
מדינת ישראל





שם תיק: יומנות שלום

מזהה פיזי: 6262/9-ב

מזהה פריט: 001it9g

כמות: 1-311-5-11-1

תאריך הדפסה: 22/12/2022

שנה _____ חודש _____

מס' תיק _____

Annex I

HOTEL IMPERIAL WIEN

Vienna, January 27, 1977.

Dear Chancellor Kreisky

Pursuant to our conversation last night, I would like to submit to Your Excellency a brief review of the current status of the Middle East crisis as well as a resume of the position of the PLO on various parameters of the problem.

There is nowadays a unanimous agreement that the Middle East crisis should be brought to a speedy solution. Unfortunately there has been a great deal of confusion over what constitutes the basic ingredients of a just and lasting solution. So far two formulas have been under consideration, the one assumes that the crux of the problem is a dispute between the confrontation Arab States and the State of Israel while the other insists that the essence of the crisis is the contradictory claims of both Palestinians and Israelis to the same country. The first formula assumes that a settlement is possible between the Arab States and the State of Israel with the Palestinians relegated to a vassal status under Jordan, whereas the other insists that peace can /only/ be achieved when the Palestinians and Israelis reconcile their contradictory claims amicably and satisfactorily through a mutually accepted formula which grants each side the degree of self expression which it seeks and insists upon.

The first formula, which finds favor in some American and Israeli official circles cannot bring about peace or even a temporary state of nonbelligrency. The explosive Palestinian parametr with its inherent and automatic built in capacity to destabilise the situation in the Middle East, will unavoidably trigger another round of military confrontation with untold damage to the protagonists themselves as well as to World interests at large. Based üpon this premise, it is clear that the only way to peace and stability in the Middle East is through the recognition and implementation of Palestinian legitimate national rights.

Within this context, we believe that Western Europe and in particular the 2nd International can play a constructive role. In fact we believe that the major victim of another military confrontation in the Middle East besides the Arabs and Israelis themselves, would be the West European countries whose economies and continued wellfare are are crucially dependent upon the continued flow of Middle Eastern oil. The 2nd International should therefore seek and insist upon an active role in the search for peace in the Middle East, not only because of the moral imperatives involved or because of the committments of the International to the lofty ideals of peace, justice and universal brotherhood, but also for the urgently pragmatic reasons of West European economic stability and welfare.

Having asserted that peace is impossible without the Palestinians, it is highly reassuring to state that the Palestinians , through an interesting process of political evolution and maturity, are prepared nowadays to contribute to the establishment of Peace in the Middle East.

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I believe that this development represents a historical breakthrough which should be eagerly seized by all interested parties to turn the dream for peace into a living realty. Surprisingly enough, the Palestinian leadership, instead of receiving support for this constructive attitude, was rebuffed by the USA, attacked by the Israeli leadership and harrassed by some Arab States. The political shortsightedness manifested in these reactions is dangerous in that it can easily persuade the Palestinian leadership of the futility of moderation and force them to adopt a hardline position which will certainly precipitate another round of military confrontation which nobody can avert.

This is precisely why a West European role is urgently needed. The Palestinian position is still positive and will remain so for the next few months at least. But how long will the Palestinian leadership retain this constructive attitude against American, Israeli and some Arab hostility, is highly unpredictible. My guess is that it won't be for very long. However, a determined West European position could possibly consolidate Palestinian moderation and exert positive pressure on the negative American and Israeli and certain Arab attitudes.

The question naturally arises: How serious is the Palestinians committment for peace. The answer is that it is very serious, provided that there is reciprocity and a real desire to tackle the problem of peace and discuss all the issues whose solution is absolutely necessary. Very briefly, it can be stated that for the return of the West Bank, Gaza Sector, the Himma and Auja enclaves, a status of non-belligrency can be established between the future sovereign State of Palestine and State of Israel. But for a full state of peace to take place, other issues will have to be settled the most important of which is the Israeli acceptance and implementation of the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their original homes, if they wished to do so or to be compensated if they freely elected not to return.

Naturally enough we have not limited our peaceful sentiments to secret and confidential talks with World leaders, but have been sending out a number of public signals which are too well known to enumerate. What is more important, we are planning on passing some very important resolutions of a very constructive nature during the forthcoming Palestinian National Council. All of this should provide convincing and irrefutable proof of the sincerity and seriousness of the Palestinian position.

Very sincerely,

January 14, 1993

From: Yair Hirschfeld and Ron Pundak
to: Shimon Peres
via: Yossi Beilin

1. In a meeting held today (January 14, 1993) with Hanan Ashrawi she has made the following proposal:

   The issues to be discussed with you in the next forthcoming meeting will be:
   a. possible ways of solving the deportee question;
   b. confidence building measures;
   c. principles of a first Israeli-Palestinian Agreement, and
   d. preparing a public meeting with Yizchak Rabin.

2. For solving the deportee question, Hanan Ashrawi has suggested to seek for a variety of security and legal parameters that will permit the G.o.I. to permit various groups of deportees to return gradually to their homes (or to prison, or to administrative detention.)

3. For introducing confidence building measures a variety of steps should be discussed:
   a. Israeli agreement that a solution of the deportee question will be publicly staged in such a way, as to give the Palestinian delegation the necessary credit for contributing to an agreed upon end of the crisis;
   b. release of prisoners;
   c. measures that will create an immediate improvement of living conditions (taxes, water, economic development, etc.)
   d. improving various issues of human rights;
   e. others.

4. In order to discuss principles of a first Israeli-Palestinian Agreement, Hanan Ashrawi gave us an internal document, the Palestinian delegation is preparing (it is reproduced here in full;, although she asked us to rephrase it and to refrain under any circumstances from quoting the document, reproduce here;)

"Points of Agreement:

1) The entire negotiating process is based on UNSC resolution 242 and 338. It must be clear that 242 and 338 must guide all phases of negotiations and that they must be fully implemented in the final stage.

2) The purpose of the interim-agreement is to establish an interim self-government, a central political authority that allows the emergence of a Palestinian entity, enabling the Palestinian people in the OPT (Occupied Palestinian Territories), including Jerusalem, to govern themselves by themselves.

3) In order that the Palestinian people in the OPT may govern themselves according to democratic principle - free and general political elections will be held under agreed international supervision.

4) The elections for the establishment of the Interim Self-Government constitute a significant step towards the realization of the national and political rights of the Palestinian people in the OPT.

5) The success of the transitional process depends on investing the Palestinian elected body with all the powers of a true self-governing authority.

6) Powers presently exercised by the Israeli military government and in particular all the powers of its civil administration will be transferred to the PISGA upon its election and inauguration.

