, as such, supports the work of NGO's, as a vital component in the provision of services to children with special needs. The Working Group recommends an increase in the number and role of NGO's in Israel and Palestine, including the development of joint projects that pair well-established Israeli NGOs as consultants and partners to emerging and existent Palestinian NGO's.

THE ANDREA AND CHARLES BRONFMAN PHILANTHROPIES (ACBP)

THE PALESTINE CONSULTANCY GROUP (PCG)

Policies and Strategies of Future Israeli-Palestinian Academic Cooperation

DRAFT SUMMARY REPORT

RESEARCH ON WATER ISSUES

November 1999

Work Group Members

PCG : Dr. Marwan Haddad, *Leader*
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Dr. Dr. Abdel Rahman Tamimi

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Mr. Yoav Harpaz
Prof. Yoav Kislev
Dr. Yehuda Shevah
Mr. Yossi Yakhin, Coordinator

Belgian-Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation Project
In Applied Scientific Research, Training and Education

19 e

Water
Working Group
Summary

Rationale

The Strategic Planning Initiative identified research in water resource management as an essential area for cooperation, given the current scarcity of water resources in Israel and the Palestinian territories. The situation is only expected to worsen with accelerated population growth and urbanization west of the River Jordan.

In order to secure the supply and protect the quality of water, Israel and the Palestinians must find ways to jointly study and manage their aquifers – in spite of large differences in the two entities' water infrastructures, levels of development, socio-economic conditions and extent of water utilization.

Augmenting work that is being carried out by government agencies and other organs in both entities, joint research is an essential tool for the two sides in their search for appropriate solutions. It provides a common database for making coordinated policy decisions, as well as having the added advantage of being fertile training ground for a cadre of professionals, especially those who will continue working together in a framework of peace. Joint research can also contribute to the process of upgrading physical capacities, distributing equipment and manufacturing new technologies.

Process and Results

The Water Working Group's five Israelis and five Palestinian experts held three workshops and several discussions over the course of the past year. The central purpose of the meetings was to identify the following six major areas for diversified, strategic research:

(1) water demand management
(2) allocations and dispute resolution
(3) water resources development
(4) water related socio-economic aspects
(5) capacity building
(6) education

With appropriate financial support, the Water Working Group looks forward to further developing and implementing projects in each of these areas.

(1) Water Demand Maagement

Water Demand Management is a comprehensive strategy to promote efficient use and conservation of water, enabling nations suffering from water scarcity to develop and grow despite their limited resources. The Working Group recommends preparation of a comprehensive set of policies and strategies for the short- and long-term demand management of water for the urban-industrial and agricultural sectors in both Israel and Palestine. The main research issues are:

- Defining practical and economic means and ways to minimize future demands for water in agriculture, urban consumption and industry
- Developing means and tools to improve efficiency of water utilization and conservation, studying and taking into account the socio-economic conditions and development needs of the entities
- Developing comprehensive management practices to be suitable to the cultural, social and financial capacity of the populations
- Exploring technical, legal and economic aspects of efficient water use to fit each society
- Examining potential obstacles to the development of non-conventional water management techniques, such as water recycling and re-use, brackish water use, etc. as potential substitutes to fresh water use (in the context of demand management)

(2) Water Allocation and Dispute Resolution

The main source of contention over water in the final status negotiations is its allocation between the parties. A first step towards the resolution of the conflict was taken by the Joint Management of Shared Aquifers research project (co-funded by the Andrea and Charles Bronfman Philanthropies and the International Development and Research Center of Canada), which proposed joint management of aquifers and outlined steps for immediate implementation. The Working Group recommends that the findings of this earlier project be complemented by research focusing on future implementation, such as:

- Means and methods to allocate water between dispute parties

- Appropriate legal and other mechanisms to diffuse potential conflicts regarding water allocation
- Joint management practices of shared aquifers, utilities, global case studies and their potential impact on the region
- Crisis management for cases of drought, pollution, etc.

(3) Water Resource Development

Future demand for water can partially be met by developing new water sources. The long-term supplement, however, will require integrated sea-water desalination. Such future developments should constitute a priority focus of research topics. Specifically, the Working Group recommends the following areas of study and research:

- Intensified ground and surface water development to capture not yet exploited sources
- Development of membranes for use in brackish water and wastewater treatment installations for re-use purposes around sensitive potable aquifers
- Management of urban and rural runoff to minimize negative impacts (pollution, etc.) and to maximize direct or indirect availability
- Possibility of developing public-private partnerships (PPP) for private pumping and distribution companies in line with public interests
- Strategies to maximize economic re-use of treated human wastes with minimum negative environmental and health impacts

(4) Water related socio-economic aspects

As in all other economic areas, supply and demand of water can be managed by using adequate pricing structures. Water pricing in Israel and the Palestinian territories, however, is a controversial issue, especially because political or ideological priorities often guide pricing decisions. Water is under-priced relative to its scarcity, reflecting a tendency to accommodate certain consumer groups. This trend was reflected in a recent survey of municipal water projects financed by the World Bank showing that the price of water globally covers only about 35 percent of the average cost of supply. In order to combat this growing trend in a region where scarcity is an immediate rather than strategic issue, the Water Working Group recommends joint study and research in the following topics:

- Cost analyses and prioritization of maintaining, improving and upgrading water systems, taking into account the high marginal costs of future, additional resource development
- Alternative options for costs of services that allow for an affordable supply of water to low income groups while simultaneously maintaining incentives for more efficient use and conservation
- Norms for water utilization from shared aquifers, taking into account cultural patterns, willingness to pay, and affordability
- Legislative options and policies to achieve water conservation through economic instruments (also referred to in *Demand Management*)
- Public awareness and education campaigns, emphasizing costs, potential impacts of new costly sources and strategies for implementation
- Potential diversion of water from one sector (e.g. irrigation) to another (e.g. urban and domestic consumption or industry) as a strategy to combat domestic water scarcity

(5) *Capacity Building*

The joint management of shared scare water resources requires the ongoing support of uniquely trained professional experts, researchers and technical staff. In order to train and prepare these professionals, the working group recommends developing academic exchanges, institutionalized cooperation between libraries and joint regional training institutes. Specific projects would include:

- Exchange of medium and high level researches for six to twenty-four months at either existing local institutions or facilities abroad
- Establishment of study programs in conflict resolution
- Mutual recognition of diplomas and course credits and joint M.Sc. and Ph.D. programs at Israeli and Palestinian universities

(6) *Education*

Attitudes toward peace and cooperation are influenced and reinforced through the education system. For instance, the central and sticking issue of ownership over water resources – which will be a bone of contention in the final status negotiations – is often misrepresented by the Israeli and Palestinian education systems, which were designed to equip with war conditions.

In order to sustain the peace process even once agreements on water allocation and management have been reached, attitudes among Israelis and Palestinians must be changed. New directions in curricula and text books are therefore of primary importance. Joint projects should focus developing, implementing and assessing these new directions as well as training educators for all ages of students.



The Role of Municipalities in the Settlement of the West Bank and Gaza Strip

A Project Proposal

Studies & Consultation - P.O.Box 486 - West Bank, Bethlehem - Tel. (02) 743343, Tel. & Fax. (02) 743369

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2. Municipalities finance

In accordance with the existing amended municipality law. The municipalities' financial resources are limited to the revenues from taxes, licenses, fuel tax, land and building ownership tax, and to revenues from rent of buildings owned by the municipality. These resources are not enough to cover the municipalities' expenditure. Therefore municipalities rely on foreign funds to cover their expenditures and execute development projects.

3. Justifications

The legal basis for municipalities existing in the West Bank is the Jordanian law number 29 passed in 1955.

Since the year 1967 the Israeli military commander has amended the Jordanian law several times thus making it more centralized. Israeli order number 418 issued on February 23, 1967 gave all powers concerning the municipalities of internal affairs by the Jordanian law to the military governor.

Gaza did not practice municipal or semi-municipal elections since the year 1948 (the British mandate). The Egyptian and the Israeli authorities practiced a right of appointing municipal councils in Gaza's major population centers, Khan Younis, Deir-El-Baleh, Rafah, and Gaza City.

Major Palestinian cities lack economic infrastructure such as electricity, clean drinking water, roads, pavements, transport, and communication.

There is a number of small and nearby municipalities that could be merged into one providing a greater capacity for planning and carrying on large developmental projects. There is also a possibility for combining a number of villages that lies near

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executing their tasks. Part four will provide possible solutions to existing problems.

2) Determine present tasks of all municipalities.

3) Identify constraints and problems facing municipalities [illegible]

each other to form one municipality.

Implementing agency

DATA studies and collaborates with a Negev-based, non-profit, independent institute, founded in 1991 to serve the Palestinian society and contribute to its economic and social development.

DATA's main objective is to provide easy access to accurate and up-to-date information to all institutions working in the area in order to encourage investment in the West Bank and Gaza.

DATA has taken on several projects since its establishment, most notably one entitled by the titles "Prospects for Post-PA Peace: the Integration and Disintegration of the Palestinian Economy in the Event of Final Status Solution" and "Middle Eastern Peace Through Regional Cooperation". In the beginning, DATA's main purpose was finding out the exact number of licenced businesses in the West Bank. DATA, in addition to setting training courses on health, safety prevention and personnel selection, furthermore DATA provides economic counseling on investment issues and has recently initiated a special unit for this cause.

7. **Target group**

The project will be conducted utilizing the twenty eight municipalities in the West Bank and the four municipalities in Gaza as the target.

8. **Objectives**

1) Demonstrate the importance of municipalities in the development process.