7) Interim arrangements must take into account the current situation and complexities resulting from 25 years of continued Israeli occupation. Therefore specific agreements will be elaborated concerning agreed upon areas.

8) The jurisdiction of the PISGA covers all of the Palestinian territory occupied in June 1967, including its land, natural resources, water, sub-soil, territorial sea, exclusive economic zone and air space.

9) The Palestinian Interim Self-Government, while exercising legislative, executive and judicial powers and responsibilities, will be subject to limitations deriving from its interim character and from the mutually agreed outcome of negotiations.

10) The PISGA should establish a strong police force responsible for internal security and public order in the OPT.

11) In order for the Palestinian elected body to exercise freely its power and responsibilities and be assured of the peaceful and orderly transfer of authority, the Israeli armed forces shall start their withdrawal, the remaining forces to be deployed in specific locations in the OPT through mutual agreement.

12) The PISGA and the G.o.I. shall reach agreements on

cooperation and liaison in the first stage, that will take into account the security needs of both parties.

13) Matters related to both tracks must be dealt within a manner accpetable to all three parties, Israelis, Jordanians and Palestinians." (end of quote)

5. We have made it clear that the gap between the quoted Palestinian proposal and a possible agreement is - according to our understanding still wide. Hanan indicated that changes demanded by Israel would have to obtain endorsement from Tunis, particularly as this draft was only an internal paper and had not yet received PLO sanction.

6. In case only a part of the gap could be bridged, the Palestinians will ask for an agreed upon "staging" of publication and will insist on permitting the Americans to act publicly as mediators.

7. We handed to Hanan a copy of your article "The Middle East in a New Era".

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אוניברסיטת חיפה
UNIVERSITY OF HAIFA

מינהל תלמידים
מדור אישורים

5/April/93

Opening Remarks:

(1)

By the content of the
last lecture in continuity
- a further notion
of additional flexibility very
well receive at home.

(2) Second hope to general
transition → probably less traumatic -
Isr-Pal
from hostility to Isr.-Pal. friendship
or alliance

(3) Yet, not all messages carry
for the Palestinian partners

Project: two kinds of media
a) for 3 hours
b) for 5 minutes

- terror continued →
→ hostile talk
-
two major mistakes.

(a) Arafat's visit to Iraq
Saddam Hussein.

(b) (a mistake in
i) personal reasons -
both the pro. Palest
camp in the Dep. of State
ii) tactical reasons
→ no hidden policy
iii) for strategic reasons
- there cannot be
realism
until US - Israel -
Egypt - Saudi - Israel
- they may come - but last
w not for the Palest.

(b) Not finalizing agreement
with Weizmann Kirkpat.
(up to personal,
tactical
w strategic reasons)

(4) Difficulties at home

(a) the "table" -
+ increase casualties in the territories

(b) family difficulties - Shin, etc.

(c) Technical difficulties (the terms)

(5) Need for a breakthrough:
create three basic cells.
Here to achieve it?

(6) VF position → VC
friendly - but not more -

(a) address + appropriate to any direct
PLO participation -
- appeal to international actors - only via the
PNA funds in addition hereof.

'good news' bad news:

(a) good news:
i) Invitation to 9th Round
272 v 338
ii) Ability to move actions with the
active participation of regional
(iii) Wide ability to put a basket together

(6) lead news: i) W. does not need
breakthrough
ii) ~~the~~ approach to inclusion of
entrods -
iii) (as in international meetings)
iv) leadership still an experiment.

(7) Homepage Invitation from Mrs.
Yin-Pel-Fuchs:

Issue (a) Position entrods
(b) direct involvement in
both Israeli & Palestinian
settlement

If:
Basic mode of cooperation
would be, can be agreed
upon.

for Group discussion.

Notes on a meeting between Shimon Peres and Rashad a-Shawa

on April 26, 1983, 10:30-11:50.

Present were also: Monsur a-Shawa and Yair Hirschfeld.

Shimon: I'd like to start the discussion by giving you a description of the present situation as far as I see it. Secretary of State Shultz is coming here in order (a) to diffuse tension between Syria and Israel and (b) to get a Lebanon agreement signed. The agreement with Lebanon has been almost finished. The only difficulties which still exist have to deal with questions of security in southern Lebanon and the position of Major Haddad. The Israeli demand is that Haddad should be in command of his troops, whereas the Lebanese have offered that he be second in charge. It is still unclear whether the Syrians will withdraw, but without that there will be no Israeli withdrawal. The U.S. officials are optimistic but not sure whether the Syrians will oblige. President Amin Jemayel is absolutely confident that President Assad will not cause any trouble and Jemayel is planning in this context a visit to Damascus. We here in Israel have some doubts if the reaction of the Syrians will really be constructive.

Regarding the development of the talks between Hussein and Arafat, we have the following information: Hussein wanted to enter peace negotiations on the Reagan plan. During the negotiations Arafat proposed to endorse Hussein's entry into the peace process under the formula that Hussein would negotiate " upon the Reagan plan and other international initiatives." Hussein agreed and signed.

Shawa: I sent a cable to Arafat to encourage him to enter negotiations exactly on the formula you mentioned.

Shimon: Arafat brought this agreement to his people who rejected it. We know that Arafat had a majority at his disposal in favour of accepting the document but minority groups within the PLO opposed and threatened to split. Thereupon Arafat decided to choose to secure his own personal position and his unchallenged political leadership instead of moving ahead in the peace process.

Hussein decided not to go ahead because of three reasons: (a) there was no headway in Lebanon; (b) he didn't feel that he had received sufficient support from the Palestinians; and (c)Hussein was very disappointed from the little support King Fahd had offered him. It appears to be obvious that the Americans will try to stick to the Reagan plan and will endeavour to overcome the three obstacles mentioned.

Shawa: What I understand has happened is the following: Ahmad Jibril, Naif Hawatme, and George Habash have acted according to the following tactics: They have made known their propositions and proposals for action which are, of course, very impractical. Then, they said, whoever acts against their three groups is against ~~XXXXXXXXX~~ the principle of unanimity and hereby against the unity of the PLO;and anybody who is against the unity of the PLO is, of course, a traitor. And they have succeeded with this tactic. You know that I tried to interfere both publicly and secretly. Anyhow, I do believe that this is not the end. Arafat can and will still go ahead. The truth is that Israel is making all kinds of difficulties, not going out of Lebanon, going ahead with the settlement policy, etc. You Israelis must more and you, Mr. Peres, should say it.

Shimon: It doesn't help to put the blame on us, and I cannot make such a statement if everybody involved says exactly the opposite. President

Reagan has stated that it was the fault of Arafat and the PLO that negotiations have broken down. King Hussein has said it. How and why should I say the opposite? Nobody would even believe me. It is the Palestinians' turn to move, and I must tell you that time is running out. The American election campaign is already starting, and by January 1984 will move into full motion. During 1985 there will be an election campaign in Israel and it might take until early 1986 until a new government will be in power in Israel. That is to say, if we don't move now, we will lose almost three years.

Shawa: We believe that there are basically two possibilities: the short-term and the long-term one. The short-term possibility is that we shall move towards negotiations which will finally lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza. This state will have to live side by side with Israel, and I believe that thereby we will create a mechanism of decreasing tension, even on the long run. The other possibility is that no headway will be made. This means that there will be a permanent war situation. We Palestinians are no red Indians. You will have to live upon arms forever. You might do it, but after hundred, hundred fifty, or two hundred years you will lose finally. Others, the Crusaders, have been here for two hundred years and then went.

Shimon: Nobody can really foretell what will be in 200 years. But don't look at distant history. It is more useful to study recent history, which is more adequate for comparing. Take the negotiations with Egypt. We negotiated for almost ten years. We achieved and signed three agreements before a peace treaty was made, and you know that the Egyptians got everything they wanted, and we gave up everything.

Shawa: But with us the situation is different. Negotiation over autonomy for the West Bank and Gaza have been going on for over three years (with Egypt), and the only outcome is that the Israeli government has tremendously increased the number of settlements. We can't negotiate like this.

Shimon: No, you shouldn't. Reagan has promised you a settlement freeze and I came out in favour of it for the time of negotiations.

Shawa: We cannot accept a "freeze" of settlements. This means you have got the right to start settlements again. We are no schoolboys whom you could punish everytime they don't act according to your wishes. There must be a complete stop to settlements. You must stop the expropriation of private property as much as of state land. You know that we claim that your making use of state lands is illegal, as they are our state lands, not your state lands.

Shimon: OK. Let us find a formula which we all can accept. I would say, as long as the negotiations go on, we will maintain the status quo. That means that no change to your disadvantage will take place.

Shawa: This is acceptable to us.

Shimon: Why don't you come out and start negotiations? What will make the Palestinians do it?

Shawa: Offering an end to the settlements and other further enticements before negotiations start.

Shimon: This is unrealistic. Begin will not do this. But if Hussein and the Palestinians will start negotiations, you can clearly achieve this demand. You have U.S. support and you have the support of the Israel Labour Party. You will get it. Regarding other Israeli concessions, that has to be negotiated. That is the purpose of negotiations. If you think about mutual recognition, this is not really the problem at stake. Mutual

recognition will presently get us nowhere. The main issue today is to get the Jordanians and Palestinians to enter negotiations. This will change the whole situation and create a new reality for the Middle East. The problem is that there is no clear alternative on your side. We have got the "Peace Now" movement, and there is the Israel Labour Party; but there is nothing the like on your side.

Shawa: We believe that Arafat will still move to an agreement with the King.

Shimon: Just the other day I got a message from the Prime Minister of Sweden telling me that he had seen Arafat and that Arafat still wants to come in. I am skeptical. You know Arafat travels everywhere and he is all the time in action, but the only action he really has to take, he doesn't.

Shawa: He and the King will move ahead.

Shimon: From Jordanians and Egyptians we know that there are two schools of thought within the Jordanian leadership. The first school of thought says: Why should we bother about the West Bank? We happily got rid of the West Bank in 1967 and got out of a sick bed. Our relations with the Arab world are good, and if we go back there, things may only worsen. The second school of thought says: The situation on the West Bank and Gaza will turn from bad to worse. People will leave and come to the East Bank and cause trouble there. Therefore we (the Jordanians) have to move in. I know that King Hussein belongs to the second school of thought. What really has to be done is to travel from Amman to Jerusalem, or from Jerusalem to Amman. It is only a small distance, but the impact would be enormous. If I were Prime Minister, I would go to Amman, and King Hussein should come to Jerusalem. Sadat said always that 90% of all problems are

psychological. It might be less than 90%, but still as a general statement Sadat was right. Today we can change the psychological atmosphere with really little means.

Shawa: We are in favour, although there are very substantial differences. There is, for instance, much difference even between Israel and Egypt on the kind of autonomy envisaged.

Shimon: Yes, but there is a great amount of basic agreement, too. It is understood and agreed also by the Egyptians that there will be no Palestinian control over foreign and defense policies. The ILP agrees generally with most of the Egyptian proposals, with one or two exceptions. Anyhow, the gap between the Egyptian position and our position is very small. Altogether, there is much more in common between our interests and those of the Palestinians than might be believed at first sight. We do not want to rule over another people against its will. But we must insist upon regulations which will provide for turning the West Bank and Gaza into demilitarized zones and have the IDF control the River Jordan as a vital security line for us. You know that I believe that we have not explored all possible options for interim settlements or a final settlement. When negotiations start, each side will and must come up with plenty of new ideas and we should study them together in depth.

Shawa: If I could go to see Arafat and the King, things might change.

Shimon: Didn't they let you go? You know I spoke to the military authorities.

Shawa: No, I didn't receive the necessary permission.

Shimon: I'll speak to Arens and I'll notify you. Things have changed to the better since Sharon left.

Monsur a-Shawa: If you could help us simply to get a meeting with Arens.

Shimon: If they let you go, when will you go?

Shawa: Even the very next day, as soon as it is only possible.

Shimon: How are things in Gaza?

Shawa: Life is miserable.

Shimon: How is your fishing season?

Monsur a-Shawa: Fishing has stopped. Literally stopped. The fish are found mainly 12 miles ~~XXXXXXX~~ away from the coast. They don't like the cold water in the winter and they don't like it too hot in summer either. If a fishing boat is caught by the Egyptians outside the 12 mile limit, it is sent back. If it's caught by the Israelis, the fishing license is withdrawn and the boat will be confiscated for six months. This makes it enormously expensive to fish and therefore virtually nobody is active.

Shimon: What about the citrus harvest?

Shawa: Also here the situation is very bad. Prices have gone down by 50%. We had the National Development Compnay which bought up all the citrus fruit and marketed it. The military authorities, however, stopped everybody from selling to the NDC. Prices are at a low everywhere. But in other places, citrus growers receive government subsidies which enable them to ~~XXXXXXXXXXX~~ compete on international markets. We have got nobody who backs us.