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XIV - Project Budget

Expenditures

Personnel Cost	U.S.$
Project Leader	[illegible]
Economist	[illegible]
Lawyer	[illegible]
Public Administration expert	[illegible]
Research Assistants (5)	[illegible]
Secretary/ Data Entry	[illegible]
Personnel Subtotal	[illegible]
Operational Expenses	
Transportation	[illegible]
Workshops	[illegible]
Perfis de Profissionais	[illegible]
Photocopying	[illegible]
Supplies	[illegible]
Computer	[illegible]
Contingency	[illegible]
Operational Subtotal	[illegible]
Administration	
Office Space	[illegible]
Other Supplies for the Office	[illegible]
Communications	[illegible]
Administration Subtotal	[illegible]
Grand Total	[illegible]

9. Workshops

Three workshops will be held during the course of the study. The first one will be held after the completion of parts one, two and three. The second workshop will be held at the end of part four and the third after the completion of part five. In each workshop the findings will be presented and discussed in the presence of municipalities representatives

and experts in the field of development planning (most likely international experts from the UN, EC and other professional organizations) so as to acquire as much input possible. A final workshop will be held after the finalization of the study to unfold main results.

11. Project team

The study will be carried out by a multi-disciplinary team of local professionals. The team will consist of a project leader (Director of Planning Amsterdam municipality), a urban economist, a lawyer, a public administration expert, a data analyst, and three research assistants. As well as secretarial services (typing, photocopying, telephone, and computer facilities).

12. Project programme

1. Task assignment

In January 1994, the project leader will have a series of meetings with the team to discuss in greater detail the scope of the study, possibly conducted each task, the order the tasks will be carried out, and the allocation of each task on the team.

2. Data compilation and analysis

Part one of the study will place emphasis on the role of municipalities in the past and on the present. Focus in this part will be placed on how effective municipalities were in the planning and development in areas under their jurisdiction. Part two will identify the major issues and their contribution to economic and social development. Part three will consider present internal (i.e. fund, human resources, and management) and external (the cooperation of citizens and the support of the judicial and executive authorities) problems facing municipalities in

executing their tasks. Part four will provide possible solutions to existing problems. The recommendations can be as honest and direct as to suggest that ruling authority ease all or some restrictions. They can even suggest that areas under the jurisdiction of a certain municipality be given away to another municipality or those that have been taken away from a certain municipalities be returned back to them to better serve the development process. Part five will set an outline specifying the tasks and the structure under which municipalities would be operate, governed by a political Palestinian entity. Under this section existing laws might be eliminated and new ones might be added.

14. Reporting

A comprehensive final report that would entail detailed account of methodology(s) used, data gathered, results obtained, and recommendations provided will be submitted to the concerned parties. The report will be divided as follows:

1. Literature: A summary of all available literature on municipalities.
2. Project description.
3. Methodology(s) used.
4. Data gathered.
5. Results obtained.
6. Recommendations to improve municipalities' current operating situation.
7. Anticipated tasks and structure of municipalities under a political Palestinian entity.
8. Sample questionnaires and interviews.
9. References.

All financial statements relating to the study will be submitted on time and in full

to the concerned party.

14. Monitoring

The project leader will report directly to the director of DATA whose job is to ensure that the project is proceeding according to schedule and in compliance with the methodology and objectives stated. An interim monitoring report will be submitted through DATA after the conclusion of parts one, two and three.

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Gaza-Jericho Agreement Annex IV - Economic Protocol

29 Apr 1994

GAZA-JERICHO AGREEMENT

ANNEX IV
Protocol on Economic Relations between the Government of the State of Israel and the P.L.O., representing the Palestinian people

Paris, April 29, 1994

PREAMBLE

The two parties view the economic domain as one of the cornerstone in their mutual relations with a view to enhance their interest in the achievement of a just, lasting and comprehensive peace. Both parties shall cooperate in this field in order to establish a sound economic base for these relations, which will be governed in various economic spheres by the principles of mutual respect of each other's economic interests, reciprocity, equity and fairness.

This protocol lays the groundwork for strengthening the economic base of the Palestinian side and for exercising its right of economic decision making in accordance with its own development plan and priorities. The two parties recognise each other's economic ties with other markets and the need to create a better economic environment for their peoples and individuals.

Article I
FRAMEWORK AND SCOPE OF THIS PROTOCOL

1. This protocol establishes the contractual agreement that will govern the economic relations between the two sides and will cover the West Bank and the Gaza Strip during the interim period. The implementation will be according to the stages envisaged in the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self Government Arrangements signed in Washington D.C. on September 13, 1993 and the Agreed Minutes thereto. It will therefore begin in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area and at a later stage will also apply to the rest of the West Bank, according to the provisions of the Interim Agreement and to any other agreed arrangements between the two sides.

2. This Protocol, including its Appendixes, will be incorporated into the Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area (in this Protocol - the Agreement), will be an integral part thereof and interpreted accordingly. This paragraph refers solely to the Gaza Strip and the

Jericho Area.

3. This Protocol will come into force upon the signing of the Agreement.

4. For the purpose of this Protocol, the term "Areas" means the areas under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority, according to the provisions of the Agreement regarding territorial jurisdiction. The Palestinian Jurisdiction in the subsequent agreements could cover areas, spheres or functions according to the Interim Agreement. Therefore, for the purpose of this Protocol, whenever applied, the term "Areas" shall be interpreted to mean functions and spheres also, as the case may be, with the necessary adjustments.

Article II
THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE

1. Both parties will establish a Palestinian-Israeli Joint Economic Committee (hereinafter - the JEC) to follow up the implementation of this Protocol and to decide on problems related to it that may arise from time to time. Each side may request the review of any issue related to this Agreement by the JEC.

2. The JEC will serve as the continuing committee for economic cooperation envisaged in Annex III of the Declaration of Principles.

3. The JEC will consist of an equal number of members from each side and may establish sub-committees specified in this Protocol. A sub-committee may include experts as necessary.

4. The JEC and its sub-committees shall reach their decisions by agreement and shall determine their rules of procedure and operation, including the frequency and place or places of their meetings.

Article III
IMPORT TAXES AND IMPORT POLICY

1. The import and customs policies of both sides will be according to the principles and arrangements detailed in this Article.

2.

   a. The Palestinian Authority will have all powers and responsibilities in the sphere of import and customs policy and procedures with regard to the following:

      1. Goods on List A1, attached hereto as Appendix I locally-produced in Jordan and in Egypt particularly and in the other Arab countries, which the Palestinians will be able to import in quantities agreed upon by the two sides up to the Palestinian market needs as estimated according to para 3 below.
      2. Goods on List A2, attached hereto as Appendix II, from the Arab, Islamic and other countries, which the Palestinians will be able to import in quantities agreed upon by the two sides up to the Palestinian market needs as estimated according to para 3 below.

   b. The import policy of the Palestinian Authority for Lists A1 and A2 will include independently determining and changing from time to time the rates of customs, purchase tax, levies, excises and other charges, the regulation of licensing requirements and procedures and of standard requirements. The valuation for custom purposes will be based upon the GATT 1994 agreement as of the date it will be introduced in Israel, and until then - on the Brussels Definition of Valuation (BDV)

system. The classification of goods will be based on the principles of "the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System". Concerning imports referred to in Article VII of this Protocol (Agriculture), the provisions of that Article will apply.

3. For the purposes of para 2(a) above, the Palestinian market needs for 1994 will be estimated by a sub-committee of experts. These estimates will be based on the best available data regarding past consumption, production, investment and external trade of the Areas. The sub-committee will submit its estimate within three months from the signing of the Agreement. These estimates will be reviewed and updated every six months by the sub-committee, on the basis of the best data available regarding the latest period for which relevant data are available, taking into consideration all relevant economic and social indicators. Pending an agreement on the Palestinian market needs, the previous period's estimates adjusted for population growth and rise in per-capita GNP in the previous period, will serve as provisional estimate.

4. The Palestinian Authority will have all powers and responsibilities to independently determine and change from time to time the rates of customs, purchase taxes; levies, excises and other charges on the goods on List B, attached hereto as Appendix III, of basic food items and other goods for the Palestinian economic development program, imported by the Palestinians to the Areas.

5.

   a. With respect to all goods not specified in Lists AI, A2 and B, and with respect to quantities exceeding those determined in accordance with paras 2(a) & 3 above (hereinafter - the Quantities), the Israeli rates of customs, purchase tax, levies, excises and other charges, prevailing at the date of signing of the Agreement , as changed from time to time, shall serve as the minimum basis for the Palestinian Authority. The Palestinian Authority may decide on any upward changes in the rates on these goods and exceeding quantities when imported by the Palestinians to the Areas.

   b. With respect to all goods not specified in Lists A1 and A2, and with respect to quantities exceeding the Quantities, Israel and the Palestinian Authority will employ for all imports the same system of importation, as stipulated in para 10 below, including inter alia standards, licensing, country of origin, valuation for customs purposes etc.

6. Each side will notify the other side immediately of changes made in rates and in other matters of import policy, regulations and procedures, determined by it within its respective powers and responsibilities as detailed in this Article. With regard to changes which do not require immediate application upon decision, there will be a process of advance notifications and mutual consultations which will take into consideration all aspects and economic implications.

7. The Palestinian Authority will levy VAT at one rate on both locally produced goods and services and on imports by the Palestinians (whether covered by the three Lists mentioned above or not), and may fix it at the level of 15% to 16%.

8. Goods imported from Jordan, Egypt and other Arab countries according to para 2(a)(1) above (List AI) will comply with rules of origin agreed upon by a joint sub-committee within three months of the date of the signing of the Agreement. Pending an agreement, goods will be considered to have been "locally produced" in any of those countries if they conform with all the following:

a.

i. They have been wholly grown, produced, or manufactured in that country, or have been substantially transformed there into new or different goods, having a new name, character, or use, distinct from the goods or materials from which they were so transformed;
ii. They have been imported directly from the said country;
iii. The value or the costs of the materials produced in that country, plus the direct processing costs in it, do not fall short of 30 percent of the export value of the goods. This rate may be reviewed by the joint committee mentioned in para 16 a year after the signing of the Agreement.
iv. The goods are accompanied by an internationally recognized certificate of origin;
v. No goods will be deemed as substantially new or different goods, and no material will be eligible for inclusion as domestic content, by virtue of having merely undergone simple combining or packaging, or dilution with water or other substances, which do not materially alter the characteristics of the said goods.