Monsur a-Shawa: On top of this, if we export to Jordan we have to pay high taxes to the military government. On each truck we have to pay $120 and the license for the drivers has to be paid in addition.

Shimon: Why is this?

Monsur: They simply want more money.

Shimon: What about exports to Yugoslavia?

Shawa: We do still export there, but very small quantities.

Shimon: Are there other difficulties?

Shawa: Yes. For instance, about money matters. Relatively recently we got a donation of $500,000 in order to build a cultural center. The money was put under my name into the bank and the military authorities don't permit us to use it. We need it for buying all kinds of equipment.

Monsur: Education is becoming more difficult. We have got a kind of university, but there is not enough room there. Students have to learn in two shifts which causes detrimental effects upon their learning performance. Huts were put up to enlarge the teaching space. The military government asked us to pull down these huts. The demand was rejected. Consequently they blocked the huts and they can't be used.

Shimon: Are there many students who go to Egypt?

Shawa: Practically none. Only very few succeed to go there on a completely private basis. But even they have difficulties. There is altogether very little contact with Egypt. Other difficulties concern for instance the action of the benevolent society for the welfare of Gaza. We wanted to donate a typewriter to a blind man who lives in Ramallah. The military authorities intervened, telling us that we should only deal with matters in Gaza. Practically, it might not be important, but it adds to our feeling that life is miserable.

Shimon: What about commercial activities?

Shawa: Everything is going down. People are only buying what is absolutely necessary: food, clothing, and similar stuff.

Shimon: I would like to be of help.

Shawa: Come and see what is going on.

Shimon : If I go, there will always be a lot of noise. This could do more harm than help. But I can tell some ~~XXXXX~~ MKs of the Labour Party to go to Gaza.

Shawa: We will receive them with much pleasure and will prepare meetings and materials for them.

Mutual greetings.

Report on Meeting with AKH and HA in London and Follow-Up
January 29-30, 2001

I. Aim of the Meeting

As a follow-up to the Taba Talks, both sides envisaged a summit meeting between PM EB and Chairman YA. In preparation of different versions of a possible joint statement, the ECF was asked to prepare a common Israeli-Palestinian document, and check, unofficially, its acceptability with the other side. Accordingly, in preparation of the meeting in London, the annexed document was prepared (see *Annex I*).

II. Common Understandings

The meeting, which was held in London on January 29-30, 2001 at the Hilton Kensington, produced the following common understandings:

1. Our Palestinian interlocutors fully agreed that a joint understanding was necessary in order to "pin-down" the major achievements made thus far in the negotiation process.
2. The remaining issues for negotiation need to be defined in a fair and accurate manner, and on the basis of formulations and wording that would permit both sides to agree on establishing an equi-distance from the envisaged final agreement.
3. The common paper shall document that a joint platform has been created and that both sides are committed to a partnership in peace.
4. If possible, the common document should become the basis for a EB-YA meeting, which shall aim to bring about a "change of the tides" in advance of elections in Israel. Barring this, the document should be viewed as a common platform for the continuation of peace talks and the unfolding of a common peace strategy after the elections.

III. Outcomes of the London Meeting (January 29, 2001)

1. The document prepared by the Israeli side was discussed in much detail (see *Paragraph IV* below).
2. Based on the remarks made by the Londoners, the group reached an understanding that a new document should be prepared. In this regard, it was agreed that the Londoners would prepare their proposal for a MOU (see *Annex II*).
3. In the event of a common understanding, it was agreed that the common document shall first be presented to PM EB, after which the it shall also be presented, by the Londoners, to Chairman YA.

	issues like "Territory and Borders" it goes substantially far beyond the Clinton Proposals towards the Palestinians. In points where the MOA offers less than the Clinton Proposals, reference to the Clinton Ideas offer a reassurance policy to the Palestinians rather than Israel. The Londoners responded "our people see it differently."
7	The Palestinian view was that the "End of Conflict" shall be contingent on the full implementation of a permanent status agreement. Accordingly, Article 7 was not acceptable.
8	See point 7 above
Establishment of the State of Palestine	
9	OK
10	
11	OK. This Article should be viewed as an example of what **should** be incorporated into the envisaged MOA so as not to make too many commitments too early in the day, leaving enough space for future negotiations and for defining and pinning down common understandings. In particular, it was stressed that Article 11(d) presented the accurate manner in which to address the "End of Conflict."
Borders and Territories	
12	The official Palestinian position is that they cannot agree to a text reading "modifications reflecting the spirit of the new era, as well as realities on the ground" in the context of a territorial agreement. They will be able to do so in practice, although they cannot agree to it conceptually as they view such wording as the Palestinian acceptance of the legality of Israeli settlements.
13	Even if EB was to accept this article, the Londoners cannot bring this text to YA. YA will contend that he got more from Clinton. Moreover, the Londoners argued that a 95% map would block Palestinian contiguity of territory in the real sense, as villages will be drawn apart from one another.
14	Under no circumstances can the Palestinian side agree to "incorporating approximately 80% of the Israeli settlements" in territories to be annexed to Israel. The Palestinian side can speak about border modifications, but cannot legitimize settlements. Refugee resettlement and relocation is not a matter for agreement with Israel. The Palestinians will decide unilaterally what language to use regarding refugee return. (Hussein said that this position was "idiotic" but could not do anything at the moment to change it).
15	OK
16	The proposed wording "the territory of Israel shall be fully

	contiguous" was superfluous.
17	OK
18	OK
Security	
19	OK
20	OK
21	OK
22	OK
23	OK
24	Belongs to the FAPS rather than the MOA. Relevant wording could read: "The State of Palestine will operate within the concept of a non-militarized state with a strong military force."
25	No agreement was reached on these Articles in Taba, and in fact Dahlan rejected them. If the Londoners were to accept these articles, it would be viewed as a provocation on their part. These issue must be negotiated in the FAPS.
26	
27	
28	The Palestinian side cannot agree on a text that will not offer a timetable and modalities of Israeli deployment and withdrawal. This may also be included in the FAPS.
29	Not acceptable for MOA, acceptable for FAPS.
Jerusalem	
30	OK
31	Articles 31(a) and 31(b) should not read "Arab-populated" and "Jewish-populated" but "Arab" and "Jewish", respectively.
32	Londoners are personally in favor, at present the Palestinian leadership cannot accept it.
33	Official Palestinian reaction was that this Article is too general. Special Palestinian sovereignty over Haram al-Sharif will be called for and clarification will be requested for "places holy to Judaism." The above indicate that the wording contains dangerous loopholes for unjustified Israeli demands.
34	May cause many questions for the Palestinian leadership.
Altogether with regard to Articles 30-34, the Londoners remarked that these articles were positive examples of how to create appropriate wording of a MOA or MOU and that were should prepare the document more or less having this level of principle understandings in mind.	
35	The entire Article is totally unnecessary

36	36(a). OK 36(b). Instead of "wish to return" should read "right to return" 36(c). Jordanians may not like it.
37	Without "right or return" will not be doable (RP: "You will not have the right of return." AH: "You will not have an agreement.")
38	OK
39	OK
End of Conflict and Finality of Claims	
40	Instead of permanent status agreement want TOP
41	OK
42	OK
43	Without FAPS not realistically applicable.
44	

V. The Londoner MOU as a counterproposal

Following the meeting in London, the Londoners prepared their own draft of a MOU on January 30th (*See Annex II*).

VI. Redrafted MOU based on the remarks of AKH and AH

The Israeli side prepared a third document, going a long way in order to accommodate Palestinian needs. The redrafted and revised MOU was sent that same evening (30 January) to London and was rejected immediately, hereby ending the exercise in failure.

VII. Anticipating a Sharon Government

The Londoners made the following remarks in this context: "If Sharon will come to power, we should build a general alternative to Sharon by producing a common paper based on the language of the Jerusalem articles (30-34) and this suggestion has been repeated after this exercise had failed."

VIII. Other Remarks

1. "We could have done the deal now, but we [the Palestinian side] don't have the quality of leadership needed to do it. We were ashamed of YA's Davos performance."

2. Tremendous mistakes were made by the Israeli side: Beginning in Autumn 1999, the Londoners received full pouvoir from YA and Abu-Mazen to quietly pursue a deal, and made three attempts towards this end. A meeting in **December** was immediately reported to Egypt, Jordan and the US and then directly leaked to the press. As a result, the envisaged next meeting was cancelled. The Londoners were then told directly by Gilad and indirectly by EB that they were not viewed as legitimate partners for negotiating probably because they were perceived as too closely associated with YB. In **March** 2000, a second

attempt was made, ending in the Stockholm disaster of April and May, as EB went behind the back of Abu-Mazen. In **August**, a third attempt was made, but it appeared to have been too late.

3. The Palestinian team did not come to Taba and Eilat in order to conclude an agreement/understanding, but rather to "hear out" the Israeli position. Nabil Shaath, went far beyond the instructions he received by setting a number for refugees permitted to return to Israel. He was by no means in a position to cut a deal.

8/2/01

ISRAEL-PALESTINE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

Preamble

The Government of the State of Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (hereinafter " the Parties"), having achieved significant progress in narrowing the differences between them on issues of final status, conclude that they have never been closer to reaching an agreement. Consequently, the Parties declare:

1. Their intention to resume negotiations at the earliest possible moment, but no later than March 1, 2001, with the goal of completing a full and comprehensive Permanent Status Agreement (hereinafter "PSA") leading to a Treaty of Peace (hereinafter "TOP") to be ratified by their respective authorized institutions.
2. These negotiations shall be based on the mutually agreed objective of the full implementation of UNSCR 242 and 338, and shall be pursued within the framework of the Peace Process initiated at Madrid in October 1991, including the Declaration of Principles of September 1993, and the Letter of Mutual Recognition between Israel and the PLO of 9 September 1993, as well as all subsequent agreements and understandings between the Parties.
3. The Parties believe that a lasting peace must be built on moral, legal and political equality between the two sides and equal consideration for each side's dignity, security, human rights, and national aspirations. The Parties further believe that a durable and sustainable peace must leave no cause for future grievance or friction between them, and that the rights of one side cannot be attained at the expense of the other.
4. The Parties believe that peace requires the transition from the logic of war and confrontation to the logic of peace and cooperation, and that acts and words appropriate to the state of war will no longer be appropriate or acceptable in the era of peace.

5. The Parties agree that the conclusion of this MOU reflects their decision to reach an end to the historic conflict and to resolve all claims on matters of final status.

6. Based on the foregoing, and taking into account the ideas suggested by President Clinton together with their respective qualifications and reservations, the Parties agree that the FAPS and the TOP shall be guided by the following:

I. The State of Palestine

7. The Parties view the establishment of the sovereign State of Palestine within agreed and recognised borders as the realization of the inalienable right of the Palestinian people to self-determination.

8. The Capital of the State of Palestine shall be al-Quds (as in "Jerusalem" below).

9. Upon the establishment of the State of Palestine, the State of Israel and the State of Palestine shall exchange full diplomatic relations with each other, and shall:

   a. Commit themselves to the peaceful resolution of all disputes between them.

   b. Undertake to refrain from intervention in each other's internal affairs or seek to represent citizens of the other side.

   c. Ensure freedom of access to, and freedom of worship in agreed Holy Sites.

   d. Commit themselves to act in conformity with the UN Charter and the norms of International Law.

   e. Undertake to refrain from any action inconsistent with their decision to end the conflict between them.

II. Borders and Territory

10. The final border between the State of Israel and the State of Palestine shall be delineated on the basis of UNSCR 242 and the pre-1967 Armistice Line with mutual and equal modifications reflecting the spirit and needs of the new era, as shall be agreed in the PSA.

11. The territory of the State of Palestine shall be fully contiguous within the West Bank and within the Gaza Strip, and the territory of the State of Israel shall be fully contiguous.

12. An exclusive safe passage between the West Bank and Gaza Strip shall be established. The Parties shall define the route and mode of implementation of this passage, as well as of local safe passages in the West Bank.

13. In delineating borders, the Parties agree that utmost consideration should be given to minimising disruption to existing lines of communication and established ways of life in the Palestinian State and Israel.

14. The Parties shall recognise the agreed borders between them as final, permanent, irrevocable and inviolable and shall undertake to respect each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political and economic independence.

III. Security

15. The Parties recognise each other's right to a secure existence free from threats of war, violence and terror.

16. The Parties shall refrain from participating in any alliance of a potentially hostile nature aimed at either side.

17. The Parties shall ensure that their territory shall not be used by any third party for threats or acts of aggression of any kind against either side.

18. All security agreements between the sides shall remain in force unless explicitly superseded by new ones. The State of Israel and the State of Palestine shall strengthen and intensify security cooperation and coordination between them via the full and ongoing implementation of these agreements.

19. The Parties view the struggle against violence, incitement and terror as a mutual interest and agree to act accordingly.

20. The Parties agree that the State of Palestine shall be a Non-Militarised state and shall be subject to agreed limitations on its security forces.

21. Consistent with Palestinian sovereignty and security needs, a multi-national security force shall be established and stationed in Palestine based on an agreed mandate and force structure. Palestine shall not allow any other third party forces on its soil.