9. Each side will issue import licences to its own importers, subject to the principles of this Article and will be responsible for the implementation of the licensing requirements and procedures prevailing at the time of the issuance of the licenses. Mutual arrangements will be made for the exchange of information relevant to licensing matters.

10. Except for the goods on Lists Al and A2 and their Quantities - in which the Palestinian Authority has all powers and responsibilities, both sides will maintain the same import policy (except for rates of import taxes and other charges for goods in List B) and regulations including classification, valuation and other customs procedures, which are based on the principles governing international codes, and the same policies of import licensing and of standards for imported goods, all as applied by Israel with respect to its importation. Israel may from time to time introduce changes in any of the above, provided that changes in standard requirements will not constitute a non-tariff-barrier and will be based on considerations of health, safety and the protection of the environment in conformity with Article 2.2. of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to trade of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations. Israel will give the Palestinian Authority prior notice of any such changes, and the provisions of para 6 above will apply.

11.

a. The Palestinian Authority will determine its own rates of customs and purchase tax on motor vehicles imported as such, to be registered with the Palestinian Authority. The vehicle standards will be those applied at the date of the signing of the Agreement as changed according to para 10 above. However, the Palestinian Authority may request, through the sub-committee on transportation, that in special cases different standards will apply. Used motor vehicles will be imported only if they are passenger cars or dual-purpose passenger cars of a model of no more than three years prior to the importation year. The sub-committee on transportation will determine the procedures for testing and confirming that such used cars comply with the standards' requirements for that model year. The issue of importing commercial vehicles of a model prior to the importation year will be discussed in the joint sub-committee mentioned in para 16 below.

b. Each side may determine the terms and conditions for the transfer of motor vehicles registered in the other side to the

ownership or use of a resident of its own side, including the payment of the difference of import taxes, if any, and the vehicle having been tested and found compatible with the standards required at that time by its own registration administration, and may prohibit transfer of vehicles.

12.

a. Jordanian standards, as specified in the attached Appendix I, will be acceptable in importing petroleum products into the Areas, once they meet the average of the standards existing in the European Union countries, or the USA standards, which parameters have been set at the values prescribed for the geographical conditions of Israel, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Cases of petroleum products which do not meet these specifications will be referred to a joint experts' committee for a suitable solution. The committee may mutually decide to accept different standards for the importation of gasoline which meet the Jordanian standards even though, in some of their parameters, they do not meet the European Community or USA standards. The committee will give its decision within six months. Pending the committee's decision, and for not longer than six months of the signing of the Agreement, the Palestinian Authority may import to the Areas, gasoline for the Palestinian market in the Areas, according to the needs of this market, provided that:

    1. this gasoline is marked in a distinctive colour to differentiate it from the gasoline marketed in Israel; and
    2. the Palestinian Authority will take all the necessary steps to ensure that this gasoline is not marketed in Israel.

b. The difference in the final price of gasoline to consumers in Israel and to consumers in the Areas, will not exceed 15% of the official final consumer price in Israel. The Palestinian Authority has the right to determine the prices of petroleum products, other than gasoline, for consumption in the Areas.

c. If Egyptian gasoline standards will comply with the conditions of sub-para (a) above, the importation of Egyptian gasoline will also be allowed.

13. In addition to the points of exit and entry designated according to the Article regarding Passages in Annex I of the Agreement for the purpose of export and import of goods, the Palestinian side has the right to use all points of exit and entry in Israel designated for that purpose. The import and export of the Palestinians through the points of exit and entry in Israel will be given equal trade and economic treatment.

14. In the entry points of the Jordan River and the Gaza Strip:

    a. Freight shipment
    The Palestinian Authority will have full responsibility and powers in the Palestinian customs points (freight-area) for the implementation of the agreed upon customs and importation policy as specified in this protocol, including the inspection and the collection of taxes and other charges, when due.
    Israeli customs officials will be present and will receive from the Palestinian customs officials a copy of the necessary relevant documents related to the specific shipment and will be entitled to ask for inspection in their presence of both goods and tax collection.
    The Palestinian customs officials will be responsible for the handling of the customs procedure including the inspection and collection of due taxes.

In case of disagreement on the clearance of any shipment according to this Article, the shipment will be delayed for inspection for a maximum period of 48 hours during which a joint sub-committee will resolve the issue on the basis of the relevant provisions of this Article. The shipment will be released only upon the sub-committee's decision.

b. Passengers customs lane

Each side will administer its own passengers customs procedures, including inspection and tax collection. The inspection and collection of taxes due in the Palestinian customs lane will be conducted by customs officials of the Palestinian Authority.
Israeli customs officials will be invisibly present in the Palestinian customs lane and entitled to request inspection of goods and collection of taxes when due. In the case of suspicion, the inspection will be carried out by the Palestinian official in a separate room in the presence of the Israeli customs official.

15. The clearance of revenues from all import taxes and levies, between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, will be based on the principle of the place of final destination. In addition, these tax revenues will be allocated to the Palestinian Authority even if the importation was carried out by Israeli importers when the final destination explicitly stated in the import documentation is a corporation registered by the Palestinian Authority and conducting business activity in the Areas. This revenue clearance will be effected within six working days from the day of collection of the said taxes and levies.

16. The Joint Economic Committee or a sub-committee established by it for the purposes of this Article will deal inter alia with the following:

    1. Palestinian proposals for addition of items to Lists Al, A2 and B. Proposals for changes in rates and in import procedures, classification, standards and licensing requirements for all other imports;
    2. Estimate the Palestinian market needs, as mentioned in para 3 above;
    3. Receive notifications of changes and conduct consultations, as mentioned in para 6 above;
    4. Agree upon the rules of origin as mentioned in para 8 above, and review their implementation;
    5. Coordinate the exchange of information relevant to licensing matters as mentioned in para 9 above;
    6. Discuss and review any other matters concerning the implementation of this Article and resolve problems arising therefrom.

17. The Palestinian Authority will have the right to exempt the Palestinian returnees who will be granted permanent residency in the Areas from import taxes on personal belongings including house appliances and passenger cars as long as they are for personal use.

18. The Palestinian Authority will develop its system for temporary entry of needed machines and vehicles used for the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian economic development plan.
Concerning other machines and equipment, not included in Lists Al, A2 and B, the temporary entry will be part of the import policy as agreed in para 10 above, until the joint sub-committee mentioned in para 16 decides upon a new system proposed by the Palestinian Authority. The temporary entry will be coordinated through the joint sub-committee.

19. Donations in kind to the Palestinian Authority will be exempted from

customs and other import taxes if destined and used for defined development projects or non-commercial humanitarian purposes. The Palestinian Authority will be responsible exclusively for planning and management of the donors' assistance to the Palestinian people. The Joint Economic Committee will discuss issues pertaining to the relations between the provisions in this Article and the implementation of the principles in the above paragraph.

Article IV
MONETARY AND FINANCIAL ISSUES

1. The Palestinian Authority will establish a Monetary Authority (PMA) in the Areas. The PMA will have the powers and responsibilities for the regulation and implementation of the monetary policies within the functions described in this Article.

2. The PMA will act as the Palestinian Authority's official economic and financial advisor.

3. The PMA will act as the Palestinian Authority's and the public sector entities' sole financial agent, locally and internationally.

4. The foreign currency reserves (including gold) of the Palestinian Authority and all Palestinian public sector entities will be deposited solely with the PMA and managed by it.

5. The PMA will act as the lender of last resort for the banking system in the Areas.

6. The PMA will authorize foreign exchange dealers in the Areas and will exercise control (regulation and supervision) over foreign exchange transactions within the Areas and with the rest of the world.

7.

   a. The PMA will have a banking supervision department that will be responsible for the proper functioning, stability, solvency and liquidity of the banks operating in the Areas.

   b. The banking supervision department will predicate its supervision on the international principles and standards reflected in international conventions and especially on the principles of the "Basle Committee".

   c. The supervision department will be charged with the general supervision of every such bank, including:

      - The regulation of all kinds of banking activities, including their foreign activities;
      - The licensing of banks formed locally and of branches, subsidiaries, joint ventures and representative offices of foreign banks and the approval of controlling shareholders;
      - The supervision and inspection of banks.

• The PMA will relicense each of the five branches of the Israeli banks operating at present in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, as soon as its location or the authorities regarding it come under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority. These branches will be required to comply with the general rules and regulations of the PMA concerning foreign banks, based on the "Basle Concordat". Para I0 d, e, and f below will apply to these branches.

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   a. Any other Israeli bank wishing to open a branch or a subsidiary in the Areas will apply for a license to the PMA and will be treated equally to other foreign banks, provided that the same will apply to the Palestinian banks wishing to open a branch or a subsidiary in Israel.

b. Granting of a license by both authorities will be subject to the following arrangements based on the "Basle Concordat" valid on the date of signing of the Agreement and to the host authority's prevailing general rules and regulations concerning opening of branches and subsidiaries of foreign banks.
In this para 10 "host authority" and "home authority" apply only to the Bank of Israel (BOI) and the PMA.

c. A bank wishing to open a branch or establish a subsidiary will apply to the host authority, having first obtained the approval of its home authority. The host authority will notify the home authority of the terms of the license, and will give its final approval unless the home authority objects.

d. The home authority will be responsible for the consolidated and comprehensive supervision of banks, inclusive of branches and subsidiaries in the area under the jurisdiction of the host authority. However, the distribution of supervision responsibilities between the home and the host authorities concerning subsidiaries will be according to the "Basle Concordat".

e. The host authority will regularly examine the activities of branches and subsidiaries in the area under its jurisdiction. The home authority will have the right to conduct on site examinations in the branches and subsidiaries in the host area. However, the supervision responsibilities of the home authority concerning subsidiaries will be according to the "Basle Concordat".
Accordingly, each authority will transfer to the other authority copies of its examination reports and any information relevant to the solvency, stability and soundness of the banks, their branches and subsidiaries.

f. The BOI and the PMA will establish a mechanism for cooperation and for the exchange of information on issues of mutual interest.