22. The Parties agree that security arrangements consistent with Israeli needs and Palestinian sovereignty shall be negotiated as part of the PSA. These arrangements shall govern Israeli early warning stations, use of sovereign Palestinian airspace and electro-magnetic spectrum and residual military presence, as well as the deployment of the multi-national security force.

23. The Parties shall agree on the timetable and modalities of a final Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian territory.

IV. Jerusalem

24. Jerusalem shall be an open and undivided city.

25. There shall be two capitals in Jerusalem that shall serve as the seat of government and of embassies to the two sides:

    a. Al-Quds, the Capital of the State of Palestine, shall include the Arab areas of East Jerusalem.

    b. Yerushalayim, the Capital of the State of Israel, shall include the Jewish areas of Jerusalem.

26. The Parties agree that the areas allotted to the two capitals shall be continuous and contiguous with free access and open lines of communication between the two capitals and their respective States.

27. Given the centrality of the Holy Basin of Jerusalem to Judaism, Islam and Christianity, the Parties agree to :

    a. Preserve the unique nature of this area and the prevailing religious Status Quo:

    b. Ensure free access to its Holy Shrines and guarantee the security and sanctity of all Holy Sites:

    c. Refrain from any unilateral acts of excavation or archaeological digs in the area;

    d. Palestinian control over sites holy to Islam and to Christianity;

    e. Israeli control over sites holy to Judaism.

28. The Parties agree that the PSA shall include a clear definition of the two capital areas and of the Holy Basin including the allocation of sovereignty, security, municipal services and functional responsibilities between the two sides.

29. Without prejudice to issues of sovereignty, the Parties agree further that the Holy Basin shall be governed by an agreed joint Special Regime.

V. Refugees

30. The Parties agree that the resolution of the Palestinian refugee problem shall be based on the implementation of UNGAR 194 as defined below and as shall be determined in the PSA.

31. The Parties agree that implementation of UNGAR 194 shall be consistent with Israeli sovereignty and the Jewish Character of the State of Israel.

32. The Parties agree that a just settlement of the refugee problem should be governed by the above and based on the principal of un-coerced free individual choice among the options of return, compensation, resettlement and/or relocation as shall be determined in the PSA.

33. The Parties agree that an international mechanism with Israeli participation shall be established to design, manage and oversee the just implementation of these options. The structure and modus operandi, as well as the resources of this mechanism shall be agreed upon in the PSA.

VI. End of Claims

34. The Parties agree that all previous agreements between them shall remain in force unless or until superceded by new ones.

35. The full implementation of the provisions the PSA shall constitute a complete, conclusive and irrevocable resolution of all the issues emanating from the historic conflict.

8/2/01

Israel-Palestine Memorandum of Understanding

Preamble

The Government of the State of Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (hereinafter " the Parties"), having achieved significant progress in narrowing the differences between them on issues of final status, declare:

1. Their intention to resume negotiations at the soonest possible moment with the goal of completing a full and comprehensive Permanent Status Agreement ("hereinafter PSA") leading to a Treaty of Peace ("hereinafter " TOP") between them.
2. These negotiations shall be based on the mutually agreed objective of the full implementation of UNSCR 242 and 338, and shall be pursued within the framework of the Peace Process initiated at Madrid in October 1991, including the Declaration of Principles of September 1993 and all subsequent agreements between the parties.
3. The parties believe that a lasting peace must be built on moral legal and political equality between the two sides and equal consideration for each side's dignity, security, human rights, and national aspirations. The parties further believe that a durable and sustainable peace must leave no cause for future grievance or friction between them, and that the rights of one side cannot be attained at the expense of the other.
4. The parties believe that peace requires the transition from the logic of war and confrontation to the logic of peace and cooperation, and that acts and words appropriate to the state of war will no longer be appropriate or acceptable in the era of peace.
5. The parties agree that conclusion of this agreement reflects their decision to end the historic conflict between them and to raise no new claims on matters of final status after the conclusion of a TOP.

6. Based on the foregoing, the parties agree on the following Memorandum of Understanding(hereinafter "MOU"):

I. The State of Palestine

7. The parties view the establishment of the sovereign State of Palestine within agreed and recognised borders as the realization of the inalienable right of the Palestinian people to self-determination.

8. The Capital of the State of Palestine shall be al-Quds (as in " Jerusalem" below).

9. The State of Israel and the State of Palestine shall exchange full diplomatic relations with each other, and shall:

   a. Commit themselves to the peaceful resolution of all disputes between them.

   b. Undertake to refrain from intervention in each other's internal affairs or seek to represent citizens of the other side.

   c. Commit themselves to act in conformity with the UN Charter and the norms of International Law.

   d. Undertake to refrain from any action inconsistent with their decision to end the conflict between them.

II. Borders and Territory

10. The final border between the State of Israel and the State of Palestine shall be delineated on the basis of UNSCR 242 and the cease-fire lines of 1967 with mutual and equal modifications as shall be agreed in the PSA.

11. The territory of the State of Palestine shall be fully contiguous within the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and the territory of the State of Israel shall be fully contiguous.

12. An exclusive safe passage between the West Bank and Gaza Strip shall be established. The parties shall define the route and mode of implementation of this passage, as well as the establishment of local safe passages in the West Bank in the PSA.

13. In delineating borders and territories, the parties agree that utmost consideration should be given to minimising disruption to existing lines of communication and established ways of life in the Palestinian State.

14. The parties shall recognise the final agreed borders between them as permanent, irrevocable and inviolable and shall undertake to respect each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political and economic independence.

III. Security

15. The parties recognise each other's right to a secure existence free from threats of war, violence and terror.

16. The parties shall refrain from participating in any alliance of a potentially hostile nature aimed at either side.

17. The parties shall ensure that hostile third parties shall not be stationed on their territory, and that their territory shall not be used by any third party for threats or acts of aggression of any kind against either side.

18. All security agreements between the sides shall remain in force unless explicitly superseded by new ones. The State of Israel and the State of Palestine shall strengthen and intensify security cooperation and coordination between them via the full and ongoing implementation of these agreements.

19. The parties view the struggle against violence, incitement and terror as a mutual interest and agree to act accordingly.

20. The parties agree that the State of Palestine shall be a Non-Militarised state and shall be subject to agreed limitations on its military forces, as shall be consistent with Palestinian sovereignty and security.

21. The parties agree that security arrangements consistent with Israeli needs and Palestinian sovereignty shall be negotiated as part of the PSA. These arrangements shall define Israeli use of sovereign Palestinian airspace and shall include the establishment of an international security force with an agreed mandate and force structure.