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a. The New Israeli Sheqel (NIS) will be one of the circulating currencies in the Areas and will legally serve there as means of payment for all purposes including official transactions. Any circulating currency, including the NIS, will be accepted by the Palestinian Authority and by all its institutions, local authorities and banks, when offered as a means of payment for any transaction.

b. Both sides will continue to discuss, through the JEC, the possibility of introducing mutually agreed Palestinian currency or temporary alternative currency arrangements for the Palestinian Authority.

•

a. The liquidity requirements on all deposits in banks operating in the Areas will be determined and announced by the PMA.

b. Banks in the Areas will accept NIS deposits. The liquidity requirements on the various kinds of NIS deposits (or deposit linked to the NIS) in banks operating in the Areas will not be less than 4% to 8%, according to the type of deposits. Changes of over 1% in the liquidity requirements on NIS deposits (or deposits linked to the NIS) in Israel will call for corresponding changes in the above mentioned rates.

c. The supervision and inspection of the implementation of all liquidity requirements will be carried out by the PMA.

d. The reserves and the liquid assets required according to this paragraph will be deposited at the PMA according to rules and regulations determined by it. Penalties for non compliance with the

liquidity requirements will be determined by the PMA.

- The PMA will regulate and administer a discount window system and the supply of temporary finance for banks operating in the Areas.

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a. The PMA will establish or license a clearing house in order to clear money orders between the banks operating in the Areas, and with other clearing houses.

b. The clearing of money orders and transactions between banks operating in the Areas and banks operating in Israel will be done between the Israeli and the Palestinian clearing houses on same working day basis, according to agreed arrangements.

- Both sides will allow correspondential relations between each others' banks.

- The PMA will have the right to convert at the BOI excess NIS received from banks operating in the Areas into foreign currency, in which the BOI trades in the domestic inter-bank market, up to the amounts determined per period, according to the arrangements detailed in para 16 below.

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a. The excess amount of NIS, due to balance of payments flows, that the PMA will have the right to convert into foreign currency, will be equal to:

1. Estimates of all Israeli "imports" of goods and services from the Areas, valued at market prices (inclusive of taxes), which were paid for in NIS, less:
    i. the taxes collected by the Palestinian Authority on all Israeli "imports" from the Areas and rebated to Israel in NIS, and
    ii. the taxes collected by Israel on all Israeli "imports" from the Areas and included in their market value, and not rebated to the Palestinian Authority,

minus

2. Estimates of all Israeli "exports" of goods and services to the Areas, valued at market prices (inclusive of taxes), which were paid for in NIS, less
    i. the taxes collected by Israel on such "exports" and rebated to the Palestinian Authority, and
    ii. the taxes collected by the Palestinian Authority on such "exports" and included in their market value, and not rebated to Israel;

plus

3. The accumulated net amounts of foreign currency converted previously into NIS by the PMA, as recorded in the BOI Dealing Room.

b. The said flows and amounts will be calculated as of the date of the signing of the Agreement.

Notes to para 16:

i. The estimates of the said "exports and imports" of goods and services will include inter alia labor services, NIS expenditure of tourists and Israelis in the Areas and NIS expenditure of Palestinians of the Areas in Israel.

ii. Taxes and pension contributions on "imports" of labor services, paid to "importing" side and rebated to the "exporting" one, will not be included in the estimates of the sums to be converted, as the "exports'" earnings of labor services are recorded in the statistics inclusive of them, although they do not accrue to the individuals

supplying them.

• The PMA and the BOI will meet annually to discuss and determine the annual amount of convertible NIS during the following calendar year and will meet semi-annually to adjust the said amount. The amounts determined annually and adjusted semi-annually will be based on data and estimates regarding the past and on forecasts for the wi following period, according to the formula mentioned in para 16. The first meeting will be as soon as possible within three months after the date of the signing of the Agreement.

a. • The exchange of foreign currency for NIS and vice-versa by the PMA will be carried out through the BOI Dealing Room, at the market exchange rates.

b. The BOI will not be obliged to convert in any single month more than 1/5 of the semi-annual amount, as mentioned in para 17.

c. There will be no ceiling on the annual foreign currency conversions by the PMA into NIS. However, in order to avoid undesirable fluctuations in the foreign exchange market, monthly ceilings of such conversions will be agreed upon in the annual and semi-annual meetings referred to in para 17.

d. Banks in the Areas will convert NIS into other circulating currencies and vice-versa.

e. The Palestinian Authority will have the authorities, powers and responsibilities regarding the regulation and supervision of capital activities in the Areas, including the licensing of capital market institutions, finance companies and investment funds.

Article V
DIRECT TAXATION

1. Israel and the Palestinian Authority will each determine and regulate independently its own tax policy in matters of direct taxation, including income tax on individuals and corporations, property taxes, municipal taxes and fees.

2. Each tax administration will have the right to levy the direct taxes generated by economic activities within its area.

3. Each tax administration may impose additional taxes on residents within its area on (individuals and corporations) who conduct economic activities in the other side's area.

4. Israel will transfer to the Palestinian Authority a sum equal to:

    a. 75% of the income taxes collected from Palestinians from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area employed in Israel.
    b. The full amount of income taxes collected from Palestinians from the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area employed in the settlements.

5. The two sides will agree on a set of procedures that will address all issues concerning double taxation.

Article VI
INDIRECT TAXES ON LOCAL PRODUCTION

1. The Israel and the Palestinian tax administrations will levy and collect VAT and purchase taxes on local production, as well as any other indirect taxes, in their respective areas.

2. The purchase tax rates within the jurisdiction of each tax administration will be identical as regards locally produced and

imported goods.

3. The present Israeli VAT rate is 17%. The Palestinian VAT rate will be 15% to 16%.

4. The Palestinian Authority will decide on the maximum annual turnover for businesses under its jurisdiction to be exempt from VAT, within an upper limit of 12,000 US $.

5. The VAT on purchases by businesses registered for VAT purposes will accrue to the tax administration with which the respective business is registered.
   Businesses will register for VAT purposes with the tax administration of the side of their residence, or on the side of their ongoing operation.
   There will be clearance of VAT revenues between the Israeli and Palestinian VAT administrations on the following conditions:

   a. The VAT clearance will apply to VAT on transactions between businesses registered with the VAT administration of the side in which they reside.

   b. The following procedures will apply to clearance of VAT revenues accruing from transactions by businesses registered for VAT purposes:

      1. To be acceptable for clearance purposes, special invoices, clearly marked for this purpose, will be used for transactions between businesses registered with the different sides.
      2. The invoices will be worded either in both Hebrew and Arabic or in English and will be filled out in any of these three languages, provided that the figures are written in "Arabic" (not Hindi) numerals.
      3. For the purpose of tax rebates, such invoices will be valid for six months from their date of issue.
      4. Representatives of the two sides will meet once a month, on the 20th day of the month, to present each other with a list of invoices submitted to them for tax rebate, for VAT clearance. This list will include the following details regarding each invoice:
         a. The number of the registered business issuing it;
         b. The name of the registered business issuing it;
         c. The number of the invoice;
         d. The date of issue;
         e. The amount of the invoice;
         f. The name of the recipient of the invoice.
      5. The clearance claims will be settled within 6 days from the meeting, through a payment by the side with the net balance of claims against it, to the other side.
      6. Each side will provide the other side, upon demand, with invoices for verification purposes. Each tax administration will be responsible for providing invoices for verification purposes for 6 months after receiving them.
      7. Each side will take the necessary measure to verify the authenticity of the invoices presented to it for clearance by the other side.
      8. Claims for VAT clearance which will not be found valid will be deducted from the next clearance payment.
      9. Once an inter-connected computer system for tax rebates to businesses and for VAT clearance between the two sides is operational, it will replace the clearance procedures specified in sub-paras (4) - (8).
      10. The two tax administrations will exchange lists of the businesses registered with them and will provide each

other with the necessary documentation, if required, for the verification of transactions.

11. The two sides will establish a sub-committee which will deal with the implementation arrangements regarding the clearance of VAT revenues set above.

6. VAT paid by not-for-profit Palestinian organizations and institutions, registered by the Palestinian Authority, on transactions in Israel, will accrue to the Palestinian tax administration. The clearance system set out in para 5 will apply to these organizations and institutions.

Article VII
LABOR

1. Both sides will attempt to maintain the normality of movement of labor between them, subject to each side's right to determine from time to time the extent and conditions of the labor movement into its area. If the normal movement is suspended temporarily by either side, it will give the other side immediate notification, and the other side may request that the matter be discussed in the Joint Economic Committee.
   The placement and employment of workers from one side in the area of the other side will be through the employment service of the other side and in accordance with the other sides' legislation. The Palestinian side has the right to regulate the employment of Palestinian labor in Israel through the Palestinian employment service, and the Israeli Employment Service will cooperate and coordinate in this regard.

2.
   a. Palestinians employed in Israel will be insured in the Israeli social insurance system according to the National Insurance Law for employment injuries that occur in Israel, bankruptcy of employers and maternity leave allowance.

   b. The National Insurance fees deducted from the wages for maternity insurance will be reduced according to the reduced scope of maternity insurance, and the equalization deductions transferred to the Palestinian Authority, if levied, will be increased accordingly.

   c. Implementation procedures relating thereto will be agreed upon between the Israeli National Insurance Institute and the Palestinian Authority or the appropriate Palestinian social insurance institution.

3.
   a. Israel will transfer to the Palestinian Authority, on a monthly basis, the equalization deductions as defined by Israeli legislation, if imposed and to the extent levied by Israel. The sums so transferred will be used for social benefits and health services, decided upon by the Palestinian Authority, for Palestinians employed in Israel and for their families.
      The equalization deductions to be so transferred will be those collected after the date of the signing of the Agreement from wages of Palestinians employed in Israel and from their employers.
      These sums will not include
      1. Payments for health services in places of employment.
      2. 2/3 of the actual administrative costs in handling the matters related to the Palestinians employed in Israel by the Payments Section of the Israeli Employment Service.

4. Israel will transfer, on a monthly basis, to a relevant pension

insurance institution to be established by the Palestinian Authority, pension insurance deductions collected after the establishment of the above institution and the completion of the documents mentioned in para 6.
These deductions will be collected from wages of Palestinians employed in Israel and their employers, according to the relevant rates set out in the applicable Israeli collective agreements. 2/3 of the actual administrative costs in handling these deductions by the Israeli Employment Service will be deducted from the sums transferred. The sums so transferred will be used for providing pension insurance for these workers. Israel will continue to be liable for pension rights of the Palestinian employees in Israel, to the extent accumulated by Israel before the entry into force of this para 4.

5. Upon the receipt of the deductions, the Palestinian Authority and its relevant social institutions will assume full responsibility in accordance with the Palestinian legislation and arrangements, for pension rights and other social benefits of Palestinians employed in Israel, that accrue from the transferred deductions related to these rights and benefits. Consequently, Israel and its relevant social institutions and the Israeli employers will be released from, and will not be held liable for any obligations and responsibilities concerning personal claims, rights and benefits arising from these transferred deductions, or from the provisions of paras 2-4 above.

6. Prior to the said transfers, the Palestinian Authority or its relevant institutions, as the case may be, will provide Israel with the documents required to give legal effect to their aforesaid obligations, including mutually agreed implementation procedures of the principles agreed upon in paras 3-5 above.

7. The above arrangements concerning equalization deductions and/or pension deductions may be reviewed and changed by Israel if an authorized court in Israel will determine that the deductions or any part thereof must be paid to individuals, or used for individual social benefits or insurance in Israel, or that it is otherwise unlawful. In such a case the liability of the Palestinian side will not exceed the actual transferred deductions related to the case.

8. Israel will respect any agreement reached between the Palestinian Authority, or an organization or trade-union representing the Palestinians employed in Israel, and a representative organization of employees or employers in Israel, concerning contributions to such organization according to any collective agreement.

9.
    a. The Palestinian Authority may integrate the existing health insurance scheme for Palestinians employed in Israel and their families in its health insurance services. As long as this scheme continues, whether integrated or separately, Israel will deduct from their wages the health insurance fees ("health stamp") and will transfer them to the Palestinian Authority for this purpose.

    b. The Palestinian Authority may integrate the existing health insurance scheme for Palestinians who were employed in Israel and are receiving pension payments through the Israeli Employment Service, in its health insurance services. As long as this scheme continues, whether integrated or separately, Israel will deduct the necessary sum of health insurance fees ("health stamp") from the equalization payments and will transfer them to the Palestinian Authority for this purpose.

10. The JEC will meet upon the request of either side and review the implementation of this Article and other issues concerning labor, social insurance and social rights.

11. Other deductions not mentioned above, if any, will be jointly reviewed by the JEC. Any agreement between the two sides concerning these deductions will be in addition to the above provisions.

12. Palestinians employed in Israel will have the right to bring disputes arising out of employee - employer relationships and other issues before the Israeli Labor Courts, within these courts' jurisdiction.

13. This Article governs the future labor relations between the two sides and will not impair any labor rights prior to the date of signing of the Agreement.

AC - rejected

Article VIII
AGRICULTURE

1. There will be free movement of agricultural produce, free of customs and import taxes, between the two sides, subject to the following exceptions and arrangements.

2. The official veterinary and plant protection services of each side will be responsible, within the limits of their respective jurisdiction, for controlling animal health, animal products and biological products, and plants and parts thereof, as well as their importation and exportation.

3. The relations between the official veterinary and plant protection services of both sides will be based on mutuality in accordance with the following principles, which will be applied in all the areas under their respective jurisdiction:

    a. Israel and the Palestinian Authority will do their utmost to preserve and improve the veterinary standards.
    b. Israel and the Palestinian Authority will take all measures to reach equivalent and compatible standards regarding animal disease control, including mass vaccination of animals and avians, quarantines, "stamping out" measures and residue control standards.
    c. Mutual arrangements will be made to prevent the introduction and spread of plant pests and diseases, for their eradication and concerning residue control standards in plant products.
    d. The official veterinary and plant protection services of Israel and the Palestinian Authority will coordinate and regularly exchange information regarding animal diseases, as well as plant pests and diseases, and will establish a mechanism for immediate notification of the outbreak of such diseases.

4. Trade between the two sides in animals, animal products and biological products will be in keeping with the principles and definitions set out in the current edition of the OIE National Animal Health Code as updated from time to time (hereinafter - I.A.H.C.).

5. Transit of livestock, animal products and biological products from one side through the area under the jurisdiction of the other side, should be conducted in a manner aimed at the prevention of diseases spreading to or from the consignment during its movement. For such a transit to be permitted, it is a prerequisite that the veterinary conditions agreed upon by both sides will be met in regard to importation of animals, their products and biological products from external markets. Therefore the parties agree to the following arrangements.

6. The official veterinary services of each side have the authority to issue veterinary import permits for import of animals, animal products and biological products to the areas under its jurisdiction. In order to prevent the introduction of animal diseases from third parties, the following procedures will be adopted:

a. The import permits will strictly follow the professional veterinary conditions for similar imports to Israel as prevailing at the time of their issuance. The permits will specify the country of origin and the required conditions to be included in the official veterinary certificates which should be issued by the veterinary authorities in the countries of origin and which should accompany each consignment.
Each side may propose a change in these conditions. The change will come into force 10 days after notice to the other side, unless the other side requested that the matter be brought before the Veterinary Sub-Committee specified in para 14 (hereinafter - VSC). If it is more stringent than the prevailing conditions - it will come into force 20 days after the request, unless both sides decide otherwise through the VSC, and if more lenient - it will come into force only if agreed upon by both sides through the VSC. However, if the change is urgent and needed for the protection of animal and public health, it will come into force immediately after notice by the other side and will remain in force unless and until both sides agree otherwise through the VSC.

b. The official veterinary certificates will include the provisions regarding OIE Lists A & B Diseases as specified in the I.A.H.C. When the I.A.H.C. allows alternative requirements regarding the same disease, the most stringent one will be adopted unless otherwise agreed upon by the VSC.

c. When infectious diseases which are not included in Lists A & B of the I.A.H.C. exist or are suspected, on scientific grounds, to exist in the exporting country, the necessary veterinary import conditions that will be required and included in the official veterinary certificates, will be discussed in the VSC, and in the case of different professional opinions, the most stringent ones will be adopted.

d. The import of live vaccines will be permitted only if so decided by the VSC.

e. Both sides will exchange, through the VSC, information pertaining to import licensing, including the evaluation of the disease situation and zoosanitary capability of exporting countries, which will be based upon official information as well as upon other available data.

f. Consignments which do not conform with the above mentioned requirements will not be permitted to enter the areas under the jurisdiction of either side.

7. Transportation of livestock and poultry and of animal products and biological products between areas under the jurisdiction of one side through areas under the jurisdiction of the other side, will be subject to the following technical rules:

a. The transportation will be by vehicles which will be sealed with a seal of the official veterinary services of the place of origin and marked with a visible sign "Animal Transportation" or "Products of Animal Origin" in Arabic and Hebrew, in coloured and clearly visible letters on white background;

b. Each consignment will be accompanied by a veterinary certificate issued by the official veterinary services of the place of origin, certifying that the animals or their products were examined and are free of infectious diseases and originate from a place which is not under quarantine or under animal movement restrictions.

8. Transportation of livestock and poultry, animal products and biological

products destined for Israel from the Areas and vice versa will be subject to veterinary permits issued by the official veterinary services of the recipient side, in keeping with the OIE standards used in international traffic in this field. Each such consignment will be transported by a suitable and marked vehicle, accompanied by a veterinary certificate in the form agreed upon between the official veterinary services of both sides. Such certificates will be issued only if permits of the recipient side are presented.

9. In order to prevent the introduction of plant pests and diseases to the region, the following procedures will be adopted:

    a. The transportation between the Areas and Israel, of plants and parts thereof (including fruits and vegetables), the control of pesticide residues in them and the transportation of plant propagation material and of animal feed, may be inspected without delay or damage by the plant protection services of the recipient side.

    b. The transportation between the Areas through Israel of plants and parts thereof (including fruits and vegetables) as well as of pesticides, may be required to pass a phytosanitary inspection without delay or damage.

    c. The official Palestinian plant protection services have the authority to issue permits for the import of plants and parts thereof as well as of pesticides from external markets. The permits will be based on the prevailing standards and requirements.
    The permits will specify the required conditions to be included in the official Phytosanitary Certificates (hence P.C.) based upon the standards and the requirements of the International Plant Protection Convention (I.P.P.C.)and those of the European and Mediterranean Plant Protection Organization (E.P.P.O.) which should accompany each consignment. The P.C.'s will be issued by the plant protection services in the countries of origin. Dubious or controversial cases will be brought before the sub-committee on plant protection.

10. The agricultural produce of both sides will have free and unrestricted access to each others' markets, with the temporary exception of sales from one side to the other side of the following items only: poultry, eggs, potatoes, cucumbers, tomatoes and melons. The temporary restrictions on these items will be gradually removed on an increasing scale until they are finally eliminated by 1998, as listed below:

Year	Poultry (tons)	Eggs (millions)	Potatoes (tons)	Cucumbers (tons)	Tomatoes (tons)	Melons (tons)
1994	5,000	30	10,000	10,000	13,000	10,000
1995	6,000	40	13,000	13,000	16,000	13,000
1996	7,000	50	15,000	15,000	19,000	15,000
1997	8,000	60	17,000	17,000	22,000	17,000
1998	unlimited	unlimited	unlimited	unlimited	unlimited	unlimited

Note: The above figures refer to the combined quantities marketed from the West Bank and Gaza Strip to Israel and vice-versa. The Palestinian Authority will notify Israel the apportioning of these quantities between these areas concerning the quantities pertaining to the Palestinian produce.