22. The parties shall agree on the timetable and modalities of a final Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian territory.

IV. Jerusalem

23. Jerusalem shall be an open and undivided city.

24. There shall be two capitals in Jerusalem that shall serve as the seat of government and of embassies to the two sides:

    a. Al-Quds the Capital of the State of Palestine, shall include all Arab areas of East Jerusalem.

    b. Yerushalayim, the Capital of the State of Israel, shall include the Jewish areas of Jerusalem

25. The parties agree that the areas allotted to the two capitals shall be continuous and contiguous with free access and open lines of communication between the two capitals and their respective States.

26. Given the centrality of the Historic Holy Basin of Jerusalem to Judaism, Islam and Christianity, the parties agree to :

    a. Preserve the unique nature of this area:

    b. Ensure free access to its Holy Shrines:

    c. Refrain from any unilateral acts of excavation or archaeological digs in the area;

    d. Guarantee the security and sanctity of all Holy Sites

27. The parties agree that the PSA shall include a clear definition of the two capital areas and the Holy Basin, including the allocation of sovereignty, security, municipal services and functional responsibilities between the two sides.

V. Refugees

28. The parties agree that the resolution of the Palestinian refugee problem shall be based on the implementation of UNGAR 194 including the right of return and compensation as shall be determined in the PSA.

29. The parties agree that implementation of UNGAR 194 shall be consistent with Israeli sovereignty and the Jewish Character of the State of Israel.

30. The parties agree that a just settlement of the refugee problem should be based on the principal of un-coerced free individual choice from the options of return, compensation, resettlement and/or relocation as shall be determined in the PSA.

31. The parties agree that appropriate international mechanisms with Israeli participation shall be established to oversee the fair implementation of these options. The structure and modus operandi of these mechanisms shall be agreed in the PSA.

VI. Final Clause

32. The full implementation of the provisions of this MOA the PSA, and the TOP shall constitute a complete, conclusive and irrevocable resolution of all the issues addressed therein.

January 28, 2001

ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT

Preamble

- The Government of the State of Israel and the PLO representing the Palestinian people (hereinafter "the Parties");
- *Declaring* their determination to put an end to decades of conflict and confrontation, and to live in peaceful coexistence, mutual dignity and security;
- *Recognizing* that peace requires the transition from the logic of war and confrontation to the logic of peace and cooperation, and that acts and words appropriate to the state of war are no longer appropriate or acceptable in the era of peace;
- *Affirming* their deep belief that the logic of peace requires compromise, and that the cornerstone for a just settlement is the recognition that the Israeli and Palestinian people both have a strong attachment to the Holy Land, and that a mutually acceptable partition of this land is the only viable solution to the conflict;
- *Reaffirming* their belief that peace must be built on moral, legal and political equality between the two side, and equal consideration for each side's dignity, security, human rights and national aspirations;
- *Cognizant* of the fact that a durable and sustainable peace must leave no cause for future friction or grievance between the two sides, and that the rights of one side cannot be attained at the expense of the other;
- *Aware* of their historic responsibilities in bringing peace to the land sacred to the three great world religions;
- *Recognizing* each other's right and the right of their peoples to a peaceful existence within secure and recognized borders free from force or the threat of force;
- *Aiming* at the achievement of a just, lasting and comprehensive peace based on the full implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338;
- *Confirming* that this Memorandum of Agreement ("MOA") is concluded within the framework of the Middle East peace process initiated at Madrid in October 1991, and pursuant to The Declaration of Principles of September 1993 and the Letters of Mutual Recognition between Israel and the PLO of September 9, 1993, as well as all subsequent agreements and letters between the Parties thereafter;
- *Having* concluded an intensive, constructive and productive round of negotiations at Taba, Egypt;

- *Having* reached an unprecedented proximity of positions concerning the main issues involved in resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and launching an era of peace and cooperation between the two Peoples;

- *Determined* to bring these negotiations to an early successful conclusion with the signature of a Treaty of Peace (TOP);

Hereby agree as follows:

Continued Negotiations

1. The Parties to this MOA are committed to implementing immediately and without reservations the Sharm el-Sheikh Understandings of October 2000 appertaining to putting an end to violence and punitive counter measures and returning to security cooperation.

2. The Parties are committed to resume negotiations as soon as possible, but no later than on February 20, 2001.

3. The Parties intend to conduct these negotiations continuously, with the objective of reaching an agreement within the following 90 days, leading to the signature of a Treaty of Peace before the end of the year 2002.

4. In case these negotiations do not reach a conclusive outcome by mid-May 2001, the Parties shall:

   a. Continue negotiations for as long as shall be required;

   b. Undertake a concurrent effort to conclude within one month an agreement concerning the implementation of outstanding mutual commitments between them in a manner that further demonstrates the resolve to reach a TOP by the above target date.

5. Negotiations shall be governed by the mutually agreed objective of reaching a just, lasting and comprehensive peace based on the full implementation of UNSCR 242 and 338 and shall be pursued within the framework of the Peace Process initiated at Madrid in October 1991, including the Declaration of Principles (September 1993) and all subsequent agreements and letters between the Parties.

6. Specifically, the Parties acknowledge the contribution of the Ideas presented to the Parties by President Clinton on December 23, 2000, which have enabled the Parties to narrow the gaps and to identify agreed parameters.

7. Successful conclusion of the negotiations shall end the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and shall mark a new era of peace and cooperation whence neither party shall have any further claim on the other with regard to the conflict.

8. The negotiations between the Parties have concluded with a clear understanding of the main characteristics of the permanent status agreement, as described below.

Establishment of the State of Palestine:

9. The Parties view the establishment of the State of Palestine, within agreed and recognized borders, as the realization of the inalienable right of the Palestinian People to self-determination.

10. The Capital of the State of Palestine shall be Al-Quds (see "Jerusalem" below).

11. Upon the declaration on the establishment of the State of Palestine, the State of Israel and the State of Palestine shall extend full diplomatic recognition to each other, shall establish full diplomatic relations, and shall:

    a. Commit themselves to the peaceful resolution of all disputes between them;

    b. Undertake to refrain from interference or intervention in each other's internal affairs or seek to represent citizens of the other side;

    c. Commit themselves to act in conformity with the UN Charter and the norms of international law;

    d. Undertake to refrain from any action inconsistent with their decision to end the conflict between them.

Borders and Territory:

12. The final border between the State of Israel and the State of Palestine shall be delineated on the basis of UNSCR 242 and the pre-June 1967 Armistice Line, with modifications reflecting the spirit of the new era, as well as realities on the ground.