11. The Palestinians will have the right to export their agricultural produce to external markets without restrictions, on the basis of certificates of origin issued by the Palestinian Authority.

12. Without prejudice to obligations arising out of existing international agreements, the two sides will refrain from importing agricultural products from third parties which may adversely affect the interests of each other's farmers.

13. Each side will take the necessary measures in the area under its jurisdiction to prevent damage which may be caused by its agriculture to the environment of the other side.

14. The two sides will establish sub-committees of their respective official veterinary and plant protection services, which will update the information and review issues, policies and procedures in these fields. Any changes in the provisions of this Article will be agreed upon by both sides.

15. The two sides will establish a sub-committee of experts in the dairy sector in order to exchange information, discuss and coordinate their production in this sector so as to protect the interests of both sides. In principle, each side will produce according to its domestic consumption.

Article IX
INDUSTRY

1. There will be free movement of industrial goods free of any restrictions including customs and import taxes between the two sides, subject to each side's legislation.

2.
    a. The Palestinian side has the right to employ various methods in encouraging and promoting the development of the Palestinian industry by way of providing grants, loans, research and development assistance and direct-tax benefits. The Palestinian side has also the right to employ other methods of encouraging industry resorted to in Israel.
    b. Both sides will exchange information about the methods employed by them in the encouragement of their respective industries.
    c. Indirect tax rebates or benefits and other subsidies to sales shall not be allowed in trade between the two sides.

3. Each side will do its best to avoid damage to the industry of the other side and will take into consideration the concerns of the other side in its industrial policy.

4. Both sides will cooperate in the prevention of deceptive practices, trade in goods which may endanger health, safety and the environment and in goods of expired validity.

5. Each side will take the necessary measures in the area under its jurisdiction to prevent damage which may be caused by its industry to the environment of the other side.

6. The Palestinians will have the right to export their industrial produce to external markets without restrictions, on the basis of certificates of origin issued by the Palestinian Authority.

7. The JEC will meet and review issues pertaining to this Article.

Article X
TOURISM

1. The Palestinian Authority will establish a Palestinian Tourism Authority which will exercise, inter alia, the following powers in the Areas.

    a. Regulating, licensing, classifying and supervising tourist

services, sites and industries.

b. Promoting foreign and domestic tourism and developing the Palestinian tourist resources and sites.

c. Supervising the marketing, promotion and information activities related to foreign and domestic tourism.

2. Each side shall, under its respective jurisdiction, protect, guard and ensure the maintenance and good upkeep of historical, archaeological, cultural and religious sites and all other tourist sites, to fit their status as well as their purpose as a destination for visitors.

3. Each side will determine reasonable visiting hours and days for all tourist sites in order to facilitate visits at a wide variety of days and hours, taking into consideration religious and national holidays. Each side shall publicize such opening times. Meaningful changes in the opening times will take into consideration tourist programs already committed to.

4. Tourist buses or any other form of tourist transport authorized by either side, and operated by companies registered and licensed by it, will be allowed to enter and proceed on their tour within the area under the jurisdiction of the other side, provided that such buses or other vehicles conform with the EEC technical specifications [I. currently adopted.] All such vehicles will be clearly marked as tourist vehicles.

5. Each side will protect the environment and the ecology around the tourist sites under its jurisdiction. In view of the importance of beaches and maritime activities for tourism, each side will do its best efforts to ensure that development and construction on the Mediterranean coast, and especially at ports (such as Ashqelon or Gaza), will be planned and carried out in a manner that will not adversely affect the ecology, environment or the functions of the coastline and beaches of the other side.

6. Tourism companies and agencies licensed by either side shall enjoy equal access to tourism - related facilities and amenities in border points of exit and entry according to the regulations of the authority operating them.

7.

a. Each side will license, according to its own rules and regulations, travel agents, tour companies, tour guides and other tourism businesses (hereinafter - tourism entities) within its jurisdiction.

b. Tourism entities authorized by either side, will be allowed to conduct tours that include the area under the jurisdiction of the other side, provided that their authorization as well as their operation will be in accordance with rules, professional requirements and standards agreed upon by both sides in the sub-committee mentioned in para 9.
Pending that agreement, existing tourism entities in the Areas which are currently allowed to conduct tours that include Israel, will be allowed to continue to do so, and Israeli authorized tourism entities will continue to be allowed to conduct tours that include the Areas.
In addition, any tourism entity of one side that the tourism authorities of the other side will certify as fulfilling all its rules, professional requirements and standards, will be allowed to conduct tours that include that other side.

8. Each side will make its own arrangement for compensation of tourists for bodily injury and property damages caused by political violence in the areas under its respective jurisdiction.

9. The JEC or a tourism sub-committee established by it shall meet upon the request of either side in order to discuss the implementation

of the provisions of this Article and resolve problems that may arise. The sub-committee will also discuss and consider tourist issues of benefit to both sides, and will promote educational programs for tourism entities of both sides in order to further their professional standards and their ethics. Complaints of one side against the behaviour of tourism entities of the other side will be channelled through the committee.

Note: It is agreed that the final wording in the last sentence in para 4 will be adopted according to the final wording in the relevant provisions of the Agreement.

Article XI
INSURANCE ISSUES

1. The authorities, powers and responsibilities in the insurance sphere in the Areas, including inter alia the licensing of insurers, insurance agents and the supervision of their activities, will be transferred to the Palestinian Authority.

2.
   a. The Palestinian Authority will maintain a compulsory absolute liability system for road accident victims with a ceiling on the amount of compensation based upon the following principles:
      1. Absolute liability for death or bodily injury to road accident victims, it being immaterial whether or not there was fault on the part of the driver and whether or not there was fault or contributory fault on the part of others, each driver being responsible for persons travelling in his vehicle and for pedestrians hit by his vehicle.
      2. Compulsory insurance for all motor vehicles, covering death or bodily injury to all road accident victims, including drivers.
      3. No cause of action in tort for death or bodily injury resulting from road accidents.
      4. The maintenance of a statutory fund (hereinafter - the Fund) for compensation of road accident victims who are unable to claim compensation from an insurer for the following reasons:
         i. the driver liable for compensation is unknown;
         ii. the driver is not insured or his insurance does not cover the liability involved; or
         iii. the insurer is unable to meet his liabilities.
      5. Terms in this Article will have the same meaning as in the legislation prevailing at the date of signing of the Agreement concerning compulsory motor vehicle insurance and compensation of road accident victims.
      6. Any change by either side in the rules and regulations regarding the implementation of the above mentioned principles will require prior notice to the other side. A change which might substantially affect the other side will require prior notice of at least three months.

3.
   a. Upon the signing of the Agreement the Palestinian Authority will establish a Fund for the Areas (hereinafter - the Palestinian Fund) for the purposes detailed in para 2(a)(4) above and for the purposes detailed below. The Palestinian Fund will assume the responsibilities of the statutory Road Accident Victims Compensation Fund in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (hereinafter - the Existing Fund) regarding the Areas, according to the prevailing law at that time. Accordingly, the Existing Fund will cease to be responsible for any liability

regarding accidents occurring in the Areas from the date of signing of the Agreement.

b. The Existing Fund will transfer to the Palestinian Fund, after the assumption of the above mentioned responsibilities by it, the premiums paid to the Existing Fund by the insurers for vehicles registered in the Areas, pro-rata to the unexpired period of each insurance policy.

4.

a. Compulsory motor vehicle insurance policies issued by insurers licensed by either side will be valid in the territories of both sides. Accordingly, a vehicle registered in one side covered by such a policy will not be required to have an additional insurance coverage for travel in the areas under the other side's jurisdiction. These insurance policies will cover all the liabilities according to the legislation of the place of the accident.

b. In order to cover part of the liabilities which may incur due to road accidents in Israel by uninsured vehicles registered in the Palestinian Authority, the Palestinian Fund will transfer to the Israeli Fund, on a monthly basis, for each insured vehicle, an amount equal to 30% of the amount paid to the Israeli Fund by an insurer registered in Israel, for the sat-ne type of vehicle, for the same period of insurance (which will not be less than 90 days).

5. In cases where a victim of a road accident wishes to claim compensation from an insurer registered by the other side or from the Fund of the other side or in cases where a driver or an owner of a car is sued by a victim, by an insurer or by the Fund of the other side, he may nominate the Fund of his side as his proxy for this purpose. The Fund so nominated may address any relevant party from the other side directly or through the other sides' Fund.

6. In the case of a road accident in which neither the registration number of the vehicle nor the identity of the driver are known, the Fund of the side which has jurisdiction over the place of the accident will compensate the victim, according to its own legislation.

7. The Fund of each side will be responsible towards the victims of the other side for any liability of the insurers of its side regarding the compulsory insurance and will guarantee their liabilities.

8. Each side will guarantee its Fund's liabilities according to this Article.

9. The two sides will negotiate within three months from the date of the signing of the Agreement a cut-off agreement between the Existing Fund and the Palestinian Fund concerning accidents which occurred in the Areas prior to the date of the signing of the Agreement, whether claims have been reported or not. The cut-off agreement will not include compensation for Israeli victims involved in accidents which occurred in the Areas prior to the date of the signing of the Agreement.

10.

a. The two sides will establish immediately upon the signing of the Agreement, a sub-committee of experts (hereinafter - the Sub-Committee) which will deal with issues regarding the implementation of this Article, including:

    1. Procedures concerning the handling of claims of victims of the one side from insurers or from the Fund of the other side;
    2. Procedures concerning the transfer of the amounts between the Funds of both sides as mentioned in para 4(b) above;

3. The details of the cut-off agreement between the Existing Fund and the Palestinian Fund, as set out in para 9 above;
4. Any other relevant issue raised by either side.

b. The Sub-Committee will act as a continuous committee for issues regarding this Article.

c. The two sides will exchange, through the Sub-Committee, the relevant information regarding the implementation of this Article, including police reports, medical information, relevant statistics, premiums, etc. The two sides will provide each other with any other assistance required in this regard.

11. Each side may require the re-examination of the arrangements set out in this Article a year after the date of the signing of the Agreement.

12. Insurers from both sides may apply for a license to the relevant authorities of the other side, according to the rules and regulations regarding foreign insurers in the latter side. The two sides agree not to discriminate against such applicants.

Done in Paris, this twenty ninth day of April, 1994

For the Government of Israel
Finance Minister Avraham Shohat

For the PLO
Abu Ala (Ahmed Korei)

From: Yair Hirschfeld April 18, 1994
to: Yossi Beilin

strictly confidential

PREPARING FOR ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN FINAL STATUS NEGOTIATIONS

I. STRATEGY PLANNING - THE PROPOSED PROCEDURE

1. The DoP signed on September 13, 1993, in Washington says under Article V/para 2 the following on final status negotiations:
"Permanent status negotiations will commence as soon as possible, but not later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period,..."
This committment creates the need for urgent strategy planning towards final status negotiations.

2. We propose that strategy planning for final status negotiations should be built intellectually upon the following six stages:
First, define essential policy aims the GoI has to obtain, and delineate red lines limiting possible concessions;
second, determine the main content of the final status agreement and evaluate concessions the GoI will have to make, in order to obtain an Israeli-Palestinian agreement;
third, evaluate the short-term political and tactical challenges the GoI will have to face;
fourth, plan short-term policies;
fifth, consider the medium and long-range strategic options and sixth, suggest immediate practical and organisational steps.

II. ESSENTIAL POLICY AIMS AND RED LINES FOR FINAL STATUS

The Israeli-Palestinian final status agreement will have to be a treaty of peace defining:
1. The permanence of a relationship of peace;
2. the final and irrevocable delineation of secure and recognized boundaries;
3. the creation of normal inter-state relations;
4. the permanent demilitarization of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip;
5. the creation of agreed upon security measures, including a coordinated mechanism to fight and suppress future terror activities;
6. the implementation of former agreements, particularly the full implementation of Annex III and IV of the DoP;
7. the final and irrevocable definition of mutual water rights and the implementation of a joint and coordinated water resources development plan;

8. the definition of final arrangements regarding Jerusalem;
9. provision for a final settlement of the refugee problem;
10. definition of settlement and property rights;
11. provision for outside guarantees, inspection mechanisms, agreed upon procedures for resolution of disputes;
12. Israeli-Palestinian cooperation in the region of the Middle East and beyond;
13. Agreed upon steps and measures leading to the implementation of an Israeli-Palestinian Treaty of Peace.

We propose to define and accept the following red lines:

First, under no circumstances will there be a reopening of the 1948-file, regarding borders, refugees, and property. or otherwise.
Second, under no circumstances will the GoI agree to remove jewish residents residing within the present city boundaries of Jerusalem; nor from areas in the West Bank adjacent to the "Green Line", where there is a 70 % majority of jewish over Palestinian residents. (see attached map)
Third, agreement on issues outlined above under II/1-13 will be essential.

III. ANTICIPATED PRECONDITIONS FOR AN ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN AGREEMENT ON FINAL STATUS

Whatever approach towards final status negotiations will be chosen, it appears that the basic parameters for the Israeli-Palestinian final status agreement are, by and large, given.
As the historical process is moving towards separation of both nations, the more clear cut the separation will become, the less friction will be created, the easier it will be to promote separation in an orderly and controlled manner, providing for the necessary circumstances to create effective medium and long-term cooperation and coordination.

This is to say, that for the final status, the following Israeli concessions appear necessary:

a) agreement to withdraw to a line that will be not far away from the "Green Line", although areas where there is massive jewish presence, eastward but adjacent to the "Green Line", will be once and forever annexed to Israel;
b) agreement to give up jewish settlements beyond this line;
c) agreement to find a modus vivendi in Jerusalem, which will enable the Palestinians to announce Palestinian inhabited Eastern Jerusalem, as the capital of a future State of Palestine;
d) agreement to create an independent Palestinian national entity, that may or may not be part of a Palestinian-Jordanian Confederation.

IV. THE POLITICAL AND THE TACTICAL CHALLENGE

Moving towards final status negotiations quickly, the GoI will face tremendous political and tactical challenges:

First, elections being set at the latest for the autumn of 1996, will create tremendous time pressure and the need to obtain visible achievements very quickly and thus may encourage the Palestinians to adopt either dilatory and/or brinkmanship tactics.

Second, during the coming months, whether negotiations on final status will start or not, continued acts of terror - both Jewish and Arab - have to be anticipated.

Third, management problems of the newly established Palestinian Self-Government Authority (PNA) and internal difficulties within the Palestinian body politic may be anticipated and will tend to create radicalizing and/or demoralizing overspill effects upon Israel.

Fourth, ongoing negotiations between the GoI and the PL0 will tend to encourage the Palestinian leadership to stress the existing gap and raise demands regarding Jerusalem, return to the 1967 borders, implementing the "right of return", etc.

Thus, moving towards final status negotiations, tactics will have to be formulated, that will minimize those dangers and will provide the Israeli public with the awareness that security threats are being diminished and substantial political gains are being achieved.

V. FOUR DIFFERENT (COMPLEMENTARY) TACTICAL APPROACHES

The following tactical approaches should be considered:

1. The "Mapai" or the "Practical Implementation" Approach:

The presently implemented "closure", creates on one hand, the asked for "separation effect", on the other hand, it causes much hardship to the Palestinian population and particularly to the lower-income classes. Moreover, the fact that the jewish settlers are excluded from the restrictions imposed, turns the " closure" into an ineffective technique, leaving too many loopholes for terrorists to act. A better organisation of the "closure" policy, could be prepared throughout the forthcoming year and should include:

a) equal and balanced travel restrictions on Palestinians and jewish settlers; with the implementation of other activities

(see below: VI/1/b-e) stepwise reinforcement of further mutual travel restrictions and creation of a border, close to the "Green Line", but according to the choice of the GoI;
b) the immediate construction of roads to separate Palestinians from the settlers, and enable Palestinians to move freely and quickly within their own areas, as well as between the Northern and Southern part of the West Bank - via and around Jerusalem - and also between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip;
c) the immediate implementation of low-cost housing programs, in order to create necessary employment, as well as visible change;
d) the establishment of Israeli-Palestinian trading stations close to the "Green Line"; encouraging Israeli-Palestinian trade, while preventing Israeli movement in the territories and Palestinian movement within Israel;
e) encouragement of Palestinian-Jordanian trade, by decreasing specific import restrictions and enforcing them, if necessary, at the Israeli-Palestinian trading stations;
f) ongoing decrease of Israeli mililtary presence in Palestinian urban and rural areas;
g) other measures that will enforce an ongoing process of separation.

The "Mapai, or: the Practical Implementation Approach" may be implemented either unilaterally, or also in full coordination with the Palestinian leadership; moreover, Jordanian support may be obtained easily, (in case import restrictions to the West Bank will be lifted) whereas international aid (particular US) to finance an ESP (Emergency Separation Programme) may be mobilised; a PR-campaign legitimizing the on-going separation process may be prepared and implemented.

Evidently, Gush Imunim, as well as the settlers of the Beqa' valley of the Jordan, will strongly oppose the "Practical Implementation Approach" and opposition may also arise from specific economic interest groups; the PR-campaign and a policy of isolating the opposition should be prepared and implemented.

2. The Academic Bachchannel Approach

To prepare for final status negotiations on the official level, an intense and comprehensive joint Israeli-Palestinian brainstorming effort, while maintaining full deniability for both sides, is asked for. The creation of a multitude of working groups on issues related to Jerusalem, refugees, borders, settlements, water, trade, security issues, joint institution building, etc.etc. should produce a variety of practical ideas, a better understanding of the mobiles and immobiles of the forthcoming negotiations and will, due to the academic nature of the endeavour

create a certain constructive smoke-screen. One working group might dedicate its attention to the drafting of an Israeli-Palestinian Treaty of Peace. Efforts should be taken to monitor the findings of various working groups and provide for various practical immediate results on the ground.

3. The Regional Development Approach

To prepare for final status negotiations with the Palestinians, but also independently hereof, to improve further legitimacy for a peace policy, Israel has to endeavour to expand economic relations with Egypt, the Arab Gulf states and Turkey.

4. The Diversified Cooperation Approach

To promote a better understanding with the Palestinians for the interim period, towards final status negotiations and thereafter, a number of Israeli and Palestinian institutes and groups should be encouraged to promote a variety of cooperation programs.

IV. THREE MAIN STRATEGIC APPROACHES TOWARDS A FINAL STATUS AGREEMENT

Whereas for the moment, short-term tactical considerations are of great importance, a medium- and long-term strategic approach has to be defined, too, in order to enable effective policy planning for final status negotiations. Altogether three alternative strategic approaches towards reaching an Israeli-Palestinian Final Status Agreement should be evaluated:

A. The All-Out Palestinian Approach:

This strategy would advocate to view Israeli-Palestinian final status negotiations completely isolated, from other Israeli-Arab developments. Undoubtedly this would be the fastest approach.

B. The Palestinian-Cum-Jordan Approach:

In practice this strategy, if adopted should be implementd by adopting a "Long Foot-Short Foot Approach":

As the DoP has created a "Long Foot", i.e. far-reaching Palestinian self-government in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area, and a "Short Foot", i.e. limited Palestinian self-government executed by power-sharing with the GoI, a continuation of this differentiated approach should be considered. Accordingly, movement towards final status agreement shall be implemented in four steps:

a. Implementation of the Gaza-Jericho agreement and enforcement of early empowerment in the West Bank;

b. Negotiating full empowerment in the West Bank, creating thus extended Palestinian self-government throughout the Gaza Strip and the West Bank; (DOP, Article VII),
c. Negotiating full Palestinian sovereignty and the creation of a Palestinian State in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area;
d. Movement towards establishment of a Palestinian-Jordanian Confederation and afterwards signing of the Final Status Agreement. (The DoP in Article V/para 3 provides for negotiations regarding "relations and cooperation with other neighbors" to be concluded before a final status agreement).