13. The State of Palestine shall have full sovereignty over the entire Gaza Strip, as well as over 95 percent of the West Bank.

14. Territories annexed to Israel and incorporating approximately 80 percent of the Israeli settlers, shall be compensated for by an equal swap of Israeli sovereign territory, accounting for such arrangements as defined in Article 15 below, and serving, inter alia, for Palestinian Refugee repatriation (see Article 37 below).

15. The Parties shall define the route, and mode of implementation of an Exclusive Passage linking the West Bank and Gaza, as well as of Local Safe Passages in the West Bank.

16. The territory of Palestine shall be fully contiguous within the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, respectively, and the territory of Israel shall be fully contiguous.

17. In implementing the provisions of this section, the Parties agree that utmost consideration should be given to minimizing disruption to existent lines of communication and established ways of life.

18. The Parties shall recognize the agreed borders as permanent, irrevocable and inviolable and shall undertake to respect each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political and economic independence.

Security:

19. Upon entry into force of this MOA all security coordination and cooperation mechanisms shall be resumed and shall continue their functions in an uninterrupted manner.

20. The Parties recognize each other's right to a secure existence, free from threats or acts of war and violence, as well as threats or acts of terror.

21. The Parties shall refrain from participating in any alliance of a potentially hostile nature towards either Party, and shall ensure that their sovereign territory shall not be used by any third party for act or threats of aggression against either Party.

22. All security agreements between the Parties shall remain in force unless explicitly substituted by new ones. The State of Israel and the State of Palestine shall strengthen and intensify security cooperation and coordination via the full and on-going implementation of these agreements.

23. Each Party views the struggle against violence, terrorism, insurgency and incitement as its own vital interest and shall maintain a policy of zero tolerance of threats or acts of violence or terror.

24. The State of Palestine shall be subject to agreed limitations on its military force structure, within the concept of a Non-Militarized State. The State of Palestine shall maintain a strong security force, whose structure, size, equipment, and mode of operation shall be agreed upon. Palestine shall not enter into agreements of a military nature without the approval of the two Parties, and shall not permit unauthorized security forces on its territory.

25. A multinational security-enhancing presence, to monitor and guarantee implementation of mutual obligations, shall be established, and stationed in the State of Palestine, inter alia, on its Eastern border. Its composition, size, deployment, funding and mandate, as well as its role in the context of temporary and limited Israeli military presence and emergency deployment, shall be defined by the Parties.

26. Without prejudice to Palestinian sovereignty, the Parties shall agree on the duration and size of Israeli military forces that shall remain in specified locations as well as on the definition and modalities of agreed emergency deployments.

27. The Parties shall also agree on the details of Israeli early warning stations, as well as on the relevant Palestinian liaison and international presence where applicable.

28. The Parties shall agree on the timetable and modalities of Israeli redeployment in and final withdrawal from the territory of Palestine.

29. The Parties shall define the modalities for Israeli use of Palestinian airspace and electro-magnetic spectrum in a manner that answers Israeli security needs without prejudice to Palestinian sovereignty.

Jerusalem:

30. Jerusalem shall be an open and undivided city.

31. In the area of Jerusalem there shall be two Capitals which shall serve as the Seat of Government and embassies of the two States, respectively, as follows:

    a. Al-Quds, the Capital of the State of Palestine, shall include all Arab-populated neighborhoods of East Jerusalem.

    b. Yerushalayim, the Capital of the State of Israel, shall include all Jewish-populated neighborhoods of Jerusalem.

32. Given the centrality of the Historic Basin to Judaism, Christianity and Islam, as well as in order to preserve its unique nature, secure freedom of access thereto and guarantee freedom of worship therein, the Parties agree that the Historic Basic shall be governed by a Special Regime.

33. The Historic Basin Special Regime (HBSR) shall be designed by the Parties so as to assure:

    a. The preservation of the prevailing religious Status Quo.

    b. Full Palestinian control over all sites holy to Islam and to Christianity;

    c. Full Israeli control over all sites holy to Judaism.

34. The HBSR shall include a clear definition of sovereign and/or functional responsibilities as pertaining to defined locations and/or specific interests.

Refugees:

35. Since 1948 the Palestinian yearning has been enshrined in the twin principles of the "Right of Return" and the establishment of an independent Palestinian State, deriving their basis from an interpretation of International Law. The realization of the aspirations of the Palestinian people, as recognized in this MOA, includes the exercise of the their right to self-determination and a comprehensive and just solution for the Palestinian Refugees. This program is thus to guarantee the future welfare and well-being of the refugees, thereby resolving the Refugee problem in all its aspects.

36. In delineating the detailed arrangements for resolving the Palestinian Refugee problem, the Parties shall be guided by the following:

    a. The aspiration of the Palestinian Refugees to return, relocate, resettle, or rehabilitate, and their economic needs for rehabilitation and compensation, as well as the related needs of Host Countries;

    b. The wish to return shall be implemented in a manner consistent with the existence of the State of Israel as the homeland for the Jewish People, and the establishment of the State of Palestine as the homeland for the Palestinian People;

    c. The program is to accord priority to the Palestinian Refugee population in Lebanon.

37. Accounting for the expressed preferences of the Palestinian Refugees, and as shall be elicited by the international mechanism, the wish to return as well as relocation, resettlement and rehabilitation can yield five possible places of permanent residence:

    a. Within a program of return to the State of Palestine

    b. Within a program of relocation to Israeli swapped territory

    c. Within a fifteen year absorption program to Israel

    d. Within present Host Countries

    e. Based on invitations extended by Third countries

38. Each Refugee may apply for compensation programs and rehabilitation assistance as shall be detailed. This will include overall development and assistance programs and compensation for property and assets, to which the International Community and Israel, shall be the principal contributors, respectively.

39. Once implemented, this program shall constitute a complete and final resolution of the Palestinian Refugee issue in all its aspects, and a complete implementation of Article II UNGAR 194.

End of Conflict and Finality of Claims:

40. The conclusion of this MOA reflects the decision of Israel and the PLO and all their agencies to end their historic conflict and to raise no new claims on matter of final status after the conclusion of a permanent status agreement.

41. The Parties agree that the implementation of each provision of the Permanent Status Agreement shall constitute a complete, conclusive and irrevocable resolution of the issues addressed in that provision.

42. The Parties agree that all previous agreements between them shall remain in force unless or until specifically they are substituted for new ones.

43. The provisions of the MOA shall enter into force immediately upon ratification.

44. The Parties undertake to submit this MOA for ratification to their respective competent institutions no later than February 14, 2001.