Evidently, adopting such a strategy, would permit the GoI, to consult with Jordan at every junction of the ongoing process.

C. The Comprehensive Approach

As Israel's aim is to achieve a comprehensive peace with all Arab nations, a comprehensive approach (or a "Snow-white and the Seven Dwarfs - Strategy") should be considered, moving to negotiations between Israel and one Arab partner nation, one after the other, or if possible negotiating with several Arab nations at one and the same time.

VII PROPOSED PRACTICAL STEPS

In continuation of the meeting in Caesarea we propose to establish three working committees:

1. Committee for an Extended Closure
members and their tasks:

Gad Gilbar -	will prepare a paper, as how to create an economic regime under closure conditions, re-establishing in fact an Israeli-Palestinian border;
Yossi Ginossar	will prepare a paper, regarding internal security repercussions of an extended closure;
Yossi Alpher	will prepare policy proposals regarding the jewish settlements under extended closure. He should also be asked to prepare a map, indicating the suggested border line;
Asher Susser	will prepare policy proposals regarding economic and political measures that should be taken towards Jordan;

Independent of the work of the committee, Nimrod Novik shall be asked to a) draw up a concept for the establishment of internationally funded ESP (Emergency Separation Programme); and
b) prepare guidelines for a PR-campaign in favour of separation.

2. Committee Investigating Israel's Strategic Options
The committee should check various possibilities of promoting the peace process, investigate possible attitudes, contacts, and moves towards Syria, Lebanon, the Arab Gulf States, Turkey, etc.

Members: Yanosh Ben Gal, Yossi Ginossar, Nimrod Novik, Asher Susser and Stephen Cohen.

3. Committee for Drafting an Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement
The committee should start to draft a peace treaty, taking into account various options.

Members: Meir Linsen and Shai Feldmann.

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The Strategic Peace Incentive Package (SPIP)

The United States and the Arab states (specifically the Gulf Cooperation Council states plus Egypt and Syria) could frame the SPIP. It should be introduced and endorsed by the U.N. Security Council so as to provide international guarantees.

Components of the SPIP would include:

- Creation of a Peace Incentive Fund. The fund would collect sufficient revenues (in the range of $15 billion to $20 billion) from the United States, European Community, Japan, and the Arab states willing to participate. The fund would be available in equal amounts to Israel and the Palestinians at specific steps of the SPIP for economic development, resettlement of Jews and Palestinians in their respective lands, and private-sector initiatives to enhance regional economic cooperation.
- Advance commitment of the Arab states to a timetable of specific steps

A Peace Incentive Fund ... would be available in equal amounts to Israel and the Palestinians.

leading to normalized relations with the State of Israel.

- Commitment of U.N.-endorsed security guarantees for Israel and the Palestinians, and creation of peace-keeping forces meeting the specific security requirements of each community. Israel may require additional specific U.S. guarantees and involvement. But the engagement and endorsement of the Security Council is important since the SPIP's international legitimacy is based on its being an elaboration of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242.

When the package of commitments has been completed and has been endorsed by the U.N. Security Council, the SPIP would then be offered to Israel and the Palestinians.

To secure the commitment of each party, the Security Council would require formal acceptance by the Israeli government and the representative parliament-in-exile of the Palestinians, the Palestine National Council, which is the legislative branch of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

Should Israel accept the SPIP and agree to withdraw from the Occupied Territories and agree to immediately cease all settlement construction and settler population expansion, the Arab states

Should Israel agree ... to withdraw from the Occupied Territories ... the Arab states would simultaneously agree to end the state of belligerency with Israel.

would simultaneously agree to end the state of belligerency with Israel.

Should Israel reject the plan, the United States should support a U.N. Security Council effort to dispatch monitors to the West Bank and Gaza Strip to report on the human-rights situation in the Occupied Territories and to provide protection to the Palestinian population under military rule.

Implementation

Step A

Simultaneous with Israeli withdrawal, the Arab states participating in the SPIP will announce acceptance of Israel's permanence and legitimacy as a state in the Middle East. There will be a U.S.-led, U.N.-endorsed effort to provide enhanced security guarantees both for Israel and for the Palestinians in the territories which Israel will evacuate.

Since the status of Israel's settlements in the territories will be left to a later stage in the process, the presence of U.N. security forces will be important not only to assist a Palestinian police force in the maintenance of public order but also to protect Israeli settlers who will remain in the territories pending final-status negotiations and to protect Palestinians from militant armed settlers.

U.N. security forces will ... not only assist a Palestinian police force in the maintenance of public order but also (will) protect Israeli settlers.

Step B

Following the evacuation of Israeli forces and suspension of settlement construction and population expansion, the U.N. security forces charged with assisting in the maintenance of public order

... The U.N. Secretariat ... will establish a timetable and process for free elections for Palestinians ...

will be complemented by a political team dispatched by the U.N. Secretariat, which will establish a timetable and process for free elections for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

In addition to covering municipal affairs, the elections, to be completed within six months, will also be for a national representative assembly. Once elected, this assembly will constitute the Palestinian interim government that will:

- organize national and local police forces to work with the U.N. security force;
- be responsible for all areas of administration and enforcement; and
- refrain from taking unilateral steps to alter matters to be resolved in final-status negotiations with the government of Israel, including the status of Jewish settlements and final borders.[2]

At the end of six months the Arab states will announce the end of the economic embargo against Israel.

[2] The Palestinians of East Jerusalem are residents of the West Bank. Because of Israeli government land confiscations and settlement development, the area of Arab habitation has become a separate enclave. It should, nevertheless, fall under Palestinian/U.N. governance during the interim period. Appropriate security guarantees, and access to Israel, should be provided to Israelis who remain in Jerusalem's eastern suburbs awaiting final-status negotiations.

Step C

At the end of one year the Arab states and Israel, under the auspices of the U.N. Security Council, will begin negotiations on regional issues such as water and arms control.

At the same time, Israel will gain access to the Peace Incentive Fund enabling it to draw on specified amounts for settlement of Soviet Jews and economic development programs.

The Palestinian interim government will also, at this time, gain access to specified amounts of the PIF in order to begin immediate economic development plans to create a viable economic and political order in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Such plans can be developed in cooperation with Palestinian institutions in the diaspora that have expertise in these areas.

The government, working in cooperation with the Palestine National Council, can also establish a Palestinian "Law of Return." This will make possible the reconstitution of the Palestinian national community in a manner consistent with the economic, social, and political absorptive capacities of the Palestinian territories.

At the end of one year the Arab states and Israel ... will begin negotiations on regional issues such as water and arms control.

At the end of three years, the U.N. Security Council will convene an all-party conference to resolve final-status issues ...

Step D

At the end of three years, the U.N. Security Council will convene an all-party conference to resolve final-status issues related to implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242.

Central to the conference will be a series of bilateral direct negotiations between the Palestinian government and the government of Israel, Syria and Israel, Lebanon and Israel, and Jordan and Israel. In each of these negotiations, issues to be resolved will include (where applicable):

- status of settlements and settlers;
- final borders and appropriate security arrangements; and
- normalized relations.

Additional final-status issues that must be discussed and resolved in fulfillment of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 are the establishment of demilitarized zones and the final resolution of refugee rights as detailed in earlier U.N. resolutions.

With the completion of this process between the government of Palestine and the government of Israel, the Arab states will offer formal diplomatic recognition to the State of Israel. At the same time, the conference will give formal recognition to the State of Palestine and admit it as a full member of the United Nations. ■

Afterword

"New Thinking for Israeli-Palestinian Peace" was originally published in March 1991 by the Coalition for Post-War U.S. Policy in the Middle East. Since that time, Bush Administration officials, members of Congress, representatives of Arab and Jewish organizations, and other Middle East policymakers have offered useful comments and criticisms.

In late May, AAI Executive Director James J. Zogby visited the Middle East to discuss the plan with Arab leaders. He met with the secretaries general of the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council, the foreign ministers of Egypt and Tunisia, a number of cabinet ministers in Saudi Arabia, and the chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization. After his return from the Middle East, he addressed a "Secretary's Open Forum" at the U.S. Department of State on the peace plan and the responses to it from the various Arab leaders.

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The peace proposal also has generated national and international media coverage. Newspaper coverage of the peace plan ranges from *The Washington Post* and the *International Herald Tribune* to the *Saudi Gazette, Asharq al-*

Awsat, *Al Ahram*, and the Israeli paper *Al Hamishmar*. Magazines publishing pieces on the peace initiative include *The Nation* and the new Israeli magazine *The Jerusalem Report*. SPIP also has been discussed on C-SPAN, CNN's "International Hour," NPR's "All Things Considered," and NBC's "Today" show, among others.

The innovative approach outlined in "New Thinking for Israeli-Palestinian Peace" will hopefully influence future efforts to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict.

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Appendix

Coalition for Post-War U.S. Policy in the Middle East

The Coalition believes that American policies in the Middle East should be based upon mutual concerns and shared goals for international and regional order, stability, prosperity, and peace.

Members of the Coalition are the American-Arab Affairs Council, American Educational Trust, American Muslim Council, Arab American Institute, Council for the National Interest, National Association of Arab Americans, National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations, and the National U.S.-Arab Chamber of Commerce.

Arab American Institute

James J. Zogby is the Executive Director of the Arab American Institute, which was formed in 1985 to increase Arab American involvement in the electoral process and to generate an honest political debate on U.S. policy in the Middle East.

Issues, AAI's newsletter, and *Update*, a clipping service, provide important news on political developments, public-policy issues, and Arab American political involvement. AAI also issues public-policy studies.